Barbara H. Stein & Stanley J. Stein

Crisis in an Atlantic Empire

Spain and New Spain, 1808–1810

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Crisis in an Atlantic Empire

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Crisis in an Atlantic Empire

Spain and New Spain 1808–1810

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To the memory of

Clarence H. Haring and Lewis Hanke
Melville and Frances Herskovits
Charles Wagley and Howard F. Cline
Dana G. Munro and Joseph R. Strayer

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Contents

Preface ix

Prologue 1

Part One: Metropole

1. A National Drama, Act II: Aranjuez 7
2. Bayonne 45
3. Dos de Mayo: Insurgency 75
4. Sevilla: The Struggle for Supremacy in Spain and New Spain 94

Part Two: Colony

5. A Contested Authority 131
6. New Spain's Cuban Counterpoint 162
7. The Powerful and Insecure: Mexico City's *Almaceneros*, 1808 191
8. The Audiencia de México, Iturrigaray, and Talamantes 214
9. Melchor Talamantes: *Criollo* Exponent of New Spain's Interests 240
10. Sevilla's *Comisionados* and Mexico City's Juntas 256

11. Viceroy Iturrigaray: *Criollos* and a Viceroy's Grand Design 296
12. Anatomy of a Colonial Coup d'État: Mexico City, 1808 325

Part Three: Metropole

13. Junta de Sevilla, Consejo de Castilla, and the Genesis of the Junta Central 361
14. Junta Central: Ideologues and Ideology 378
15. Junta Central versus Junta de Sevilla: The Colonial Question 403
16. Financing the Resistance in Spain 430
17. Dissolution of the Junta Central 454
18. Regencia and Junta de Cadiz 466
19. The Pivotal *Orden* of 17 May 1810 490
20. Colonial Insurrection and the Call for the Cortes 529

Part Four: Colony

21. An Eroding Colonial System: New Spain, 1808–1810 555
22. Fissures in the Colonial Elite: Merchants 572
23. Fire under the Embers: Between Preemptive Coup and Insurrection 587
24. The Regencia's *Comisionados* and Bishop-Elect Abad y Queipo 614
25. *Oprimidos y Opresores* 631
26. "No Hay Más Recurso Que Ir a Coger Gachupines" 653

Conclusion 661

Notes 665
Bibliography 759
Index 773

Preface

In previous volumes it has been a pleasure to acknowledge the generous financial support of many organizations and institutions for research abroad in Mexico, Spain, and France. Now it is appropriate to acknowledge the never-failing cooperation of Princeton University: deans of the faculty, the Committee on Regional Studies, and latterly the University's Committee on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences; the ever-patient divisions of Firestone Library—Circulation, Rare Books, and Manuscripts; the Visual Resources Collection of the Department of Art and Archaeology; Francisco Fonseca (Collections Development), who prepared the final version of the bibliography; and the support of chairmen and secretarial staff of the History Department, in particular Pamela Long for meticulous editing while retyping the manuscript. I am grateful to Suzanne Flinchbaugh, my acquisitions editor at Hopkins, and to Brian MacDonald, who copyedited the manuscript. And one further note: the authors are honored that this country's oldest university press has handled our now four studies of imperialism and merchants.

Over years of research and writing, Barbara and I have always been encouraged by the interest and advice of family and friends: our gratitude is boundless.

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Crisis in an Atlantic Empire

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Prologue

War at sea had shaped the contours of the Atlantic since 1500, and in the two years between 1808 and 1810 of Spain's "first" empire it was decisive. The sea linked the plantation economy of the Caribbean and the silver mines of New Spain to Europe: it was the maritime highway for trade between Spanish, French, and English metropoles and their American colonies, carrying manufactures and millions of African slaves westward, and silver, sugar, rum, coffee, and indigo eastward.

The Atlantic was the origin of imperialism. Since the middle of the sixteenth century, silver from Peru and New Spain had supported Spain in Europe; in 1800 Spain's empire in America was "old" but as profitable as the "new" empires of its competitors. New streams of silver from Guanajuato and Zacatecas in New Spain were indispensable for the wartime economies of Spain, France, and England in these years of constant continental conflict to suppress revolution in France, then confront French imperialism in Europe.

This is a macroscopic view much simplified; a microscopic scan is more complicated. In the British colonies in North America after the Seven Years' War, the financial costs of warfare ignited resistance, then insurrection and the first independence movement in the western Atlantic. Might it provide a model for colonies in Middle and South America, for instance, in the populous and profitable colony of New Spain and its viceregal capital at Mexico City containing more than 100,000 inhabitants, the largest urban concentration in America? With the clarity of hindsight we can follow how renewal of warfare in the Atlantic after the elimination of the Franco-Hispanic fleet off Gibraltar created a financial and political crisis in the Atlantic's oldest, deeply rooted colonial empire.

For three hundred years, a handful of Europeans from Spain (*peninsu-*

lares/europeos), augmented by those born in the colonial privileged classes (*criollos/americanos*), managed to rule over, and effectively govern, a regenerating native population stretching from central New Spain to the central valley of Chile. By 1808 Spain's empire in America rested on two large viceroyalties: Peru and New Spain. The latter was larger in population (over 6 million), and the most productive (it minted in 1800 on average 20 million pesos/dollars annually); it was the empire's largest trading partner in exchanges through the Caribbean and across the Atlantic between Veracruz and almost exclusively Cadiz.

Tension between *peninsular* and *criollo* elites in this as in other colonies was hardly a novel phenomenon. What *was* novel were seismic shifts in the Atlantic economy and the balance of power among Europe's hegemons, England and France. The shifts were a complex of factors: Europe's demand for the primary products of the Caribbean islands and New Spain's silver pesos; pressure on Spain's transatlantic system of managed trade—a formal monopoly—from English, French, and U.S. export merchants hoping to operate at Veracruz; and—the most decisive factor—restiveness among elements of the *criollo* elite seeking, from Madrid (and, ultimately, Cadiz), among other issues, a more open trading system (*comercio libre*). New Spain's elites concentrated in their great capital city sought growth with stability, and—low in priority—some administrative autonomy to respond to unexpected external developments in the metropole of the empire, the peninsula.

Colonial authorities like their counterparts in Madrid could not overlook the restiveness of the colony's landholding and mining interests, informed during the previous decade by foreign journals, personal and business correspondence, and the official, doctored press of unsettling changes abroad. Most unsettling were those events in revolutionary France of the 1790s: uncontrolled peasant movements, the transition from "absolute" to constitutional monarchy, anticlericalism, and vicious civil war of province against "nation" (the Vendée)—and, in the aftermath, French imperialism and stability under a young army officer of political ambition, insight, and decisiveness. They could not ignore, moreover, New Spain's neighbor across the Mississippi, former colony and now independent nation, growth-oriented and expansionist, the United States.

Tension between New Spain and Spain, colony and metropole, could be managed, providing government and society in the peninsula—bureaucracy, territorial aristocracy, clerical establishment, armed forces, and small influential merchant bourgeoisie in the colonial trades at Cadiz and Sevilla—remained unified in confronting crisis. Early in 1808, however, unity was

fractured when the metropolitan government had to confront occupation by French armed forces, along with a commander who hoped to modernize Spain's administration while preserving privilege and granting French export interests direct participation in Spain's transatlantic monopoly—so Napoleon Bonaparte promised Bordeaux merchants on his way to meet Spain's royal family at Bayonne in 1808.

Bonaparte's designs brought to the surface a cleavage in Spain's governing elite that widened after 1789 under Charles IV and his leading minister, Manuel Godoy. On one side were those convinced that the values and institutions of an imagined halcyon *monarquía* should be restored by any means; on the other were enlightened (*ilustrado*) critics who were in general reform-minded and wary of popular participation, potential violence, and "anarchy." And among the *ilustrados* was a faction—some, weary of half-hearted efforts of reform, willing if necessary to cooperate with external forces to eliminate privilege in politics and society, and equally distrustful of the *populacho*. They welcomed French support of their goals: opponents would dismiss them as *afrancesados*. On one issue, *fernandistas* and the varieties of *ilustrados* were united. Both parties would keep intact Spanish colonialism across the Atlantic. This was unquestioned, although some reformers in the peninsula might under duress experiment with limited change in the transatlantic system to accommodate influential Cuban sugar interests in wartime.

Overseas in America the situation was far more explosive. Would groups among the elites of the colony of New Spain—mine owners, *hacendados*, *ilustrados* among the native-born clergy—back the status quo as passive observers of the shocking unraveling of authority in the metropole? Would some of the elite, bewildered by provincial juntas in the metropole competing to represent nation and empire, find an opportunity to modify the colonial system by creating an interim autonomy to push through local adjustments until the metropole was liberated and an acceptable government installed at Madrid? If elements of New Spain's elites rejected an appeal from the Junta de Sevilla (where Cadiz merchants were influential) to recognize its authority and chose instead autonomy, would the constellation of those determined to preserve the status quo in the colony—*audiencia*, *peninsular* merchants, army officers—tolerate even the suspicion of autonomy? More to the point, might autonomy inevitably drift to independence, as in England's North American colonies between 1765 and 1776?

Crisis in the metropole quickly became crisis in the empire. It began with the failed coup d'état against Godoy at the Escorial in late 1807, erupted with the successful coup d'état at Aranjuez the following March, and in

September of 1808 imperiled centuries of Spanish rule in the empire's richest colony, New Spain.

Put in other terms, this study examines an accumulation of countervailing elements in a spasm of imperial crisis. It is about the collective mind-set of imperialists in Spain and its major colony, New Spain, as the civil service at home and in the colony struggled to preserve traditional structures of exchange—Spain's transatlantic trade system—with Caribbean ports at Veracruz and Havana in wartime after 1804; about how Madrid handled powerful metropolitan and colonial interests in trade and in its civil service as these sectors of its political class struggled to preserve their metropole's gothic edifice of established structures and hallowed values that emphasized kinship, religion, and self-interest. It studies external challenges and the calculations behind imperial responses: fissions in the political class over expedients—choosing as ally a lesser evil, England or France; preserving the status quo with regime change or changing the Napoleonic authoritarianism of French liberalism. It is about trade and hegemony, about the contest between free trade and monopoly trade, ultimately about hegemony in the Atlantic at the beginning of the nineteenth century and the onset of the imperialism of free trade.

In essence, it is about merchants—an enduring and influential interest group, both imperialist and transatlantic—and their politics of preservation.

1. A National Drama, Act II: Aranjuez

Los ministros del rey estaban ya ganados por los conspiradores . . . temían participar de mi desgracia si no se daban prisa a abandonarme y a dar pruebas de ser contrarios míos concurriendo al gran plan que la facción traía entre manos . . . veía en ellos cierta manera de mostrarse y de tratarme semejante al que tiene un heredero que está ansiando el último suspiro del que muere. Godoy, *Memorias*

Rara tendencia y concordancia, esperando los unos que en el reinado de aquel Príncipe cesarian las medidas y las cargas que pesaban sobre las clases superiores: y los otros que pondrían mano poderosa en las reformas radicales. Godoy, *Memorias*

Al primer revés que experimente, tendrá el recurso del mar, de América, y España sin sus colonias es una carga. Tournon to Napoleon, Burgos, 16 March 1808

During the winter of 1807–1808, the events of the previous October cast a lengthening shadow over the Iberian Peninsula. As the internal political crisis precipitated by the Escorial affair (October 1807) deepened, the consequences of the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1807) took shape in the occupation of Portugal and key points in Spain between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. Although the two developments were played out in different settings, they would prove closely related in causation and consequence.

The significance of the Escorial affair may be perceived as true theater on different levels. On one level, it reveals the profound political crisis confronting the Spanish government and the determination of factions around the Prince of Asturias, Fernando, to unseat Prime Minister Godoy and—some suspected—initiate policy reversals. On another level, the manner of publication showed the public the intent of elements in high echelons of government to involve a popular audience in a morality play where—to use a simile then current—Fernando figured as the Prince of Light. Godoy

was Lucifer, and Fernando's mentor, Juan de Escoiquiz, was the archangel. On yet another level, one may detect in this conjunctural crisis the emergence on the political stage of crisis managers and their subordinates who operated through informal networks outside and inside formal structures of power. At this last level, analysis of the genesis, actors, and aftermath of the Escorial episode may provide understanding of the way major interest groups within Spain's old regime mustered the will and strength to protect themselves and preserve society, the state, and empire of which they formed an integral part.

The Escorial Affair

Oversimplified, the drama of El Escorial revolved around removing the royal couple's confidant and virtual prime minister, Manuel Godoy, by a cabal of aristocrats, clergy, military officers, and high civil servants and subsequently forcing the abdication of Charles and María in order to crown Prince Fernando.

As prime minister, Godoy was overwhelmed by interconnected issues. In hesitant fashion, he had sided with the surviving *proyectistas* of the era of Charles—*ilustrados* like Jovellanos and Meléndez Valdés whose hopes for delayed change disturbed traditionalists (in the *partido aristocrático* headed by grandees Infantado and Orgaz) fearful of revolutionary currents at home and abroad. Particularly disturbing were perceived threats to Spain's colonies in the Caribbean, which lacked effective defenses against potential amphibious operations by English forces against Veracruz, Havana, or Cartagena after the naval disasters off Cape St. Vincent (1797) and Trafalgar (1805), and—no less troublesome—by French commercial groups pressing Bonaparte for trading access to Mexico's silver and consumers. Godoy and his ministers grasped both the strategy and the tactics of Europe's hegemons: after 1797, Godoy's policy seemed to rely on a French ally in blocking English pressure. Spain and Godoy were between two grindstones.

To break the impasse, the *grandes* moved first, aiming to oust Godoy: they used Fernando and his mentor Juan de Escoiquiz to plan a palace coup, just as the antireformist groups had engineered the removal of Esquilache in 1766 and, in the 1790s, Aranda. The Madrid public quickly learned not only of the attempted coup to remove Godoy and then the royal family but also of an imminent trial by the Consejo de Castilla and cabinet ministers (30 October 1807). A few days later came another decree (6 November) incriminating Fernando's mentor Escoiquiz, the instrument of aristocrats

Infantado, Orgaz, Ayerbe, and Bornos. To mask the affair, Charles IV pardoned his heir and son, Fernando, and "cleared" the would-be high-level *golpistas*, but it revealed a weakened Bourbon monarchy and Prime Minister Godoy as the target of an ongoing conspiracy. Spain's civil society was splintering, and Godoy's ministry collapsing.

The canonical view of the Escorial affair was publicized at the time and rejuvenated later by Juan de Escoiquiz, Pedro Cevallos, and others.[1] Its focus: the presumed ambition, venality, and sheer ineptitude of Godoy, whose alleged "despotic" power derived from the weakness of an aging king and an unavowable relationship with a queen willing to disenfranchise her oldest son. Only the courage of a handful of loyal subjects, according to this view, promised the restoration of the government's "legitimacy" by removing Godoy and liberating Fernando and the nation from his "oppression." A secondary focus presents a clear indication of Bonaparte's intention to exploit a rift within the royal family in order to replace the Bourbons with one of his family. In this traditional interpretation, a major player, Juan de Escoiquiz, appears as well intentioned although misguided, an unwitting instrument of French aggression, even as a covert Bonapartist.

This interpretation, despite superficial plausibility based on Godoy's progressive empowerment by Charles, his growing unpopularity in some quarters, France's search for a political lever in Spain's politics, and Bonaparte's hostility to all Bourbons, questions the rationale of the whole episode. For one thing, it is incredible that the Francophobic *fernandistas* abruptly opted for a French solution to the profound crisis of monarchy and empire in late 1807, or that the Francophobic faction that had surrounded Fernando's deceased wife (*partido de la señorita*) became a Francophile faction behind Fernando himself. After all, *fernandista* criticism of Godoy emphasized Godoy's presumed reconciliation with the Directoire in what they considered the "humiliating" treaty of peace at Basle (1795) and the "impolitic" Franco-Spanish alliance that followed. For the realignment had led to war with England and Portugal and—more serious—to interrupted trade with the American colonies and the sharp drop in silver receipts, to the financial drain of a disastrous subsidy to France, to the sacrifice of Spain's naval forces operating with those of France, to Godoy's ill-concealed threat to mobilize against an unnamed enemy in 1806 (France), and more recently to the Treaty of Fontainebleau and to a joint occupation of Portugal via the passage of French troops through northwest Spain. The real criticism of Godoy, however, was neither ambition nor immorality but rather incapacity to counter the policy of Spain's ally, France. His major shortcoming was

his evident inability to prevent what to many was the imminent French occupation of Spain and the consequent loss of contact with the colonies, even their loss.

Furthermore, it is implausible that *fernandistas* believed that merely the proposed marriage of Fernando to a Bonaparte would permit the French government to institute changes in Spain that would impact influential Spanish interest groups, particularly the privileged elites—aristocratic and clerical as well as bureaucratic—circling Fernando. Bonaparte's scorn for Spain's grandees was well known. Worse, such an alliance by marriage might lead to French domination of Spain and induce London to move overseas against the now isolated Spanish colonies in America.

Which raises *the* question: What then was the purpose of inviting French intervention in Spain's domestic affairs in order to remove Godoy at the moment when French troops entering Spain were supposed to strengthen the French alliance?

The opening gambit of the Escorial was Fernando's curious private letter (11 October) to Bonaparte requesting protection against Godoy and marriage to someone of the House of Bonaparte. It was delayed until 20 October just prior to the signing of the Treaty of Fontainebleau and three days after French forces began to move toward Portugal through northwest Spain. Calculated to arrive at Paris as the way opened for the occupation of Portugal and a French bridgehead in Spain, the 11 October letter has been considered crucial: it offered Bonaparte a mechanism for removing the Spanish Bourbons, an idea he had harbored since at least 1804.

French forces were feared ever since they had moved into Spain's northern provinces briefly in 1794 and again in 1801 on the road to Portugal. Now they would occupy Portugal but force the Portuguese monarchs to flee to refuge overseas in the colony of Brazil. In addition, the *fernandista* faction foresaw an asymmetrical conflict with omnipotent France and unavoidable disastrous consequences for the Spanish Empire, but the appearance of a new symbol of unity. There was the possibility in the letter's request for Bonaparte's protection of Fernando that, with Godoy gone, Fernando might serve as a new center of power, a fresh symbol of national unity. Cynics in Madrid's political society no doubt interpreted the marriage element as a ploy, surely to be rejected by Charles IV and Bonaparte, which led Escoiquiz to justify the marriage proposal.[2] Much intelligence about the political situation at Madrid may well have been supplied by Escoiquiz in frequent, private discussions with French ambassador François de Beauharnais (brother-in-law of Bonaparte's wife, Joséphine), who reported to Talleyrand and his successor Champagny. This misinformation created, above

all, a dangerous misperception of the Spanish politics that the aristocratic cabal around Fernando aimed to imprint on the ingenuous, gullible French diplomat.

For instance, in mid-July 1807 Beauharnais described Godoy as "craintif, timide, ignorant à l'excès, cupide au supreme degree et insatiable; seul, il possède Presque tout l'or des deux Espagnes . . . faux . . . incapable d'avoir un plan." Overall, "Toute l'Espagne désire un autre ordre de choses . . . et espère que l'Empereur des Français daigneras l'occuper un jour de ce pays, pour remettre chaque chose à sa place." Although Beauharnais never met Fernando, he reported Fernando as "généralement aimé" who showed "indifférence et une sorte de simplicité" and "la prudence, de l'honneur mais il est forcé de dissimuler pour éviter les persecutions." Later Beauharnais informed Talleyrand that Fernando was inclined to "se délivrer tôt ou tard du joug" and be supported by aristocrats like the conde de Bornos and the duque del Infantado, clear signs of their readiness to move against Godoy. Only weeks before the Escorial affair was publicized, French foreign minister Champagny asked Beauharnais to clarify his often-cryptic reports. Though Beauharnais's immediate replies do not appear in French archives, he tried to justify unauthorized relations with Escoiquiz and other *fernandistas*, noting that he responded to Escoiquiz's repeated advances, resolved "de ne pas devoir laisser echapper une occasion de servir mon souverain, en prenant connaissance des sentiments, et du caractère de l'héritierde la couronne." Observing Escoiquiz, his marital status, "exemplary" life, and "fatherly" benevolence for Fernando, he was convinced that Escoiquiz was a reliable source of information. After all, he once concluded, "Dans la supposition . . . que cet homme fût un intrigant, que resultait-il de facheux? Rien." There was no incriminating evidence, "ni lettres, ni preuves, ni témoins, ni même un mot à répéter."

Receipt of Fernando's 11 October letter apparently convinced the group around Bonaparte that the option of changing Spain's heads of state, a dynastic substitution if not regime change, was possible. Bonaparte declared Fernando was under his protection but omitted reference to a marriage. On the other hand, henceforth *fernandistas* publicized that Bonaparte was supporting Fernando against Godoy and favored a possible marriage. So French forces en route to Portugal via northwestern Spain could be viewed as a prelude to the end of Godoy's influence and, at last, to profound changes.

That the Escorial affair modified Bonaparte's approach to intervention in Spain is no longer seriously questioned. The record suggests, however, that officials in the French Foreign Ministry sensed that the affair involved a

hidden Spanish agenda that might counter French intervention. In January 1808, a troubled Foreign Minister Champagny wrote Beauharnais for more details because he found "quelque chose de mystérieux"—probably because contradictory intelligence was coming from other sources at Madrid. When Beauharnais's response proved unsatisfactory, Champagny turned to Spain's representative at Paris, Izquierdo, to request he leave immediately for Madrid and return with the clarification Bonaparte demanded, the trial proceedings, and the aristocrats and civil servants involved. By that time, however, events in Spain reduced the tactical options available to the French. Later it became clear that Escoiquiz's off-the-record exchanges with Beauharnais designed to invite external intervention had been at the root of Bonaparte's "politica péculiar"—as Cevallos would entitle it years later.

Within Spain, the isolation of Manuel Godoy grew apparent. Publicity, a signal, novel feature of the Escorial affair from the publication of Charles's decrees of 30 October and 5 November (one accusing Fernando of treason, the other granting a conditional pardon), increased as the trial of his collaborators got under way in November and continued in December. Though officially secret, the hearings were selectively leaked by those involved as well as by the Escorial's Jeronymite monks in daily contact with the defendants. Rumors accused Godoy of initiating the trial for his own ends. In January the verdict of innocence was hailed, while the defendants' banishment—despite the judicial restoration of their rights and privileges—was viewed as further proof of what they labeled Godoy's "tyranny." His days in power appeared numbered as the public fixation on Fernando intensified and rumors of his expected marriage to a relative of the emperor of the French gained credence.

Now Godoy's long-standing enemies among the integrated conservative elites of aristocracy, bureaucracy, and clergy were joined by advocates of French-model reform (*ilustrados*), who saw in Bonaparte's "protection" of Fernando the chance for progressive change in Spain under authoritarian auspices. "Rara tendencia y concordancia," Godoy later acutely observed, "esperando los unos que en el reinado de aquel Princípe cesarían las medidas y las cargas que pesaban sobre las clases superiores; y los otros que pondrían mano poderosa en las reformas radicales."[3] For differing reasons, traditionalists and reformers alike welcomed rumors that French troops were on their way to execute Napoleon's decision to remove Godoy, sanction Fernando's marriage to his niece, and even to place him on the throne. To some, Fernando's accession would end the sale of the properties of pious foundations of the church made obligatory by the process of Consolidación, initiated in 1798. Others trusted that "le Grand Napoléon change-

rait l'administration de ce pays, . . . nous donnant son code, . . . nous délivrant des obstacles, des entraves dont tout est surchagé . . . [des] rentes excessives des chanoines, des éveques, etc."[4] While *fernandista* networks throughout Spain intensified their campaign against the *privado*, Godoy's supporters drifted away, alienated by his "ineptitude" and venality revealed in the proceedings of the Escorial and the Treaty of Fontainebleau. Many feared supporting a fading leader, while others saw the entry of French troops into the peninsula as Spain's sole bulwark against an expected English landing.[5]

Foreign Minister Pedro Cevallos appeared to confirm public expectations by reiterating Spain's "close alliance and intimate friendship" with the emperor of the French. As for the projected marriage, Charles IV seemed to sanction the proposition of Escoiquiz and Beauharnais when he advised Napoleon in mid-November it would be welcome provided it met Bonaparte's approval. Again he assured him of "unalterable determination" to observe faithfully all Spain's treaties with France. As an "old ally and friend, whose loyalty had been proven over time," Charles emphasized he would "never allow any event . . . complaint or other reason whatsoever to interfere or separate him from so beneficial a friendship and alliance."[6] The message was clear enough: Bonaparte could count on Charles.

By the end of 1807, official sanction and *fernandista* propaganda had apparently worked a surprising about-face in Spanish attitudes toward France. Beauharnais, who only a few months earlier had accused the Spanish government of making no effort to silence Anglophiles who claimed that the "enmity of the English cost Spain less than the friendship of France" and asserted that in the Spanish Foreign Office Anglomania was "en vogue comme un grace d'état," now hailed the remarkable transformation engendered by the forthcoming alliance by marriage.[7] "La haine pour les Français semble en cette occasion avoir été comme par magie convertie dans un amour franc et sincère," an impressionable Beauharnais wrote Champagny. Before the Escorial, he explained, Spanish opinion had been strongly anti-French; among France's bitterest enemies had been "tous les lettrés, les gens de loi, la majeure parti des médecins, quelques jeunes ecclésiastiques"—all the professional class disappointed at the outcome of the revolution in France. The groups that had opposed the revolution from the outset—most of Spain's clergy secular and regular, the high civil service and military elites, the upper nobility, and "two-thirds" of the merchants—had been driven to Francophobia and united by nationalism. They felt that only a minority of enlightened Spaniards who lamented the misfortunes of their country looked to Bonaparte for improvement. Now all—"noblesse, militaires,

commerce, clergé, magistrats, litérateurs"—joined in opposition to Godoy; they awaited deliverance by the "mains puissantes, protectrices, bienfaisantes" of Napoleon.[8] Beauharnais was oddly uncritical of the rapid reversal of public opinion toward France.

Late in December Beauharnais's views were reinforced by a personal and perceptive agent of Bonaparte, Claude Phélipe de Tournon, sent to Madrid to reassess elite opinion. He echoed Beauharnais, writing that "les malheurs de M. le prince des Asturies l'avaient rendu l'idole de la nation, que le prince de la Paix en étoit regardé comme un tyran et le partisan des Anglois." In a long interview with Charles IV and the queen, they had spoken to him at length of their attachment to Napoleon. Of Fernando he could only say that he had happened upon him in the company of "a few officials and monks" in the library of the Escorial Palace, but that the prince quickly excused himself. "Le genre de vie que mènent les Infants d'Espagne n'est pas propre à les faire bien connaître"; he noted, however, that Fernando "a eu une assez bonne éducation dirigée par un ecclésiastique d'origine française." Had Tournon spoken to Escoiquiz? Of Godoy, again echoing Beauharnais, he wrote that "cet homme qui depuis 17 ans gouverne l'Espagne avec un despotisme dont on n'a aucune idée hors de la péninsule . . . on peut dire avec vérité, que l'astuce, la souplesse et l'intrigue composent tout son mérite." Aside from crass ignorance, Godoy's avarice was incalculable: "On ne peut évaluer ses richesses . . . il dispose de toutes les finances sans rendre compte." The time was ripe, Tournon ended, for French intervention in Spain under the aegis of the Prince of Asturias. Backed by thirty thousand troops, Godoy could be offsided, and Charles IV moved to resign or make his son regent.[9] The informants of Tournon and Beauharnais were clearly angling to remove Godoy, if necessary, with French intervention.

There was another French informant who claimed to enjoy Beauharnais's confidence and surpassed the ambassador's dithyrambic views and Tournon's gullible hyperbole. In November, Chabannes, a Bordeaux merchant residing at Madrid with eyes on the American colonies, wrote both Champagny and Talleyrand assuring them that the proposed marriage would make Spain "l'allié le plus fidèle, et qu'une politique adroit peut rendre le plus utile au Commerce, à l'industrie, et à la richesse de la France." This scenario could be accomplished by the abdication of Charles IV ("qui a déjà voulu plusieurs fois abdiquer la Couronne") as well as the "disappearance" of Godoy and, with him, "all English influence."

Thus the French would control Spain's ministry and—logical conclusion for a Bordeaux exporter—"pourrait faire participer la France à toutes les richesses de l'Amérique." This merchant's vision would be embraced

by Bonaparte. Anglophile Godoy, however, was a threat, and, he warned, "le nom du prince des Asturies est nécessaire en ce moment à la conservation de l'Amérique, et si l'Espagne restait sous la domination du prince de la Paix, ou passait subitement sous une domination étrangère, il serait fort à craindre que les colonies espagnoles ne se rendisse indépendentes et n'ouvrirent leurs ports au anglais."[10] Chabannes did not lack foresight.

It is difficult to believe that Bonaparte and his circle fully trusted such views of the advantages of the proposed marriage. Well before the Escorial affair, Napoleon had been suspicious of Beauharnais's involvement in Spanish court intrigues, fed perhaps by the English.[11] Now, responding to further questions from Paris, Beauharnais reasserted that he had issued instructions, forwarding "les rapports les plus positifs et surtout exempts de cette partialité coupable dont les suites sont souvent incalculables." His purpose as ambassador, he observed, was to "adoucir les esprits aigris, tempérer l'exaltation, réunir les factions opposées, arrêter peutêtre une guerre intestine"—hardly the role of a presumably disengaged diplomat.[12] Beauharnais saw no inconsistency between denunciations of Godoy as a traitor and enemy of France and his own advocacy of Fernando, whose aristocratic backers he had recently denounced for Francophobia and who were probably his main source of information.[13] One suspects that Napoleon, who as a rule did not underrate opponents, concurred with his brother-in-law Murat, who also believed that enthusiasm for Fernando derived mainly from the proposed marriage to a relative of Napoleon.[14] However unfounded the belief, evidently it facilitated France's initially uncontested military penetration of Spain.

Bonaparte's initial reaction to the Escorial concerned its possible effect on the Franco-Spanish occupation of Portugal agreed upon at Fontainebleau.[15] Although promptly reassured on that score by Godoy and Ambassador Izquierdo, and by Spain's ratification of the treaty, uncertainty about the situation at Madrid further justified reinforcement of French forces in the peninsula. Napoleon left for Italy in mid-November, confident that Lisbon would soon fall to Junot. With Napoleon's power and prestige at their apogee, the occupation of England's dependent state on the European continent and the removal of the Braganza dynasty seemed ineluctable and a foregone conclusion. Of no less importance, the operation would give France a strategic military position in northern Spain and enhance its political leverage at Madrid.

Although these objectives would be realized over the next three months, they revealed flaws in conception and execution with short- as well as long-term consequences never envisaged by Napoleon and his advisers. Occupa-

tion by a foreign power invariably produces unintended consequences, in part the result of following delusion rather than reality.

Regime Change: Portugal

The occupation of Portugal was poorly thought out, ill-prepared, and hastily executed.[16] Originally scheduled to leave Bayonne on 1 September when Portugal rejected France's first ultimatum, Junot's troops did not leave France until two weeks after the rejection of the second ultimatum (1 October). Delayed by military unpreparedness and diplomatic maneuvering, Junot's army finally entered Spain on 18 October after Napoleon learned of Portugal's capitulation to French demands but well before the treaty authorizing the joint Franco-Spanish invasion and partition of Portugal was initialed at Fontainebleau and ratified at Madrid. Junot's forces were inside northern Spain when he learned that Portugal was at war with England, but nonetheless he was directed to accelerate his movement to Lisbon in order to arrive by 1 December, whether as friend or foe.[17]

Napoleon's haste at last to initiate Junot's operations was probably inspired by fear that Portuguese capitulation to French demands might justify Madrid in withdrawing from the planned occupation.[18] In fact, Charles IV, partly at the behest of his reigning daughter and son-in-law at Lisbon, had appealed to Bonaparte to reconsider the invasion of Portugal, warning of the effect on Spain's American colonies. Thus, the French government's disregard of international protocol, the delayed implementation of the Portuguese operation (providing time for the Portuguese and Spanish courts to take defensive measures), and, above all, the French government's disregard of the possible consequences of its peninsular strategy would impair the success and mar the image of Napoleon's "liberating" Iberian enterprise in the short and long term. The reasoning of the Spanish government was sound.

In the event, Junot's army of young conscripts proved inadequately prepared and equipped for the climate, the rugged terrain, and the lack of resources it experienced on the Iberian Peninsula. Moreover, poorly briefed on his mission, Junot was unprepared for problems involved in its execution. French plans called for what was in effect an army of occupation assisted by local Portuguese or Spanish units and a clear hierarchy of command. Initially uncertain whether to command or obey the Spanish military, Napoleon's instructions soon clarified that the Spanish military role would be marginalized.[19] Coordination between French and Spanish commands and Madrid had received little attention, complicated by

failure to establish the exchange rate of the franc in provisioning French troops. Fontainebleau assigned responsibility for provisioning French units in transit to the Spanish government, which in turn was expected to order provincial authorities to deliver supplies subject to reimbursement by the central government. Predictably, performance failed to meet French expectations; they soon began to commandeer food and animals for transport. Junot complained that Godoy, whose "zeal had flagged for some time," had failed to solve such problems.[20] In this situation, Junot concluded that, given Spain's resources, provisions had to come from France; he predicted that the problem would be exacerbated in Portugal by the government's decision to close its ports, which would require long, difficult transport overland.[21]

Portugal's delayed capitulation to French demands became another source of Junot's uncertainty. If he were to find Portugal's Prince Regent João in Lisbon, as he still thought likely, what should he do with him and the royal family?[22] Napoleon's response was prompt and explicit. Junot was to accelerate his march in order to arrive in time to seize the Portuguese fleet; for this purpose, Napoleon had ordered twenty naval officers to leave secretly for Lisbon. As for the prince regent, who now might be expected to receive the French as "auxiliaires," Junot was instructed to "faire connâitre au prince-régent qu'il doit se rendre en France," to convince him to go willingly if possible and provide an escort (*commission*) of French officers—in fact, his guard. All Braganzas who had a claim to the throne along with potentially troublesome notables should be sent to Bayonne; a part of the Portuguese army should be ordered to France and enter the service of the emperor of the French.[23] In early November 1807, this was a foretaste of French strategy for Spain.

Although Junot, "sensing the importance of taking Lisbon," questioned Napoleon's assessment of the difficulties involved, he decided to cut his marching time to Lisbon by ten days.[24] The difficulties were not envisioned. Shortening the route by crossing the desolate Serra de Gata between Salamanca and the Tagus provided a foretaste of the hazards French forces would later encounter in the rest of the peninsula: few and poor roads, lack of food, steady rain, and snow. At Alcántara near the Portuguese border on 19 November, Junot encountered Spanish officials uninformed and then incredulous that he was en route to Lisbon; they could provide no reliable maps or information about Portugal, or anyone who spoke Portuguese. Once inside Portugal his exasperation increased. Without rations since Alcántara, his troops were famished and worn out. Many succumbed to fatigue; others were assassinated for pillaging. Because Spanish authorities

had failed to arrange provisions for the march, hungry troops seized stores of wine, many dying of "une ivresse affreuse." But, he added hopefully, once in the "magnificent port of Lisbon," such travails would be forgotten.[25]

Junot and his tattered advance guard entered Lisbon on 30 November to find the prince regent and court already embarked aboard English warships about to sail to Portugal's colony in America, Brazil. He advised Napoleon to remember "combien j'ai du regretter de voir s'échapper, si près de moi, l'objet de tant de fatigues et dépriviations de tout genre; mais d'un autre coté, n'est ce pas un bien, que le prince ait decidé d'un coup, la question de la prise de possession du Portugal?" Anticipating Bonaparte's intention, he suggested he give Portugal to a member of his family, justified by Madrid's unwarranted revelation to Portugal's prince regent of the still secret Treaty of Fontainebleau and Madrid's reluctance to participate in the Portuguese operation. If the Braganzas were replaced, he warned, more troops would be needed, "car il faut absolument occuper tout le Portugal, et peutêtre résister à une armée anglaise."[26] Collaboration was no longer viable in Portugal.

Bonaparte was not ready to abandon the Treaty of Fontainebleau and seems to have considered holding Portugal as a bargaining chip in future negotiations—as he may have proposed to do with the Braganzas had they remained. It soon appeared, however, that the treaty, probably never seriously considered by key French or Spanish decision makers, had already begun to disintegrate.

The tripartite division of Portugal presented problems from the moment Lisbon was occupied. Lisbon and central Portugal, assigned by Fontainebleau to the French, depended for food and other supplies on provinces occupied by Spanish forces to the north and south, and on imports by sea, a source now cut off by English blockade and French embargo. Furthermore, the Portuguese officials had simply absconded with the government's funds; above all, Portugal's main source of funds, customs revenues, now disappeared. "Notre position est critique," Junot had to report dramatically in mid-December, "la place est sans argent, le papier monnaie sans crédit, les autorités sans vigueur; un désordre affreux règne dans toutes les branches de l'administration de la Justice. L'armée non payée depuis longtemps craint encore pour son existence future, et surtout de quitter son pays." Before the occupation, he wrote, Lisbon "vivait de charges ou de pensions; il faut necessairement en payer une partie pour qu'ils ne meurent pas de faim." Food was in short supply, and the Spanish who occupied the agricultural areas were uncooperative; Lisbon had only one month's supplies. In early January, London prohibited the entry into Lisbon of vessels that had not first touched at an English port, which obstructed food imports and exports

of Portuguese staples. Commerce was stagnant, manufactures were closing down daily, and customs revenues were nil. Yet Madrid refused to furnish money or provisions. These were only the initial consequences of poorly planned intervention.

Junot retaliated, expropriating English goods still warehoused; he also confiscated property of those who had fled to Brazil, then of selected church assets.[27] Nevertheless, disregarding the paralysis of the Portuguese economy, at the end of December Napoleon insisted that the government contribute 100 million francs.

Junot's takeover of Portugal's administrative apparatus, abolition of the Braganzas' claim to the throne, and Napoleon's refusal to make public or honor the terms of Fontainebleau profoundly impacted Spain's political elites. News of demands upon the privileged and unprivileged sectors of Portuguese society spread across Spain from town to town, and especially from one religious institution to another. Less publicized, the flight of the court to Brazil and the prince regent's decision on debarking at Salvador in January 1808 to open Brazil's ports to neutral and allied shipping sent tremors throughout Spain's political, mercantile, and elite establishments. (Publication in New Spain's *Gazeta de México* of the prince regent's action was held up for months—for obvious reasons).

Spanish fears aroused by developments in neighboring Portugal were heightened by fresh military preparations in southern France. Then, at the end of December French troops crossed into Spain at Irun and Roncesvalles to occupy strategic points in northern Spain at Burgos, San Sebastian, and Pamplona; from Perpignan other forces moved toward Barcelona.[28] Ostensibly to reinforce troops in Portugal to confront any English operations on Portugal's Atlantic coast, French forces now exceeded the number stipulated at Fontainebleau. By mid-March there were thirty thousand in Portugal, and roughly seventy thousand occupied Spanish territory north of the Ebro as well as the major routes to Portugal and Madrid—without formal protest by Spanish authorities.

No longer could one doubt that French operations in Portugal were a blueprint of French strategy for Spain. Nor did it seem possible that, with the removal of Bourbons from Italy and Braganzas from Portugal, the Spanish Bourbons would long be left in place. Just as the Escorial affair had revealed the fragility of Spain's political institutions, the occupation of Portugal showed the fault lines of its government.[29]

Regime Change: Spain

Back in Paris during the early weeks of 1808, Bonaparte studied the Spanish situation, consulted his advisers, and analyzed the reports of the previous fall drafted by Beauharnais, Tournon, Turenne, and others sent to report on developments in Spain.

The French were unsure about how to handle Spain. Interventionists were troubled by their initial experience in Portugal, which made clear the potential pitfalls of regime change in Spain, which, except for two years of revolutionary turmoil and war, 1793 to 1795, had been France's foremost ally for more than a century. Spain's primary reason for the alliance was a France capable of joining Spain in countering England's designs on the American colonies and their trade. The anarchy of the revolutionary years of the 1790s had ended with the revival of France after Brumaire, indicating it was again viable to find effective collaboration against English hegemony at sea.

Now French interventionists had to absorb the implications of the Escorial affair—the fragility of political institutions and leadership in Spain. The absence of Spanish cooperation in the occupation of Portugal attested to Madrid's unreliability, confirming the "fragility and inutility" of the Spanish alliance. By early 1808 the question for French interventionists was not when but how to effect a change of regime at Madrid, how the Spanish Bourbons could be displaced with minimal violence.

In late January Beauharnais was instructed to provide further information, and in February another group of intelligence officers went to Spain to report on military affairs, public opinion, and the behavior of Spain's leaders.[30] While reinforcing his forces in the peninsula, Bonaparte could explore his political options in Spain, now a central focus of his challenge to English power in the Atlantic and the western Mediterranean.

The ramifications of the Escorial trial increasingly perplexed the French. In January Napoleon answered Charles IV's letter of the previous November, offering a veiled approval of the proposed marriage *if* the condition attached by Charles to his pardon of Fernando were removed, *if* current Spanish foot-dragging in defeating the common enemy ended. Now a more effective alliance would be the precondition of the marriage, not its consequence as Beauharnais had suggested. Napoleon appeared to put the marriage project in limbo, without, however, placing an immediate quietus on it.[31]

Clearly he entertained other plans, which necessitated analysis of the underlying weaknesses revealed by the Escorial affair. With good reason, Bonaparte still distrusted the reporting of French agents. So two days after

responding to Charles, he turned to Foreign Affairs Minister Champagny to "faire une notice historique de la conspiration de l'Escorial d'après les bulletins de Beauharnais pour . . . usage selon les circonstances."[32] Champagny then asked Beauharnais for a detailed account of the Escorial, since he found in it "quelque chose de mystérieux."[33] At the same time, Jean Baptiste Esménard, recently returned from Spain highly recommended by Beauharnais for his grasp of Spanish politics, applied for a post in the French foreign service. A military officer in France before the Revolution, Esménard had joined the Spanish army in 1792 and gained status at the Spanish court; his stature grew as consultant and publicist whose services Bonaparte and the foreign policy staff now used.[34] He would encounter no difficulty in reintegrating himself with former royalists at Paris.

Esménard's first assignment led to his "notice historique" that Napoleon needed. In transmitting Esménard's memo to Napoleon, Champagny stressed that the Escorial affair would inevitably "ejercer la mayor influencia sobre los destinos de España." He felt duty-bound that Napoleon grasp its principal features to obtain an accurate picture of the situation in Spain as well as the opinion of its inhabitants and the "deseos que ellos le dirigen."[35] If nothing else, Champagny was astute.

The memorandum was probably the joint product of Esménard and the leading policy adviser in the French foreign office, Hauterive.[36] It was an extraordinary, comprehensive attack on Godoy, seemingly by a Spaniard but with a decided French viewpoint, and it must have absorbed the mindset and planning of Escoiquiz and those in his aristocratic and bureaucratic circles whom Beauharnais and Tournon had consulted. It had Escoiquiz's handprints and an insider's grasp of details. It summarized Escoiquiz's trial testimony, then described how Godoy had betrayed the interests of France and Spain. Under his administration, France had had to carry the full burden of naval warfare against England; the memo reported Spain's shipyards "abandonnés, magazins sans approvisionnement, vaisseau sans équipages, marine ruinée." Godoy, "protector" of trade, "n'a rien fait pour faciliter ses communications dans l'intérieur et assurer ses relations avec le dehors . . . inhabile, imprévoyant et sans force, il n'a suivi contre l'Angleterre qu'un offense faux et timide." As a result, four vessels "loaded with gold" had been seized at sea without resistance or protest. Lacking "avis ni secours, Buenos Aires furent [*sic*] surpris par les anglais et ne durent delivrance qu'au general Liniers, français au service d'Espagne." Under a firm Spanish government, England could not control Gibraltar, and a handful of men "isolated on a rock" controlled the strait, while corsairs infested Spain's coasts. There had to be secret intelligence with the English, the memo speculated, charging

Godoy with abandoning France for a premature peace with Portugal in 1801, revealing France's naval strategy to the English and refusing to add his best vessels to the joint naval force at Trafalgar. That disaster had been followed by Godoy's inexplicable proclamation of October 1806, alerting Spain's armed forces without justification. And now Godoy was obstructing the movement of French troops in the peninsula.

Finally, Esménard's memo—like Chabannes's—addressed the economic grievances of French manufacturers and exporters selling to Spain's colonies via Cadiz. The memo asked rhetorically: "Pourquoi, lorsque l'Espagne n'a qu'un petit nombre de manufactures, prohiber l'entrée des marchandises du Continent où les charges de droits dont même on change sans cesse l'évaluation afin de mettre au commerce . . . de la France de nouvelles entraves?" Although Spain retained "gold" in America, "l'ennemi toujours prévenu du départ de nos gallions . . . s'en empare." In sum, Europe had entered a new era in which "la législation se simplifie, et s'eclaire; l'administration marche et le continent prend de nouvelles forces . . . L'Espagne . . . qui posséda la moitié de l'Europe, serait-elle réduite a souffrir le démembrement succesif de ses colonies des deux mondes?"[37] The thrust of Esménard's memo was that Godoy must be removed, Champagny adding that Spaniards would welcome French support.

Through Beauharnais, Tournon, and now Esménard, the Escorial and Escoiquiz (its manipulator) had obtruded into the planning of Napoleon's inner circle of advisers. However, far from accepting the marriage proposal—the critical point of French intervention—which Escoiquiz had proposed to tighten the bonds between the two nations and facilitate Godoy's removal, Napoleon now resolved to remove the Bourbon dynasty itself. The Escorial affair, as agents reported, had presented a means of achieving this end. French policy makers perceived, as *fiscal* Simón Viegas had warned during the trial, that the Escorial discredited not only Godoy but also Charles IV and Fernando.[38] Both father and son had shown themselves incompetent and manipulable. Despite declarations of loyalty to France, neither could be considered reliable or instruments of French policy for three reasons: family associations, personal weakness, and Spain's internal situation.

Influenced (or justified) by his agents' reporting, Napoleon counted on enlightened (*ilustrado*) elements among Spain's elites eager for changes that should favor France in its war with England, the expansion of French markets in Spain and overseas in its possessions, and French aspirations to dominate the Mediterranean. Spain's antiquated administration, underutilized colonies, but accumulated wealth and naval potential could not be

left to the vagaries of obsolescent political ideology and practice. In one way or another, sooner rather than later, Spain must be incorporated into the new Europe emerging under French auspices. This now seemed attainable because not only would Spaniards welcome liberation from Godoy's domination and the removal of its incompetent ruling dynasty, but influential sectors of Spanish society, Bonaparte was convinced, would also be desperate for effective reform. Here were all the elements of the delusion of a successful and presumably welcome military intervention. In fact, by mid-February Bonaparte was committed to "rapid and radical" intervention[39] despite his recent disastrous intervention in Egypt. Characteristically, he kept his ultimate goal secret: "Il faut qu'une chose soit faite pour qu'on avoue y avoir pensé," he confessed in late March 1808 when his objective was in sight.[40]

His strategy employed a combination of escalating military and political pressure, and he tried to foresee Madrid's response, while being prepared to take immediate advantage. Thus, with the rapidity Escoiquiz considered his trademark, Bonaparte moved to occupy Madrid ("le centre des espagnols") and apply inordinate diplomatic pressure, both calculated to leave the Spanish government no military or political alternative to his solution to their crisis.

On 20 February Bonaparte appointed Murat, his brother-in-law, to overall command of French forces in Spain and to act as his political representative, in effect his proconsul. Murat had built a reputation for handling "les affaires hardis," displayed during the coup of 18 Brumaire and later the execution of the duque d'Enghien when Murat was Paris's military commander. The significance of his appointment could not have escaped Spaniards, who had foreseen his coming since the past December. At Bayonne, Murat organized his command, familiarized himself with the situation in Spain, and prepared to cross the frontier headed for Victoria and then Burgos to meet Napoleon there on 22 March. Other military units were ordered to the zone between Burgos and Aranda del Duero and to Valladolid. Protected by these, Murat would proceed to Madrid ready to respond "s'il arrivait que les Espagnols fussent en situation de se défendre à Madrid."[41] One had to be ready for collaboration with or opposition from the Spaniards. By 20 March the French held strategic points close to Madrid, where Napoleon—waiting at Burgos—expected important events to occur four days later.

The other element of his strategy, a tactical weapon, was resort to diplomatic terror to soften up decision making at Madrid and Aranjuez. On 24 Feburary, after meeting with Talleyrand and General Duroc, Izquierdo

left Paris unofficially for Madrid to review issues the French authorities felt "clouded" relations; he was expected to return immediately with a response. In effect, he had to present an ultimatum; his arrival at Madrid on 5 March would be the final factor precipitating dramatic changes in Spain.[42] To disorient the Spanish government, Beauharnais would inform Godoy on 16 March that fifty thousand troops would halt at Madrid en route to Cadiz, to be followed by Napoleon on his way to Gibraltar and North Africa. In Madrid—this was implicit—he would settle the succession to the throne of Spain.[43]

One element of Napoleon's strategy required that he halt at Burgos until military and diplomatic moves at Madrid would produce a situation justifying his intervention. At the moment he ordered Murat to proceed to Madrid where Izquierdo would present the ultimatum, he also sent Tournon there to monitor the situation and report to him at Burgos by 15 March, where presumably Izquierdo would give him the response of Charles and María Luisa.

In early March, however, Napoleon decided to delay arrival at Burgos until 22 March. His plans now jelled: Beauharnais, who understood Murat would occupy Madrid sometime between 22 and 29 March, was instructed to advise Godoy that Murat would arrive at Madrid with not 50,000 but 100,000 troops en route to Cadiz and that Napoleon would settle the matter of the succession then. On the other hand, if Godoy or Fernando showed interest in going to Burgos, Napoleon would be pleased to receive him there.[44]

Another element of Napoleon's strategic planning was imagining with Champagny and Esménard how the Escorial affair might advance French objectives. Champagny had noted (19 February) that the Escorial had already discredited Charles and Godoy and revealed that Fernando, recipient of a conditioned pardon, would be considered an unworthy successor to the throne of Spain. In early March, Napoleon had Esménard draft a propaganda pamphlet ostensibly written by a Spaniard that included all the anti-Godoy charges of the memo of 11 February and, at the same time, questioned Fernando's succession given the "incertitude qui intéresse les Espagnols et leurs amis sur les suites nécessaires de l'hérédité du trône."[45] Obviously, the French partisans of intervention had no faith that Fernando would alter Godoy's policies.

If the strategy was aimed at eliminating the Bourbons, what about tactics? It appears that Napoleon expected that the impact of Izquierdo's mission to be combined with the announcement of Murat's impending occupation of Madrid and his own arrival would precipitate armed reaction in

the capital, Godoy's flight with or without the royal family to Andalusia or "some port," and a coup against Godoy—or a combination of two of these reactions.[46] Any of these scenarios could justify French intervention, military or political. In the likely event of Godoy's overthrow, Charles (whose loyalty to the alliance Napoleon never doubted) would be amenable to French persuasion. And if Fernando were excluded from the succession because of his father's conditional pardon, a dynastic substitution was achievable, if not at once, then in the near future. Essential to Bonaparte's strategy was observing legal procedures, to ensure the support of Spain's *ilustrados*.

With Godoy out of the way and Madrid occupied, he would enter Madrid to stabilize the situation and mediate the quarrel between Charles and Fernando—in the interest of France. If these possibilities failed, he still had a fallback position based on the demands in the ongoing negotiations between Izquierdo and Paris: cession of trans-Ebro territory to France, the disposition of the throne, and—always underplayed but of great significance—the ever-present issue of trade concessions in Spain's Atlantic system. If hostilities erupted, Napoleon felt his forces could handle them. However, once French tactics seemed about to bear fruit in the second week of March, Bonaparte—never one to underestimate antagonists—realized that his strategy involved risks in Spain greater than calculated.

Even before Izquierdo would leave Madrid for Paris on 11 March, a flare-up of nationalism in Spain—a contingency overlooked or underemphasized in the situation reports prepared for Bonaparte—led Bonaparte to change tactics, downplay aggressive military options, and give priority to a negotiated settlement of the Spanish question. This would be only the first of many unplanned consequences of planned regime change.

In the first place, French forces advancing into Navarre and Catalonia in late February and early March sparked violent reactions and what seemed a mercurial shift in public opinion. This belied the optimism of Beauharnais and other agents regarding the collaborative attitude of the Spanish public. For example, at Pamplona the French commander reported that Navarrese were angered at the underhanded methods used to seize its citadel. "Les habitants en furent consternés. Le vice Roi eut un chagrin du diable. Il faillit y avoir le 18 [fevrier] une révolte provoqué par les étudians," which the civil authorities barely managed to suppress.[47] From Barcelona where news of Pamplona arrived just before the French seized the nearby citadel at Montjuich, French dispatches described popular anti-French animus. "On continue toujours à crier sur notre séjour dans Barcelona, on parle d'armes, de munitions et de massacre . . . On continue d'attribuer la fermeture des métiers aux français . . . On ferme des fabriques tous les jours depuis que

nous sommes à Barcelone." Catalonia's captain general in the course of an altercation with the French commanding officer threatened to call out his troops.[48] Further west at San Sebastian, the Spanish governor, the émigré duque de Mahon, denied the French troops entry into the city until orders came from Madrid.[49] And at Victoria and Burgos, where local noblemen (mostly committed *fernandistas*) welcomed Murat, nonetheless the problem of provisioning large military contingents brought tension and conflict.[50]

But while news of occupying forces in the north turned many against the French, rumors still circulated that French troops would be followed by Napoleon himself, surely to remove Godoy and settle Fernando's marriage to Tascher. An intercepted letter from Sevilla hoped that when queen she would be Napoleon's instrument in redressing Spain's economic and political problems. From Burgos, General Mouton wrote that Francophile Spaniards were convinced only a new family alliance "peut conserver l'existence de leur pays, prévenir les convulsions, et peutêtre"—and what was rarely expressed but always dreaded—"la séparation de leurs riches possessions de l'Inde."

Such fantasies were shattered on 19 February when the official *Gazeta de Madrid* reported Tascher's marriage to the Prince of Aremberg. Significantly, Spanish censors made no effort to suppress the news; now the gambit of an alliance by marriage disappeared and, with it, the hope of some Spaniards that she might be an instrument of change in Spain. Now the alternative would have to be military occupation. As Beauharnais had to write, "Le marriage de Mlle Tascher a frappé de stupeur les personnes attachées à la France," warning that a substitute be quickly found since "cette nation, incertaine encore sur le parti qu'elle doit prendre, cherche à pénétrer si elle peut se sauver elle-même, se croyant abandonnée par la France." As for Godoy, he was unsure of his next step. "On parle du départ du généralissime . . . ou sa fuite dans laquelle il cherche à entrainer leurs Majestés." As evidence, Beauharnais cited the flight of many Madrid bankers to Cadiz or Bayonne, concealment of silver, communication with unnamed foreigners, the government's dispatch of agents to Andalusia, and the reinforced security around Godoy's residence.[51] A Lisbon-like scenario seemed imminent.

The collapse of Beauharnais's pet project (Fernando's marriage) sensitized the ambassador to other developments. He recorded the Madrid public's astonishment at what censors allowed in the *Gazeta*—Tascher's marriage, Napoleon's financial exactions from the Portuguese, further entry of French troops, daily reports of contingents of French soldiery passing through Irun, a description (culled from a foreign periodical) of Junot's hungry, barefoot soldiers at Lisbon, and—particularly disquieting—the

flight of the Portuguese court to Brazil. He attributed publication of such news items to elements in the Spanish government that aimed to "indispose and irritate opinion against France." In any case, such items in the official press left "Castilians in little doubt of an approaching change in the political system." At this point, Beauharnais predicted Godoy's imminent retreat to Andalusia or a coup against him. He realized that Spain, cut off from its vital trade with the American colonies, its domestic commerce reduced to smuggling, without manufactures and unable to export its staples, would descend into a profound economic and financial crisis. Yet, he had to comment ironically, at this moment Charles IV—insouciant or feigning confidence—could not wait to get to the Pardo to hunt.[52]

General Mouton reported at Burgos that he had a broad grasp of Napoleon's strategy, intended to "s'emparer du Royaume, et de la traiter comme Portugal," and noted signs of "resignation apparente" and "sourde fermentation" barely restrained by local clergymen. The reality was bitter: although *fernandista* grandees in Madrid need not be feared, "les peuples ne sont pas incapable de l'énergie du desespoir." The chaos of revolutionary years at Paris and elsewhere had sensitized Frenchmen like Mouton to the power of the people uncontrolled.

Penchon de Vandeuil, just returned from Buenos Aires where he had been an aide-de-camp of Viceroy Liniers, also noted the suspicious alacrity with which Madrid's *Gazeta* had printed items about Tascher and Portugal. Whatever the accuracy of public conjectures, he counseled Talleyrand, all social classes had favored the marriage, which "préviendrait la dissolution de la Monarchie Espagnole. C'est surtout ce dernier objet que les Castillans paraissent avoir à coeur et la crainte de voir l'Espagne subdivisée en plusieurs principautés particuliers les domine au point qu'un changement même de dynastie ne les effrayerait pas, pourvu qu'ils eussent la certitiude de rester par un même pacte que celui qu'ils ont aujourd'hui avec la couronne, et de former dans l'avenir un même corps de nation." On the other hand, he noted that Godoy found incredible that Napoleon wanted to maintain the Spanish Bourbons in the person of a "prince ignorant, entêté, méchant comme le prince des Asturies."[53]

Already blamed for the economic and political crisis, Godoy was now held responsible for inviting French forces into the peninsula and the occupation of Portugal, and for what it foreboded for Spain. Antonio Alcalá Galiano, then an *alcalde de casa y corte* at Madrid, later recalled the proliferation of intrigue, rumor, and conflicting opinion. The royal family remained secluded at Aranjuez, and Fernando was kept out of sight,[54] while at Madrid the notables also secluded themselves, lamenting the unstable

political situation and fearful of confrontations (*desabridamientos*) that contacts between French and Spaniards might bring. Such was the hatred of Godoy that even those hostile to Bonaparte "con extraña contradicción y desatino culpaban al gobierno porque así diera entrada en España a los franceses quando por otro lado, nos poníamos de parte de quienes celebraban su venida."[55] Only continuing gossip of Fernando's marriage to a relative of Napoleon had offered hope of Godoy's removal, a peaceful outcome of French occupation, the end of administrative paralysis, and prevention of civil war and, most essential to Alcalá Galiano and other high civil servants, of the loss of the colonies.

By early March at the latest, reports from Spain slowed Bonaparte's strategy of "rapid and radical intervention." French commanders complained of serious problems in maintaining and provisioning their troops. Conscripts were young, poorly selected, untrained, and ill-equipped for the peninsula's climate and terrain. Officers were few, many too old or too young. Murat, whose initial impression of Spain was of a dismal "vaste désert," reported his troops lacked essential items—clothing, shoes, mess kits, even ammunition. Madrid had turned over to local authorities responsibility for provisioning French troops, promising later reimbursement; meanwhile, French quartermasters lacked local currency to purchase supplies since Spanish currency was in short supply, and when it was available, exchange rates were unfavorable to the franc. Spain's military administration was untrained, and the personnel too few to handle the novel situation.[56] As the supply system began to break down, access to food and draft animals became major sources of friction with the local population, and between the locals and the central government; Madrid's ministries could not agree on their responsibility for dealing with the French commanders.[57] Consequently, French forces showed poor discipline, frequent desertion, and high morbidity, and there were repeated episodes of violence between French soldiers and Spaniards.[58]

Other reports suggested that recalcitrant Portuguese and Spanish military units were capable of more resistance than earlier assumed. Napoleon found Junot derelict in failing to replace Portuguese commanders and to send Portuguese troops to France for dispersal among French units. Although French commanders had secured key defensive positions north of the Ebro, Spanish commanders held forces that, in conjunction with well-armed popular resistance groups, might pose serious problems. All Spaniards, it seemed, carried rifles or poignards; Madrid had recently shipped arms to Navarre and Catalonia. Above all, Spanish general Solano, whose

movements after returning from the joint occupation of Portugal had troubled Napoleon, was now headed for Talavera, possibly Madrid. This suggested Godoy's intention to "defy" the French and to take refuge in Andalusia; it coincided with reports of sighting English convoys along Spain's southern coasts.

As military strategist, Napoleon immediately gave highest priority to the problems of France's armed forces in the peninsula. Even more troubling were reports of growing anti-French animosity there. Probably Napoleon trusted the reporting of his personal agent, Tournon, back in Spain by early March to reassess the volatile situation. Tournon was struck by changes since his earlier visit, by what he assessed carefully, and by what, since the Revolution, had impressed its importance upon France's political classes: public opinion, however measured. "J'ai trouvé dans Madrid et sur ma route de grands changements dans l'opinion," which he attributed to "l'entrée des français à Pampelune et à Barcelone, les proclamations qui ont été faites en Portugal, l'incertitude oú ils sont sur leur sort, [et] la crainte d'un avenir qui ne peut être que sinistre puisqu'on met tant de soin à le cacher, disent-ils." Napoleon should come to Spain immediately to "calmer et rallier les esprits."[59] He also noted that Godoy acted indecisively; that he seemed about to order resistance to French units en route to Madrid, where thousands of Spanish troops were now camped in or near the capital; and that the Madrid garrison was resupplied with ammunition. Insecurity had caused a 15 percent decline in the value of the widely held treasury bills (*vales*), currently selling at 65 percent below par. Tournon ended his pessimistic report of 9 March with a recommendation for direct action: "Quelque projet qu'on puisse avoir" had to start by eliminating Godoy, it was "le seul moyen de regagner l'opinion de la nation." This would be easy, he added, because fortunately Spaniards held him responsible for the dismal events they were experiencing.

Before leaving Madrid four days later (13 March) for Burgos, Tournon learned that Godoy had returned to Aranjuez where officials were presumably readying the court for flight now to the Gibraltar area. If that happened, Tournon foresaw realistically, it would be problematic to hope to obtain from the Spanish government anything by force since "al primer revés que experimente tendrá el recurso del mar, de América, y España sin sus colonias es una carga." The implications of the French invasion of Portugal had not been lost on Tournon. Spain's American colonies, he ventured, were more productive than the metropole and before long could dispense with the mother country, while the flight of the royal family to America

would consolidate colonial governments—even precipitate the independence of Brazil from Portugal.[60] Tournon's vision of the immediate future of the Iberian colonies in America was remarkably sound, even prescient.

Napoleon's correspondence over the second week of March indicates he was prepared to occupy Madrid, but he perceived that, in pushing the Spanish government too hard, he could endanger the ultimate objective, peaceful occupation of Spain and replacement of its government. Godoy's removal with or without French involvement would still leave obstacles to an overall French solution to the Spanish predicament. Added to the widespread animus toward the French, he noted the deep-seated fear of territorial dismemberment, institutional change, and—an ever-present concern—loss of empire. These factors had become peculiarly linked to the survival of the Bourbon dynasty and Fernando's popularity, although one French observer felt that the elites were more attached to monarchical institutions than to the Bourbons. Furthermore, Napoleon was now acutely aware, perhaps because of the recent Portuguese experience, that the flight of the Bourbons to America might precipitate a colonial crisis and an opportunity for the English to monopolize Spain's trade there. This would undermine long-term French as well as Spanish interests.

At this point, Napoleon neither could nor would recall his earlier orders. Instead, he tried to slow the momentum of events by shifting to a conciliatory stance, welcoming negotiation.[61] On 14 March he decided not to be at Burgos on 22 March but assured Murat that, if necessary, he would proceed promptly. Murat was to forward rapidly "toutes les propositions directes ou indirectes qui seraient faites," informing Spanish authorities that Napoleon would be at Burgos when his troops entered the capital. "Quelles que soient les intentions de la cour de Madrid," he instructed Murat, "vous devez comprendre que ce qui est surtout util, c'est d'arriver à Madrid *sans hostilités*, d'y faire camper les corps par division pour les faire paraître plus nombreus" (emphasis added). French troops would be liberators rather than occupiers.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte predicted his differences with the Spanish court could be settled. His precautions, he explained to Murat, would leave nothing to chance. If war broke out, Murat would be prepared and, more important, supported. He reemphasized, however, "je veux rester ami avec l'Espagne et remplir mon but politique sans hostilites." In his emphasis on avoiding conflict deep in the peninsula, Napoleon sensed the disasters of a war in Spain. The theme of dialogue, of negotiation, reappeared in another letter on 16 March—the eve of the coup at Aranjuez—when he told Murat (presumably close to Madrid) to reassure Charles, María Luisa, Godoy, and Fernando that he was on the way "afin de concilier et d'arranger les affaires."

The essential object, he impressed on Murat, was to get to Madrid to rest and resupply his forces, always remembering to avoid hostile action because "il serait dangereux de trop effaroucher ces gens-là."[62] Three days later he wrote Murat—this was the day Charles abdicated in favor of Fernando—voicing a "dearly held hope" that Murat had arrived with his troops at Madrid without incident. At that moment he anxiously awaited the imminent arrival of both Izquierdo and Tournon "pour savoir le parti à prendre pour arranger les affaires."[63] On 23 March (just before Fernando would enter Madrid in triumph), Bonaparte instructed Murat to take no action against the court, whether it remained at Aranjuez or (if it withdrew) at Sevilla; however, Charles should know there was nothing to fear, and Godoy that Spanish forces would take no hostile action. Events in northern Europe, he informed Murat from Saint-Cloud, further delayed his departure for the south, and he hoped to receive Murat's reports on what he expected to happen on 17–18 March.[64]

Bonaparte's *imaginario* did not materialize. Even before receiving new French demands, Spain's Ambassador Izquierdo had "panicked" when he learned of Bonaparte's forces on the Spanish frontier.[65] At Bayonne, where he met the Spanish commander, the duque de Frias, he seemed worried. When he reached Madrid, Izquierdo conferred with Godoy until late in the evening; the next day both journeyed to Aranjuez, where Izquierdo laid out for Charles and Luisa the demands in the new French diplomatic offensive. Presumably other long conferences followed as Izquierdo communicated with Godoy, Soler, and other cabinet officers.

The French demands were hardly new but served to lay French cards on the table: a demand for demonstration of the Spanish government's willingness to meet basic French objectives—namely, active participation in the war against England and in furthering France's political and economic goals in the peninsula. Clearly the French government viewed an effective Franco-Spanish political alliance in the war with England as inseparable from French economic and political domination of Spain.

As outlined by Izquierdo, the French attributed Spain's internal dissension to English intrigue and failure to cooperate in the common cause against the common enemy. This failure—demonstrated by delaying the dispatch of a Spanish fleet from Cartagena to Toulon, tolerating English smuggling along the coast, and resistance to a "broad new commercial treaty" and its colonial clauses—obliged France to supplement its forces in the peninsula in order to protect troops already there and prevent an uprising that would imperil France's alliance with the Bourbon dynasty. Bonaparte proposed to strengthen their alliance by marrying Fernando to a

Bonaparte *if* Charles would agree to remove the condition of good behavior from the royal pardon he had granted in the Escorial affair. Otherwise, he proposed to replace Fernando with one of his brothers as heir to the throne of Spain. And another demand was evident: that French troops circulate without impediment in the peninsula and, a key issue, that the government immediately remove obstacles to France's trade with Spain. Finally, the territorial claims: Spain would cede to France the provinces north of the Ebro in exchange for Spanish suzerainty over Portugal.[66] All undermined Spain's territorial integrity, independence, and dynastic continuity; its commercial structures; and, above all, its colonial empire.

Regarding the French government's real intentions, Izquierdo opined that as long as Charles remained on the throne, Bonaparte would not seize the crown. Should Charles be "absent," however, given Napoleon's animus against the Bourbons and his low opinion of Fernando, it was likely he would replace the dynasty as he had done elsewhere in Europe.[67]

Godoy, convinced of Bonaparte's designs on the Bourbons and himself, now resolved to withdraw the royal family to Andalusia, where he hoped to negotiate from a position of some strength. General Francisco Solano was ordered to move his troops from Badajoz to Sevilla to protect the Bourbons' withdrawal, and Godoy returned to Aranjuez to prepare for the retreat to the south. As might have been foreseen, this much-debated move immediately put into motion a concerted opposition that challenged the decision to withdraw by arguing that Godoy's ultimate goal was to transport the royal family overseas to Mexico and that Napoleon, to the contrary, had given no sign of hostile designs on Spain as ally. Within Charles's immediate entourage, not only did his brother, *infante* Antonio, and other family members oppose the departure; so did the royal confessor on grounds of conscience, which had a strong inhibitive effect on Charles. With the exception of Soler, a prestigious group of high civil functionaries led by Pedro Cevallos (State), José Antonio Caballero (Justice), Francisco Gil y Lemos (Marine, an ex-viceroy of Peru), and the Consejo de Castilla adamantly opposed the withdrawal. Charles, in the face of this united opposition, fearful of popular resistance to a withdrawal to Andalusia, retracted his earlier approval. He issued a statement assuring the public that he would never abandon Spain "except to meet the emperor."[68]

Whether Godoy in fact abandoned his decision to go south (as he later claimed) or sought to carry it out in secret (as others have maintained) is moot; his time had run out.

The Double Coup at Aranjuez

The coup d'état that removed Godoy and brought the abdication of Charles IV to Fernando his son occurred at the royal *sitio* at Aranjuez between 17 and 19 March.[69] It was precipitated by fear that Godoy would take the Bourbons to Andalusia and then allegedly to Spain's major overseas colony, New Spain, repeating the flight of the Braganzas to Brazil at the end of 1807, just before Junot's troops entered Lisbon. In the early hours of 18 March, a crowd recruited from the surrounding towns along with palace employees and members of the Guardias de Corps attacked the residence of Godoy at Aranjuez. Although Godoy hid in the servants' quarters, his disappearance dissolved any of his remaining authority. Charles IV was terrified by the crowds, which recalled to him the coup against Esquilache four decades before and the flight under cover of nightfall of Charles III and his young family to the security of Aranjuez. He had to accept the ouster of Godoy and voiced the implausible intention to assume full political and military leadership.

Power, however, had already shifted to Fernando's faction, which now held Godoy in custody. When Godoy finally emerged from hiding on 19 March, he was manhandled by a mob barely contained by palace troops. Charles then abdicated, and the Consejo de Castilla immediately recognized Fernando as his legitimate successor. But no sooner was Fernando accepted than Charles informed Murat secretly that his abdication was invalid because unwillingly made under threat of mob violence and therefore lacking appropriate formalities.[70] The Spanish succession was incomplete, not to say erratic.

At Aranjuez again one detects the guiding hand of those who played key roles in the Escorial affairs of the previous October and December.[71] If Escoiquiz and Infantado were absent in internal exile in Andalusia, they were very much present in spirit. Clearly the moment had come, to use Escoiquiz's phrase, to "put Fernando in his proper place."[72] The conde de Montijo, who according to Escoiquiz earlier had proposed to remove Godoy by coup, now entered the scene as the visible promoter of mob violence at Aranjuez and Madrid, which gave dramatic élan to the political overturn long planned by Madrid's crisis managers.

Presumably returning from Cadiz supplied with cash, Montijo canvassed the Aranjuez environs posing as a peasant ("el tío Pedro") to organize the mob assembled at Aranjuez on 16 March, to provide both force and mythic sanction of people power, the first of repeated "popular" gatherings that punctuated events of 1808.[73] As peripatetic firebrand and liaison figure,

Montijo epitomized to the point of caricature the salient role of *fernandista* grandees in manipulating informal networks of regional interests, kinship, and patronage to galvanize the opposition into action at specific moments and places.

Eugenio Eulalio Palafox y Portocarrero de Guzmán, Croy d'Havre y Lopez de Zúniga, seventh conde de Montijo, was suited by family, formation, and personality to perform as flamboyant protagonist of Spain's restive aristocracy. Inheriting the title of conde de Montijo from his mother (Francisca de Paula de Portocarrero de Guzmán), who died in 1807, he had chosen her more prestigious patronym as his. The Portocarreros, aside from multiple titles and entails, had occupied important positions at court and in country, metropole and colonies, since the early seventeenth century.[74] In the eighteenth, the fifth conde de Montijo, Cristóbal Gregorio de Portocarrero (1692–1763), served as ambassador to London and president of the Consejo de Indias; his brother (Luís Cristóbal de Portocarrero de Guzmán) had been cardinal archbishop of Toledo.[75] On the paternal side, Montijo was a member of the Aragonese house of Palafox, which held a cluster of titles with ramifications in Aragon, Navarre, and the Basque provinces. Though less affluent and influential than the Portocarreros, the Palafox, too, in the past had held royal appointments in church and state, on land and sea, and on both shores of the Atlantic.[76]

María Francisca de Sales Portocarrero (1754–1808), condesa de Montijo on her grandfather's death (1763), was educated by her uncle, archbishop of Toledo, who placed his young charge in a convent school recently established at Madrid by French Salesian nuns dedicated to transplanting to Spain new and rigorous concepts of female education. When her uncle died in 1771, he left her a considerably improved patrimony as well as the title of condesa de Tepa. Now she left the convent school to marry and have six children by Felipe de Palafox y Croy d'Havre, an army officer studious and retiring. The condesa shared some of the former owing to her French education, little of the latter; she cut a rather flamboyant figure in the Catholic enlightenment of the reign of Charles III. A founder of the Sociedad de Damas de Carlos III, she was devoted to charitable works and hosted a *tertulia* frequented by members of the Madrid's political class, influential clerics, and progressive-minded intellectuals like prominent public servant and literateur Gaspar Jovellanos, a loyal friend. Association with Jovellanos inspired her short tract criticizing government prohibition of high-quality muslin imports then much in vogue, on the ground that the state lacked authority to dictate women's choice of self-adornment.[77] This, Madrid's Cinco Gremios Mayores must have applauded. In 1805, however, her op-

position to Godoy's politics along with her Jansenist leanings resulted in forced retreat to Logroño, where she died in the spring of 1808.

The condesa must have imparted some of her iconoclasm, independence, and perhaps flamboyance, as well as opposition to Godoy, to her sons, who entered the elite artillery corps at Madrid. The anti-Godoy intrigues of Eulalio, then conde de Tepa, can be dated at least to 1806, when he conspired in Andalusia to remove Godoy. At the same time he became the focus of widespread political interest as author of a well-circulated pamphlet asserting the aristocracy's right to recapture its former political preeminence in high office; he advocated as well the formation of a military party—the aristocracy was reaching out to its members in the artillery corps and the royal guards and to the military in general, fearful of conflict with France.[78] Marriage to María Ignacia Idiáquez y Carvajal, daughter of the duque de Granada y Ega, as well as his sisters' marriages to equally prominent aristocratic families of Aragon and Andalucia,[79] added to an exaggerated sense of status and mission.[80]

While grandees "threw the first stone," as Pedro Giraldo had predicted in 1806, elites in the guards regiments and the artillery corps ably seconded them. Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui, a guards officer, and his brother, Tomás (colonel in the Pavia regiment), had been liaison agents who provided key depositions in the Escorial affair; now they played a comparable role at Aranjuez. Manuel Francisco publicized Fernando's opposition to Godoy's plan to take refuge in Andalusia, and he triggered the assault on Godoy's residence at Aranjuez.[81] Like Montijo, he too would reappear frequently, notably in the events overseas in 1808 leading to the coup d'état at Mexico City against Viceroy Iturrigaray.

Although the *grandeza* and members of the elite military corps provided the activist cadres of the coup, decision making at Aranjuez (as at the Escorial) came from within the high-civil-service apparatus. The conservative cabinet minister José Antonio Caballero, who earlier had invoked the specter of popular riots to persuade Charles to publicize the Escorial affair and who, as minister of justice, had officiated over the trial, now employed similar visions of mass violence to intimidate a vacillating Charles IV to abandon the retreat to Andalusia and secure instead automatic approval of the Consejo de Castilla for Fernando's enthronement.[82]

As in the Escorial affair, similarly the Consejo played a crucial role at Aranjuez in opposing retreat to Andalusia, citing—what the political class had been observing closely—"lo que acaba de suceder en Portugal" and delaying the movement of troops to cover such a move.[83] It was less explicit in justifying its uncharacteristic haste to recognize Fernando's accession,

implying that it had been compelled to do so by imminent popular unrest predicted by Justice Minister Caballero.[84] As in the previous October, the Consejo promoted the *fernandista* cause by tactics carefully defined by its institutional role.

At Aranjuez, however, the self-effaced figure behind the scene at the Escorial who had drafted Charles's letters to Napoleon, as well as the appropriate decrees communicated to the public, now emerged front and center as the "man of the hour."[85] It was Pedro Cevallos, Charles's dependable foreign affairs secretary (Estado) who emerged from a private meeting with a distraught Charles on 19 March to announce his abdication and draft the decree in which Charles legitimized his sudden abdication, citing poor health and a long-standing desire to retire. The rioting associated with this event, Cevallos would later claim, was merely a spontaneous act of popular self-preservation, justified by natural law, by a people dreading abandonment by their ruler-king. Given his long, close working relationship with Godoy, Cevallos prepared what was his pro forma resignation immediately rejected by Fernando. In a well-circulated decree, Fernando lauded his secretary of state's loyalty to the Bourbon family. The mobs that attacked the properties of other Godoy associates had carefully avoided Cevallos's.

Cevallos would publish a more convincing explanation of the Aranjuez coup and Charles's abdication six long and tumultuous years later, after the restoration of the Bourbons in Spain under Fernando. Obliged to defend his role in the events of March culminating later in the Bourbons' dethronement at Bayonne, Cevallos rationalized the abdication on the ambiguous grounds of political necessity and foreign relations, "cuando por accidente y circunstancias políticas ha venido la Nación al punto de ver comprometidas sus relaciones exteriores y conviene mudar de mano para mejorarlas, en tal caso la renuncia del trono es el acto más heróico . . . la prueba más concluyente del amor e interés por la causa pública. Tales . . . fueron los motivos con que procedió SM el Rey Padre a la virtuosa renuncia de la Corona en favor de su primogénito el Sr. Fernando Séptimo."[86]

The Role of the French

The coup at Aranjuez was the handiwork of desperate traditionalist groups within Spain's elites.[87] Here, the French, curiously enough, played a surprisingly passive role. Recall that Bonaparte had instructed Murat to be at Madrid on 23 March, assuring he would be at Burgos at the same time. Apparently he intuited contingencies that might justify open and decisive intervention in the internal affairs of Spain.[88] Whether the development he

expected would lead to the royal family's flight to Andalusia or perhaps Godoy's removal is unclear. Public opinion, manipulated to expect French collaboration against Godoy, appeared to accept and even welcome the entry of French troops to support Godoy's removal and, hopefully, Fernando's accession. In his correspondence, Beauharnais celebrated both events optimistically as the beginning of a new, closer unity between France and Spain. On news of Godoy's removal, Beauharnais claimed that Charles immediately turned to him for guidance; Fernando's enthronement, he speculated, now appeared to give him an important role as intermediary through his *fernandista* contacts—who in fact deliberately misinformed him. Fernando, he felt assured, would maintain Charles's policy of friendship and alliance.[89]

Beauharnais, however, lacked Paris's backing for his support of Fernando.[90] Napoleon had already discarded (if he ever entertained) the project of Fernando's marriage to a member of his own family, because he saw no suitable consort available. Far more important as his advisers then argued, Escoiquiz would later suggest, and Napoleon's own destiny would show, "une femme est toujours un lien trop faible pour forcer la conduite politique d'un prince." Moreover, Fernando himself clearly lacked the essential qualities and the kind of support necessary to render him a useful tool of French interests. Only a few days before what became the double coup at Aranjuez, Bonaparte announced his decision to exclude Fernando from his plans for Spain in a fashion revealing his careful analysis of events at the Escorial. "Comment placer . . . sur le trône un prince deshonoré qui n'a échappé à l'échafaud que par la grace que lui a accordée son père?" On the same day (8 March) he ordered the drafting of propaganda pamphlets for distribution in Spain. Napoleon was thus far from anticipating the opening that Charles's abdication at Aranjuez on 19 March would provide.

Nor, for that matter, was Bonaparte's lieutenant general encamped near Madrid prepared for the 17–18 March events at Aranjuez. Murat's initial reaction to the coups was remarkably more prescient and logical than Beauharnais's: fear that Fernando's accession was really designed to rally Spaniards *against* the French, and uncertainty about his own future role as a result of this unexpected development. Hurriedly he penned to Bonaparte his dismay at the sudden dismal turn of events, the ramifications of a war of occupation. "Je ne puis dissimuler à Votre Majesté toute ma douleur," he wrote. "Je prévois que la sang peut couler et l'Europe ne manquera pas de dire que c'est la France qui l'a ordonné, puis qu'on semble avoir attendu la presence de vos armées pour le faire et que l'ambassadeur semble ne pas y être étranger. Sire, je commande ici vos armées. Je représente ici votre majesté, et certes personne d'Europe ne croira que je suis à leur tête

sans connaître vos projets et si Madrid vient a être agitée et que des têtes tombent, n'importe les qu'elles [*sic*] que dira-t-on? Qu'el [*sic*] jugement en portera et la géneration présente et la géneration future? . . . Je reponds de tout et même de la tranquilité. Votre Majeste ne peut pas vouloir employer d'autres moyens, soit qu'elle veuille protéger ses officiers, de renverser la dinastie des Bourbons ou affranchir les Espagnes du joug du Prince de la Paix"—all of which suggests he had in mind the core elements of Napoleon's plan for Spain.[91]

But he warned of the example Spain might set for France: "C'est la queue des Bourbons qui s'agite à Madrid; il y a aussi un faubourg St. Germain, qui semble tout bien s'entendre avec celui de Paris." Evidently he foresaw an alliance between *fernandistas* ("la queue des Bourbons") and anti-Napoleon elements at Paris ("un faubourg St. Germain"). More apprehension surfaced the next day. "J'aime penser que le Prince des Asturies ne changera point le système de bonne harmonie avec la France qu'il manifeste. S'il en était autrement, il lui serait bien plus facile qu'à son père d'exciter un soulèvement, non parcequ'on a un véritable attachement pour lui, mais parceque'il devient nécessaire dans cette circonstance, et que dans toutes les révolutions on a besoin d'un nom puissant."[92] On receiving the following day a personal message from María, former queen of Etruria and Charles IV's daughter, suggesting that Charles considered his abdication invalid, Murat embraced what suddenly—and brilliantly—he conceived as Napoleon's "véritable projet." Accordingly, he would protect Charles, who "might be considered a hostage." "S'il se rend à mon Quartier Général je l'enverrai à Votre Majesté et alors l'Espagne se trouverait véritablement sans Roi, puisque le père aura abdiqué, et que vous serez le maître de ne pas reconnaître le fils que l'on peut regarder comme usurpateur. Enfin mon offre montrera à l'Europe entière le grandeur de votre générosité et on imposera dans toutes les hypothèses à la malveillance."[93]

Entering Madrid on 23 March, Murat acted on this perception despite Tournon's warning and Moncey's fears.[94] When Fernando entered Madrid the next day accompanied by the *grandeza* and elites of church and state, Murat conveyed his compliments but informed Fernando he could not greet him in person without Napoleon's authorization.[95] He had attempted to block Fernando's formal entry until he had Charles's signed protest in hand, he wrote Napoleon, but delayed negotiations with Charles (carried on between General Mouthion and Charles's daughter María), while Beauharnais's failure to help postpone Fernando's entry into the capital made it impossible to prevent Fernando's arrival as well as publication of his assumption of sovereignty.[96] Otherwise, Murat intimated, Fernando

might have been persuaded "à différer son entrée solemnelle à Madrid . . . et partir pour aller au-devant de Votre Majesté." He had impressed upon Beauharnais, however, the importance of applying all his influence with Fernando to persuade him to meet Bonaparte.[97] As for Charles's fate, Murat reported that he wanted permission to purchase property in France where he and the queen might live out their days in peace. Clearly, Charles could be counted on.

Murat also assured Bonaparte that he had not neglected the military situation, had directed Beauharnais to ask authorities at Aranjuez to order the return of the troops of Generals Solano and Carraffa to Portugal, and had written Junot to integrate them into his forces. Thus, eager General Murat wrote that "il n'y aura véritablement plus d'armée Espagnole et Votre Majesté pourra disposer de l'Espagne." As for the undercurrent of anxiety in Bonaparte's recent correspondence regarding "la possibilité d'une soulèvement en Espagne," he answered categorically, "Je le garante impossible; et s'il se manifeste jamais quelque genre d'insurrection, ce ne será que dans la Manche ou dans l'Andalousie . . . pays que nous n'avons pas parcouru. C'est l'intérêt seul de la Dynastie des Bourbons qui a dicte la plupart des rapports que vous ont été faits. Votre Majesté est admirée et adorée dans toute l'Espagne et c'est d'elle qu'on attend un plus heureux sort."[98] Murat allowed loyalty to cloud acuity.

Murat, chosen for the Spanish assignment for his "hardiesse," inadequately briefed on the situation in Spain, and surprised by the Aranjuez coup and its contradictory implications, despite the assurances he received, still repressed doubts about the entire Spanish project. As he concluded his dispatch on 24 March, "Si je m'étais trompé dans toutes mes démarches, je serais bien malheureux; mais je le repète, j'ai cru bien faire, et je n'ai écouté que mon zèle pour la gloire et le service de Votre Majesté. Accoutumé à être dirigé par Elle, je sens aujourd'hui plus que jamais combien j'aurais besoin de ses bontés et de ses conceils paternels dans une circonstance aussi délicate."[99]

Aranjuez had clearly inspired in Bonaparte's lieutenant general a premonition of a contingency about to materialize. Three months later in the aftermath of the Dos de Mayo and his inflexible military response, and amid general insurrection, he was incapacitated by a severe traumatic crisis that required his removal from the Spanish command.

The Significance of Aranjuez

Aranjuez transformed the Spanish situation profoundly. In removing Godoy and installing Fernando, it created momentarily a new, effective symbol of nation and empire united. Behind that symbol, power passed to those who had played a determining role in the Escorial affair and who now called others to join them on the political stage. Many exiled from Madrid by Godoy returned to prominent roles, among them *ilustrados* Azanza, O'Farrill, Jovellanos, and Saavedra. On the other hand, the events of 17–20 March did not eliminate Charles and María Luisa—or even Godoy—all three now given new roles in the emerging drama. Further, the subtle chemistry of the event brought into momentary alliance *fernandista* crisis managers and two small, ideologically fissioned currents of opinion in Spain. One saw in a *fernandista* triumph the victory of backward-looking privileged elites; its members also perceived the chance of a bloodless transition to a regenerated monarchy through dynastic substitution—an outcome preferable under the circumstances to Bourbon rule of the traditional style. The other included those proto-liberals who for some time had favored the revival of the Cortes and the transformation of Spain into a constitutional monarchy of English design. They saw an opening in this direction through a *fernandista*-inspired insurgency that a dynastic change seemed destined to bring. Thus, Aranjuez brought a brief euphoria, a peculiar consensus to Spain's internal politics.

The circumstances of the coup had other domestic consequences. Justified as an act of self-preservation by the "people" confronting abandonment by the ruler, it preempted any subsequent move to seek refuge overseas in an American colony and possible loss of empire. And not least important, as the French were quick to note, to many Spaniards it demonstrated the nation's ability to act in self-defense.

More significant was the impact of the double coup at Aranjuez on Bonaparte's Spanish design. Murat's confused reaction to Fernando's enthronement reflected Bonaparte's habitual secretiveness while keeping various options open until enemy action dictated a choice. At the time of the Aranjuez coup, Bonaparte was continuing to reinforce the occupation of Spain while escalating diplomatic pressure intended to force the country to political capitulation if possible, or military confrontation if necessary. The removal of Godoy, essential to the French solution, promised to open the way to French domination; it had been prepared by the shadow over Fernando's succession cast by the Escorial affair, and by Charles's inability to reject Paris's demands transmitted by Izquierdo.

While Murat agonized over the significance of Aranjuez, Izquierdo returned to Paris on 20 March to discuss with Talleyrand and Duroc the Spanish government's response to the multiple French propositions he had personally delivered to Charles and Godoy at the beginning of the month. From Izquierdo's dispatch of 24 March detailing fresh French demands, it seems clear that at that moment Bonaparte and his advisers, still unaware of Aranjuez, expected to impose France's agenda on Spain through escalated diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of force. Paris now advanced that, in view of French forces in Spain, "un arreglo hecho entre el govierno francés y español con recíproca satisfacción puede detener los eventos, y elevarse a solemne tratado."

French treaty proposals gave priority to Bonaparte's promise to traders at Bayonne (and voiced by Bordeaux merchant Chabannes in late 1807) to insert under the guise of reciprocity French commercial interests into Spain's American colonies. The proposed treaty stipulated, first, that in "las colonias españolas y francesas podrán franceses y españoles comerciar libremente, el francés en las españolas como si fuese español y reciprocamente el español como se fuese francés en las francesas, pagando unos y otros los derechos que se paguen en los respectivos países por sus naturales." What would be in effect a privileged position would exclude all other nations. Second, Spain would absorb Portugal while France annexed Spanish provinces north of the Ebro contiguous to France. The succession to the throne of Spain, which was the third provision, would be settled "once and for all." And, fourth, a new treaty of mutual offense and defense would follow.

Izquierdo's accompanying memo to Charles and Godoy made clear his interpretation of the French proposals. He had earlier cogently observed to Talleyrand that "abrir nuestras Américas al comercio francés es partirlas entre España y el Imperio francés; que abrirlas únicamente para los franceses es dado que no quede de una vez arrollada la arrogancia inglesa alejar cada día más la paz y perder, hasta que se firme, nuestras comunicaciones y las de los franceses con aquellas regiones." As for the proposed territorial transfers, Izquierdo had countered that Portugal without Brazil would be more burden than benefit to Spain, while annexation by France of Spanish territory along the Pyrenees would contradict the Treaty of Fontainebleau and—worse—be wholly unacceptable to the area's population. Finally, Izquierdo had been brutally frank when he asked Talleyrand if French plans included putting French troops on Spanish soil masked under the "decoroso nombre de 'Tratado Ofensivo y Defensivo.'" Such garrisons were unnecessary, Izquierdo pointed out, given, first, the Hispano-French alliance and, second, Spain's proven ability to defend Buenos Aires, El Ferrol, Cadiz, and

the Canaries. Izquierdo ended his memo with the barely concealed warning of the ministry at Paris that Madrid avoid hostile actions that might bring "fatales conséquencias" and respond without delay to the French government's demands.[100]

What was a virtual ultimatum, designed to force the Spanish court to flight or fight, reached Spain a week after Fernando had entered Madrid and days after news of Aranjuez reached Paris. Fernando's accession short-circuited the French strategy and clearly was not among the scenarios envisaged by Bonaparte. Trusted advisers now counseled him that young Fernando, clearly the creature of Francophobe factions, would prove even more obstructive of French goals than his father.

Thus, events at Aranjuez now made not only necessary but possible the dynastic substitution that had long been Napoleon's preferred option in the Spanish problem. Most important, however, the double coup at Aranjuez meant that the manner in which this occurred was predetermined by Spanish crisis managers in the name of Fernando. The road to Bayonne had been opened by Spaniards themselves.

Coda

The coup removing Godoy—prominent official and confidant of Charles and María Luisa—was a confluence of many currents. Or are they better termed ambivalences?

One ambivalence was French foreign policy to maintain Spain as an ally with colonial staples and precious metals from which both could benefit. Yet French policy had to restrain trading and manufacturing interests demanding greater access to the ally's colonies, which Frenchmen in the public and private sectors considered ineffectively exploited. Contained under France's old regime, those interests became dominant during and after the Revolution, all the more so after Madrid—under recently appointed Manuel Godoy—temporarily abandoned the Franco-Hispanic alliance to join England's first anti-French coalition. Years later, after the collapse of the Directoire, the French saw in a triumphant, postrevolutionary Bonaparte a cooperative sponsor of muscular intervention in Spain's domestic politics. Behind Bonaparte's policy of demanding financial support from an ally seeking to maintain neutrality was the disappearance of France's mirage in the West: the loss of Canada, then Saint-Domingue, and, providing confirmation, the unexpected abandonment of Louisiana. Bonaparte and his associates had another mirage: they were convinced that regime change at

Madrid—Godoy's removal—would be welcomed by disaffected elements of Spain's elites and political class.

The error of the French was in viewing the opposition to Godoy's policies as monolithic. Aristocrats were embittered by exclusion from high political office during the eighteenth century, especially irked by the appointment of an *arriviste* from Extremadura, Godoy, which coincided with the upsurge of quick wealth and flamboyant corruption associated with a kind of peninsular *jeunesse dorée*. This troubled, for instance, a naive Malaspina returning from a tour of the colonies to Madrid in the 1790s, who proceeded to associate with disaffected aristocrats. To this group of disaffected was joined Spain's clerical establishment, which had welcomed the counterrevolutionary, nonjuring French clergy self-exiled to Spain. For its part, the Spanish clergy was riled by the Godoy administration's fiscal policy, especially the Consolidación subsequently extended to New Spain and other American colonies in 1804. Moreover, French observers minimized the affinity of many in the aristocratic opposition for the English "model" of monarchy, stable and counterrevolutionary.

French observers also erred in misunderstanding that other segment of the opposition to Godoy, the liberal-minded military and political elites impatient with the old regime's general immobility. Many among them indeed were attracted to the French "model," epitomized by an authoritarian military figure, Napoleon Bonaparte, who had brought stability *and* change to post-Directoire France. However, just as Beauharnais and Tournon overlooked the Anglophile current in the aristocratic opposition, so they failed to perceive that Spanish "liberals" (*ilustrados*) were deeply committed nationalists, not Francophiliacs. They sought a Spanish path to change.

There was a second ambivalence, the aim of successive administrations at Madrid to maintain an elusive neutrality between the two hegemons seeking to dominate the Atlantic. Never easy to pursue, the policy became impossible to maintain after 1804 and then Trafalgar on the one hand and, on the other, France's successful penetration of central Europe. Except for the shipping of neutral U.S. merchants, whom English naval forces allowed to enter Veracruz, the English virtually shut down contact between Veracruz and Cadiz. The alliance with France became, for many of the Spanish elite, intolerable.

What brought disaffected Spanish elites and French merchants and manufacturers to focus on Godoy and his administrators was a shared interest in shaping Spanish policy through regime change. For both sides of the Pyrenees, removing Godoy became essential. At this juncture the core issue

for Madrid remained an old one—how Spain might preserve the loyalty of elites in the American colonies, or limit their aspiration for autonomy or independence. This would be the core issue in the four years after the Escorial affair. Spaniards believed that England would welcome resistance to France under Napoleon and might not encourage colonial independence. And if Godoy managed to spirit Charles and María Luisa to New Spain—in effect, repeating the flight of the Braganzas to Brazil at the end of 1807—the trade of Spain's colonial empire might be opened to allied and friendly nations. This is why Napoleon wanted Junot to hurry through Portugal to seize the Braganzas before they embarked aboard the English fleet at Lisbon for Rio; and this is why Napoleon sent Murat to Madrid to forestall the withdrawal of Godoy and the Bourbons southward to Cadiz and, probably, from there to Mexico City.

The Spanish elites who orchestrated Godoy's *escarmiento* understood the importance of continuity in government, which would provide no justification to the colonial elites to claim temporary sovereignty under the cloak of autonomy and to break out of the Spanish system of managed Atlantic trade. This explains why they sent Fernando north to meet Napoleon, not south to Cadiz. At Bayonne the French thought military power would overcome Spanish guile; but French intervention to change the Spanish regime would encounter stubborn guerrillas and the disasters of war in the peninsula. Murat's reaction to the Dos de Mayo transformed French forces from "liberators" to "occupiers." And with the breakdown of central government in Spain and the upsurge of regional juntas claiming to represent the "nation," colonial elites could seize the opportunity to move toward autonomy. This is the complicated interaction of metropole and colonies between the spring of 1808 and the fall of 1810.

2. Bayonne

Les Amériques, inquiets sur le destin de la mère patrie, perdant toute considération pour un sceptre faible et pour un throne renversé par les membres même de la famille royale, pourraient se laisser aller aux suggestions des enemis du Continent et priver pour jamais l'Europe des avantages qui sont attachés à leur possession.

Napoleon Bonaparte, *Proclamation*, May 1808

Una nación no puede tener menos derechos que un particular. Quien vituperará la política porque procure la salud del estado por les medios que se reputan legítimos en uno de sus miembros? Quien rehusará a los Reyes los recursos del artificio y del engaño que goza el último de los ciudadanos, quando es injustamente attachés à leur possession?

Pedro Cevallos, *Observaciones*

En la crisis más trascendental de nuestra historia moderna, los monarcas, al despojarse de sus atributos, han abandonado la soveranía. Miguel Artola, *Orígenes*

There is only one thing to do in this world, and that is to keep acquiring money and more money, power and more power. All the rest is meaningless.

Napoleon Bonaparte to Joseph Bonaparte, Paris, 1795, in Esdaile, *Peninsular War*

There is no evidence of either mediation or arbitration of the claims between the Spanish and French parties—the Bourbon royal family and Napoleon Bonaparte—gathered at Bayonne. In fact, aside from the final documents signed there in early May and the letters exchanged between the Spanish principals, there appears to be no bona fide record of what transpired between the arrival of Fernando on 20 April and the internment of the Bourbons in France in mid-May. One historian has noted that "és difícil la reconstrucción definitiva de los hechos."[1]

Successive historical treatments of the event have been based largely on the accounts provided by Pedro Cevallos in his famous manifesto of Sep-

tember 1808 denouncing Napoleon's political "piracy"[2] and on the slightly variant account of Juan Escoiquiz published in 1814 and rearticulated with a new twist in his memoirs years later.[3] The French principals at Bayonne, Bonaparte, Champagny, and Duroc left no details of their participation in their memoirs.[4] The recollection of one of Bonaparte's advisers, the Abbé de Pradt, added little factual substance to Escoiquiz's version. With the exception of the correspondence of Bonaparte and Murat published in the nineteenth century, relevant archival materials and diplomatic correspondence are singularly lacking for the critical interval between 20 April and 12 May. Thus the treaty of Bayonne, by which Charles IV transferred the crown of Spain to Napoleon Bonaparte, the convention providing for other members of his family, statements exchanged between Fernando and his father Charles before Bayonne and addressed to the Spanish people afterward, and the position paper of 24 April signed by Champagny advocating the dynastic substitution, in reality a change of regime—all constitute the only *official* record of what happened at Bayonne. The dearth of basic information may be partly explained by the destruction of sensitive documents by Spanish and French policy makers after the restoration of Fernando as king in 1814.[5] Probably, however, the tacit understanding on the exchange of national guarantees of dynastic rights reached before Bayonne meant that the term *mediation* was employed by each party to obscure well-calculated but unavoidable ends.[6]

Cevallos's account of the antecedents and developments at Bayonne were decisive in filling this historiographical vacuum. However, Cevallos's *Exposición* must be viewed in the context of its time and place. Printed by the government's Imprenta Real at Madrid in early September 1808, it followed after the *fernandista* insurgency that was initiated by the uprising at Madrid on the Dos de Mayo; after the unexpected—and encouraging—defeat at Bailén of French forces penetrating Andalusia under General Dupont; and after French forces abandoned the first siege of Zaragoza. Joseph Bonaparte had recently come to Madrid from Bayonne, where as the king of Spain and the Indies he had received the oath of loyalty of high Spanish officials and members of the Spanish elites assembled to approve a constitution for Spain and then had to withdraw with government officials to Vitoria.

For Cevallos, who had accompanied Fernando VII to Madrid as his foreign minister, the long-awaited decisive moment to consolidate a viable *fernandista* government had arrived. Deputies of the autonomous provincial juntas representing Fernando were forming a central government able to coordinate the resistance to occupying troops, administer the colonies, and enter into formal alliance with England. Unity was now imperative. It

was also the moment for Cevallos to appeal to all Europe and the Atlantic world to support—even imitate—Spain as it struggled against France by denouncing those "torpes medios de que se ha servido el emperador de los Franceses" in his "atroz violencia" against Spain and its new monarch.[7]

Cevallos's polemic was distributed with nothing short of extraordinary rapidity. Copies were immediately distributed or reprinted in every major Spanish city, while simultaneously a Lisbon edition appeared. Sample copies together with a French translation were dispatched through diplomatic channels to major European centers. Twenty thousand editions came off presses in Mexico, Lima, and Buenos Aires. In the United States, editions were available before the end of 1808 in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Georgetown, and Charleston.

In view of official silence and public speculation that followed the sensational announcement of the abdication of the Spanish Bourbons at Bayonne, the impact of Cevallos's revelations can scarcely be exaggerated, although the immediacy of their effect varied according to local political conditions and audiences. In England, the Foreign Office had been alerted in April from the listening post at Gibraltar that "the real object of Fernando's journey [was] to put justice on his side" and that "the whole Nation [was] under arms ready to act against the French on the first proof of bad faith."[8] The accuracy of this intelligence report indicates reliable contacts between Gibraltar and Sevilla-Cadiz, at the least. George Canning scarcely needed to be informed by Charles Stuart, who remitted a copy of Cevallos's *Exposición* "on the mysterious transactions between this country and France in the last six months," that it was a "highly important [and] valuable . . . monument." Cevallos's extended pamphlet was a powerful propaganda weapon of the first order.[9] It reviewed with detail the Escorial affair and subsequent developments—all published in the *Gazeta de Madrid*, to be sure—giving what became the official spin to the collapse of Godoy's government at Aranjuez and the premature accession of the Prince of Asturias, Fernando.

To Benito Pardo de Figueroa, far away at Moscow as Spain's ambassador, Cevallos underlined his message. The Spanish government and nation, he wrote, "habían agotado todos sus recursos y experimentado los mayores desastres por conservarse fieles a la alianza estipulada con la Francia," trusting to ward off "las invasiones y trastornos políticos" the French government had inflicted on other European nations. At last, with Spain's treasury empty and its military forces dispersed outside its borders in support of France, Bonaparte had "studiously planned" to perpetrate "una usurpación sin exemplo en la historia." Now, however, Cevallos wrote, when Madrid and many provinces were "liberated from French oppression," he owed "a

la Nación, a la Europa entera y a la Posteridad una relación sencilla, exacta y documentada . . . de los estraños sucesos de Bayona." He urged Pardo de Figueroa to ensure that his *Exposición* was brought to the attention of Russian authorities along with the gazettes reporting the surprising defeat of Dupont's army at Bailén in Andalusia, the failure of the French siege of Zaragoza in Aragon, and the welcome news of the American colonies' support of Fernando. Here was the immediate origin of the crisis of the Bourbon regime in Spain and its empire.[10]

The *Exposición*

The goal of the *Exposición*, Cevallos declared in opening paragraphs, was informing the nation about "las verdaderas causas que la han traído al estado actual, y a manternerla firmemente en el noble ardor que la anima" and showing Spain and the world "los torpes medios de que se ha servido el Emperador de los Franceses para aprisionar a nuestro Rei Fernando VII, y avasallar a esta nación."

Europe, he was certain, was aware that since the Treaty of Basle, Spain had maintained its "ruinous alliance" with France, sacrificing navy, army, and funds to its ally "sin que se pensase nunca en preservar a la nación de las maquinacioanes de un aliado que iba corriendo la Europe como conquistador." After Tilsit, the French government "resolvió la ruina de Portugal y de la España" by reducing them to the same status as Italy, Holland, Switzerland, and the Confederation of the Rhine. Seeking a pretext to carry out this "gigantesco y atrevido plan de avasallar una nación amiga y aliada, que tantos sacrificios había hecho por la Francia," Napoleon—never fastidious in choice of means to achieve his ends—decided to use his ambassador at Madrid to foment discord in the heart of Spain's royal family. Beauharnais tried to seduce Fernando, proposing marriage to a relative of Napoleon. Fernando, the prince of Asturias, under pressure accepted Beauharnais's proposition, then wrote Napoleon as Beauharnais insinuated. There was reason to believe, Cevallos asserted, that the subsequent scandalous imprisonment of Fernando in the late fall of 1807—the Escorial affair—was touched off by the revelations of a French agent and that the equally scandalous decree accusing Fernando of sedition (which Charles had to sign) was also part of the French conspiracy. Spain, however, aware of the "god-fearing rectitude" of Prince Fernando, suspected at once that the proposition was contrived by Godoy "con tanta absurdidad como audacia, para sacrificar el único obstáculo que entonces se oponía a sus miras." But Godoy, intimidated by the public's reaction to Fernando's unjustified

imprisonment, now tried to reconcile father and son by forging letters that he forced Fernando to sign and which moved his parents to grant him pardon and "apparent freedom."

Meanwhile, Cevallos continued in his exposé, the Treaty of Fontainebleau, "negotiated and signed" by Spain's representative Eugenio Izquierdo and Marshal Duroc for France without the "slightest" participation or even knowledge of the Spanish ministry that Cevallos headed, was the subterfuge used by Bonaparte to seize Portugal, evict the Bourbon royalty from Tuscany, and insert French forces into Spain, where they surreptitiously occupied Spain's fortresses at Pamplona, San Sebastian, Figueres, and Barcelona. In position to control Spain, Bonaparte then sent Izquierdo back to Madrid with a series of verbal demands designed to terrorize Charles and Godoy into abandoning "la capital y la peninsula y trasladarse a México."[11] The recent example of the Portuguese royal family, Cevallos opined, "parecía haber llenado las miras del Emperador; y es de creer que S.M.I. se prometió éxito en España."

Bonaparte, Cevallos continued, discounted the Spanish people: "El descontento y temor se vieron pintados en todos los semblantes," and consequently the plan was abandoned. Even so, "Era tal la desconfianza general, tanta la grandeza de los males que debían seguirse, y tales y tantos los síntomos de la resolución de aumentarse," that the sudden unexpected developments at Aranjuez on 17 and 19 March resulted in the imprisonment of Godoy "que sin el título de Rei había exercido, por decirlo así, exclusivamente y por muchos años las funciones de tal."[12] Now Charles and María Luisa, "viendose sin el apoyo de su Favorito, tomaron la inesperada y espontánea resolución, a que estaban determinados algun tiempo había, de abdicar su corona . . . en su hijo y heredero." Bonaparte, however, "no sospechando siquiera que los españoles fuesen capaces de semejante resolución," presumed that the royal family would be on the southern coast about to embark for America, leaving Spaniards ready to receive him "con los brazos abiertos." On that supposition, Napoleon had ordered Murat to enter Madrid with his forces on March 23 to prepare for his announced arrival.

When Fernando VII entered the capital on 24 March acclaimed as "el regenerador y ángel tutelar de todos sos vasallos," he was immediately recognized as king of Spain by the diplomatic corps except by the French. Murat immediately "empezó a sembrar la discordia" by declaring that, in view of the circumstances in which Charles had abdicated at Aranjuez, he must await further orders from Paris. Meanwhile, he tried to remove Fernando from Madrid by urging that he meet the emperor reported to be nearing the capital. At the same time, continued the *Exposición*, Murat, Beauharnais,

and French agents "maniobraban por otro lado con los Reyes Padres para arrancarles una formal protesta contra la abdicación de la corona" which—to the contrary, Cevallos reiterated—had been made "espontaneamente . . . con las solemnidades acostumbradas."

Cevallos claimed that, despite his advice to Charles not to leave Madrid until he was certain that Bonaparte was near the capital, the arrival of Bonaparte's key informal agent, Savary, ended his reluctance. Bonaparte dispatched Savary, Cevallos went on to explain, to ascertain whether Fernando's "sentimientos con respecto a la Francia eran conformes a los del Rei su padre." A Francophobic Fernando and his associates could undermine hope in continued Franco-Hispanic cooperation. If Savary would affirm Fernando's favorable response, "El Emperador prescindería de todo lo ocurrido, no se mezclaría en mada de lo interior del reino, y reconocería desde luego a S.M. por Rei de España y de las Indias." Informed by Savary that Bonaparte was near Madrid, Fernando set aside "toda repugnancia y temor" and set out to greet him—a gesture he was told would gratify Bonaparte. On the day of his departure, Savary "aparentando el mayor zelo e interés por S.M., manifestó desear el honor de acompañarle en su viage"; indeed, Savary followed in a separate coach as far as Burgos. At that point, the *Exposición*'s readers learned, Savary, convinced that Fernando would go no further, continued on to Bayonne to brief Napoleon and presumably obtain a letter that would persuade Fernando "to leave his people."

"Nada particular ocurrió en Vitoria," wrote Cevallos cryptically of the four-day stopover at the capital of the province of Álava, while at Bayonne "combino el general Savary con el emperador . . . para dar el último golpe" as French troops cantoned around Vitoria "hacían, según se supo después, algunos movimientos sospechosos." Savary now reappeared with a letter from Bonaparte containing, according to Cevallos, "expresiones poco decorosas y no muy lisongeras." Nonetheless, Savary "añadió tales y tantas protestas del interés que tomaba el Emperador por S. M. y por la España, que llegó a decir: 'Me debo cortar la cabeza si al quarto de hora de haber llegado S.M. a Bayona, no le ha reconocido el Emperador por Rei de España y de las Indias.'" Fernando, again disregarding the alleged advice of Cevallos, decided to continue to Bayonne "no pudiendo concebir su Real ánimo que un Soberano aliado suyo quisiese hospedarle para aprisionarle, y para acabar con una dinastía, que lejos de haberle jamás ofendido, le había dado pruebas tan relevantes de amistad." Even when, after crossing the border, he met the grandees whom he had sent to France in March and received their even more negative prognostication, Cevallos wrote that there was now no turning back.

On entering Bayonne, the *Exposición* continued, Fernando was met by General Duroc who led him to poorly furnished quarters. There Bonaparte—joined by his generals—offered a brief welcome and "the two sovereigns embraced each other." That evening Fernando was invited to dine with Bonaparte at the palace of Marrac where he was received with similar hospitality. On returning to his quarters, however, Savary shocked Fernando and his counselors with the news that "el Emperador había determinado irrevocablemente que no reinase la dinastía de Borbon de España, y que en su lugar sucediese la suya, a cuyo efecto quería S.M.I. que el Rei renunciase por si y por toda su familia la corona de España y sus Indias."

Cevallos found it difficult to recapture the astonishment of Fernando. A tired Fernando found that "el mismo hombre que le había llenado de seguridades en Madrid y en el camino, que le había arrancado de su corte y su reino para arreglar en Bayona puntos importantes a los dos estados, y ser reconocido por S.M.I., tiene la osadía de presentar con una proposición tan escandalosa." Cevallos was building a case in which a monarch loyal to the alliance with France was betrayed by misguided confidence.

The following day, called by Bonaparte to discuss with Champagny the verbal demands presented by Savary, Cevallos recalled that he protested Savary's "perfidy" to the French foreign minister. He also recalled assurances tendered in Bonaparte's name at Madrid as well as the promise that Fernando would be recognized as king "el momento que se verificase la entrevista de los dos Soberanos en el palacio imperial de Marrac." Cevallos reminded Champagny that he was fully authorized to protest the violence against the king's person, "no permitiendole volver a España" nor respond to Bonaparte's demands "categorica y terminantemente que el Rei no podía ni debía renunciar su corona a favor de otra dinastía, sin faltar a lo que debía a sus vasallos y a su propia reputación; que tampoco podía hacerlo en perjuicio de los individuos de su familia . . . ni menos podía condescender en que reinase otra dinastía, que sólo debería ser llamado al trono por la nación española en virtud de los derechos originarios que tiene para eligirse otra familia luego que se concluya la que actualmente reina."

To Champagny's claim that Charles's abdication had not been voluntary, Foreign Minister Cevallos declared that he himself had often overheard Charles express a wish to abandon the burden of government to Fernando and retire to private life. The people's action at Aranjuez, Cevallos pointed out, had been just a response to the belief that Charles might abandon Spain for refuge in America. By indirection, Cevallos was implying that the mere rumor of a royal retreat to the colonies overseas threatened the vast web of colonial interests in the metropole. As for Champagny's asser-

tion that Bonaparte could never trust the Bourbons in wartime, he retorted that state interest always prevailed over ties of blood in relations between nations, as shown in the alliance between France and Spain once the peace treaty at Basle in 1795 ended Spain's war against France, 1793–1795.[13] "Todas las razones de la política persuadía a la España que viviese en perpétua paz con la Francia," he assured Champagny. However, should the Spanish nation see "ultrajada la independencia y seguridad de su idolatrado Soberano," he warned, France would lose an ally whose assistance had been critical in its triumphs. England, which had vainly tempted the Spanish government to separate from France, "aprovecharía esta coyuntura para disminuir las fuerzas de su enemigo." He predicted that London would supply Spain with arms, money, and naval power for "la gloriosa empresa de defender la independencia y seguridad de su Rei y señor natural." Furthermore, France's enfeebled colonies in America would no longer count on Spain's naval forces to block Great Britain's aggressive projects, and British traders would no longer have to compete in Spanish markets with French imports privileged by Spanish tariffs.

Above all, Cevallos claimed he had cautioned Champagny of the threat to France's reputation inherent in violating the recently signed Treaty of Fontainebleau that guaranteed the independence and integrity of Spain's monarchy. This brought Cevallos to what was one—if not *the*—main argument of his *Exposición*, the justification of resistance against a deceitful one-time ally. Once the rest of the world learned of the promises luring Fernando to Bayonne to strip him of a throne he had accepted according to the fundamental laws of the nation as a result of the voluntary abdication of his "august Father," posterity would refuse to believe, declared Cevallos, "que el Emperador haya podido dar un golpe tan decisivo a su reputación, cuya pérdida no dexa a sus guerras otro medio de concluirlas que el estrago y la exterminacion."

At this point in the dialogue between Cevallos and Champagny, according to the *Exposición*, Napoleon—listening to the exchange from a neighboring room—interrupted to charge Cevallos with treason to Charles "merely" because he insisted on serving Fernando, his son; and he excoriated him for confiding to a foreign diplomat that if France violated the integrity and independence of Spain, 300,000 Spaniards would prove that "no se insulta impunement a una nación fuerte y generosa." Bonaparte ended the confrontation by advising Cevallos that he should "espouse more liberal principles and not sacrifice the prosperity of Spain to the interests of the Bourbon family."

Bonaparte then requested Fernando to replace Cevallos with a "more

flexible negotiator." However, the replacement, Pedro Gómez de Labrador, hastily sworn in and carefully instructed by Cevallos, repeated the same arguments that ended in another stalemate. When Labrador raised the question of Fernando's return to Spain and was unanswered, while the number of French security agents surrounding Fernando increased, Cevallos concluded Fernando was Bonaparte's virtual prisoner. Frustrated in his attempt to overcome the tenacity of Fernando and the zeal of his retinue, Bonaparte resorted to another tactic: he ordered Murat to ensure that Charles and María Luisa were brought to Bayonne "para hacerles el instrumento de la opresión y desgracia de su Hijo."

Cevallos reflected at some length on Bonaparte's ability "borrar del corazón del Rei Padre [y] arrancar de sus entrañas el amor por su Hijo primogénito, que la intriga más horrenda de corte no había podido del todo extinguir," on how Charles and María Luisa indeed became the "executioners" (*verdugos*) of their son. For example, Cevallos wrote that Charles, on arriving at Bayonne, told Fernando that although he wished to neither reign nor return to Spain, nevertheless he insisted on proposing that Fernando "renuncie en su favor la corona, para hacer un presente con ella al Emperador; esto es"—Cevallos added ironically—"a un Soberano que ha sido en parte el orígen de las necesidades de España, la única causa de la pérdida de nuestras escuadras, el principio de los temores y sobresaltos de la corte y de la nación, y el intento de viage de la Familia Real a Sevilla y a la America." Cevallos left to the judgment of European readers his rhetorical question: "Si es posible que un Monarca amante de sus hijos, dotado de luces, penetrado de los principios de la religión, y piadoso sin superstición, olvida en un momento, sin estar violentado,[14] todas sus relaciones de familia, y firme el decreto de proscripción de toda su dinastía, para llamar otra que no estima, antes bien, detesta como attentadora a los tronos que pueden lisongear su ambición?"

In this fashion, Cevallos related, Fernando VII, "conducido por el respeto, preso y forzado por las circunstancias, hizo una renuncia condicional de su corona a favor de su augusto Padre." To the letter containing Fernando's obviously reluctant proposal, Charles replied, accusing his son and his counselors of undermining the *monarquía* and its alliance with France. In turn, Fernando replied to his father in a "prudentísima contestación," which Cevallos included with previous letters in a long documentary appendix to his *Exposición*.

Fernando's conditional renunciation (evidently Cevallos's handiwork), after reiterating the basic points of the *Exposición*, resurrected a neglected exchange between father and son after Charles had reached Bayonne. Here

presumably Charles ordered Fernando to return his crown; Fernando asked why his father wanted the crown returned, since he had told him that "ni quería reinar, ni menos volver a España." Nevertheless, Fernando agreed to abandon his throne moved by love, respect, and filial obedience, as well as to protect his "beloved vassals" from civil war. He attached a condition: that Charles accompany him back to Madrid and convene a *cortes* since it alone could sanction the transfer of the crown.[15] Cevallos's intention in creating the appendix is murky: Did he consider the pitfalls of uncoordinated local juntas of "popular" inspiration, or of a revived *cortes* representing the "nation," which did materialize two years later?

Significantly, Cevallos—a masterful propagandist—also added to the *Exposición*'s appendix the text of Charles's letter rejecting Fernando's conditional renunciation. In it Charles dismissed Fernando's proposed *cortes* as just another "foolish" (*necia*) idea advanced by inexperienced counselors.[16] He accused Fernando of accepting their "perfidious" intent to abandon the alliance with France. That alliance, despite its upsides and downsides, Charles declared, had protected the Bourbon monarchy in Spain since 1795 and preserved Spain's neutrality until an English fleet attacked Spanish shipping at the end of 1804 and reopened war with England. "La España, rodeada de costas y que debe una gran parte de su prosperidad a sus posesiones ultramarinas, sufrió con la guerra más que qualquier otro estado." The letter continued: "La interrupción del comercio y todos los estragos que acarrea afligieron a mis vasallos; y cierto número de ellos tuvo la injusticia de atribuirlos a mis Ministros." Fernando, under the influence of his wife, shared her Francophobic sentiments and ill-conceived resentment of Charles, María Luisa, and the Godoy administration; he accepted the leadership of the faction conspiring against the government and Charles himself. His involvement brought his arrest; but despite the pardon his father granted, propaganda disseminated by his supporters and their secret contacts with Bonaparte had brought the occupation of Spain by French forces. Their penetration into Spain inspired Charles's proposal to withdraw south to a more secure site; the proposal failed, paralyzed by the faction that resorted to ill-advised violence to crown Fernando king. So Charles had to conclude that the "Escorial conspiracy had now achieved its end." Yet it was clear, he added, that Fernando would never be recognized by Bonaparte, in whose hands the fate of Spain now lay. In this situation "el pensar en recurrir a agitaciones populares es arruinar la España," Charles emphasized. "He reinado para la felicidad de mis vasallos y no quiero dejarles la guerra civil, los motines, las juntas populares y la revolución . . . y cuando, en fin, esté seguro que la religión de España, la integridad de sus provincias, su

independencia y sus privilegios serán conservados, bajaré al ssepulcro perdonandolos . . . la amargura de mis ultimos años."[17]

Charles's accusatory letter inspired what Cevallos called a "prudentísima contestación" from Fernando—a letter probably written later by Cevallos to reinforce and lend greater consistency to the message he hoped his *Exposición* would convey. Fernando expressed full support for Charles's faithful adherence to the French alliance, and he attested that he, too, had proved his adhesion to that alliance from the moment he became king in March. Moreover, he had not shared his father's suspicion (*desconfianza*) caused by the entry of "tantas tropas extrangeras en España." After all, he wrote slyly, those soldiers arrived as friends and allies to be received with "una total confianza." He explained that Spanish troops had been recalled from Portugal not to "sostener la gloria del trono," as Charles claimed, but "sostener sus vasallos" by covering retreat to Sevilla and—all agreed—to transport the royal family to America. The people's protest at Aranjuez had been a response to that intention and was not related to Charles's decision to abandon his throne.

After repeating Cevallos's emphasis on the spontaneity of Charles's abdication, Fernando cited measures he had authorized to assure Bonaparte of Spain's support of France, by sending a deputation of grandees to greet Bonaparte in his name, then adding his "beloved brother" to the group, and, finally, by setting out himself fully confident of Bonaparte's recognition as assured by Beauharnais, Murat, and Savary. As for correspondence containing derogatory remarks about France presumably in Bonaparte's possession, Fernando confessed he could neither account for them nor know how Bonaparte might have obtained the letters, since he had written nothing of the kind.

Cevallos recalled that the day after Fernando wrote his letter, Bonaparte visited Charles and María Luisa, who called their son to hear their "expresiones y dictados tan denigrativos y humillantes" that Cevallos refused to record them. Peremptorily Charles ordered Fernando to renounce the crown, otherwise he—and associates—would be considered "usurpador de la corona y conspirador contra la vida de sus Padres." Unwilling to involve supporters in his disgrace, Fernando had to retract the conditions attached to his renunciation, then signed his devolution the next day (6 May), which followed his father's abdication on the day before.

Fernando's renunciation was the only such document included in the *Exposición*, the only one where Cevallos as foreign secretary admitted a role. In the document, Fernando expressed surprise at the way his father had humiliated him in the presence of his "venerada madre" and Bonaparte

merely because of reasonable conditions inserted in his renunciation. Faced with the possibility he and supporters would be considered "reos de conspiración," Fernando complied with his father's command.

Cevallos's account of developments at Bayonne did not end there, however. He proceeded to note that he had used special agents, to circumvent interception of regular couriers, and to keep Madrid's Junta de Gobierno abreast of the situation. Observing the worsening situation, Fernando expected Madrid's Junta to reform as a new Junta de Regencia "en parage seguro" and initiate an anti-French insurgency if necessary. That a Regencia did not appear Cevallos attributed to the "irrestible fuerza" available to Murat, who—along with Cevallos and others—must have reasoned that a Regencia would prevent Napoleon from imposing his own ruling figure at Madrid. Hence Cevallos sent to Madrid a Real Orden (probably drafted by himself) granting virtually unlimited discretion "para que executase quanto convenía al servicio del Rei y del reino: y que al efecto usase de todas las facultades que S.M. desplegaría si se hallase dentro de sus estados." Did Cevallos foresee the eventual internment of the royal family in France? Fear of interception, he would claim, prevented him from writing more clearly.[18]

Meanwhile, a bewildered Junta de Gobierno at Madrid dispatched an agent north to Bayonne seeking critical royal directives. Should it reconstitute itself as a Consejo de Regencia, or should such a council consist of other representatives? If the latter, should the king or Junta itself appoint the membership? Should hostilities be initiated against French occupying forces? And if so, how and when? Did Fernando want to commence hostilities by closing frontier crossings to prevent the entry of French reinforcements? Did he want the Cortes to be convened, in which case a royal decree addressed to the Consejo de Castilla was needed or—in case the Consejo itself were no longer at liberty to execute a royal order—to "qualquiera Chancillería o Audiencia del reino que se hallase desembarazada de las tropas francesas?" (Despite this critical moment in the life of the *monarquía*, the traditional government legislating process had to be followed.) And, finally, if the Cortes convened, which issues should be addressed?

The Junta's agent carried these queries to Bayonne, and immediately on 4 May Cevallos presented them to Fernando as king. In response, two royal decrees were issued the next morning. One, "written in the king's own hand"—so affirmed Cevallos—was addressed to the Junta de Gobierno; the second—merely initialed by Fernando—was directed to the Consejo de Castilla or, in its absence, to any *chancillería* or *audiencia* anywhere in unoccupied Spain. Cevallos claimed that they reached one member (name withheld) of the Junta at Madrid who "no hizo uso alguno del lo que la

concernía, y ni tampoco pasó al consejo él que venía dirigido para él." By that time, he clarified, the French had triggered the events of 2 May in order to seize control of the central government; Murat had taken over the presidency of the Junta de Gobierno, and the remaining Bourbons packed off to Bayonne. Cevallos confessed that fear of compromising Fernando with the French led him to destroy the two important decrees signed on 5 May, but he testified that in substance they authorized the Junta de Gobierno "en la forma más ámplia para que en cuerop o substituyendose en una o muchas personas que la representase, se trasladase al paraje que creyes más conviene; y que en nombre de S.M. . . . exerciese todas las funciones de la soberanía. Que las hostilidades deberían empezar desde el momento en que internasen a S.M. en Francia . . . y . . . que en llegando ese caso, tratase le Junta de impedir . . . la entrada de nuestras tropas en la peninsula."[19] In a footnote, Cevallos called attention to the "perfecto acuerdo . . . entre la voluntad del Rei manifestada a la Junta en su Real decreto de 5 de mayo y la determinación de sus leaales vasallos, pues hemos visto casi todas las provincias de la monarquía levantarse e un mismo tiempo espontaneamente contra la opresión, sin tener el menor antecedente de la voluntad de su Soberano." As proof of the authenticity of the two decrees signed or initialed by Fernando on 5 May, Cevallos cited the sworn testimony of three members of Cevallos's *Secretaria de Estado* signed on 1 September, Eusebio de Bardaxi, Luis de Onís, and Evaristo Pérez de Castro.[20]

Anatomy of Bayonne

"Presentar a Buonaparte en la actitud de un usurpador; despojarle de las apariencias de la justicia;[21] levantar el velo que cubría los excesos de su ambición; hacer ver a la España que sus derechos y los del Rey fueron defendidos tanto como permitieron las circunstancias; y que las virtudes de S.M. eran dignas de la suerte que las leyes y el voto unánime de la nación le habían deparado"—thus six years later Cevallos listed in his *Observaciones* the motives in writing what was partly exposition and more manifesto.[22] He now conceded in painting a Manichaean canvas of events that he had purposely omitted what was irrelevant to his purpose, or injurious to the reputations of some participants. It was the bare documentary testimony of Napoleon, however, that he claimed proved his case against the emperor of the French. Upon this unvarnished evidence, he argued, "descansa la verdad de la historia," whose "leyes severas" he had respected in drafting the "reflexiones convenientes a la instrucción de los hechos."

Analyzing the background of the dethronement of the Spanish Bour-

bons suggests, however, in the evidence omitted as well as fabricated and in his "reflexiones" on both, that Cevallos abandoned the role of historian for the parti pris of defender of the old regime in Spain against the expansionism of postrevolutionary France. That role required the obscure artifices he and associates had employed in preparing the Bayonne scenario for the purpose of stirring a cause célèbre to unite Spain and hopefully other European states against an imperialist France.

Evidence presented earlier, contrary to assertions in the *Exposición*, shows that the attempted coup at the Escorial was hardly the result of Napoleon's Machiavellian plan to divide the royal family. Rather it implemented a design devised by Escoiquiz, in association with conservatives in Spain's Foreign Ministry led by Cevallos, to entrap Godoy and persuade Bonaparte how easily Spain's domestic divisions, combined with military intervention sanctioned by the Treaty of Fontainebleau, might facilitate French control once Bonaparte could replace a Bourbon monarch with a Bonaparte.

Cevallos did not claim that the ouster of Godoy followed by Charles's abdication—the successful double *golpe* at Aranjuez—was the result of Bonaparte's intervention, as well he might have.[23] Rather, he ascribed the initial coup that finally ousted Godoy to a public fearful of the consequences of the royal family's rumored flight, responding to the instinct of self-preservation. The following coup bringing Charles's abdication Cevallos attributed first to profound dismay at Godoy's absence, then to Charles's wish to retire, and finally to Charles's willingness to sacrifice his throne in defense of national interest and the imperatives of foreign policy. Cevallos's assertion, that Charles's protest against his forced abdication at Aranjuez was inspired by Murat, flies in the face of evidence in the correspondence of Monthion and Murat. Clearly, the coups at Aranjuez that opened the road to Bayonne were not of Bonaparte's making. Consider Murat's anxiety over any threat to Bonaparte's Spanish policy; his epiphany perceiving an opening for Bonaparte when Charles insisted his abdication was involuntary—the result of force majeure—then implied his interest in retirement in France. In the interval between news of Fernando's succession and that of Charles's retraction, Bonaparte, who had prepared for a different scenario, was disoriented, as his correspondence shows and as historians have in general concluded. Under such circumstances, Bonaparte probably decided to reassure Spain's elites—grandees, nobility, clergy, small bourgeoisie—that French policy would make neither radical administrative nor economic changes.

Moreover, Cevallos's view of Savary as Bonaparte's wily and ruthless

agent who lured Fernando from Madrid to Bayonne is contradicted by Savary's own dispatches.[24] His mission was to reach an understanding with Charles and María Luisa at the Escorial before reaching Madrid, and with the advisers of Fernando there, on mutual guarantees covering Bourbon dynastic rights, subject to formalization at Bayonne. When it was decided that Fernando would depart for Bayonne on 10 May, it was also agreed Savary would proceed well in advance of Fernando and his party. There is no evidence of French troops escorting Fernando, although they controlled Burgos and also Vitoria, where Fernando dallied for several days as determined by his supporters. Frustrated by the delays, Bonaparte ordered Bessières to arrest Fernando if he turned back. Fernando and retinue went on to Bayonne without French escort or Savary.

Attention has already been focused on the omissions and prevarications in Cevallos's account of the five days spent in Vitoria. In recording that nothing important happened there, Cevallos clearly ignored events casting doubt on the message he aimed to project and even fabricated happenings that served his purpose. Thus, while he insisted that he opposed the journey to Bayonne from the start, to the contrary he issued decrees fixing public attention on the serene confidence in Bonaparte's goodwill with which Fernando marched to his fate. To encourage popular expectations, he ordered public prayers throughout the peninsula for the *fernandista* cause while informing the public that Napoleon's ambiguous letter of 16 April provided assurance of benign intentions, and quoting Savary's offer to "have his head cut off" were Fernando not quickly recognized. Reference to the forebodings of Valdés, Cuesta, and Urquijo was omitted.

In formulating his version of what happened at Bayonne, Cevallos had two aims: first, to heighten public expectation that Napoleon would recognize Fernando and, second—his primary one—to dramatize the illegitimacy of Bonaparte's appropriation of the crown of Spain. Nothing was more conducive to that end than Cevallos's assertion that no sooner had Fernando arrived at Bayonne than Napoleon, without demure or debate, declared the Bourbons no longer would rule Spain and that their son Fernando must renounce the crown in his own name, and that of his whole family, in favor of Bonaparte. When Fernando rejected this fiat, Bonaparte allegedly imprisoned him and ordered French commandants at Madrid and Burgos to send Charles to Bayonne where, at Bonaparte's insistence, the father forced his son to return the crown in order to "present" it to Napoleon. Thereby Cevallos demolished the image of "close alliance and intimate friendship" he had fabricated in his well-circulated pronouncement

as foreign secretary and virtual prime minister. His account of subsequent developments at Bayonne merely elaborated this basic theme of Napoleonic perfidy.

Although few voices then and fewer later contested the accuracy of Cevallos's hyperbolic coverage of the extraordinary development at Bayonne, the sequence of events preceding the regime change at Bayonne was not as alleged by Cevallos. Spain's crisis managers played a far more determining role than the prime minister dared admit at that time. If the Bayonne episode indeed contained the elements of a death foretold, Cevallos and his immediate associates (co-conspirators, perhaps) actively participated in officiating at the last rites, drafting the elegy, and preparing the resurrection.

Cevallos's *Exposición* of 1808 had opened with a salvo against Bonaparte that quickly preempted the battlefield of discourse and opinion in several ways. In insisting that Fernando surrender the crown in his own name and that of his whole family, Napoleon implicitly recognized Fernando's legitimacy, for otherwise how could he then transfer it to Bonaparte? Thereby Bonaparte's dramatic announcement removed the issue of the merits of rival Bourbon claims, replacing it with that of Napoleon's deceit—his refusal to fulfill the assurances of recognition made by Savary at Madrid and Vitoria. The journey to Bayonne seeking Napoleon's assumed mediation became not only irrelevant but illusory—in Cevallos's scenario, another of Napoleon's deceits to pursue his criminal objective. Thus the question at Bayonne was transformed from which Bourbon would rule Spain, to what was intended at the beginning, a momentous policy choice. Would the choice be support for the French alliance and war against England, *or* war against France? Spain's political class, unable to opt for the neutrality so desperately pursued by Godoy's administration, would ingeniously choose *both*.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte received encouraging signals—from Charles and other members of the royal family, from Murat at Madrid, and from the Junta de Gobierno there (it had handed Godoy to French custody), which secretly reinstated Charles as king—that Fernando would proceed to Bayonne where Charles would renounce his throne peaceably. Lingering doubts, however, led Bonaparte to rely on military force if the Bourbons proved recalcitrant or—a real possibility—if they were retained by those opposed to French arbitration of Fernando's recognition. Bonaparte's correspondence between the moment he received Savary's report of 8 April and the arrival of the last Bourbon at Bayonne substantiates Cevallos's account of how Bonaparte prepared to achieve French ascendancy in Spain. In omitting the origin of Bonaparte's decision to proceed to Bayonne, however, Cevallos obscured the eminently executed scam in which Spain's crisis man-

agers involved him. To cite Talleyrand, the *manner* in which Bonaparte dethroned the Spanish Bourbons created the cause célèbre that ignited open opposition to France's hegemony in Europe.

On these grounds, it is difficult to challenge Fugier's conclusion that in the Escorial affair Escoiquiz had succeeded in persuading Bonaparte it was possible to crown a member of his family king of Spain without risking a conflict he wished to avoid. Next, Aranjuez's denouement showed Bonaparte that the project was feasible with the unexpected cooperation of Charles IV. For in cryptic messages Charles himself appeared to suggest that a change of dynasty would be acceptable provided France guaranteed Spain's institutions, territorial integrity, and especially its colonial hegemony. Godoy later observed that secretly the Bourbons reinstated Charles, who had gone to Bayonne to surrender the crown peaceably. As Godoy would later comment, the Bourbons proceeded to Bayonne "on their own feet" at the advice of counselors, who could devise no other solution to the Spanish crisis than to divide Spain in two.

The decisions of 1808 and their consequences came under serious scrutiny only after the Bourbons returned from gilded exile in 1814. Then Pedro Cevallos—whose manifesto of 1808 was already an icon of anti-Bonapartist national resistance, Spain's War of Independence—revealed the deceit employed to craft the *manner* whereby Bonaparte would dethrone the Bourbons at Bayonne. At that point, Fernando VII and his entourage returned to Madrid after the exhausting six-year Peninsular War to suppress Spain's brief constitutional interim under the Cortes and—when the metropole was engaged overseas in counterrevolution—to suppress colonial movements for independence. Inevitably questions arose about the wisdom of the decisions of 1808. Cevallos, once again Fernando's foreign secretary, had to defend his role in the events of 1808, countering critics who doubted the veracity of his manifesto as well as the consistency of his behavior at that time. His opportunity surfaced in a controversy over issues raised in Escoiquiz's recently published *Idea sencilla de las razones que motivaron el viage del rey don Fernando VII a Bayona en el mes de abril de 1808*. Now Cevallos revealed the rationale explaining the evident contradictions in Spain's ingenious "politica peculiar" of 1808.

Escoiquiz's defense of the Bayonne episode, published simultaneously in Spain and France in 1814, substantiated and embellished Cevallos's *Exposición*. Unlike Cevallos, however, Escoiquiz justified the design of the royal family traveling to Bayonne with the very rationale he had used to explain Fernando's incriminating letter to Bonaparte in October 1808: his faith in a rationalist Bonaparte, his self-interest, and the record of what

he termed Bonaparte's "moderation" in handling his opposition. Among other incidents, Escoiquiz cited Bonaparte's backing of the Bourbons in Sicily, that is, until their violation of the treaty with France forced him to depose them. It is plausible that Escoiquiz aimed to prove he had no responsibility for the subsequent disasters of Spanish guerrilla resistance to French occupying forces.

In his manifesto, Cevallos had minimized Escoiquiz's role at Bayonne by reference to Bonaparte's alleged offer giving Fernando Etruria and by labeling Escoiquiz "uno de los manipulantes que jugaban en esta intriga"—a comment Escoiquiz bitterly resented. Escoiquiz began his *Idea sencilla* by pointing out the advantage of *fernandistas* like Cevallos and the duque del Infantado who had returned immediately to Spain from Bayonne to cultivate public confidence and play influential roles in successive *fernandista* administrations. Meanwhile, those who, like himself, had remained in France, could not defend themselves from charges of "ligereza, de falta de reflexión, de ignorancia o de imprudencia" in recommending to the Bourbons "aquel funesto viage." Clearly his pamphlet aimed to justify the recommendation.

He reviewed the alternatives open to Fernando once crowned in 1808, the time Escoiquiz returned to Madrid from Andalusia, where he had been exiled after the Escorial affair. With a large part of the Spanish army collaborating with French forces outside the peninsula, military confrontation with French troops was out of the question. He mentioned the possibility of fleeing Madrid (an indirect reference to Godoy's hope of finding refuge for the royal family in New Spain?) but felt that would not avoid civil and international war. Moreover, Fernando's position was insecure given the reasonable suspicion that Charles IV had asserted to the French that his abdication to Fernando at Aranjuez was done under pressure. Worse, the situation in Madrid might turn violent at any moment.

On the other hand, Escoiquiz claimed that many in the political class believed Bonaparte, rumored to have already left Paris for Madrid, intended only to negotiate concessions already in the "tratado remitido por Izquierdo": cession to France of Spain's provinces north of the Ebro and control of the road for French troops marching to Lisbon. Bonaparte's record, according to Escoiquiz, showed comparable compromise; it seemed inconceivable that he would sacrifice an ally, whose new ruler wished to marry into the Bonaparte family. Moreover, Fernando's enmity would spell disaster for France. As for Cevallos's claim that he had learned from secret dispatches what Bonaparte really intended, Escoiquiz raised the obvious point: Why then did Cevallos fail to share such critical data with Fernando's circle, including himself? So Cevallos also bore major responsibility for the

decision to have the royal family proceed to Bayonne, since that had the approval of all the royal counselors, including Cevallos.[25]

Escoiquiz agreed with Cevallos that Bonaparte's conduct at Bayonne—removing the Spanish Bourbons—was outrageous. However, despite Bonaparte's initial insistence that Fernando renounce his rights, still Escoiquiz thought Bonaparte might be dissuaded to abandon his design. In a lengthy recapitulation of discussions with him, Escoiquiz summarized arguments he had used to convince Bonaparte to abandon an impolitic policy. Listing France's advantages in recognizing Fernando, he reported that Spain's "true state" was other than Bonaparte perceived. The Spain of 1808 was not that of 1700, when conflict over legitimate claims to the Spanish succession was justifiable. Now seizing the crown of Spain would alienate all Europe and lead to the "extermination of all Spaniards"—presumably alluding to civil war, and he warned Bonaparte it was in error to assume that just the "rabble" would resist a dynastic change. Resorting to the rhetoric of his memorial of 1794, when he had supported war with France, Escoiquiz predicted that grandees, the wealthy, and the religious communities would provide an example to the people. "El furor les dará armas, la desesperación los reunirá y les hará adoptar un sistema energico de gobierno." Portugal and England would support the resistance and the overseas colonies would contribute with "all their treasure." Even if French occupation could not be completely defeated in Bonaparte's time, Spanish resistance would ultimately destroy an imposed dynasty.

Escoiquiz believed his strongest point in the interview with Bonaparte was the potential loss of Spain's colonial empire under a Bonapartist dynasty. Spain, "arruinada, desierta, reducida a la mayor miseria, privada de todos sus inmensas colonias y por consiguiente de sus riquezas y de su Marina," would be useless to France; Bonaparte's confidence in retaining the Spanish colonies was chimerical: "Sobre la disposición de los ánimos en nuestras colonias no me dejan duda alguna de que se separarán todas de su Metrópoli antes de reconocer la nueva dinastía." Furthermore, "el menor descontento, aunque reinase Fernando mismo, bastaría para romper una unión que ya en nel día no pende sino de los débiles vínculos del hábito."[26] Only England would benefit from Bonaparte's decision, joining its supremacy at sea to control of trade and bullion flows hitherto shared by France through its alliance with Spain and the privileges it granted. Unable to counter these arguments, Escoiquiz thought Bonaparte might reverse policy. On the following day, 22 April, Bonaparte publicized his resolve to dethrone the Bourbons.[27]

It was now Cevallos's turn at apologia. Responding to Escoiquiz's jus-

tification for supporting the trip to Bayonne—faith that Bonaparte might prefer a closer Franco-Spanish alliance—Cevallos termed this an example of "deformidades políticas." There were no grounds for Bonaparte's interest in legitimacy or moderation; his feigned moderation was a device of the "pertubador de la Europe" to mask an insatiable ambition.

Cevallos's claim that he understood Bonaparte's tactics in pursuing a dream of universal empire raises again the question: Why had he, like Escoiquiz, failed to warn Fernando and *fernandistas* what would surely happen at the encounter at Bayonne? In 1814 Spain's political class must have been perplexed by the contradiction between Cevallos's presumed foresight and his signed statements in 1808 that had misled the public to expect Fernando would be recognized as Spain's ruler by his "íntimo amigo y aliado." To explain such inconsistencies, Cevallos had to reveal the rationale of the policy of sending the royal family to Bayonne.

There is another voice to be heard about the road to Bayonne: Godoy's. While Cevallos and Escoiquiz, not to mention other observers like the Abbé de Pradt and French foreign minister Champagny, believed Bonaparte never would reconsider his resolve to remove the Spanish Bourbons, Godoy thought otherwise. Bonaparte, Godoy mused two decades later (1836) in his memoirs, had weighed the risks and would have preferred restoring Charles to his throne—had Charles been amenable.[28] His refusal, however, to reign by relying upon French support and thereby risking civil unrest, accounted for yielding the crown to Bonaparte; in Godoy's optic, he had to fault Fernando and his advisers for the consequences of the Escorial and Aranjuez, as well as Bonaparte for profiting from their actions. Repeating Charles's assertion to Fernando in a letter of 2 May, Godoy reiterated his intention to have the court retreat to Andalusia where, protected by troops withdrawing from Portugal, they might have resisted Bonaparte's demands. Above all, Godoy emphasized Charles acted with the interests of Spain at heart in contrast with the *fernandistas*' narrow dynastic focus that had brought a tide of disasters.[29]

Political dissimulation coupled to ulterior objectives, self-justification, and hindsight clearly shaped post facto memories of the actors at Bayonne, elements of truth aside. The circumstances of Bayonne, the declarations and letters attributed to the Bourbons regardless of their accuracy (clearly the work of advisers), and the private letters intercepted by French and Spanish authorities support the hypothesis that, for both major factions, Bayonne served the function of public ritual. The French wanted to lend a semblance of legality to a decision dictated by raison d'état; Spaniards hoped to con-

firm the illegality of the decision via often apocryphal statements serving a similar end.

On 14 May 1808, the royal family went to internment in France. Fernando, king in exile, along with his brother Carlos and uncle Antonio joined by their *mayordomo* the duque de San Carlos and retainers, would spend the next five years at Valençay, Talleyrand's estate in the Loire valley. Charles, María Luisa, and their daughter, the former queen of Etruria, accompanied by Godoy, went to Compiègne and later to Italy. Although later there was occasional correspondence between the two groups, 1808 left a lasting personal rift.

The Treaty of Bayonne, initialed on 5 May by Duroc (for Bonaparte) and Godoy (for Charles IV), declared the two parties' mutual interest in preserving Spain from civil and international war, in assuring Spain's integrity and the protection of its colonial empire, and in achieving peace in the Atlantic. The first of ten articles stated that, given the anarchy and division in the royal family, only Bonaparte could reestablish order to ensure the *monarquía*'s integrity and independence, and the "single Roman Apostolic Religion." Charles consented to cede to Bonaparte his title to the throne of Spain and its colonies under the conditions in subsequent articles. These posited the return of property confiscated after the coup d'état at Aranjuez; asylum and support of the royal family in France (including proprietorship of the Chambord estate, its forests, hunting preserves, and farms); and the use of Bonaparte's imperial palace at Compiègne, its forests and preserves during Charles's life. In addition, Charles would receive from the French government an annual stipend of 30 million reales, which, added to stipends for other members of the royal family, would be reimbursed to France through an agreement to be later arranged. In exchange, Bonaparte would acquire in Spain all the "bienes allodiales y particulares no pertenencientes a la corona de España, de su propiedad privada."[30] A second treaty, on 10 May, initialed by Escoiquiz and Duroc, contained similar provisions in favor of Fernando in exchange for his adherence to the transfer of the crown to Bonaparte, the return of his title of prince together with an annual income of 1 million reales, and proprietorship of estates in French Navarre.[31]

Two days later at Bordeaux, Fernando publicly renounced his crown. The formal renunciation, probably drafted earlier at Bayonne by Escoiquiz, was published officially at Madrid on 18 May. It informed the people of Spain that, forced to choose a lesser evil, he had proceeded to Bayonne; on learning that his father Charles had retracted his abdication, dutifully he

returned the crown to his father for transfer to Bonaparte. Under these circumstances, since "todo esfuerzo de sus habitantes en favor de sus derechos parece sería no solo inútil, sino funesto, y que solo serviría para derramar ríos de sangre, asegurar la pérdida, cuando menos de una gran parte de sus provincias y la de todas sus colonias ultramarinas," he accepted renouncing the throne, particularly given Bonaparte's commitment "conservar la absoluta independnencia y la integridad de la Monarquía española como de todas sus colonias ultramarinas . . . mantener la unidad de la religión católica, las propiedades, las leyes, [y] usos, lo que asegura para muchos tiempos y de un modo incontrastable el poder y la prosperidad de la nación española." His proclamation exhorted the people to remain tranquil, "esperando su felicidad de las sabias disposiciones y del poder del Emperador."[32]

The Bayonne Strategists: Escoiquiz versus Cevallos

Obviously, the ultimate costs of Bayonne—internal war in the peninsula and overseas colonial confusion over sovereignty because there was both a government at Madrid and the royal family of the *monarquía* exiled in France—dissuaded the principal figures in the Bayonne developments from accepting responsibility for the strategy and its outcome. Cevallos insisted his advice had been consistently overridden by *fernandistas*, his protests ignored by Napoleon. Escoiquiz, however, found self-exculpation more difficult. There were his signatures on the documents, which implied that Fernando understood the treaty's terms. Yet Escoiquiz claimed that Fernando acted "sin consulta mía, ni de otro ninguno de sus consejeros"—something hard to accept. Escoiquiz rationalized that Fernando, in consenting to the terms of the treaty, was not irresponsible since "por su nulidad pública y por todas sus circunstancias, ni perjudicaba a su honor, ni podía enfriar el valor y la lealtad de los españoles, que debían reirse de semejante tratado."[33] And as for Fernando's proclamation at Bordeaux on 12 May confirming his renunciation of the crown, Escoiquiz tried to minimize its impact by claiming that he had drafted it "en tales términos que a los ojos del lector más lerdo era una protresta contra la violencia y una exhortaación para animar a los españoles la guerra, más que un decreto para hacerles admitir otra dinastía."[34]

While Cevallos took the high ground of political principle, Escoiquiz maintained the low ground of pretended political expediency, a position difficult to defend consistently. To be sure, the differences between the self-inflating mentor of Fernando and the self-effacing secretary of state had more to do with their roles and contrasting personalities than with their

objectives. Escoiquiz accompanied Fernando to Valençay, but he soon left for Paris, leaving behind as mentor his nephew Juan Gualberto Amézaga. At Paris it was noticed that he exchanged views with an apparently kindred spirit, Talleyrand. Escoiquiz remained in France, like other exiles, awaiting the outcome of conflict in the peninsula, while Cevallos at Bayonne participated in the difficult transition to an imposed dynasty, and a new sovereign, whom Spanish authorities were "invited" to select from a limited number of candidates. While Cevallos would have a prominent role in the successive governments of insurgent Spain, Escoiquiz was blamed for the unforeseen and bitter consequences of the Bayonne strategy.

Only after 1814, in the security of the restoration of Fernando, could Cevallos and Escoiquiz openly clarify the real dynamic of developments begun at the Escorial, maturing at Aranjuez, and culminating at Bayonne. It became an acrimonious exchange of pamphlets over responsibility for counseling the road to Bayonne. Escoiquiz was bitterly resentful of Cevallos's depreciative reference to him in his *Exposición* (1808) as "uno de los manipulantes que jugaban en esta intriga," one who had maliciously or foolishly promoted the journey to Bayonne. His justification: Bonaparte had been moderate in handling other European monarchs and might prove conciliable in the case of Spain. To strengthen his case, he attacked Cevallos for failing to share his secret intelligence about Bonaparte's real policy for Spain. He implied that if Cevallos had known for some time of Bonaparte's intention to remove the Bourbons, as shown in his well-circulated manifesto of September 1808, he too was responsible for Bayonne, a decision approved by cabinet ministers, including Cevallos.[35]

Cevallos retorted by charging Escoiquiz with "deformidades politícas," including his view of Bonaparte's sensitivity to legitimacy or sense of moderation. Where Escoiquiz claimed some justification for Bonaparte's dethroning the Bourbon king of Naples and collaboration with the English, Cevallos countered that none of Bonaparte's conflicts were defensive, but rather opponents had to accept his treaty proposals: "La justicia demasiado débil se veía forzada a abrazar como los únicos medios que le restaban para conservar su existencia, y que en ocasión oportuna se podía y debían despreciar." Again he paraphrased his internationalist guide, Grotius: "No son los primeros ataques, sino las primeras injurias las que constituyen las guerras ofensivas." Finally, he made explicit the rationale of the government's crisis strategy after Aranjuez: "Una nación no puede tener menos derechos que un particular. Quién vituperará la política porque procure la salud del estado por los medios que se reputan légitimos en uno de sus miembros?

Quién rehusará a los Reyes los recursos *del artificio y del engaño* de que goza el último de los ciudadanos quando es injustamente atacado?"[36] (emphasis added).

Cevallos would not claim *artificio* and *engaño* alone had trapped Bonaparte at Bayonne. Rather, Providence, veiling the consequences of his injustice, ultimately engineered his self-destruction. "Ella por sus incomprehensibles juicios puso el azote en las manos de Napoleón; ella sola podíar arrojar el azote al fuego, haciendo que las obras de la iniquidad . . . cayeron al golpe de la iniquidad misma . . . Acercaba el momento eligido por la Justicia Divina para el castigo del perturbador de la Europa, y sus Soberanos nada dexaron por hacer para realizar los altos designios de la Providencia."[37] And now Cevallos rendered Spain the vanguard of anti-Napoleonic resistance: "La heróica España, que preferiendo la muerte al horror de someterse al invasor, emprendió una guerra religiosa, política y individual, y enseño a las Potencias el arte de triunfar de su opresor."[38] Going to Bayonne was a disaster foretold, Cevallos argued,[39] because "existían aquellas circunstancias en que el interés del Reyno y el personal del Rey reclaman una atrevida y arriesgada empresa." The Spanish strategists of Bayonne conjoined the interest of state and monarch, "que siempre es uno mismo, persuadían que se acometiese la peligrosa empresa de ponerse a la discreción del enemigo más encarnizado de la dinastía de Borbón."[40] Events had finally vindicated the strategy in the form of the restoration of the Bourbons and the principle of legitimacy in Europe's governance. Cevallos, like Escoiquiz, was evidently another of God's archangels.

In his last years at Ronda, Escoiquiz insisted he too had foreseen the expansionism of postrevolutionary France, then analyzed that extraordinary army officer catapulted to power in those decades. As a result, he was convinced that early on he found Bonaparte's Achilles' heel—short-sightedness that led to his entrapment. His insight was confirmed by Bonaparte's failure to divine the consequences of occupying Spain, "claras a los ojos de todo político profundo, como lo han sido la resistencia de ella, la restauración del valor de las demás naciones con su ejemplo, la reunión de las fuerzas de estas contra él y el efecto de la preponderancia de la Inglaterra en toda la Europe para reunirla contra su ambición, una vez manifestada con tanta claridad en dicha invasión de España."[41] Escoiquiz could claim an active role in Milton's eternal struggle between good and evil, in which Divine Providence enlists men of unique insight who cause evil masquerading as good finally to reveal its essence: the enemy of humankind.

In early May 1808, however, this was far from clear. Then history seemed to offer a different lesson, as the *ilustrado* government at Madrid, hoping

to consolidate public opinion behind a Bonapartist monarch, prepared to convene Spain's notables at Bayonne, there to approve a constitution to limit abuse of political power—what seemed to have brought Spain to an impasse. Many saw in dynastic change the workings of Divine Providence intent not upon an exemplary punishment (*escarmiento*) of Bonaparte but rather upon triggering change with progress in Spain. Indeed, looking ahead in a counterfactual fashion, had the widespread anti-French resistance movement not materialized, Cevallos and Escoiquiz might have been instruments of a far different Providence. It might have eliminated the Bourbons from Spain because of their egoism and incapacity and allowed French interests—as in 1700—to plan the regeneration of Spain but within the parameters of inherited structures and vested interests—drawing upon the untapped resources of its colonial empire. A perverse Providence, however, had its contradictory and inscrutable ends, and a longer timetable. The old regime the *fernandistas* aimed to preserve would be shaken to its foundations by crosscurrents that Bayonne unleashed, while the colonial empire in America—long the regime's underpinning—would slowly cut its metropolitan moorings. And unexpectedly for the decision makers at Bayonne, Madrid, and Paris, there would grow a slender and, in the long run, hardy shoot of another political creed, liberalism, springing from soil loosened by a fractured *ancien régime*.

"L'affaire la plus importante": The Colonial Question

Temporary displacement of the Spanish Bourbons at Bayonne has been interpreted variously, at the outset as the initial damming of the tide of Napoleonic aggression moving through Europe. Hispanists have construed it as a development that sparked national resistance and redefined the social contract between people and rulers in Spain. Latin Americanists see the brief—and shocking—change of monarchs in the metropole as initiating the decolonization of Spain's American empire. And, latterly, economic historians find, in the antimetropolitan movements in the western Atlantic begun by England's North American colonies, the closing of the initial phase of the Atlantic system's commercial structures. Evidently what in the context of the time a few accepted as inevitable and even desirable—the transfer with appropriate if deceptive formality of the Spanish crown from Bourbon to Bonaparte in 1808—had consequences far beyond expectations of the groups and interests involved.

In retrospect, a common thread interlocking these consequences was the Spanish colonial question. The interaction of interests and perceptions tied

to this problematic shaped the outcome of conflict in the Atlantic world by the third decade of the nineteenth century.

The change of monarchs formalized at Bayonne at its basic level was a projection of the Franco-English competition for control of the Atlantic, its trade in manufactures, raw materials, and precious metals flows. No longer operable were those informal understandings and legal subterfuges whereby Spain in the eighteenth century had managed a tenuous equilibrium between the Atlantic hegemons. The French revolution weakened the "family association" and the institutional basis of Spain's modus vivendi with its powerful neighbor. Now the French government demanded unequivocal, effective collaboration with its proposed "federative" system turned empire under Bonaparte, along with privileged access to Spain's colonial resources. At Bayonne, French policy makers could congratulate themselves that, on the basis of military forces, Bonaparte's prestige, and the craft of their diplomats, they had sidelined those Spaniards advocating peace with England. Without war, Spain, like Portugal, had been incorporated into the continental system and simultaneously opened to French commercial expansion. Any challenge to this "settlement" involving any popular participation could be effectively suppressed. Spain's aristocracy, civil service, and religious establishment, if distrustful of Bayonne's guarantees of status and promise of limited reforms, could be won over in time, while the American colonies would surely welcome the prospect of more enlightened economic and political policies by the Spanish metropole.

French policy makers misjudged the Spanish situation in several ways. They underestimated the depth of Francophobia in the mass of Spain's peoples as well as in its traditional elites. They overestimated the influence of Spain's political class who for more than a century had looked to France for appropriate models of political and economic regeneration. But, above all, they failed to perceive the importance and complexity of the colonial question in Spanish affairs. Impressed by the volume of transatlantic bullion flows and the profitability of the empire's colonial trade, they were unaware or heedless of the myriad ways in which colonial interests permeated the economic, social, and political fabric of the old regime in Spain. In the century separating the settlement at Utrecht ending the War of the Spanish Succession from that at Bayonne, Bourbon reformers had allowed colonial interests to proliferate throughout the peninsula, as new ports were opened to colonial trade, new enterprises were established to supply it, new wealth was drawn from America, and new aristocratic titles and entails created along with religious foundations and civil service posts.

Ignoring manifestations of concern in Spain over the repercussions of

France's war on land against sea power, Napoleon and his advisers miscalculated Spain's reaction to a policy that escalated the risk of losing its empire. In this context his optimism in rapidly forming a joint Franco-Spanish naval force to confront that of England was unwarranted. Less easy to gauge but of related significance was the expectation that England, confronting a rigorous continental blockade and economic collapse, would agree to a peace. Ultimately, the American possessions of Spain and Portugal enabled England to avoid such a crisis.

The pitfalls that confronted the French in dealing with the colonial question entered the calculations of Cevallos and his group even before the Bayonne treaties were signed. There is no question that not until the Bayonne negotiations were assured did Cevallos at Vitoria choose to order Madrid authorities to issue to colonial authorities a formal announcement of Charles's abdication and the accession of Fernando. Now, it would seem, Cevallos felt confident that the regime change would indeed take place and the moment ripe for formalizing overseas Fernando's enthronement with appropriate ceremony.[42] Meanwhile, Madrid had become a tinderbox.

On the same day Murat forwarded to Paris an unsettling report of the comte de Laforest, who had just replaced Beauharnais as ambassador, many in the capital believed that "au premier bruit des évènements prêts a éclater en Espagne, il n'y aie des tentatives soit pour soulever les colonies Espagnoles en faveur des princes de la maison de Bourbon, soit pour les porter a l'indépendence, soit pour en reunir une partie au Brésil." French interests—here he aired the viewpoint shared by Bonaparte and his advisers—required "incontestablement l'intégrité du territoire et la participation au commerce des colonies Espagnoles." He urged immediate action to protect Spain's naval forces from seizure by the English or their supporters "au moment où les intentions de S. M. l'Empereur seront annoncées définitivement."[43] Less than two weeks later, Murat again reported—presumably after conversation with members of the Madrid elite—that "tout le monde pense ici que la conservation des colonies est l'affaire le plus importante" and that, since the first news of European developments to reach the colonies would have the greatest impact, it was essential to forestall the arrival in the American colonies of news disseminated by English sources.[44]

Murat—possibly urged on by his Spanish associates—remained preoccupied with the impact of peninsular events in the American colonies. Uncertainty and division within the Junta de Gobierno at Madrid and the malaise created by the violence in the capital on 2 May made immediate action difficult, despite Murat's swearing in as the Junta's president. On 8 May Murat returned to the issue, advising Bonaparte that in the prevailing state

of disorganization "l'espoir de conserver les colonies . . . réunit tous les esprits . . . tous les voeux sont tournés vers les colonies et il est du plus grand interêt de prévenir les nouvelles que les anglais ne manqueraient pas d'empoisonner." Agents would depart from the capital the next day for Cadiz, where two ships would carry to America the formal report of the complex changes at Bayonne: Charles's retraction of his abdication and confirmation as monarch, and Murat's appointment as his lieutenant general.[45]

There were more delays. On 14 May Murat reported that Vandeuil would go to Cadiz with dispatches for Viceroy Santiago Liniers, presumably because Liniers could maintain the loyalty of the Rio de la Plata. However, Vandeuil was still in Madrid on 19 May and the following day Murat wrote that English blockaders prevented the departure of the two ships. He had often complained of the incapacity of Spain's naval secretary, Gil y Lemos, while the usually cooperative war secretary O'Farrill "ne fait pas ce qu'il veut"—all of which led Murat to despair of the "utterly disorganized" situation. He found the French consul at Cadiz, Leroy, ineffective; it was essential, he advised Napoleon, that the troops under General Dupont rapidly occupy Cadiz since "toutes les troupes espaagnoles se trouvent réunis dans l'Andalousie et en Portugal"—a force of about twenty-five thousand. In addition, he informed Napoleon on 29 May that he had decided to send government announcements to colonial capitals from a port between the Portuguese border and the port of Cadiz.[46]

Meanwhile Murat tried to reassure himself and Napoleon that the provinces remained peaceful. On receiving word of thousands of English troops disembarking at Gibraltar, he presumed that their presence was "pour voir les résultat de l'insurrection . . . mais qu'ils ne tenteront rien en voyant que tout est rentré dans l'ordre."[47] By the time Bonaparte had in hand this dispatch, an anti-French insurgency was spreading throughout the peninsula, and a *fernandista* junta proclaimed in Andalucia.

Murat, overwhelmed by military, political, and financial issues he was unprepared to confront, suffered a nervous breakdown. Dispatches to Paris, written by others, claimed on 29 May that the proclamations about Bayonne destined for the colonies in America had already been printed and forwarded to the Consejo de Castilla at Madrid and that General Gregorio de la Cuesta had been nominated as New Spain's viceroy to replace the incumbent Iturrigaray.[48] Two days later he wrote that if the poor condition of his health continued, Napoleon should consider a replacement. On the next day he wrote Bonaparte that he had finally obtained the funds to provision the ships sailing to the colonies on 15 June—funds generated from the sale of crown diamonds.[49]

The Bayonne "solution" was bearing bitter fruit for French policy makers. Madrid, "le centre des Espagnols," was becoming isolated from much of the peninsula as well as from the colonies overseas, with lasting repercussions on the government and the empire.

Spain's colonial question, evidently critical in both genesis and denouement at Bayonne, appears peculiarly illusive, even contradictory in *official* accounts of the event. The sole—and vague—reference to the colonial issue in the Bayonne "negotiations" is Escoiquiz's alleged effort to persuade Napoleon that failure to recognize Fernando would inevitably incur loss of the colonies in America; the formal treaty referred merely to the integrity of the Spanish monarchy. Only the final proclamations of Fernando and his father justified their renunciations in terms of the possible adverse effects of conflict and political division in the metropole and overseas. Such silence would seem to cast doubt on the colonial question as a factor in the rationale of a Spanish strategy to create an anti-French insurgency in the name of Fernando VII. Here, then, lies the apparent contradiction: How could Escoiquiz, Cevallos, and other Spanish crisis managers have ideated the very scenario that Escoiquiz claimed would provoke colonial disaffection?

The answer seems to be that at Bayonne the *fernandista* crisis managers trusted that Spain, united in loyalty to its victimized monarch and supported by "sus poderosas colonias [which] *prodigarán todos sus tesoros para auxiliarles*" and by England, would ultimately prevail against French forces in the peninsula (emphasis added). "Los datos que tengo sobre la disposición de los ánimos en nuestras colonias," Escoiquiz claimed he warned Bonaparte, "no me dejan duda alguna de que se separarán todas de su Métropoli antes de reconocer la nueva dinastía." To which he added with prescience: "El menor descontento, aunque reinase Fernando mismo, bastaría para romper una unión que ya en el día no pende sino de los débiles vínculos del hábito."[50] Although Escoiquiz's fictional debate with Bonaparte at Bayonne over the colonial question clearly reveals more hindsight than foresight, and more about his conversations with the Abbé de Pradt than presumably those with Bonaparte, his stance at Bayonne would substantiate his subsequent conclusion that at Bayonne it was "still possible to believe that the colonies of Spain would remain loyal."[51]

Cevallos, for his part, based his confidence in the integrity of the empire on the legal commitment to which the French agreed at Bayonne and upon a comparable commitment he had sound reason to expect from English authorities once an anti-Napoleonic insurgency might get under way. Not many years later, the Bourbon restoration and the Congress of Vienna in confirming Spain's colonial suzerainty seemed to vindicate Cevallos's posi-

tion. In those intervening years, however, the complex interaction of forces brought into play by Bayonne brought changes too profound to be long contained by international treaties, however solemnly made, whether at Bayonne, London, or Vienna.

The Bayonne treaty had less obvious but equally profound colonial implications, which invite speculation. To be sure, the treaty providing the residence for Spain's royal family in France may be considered primarily part of a dynastic quid pro quo. But it served other purposes—political ones—as well. Not only would the Spanish Bourbons be considered hostages ensuring Spain's adherence to the understanding at Bayonne and—more important—inspiring anti-French insurrection; they could also be bargaining elements in a future international settlement whether with England or with Spain. For Spanish interests, however, French custody of the Bourbons promised a powerful additional advantage: it precluded flight to an American colony. Its negative consequences Spain's crisis managers could foresee as they digested news of what had happened when the Braganza royal family disembarked from an English warship at Baía, Brazil, in early 1808: the collapse of an old, imperial, managed Atlantic trading system.

Cevallos's conspectus proved accurate, for over the next six years neither England nor France would undermine the integrity of the Spanish Empire in America. For his part, equally accurate was Escoiquiz when he alerted (so he claimed) Bonaparte that "el menor descontento" would destroy any Franco-Hispanic "union." Neither strategist, however, flirted with the improbable, a fissure in Spain's armed forces and its consequences.

3. Dos de Mayo: Insurgency

Verificada que fué la cautividad del Rey en Bayona . . . la nación quedó acéfala . . . El pueblo español . . . se apresuró a nombrar en cada provincia una autoridad soberana que depositó en corporaciones denominadas Juntas provinciales. Flores Estrada, *Exámen imparcial*

La guerre civil, el mayor de todos los males, es ya inevitable.
Jovellanos to Mazarredo, 12 May 1808

El plan se aprobó y pareció admirable . . . Mas, ?cómo llegar a su ejecución, enteramente a espaldas del poder constituido sin falsear la base de todo el edificio levantado, cayendo en el abismo de la insubordinación? . . . ? cómo asumir en sí la inmensa responsabilidad de dividir de nuevo el Poder Supremo de la Nación e introducir en todo el reino un principio de anarquía, más peligroso mil veces que la misma guerra con el extranjero que se trataba de provocar? Estos juiciosos escrúpulos hicieron fracasar el complot. Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*

[V]ous n'épargnerez pas la canaille de Madrid . . . Toute fois, s'il y a une émeute, il est nécessaire que vous fassiez arrêter et fusiller dix des plus coupables.
Napoleon to Murat, Bayonne, 26 April 1808

While the dynastic substitution or formal renunciation of the Bourbons at Bayonne may be seen as an epilogue in which French and Spanish policy makers achieved their separate and contradictory ends, it was also the prelude to a new drama opening on a far broader stage. On 2 May, when Talleyrand wrote Napoleon that all Paris was watching the "great spectacle" at Bayonne where "les intérêts les plus intimes et les plus personnels de chacun paraissent tous confondus dans tous de votre puissance, de votre système et de votre gloire," he was unaware that on that day another spectacle opened in Madrid, presaging the end of that very "power, system and glory" which he shared and celebrated effusively.

Dos de Mayo: The Drama

The Dos de Mayo—a spontaneous mass eruption *or* the trigger of a planned response to a foreign occupation—followed what seems a simple script. But was it?[1]

Consider the complex context of this urban riot in the capital of the Spanish Empire occupied by foreign troops presumably friendly. At stake for French and Spanish interests was preventing the flight of Bourbon royalty to refuge overseas in the capital of the empire's richest colony, Mexico City. Junot's invasion of Portugal in late fall of 1807 had failed to prevent the Braganzas' move to Rio de Janeiro; the immediate goal of Murat was occupation of Madrid, hopefully collaborating with Spanish factions interested in long overdue change, confining Bourbon family members in France, and occupying Cadiz, by land and by sea. There was, moreover, a curious and unintended convergence of French and Spanish policies toward the American colonies: neither wanted them to opt for temporary autonomy, much less independence, which would open them to exploitation by English commercial interests. Could the French manage to ship Godoy and Bourbon royalty at Madrid to France without opposition; could Spaniards opposed to collaboration with France prevent this? The Dos de Mayo, like the subsequent September coup of 1808 in Mexico City, would have unimagined consequences for Spain and New Spain.

As French troops moved toward Madrid in March and April, tension between foreign soldiery and local xenophobic residents inevitably developed and became frequent at the end of April.[2] Bonaparte, interpreting intelligence data, understood this was the moment to reassure the most influential factions in Spain. On 28 April he ordered Murat to recommend that Madrid's Junta Suprema de Gobierno (its leading figures were *ilustrados* Miguel de Azanza and General Gonzalo O'Farrill) advertise that "l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Espagne seraient garanties ainsi que la conservations de tous les privilèges," and he was quite specific. "Vous ferez entendre," he wrote Murat, "aux meneurs du clergé et de la noblesse que la conservation de leurs privilèges dependrá de la conduite qu'ils tiendront envers moi."[3] Bonaparte had concluded that behind the Aranjuez coup against Godoy in March were Francophobic clusters among Spain's clergy and nobility.

French officers as veterans of the occupation of other countries in western Europe were hardly unprepared for civilian resistance. Only a few days before, on 28 April, as Napoleon foresaw the need for crowd control, he displayed the compassion of an aggressive, successful field commander when he recommended to Murat, "Je suppose que vous n'épagnerez la ca-

naille de Madrid si elle remue," adding if necessary seize and shoot "dix des plus coupables."[4] Murat—"docile aux préceptes de l'Empereur"—had no scruples in following this recommendation.[5] In response to inspired rumors of the departure of members of the Bourbon family to Bayonne, a crowd clustered at the gates of the royal palace at Madrid on the morning of 2 May.[6] An anonymous *madrileño* had slipped into the grounds of the royal palace and witnessed preparations for departure, and later an anonymous *grande* appeared on a palace balcony appealing to onlookers for support. More rumors from the palace and then the arrival of a French officer to survey the scene fed the excitement and bellicosity of the crowd until French troops came to disperse it by firing shots into the air. The crowd in flight now spread furor through the city, attacking French soldiers wherever encountered. French units stationed in and around the capital were ordered to restore order while Spanish troops remained in their barracks.

The notable exception was a group of Spanish artillery officers in the Parque de Monteleón, the splendid premises donated to the group's Cuerpo de Artillería (brainchild of the conde de Aranda) in 1803 by the heir to the *mayorazgo* founded by Hernán Cortés, the duque de Monteleón. Fernando, following his father's abdication at Aranjuez, had gone there, before setting out for Bayonne, to express confidence in the loyalty of the elite and widely respected artillery corps. Opening the gates of the Parque, the officers handed arms to the crowd directed there by José Blas Molina y Soriano, a former dependent of the *infante* Antonio Fernando's brother and now a Madrid merchant and ardent *fernandista*. Rolling out an artillery piece, the artillerymen joined the battle between the infuriated crowd and French soldiery. In the struggle, two artillery officers were among the first victims, Pedro Velarde and Luis Daoiz, martyrs to the cause of Spain's war of independence against Napoleonic France. The violence contained and public order restored, there came a series of public executions of some of the crowd—exemplary punishment—by French firing squads. French commander Murat was true to his word; he did not hesitate at terrorizing Madrid's people to restore order.

The number of casualties varied but was considerable. The Consejo de Castilla that helped pacify the city claimed in its self-justifying manifesto three months later that parish records showed 104 Spaniards dead, 54 wounded, and 35 unaccounted for, while the French lost many more. These figures clearly excluded those executed on 3 May by the French: according to Murat, 100 peasants taken with arms in hand, a figure doubled by French general Grouchy. Other sources reported far higher casualties. Prussia's minister to Madrid wrote home that 1,200 Spaniards and 200 French

had died in the course of the violence and repression. At Paris the *Moniteur* quoted a letter from Madrid written in the evening of 2 May rioting, referring to "plusiers milliers des plus mauvais sujets du pays" dead along with 25 French. Perhaps the most credible estimate is that of Pérez de Guzmán, who, on the basis of municipal records, concluded that 408 Spaniards died during the uprising, while 171 recovered from wounds. Desdevises du Dézert, conceding that "on ne saura jamais exactement que fût le nombre des victimes," accepted Toreno's estimate of 1,200 overall casualties—the most likely calculation.[7]

News of Madrid's rioting did not initially perturb Napoleon or his advisers. French military and diplomats never doubted that ruthless repression had cowed Madrid's troublemakers. Murat—perhaps to settle his own anxiety—assured Napoleon that the Prince of Asturias "perdit ce jour-là sa couronne; son parti complètement battu se range du côté du vainqueur. Votre Majesté peut disposer de la couronne d'Espagne et la tranquillité publique ne será troublee." On 10 May Talleyrand also reassured Napoleon that "les affaires d'Espagne . . . sont au fond complètement finies" and—with wish father to the thought—that "cet évènevenement met fin aux séditions en Europe."

The dead at Madrid were not as readily interred. Talleyrand conceded that news of the "several thousand" killed in the Spanish capital and published in the *Moniteur* without "expression of regret" was received with chagrin. He detected a certain "effroidissement" in some French circles and an "impression of terror in the ministers of even the most friendly courts." Later some would recall that the words "intrigue" and "infamy" were overheard and that some Spaniards of "liberal" views now joined the ranks of the *fernandistas*. Such were the chaotic and deadly origins of the later long and cruel civil and international war in Spain.

To Spaniards, even those far removed from the recent events, the apocalyptic implications of events at Bayonne and Madrid seemed far clearer and more immediate. Gaspar de Jovellanos, recently recalled from exile at Mayorca and now asked by the Junta de Gobierno to help pacify his restive native province of Asturias, wrote in dread to Admiral Mazarredo on 12 May that "la guerra civil, el mayor de todos los males, es ya inevitable . . ." Worse, "sin unidad, sin plan, sin medios, cual será la suerte de los pueblos llamados a tan terrible lucha?"

Reporting to Napoleon two days after 2 May, Murat—an astute army officer thrown up by revolution—probed beneath the surface, interpreting the episode as a last desperate effort to force the recognition of Fernando's accession "par l'appareil d'une opinion factice," all inspired by Fernando's

counselors at Bayonne and executed by supporters at Madrid. He noted the virtually official campaign by the authors of the recent coup at Aranjuez to have Fernando's accession celebrated solemnly in every town, village, and hamlet, threatening all who did not accept the validity of Charles IV's abdication to his son; the same conspirators, Murat noted, also whipped up anti-French sentiment by acts of terrorism and propaganda.

Murat attributed to Pedro Cevallos, in particular, authorship of an incendiary pamphlet obviously designed to precipitate confrontation in Madrid at the moment Charles arrived at Bayonne. That an explosion was clearly in the making was evident, he foresaw, in the "fureur impatiente d'agir" displayed by the populace of Madrid, now swollen by an influx of peasants from the countryside, by the availability and distribution of portraits of Fernando, and by the circulation of handbills calling on *madrileños* not to be outdone by the provinces in rising to the defense of the new king. The authors of the Aranjuez coup, he added, recognized the importance of Madrid as setting an example. Clearly, the pattern of 2 May events showed that the people were merely the "instrument des hommes plus capables de combinaisons." The lessons of mass movements were not lost upon this child of the Revolution. Yet despite anguish over the fate of his soldiers "fallen outside the field of battle," Murat experienced a brief surge of euphoria after 2 May, perhaps relief that his troops had smothered Madrid's mobs. That day, he insisted, had ended the "revolution" at Aranjuez by destroying the illusion that "quelques misérables de la lie du peuple" might prevail over troops "accoutumés à vaincre et de détruire de grandes armées." Moreover, there was one consolation: he was convinced that violence had brought thoughtful observers to the side of the government, the Junta de Gobierno he now presided over.

The Cuerpo de Artillería: Velarde and Daoiz

Juan Pérez de Guzmán's exhaustive study of the Dos de Mayo confirms Murat's conclusion that it was not spontaneous but a carefully orchestrated event designed to set off a general insurrection in the provinces. Against the background of spreading confrontation, Pérez de Guzmán attributed a key role to *fernandista* elements within the elite artillery corps and regiments of the Guardias de Corps and in the court aristocracy and its *dependientes*. Pedro Velarde, the young *montañés* artillery officer serving as secretary of the artillery corps' Junta Superior del Arma under José de Navarro Falcón, is credited with masterminding the project: an uprising at Madrid would trigger insurgency nationwide. A fellow officer and close friend, Luis Daoiz, re-

cently assigned command of the artillery unit billeted in Madrid, was slated to play a major role in implementing the project, to "sumar cooperadores resueltos, de gran reserva . . . para poner por obra con éxito seguro tan vasto plan." Daoiz and Velarde are emblematic of Spain's integrated elites rejuvenated by eighteenth-century military reforms, whose social origins, training, and networks bridging metropole and colonies would enable their class to survive the crisis of the imperial regime at home and in America well into the nineteenth century.

From biographical evidence, Pedro Velarde y Santillán (1779–1808) seems an unlikely candidate for grand political strategist. Twenty-eight in 1808, Velarde belonged to a gentry family ramified in the hinterland of Santander between the Besagua and Pas Rivers whence many had emigrated in the mid-eighteenth century to the army, bureaucracy, and church. The interests of this extended family were advanced by members who established a preparatory school at the university of Valladolid, the Colegio de los Velardes, "a cuyas becas fueron llamados por su ilustre fundador los descendientes de las casas de Velarde de la villa de Cartes y del lugar de Viernoles." Not a few also held prominent colonial posts. Thus Juan Antonio de Velarde y Cienfuegos, a graduate of Valladolid's Colegio de Santa Cruz, served on the colonial Audiencias of Santo Domingo and later Guatemala (at one moment, captain general), then moved to New Spain in 1760 as *juez foraneo* in the *residencia* of deceased viceroy marqués de las Amarillas and as *fiscal del crimen* in the Audiencia de Mexico. (Nicolas Velarde was *contador de Hacienda* at Veracruz, 1738–1760.) As *fiscal* at Mexico City, Velarde y Cienfuegos spearheaded the opposition to the reforms pushed by Visitador-General José de Gálvez. There he married María Josefa de Rojas y Rocha, daughter of the Audiencia's *alcalde del crimen* (Antonio de Rojas y Abreu),[8] whose brother was wheeler-dealer and multiple entrepreneur Francisco de Rojas y Rocha, *comisionado de guerra, alcalde mayor* of cochineal districts in southern New Spain, mining speculator, and author of a patriotic ode commemorating Spain's victory at Pensacola dedicated to his patron, Viceroy Matias de Galvez.

Furthermore, the social ramifications of Velarde's brother-in-law were wide: Francisco de Rojas y Rocha had married in Spain María Clotilde de Garcia de León y Pizarro, which made Velarde y Cienfuegos *concuñado* of José de Garcia de León y Pizarro, ex-official in the Secretariat of Estado (his pushy mother—"la Pizarro"—had been prominent in Malaspina's disgrace in 1796). More significant in this context, by marrying María Clotilde, Velarde y Cienfuegos became an uncle of Francisco de Rojas y Pizarro, the intelligence agent and *oficial segundo* of the Real Cámara and Real Estampilla,

who in 1806 reviewed Pedro Giraldo's reports on the political situation in Spain and quite likely similar reports from relatives and connections in New Spain.[9]

Overseas in Spain's colonial world, Pedro Velarde was also connected to New Spain's bureaucratic and mining elites through his paternal grandmother, sister of the marqués de Herrera (Vicente de Herrera y Rivero), a graduate of the Colegio Viejo de San Bartolomé at Salamanca. After twenty-two years in the Audiencias of Santo Domingo, Guatemala, and finally Mexico (as *regente*), Herrera returned to the metropole in 1786 as a member of the Consejo de Indias. In New Spain he participated in framing the *Ordenanzas de minería*, married the daughter of one of New Spain's mining tycoons, Pedro Romero de Terreros, conde de Regla. When Herrera died at Madrid his great nephew, Pedro Velarde y Santillan was living with him. In these social ties by blood and alliance, one discerns the synapses of the political process that galvanized Spain in 1808.

Velarde graduated from Segovia's artillery school in 1799, participated in the short Hispano-French campaign in Portugal (1801), and in 1804 at the rank of captain taught mathematics at Segovia. There he remained until appointed secretary of the Junta Superior del Arma at Madrid in 1806. In his service record of 1806, Miguel de Cevallos, *sub-inspector* of the Cuerpo de Artillería and brother of the secretario de estado (Pedro Cevallos), recorded that Velarde "tiene los mejores disposiciones y desempeñará las comisiones del cuerpo."[10] This strong recommendation and surely the informal intervention of a network of relatives—uncles Julian de Velarde y Herrera, army officer and *gentilhombre de camara* at court, and Vicente de Herrera y Rivero—brought Velarde's transfer to the Junta Superior del Arma and residence at Madrid in the home of his uncle Herrera. That he enjoyed the confidence of Madrid's politically influential appears confirmed by his selection in 1807 as an aide-de-camp of Godoy and assignment to Spain's sensitive intelligence mission at French headquarters at Burgos in March 1808.

While Velarde, according to his close friend Francisco Novella, was credited with planning a peninsular insurrection to be initiated at Madrid and repeated via instructions to provincial *departamentos* of the Cuerpo,[11] another artillery officer (an *andaluz*) assumed its implementation. Luis Daoiz y Torres (1767–1808), also a member of the Junta Superior and Velarde's confidant, was equally well placed, suited by background and connections for his role. Born to an extended family of the provincial elite of Lower Andalusia—through his mother he was linked to the "first houses" of Sevilla, Carmona, Morón, Cadiz, Puerto Santa María, Medina Sidonia, and Ronda and to relatives at Gibraltar and Sevilla—Luis Daoiz also had roots in Na-

varre in *señoríos, merindades*, and a townhouse at Daoiz. His father held the position of hereditary *alguacil mayor* and *regidor perpetuo* of Barrios near Gibraltar along with a pension as compensation for the loss of equivalent status at Gibraltar on its transfer to England in 1713.

After graduating from Segovia in 1787, Daoiz began his military career: prisoner of the French at Toulouse in the campaign of 1794, he defended Cadiz against English assault (1797) and as naval artillery officer visited Veracruz and Havana (his father owned Cuban properties). Early in 1808 Daoiz was moved from Puerto Santa María to Madrid to command "la tropa que hacia el servicio de la plaza y el detalle del Arma de Artilleria." Like Velarde, Daoiz was well connected at Madrid where an uncle, Fernando Daoiz, after long service as naval officer in American waters, had become a member of the Consejo Supremo de Guerra. A native of Pamplona, Fernando Daoiz was a protagonist of Navarrese interests in the capital. Among his associates were Luis Lasqueti y Gálvez and the second conde del Real Tesoro (José Manuel Villena y Porlier), not to mention other "fuertes vinculos de parentesco y hasta mano, en Palacio por medio de la camarista de la Reina Da. María Manuel Daoiz," wife of an army treasury officer (Cayetano Urbina) who joined the Consejo de Indias in 1807. Through these connections to gentry and aristocracy, Pérez de Guzmán has suggested, Daoiz learned of the details of the Escorial affair, which led him to Velarde and, with him, to plan resistance against French intervention in the peninsula.[12]

We can only speculate that planning for resistance had begun, even before the Treaty of Fontainebleau and the Escorial affair, among the power elite of Madrid with whom talented artillery officers Velarde and Daoiz were in frequent contact. Pérez de Guzmán believed that both the head of the Junta Superior del Arma, José Navarro Falcón, *sub-inspector de Artillería* at Cadiz and in 1808 a colonel in the Junta Superior Económico of that corps, and José Navarro Sangrán were also involved in planning an anti-French insurrection along with fifteen other artillery officers. Among them was Francisco Novella y Azbal, who fought alongside Daoiz at Oran (1792), and later was taken prisoner with him by the French (1794). Decades later he would command royalist units operating overseas against anticolonial insurgents in New Spain and participate in the coup d'état that deposed another viceroy in that colony, Ruiz de Apodaca, in 1821.[13]

This intricate social canvas may clarify why the Dos de Mayo did not follow a simple script or the "Plan de los Artilleros." Velarde, twenty-eight in 1808, was possibly the more visionary of the two; Daoiz was already forty-one with more field experience and possibly more pragmatic. Both had had contact with fellow French army officers, Daoiz more so. It is not

far-fetched to assert that no military in Spain's armed forces of that moment failed to draw conclusions about the bitter internal war in the Vendée in revolutionary France of the 1790s, and about the tactics, strength, and endurance of local peasantry, with sustained clerical support, in resisting a new imposed secularizing order. Velarde and Daoiz did not provide details of their "Plan" perhaps for security reasons, probably because they were uncertain of the full collaboration of fellow officers of their Cuerpo ("no contaban aquella perfecta conformidad de resolución," as Novella ambiguously phrased it). The Vendée experience would seem to resonate in Novella's overall evaluation of the "Plan." "Ya estaba adoptado el sistema de guerra que se había de formalizar"—guerrilla tactics? As part of his design for nationwide resistance, Velarde alerted artillery posts (*departamentos*) to expect "las órdenes para obrar."[14]

The risks were multiple. First, the plan might be leaked to Murat or to a member of the Junta de Gobierno that Fernando had appointed to collaborate with Murat in his absence.[15] More risky was "la inmensa responsabilidad de dividir de nuevo el Poder Supremo dela Nación de introducir en todo el Reino un principio de anarquía." These military officers drawn from the lower nobility or gentry might label their movement a revolution but one managed from the top down; it would be *nationalista* and by no means *populista*, representative nor democratic in the French fashion of a decade earlier.[16]

It now seems clear that crowd violence at the Parque de Monteléon, with overt participation of elite military personnel planning a national resistance, was the factor distinguishing the Dos de Mayo from Spain's tradition of urban movements in which clergymen often provided the most obvious actors. The nationwide impact of the 2 May insurrection derived from what was seen as a form of class collaboration uniting urban lower classes and representatives of provincial elites. Moreover, the participation of officers of the cohesive, prestigious artillery corps could only foreshadow future military intervention. The ideological cleavage within Spain's armed forces between adherents to social and political stasis and believers in managed renovation of political and social structures would open the way to armed resistance to French occupation and—looking ahead—initiate the role of the military in the subsequent trajectory of Spain.

An Alternate Junta de Gobierno

Despite evidence that the Dos de Mayo formed part of a general movement of national resistance, even in the initial stages of mobilization against

occupying forces the *fernandistas* were fractioned by region and interest on their objective and, more important, by who or what would direct the national movement. Some, including Velarde, may have expected that the Junta de Gobierno, left behind at Madrid on Fernando's departure for Bayonne, would authorize a separate junta in unoccupied territory; it would be responsible for declaring war against France and convoking a *cortes* or constituent assembly to create a regency.[17] There was an alleged instruction (*pliego*)—verbal or written—from Fernando on his arrival at Bayonne and before returning the crown of Spain to Charles IV. That instruction specified that if Madrid's Junta de Gobierno could not execute the instruction, any *audiencia* or *chancillería* in the peninsula should do so. This would have unplanned consequences in Spain's colonial world, for it could justify pressure for interim autonomy. It may also explain why Velarde contacted a prominent member of the Junta de Gobierno with colonial interests, Cuban-born general Gonzalo O'Farrill, to obtain weapons. And although O'Farrill readily cooperated, Daoiz was convinced Velarde had erred in trusting a highly visible collaborator of the French, thereby compromising their plan of resistance and their own lives.

Was Velarde indeed so naive? Under the presidency of the *infante* Antonio, the Junta de Gobierno did take measures to create a *fernandista* government outside Madrid, perhaps—and this was important—initially at Teruel in Aragon. At a meeting of representatives of Madrid's *consejos* and tribunals on 1 May, Antonio authorized an alternate junta if the existing Junta were "inhabilitado" to consist of three prominent military officers, Gregorio García de la Cuesta, José de Ezpeleta y Veyre, and Antonio Escaño matched with three high civil servants, Manuel de Lardizábal, Juan Pérez Villamil, and Felipe Gil de Taboada. A composite sketch of this alternate or counter-junta turns up the colonial experience or extensive contacts of four members. Cuesta,[18] Ezpeleta, and Taboada (a naval officer) had served for varying periods in either Peru or Granada; Cuesta's exposure to post–Tupac Amarú Peru left him suspicious of all movements of the "popular will." Pérez Villamil, lawyer by training and a civil servant, represented the Consulado de Cadiz as *abogado titular* at Madrid; Lardizábal, born in New Spain, made his career in the peninsular civil service. Evidently all were aware of the overriding necessity of holding on to the colonies in America. The ultimate junta could shift its headquarters, call for war against the French, and convoke a *cortes* to form a regency in Fernando's name. According to Escaño, on the same day Antonio convoked the alternate junta and instructed its members to assemble outside Madrid to await further orders.

Its activation would depend on developments at Madrid as well as orders delivered by couriers from Bayonne.

However, neither Lardizábal nor Pérez Villamil was able to leave Madrid. But Gil de Taboada went to Aragon, and Escaño to Valencia via Teruel. On reaching Teruel—a possible site for the alternate junta—Escaño, finding no *pliego*, proceeded to Valencia where he found orders to return to Madrid; he now expected that imminent French occupation of Aragon would force the alternate junta to form not in Aragon, but in the south, in Andalusia. At Madrid he learned that a junta member had betrayed the project to the French and that relevant *pliegos* had been destroyed.

The fate of the plan for an alternate national Junta de Gobierno remains unclear. If the condition for establishing an independent, alternate government was prior nullification of Madrid's Junta de Gobierno, that condition could have been realized when *infante* Antonio (its president) left for Bayonne and was replaced by Murat, backed by Minister of Justice Caballero but whose appointment was opposed by Gonzalo O'Farrill. In fact, at Bayonne on 4 May, Charles IV, once again king of Spain, authorized Murat's appointment. Murat proceeded to deal individually with the Junta's members, not as a collective body. Why, then, was the alternate junta not activated at Teruel or, if not there, in Andalusia as Escaño anticipated?

We have to recall that in April–May 1808 Spain's political class fissioned into two blocs or factions: "Liberals" who hoped to modify the old regime from the top, avoiding a popular, representative, constituent assembly like the one prominent in the early stage of revolution in France; and "Traditionalists" who aimed to preserve metropole and colonies—imperial Spain—at best with minor adjustments by merely replacing Charles IV with Fernando VII. This factionalism was a leitmotif of the debate over a new junta when Fernando departed for Bayonne in the company of Charles and María Luisa.

Azanza and O'Farrill, prominent *liberales/ilustrados* in Fernando's Junta de Gobierno at Madrid, defended their decision not to activate the alternate junta on legal grounds.[19] They were under orders, they insisted, to fulfill *only* Fernando VII's instructions from Bayonne. However, when those instructions came to Madrid, Fernando had abdicated to his father. Second, the now invalid instructions from the *fernandista* government were received after Murat had suppressed the Dos de Mayo and effectively disarmed Madrid. Azanza and O'Farrill stressed the chronology of events, the vacuum of authority, and imminent anarchy after 2–3 May. In their optic, they had but one option: defense of Spain's imperial interests under the new dynasty

selected by Napoleon at Bayonne, that of José I.[20] But Cadiz monopolists, a crucial factor, would never trust them. They represented those high civil servants in the government of Charles IV, overturned by what the Spanish Right now liked to call the Aranjuez "revolución," who had seemed receptive to demands in the colonies for temporary relaxation of transatlantic trade structures in wartime.

"Traditionalists" represented by Pedro Cevallos, Fernando's chief crisis manager at Bayonne, wanted immediate formation of a regency government once *infante* Antonio abandoned Madrid for Bayonne. For Cevallos, the *Regencia* became an absolute necessity after Spanish resistance forces unexpectedly defeated French troops under Dupont in September at Bailén in southern Spain. Azanza's reluctance to create a regency, Cevallos was convinced, doomed the project. Cevallos did concede, however, that this failure was a blessing in disguise since it seemed to demonstrate that mass insurrection had welled up wholly spontaneously from an outraged people or, to use Cevallos's phrasing, "sin tener el menor antecedente de la voluntad del soberano."[21] Cevallos wanted deniability and plausibility.

Cevallos's position was undermined by an agent from Bayonne transmitting orders from Fernando to Madrid's Junta. Justo María Ibar Navarro, a member of the deputation of the Province of Navarre at Madrid, reported to Junta de Gobierno members Azanza and O'Farrill that Napoleon had removed the Bourbons (who had abdicated to him) and that Cevallos *informally* had instructed the Junta through him that "por entonces no se hiciese novedad, porque era de temer de lo contrario que resultasen funestas consequencias contra el Rey . . . y el reino se arriesgaba, descubriendo ideas hostiles antes que estuviese preparado para sacudir el yugo de la oppression."[22] Cevallos never denied Ibar Navarro's courier role, only that the instruction to the Junta de Gobierno for the formation of a regency had been misinterpreted by Azanza as *carte blanche* for maintaining collaboration with French authorities at Madrid. Thus it would seem that the secret, ambiguous, and chronologically awkward instructions from Spaniards at Bayonne brought the inevitable, even premeditated political division of Spain as the traumatizing sequence of events polarized factions and interest groups in supporting or opposing the new regime created at Bayonne.

A Grand Strategy of Survival?

In retrospect, however, probably Azanza, O'Farrill, and other like-minded *ilustrados* now added to the Junta (including the marqués de Casa Valencia and Bernardo Iriarte) had been slated from the outset to pro-

tect the interests of Spain under French occupation, by collaborating with the Bonapartist regime soon to be headed by Napoleon's brother, José Bonaparte. They could be relied upon to preserve Spain's essential interests in collaboration with a new king who might eventually adopt those interests as his own. Among those interests, none was more essential than maintaining Spain's colonial nexus. Azanza, whom Cevallos consistently addressed as valued friend, could be counted on to use his colonial experience to preserve that nexus; indeed, shortly he became José I's colonial secretary. O'Farrill, one of Cuba's planter elite, might surely guarantee that important colony's loyalty, as did Azanza that of New Spain, where he had recently been viceroy. Clearly widespread civil war and French occupation forces posed disaster to such a prospect.

Thus, failure to establish immediately a government in the form of an alternate insurgent junta outside Madrid would seem more than the consequence of French *force majeure*, more than an unforeseen sequence of events, confusion, tergiversation, or betrayal by secret partisans of France. It can be seen as an ingenious design to preserve Spain and its American empire despite the ultimate victory of either France or England in the struggle to control the Atlantic. The dual facet of Spanish defense strategy embodied in the Bayonne settlement required not only that the "precious heritage of the Spanish monarchy" be preserved under a new French dynasty that might prevail, but also that an anti-French government of *fernandistas*, capable of making peace with England and thereby reestablishing transatlantic trade with the colonies, be preceded by a sustained insurrection in the name of the Spanish Bourbon monarchy now enjoying luxurious exile in southern France.

Ilustrado military leaders like Azanza and O'Farrill acted on the assumption that military resistance against superior armed forces would be unsuccessful and costly.[23] They were proved partially right. In 1814, at the beginning of the Restoration years, Azanza and O'Farrill in self-imposed exile at Paris conceded that against all odds Spanish resistance had ultimately evicted French forces and restored the Bourbons. And they were correct in foreseeing the duration and terrible costs of resistance complicated by civil war. In initiating the wave of Europe's anti-Napoleonic reaction in 1808, *fernandista* traditionalists would pay an unexpectedly heavy price. Laforest, formerly Napoleon's ambassador to Spain, in 1814 consoled Azanza and O'Farrill, who had to find refuge in France: "Los asuntos de la España podían de muchas maneras encaminarse al punto en que se hallan," he wrote, adding that "queda a VV la satisfacción de haberse mantenido en la línea que habría debido probablemente arrastrar menos convulsiones en su

patria, y por consiguiente conservarle más poder relativa. Los que han seguido un camino diferente han obrado tambien muy honorosamente, pero no podían tener esta última esperanza . . . Hablemos claro: el gigantesco edificio de la fuerza debía desmoronarse tarde o temprano, y las naciones que han sufrido menos destrozos son las que han esperado para declararse que hubiese una coalición y un objeto generalmente determinados. Por esto la España es el país de la Europa que tiene más llagas que cicatrizar."

The absence of a nationally accepted *fernandista* center of gravity after Bayonne and Madrid in early May had unintended consequences by creating a vacuum of power. Now the nation was not only without a resident Bourbon king but, as Azanza would later underscore, without leaders and unity. As a consequence, "All reputations were now open to suspicion in the mind of public opinion." The eventual success of popular insurrection was viewed at best as uncertain. Those members of the elites backing the *fernandista* cause were reluctant to risk loss of their prerogatives and properties guaranteed them at Bayonne. Many therefore tolerated the "intruso" José Bonaparte from self-interest; others, reacting to the leadership that had brought them to such a pass, hoped that a new regime might assure stability while sponsoring reform—but unlike France—without revolution. Were they hedging their bets in what was also an internal, divisive civil war? And many who accepted high office in José I's new government feared the costs of civil war: political and social divisions, economic disaster, and, worst of all to both "liberals" and "traditionalists," loss of the gains of colonial hegemony—the Spanish Empire in America. Fernando—like his father—had formally abdicated, turned the *monarquía* over to Napoleon, and gone into exile in France. Now Napoleon could appoint José Bonaparte as reigning monarch, an appointment traditionalists considered illegal, illegitimate, and an affront. Where, then, did legality lie?

More important, as Urquijo wrote General Cuesta in April, even *fernandistas* committed to insurgency were divided by regional identity and sectoral interests—the specter of internal, civil war. Basques, Asturians, Aragonese, Catalans, and Andalusians had joined the *fernandista* movement for diverse and often contradictory reasons. Regional conflicts had always been mediated with difficulty by the intricate workings of the political structure of Spain's *monarquía*: the figment of royal authority played an important role in sanctioning the outcome of such conflicts. In the absence of such authority after Bayonne, however, aspiration to hegemony and fear of domination among regional groups made general recognition of a regency more than doubtful. Concluded one observer in Bayonne's aftermath: although "la fierté nationale a été le principal ressort mis en jeu pour exciter les der-

niers mouvemens," the strength of regional rivalries meant that "un gouvernement qui voudrait tirer part de ce sentiment national ne parviendrait peutêtre pas à amalgamer en un seul corps toute la nation." On the other hand, "si, par exemple, il reunissait en regimens particuliers les habitants de chaque province, . . . on verrait alors que la fierté provinciale fait quelquefois les mêmes prodiges que la fierté national a enfantées sous les yeux de nations étrangères." Abbé de Pradt put it another way later: "Si l'Espagne n'avait pas été separée de son gouvernement," he was convinced that "elle aurait pu être subjugée, car il peut arriver . . . qu'un gouvernement soit assez fort pour répondre de la nation aux étrangers, sans cependant l'être assez pour repondre des étrangers à la nation."[24] A political condition in which no recognized authority controlled national power constituted anarchy to Azanza and O'Farrill and spelled disaster at the hands of the English, whose attention had long been fixed on the Spanish Empire in America.

Anarchy: Insurgency by Province

The Dos de Mayo consolidated French control over Madrid, precipitated, first, the abdication of Charles IV and then the renunciation of Fernando and the *infantes* to Napoleon at Bayonne. More important, it triggered nationwide insurrections in the provinces, the peninsula-wide reaction Velarde and Daoiz had contemplated.

The *bando* (proclamation) of a general insurrection against France was issued on 2 May—the day of insurrection—at Móstoles, a small town southwest of Madrid. Significantly; it was drafted by Juan Pérez Villamil (possibly in collaboration with Antonio Fernández de León), a member of the alternate Junta de Gobierno created at Madrid by the departing *infante* Antonio. Signed by the two *alcaldes* of Móstoles, the *bando* appealed to municipal officeholders everywhere in the peninsula to spread news of events at Madrid and the nation's plight, exhorting Spaniards to attack the French.

The Bando de los alcaldes de Móstoles had peculiar significance in the initiation of the Spanish insurgency of 1808. Addressed to the *ayuntamientos* of the peninsula, the *bando* bypassed higher provincial military and political authorities perhaps because they might not have been initially receptive to the message. Nor was the proclamation without careful preparation. From the Escorial affair of the previous October onward, Cevallos and the Consejo de Castilla had propagandized the *fernandista* message sub rosa among local authorities who now could be expected to respond with direct action. To legal-minded figures like Cevallos and Villamil, *ayuntamientos* constituted the fundamental political entities most representative of the na-

tion and could therefore sanction a revolution of legitimacy. Months later in questioning the legitimacy of the Junta Central and favoring a regency, Villamil would join Cevallos and other exponents of natural law in the conviction that, in Spain's state of abandonment after the dethronement of the Bourbons at Bayonne, sovereignty had devolved upon the nation represented in *ayuntamientos* by their *vecinos* (heads of families). Once the insurgency in Fernando's name flared, however, it was presumed that local authorities would unquestionably delegate authority to higher government organs, ultimately to a regency. Reality, as we shall see, would prove far more complex.

After the Dos de Mayo an exodus began from Madrid. Provincial entities such as the politically influential aristocrats of the Maetranza of Ronda, whose members had been invited to the capital to celebrate Fernando's accession and had witnessed the violence of 2–3 May, received permission to return home; at the same time an official report listed 959 deserters from the Madrid garrison in the month of May. As news of Fernando's internment in France traveled south from Bayonne to meet reports of mayhem at Madrid, signs of provincial revolt proliferated. At the end of May, just preceding the festival of San Fernando, the *bando* of Móstoles sparked the formation of local juntas in major cities and towns from Cartagena in the southeast to Oviedo in the northwest, and from Zaragoza in Aragon to Sevilla and Cadiz in Andalusia. The first week of June brought similar movements in Catalonia and lesser towns of the peninsula and on the islands of Mayorca and Minorca.

In provincial capitals at Cartagena, Valencia, Sevilla, Badajoz, Oviedo, Santander, and Zaragoza, the trajectory was generally the same. Crowds, assembled by prestigious local notables, were directed to local army depots, where arms were distributed, and then to the *ayuntamientos* themselves. There, yielding to the "popular" will, officials affirmed loyalty to Fernando, then formed independent juntas composed for the most part of local, established authorities. A notable exception—it would have far-reaching effect—was in Asturias where the Junta General del Principado at Oviedo, its regional organ then already in session, provided institutional rather than any popular, representative sanction to the insurgency.

Murat's Crisis

During May the French position in Madrid deteriorated rapidly. On the departure of *infante* Antonio for Bayonne on 4 May, his replacement, Joaquin Murat, as president of the Junta de Gobierno was a substitute whom

collaborating Spanish authorities in the capital expected would strengthen their political position throughout the country. While Madrid was now securely in the hands of the French as news of 2–3 May and of the denouement at Bayonne spread nationally, however, French political control of the Spanish situation was clearly weakening. Despite optimism that recent developments in Madrid would rally Spain's elites to collaborate with France, Murat grew anxious about the security of his forces deep in the peninsula. In Madrid he noted the vacillating cooperation of Spanish officials, open opposition by the Consejo de Castilla, the threatening presence of Spanish Guards regiments, the desertion of Spanish troops, and his own lack of authority over the Spanish military, police, and press. In the northern provinces, French couriers were intercepted, peasants were arming, and French soldiers ambushed. From the south came disturbing reports of rising *fernandista* ferment, of twenty-five thousand Spanish troops concentrated in Andalusia and Portugal, ten thousand English soldiers disembarked at Gibraltar, and of increasing, secret Spanish contacts with the English off Cadiz. Murat recorded frustration in trying to implement Napoleon's instructions to initiate naval construction at Cadiz and dispatch urgent correspondence to the colonies, at a time when the French lacked control over Spain's ports and shipping.

Above all, Murat's financial situation was turning very critical. "La tâche . . . paraitrait au dessus de mes forces, si VM ne venait à mon secours," he confessed to Napoleon on 8 May. "Tout est desorganisé, les finances surtout . . . pas un sol dans les caisses . . . le crédit a disparu. Sire, Votre Majesté vient de conquérir l'Espagne par la force de son génie et par celle des circonstances." Now a loan was essential to maintain the government afloat and prevent further disaffection. To Napoleon's continuing admonition to "find money" and rebuild the Spanish navy, Murat explained (23 May) that Madrid's wealthiest bankers—Murphy, Murgeon, and Michel—lacked cash but nonetheless had consented to provision the navy in return for "assignations sur le Mexique, ou sur les douze millions de francs que sont déjà à Londres pour son acompte"—clearly the product of Consolidación receipts transferred from New Spain and, off-the-record, of the crown diamonds "en gage." The French were well aware of the flow of *pesos fuertes* from Spain's wealthiest colony across the Atlantic.

He included a report whereby Napoleon could understand "combien il est instant de secourir le Port de Cadiz." As a result of his orders, Dupont's forces would head there by forced marches; banker Murphy would supply letters of exchange worth 500,000 francs "sur la place de Cadiz." "C'est comme si on y envoyait de l'argent comptant," he explained. Other financial

needs were equally overwhelming. "Toutes les provinces me tormentent pour avoir des fonds pour les différens services," he wrote, appealing for a 20 million franc loan in specie from France. He emphasized that further financial credits would be requested once Napoleon decided Spain's future. Meanwhile it was essential to stabilize the Spanish government by quickly installing a new monarch and restoring confidence in his authority through a formal constitution. In a moment of optimism, he reported that the latter prospect had already turned "bad faith into zeal" in "tous les fonctionnaires publics." Referring to the reform-minded or liberal factions among Spain's political class, to prominent figures as Azanza, Cabarrús, and O'Farrill, he observed, "Chacun se dit, nous allons enfin avoir un gouvernement et une administration; deux a trois cents grands d'Espagne vont cesser de nous tyranniser. Une constitution libérale va enfin assurer les droits de tous . . ." There was much truth in his reference to the Spanish aristocracy.

Murat, after discussion with Spanish officials at Madrid, passed along to Bayonne an initiative of O'Farrill and Azanza for an assembly of Spanish notables to draft a constitution "quelle que fût." Increasingly depressed by adverse reports from the peninsula, Napoleon now reluctantly approved the proposal, and Murat's government hastily selected representative personnel from among Spain's civil service and ecclesiastical and commercial elites. In response to Madrid's anxiety about the loyalty of its American colonies, belatedly a provision was made for including six Americans (*criollos*) to represent Spain's overseas possessions in the assembly now scheduled to meet shortly at Bayonne on 15 June. A constitution however unrepresentative was desperately needed.

For Murat, however, the pressure and frustration of implementing French policy proved psychologically unbearable. On 27 May on the arrival of Napoleon's delayed approval of the constitutional project, Béliardí had to advise Napoleon that Murat's health "ne lui a pas permis aujourd'hui d'exécuter les intentions de VM; demain elle espère pouvoir s'en occuper." In a postscript, he added that a very depressed Murat "has been extremely flattered by one of His Majesty's letters, has read it many times," and "elle influirá beaucoup sur le rétablissement de sa santé." Although Murat resumed his responsibilities, Laforest had to recommend he be relieved; in mid-June, just before the constitutional assembly recommended by Azanza and O'Farrill would convene at Bayonne, Murat posted a final note from Madrid expressing sorrow "at being ill." Incapacitated by what was clearly a psychological episode, he was replaced by Savary and returned to France as the insurrection begun at Móstoles spread throughout the peninsula.

In fact, however, during May the Madrid government reacted more to

prevalent fears of aggression overseas in the colonies by English amphibious forces than to the threat of a pro-English insurgency in the peninsula. It failed to dispatch couriers and arms to the colonies before the English might exploit the Bayonne denouement. As insurgency spread, however, clearly control of Andalusia became critical to the central government's control of the colonies as well as the peninsula. French intelligence recorded the colonial preoccupation of Spanish notables gathering at Bayonne in early June to draft a constitution and accept Joseph Bonaparte as Spain's new king. "On a parlé seulement de la situation de Cadiz et de la marche du corps d'armée du . . . Général Dupont sur cette place . . . le clef du commerce le plus avantageux . . . on tremble aujourd'hui pour l'Andalousie et pour Cadíy sur le compte duquel on se supposait tirer avec confiance. On a attribué à cet état des choses la convocation inattendue des Deputés Espagnols . . . de Seville . . . , [et] les progrès de l'insurgence de Cadíy y de'Andalousie."

4. Sevilla: The Struggle for Supremacy in Spain and New Spain

[Los Borbones] que tenían un legítimo derecho y autoridad para convocarnos y conducirnos a sus enemigos, lejos de hacerlo, han ido espontaneamente y sin violencia con ellos.

Adolfo de Castro, *Historia de Cádiz*

The Provinces of the Kingdom are at present in a state of perplexity and confusion. It is to be lamented that perfidy and treason should have deprived us of the helm to steer and direct matters under such circumstances at the present . . . the General [Castaños] fears that the consequences will be the most disastrous to the Nation.

Translation of a letter from Algeciras, 5 May 1808
Dalrymple to Castlereagh, 7 May 1808

This morning it seems probable that the governor of Cadiz will act in concert with with . . . Castaños and . . . resistence to the French will have been raised in various parts.

Letter to Sir Hew Dalrymple, 25 May 1808

Competition for hegemony in the metropole in 1808, after the collapse of the Bourbon government that entrusted the *monarquía* to France under Bonaparte at Bayonne, had more than the political dimension of filling the void of a national government. Many were the dimensions: as far as Cadiz interests were concerned, the principal was preservation of Cadiz's privileged port monopoly over the transatlantic trade with the American colonies and offsiding the articulate reform-minded in the Junta Central and then in the Regency. Cadiz and its like-minded colonial correspondents were engaged in an epic struggle to guard their special trading interest.

One dimension was the struggle to preserve and restore "provincial" rights, privilege and exemptions that tortoise-like Castilian centralization had been undermining especially so in the last half of the eighteenth century. Overall, there was the dimension of resistance to elements of change threatening deeply held cultural values embedded in Spain's anti-Gallican

Catholicism. In this light, France after 1789—no matter the vicissitudes of government—epitomized anticlericalism, elimination of the thought-control mechanisms of the Inquisition, atheism, and stripping the ecclesiastical establishments of their wealth. In the third place, the peripheral provinces of the peninsula—Catalonia (Barcelona), Vizcaya (Bilbao), and Asturias (Santander)—pressed for economic policy changes. For Cadiz—but not Sevilla—continued monopoly was essential. Cadiz regionalists—the colonial traders in the Consulado there—considered the collapse of the central government at Madrid a godsend for reasserting control over transatlantic trade policy, a control gradually chipped away after 1759 under Charles III and IV, as the *flota* system was eliminated and cautiously promoted *comercio libre* permitted select peripheral ports to enter the transatlantic trade with the American colonies.

The support of Cadiz merchants, first for the nearby Junta de Sevilla competing against peninsular juntas for supremacy, and then forming its own junta, was driven by the hope of preserving the status quo in trade policy, even a rollback. It makes comprehensible countering in the metropole and overseas in the colonies competition from Juntas at Oviedo and Galicia, then pressing the fragile Junta Central and, ultimately, the Regencia in 1810. Tactics varied: at the outset there were surgical assassinations of potential dissidents masked as "popular" mass actions (the "pueblo"), followed by the race to London for recognition, economic assistance, and its official toleration of Spain's "closed" Atlantic trades. It would culminate in Cadiz's total domination of colonial trade policy in May of the decisive year 1810.

Among the provincial juntas created in 1808, Sevilla's played a salient and fateful role in the first years of Spain's anti-French insurgency. The Andalusian capital was destined by size, political influence, history, and geography to become the main base of *fernandista* power from 1808 until occupation by the troops of José I in early 1810.

The third largest city in the peninsula, Sevilla had twice in the eighteenth century been proposed to replace Madrid as the *monarquía*'s capital. It had long held special status and influence in the *monarquía* not only as economic and administrative center of the *reinos* of Sevilla, Córdoba, Granada, and Jaén—"Las Andalucías"—but, from the fifteenth century, as base of Spain's Atlantic expansion. As a prestigious and lucrative way station in the career advancement of Spain's military, bureaucratic, and ecclesiastical elites, Sevilla linked Andalusia to Madrid and other parts of the peninsula. In the eighteenth century, Andalusia's territorial magnates and merchant guilds applied their wealth and position to guard regional and sectoral

interests against Bourbon reforms designed to develop other parts of the monarchy and curb their virtual monopoly of agricultural and commercial wealth. Bourbon policies did benefit Andalusian interests. Sevilla turned into a center of Spain's profitable tobacco monopoly; its tobacco plant had two thousand employees processing imports from the colonies.[1]

Although Sevilla lost control over colonial trade to Cadiz early in the century, it kept important advantages in colonial and European markets for export of fruits, wines, and olive oil. Its rural properties gained from investments of merchants in the colonial trades and from high-level civil servants—for instance, Viceroy marqués de Amarillas, General Calleja, the conde de Tepa, and Francisco Saavedra, among many others. Despite tension with Cadiz *negociantes*, Sevilla's landed aristocracy and commercial bourgeoisie worked out a modus vivendi with the influential commercial entrepôt in its jurisdiction; they shared in Cadiz's profitable commercial litigation; both handled disbursement from Consulado funds to "old creditors" of the crown. In addition, in the early decades of the nineteenth century Cadiz profited from agiotage in certificates of the national debt, the *vales reales*, whose owners were concentrated in Andalusia in 1808.

Andalusian elites tended to favor peace with England. Nowhere else in the peninsula was war against France (1793–1795) as popular, or were the Peace of Basle and realignment with France more excoriated. English blockaders off Cadiz cut agricultural exports and trade with the colonies. Furthermore, in the emergency after 1804, Godoy's intervention in the maritime and commercial affairs of metropole and colonies threatened the interests of southern Spain—all the more so when Godoy became a permanent member of Sevilla's powerful Ayuntamiento in 1807.[2]

It is no surprise that Andalusia figured prominently in the political planning of *fernandistas* in 1808. While some considered Andalusia a possible retreat for a regency forced to abandon Aragon or Valencia by oncoming French occupiers, Andalusians disfavored the whole concept. Instead, they reasoned in the governmental crisis after Bayonne that semi-autonomous regional juntas created by "popular" insurrection controlled by local elites might better resist French occupation. Above all, Andalusia was the logical core of resistance to a French-backed government at Madrid: it was close to English forces at Gibraltar and the resources of Cadiz. That port's virtual insular geography and the metropole's main link with the transatlantic empire rendered it a refuge for a national government of resistance. Geography, history, and regional interests favored investing Andalusia's provincial Junta with authority to act for the nation in military and financial issues, foreign policy, and, of course, colonial trade.

Spain's crisis managers contemplated their Andalusian card for some time. Later the conde de Montijo would claim that in 1806 he had approached without success Francisco de Saavedra and General Gonzalo O'Farrill, proposing to remove Godoy; on the other hand Montijo obtained support from General Francisco Javier Castaños, Francisco de Jaúregui, Ignacio Pezuela, Benito de la Mata Linares, and distinguished Sevillanos to move Fernando VII to Andalusia and declare him king.[3] Godoy also had considered moving the Bourbons south to Andalusia where he hoped to concentrate armed forces to resist the French from a strong defensive point. The coup at Aranjuez had cut short that option and Montijo's projects.

However, *fernandista* participants in the Escorial affair had been exiled in January 1808 to strategic points in Andalusia: the duque de Infantado (Écija) near Sevilla; Escoiquiz (Tardón); Tomás de Jaúregui (Puerto Santa María). Montijo, who later asserted he was convinced from the beginning of Andalusia's major role in the resistance to the French, alleged he had brought funds from Cadiz just before Aranjuez; he soon returned southward to Andalusia to repeat in the insurgency there what he had done at Aranjuez. Perhaps more important was a less publicized meeting between an agent from Sevilla's Ayuntamiento and Pedro Cevallos just after Aranjuez.[4]

Godoy's ouster and Fernando's enthronement were welcome news in Andalusia as local elites intentionally made public. Mass celebration was encouraged by official and unofficial ceremony, religious as well as secular, proclaiming Fernando the legitimate ruler, all accompanied by sermons, prayers, and "te deums" alternating with nightly illuminations and formal dinners in the larger towns.[5] At the same time French agents—they considered the intervention as a Hispano-French collaborative exercise in reforming Spain—reported signs of inspired anti-French agitation in cafés and taverns of Lower Andalusia. "Nos antagonistes probablement de concert avec nos enemis, cherchent tous les moyens pour exciter une insurrection contre les Français," LeRoy reported on 20 April, adding that "la police ne prend aucune mesure pour faire cesser les faux bruits scandaleux."[6]

French perception of English entanglement in Andalusian events was well founded. London, of course, was following closely conditions in the peninsula, collecting information in peninsular ports and from agents and smugglers frequenting Gibraltar. Despite the hope of commencing hostilities with France in southern Europe, first in Italy and now Spain, the English were not optimistic that Francophobic groups in the peninsular would initiate warfare, much less succeed; London would not commit English forces in a hopeless venture. Many Spaniards, recalling their wartime collaboration with the English in 1793–1795 and London's initial reluctance to

bolster the Portuguese against Junot's army of occupation in late 1807, remained unconvinced England would support a *fernandista* insurrection of dubious success without suitable compensation—for example, concessions on trading with the Spanish colonies in America.

Whatever English policy makers' doubts, it is clear that English observers were slow to detect a hidden agenda behind developments in Spain. In fact, reports reaching Gibraltar after Aranjuez seemed to substantiate the impression that the Spanish government was fragile and increasingly the captive of Francophile groups. They had good reason: some Spaniards in the high civil service and armed forces believed only French collaboration might finally lead to long-blocked reform measures. When London examined the makeup of Fernando's first cabinet choices, protestations of friendship and alliance with Bonaparte, publication of the sentence of those involved in the coup at Aranjuez, then Fernando's voluntary journey to meet Bonaparte, and finally the shock of the Dos de Mayo and the Bourbons' renunciation of the throne at Bayonne, it could only see the Spanish authorities capitulating to French power and influence.[7] Spanish crisis managers, it would appear, were neither prepared nor willing to provide information or assurance to dispel such pragmatic pessimism.

To be sure, frustration and uncertainty in England about the peninsular situation were in no small part the consequence of limited intelligence. Besides customary secrecy and pretense enveloping policy making at Madrid, London had few agents in the country. Since the end of diplomatic relations in 1804, only John Hunter, commissioner for negotiating prisoner exchanges, offered a limited avenue of communication between Madrid and London. Additional intelligence came through English naval officers and agents in peninsular ports where there was pro-English sentiment. At England's military stronghold and trading depot at Gibraltar, there was at best limited contact with Spanish military counterparts at the naval base at Algeciras and the army's Campo de San Roque installations (incidentally, provisioned on occasion from Gibraltar stocks). Smugglers' networks centered on Gibraltar also provided information on Andalusian developments. In short, intelligence was inadequate, far from trustworthy.

Worse, information gleaned from official gazettes and unofficial sources offered puzzling contradictions. As the crisis in Spain deepened in March, London looked for reliable information, and simultaneously *fernandistas*—outwardly opposed to the English enemy—tried to open covert channels with London. Early in 1808 José de Torres, who was in the Spanish diplomatic service—the French identified him as the son of a prominent Spanish merchant residing in London—along with a merchant by the

name of Salazar went to Algeciras where they were put in contact with the commander of the base at Campo de San Roque, General Francisco Javier Castaños. When French officials at Madrid insisted that John Hunter be removed, the *presidente* of the Junta de Gobierno, the *infante* Antonio, asked Hunter to choose another site to execute his commission. Hunter chose Sevilla; London sent Charles Vaughan—as an additional member of the prisoner exchange commission—to Andalusia, where the acting captain general, Manuel de la Peña, provided accommodations for the commission's members.[8]

Hispano-English Spring: Gibraltar-Sevilla

Meanwhile exchanges between the commander at Gibraltar, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and Castaños at San Roque became significant. Castaños, beneficiary of English provisions for his troops, had been in touch with Dalrymple, furnishing *pasavantes* to English agents to enter Andalusia.[9] Dalrymple could now furnish London with credible if often oblique clues to Spain's anti-French strategy. Hence, two weeks after the coup at Aranjuez, Dalrymple informed Castlereagh that a "Spanish gentleman" had assured him that "all the political abilities in Spain, long sanctioned by publick opinion, at this moment surround the threone" and that Fernando, uncertain of French intentions, had expressed "confidence in the king of England" in case of need.[10] On 28 April, Dalrymple also passed on information ("very secret") from John Hunter that a "party" close to the government had asked for assurance in obtaining "a supply of arms from me and from the Rock, if wanted." Hunter had written that "he could make no reply to unauthorized insinuations" but would communicate every overture "made to him in a regular form." Dalrymple went on to explain that his information came from "Mr. [Emanuel] Viale, a principal native merchant here, and is derived from a person . . . in whom I can entirely rely as being intimately acquainted with what passes at the Headquarters of Algeciras." He added—perhaps responding to London's impatience with Spain's slow reaction to French aggression—that Viale's contact, now identified as a Felix Herrera, "even went so far as to express apprehension that the Spanish character would be sullied by the extermination of the French army before sufficient evidence could be obtained of the bad faith which is suspected." Herrera's fear highlights the dilemma of Spaniards accustomed to decades of Hispano-French cooperation in countering English expansion.

Clearly intrigued by these mixed signals, Dalrymple wanted clarification, particularly the "discordance between the style and the substance of some

of the official publications." In a meeting with Viale and Herrera, the latter explained that "the real object of Ferdinand's voyage is supposed to be personal safety, to be out of the way of the French and the moderation of his conduct to put justice on his side, . . . all the nation is under arms ready to act on the first proof of bad faith." The French, as Herrera point out, "are wholly dependent on the Peninsula for their supply of provisions . . . purchased by the Spaniards and paid for by the French commissaries." On the other hand, Dalrymple noted that confidence in Spaniards' ability to "drive the French out of Spain" was far from universal among the Spanish army officers; "the general [Castaños]" was "very uneasy." A marginal comment on Dalrymple's dispatch echoed his doubts about Herrera's optimism, noting "I fear otherwise."[11]

Dalrymple proceeded to arrange with Spanish postal authorities to expedite the flow of intelligence while speeding up the unloading of arms at Tetuan. On 29 April the French consul reported that forty-eight ships had entered Gibraltar, of which thirty-three then proceeded to the east with provisions and merchandise.[12] As a public indication of English policy in transition, Spanish shipping from the colonies captured by English corsairs was returned with cargoes "in view of the difficult situation."

News of the Dos de Mayo and then of Murat's appointment as Charles IV's lieutenant general in Spain approved by Fernando's Junta de Gobierno momentarily disconcerted Spanish army officers at San Roque and Algeciras, as well as Dalrymple at Gibraltar. A letter from the Spanish commandant at Algeciras, translated by Dalrymple and transmitted to London, attributed Madrid's uprising to the return of Charles IV as king, and the Junta de Gobierno's acceptance of Murat as lieutenant general. "The nation will not receive him [and] by this means Napoleon will . . . become master of all whilst he is deceiving us with flattering promises as he is doing in Catalonia . . . notwithstanding the firmness of General Espeleta and the energy and determination of the People . . . The Provinces of the Kingdom are at present in a state of perplexity and confusion. It is to be lamented that perfidy and treason should have deprived us of the helm to steer and direct matters under such circumstances as the present . . . the General fears that the consequences will be the most disastrous to the Nation."[13] Those consequences—no "helm"—could be widespread, multiple, and uncoordinated insurrection that organized troops of occupation could suppress.

Logically, then, on 6 May Castaños distributed a proclamation denouncing the Madrid insurgency and appealing to "el celo patriótico de los buenos ciudadanos españoles [que]debe conservar toda su energía y vigor para cuando el gobierno lo reclame y no desperdiciarla en pequeñas explosiones

tumultuarias."[14] In a letter to Viale on the following day, Dalrymple echoed General Castaños's worry and warned of the consequences of recent events at Madrid. He lamented that the "opportunity of frustrating the insidious designs of France, afforded by the noble feeling and high spirit of the Spanish Nation, has been so lamentably and unaccountably neglected; and that by the combined operation of treachery and infatuation, a stroke seems to have been struck decisive of the fate of Spain and the ill-fated House of her legitimate Sovereign." By way of prediction and warning, he asked rhetorically: "Must the Indies, the Fleets and neighboring Possessions of Minorca and Ceuta follow the fate of the European Continent? . . . Has not the Marquis of Socorro [General Francisco Solano] and Don Castaños the Means (if speedily employed) of saving some, if not most of those valuable possessions for their lawful King? Unhappily the blind Goddess affords but short and sudden opportunities of striking strokes against her darling Favourite, and those are commonly spent in doubt and hesitation."[15]

But on the next day, in a letter to Castlereagh, Dalrymple's doubts ceded to an apocalyptic prediction. "The next advice," he wrote, "will announce the catastrophe and the necessity as well as the power of concealment will be at an end."[16] Others sensed an imminent resolution of the tense moment. An official of the Cadiz Consulado, José Fernández de Cosío, reacted similarly. Despite his dismay caused by recent developments at Madrid, he wrote that "debemos esperar que este se rompa breve y conforme a la buena fe con que se procede."[17] As for Dalrymple, his dispatch on 8 May clarified matters, when he reported the substance of an interview that morning between Viale—now virtually Dalrymple's agent—and Castaños's private secretary, Francisco Fonleta. There Fonleta told Viale that it was "apprehended that the Grand Duke of Berg would attempt by force to possess himself of the Regency; in this case the Province would arm with regular troops and inhabitants, that the general at their head would move to the Sierra Morena to check the progress of the French . . . and if other provinces followed the same example or express their readiness to concur," Castaños would then ask for aid "and even enter into a formal written convention." Fonleta noted that "if the perfidy of Bonaparte was such as to attempt to make the Dynasty of the Bourbons disappear . . . they would concert timely measures to secure the possession of South America." The American colonies were never far from the thinking of the Spanish political class; Castaños was revealing *fernandista* commitment to Hispano-English collaboration undoubtedly on advice from Sevilla.

Referring to a memorandum while making these statements—an indication he was following detailed instructions—Fonleta then asked if Viale

had brought along similar written instructions, and what was Dalrymple's thinking. Viale affirmed that in this early phase it was necessary "to know the General's plans before entering an understanding which must be honorable and likely to be approved by both sides," underscoring the "necessity of our being put in possession of the French Fleet at Cadiz." Fonleta replied that Castaños was already in communication with General Manuel de la Peña at Cadiz and "so soon as the Nation should consider itself at war with the French, the Spanish Fleet would sail and carry the Infante Don Francisco . . . to South America [and] . . . British ships might enter Cadiz . . . in short that the French Fleet would be ours." When Fonleta expressed the view that the Infante Antonio would never go to Bayonne or allow his young nephew, Francisco, to do so, Viale brought up an outcome worrisome to the English if they were to intervene. "On my representing that according to appearances, notwithstanding the valour and disposition of the Spanish Nation, if they [the French] kept and destroyed those of the Royal Family whom they have at their mercy, and if they either killed or seized those remaining at Madrid, they would remain without a head, and what might be the consequences?" Fonleta had no hesitation, affirming that "even that event was provided for, and he was authorized to say from the General that the Grand Archduke Charles is the person for whom they propose the throne."[18] On the next day Dalrymple received a personal note from Castaños confirming the substance of Viale's interview, adding that "the time is already arrived to declare or manifest what was premeditated with so much anticipation" but warning that "it is convenient to show reserve and disguise until the return of Navarro." In fact, Brigadier Joaquín Navarro,[19] Castaños's close friend and adjutant, had gone to Cadiz to consult with the local commandant, General Manuel de la Peña—a conduit for Sevilla's instructions. Hispano-English cooperation by Castaños and Dalrymple was now well advanced. So much so, Dalrymple had to ask London for instructions on responding to what he construed as Castaños's (or more accurately) Sevilla's "bold plan." Aware, however, that "if events succeed each other with the rapidity there is reason to expect, and the Spaniards are constrained to act before His Majesty's pleasure can be known," he was prepared to offer the cooperation of the royal navy, while using every opportunity "to apprise Your Lordship of the effect the strange course of events has upon my mind, and the general line of conduct I may in consequence be induced to adopt or recommend for adoption to the Admiral [Purvis] and Major General Spencer, upon whom much of the execution must necessarily depend." Admiral Purvis had been ordered with five thousand men to anchor off Rota, across from Cadiz.[20]

Instructions from London were delayed. Dated 25 May, they arrived when insurrection—as Castaños had feared—was already widespread in Spain. Indeed Castlereagh—it seems he had reliable information on the situation in Spain—introduced his instructions by observing that "this morning it seems probable that the governor of Cadiz will act in concert with . . . Castaños and . . . resistance to the French will have been raised in various parts." He approved Dalrymple's exchanges with Castaños and agreed to send reinforcements and funds needed immediately. While the "various changes which have recently taken place in Spanish politics, the weak and wavering part played by the government, and the uncertainty of the ultimate disposition and determination of the People, have hitherto prevented His Majesty's ministers from taking any decided line," he reported that the cabinet thought it "possible the present crisis and unparalleled Treachery of Bonaparte may produce that effort." He warned on the other hand, no doubt recalling the vacillations of earlier Spanish foreign policy, that "to be successful, it must be general and sincere, neither to be intimidated by menaces nor to be seduced by promises or compromise." Castlereagh assured Dalrymple that "His Majesty entertained full reliance upon his vigour in cooperating with the Spanish upon the virtuous principles for restoring the independence of the Spanish monarchy and ultimately the independence of Europe." The fate of Spain's colonies in America dominated London's considerations. In the event that "the Royal dynasty shall be removed, measures will be taken to secure Spanish America," and Dalrymple was asked to "look to this contingency with the utmost anxiety as it must be of the utmost importance that the resources of those opulent provinces should not fall into the hands of the French."[21] The English could not overlook that their successive amphibious assaults at Buenos Aires in 1806 and again in 1807 had been dismal defeats.

France's Cadiz consul LeRoy was, of course, immediately aware of the arrival of Purvis's naval unit and troops at Rota. But while he anxiously awaited Dupont's forces to reinforce French positions near the port and requested Junot to be ready to come to his assistance, he did not envision an immediate move by the English. He reasoned that the English were unable to attack from their isolated position at Gibraltar or occupy the fortified port of Cadiz. Like Murat at Madrid, he relied on the loyalty of Spanish military commanders who in fact continued to support the government at Madrid and express their acceptance of the new order, while simultaneously opening relations with the English (commanders, for instance, like General Cuesta). There were seemingly good reasons for the confidence. Murat's aide-de-camp Constantin, who visited key Spanish army officers in south-

ern Spain, reported that General Castaños had confided on 17 May that he had foreseen the change of dynasty when French forces began entering Spain, that he was satisfied that the change had occurred legally, and that he could be as counted on as if he were a French general.[22] Other sources confirmed Constantin's assessment of Castaños: "Homme d'esprit, qui m'a paru avoir de la finesse enveloppé de formes assez simples . . . d'une grande influence sur les troupes . . . et même dans tout le pays, il a trop de bons sens pour vouloir faire le don quichotte pour une famille qui a cessé de regner, et il ne demande pas mieux que de s'attacher au nouvel ordre de choses, pourvu qu'il y trouve quelque avantage."[23] A case of the wish being father to the thought? Murat had already recommended—here another sign of the general preoccupation with the "opulent" colonies in America—that Castaños be assigned to the viceroyalty of New Spain, an offer Castaños revealed to the English while expressing astonishment that the French failed to suspect his loyalty to the new regime at Madrid.[24]

By now Castaños was playing for time. His correspondence with Murat throughout May 1808 suggests a fine capacity for dissimulation while apparently awaiting the uncertain outcome of events. Besides reporting English operations in Andalusia, he warned Murat that Admiral Purvis had sent a brigantine to Veracruz with official proclamations issued at Bayonne and Madrid "dans le dessein de persuader aux habitants du Mexique que la dynastie des Bourbons cessant de regner en Espagne, l'époque de l'indépendence est arrivé pour la colonie." Nevertheless, while expressing appreciation of Murat's confidence in him, he confessed—probably honestly—that he feared "l'experience n'apprenne à votre altesse qu'elle s'est formé une opinion trop favorable à mon égard," adding ambiguously: "Ma conduite sera toujour celle du militaire le plus subordonné et de l'Espagne le plus jaloux de contribuer a la prosperité de son pays."[25]

Castaños's equivocal—seemingly duplicitous—stance probably encapsulates the shock, awe, and sheer confusion created among Spaniards by the extraordinary developments from Aranjuez to Bayonne to the Dos de Mayo, by the voluntary renunciation of the Bourbons, father and son, to the emperor of the French, and by the thrust of French troops into central and southern Spain. These were seismic events comparable to the strange defeat of France in 1940.

Was Castaños's behavior intended to gain time, as some Spanish historians have concluded? Did he share the doubts of many military commanders who recalled the less than wholehearted support England had given Spain in their war against France in 1793–1795, its provocative behavior in the premature seizure of Spanish silver ships in 1804, its eagerness to conduct the

Portuguese royal family to refuge in Brazil in 1807? Did he in fact fear that England might not commit itself to a *fernandista* insurrection of dubious success without compensation in the form of valuable colonial concessions, or that it might exploit Spain's plight to extend its commercial penetration of the colonies? Minus a coordinated resistance and a viable government, Castaños may have reasonably prepared for collaboration as well as resistance while awaiting developments and decisions still in the making.

Castaños was not the only military figure to assume an ambiguous position in May 1808. Manuel de la Peña, acting captain general of Andalusia in the absence of General Francisco Solano, was another officer whom both French and English officials believed they could trust.[26] Like Castaños, shocked by the Dos de Mayo, Peña quickly praised the prudence of the Madrid authorities in its aftermath to accept decisions made at Bayonne, and attempt to quell anti-French agitations. He assured French consul LeRoy that the English could never occupy Cadiz.[27] On such faith—despite "les extrêmes agitations qui se remarquent dans les principales villes d'Andalousie lors de l'arrivée de chaque courrier" and ongoing official celebration of Fernando's enthronement, the French consul continued to believe that the support of Spain's ranking generals and the expected arrival of Dupont's troops would dispel the thunderheads gathering over Andalusia.

Dupont's arrival, however, was delayed, and Solano's arrival in mid-May replacing General Manuel de la Peña was less than reassuring. While Solano wrote Murat that Cadiz was prepared for any English assault, secret intelligence revealed that Andalusian maritime defenses were illusory, whereas Spanish contacts with the enemy were increasingly overt. "[Solano] reçoit très souvent des parlamentaires de la flotte [anglaise]." Precisely where did Solano stand? In a confidential interview with Consul LeRoy, he expressed the opinion that Dupont's forces now moving toward Andalusia were "trop nombreuse . . . s'il s'agit d'auxiliares," but too small "s'il y a d'autres intentions."[28] "Other intentions" apparently referred to French intentions to occupy Cadiz with six thousand troops and replace Spanish with French forces in Andalusia. Murat at Madrid seemed as confused and uncertain as Castaños at Sevilla, since he protested that this was hardly the moment to shift Spanish troops to France.[29]

Insurrection in Andalusia

In mid-May, Cadiz had become the focus of the powers involved in the peninsular situation, and not least of the Spaniards themselves united in their determination that no foreign force should occupy the city. In fact it

was news of the march of Dupont's troops toward Cadiz and the presence of Purvis's fleet at Rota that precipitated Andalusia's insurgency in the last days of May.

Although a subsequent French report traced the "évenements insurrectionnels qui ont éclatés en Andalousie" directly to the Aranjuez coup and the agitation unleashed in Andalusia by its promoters, it considered news of the *infante* don Antonio's departure from Madrid for Bayonne plus reports of Dupont's twenty-three thousand soldiers marching on Cadiz as cues that precipitated the widespread insurgency. Ordering Purvis's task force to Rota from Gibraltar could only have occurred only "sur l'avis parvenue à l'enemi des dispositions où l'on était contre les français," the analysis concluded. "Du moment que l'Escadre et son convoi eurent mouillé dans le O.N.D. de Rota, ils [le comte de Tepa et autres meneurs subalternes] entretinrent en plein jour . . . des intelligences avec l'amiral Purvis." Most incredible to the French at Cadiz was the captain general's refusal to heed French warnings or prevent frequent communication with the English by the governor of San Lucar as well as the incendiary activities of regiments of the four military orders along with the local militia of Xérez de la Frontera.

France's Consul Canclaux at Cadiz concluded that the insurrections that now broke out simultaneously at Cadiz, Sevilla, Xérez, San Lucar, and other Andalusian towns, like those elsewhere in Spain, all followed the model established at Aranjuez on 19 March. "Tout fût calqué sur cet évenement aussi inattendu qu'inconcevable . . . l'esprit de pillage et d'insurrection qui anima les acteurs de cette révolution, se joignit à celle dirigée contre les français . . . excités dessous main par des officiers, des moines et des hommes dont la fortune existante dans l'Amérique du sud paraissait leur donner le droit de tout braver et de tout entreprendre." Once again Spanish colonial interests surfaced as a key factor in uprisings in the metropole.[30]

It was not the aristocratic conde de Montijo, however, who had the most visible role in the formation of a *fernandista* government at Sevilla, but—as so often in such movements—a figure at the margin of the formal structures of society, Nicolas Tap y Núñez, whom history has made a prominent actor in the event. Tap was, as were other prominent participants in the violent movements of 1808, an embittered man.[31] An Andalusian from Morón de la Frontera, he was the son of a merchant who had settled in Sevilla after many years across the Atlantic at the port of Buenos Aires. With only a smattering of education, he migrated to Madrid, where he established a commercial firm and moved into a large-scale smuggling enterprise with a Frenchman, François Rigal. Rigal, he claimed, had tricked him out of 36,000 pesos, and in a long litigation Rigal denounced him to Godoy; he

was arrested and imprisoned for more than two years as a common criminal in a Cadiz jail. He participated in a commercial speculation in 1797 involving French ambassador Perignon and the Cadiz merchant Terry, who had obtained a contract (*exclusif*) to send non-Spanish goods on neutral vessels to the key ports of Havana and Veracruz during the short period of *comercio neutro*. In any event, Tap emerged from jail in late 1807 and—bitterly opposed to Godoy—threw himself into the *fernandista* movement. He moved about Andalusia under cover of smuggling operations between Sevilla and Gibraltar, writing pamphlets and distributing them and other propaganda in taverns and cafés. Soon seconded in early May 1808 by Antonio Esquivel and Juan de Ayus, he now claimed several thousand supporters.[32]

Despite Tap y Núñez's flamboyant claims as "gran caudillo" of insurgent Sevilla, it seems clear from his and others' accounts that he was only an accessory to "personas de importancia" like Joaquín de Goyeneta (*procurador* of Sevilla's Ayuntamiento), Fabián de Miranda (a friend of Esquivel and Ayus), the Franciscan cleric-intellectual Manuel Gil, and—this is significant—officers of the artillery corps. Among the officers were Vicente María Maturana and the brother of the conde de Montijo. During his service overseas in the La Plata area—Tap y Núñez had also been at the port of Buenos Aires—Maturana formed mobile artillery units; later he was shifted to San Roque as artillery commander opposite Gibraltar. In 1806 Maturana joined the conde de Montijo and the Jaúregui and Aróstegui brothers in Andalusia in a plot to remove Godoy.[33] A possible hypothesis: after the Dos de Mayo in which Andalusian artillery officers Luís Daois and Novella were prominent, plans were well advanced to create an insurgent movement in Andalusia. It was artillery officer Maturana and perhaps another artilleryman, the conde de Montijo's brother Cipriano, who opened the magazine of Sevilla's artillery unit in the evening of 26 May to distribute to Esquivel, Ayus, Tap y Núñez, and a mass of followers arms and munitions.

Then on the next day they appeared at the *junta extraordinaria* of Sevilla's Ayuntamiento and representatives of Sevilla's ecclesiastical establishment picked by the archbishop.[34] What ensued was not happenstance but ritual—predictable, planned, yet still surprising. As related by Tap, the uninvited presence of the armed masses at the joint junta touched off the predictable "algazarra que ocurre en tales momentos en expansiones populares . . . el vocero de vivas y mueras . . . las arengas de los cabecillas y las improvicaciones de los patriotas; iban y venían comisiones del pueblo a las Casas Capitulares a manifestar a la asamblea alli reunida los deseos populares . . . por encima . . . parecía flotar el alma del pueblo, desprendido de todo apasionamiento, enconos y ambiciones, envuelta en una santa y noble

aspiración encaminada a la defesa de los altos intereses de la religión y de la patria." At the peak of confusion and uproar, the *asistente de Sevilla*, Vicente Hore, considered a supporter of Godoy and the recently installed Junta at Madrid, called for an oath of loyalty to Fernando VII. The planned clamor gave way to silence, anger, and "tears" for the king in captivity, and the appearance of Lope de Olloqui y Riostrada, Sevilla's *alférez mayor*, carrying the royal standard. "As by a hidden spring" others were unfurled from the balconies of the townhouses surrounding the main plaza. There was an oath of loyalty to Fernando formalized by the Ayuntamiento, and then those assembled, with the approval of Tap y Núñez, chose the members of the Junta de Sevilla, who took power in the name of the absent king. That Junta incorporated church, civil authorities, armed forces, and men of business—but clearly not "el pueblo."[35]

Quickly Sevilla's Junta asserted that it included "personas más respetables de todas las clases," which is to say the elites: the archbishop of Laodicea, the dean of the cathedral (Fabián de Miranda), along with secular and regular clergymen; the *regente* of the Audiencia de Sevilla and four *oidores*; three titles of Castilla; three field marshals, naval officers, and two prominent merchants. Most influential in the coming months was the Junta's acclaimed *presidente*, Francisco de Saavedra y Sangronís, distinguished civil servant formerly *intendente* at "Caracas" (Venezuela), in Spain as *consejero de estado*, then *secretario de hacienda* and briefly prime minister.

The choice of Saavedra was obviously planned to give stature and authority to the Junta de Sevilla. Like most of the *junteros*, Saavedra was an Andalusian but with a national reputation. After resigning when prime minister in 1800, he resided in southern Andalusian towns—Puerto Real, Puerto Santa Maía, San Lucar, Xeréz de la Frontera, and Écija, finally settling in the provincial capital for health and investments (he kept careful records) and closely watching his country's unfolding drama. He does not appear to have participated in the events preceding the crisis in the spring of 1808. Never a rigid partisan, ever conciliatory, moderate, and often indecisive, "las desgracias y persecuciones habían quizás quitado a su alma el temple que reclamaban aquellos tiempos," Toreno wrote generously of Saavedra's performance in 1808.[36] León y Pizarro, *oficial mayor* during Saavedra's brief tenure as prime minister, recalled his penchant for leaving major policy decisions to others. As he put it, "Este sistema de confianza producía lo que era natural, agradaban y era abusado por los que querían intrigar en los negocios." Despite Saavedra's diligence in analyzing issues, León y Pizarro had to add that "en tratandose de cosa que tuviera que hacer con otros, y peor aún que hubiera de mandar a otros, parecían suspendesse sus facultades."[37] Hew

Dalrymple, who had good informants, confirmed this impression: "The president, Saavedra, is a man of little decision or confidence in himself and is therefore easily influenced by others," he confided to Castlereagh in mid-June of 1808.[38] Others of the Junta de Sevilla Dalrymple ranked as "ordinary men" with the exception of the cleric Manuel Gil, "the most talented . . . though loquacious to the point of indiscretion." Gil, a good friend of Fabián de Miranda, was quickly made acting *vice-presidente* of the Junta and for a time its prime mover and leading spirit.[39] Gil, like Juan de Escoiquiz, was an intellectual of religious vocation and strong political avocation, and representative of the conservative anti-Gallican Catholic enlightenment in Spain in the late eighteenth century; he testified forcefully against Pablo de Olavide and his program for reform in Andalusia at Olavide's trial by the Inquisition in 1775.[40] And, like Escoiquiz, whose conservative political orientation he shared, he had been employed by the ministry of State in counter-French security operations in the 1790s.[41] In 1795–1796 Godoy had used him to edit what could have been a public, sharply critical report on Spain's colonial trade policy by Malaspina on returning from his seven-year voyage around Spanish America. Ostensibly Gil's job was to improve Malaspina's Italianate Spanish, really to censor criticism of Spain's whole transatlantic trading system as metropolitan authorities tried to assay the effects of *comercio libre* of 1789.

Like Escoiquiz, Gil had followed carefully—always with discretion—the delicate situation of the Spanish Empire in the unsettling final decades of the eighteenth century. He too had read the publications of the Abbé Raynal with whom he identified Malaspina "y otros habladores," whom he accused of abusing "los papeles más útiles y aún los más reservados pertenecientes al comercio, frutos, cultivo y sistema de gobierno de nuestras Indias" for the purpose of recommending "legislación dudosa [que] destruirían aquellas posesiones, o turbarían si no acababan del todo el justo imperio de España sobre ellas." Of course, these views proved Gil's support of the position of the conservative mercantile elite of Cadiz, to which he had paid special tribute in a eulogy of Alexandro O'Reilly.[42] Although a protagonist of Cadiz's interests and critic of Malaspina, Gil had become a victim in the anti-Godoy plot in which Malaspina and some Andalusians were caught up. In 1797 he was arrested and sentenced without trial to confinement in a monastery in Sevilla where he remained until late 1807. Gil would not accept public dishonor passively in Sevilla, where he claimed status and distinction of forty years' standing. Predictably he joined the anti-Godoy and *fernandista* operation early on.

An "intimate friend" of Gil, Fabián de Miranda, dean of the Cathedral

of Sevilla, was influential in forming the Junta de Sevilla; he followed Gil as its *vice-presidente*, a post in which he became an outspoken supporter of Sevilla's hegemony over other metropolitan juntas in foreign policy issues and especially colonial affairs. As for the Junta de Sevilla, it was organized by commissions, of which clearly the most important was that of Estado, whose key members included leading figures in the Junta and another officer of the elitist artillery corps as its secretary, Juan Bautista Esteller.[43]

In its first order of business, the Junta de Sevilla removed the suggestion of popular participation in claiming sovereignty. Its first proclamation (29 May) carefully distanced itself from implications of crowd mobilization preceding its formation. As the proclamation sanitized crowd participation in careful detail, the inhabitants of Sevilla responding to recent events used "las facultades de que el mismo pueblo se estima condecorado . . . fué presentarse con fuerza armada en las casas de Ayuntamiento y tomando la voz [pidió] . . . se nombrara por las autoridades constituidas, Estado Ecclesiastico, Secular y Regular, cuerpo de Nobleza, Oficiales generales y Comercio, una Junta Suprema de govierno, que reasumiendo las jurisdicciones y toda potestad, rigiese, gobernase y dispusiese cuando ocurriera . . . hasta lograr los fines que se han propuesto de defender la religión y la patria."[44] In another proclamation on the same day addressed to Spaniards in Europe and the American colonies, the Junta expressed unambiguously the conservative nature of its insurgency: "En España no hay revolución." It reassured Spaniards overseas with the promise of restoring the old regime: "Solo pretendemos defender lo que hay mas sagrado contra el que con pretexto de alianza y amistad nos lo arrebató, y de quien debemos temer que sin pelear nos despoje de leyes, de monarchas, y de religión."[45]

That the Junta de Sevilla wanted itself seen as spearheading a broad, spontaneous insurgency is clear from its *prevenciones* issued the previous day and immediately circulated to other juntas in the peninsula. Expressing confidently that all Spain would join *its* insurgent movement, it laid out military and political guidelines to ensure success. First, it was essential "evitar toda acción general" since a centralized command at this juncture would invite disaster. Rather, the situation of Spain dictated "una guerra de partidas, de embarazos"—autonomous uprisings far from following a French model. Each province would appoint a committed, experienced army officer commanding military officers of merit, such as those of the artillery corps. A supreme military command would consist of three generals representing Spain's three major regions, each in charge of veteran troops as well as popular cadres. A campaign of public opinion would publicize "la perfidia horrible con que los franceses han obrado con toda España y hasta

con su Rey Fernando Séptimo" and guarantee that, once restored to his throne, Fernando would convoke a cortes to reform abuses and establish such laws as "el tiempo y la experiencia dicten para el público bien y felicidad; cosas que sabemos hacer los españoles . . . sin ncesidad que vengan los viles franceses a enseñarnoslo." In effect, Sevilla aimed to counter French promises to introduce reform measures in the way the revolution had done in France. Until Fernando's return, however, efforts must be directed to prosecute the war against the French occupation.[46]

There were notable omissions in Sevilla's *prevenciones*, which were obviously designed as a blueprint of political organization and agenda for the insurgent provincial juntas of Spain. There was no mention of who might formulate foreign policy, address colonial administrative issues, or—what was Cadiz's main preoccupation—the colonial trades and *comercio libre* in particular. These responsibilities would be reserved for the Sevillan Junta, which soon titled itself Junta *Suprema* de España e Indias.

Although not overt, the Junta de Sevilla's aspiration to hegemony in Spain and the American colonies is implied in its manifesto of 17 June.[47] "Las Américas," it asserted anxiously as it staked out its immediate and long-term objectives, "no pueden dexar de unirse a ella en causa tan justa. Uno mismo será el esfuerzo de ambas por su Rey, por sus Leyes, por su Patria, y por su Religión . . . Las Américas la sostendrán . . . enviando inmediatamente los caudales Reales y . . . donativos patrióticos." And then came the traditional ambiguity: "El comercio volverá a florecer con la libertad de la navegación, y con los favores y gracias oportunas que le dispensará esta Suprema." Significantly, Manuel Gil confided to Major Cox that this manifesto would not be published until Sevilla's agents, Jabat and Jaúregui, left Cadiz for New Spain. Cox then passed this observation to Dalrymple with his belief there seemed a "considerable difference of opinion and want of consistency" among the members of the Junta de Sevilla "in regard to the system which ought to be pursued relative to the South American Provinces," leading him "to believe that a plan which was formed is now entirely done away and something new substituted in its stead."[48] One may now understand the Junta's delayed and studied public ambiguity on colonial trade policy at this point.

If Cox's presumption about "something new" was correct, what was the original plan for the Spanish colonies? Why was it abandoned, and why was publication of Sevilla's manifesto held up until its commissioners departed? Speculation suggests an earlier design pushed by *fernandista* crisis managers may have favored a more flexible approach to the colonial problem—most important, *comercio libre*—than what the Junta actually implemented.

Certain personnel shifts in the Junta and concurrent events support this hypothesis.

Sevilla's Local Critics

The Junta de Sevilla contained rival factions from its inception.[49] Perhaps the most important division counterpoised a physiocratic group to one of strictly mercantilist viewpoints. Prominent among the physiocrats were Francisco Xavier de Uriortua, a lawyer and member of Sevilla's Ayuntamiento, and his brother Juan Manuel, a *negociante*. Both were part of the territorial elite of Andalusia and active in establishing in 1788 a new Consulado at Sevilla that included landowners alongside merchants. In 1787 in the twilight of reform under Floridablanca before the tornado of the French Revolution, *comercio libre* could be aired in print. Francisco Xavier wrote the controversial *informe* published by the prestigious Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid condemning the "inhumano sistema de comercio que por más de dos siglos havía seguido la España con sus colonias en America," a system whereby "nuestros com-vassallos y nuestros hermanos" have been kept "en la dura alternativa de carecer de las cosas más precisas o pagarlas al exorbitante precio que le señalaba de insaciable codicia de un monopolista" while agriculture in Spain and the colonies stagnated under the weight of mercantilist restrictions and oligopolistic interests.[50] Uriortua's target went unnamed, but the political class recognized it was the Cadiz merchant community. The next year his brother Juan Manuel articulated similar views when *prior* of Sevilla's new, resurrected Consulado. The Uriortuas' stance was hardly calculated to win the backing of the Consulado de Cadiz, which had publicly opposed including New Spain in *comercio libre* of 1788.[51] Seventeen years later (1805) after wars, financial crisis, and political instability, Francisco Xavier de Uriortua, now honorary member of the government's Junta de Comercio y Moneda as well as *asesor de los ramos de consolidación* in the province of Cadiz, proposed that Cadiz merchants trading with the colonies lend the Caja de Consolidación 1 million pesos. Matters worsened when General Francisco Xavier Solano, captain general of Andalusia, suggested in 1805 that Uriortua substitute him as presiding officer at meetings discussing the loan, and the Consulado de Sevilla objected strenuously on the ground that Solano, mere honorary member of the Junta de Comercio y Moneda, lacked the proper status. Unlike the unfortunate conde de Águila, *procurador* and a member of Sevilla's Consulado, who had also signed the Real Sociedad's critical *informe* and was assassinated by a Sevillan mob, Uriortua lived to fight another day.[52]

It is safe to assume that major figures in the Cadiz Consulado were relieved when in May 1808 General Solano and others who shared his outlook were removed from the political limelight by Sevilla's insurgent mobs. The conde de Tilly, who quarreled with the conde de Águila over Junta policy in Uriortua's residence, may have been responsible for Águila's murder, in the view of Francisco Saavedra, while other sources blamed "agentes de un enemigo oculto." Among others named to the Junta but quickly replaced on grounds of "popular" mistrust were Joaquín de Uriarte, a member of the Consulado de Sevilla, replaced by Celedonio Alonso; Francisco Cienfuegos (nephew of the physiocrat Gaspar de Jovellanos), who would later implement physiocratic policies when assigned overseas to Cuba; and Vicente Basadre, former secretary of the Consulado de Veracruz and a committed physiocrat who wisely kept a discrete profile.

Suppression of physiocratic members of the Junta de Sevilla is intimated in the key phrase of the mid-June manifesto that declared the Junta would represent the metropolitan government, continue existing legislation and institutions, and grant "favores y gracias" for reviving the colonial trades. The language seemingly removed hope or expectation in the colonies that the *fernandista* government at Sevilla might address long-standing colonial grievances in administration and commerce. Perhaps fear of colonial resentment of this inflexible position was behind the Junta's decision to withhold publication of the manifesto until the departure of the "San Justo" with the two commissioners to Veracruz and then Mexico City aboard. In any case, the delay reveals the influence of conservative Cadiz merchants in—and on—the Junta de Sevilla from its inception.

Sevilla-Cadiz and Dissidence: The Political Assassination of General Solano

The first priority of the Junta de Sevilla was assertion of its power to govern Andalusia. In fact its authority was recognized by insurrectionary Juntas at Jaén and Córdoba; Granada, seat of the Chancillería de Granada, claimed a higher right to supremacy in the province. Only the intervention of General Castaños prevented Sevilla from sending troops to take over that city.

Getting Cadiz to support the Junta de Sevilla presented a more serious and complex problem. Although the port lay within Sevilla's administrative jurisdiction as a *reino* of Andalusia, economically it was more important. Its customshouse generated more revenue than all Andalusia and enjoyed a large measure of de facto political autonomy with direct access to Madrid. Cadiz's *gobernador* was captain general of Andalusia and titular president

of its Consulado as well as of the Audiencia and answered only to Madrid. In turn, the Consulado de Cadiz, representing the powerful colonial mercantile establishment, had exclusive jurisdiction over the major sector of Cadiz's economy, claiming sole recourse to the Consejo de Indias and the king. With a broad network of interests and influence in both metropole and colonies, it played a powerful if informal political and economic role; the naval base and academy were administratively independent of Sevilla. Last, the general perception of Cadiz—"almost an island"—as ultimate and impregnable refuge of anti-French resistance in the metropole enhanced its importance in 1808.

Cadiz's support of the Junta de Sevilla, which claimed national sovereignty in Fernando's name, was essential. But it was not unconditional: Cadiz exerted a determining influence on financial, commercial, and colonial policy formulation. The instrument of influence would be a junta of local elites, its Junta de Observación y Defensa. Formed on 29 May, this body declared its subordination to the Junta Suprema de Sevilla the day after the assassination of the governor of Cadiz and captain general of Andalusia, General Francisco María Solano, marqués del Real Socorro.

This was an extraordinary development in the context of incipient insurrectionary activity after the stunning developments at Bayonne. In its immediate context, Solano's assassination proved essential to the consolidation of the hegemonic role of the Junta Suprema de Sevilla. Given the authority of Andalusia's captain general as supreme military and political commandant of an important province, it was unlikely that this representative of the central authority at Madrid would subordinate himself to any local body—Cadiz commercial interests in this instance—ostensibly created by "popular" fiat and claiming supreme authority over Spain and America in Fernando VII's name. Solano, in his Andalusian post since late 1803—except for acting as interim commander of Spanish troops in the Franco-Spanish occupation of southern Portugal—was, of all Spain's captains general in 1808, probably the least likely to accept such subordination. As far as Cadiz was concerned, Solano had a solid—perhaps too solid—grasp of the aspirations and grievances of many colonial elites, in his case, of Venezuela ("Caracas") where Francisco Saavedra had served as a high colonial administrator. Solano's colonial background would be his misfortune.

Francisco María Solano Ortiz de Rozas was born at Caracas in 1768, the son of José Solano y Bote, a naval officer of obscure Extremaduran origin who made a distinguished career in the colonies: captain general of Caracas and participant in Bernardo de Gálvez's defeat of English forces at Pensacola in 1783.[53] In 1762 he married the daughter of Domingo Ortíz de

Rozas, who served first as captain general of Chile and later of the Rio de la Plata. Possibly his marital connection, administrative skill, and response to Esquilache's projects for colonial reform and development led to appointment as captain general and governor of Caracas. There he bought land, promoted the economic development of the colony, and inevitably had to handle widespread smuggling between the colony and nearby foreign ports—Dutch, English, and French—in the Caribbean. Briefly governor of Santo Domingo, where he encouraged tobacco cultivation, in 1782 he was in Cuba to prepare for naval operations against the English in the Caribbean. Honored for his participation in the reoccupation of Pensacola with the title of marqués del Real Socorro and a land grant in Cuba, José de Solano y Bote returned to Madrid as *consejero de estado* and favor at court.[54]

His eldest son, Francisco María Solano, entered the military with more advantages than his father (the sons in their teens were accepted in the Orden de San Juan) but with no less sense of vocation and national service. Prisoner in the war with France in revolution (1793–1795) and possibly embittered by English collaborators in that conflict, he volunteered to serve in France's Army of the Rhine under General Moreau. In 1796 as part of the Spanish delegation negotiating renewal of the Franco-Spanish alliance, he sent a position paper to Godoy advocating a continental alliance against England's maritime supremacy, expressing concern with its evident designs on South America's Pacific coast and domination of the Atlantic. Here he was tapping into Spain's reaction to English expansion in the Western Hemisphere in the eighteenth century. England, he wrote, had violated the basic principle of international relations: "Una nación no puede ser aliada de otra quando sus intereses son incompatibles" and "no puede dejar de ser su enemigo quando atenta solo a los suyos." Only the joint efforts of France, Holland, and Spain "amistosamente reunidas" could "conservar sus posesions y evitar la ruina total de su comercio."[55]

But while Solano continued to view English sea power as the major threat to the Spanish empire after 1796, Napoleon's emergence as, first, consul and then emperor was a source of renewed apprehension over Spain's international interests as expressed in his memoire of 1796. Opposition to Bonaparte and the expulsion from France of his friend, Moreau—he may have contacted Moreau when he passed through Cadiz on his way to exile in the United States—may have altered Solano's attitude toward France. This was evident in early October 1806, just after news of the English attack on Buenos Aires and before the French victory at Jena, when French consul LeRoy at Cadiz reported that "le fait est que . . . Solano est entièrement changé à notre égard depuis deux ans; il s'efforce d'éloigner tout ce

qui aime la justice et se laisse influencer par les flatteries des correspondants de Gibraltar, Lisbonne, etc." While masking his conduct by praising French naval officers, "il laisse un champ vaste à tous les intriguants qui l'entourent et qui affichent hautement leur haine contre les français."[56] When Bonaparte's victory at Jena ended the immediate prospect of a revived European coalition against France and cut short Godoy's premature overture to England, Solano, like Godoy, tried to retract his criticism of the French, explaining to LeRoy that he had begun his career agreeing with "ce que l'alliance devait promettre aux Français" but later had to follow the example of those whose career advancement was blocked by identification with the so-called French party.[57]

Above all a military officer, Solano then as later defended his "honor" as an officer obedient to the chain of command—to many in the Spanish military soon a source of confusion when two governments sought their obedience, one at Madrid and the other at Sevilla/Cadiz. As the authority of the government at Madrid disintegrated and the chain of command weakened, his uncertainty grew. Recalled from the campaign in Portugal in mid-March 1808 to cover the possible retreat of the royal family to Andalusia and possibly to New Spain, he neared Toledo when the rioting at Aranjuez overthrew Godoy and brought Fernando's accession. Ordered by Pedro Cevallos to return to his former command post, he was at Badajoz when news reached him on 4 May of the Madrid uprising of 2 May and the call to arms issued by Pérez Villamil at Móstoles. With the conde de la Torre del Fresno, acting captain general of Extremadura, he convened a military council and published an order for general enlistment.[58] Couched in terms of Godoy's fateful proclamation of 6 October 1806, it proved equally premature. Soon afterward he learned from Murat's agent Constantin of how Murat had pacified Madrid with the cooperation of the Spanish military there, of the departure of the *infante* Don Antonio for Bayonne, and of his replacement by Murat as *presidente* of the Junta de Gobierno. He was shocked, above all, by the unsettling text of letters between Fernando and Charles at Bayonne in early May. Solano, who had initially stated that the military code prohibited him from replying to Murat's dispatches without direct orders from the war minister General Gonzalo O'Farrill, "parut avoir entièrement changé d'idées," explaining to Constantin "les motifs du refus qu'il avait fait d'obéir Murat."[59]

It was the letter of Charles IV of 2 May, published in the *Gazeta de Madrid*, that Solano read and reread in Constantin's presence, which affected him profoundly. In it Charles summarized Spain's foreign policy since Basle (1796) and denounced the Escorial conspiracy, the Aranjuez coup that now

threatened to bring "la guerra civil, los motines, las juntas populares y la revolución," and, in their aftermath, the disintegration of the *monarquía*. Solano agreed to provide Constantin with an escort on his mission to visit Castaños at Gibraltar. However, his reply to Murat's dispatch that informed him of the suppression of the insurgency at Madrid and his assumption of power—like that of Castaños—was ambiguous. While sympathizing with Murat's bitterness over the death of "brave French soldiers" in the course of the 2 May uprising, Solano judged that Murat must also recognize in the riot "quelques traces de noblesse qui distingue le caracatère de mes compatriotes." Responding to Murat's appeal for support, he added: "Rien, monseigneur, ne peut m'être plus agréable que de conserver mon existence au bonheur de ma patrie; tout ce que je suis, je le suis par elle et pour elle. Le gouvernement peut compter sur mes efforts pour concurrir a ses bonnes intentions."

As for the troops under his command, "Mes fonctions en Extremadure sont réduites au commandement du reste des troupes avec lesquelles nous sommes entrés en Portugal . . . et elles se sont consacrées à soutenir les mesures très eficaces que le commandant général de cette province, le comte de la Torre del Fresno, a prise pour maintenir l'ordre à diriger le zèle d'un peuple alarmé sur le risque de la capital; mais qui au milieu de son effervescence s'adresse à ses chefs et à ses magistrats pour leur demander des armes et de l'emploi. VA.I. et R., si distinguée par son patriotisme, ne condemnera pas sans doute ce mouvement du peuple qui n'a jamais cessé de respecter l'authorité que le gouverne et qui a été tranquile aussitôt qu'il a été détrompé." Solano informed Murat that he had just received from the minister of war, O'Farrill, the Junta Suprema de Gobierno's order concerning the march of his troops to Andalusia, and that he himself was awaiting further orders. As for Murat's letter of 6 May announcing his appointment as Charles IV's surrogate in Spain, "something must have happened to prevent its receipt," a fact that did not surprise him in view of the absence of the official proclamation of the new government in dispatches he had received. Evidently Solano was punctilious in insisting on his subordination to the Spanish authorities—and that included the war minister—in Madrid.[60] In fact, Murat did not officially assume his new post until later.

On O'Farrill's orders, Solano returned to Cadiz and his post as captain general of Andalusia. En route he stopped at Sevilla, where he reportedly met with *fernandista* representatives, refused to commit himself to their plan to form a revolutionary government—possibly Castaños had already done so—and then hurried to Cadiz.[61] Arriving about 15 May, he found the port city in ferment. On receiving the appeal from Móstoles for an uprising,

acting governor General Manuel de la Peña had also convened a military junta in response to popular demand; but, as at Badajoz when word of the pacification of Madrid and the renunciations of the royal family at Bayonne arrived, moves to arm the people were suspended. Amid growing popular unrest, Solano sought to preserve military and political command. In response to Admiral Collingwood's appeal to participate in an insurgent movement against the government at Madrid, Solano replied that he lacked power to take what was in effect foreign policy into his own hands. "Mon pays a un gouvernement; je n'ai d'autre pouvoir que celui qu'il me confie et c'est à lui que vous devez addresser vos propositions."[62] But while he assured the French that Cadiz's defenses were ready for any English hostile activity and agreed to Admiral Rosilly's proposal to intersperse his naval vessels among those of Spain in the Cadiz bay, French intelligence reported that the forts facing the English fleet "n'ont que le simulacre de la défense." It would appear, the French agent added, that more was involved than inaction due to uncertainty created by Solano's refusal to take the measures demanded by the presence of Collingwood's blockading fleet.

At this point distrusted by English and French officers alike, Solano's fate was sealed. The arrival on 28 May of the conde de Montijo and Eusebio de Herrera to request that Cadiz reject the Madrid government and turn to the newly formed Junta de Sevilla was hardly calculated to win the immediate support of Captain General Solano. Montijo, although officially charged to deliver the Junta de Sevilla's dispatches to Solano, was not a member of the Junta; indeed, his reputation and notorious involvement in the *fernandista* anti-Godoy intrigues of preceding years could only heighten the doubts of a military commander like Solano. Nor did Eusebio Antonio de Herrera y Rojas, member of the Junta de Sevilla "por los generales," seem adequately authorized to demand the captain general of Andalusia recognize Sevilla's self-assumed supreme authority. Typed by Dalrymple as an "indiscreet, busy person who is prone to exceeding his powers," Herrera was a naval officer who, like Solano, had transferred to the army. And, like Solano, his family had roots in both Spain and the American colonies in the eighteenth century, if not earlier. Herrera was born in Chile (1754); his paternal grandfather, native of Puerto Santa María (on the Bay of Cadiz), had been *presidente* of the Audiencia de Charcas (Alto Peru); a paternal great uncle, a *corregidor* and *contador* of Lima's Tribunal de Cuentas; and an uncle, *corregidor* of Tarija (Chile). His father and maternal grandfather had been *regidores* on the Ayuntamiento of Santiago (Chile), where Solano's maternal grandfather had also been *gobernador*. Herrera joined the Órden de Alcántara (1788), and reached the rank of *mariscal de campo* in 1806.[63] Both

Herrera and Solano were in a real sense children of the Spanish Empire, then more than two hundred years old, and there were many like them.

The Military and the Crisis of Legitimacy

An "instrucción" that Montijo carried to Cadiz from the Junta de Sevilla detailed how to compose a junta of resistance, subordinate to the Junta Suprema de Sevilla. It was clear and well thought out. Specifically, it requested "ayuntamiento, clero y prelados de las religiones, curas, nobles y demás personas que congregados estos estimen convenientes (no "pueblo" invited), se forme una junta de seis pesonas que reciba las órdenes de esta Suprema . . . y en todo use de la autoridad de esta en todo." The new junta would enlist immediately all volunteers, others if necessary, of ages sixteen to forty-five; select their officers from "personas honradas," and petition individuals and corporations to donate funds managed by someone the junta chose.[64] In addition, Montijo and Herrera insisted—presumably orally—on the immediate surrender of Admiral Rosilly's fleet in the Cadiz bay, and on sending troops to defend Sevilla from oncoming French forces.

Hardly surprising was Solano's immediate reaction to the message carried by Montijo and Herrera, as at Badajoz a few weeks earlier—to convene a council of concerned military officers, two of whom were former captains general of Andalusia. In the late evening of 27 May, they agreed to issue a carefully worded summary of their deliberations in the form of a *bando*, a model of analysis and concision that touched all the major issues that the proposed Junta de Cadiz would have to confront immediately.

The military group warned that "unos enemigos ansiosos de lucro amenazan nuestras costas" were waiting to turn Cadiz into a smugglers' paradise like Gibraltar, and it emphasized with barely restrained rebuke that the Bourbons, who "tenían un legítimo derecho y autoridad para convocarnos y conducirnos a sus enemigos, lejos de hacerlo . . . han ido espontaneamente e sin violencia con ellos." This was the source of nagging confusion over legitimate authority after Bayonne, the proliferation of competing provincial juntas, and the military's bedevilment. Nonetheless, the officers expressed their readiness to respond to the "clamores generales de la provincia" for recruitment and action against the French. But, they added with foresight, let none of those, now so insistent, later incriminate them "por haberles llevado como rebaños de ovejas a la carnicería. Para combatir es menester alistarse, regimentarse, disciplinarse, y tener una táctica." Next, the officers revealed—and reminded—how the colonial conquest experience of three centuries earlier had been absorbed by the Spanish military. "Sin ella seri-

amos como los mejicanos o tlascaltelcos delante de Hernando Cortés al tiempo de la conquista. Es necesario una numerosa artillería que exije mucho ganado de tiro y carga; además provisiones de toda especie, pues no hemos de ir a saquear nuestras provincias. De otra parte, sin dinero no se hace la guerra." As experienced military, the officers prophetically warned that resistance to the occupier would be a long one. "En fin, no es asunto de una campaña corta, a menos que desde luego fuésemos derrotados completamente. Son menester muchas y muchas victorias para conseguir el fin que se propone." Above all, the military warned against the use of deliberate political assassination—an allusion to what *fernandista* mob creation had produced, such as the assassination of Hacienda minister Sixto Espinosa and others earlier at Madrid. "El campo de Marte es solo el teatro del honor; los asesinatos prueban bajeza y cobardía, cubren de infamia y atraen represalias crueles y justas"—precisely what Murat had ordered in May at Madrid. Finally, while agreeing to recruit and train volunteers, the military refused to send forces from Cadiz to Sevilla—the port was too important. "La defensa de Cadiz no puede desatendese por su importancia, por la escuadra, por el arsenal y por el puerto, tambien por las riquezas que encierra."[65]

Restraint, however, was no longer possible. Even as the *bando* circulated, however, a well-directed mob was already set in motion. Incited by agents, among whom Montijo was allegedly prominent, and swollen by prisoners released from the city's jail, the crowd now attacked the home of the French consul demanding the surrender of the French fleet in the harbor and a declaration of war against France. Solano now reconvened the military council again into session, and measures were passed to fall into line with Sevilla. Solano summoned representatives of Cadiz's Ayuntamiento, the Consulado, and ecclesiastical authorities to consider how to finance the volunteers. In addition, a member of the military council was dispatched to Sevilla to take charge of enlistment and training of recruits. The council, however, backed away from attacking the French fleet in the bay on the grounds that it would endanger Spanish shipping moored nearby and invite the English to occupy Cadiz.[66]

The military council's refusal to act against Rosilly's fleet was the immediate pretext to attack the residence of Captain General Solano by the crowds now armed from the port's artillery magazine. Accounts of what happened vary in details, but the outcome was clear. Solano, guarded by a small detachment under José de San Martín (soon a commanding figure in La Plata's war of independence) but abandoned by the military council, was dragged by the "mob" from his residence, paraded through the streets of the port, and about to be hanged, like the smugglers he had prosecuted.

He was saved from military ignominy by the intervention of a friend, Carlos Pignatelli, who killed him.

This was a case of organized political assassination under cover of an anonymously guided "crowd" operation, and it suggests that there is no doubt that Cadiz sent its commissioners Jabat and Jaúregui to Mexico City authorized to remove Viceroy Iturrigaray by force if they judged circumstances so warranted. They did. As for army officer San Martín, his revolutionary position a few years later in South America is understandable.

Solano's assassination must be seen in context. It was neither the first nor far from the last such surgical operation in tumultuous 1808 when the world of Spain and its Atlantic empire were turned upside-down. It followed the political assassination of the conde de Águila (Sevilla, 27 May) and of Valencia's captain general (April), and preceded that of the conde del Torre del Fresno and General Caetano Filangieri along with other army officers and provincial governors, as a guerrilla-type warfare against an occupying power developed aspects of internal war between reformers and traditionalists. Solano's elimination exemplifies liquidation of the enlightened section of Spain's military elite that—along with segments of the civil service at home and abroad—had emerged in the last half of the eighteenth century. The point is, for none was the trauma of 1808 more acute than for Spain's military establishment. While the civil service had little alternative to formal acceptance of the novel situation that flowed from Bayonne, the military at Madrid and in the provinces, as captains general and intendants, fissioned between Bourbon and Bonaparte, Fernando VII (exiled in France) and José I at Madrid. They had to take a public position. The military cadres had to back their choice by initiating hostilities against either internal rebellion or French occupiers—either one disastrous to Spain and its empire.

To Solano born in a colony in America, 1808 posed a particularly excruciating dilemma. Loyal to the *monarquía* to which he avowed "all that I am and all that I have," he had been the first and only high military figure to call for reaction at the time of the Dos de Mayo. By training and temperament, however, he was unprepared for, and had little faith in, popular rebellion and regional autonomy, which Charles III had warned against. Part of the military elite, he participated in government efforts to reduce regional enclaves of rights, privilege, and power, particularly as captain general of Andalusia where that conflict had its most acerbic form. Asked by the French if he was afraid to resume his command in Andalusia given the insurgency in the area, he replied he would "like to govern the Andalusians forever." He may have guessed clearly the consequences of *fernandista* strategy: despotism without enlightenment and without colonies.

Miguel de Azanza, former viceroy of New Spain, characterized the assassinated of 1808 as among the most enlightened and effective of Spain's military and political elites.[67] They were among those who had benefited most from social mobility and career advancement apparent under Charles III and Charles IV. Their world was founded on merit, discipline, hierarchy, and loyalty to constituted authority. Disappearance of that authority and its substitution by competing regional economic and political factions, legitimated by the figment of an absent king manipulated by regional and sectoral interests, undermined the very rationale of their existence. Some like Solano, Águila, Torre del Fresno, and Filangieri were assassinated, while others like Azanza, O'Farrill, Morla, and Sotelo accepted the legitimacy of Bonaparte's choice, José I. This cadre of still-believing reformers would be offsided at the insurgency's end.

General Tomás de Morla, on the military Junta that had unanimously approved the edict initiating Cadiz's insurrection, succeeded Solano as *gobernador* of Cadiz. The Junta de Observación y Defensa under his presidency, composed of representatives of the Ayuntamiento, clergy, nobility, and merchant bourgeoisie, took an oath of allegiance to Fernando in exile and accepted the supremacy of the Junta de Sevilla over the whole peninsula. Although the surrender of Rosilly's fleet had been the ostensible demand of the "people" that preceded Solana's assassination, Morla delayed taking action until mid-June, after the Junta de Sevilla had arranged an armistice with England and declared war on France.

Morla, whose impassivity during the orchestrated mob actions at Cadiz on 28–30 May raises questions of professional rivalry with Solano, was also an artillery officer with a similar pattern of military and political promotion and authored a treatise on military fortifications. In succession had come: membership in the military Orden de Santiago (1794) and the Orden de Carlos III (1804), travel in Europe, contacts with the French military establishment, and appointment as captain general of Andalusia (1800) and finally *consejero de estado*. Morla, like Solano, was part of the enlightened Spanish military elite, but he was also peninsula-oriented and an *andalus*. Twenty years older than Solano, he came from Xérez de la Frontera and the local territorial elite. Of the seven sponsors of his entry into the Orden de Carlos III in 1804, all came from the Andalusian social and economic establishment. Five were *andaluces*, two were members of the elitist Maestranza d Ronda, three were associated with Cadiz's business community, and three were employed in civil service as provincial tax collectors and customs officers. Most had effective, honorific military status.[68]

As a representative of Andalusian interests, Morla, unlike Solano, advo-

cated peaceful relations with England. French Consul LeRoy harbored no doubts about his antipathy for the French.[69] In May 1808 Morla interpreted French penetration into Spain as the primary threat to the *monarquía*. At the same time, he was haunted by fear that the English might convert Cadiz into another Gibraltar, and during his brief tenure as *gobernador* he opposed English requests to land troops at the port. The Junta de Cadiz, under Morla as *presidente*, while accepting the authority of the Junta de Sevilla, jealously defended its local power, forming its own voluntary militia composed and commanded by local merchants and adamantly rejecting English overtures to occupy the port. It was a peculiar irony of history, therefore, that two years later in the darkest hour of the *fernandista* government, Morla would choose to serve as adviser at Madrid to General Gonzalo O'Farrill, José Bonaparte's (now José I) war minister, in devising strategy for occupying Cadiz to forestall an English landing.

Sevilla: Legitimacy, Finance, and New Spain

Given the commercial and financial importance of Cadiz and its merchants' influence, its Junta inevitably would dominate the nearby Junta de Sevilla, whose use of the trappings of sovereignty over other juntas of the resistance it viewed with amusement. Such influence, although exercised informally, was soon evident in various developments, most important in the loan conditions that the Consulado de Cadiz offered the Junta de Sevilla, the selection of delegates to represent the Junta Suprema de Sevilla in negotiating a treaty of peace and alliance with London, and the appointment of commissioners sent to Havana, Mexico City, and other colonial capitals to obtain support and funds.

From the outset the Junta de Sevilla's financial situation was precarious. Compared to military and civilian demands, its sources of income were limited. Immediately it had to suspend the sale of the resources of the ecclesiastical *fondos píos* under Consolidación while vowing to support the *vales reales* and resume its interest payments. Sevilla's subordinate juntas retained their own revenues. Although Cadiz commercial magnates pledged support in the form of provisions and funds, and the Consulado de Cadiz donated a percentage of its employees' salaries to the *fernandista* cause, overall its support was slow and unpredictable.[70] After an initial interest-free loan of 42,000 *pesos fuertes* raised under the authority of Dalrymple and at Emanuel Viale's urging, Gibraltar's merchants were reluctant "to advance more money whilst there is no National Government the credit of which can be pledged for the repayment."[71] Eusebio de Herrera's request in the Junta de

Sevilla's name on 18 June for a loan of £100,000 from Gibraltar's merchants was rejected on the same grounds.[72]

On June 21 Sevilla's finance officers asked for cash in the form of a 1 million peso loan from the Consulado de Cadiz, which may have earlier recommended the move. One week later the Consulado replied cautiously, explaining that the year before it had failed to raise the 12 million reales loan requested by Godoy's government at a high 12 percent interest on cash or 6 percent on *vales* on the security of an import duty to be administered by the Consulado. Now in the atmosphere of merchants' distrust of all political bodies, there was little hope that a fresh loan would be forthcoming unless Sevilla asked for a specific amount (only 1 or 2 million), offered one special security with a specific interest rate along with time and place of interest payment and capital redemption. The Consulado emphasized that subscribers would probably expect an interest rate equal to that of the earlier loan and suggested that with peace that high-rate interest loans might be refinanced by the same or other subscribers.[73] Cadiz, foreseeing the resumption of its profitable colonial trades, was intent on recouping its capital losses through the mechanism of lending to government at high interest and rapid reimbursement.

Although Cadiz had no direct participation in the deliberations of the Junta de Sevilla, its interests were well represented in the delegation sent to England at the close of June to seek recognition as the government of Spain, to negotiate a peace treaty, and to obtain economic assistance. Of the four-man delegation that reached London, the ostensible leader was Adrián de Jácome, a member of the Junta de Sevilla "por los generales." From an influential Andalusian family of merchant origin ennobled at the end of the seventeenth century, Jácome had been disgraced during Godoy's administration; after six years as commanding officer at San Roque near Gibraltar, he had been abruptly removed on charges still unclear, accused of unauthorized relations with the English. Perhaps he enjoyed overly friendly contacts with the Duke of Kent and George Canning.[74] Like naval officer Jabat, who was exonerated and restored to rank at the end of 1807, Jácome turned active *fernandista* and, with his brother the marqués de Tablantes, who was secretary of the elitist *Maestramza de Sevilla*, he joined the Andalusian uprising of May.

While Jácome represented the Andalusian elites prominent in Sevillan society, the delegation's second member represented an old Cadiz family of Basque and Genoese antecedents prominent in the royal navy and colonial trade. Juan Ruiz de Apodaca—like Jácome—also held a personal animus against Godoy, whom he believed responsible for disgracing his brother,

Sebastián, imprisoned at Cadiz for burning the naval ships under his command when Trinidad had to surrender to the English in 1798. Participant in General Solano's military council, Apodaca would later play an important role in colonial affairs as captain general of Cuba and then viceroy of New Spain.

Probably as important as the nominal chiefs of mission to London, Jácome and Apodaca, were the mission's two secretaries, Rafael Lobo and Lorenzo de Noriega, closely linked both to Cadiz and, through Cadiz, to Veracruz and Mexico City. Rafael Lobo y Campos—member of the Orden de Alcántara in 1804—was born at Jalapa in New Spain, where his father from Cadiz, Juan Santiago Lobo y Candiani, had been a merchant before retiring to Cadiz. At Veracruz he left behind an older son, Juan Bautista, prominent in the commercial and political issues of Veracruz. When the father retired, he took to Cadiz two other sons, Miguel (later important at that port) and Rafael, who became a naval officer. This background and language proficiency equipped young Rafael to serve as secretary of the Junta de Sevilla and then member of the delegation to London. There he helped engineer the withdrawal to Spain of the Spanish contingent stationed by Bonaparte in Denmark to defend its coast against English attack.[75] Finally, there was Lorenzo José de Noriega, whose business connections at Cadiz and relatives overseas at Mexico City and Veracruz equipped him for intervening there on behalf of peninsular interests.

At London, the Sevillan delegation was chagrined to find competitors for recognition in representatives from the Junta of Oviedo (the province of Asturias) and those of Galicia also hoping for recognition and financial aid. London insisted wisely on a prior agreement among the competing peninsular juntas and refused to recognize the hegemony of the Junta de Sevilla or release Spanish government funds from the colonies retained at London. Sevilla had to instruct its delegation to persuade the English with the misleading assertion that "the provinces of Spain are in the process of recognizing this Supreme Junta as the true depository of royal authority and the center of a union without which we would risk a civil war which would completely destroy our holy cause." When this claim could not be sustained, the Junta de Sevilla fell back upon its colonial connections: it was the Supreme Junta by virtue of the "heroic enterprise it has taken upon itself . . . to conserve through its commissioner and other means . . . the possession of all the Americas." To the Junta de Galicia, it affirmed that the preservation of the empire was "one of the principal objectives" of its claim to leadership. Colonial policy required a single hand, it emphasized, warning that sending other commissioners would reveal "a division among

the provinces of Spain which does not and cannot exist." But it did. Most peninsular juntas supported Oviedo and Galicia in rejecting Sevilla's claims to supremacy.

Inevitably the Junta de Sevilla's pretension to sovereignty over metropole and colonies exacerbated regional divisions in Spain and, worse, initiated a bitter divisive process in the American colonies that it had planned to avoid. This was evident in its choice of two commissioners—Jaúregui and Jabat—sent overseas in late June to demand recognition of its supremacy and to seek financing from both colonial administrative authorities and the political and economic elites in its wealthiest, most populous colony, New Spain. The commissioners were distinguished by loyalty to the *fernandista* cause and, like Lobo and Noriega, to the special commercial interests of Cadiz and Mexico City.

Of the two, Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui y Aróstegui seemed the more empowered. His brother-in-law and cousin was José de Iturrigaray, whose recognition of the supremacy of the Junta de Sevilla and readiness to commit New Spain's financial support were essential. Though a generation younger than Iturrigaray and at the time only an army captain, Jaúregui bore a more prestigious family name; possibly Iturrigaray owed his viceregal appointment in part to his mother-in-law, widow of a former viceroy of Peru, Agustín de Jaúregui. A wealthy and influential matron at the court with colonial exposure, she was granddaughter of Martín de Aróstegui, a former director of the Real Compañia de la Habana, Spain's major source of fine tobacco processed at Sevilla. Jaúregui had a further connection to the Cadiz commercial elite: he married the daughter of the marqués de Casa Laiglesia, an ennobled merchant who financed Iturrigaray's personal expenditures when he sailed from Cadiz with his family to assume the prestigious viceregal post at Mexico City.

Despite Jaúregui's apparent priority in appointment and status as Cadiz's agent, Juan Gabriel Jabat proved to be the dominant personality. If Jaúregui's presence was designed to win over Iturrigaray through kinship and marriage to accept the Junta de Sevilla, Jabat's appointment promised to alienate and even eliminate Iturrigaray by sheer confrontation. Although Jabat, Jaúregui, and Iturrigaray were *navarros*, Jabat's lineage was obscure with few connections to Navarra's "Muy noble y muy Leal" Valle de Baztán. Unlike other Jabats who went into trade, Juan Gabriel enrolled in the naval academy at Sevilla and rose to the rank of captain in the coast guard at Veracruz in the 1790s. In 1803, when Iturrigaray was already viceroy, Jabat was accused of illegal appropriation of prize moneys, and two years later his property was embargoed, and he was ordered to return to Spain. Iturriga-

ray approved this sentence. He spent two years at Madrid appealing his sentence, and in late January of 1807 it was reversed; perhaps this was helped by social connections, specifically by marriage in the colony to the daughter of Lorenzo Calvo de Alba, a *fiscal* of the Audiencia de México, later posted to Madrid as member of the Consejo de Indias and a firm supporter of the interests of the Cadiz–Veracruz–Mexico City commercial axis. In 1808 Jabat was a committed *fernandista*, and it is not surprising that the aging naval minister, Francisco Gil y Lemos, who had signed his exoneration of charges of illegal actions, sent him from Madrid to Sevilla with official reports of the Dos de Mayo. On the strength of contacts at Madrid, Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City among those critical of Iturrigaray, Jabat was added to Jaúregui's mission to the colony of New Spain. Furthermore, one suspects Jabat's desire to avenge his disgrace during Iturrigaray's administration and possibly to be rewarded for the successful mission to Mexico City. Later he petitioned for a post in Veracruz's customshouse.

What were the instructions given the two commissioners to the colony of New Spain? If written, they were never found; if verbal, never revealed. Evidently they included delivering the Junta de Sevilla's claims to supremacy and requesting recognition and financing. But what kind of adherence to Sevilla? This issue was critical, for it went to the heart of the relationship of the colonies in America to Spain.

Was New Spain a *reino* (realm) of the *corona* of Castile—a crown colony—like the *reinos* that composed Andalusia; or was it a colony of the national entity, España? Peninsular crisis managers quickly envisioned the possibility that, in the vacuum of metropolitan authority with Fernando in France, local juntas might surface in the American colonies as in Spain itself, with the participation of *criollo* elites already serving in the *ayuntamientos* of colonial capital cities. They feared that, in the very act of acclaiming the legitimacy of Fernando VII—not that of José I—they might assume *their* own right to regional autonomy by forming juntas that could be a prelude to independence. To many peninsular interest groups, and especially to Andalusia's agricultural and commercial interests, any form of colonial autonomy threatened the oligopoly of Cadiz-based staple exporters and entrepôt *negociantes* in the profitable trade with the colony of New Spain. All *fernandista* leaders agreed that control of customs revenues at Mexico City and Veracruz had to remain in imperial hands.

Thus, in addition to the commissioners' general instructions on how to persuade authorities at Mexico City that other peninsular juntas were recognizing the Junta de Sevilla as *suprema*, we must presume that Jabat and Jaúregui carried ultrasecret powers to take any measure to ensure the

subordination of New Spain to its authority, or to depose the viceroy if necessary (as Jaúregui later claimed), or to remove him by coup d'état (as Jabat would boast). One must speculate that the Juntas of Sevilla and Cadiz, knowing of Iturrigaray's unpopularity among the *negociantes* of Veracruz and Mexico City and their correspondents at Cadiz, were prepared to pay the price for their support by abetting and authorizing his removal. Certainly Sevilla's choice, as a commissioner to the colony of New Spain, of the former naval officer whom Iturrigaray had ordered returned to Spain under arrest accused of gross malfeasance, could be interpreted only as the prelude to another *escarmiento* of a prominent military and political figure solely on the presumption of his dubious loyalty to Fernando VII in exile and to the *fernandistas*, claiming to represent him. That *escarmiento*, as we will see, indeed took place. But it did not bring recognition of the sovereignty of the Junta de Sevilla. In following months Sevilla's hegemonic pretensions submerged as other juntas in the peninsula formed a national Junta Suprema Central to govern in the name of Fernando VII. Yet far from relinquishing claim to their traditional, privileged role in colonial affairs, Andalusian elites continued to pursue their colonial hegemony. Cadiz's merchants defended their special interest and pressured the Junta Central on colonial policy and, when that body collapsed, the successor Regencia in refuge at their port.

And one final reflection: legitimating the overthrow of a sitting, popular viceroy, those elites—specifically, Cadiz merchants in the transatlantic trade—helped crystallize over the next two years among many of New Spain's landholding and mining elites an underlying feeling of exploitation by outsiders, *Españoles peninsulares*. The road to Bayonne in 1808 would also lead in 1810 to Hidalgo's road to Guanajuato and the *peninsulares* in its *alhóndiga*.

5. A Contested Authority

Quién será él que tenga don de acertar en todo, principalmente en tiempos de confusión, y de extraordinarias y complicadas circunstancias? Viceroy General Iturrigaray

Car ce qui se passe en Amérique intérèsse autant le monde entier qui malheureusement ne s'en occupe pas, que l'Espagne elle-même. Abbé de Pradt, *Mémoires*

Todo el mundo sabe que no hay otro agente más poderoso para exciter a los hombres de trabajo, sino el dinero; que es la sustancia de este mundo en face de las divinas letras.
Consulado de Mexico to SM, 25 Nov. 1805

Between mid-March and early May 1808, Spain's monarchy and imperial system entered a period of crisis not experienced perhaps since the *comunero* violence of the early sixteenth century. Six weeks of political upheaval beginning with Spain's first modern *golpe de estado* at Aranjuez seemed to terminate with the abdication of the Spanish Bourbons and the interim designation of Napoleon's military proconsul, Joaquin Murat, duc de Berg, as his *lugarteniente* in Spain. News of the Bourbons' abdication then set off a comparable period of political crisis across the Atlantic in New Spain between mid-July and mid-September, ended only by New Spain's first *golpe de estado*, when the viceroy was imprisoned, then packed off to Cadiz. Not since the brutal trauma of the seizure of Moctezuma and conquest had the colony of New Spain experienced a comparable crisis. Clearly the two phases of crisis in metropole and major colony, March to September, were linked; not so obvious are the interests and fissures that led, one is tempted to add, inevitably to the *golpe de estado* in Mexico City on the night of 15 September 1808.

History is concerned with change, which is why change by revolution

has attracted historians' attention, and understandably so. Preservation of the threatened status quo by resort to force, on the other hand, has drawn far less attention. There are few anatomies of the coup d'état, few analyses of why people endure repression, perhaps because, in modern times, coups and repression are so commonplace. Structuralists who customarily emphasize the long swings are really analyzing how minorities have contained the mass of the exploited.

There is a typology of the *golpe de estado* that fits the phenomenon. The mini-*golpe* is designed to change ministerial posts in order to force policy changes or prevent them; in eighteenth-century Spain the classic example was the *motín* against Charles III's minister, Esquilache. The major *golpe* was what occurred in 1808 in Spain and New Spain; the *motín* at Aranjuez of March 1808 displaced Manuel Godoy and was followed by the removal of the king himself, while six months later came the overthrow or "deposition" of New Spain's highest colonial officer, Viceroy General Iturrigaray.

Whether minor or major, *golpes* share certain recognizable qualities despite permutations of time and space. *Golpes de estado* are in general either counterrevolutionary or, as in 1808, preemptive, designed to forestall an imagined crisis of the established order. Since the purpose of the *golpe* is usually the preservation or revival of former structures, the interests or forces behind the *golpe* must be veiled; they represent, after all, the forces of order. Those executing the coup are not officially linked to the interests seeking the preservation of their order. The *populacho* is the officially designated term for those rioting against Charles III's "favorite," Esquilache; "el pueblo," it was officially reported on 16 September in Mexico City, was labeled the agent of the *golpe* against Iturrigaray. In both cases, legitimization of the *golpe* was found by making the "people" rather than "interests" appear as the aggrieved. It follows, then, that the crowd or the people cannot as a body plan a *golpe*, for the people engage only in a mass, spontaneous, faceless, and hence unaccountable and unplanned action. In point of fact, however, *golpes* are the product of careful planning deliberately obscured. But planning is not the same as execution and, in the short as well as long term, often yields unwanted results. By the curious chemistry of history, the Aranjuez *golpe* ultimately helped produce what its planners never wanted, the Cortes of Cadiz (1810–1813), while the *golpe* against Viceroy Iturrigaray on 15 September led to the long, anticolonial revolution of New Spain's rural bourgeoisie, mineworkers, and "peasantry." When the reason of conservation sleeps, monsters flourish.

What follows is an effort to uncover the interest groups and divisions

in the colony of New Spain that in the aggregate caused the *golpe* of September, always bearing in mind that both the peninsular and *criollo* political elites in Spain's major colony were attuned to news of developments in western Europe and North America; that they knew that Mexico City's *Gazeta* and *Diario* published only what colonial authorities thought fit to print; and consequently that the elites had to rely upon private correspondence and rumor brought to Veracruz by neutral ships, mainly from U.S. ports. One must remember that New Spain was an integral segment of the larger world of the Caribbean and Atlantic systems, a fact driven home by the decision of the Junta de Sevilla in July 1808 to dispatch carefully selected *comisionados* from Cadiz to Havana and Mexico City to elicit from the colonies undivided political subordination and from New Spain's government and the private sector massive monetary support for Spain's struggle against French occupying forces and those allied with them in the peninsula.

The Colonial World of New Spain's Merchants: Sources of Fission and Unity

By 1808 two of the colony's most influential corporate bodies, *consulado* and *audiencia*, had distanced themselves from the chief colonial officer and his policies. As in all analytical approaches, merchants and *oidores* can be examined as blocs or presumed monoliths, which is not to neglect both vertical and horizontal cleavages, especially among the merchants. Despite internal divisions, however, these corporate bodies adopted policies and positions that their membership as a group espoused, although some members differed privately. In mid-1808, the merchants of Mexico City and Veracruz would jettison Viceroy Iturrigaray when the collapse of authority in the metropole appeared to provide him with the option of autonomy.

For twenty years merchants in New Spain had operated in a climate of expansion stimulated by *comercio libre* of 1789, by contact with the Far East through Manila in the Philippines and by profits from wartime import shortages abetted by widespread smuggling along the Caribbean coast. *Comercio libre*, *comercio neutro*, and the *gracias* and *licencias* allocated by Madrid authorities after 1804 fostered an ambiance of growth and opportunity for penurious, ambitious immigrants from the peninsula, predominately from Cantabria and—at Veracruz—a few from Catalonia. *Vizcaínos* (from Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and, in lesser numbers, Navarra) emigrated in limited numbers, many going directly from Santander to established kinsmen at Veracruz and Mexico City. In larger numbers were the other Cantabrians,

the *montañeses*, a majority from the upper rather than the lower valleys of Santander, from the pueblos along the Deva and Nanza Rivers; among the *montañeses*, these immigrants were called *lievaneses* to distinguish them from a small number of later-comers, the *asturianos*. So strong were the kin and kith ties of immigrants from the ethnically fragmented Spanish metropole, and so bitter the sustained rivalries, that since 1742 elections to offices in the Mexico City Consulado had to be organized into *partidos* or factions of *vizcaínos* and *montañeses*. There was a third group of Cantabrians drawn from microregions between the Basque provinces and the Montañas, the *encartados* of the Encartaciones; in Mexico City's Consulado they were registered as *vizcaínos*, although as a group they often aligned themselves with the later-coming *montañeses*.

Among Cantabrian immigrants entering New Spain's commercial enterprises, certain characteristics were notable. No matter the conditions of poverty or limited affluence they abandoned in their peninsular microregions, in a colonial world peopled by legally subordinated masses of *indios* and *castas*, Cantabrians considered themselves racially superior, even with respect to the "white" or near-white Spaniards born in America, the *criollos* or *españoles americanos*. A mentality inseparable from colonialism, the assumed superiority of the peninsula-born had subtle and not-so-subtle projections: in hiring patterns of Mexico City's *almaceneros*, who systematically failed to employ the native-born as clerks (*caxeros*); in the predominance of *peninsulares* or *españoles peninsulares* in the colonial civil service; and in the upper reaches of the ecclesiastical and military entities. Peninsular racial superiority had long fired resentment among all natives of New Spain, particularly among the *criollos*—all the more so among *criollos* at the end of the eighteenth century and in the first decade of the nineteenth when they perceived the inferior position of a metropole pulled apart by the rivalry of French and English imperialisms. The illusion of peninsular superiority reinforced, indeed justified, a second characteristic shared by Cantabrian immigrants: their "right" to exploit the human and natural resources of New Spain ("hacer la America"), since, they claimed, the native born with few exceptions seemed inefficient or ineffectual businessmen. Third, while peninsular birth alone bonded the approximately seven thousand *peninsulares* in the colony, far stronger were the bonds maintained between immigrants in New Spain and those in the microregions (*patrias*) of their Cantabrian youth, what *criollo* Servando de Mier labeled "el vínculo estrechísimo de unión que forman entre sí a larga distancia los compatriotas para ayudarse, servirse y colocarse."[1]

Discrimination of groups into a majority of *criollos* (about 1.5 million)

and a minority of *peninsulares* (about 7,000) should be utilized carefully. Length of residence, type of business enterprise, marriage patterns, and social networks, along with imponderable factors, fractioned the *peninsulares* residing in New Spain, producing cleavages often transcending common peninsular birth. The cleavages explain the divergence of opinion among the members of a superficially monolithic merchant guild, whether in the colonial capital or the major port town of Veracruz. There were peninsular merchants long resident in the colony whose ramifying commercial and investment activities linked them to mining enterprises owned and operated by *criollo* families. These Spaniards tended to be empathetic to *criollo* needs and in this sense were what might be termed "criollized," just as they viewed critically those newcomers from the peninsula trying to reopen and rework silver mines or develop new ones in Guanajuato and Zacatecas in the boom years at the end of the century. There was a faction of merchants who hoped modifications in the closed Spanish commercial system might supply the dynamic sector of the colonial economy, mining, with inputs of mercury, blasting powder, iron, and steel at stable prices. Their view conflicted with those who resisted any opening of Spain's transatlantic commercial system to neutral traders (which did not inhibit their own participation in smuggling). This group vehemently opposed the viceroy's policy of accepting neutral shipping arriving with proper documentation from Baltimore or Jamaica, and they would protest vehemently shipments of European goods reexported from Veracruz's vigorous competitor in the Caribbean, the port of Havana. Joining them were those *peninsulares* producing sugar and aguardiente in the Cuernavaca valley for Mexico City's consumption and for export, who tried to block imports of similar Havana products.

The foregoing reveal vertical cleavages in the colony's predominately peninsular commercial elite. There was yet another division in this group, a horizontal one, that split the established peninsular merchants from more recent immigrants with no or limited capital; the relatively large numbers of *caxeros* in the major cities and the countryside, proprietors of *tiendas*, *tiendas-mestizas*, and *pulperías*. Differences between those who had achieved prominent wealth and status and those attempting to do so surfaced within the Consulado of Mexico City in the elections of 1807 and 1808, not unexpectedly within the *partido* representing the largest contingent of recent immigrants from the peninsula, the *montañeses*. Yet the electoral controversy of 1807 which ultimately pitted viceroy against Consulado must be examined within a larger framework of relations between merchant and imperial ("state") interests between 1805 and 1808. Such interests were conflictive in the electoral procedures of the Consulado, in the viceroy's execution of

Madrid's policies for Veracruz shipping in wartime and in the persistent pressure of Madrid to clarify the Consulado's administration of the *avería* tax. Resolution of such conflicts uncovered the real limits on viceregal intervention, the influence of New Spain's mercantile corporations, and the degree to which this interest group pressured the government of colony and metropole as Spain's imperial system disaggregated under French and English pressure.

Conflict: Viceroy Iturrigaray and Consulado Elections, 1807

By late fall of 1806, Iturrigaray had been viceroy of New Spain for three years. He had acquired more than a customary grasp of the colony's terrain and its defense needs, the aspirations of its native elite (*criollos*), and the interests and influence of two of the colony's major corporate bodies, the *audiencia* and the *consulado*. He was also becoming aware of friction between the colonial state—specifically, policy made in Madrid and ordered executed by New Spain's viceroy—and groups within the long-established Consulado of Mexico City and the recently formed Veracruz one. More essential, Iturrigaray grasped the danger of splits or fissions within Mexico City's influential Consulado, the mercantile guild that, as a corporate body, symbolized the peninsular economic interest in New Spain. Peninsula-born merchants controlled external trade with Spain and the Philippines, and intercolonial trade with Cuba, Central America, Venezuela, and Peru, not to mention the equally lucrative internal exchanges of a population of clearly more than 6 million real or potential consumers, a population two-thirds that of Spain itself.

Various factors sensitized him to the divisions and their possible projections. Iturrigaray came from Navarra, a province of Cantabria with strong attachment to its regional traditions, privileges, and rights; he had been formed in the military schools, which emphasized national over regional interest. Service at Cadiz had exposed him to the currents within Spain's most important port and to its hegemony over the Spanish transatlantic commercial system. Furthermore, three years of residence at Mexico City and contact with the *criollo* officers of the colonial army he disciplined and trained primarily to defend the Veracruz coast against English amphibious operations sensitized him to the importance of *criollo* loyalty to the imperial system at critical junctures in the metropole. Iturrigaray, it is plausible to hypothesize, had begun to recognize that the greatest threat to the colonial system was disunity, divisions between *criollos* and *peninsulares*, and even more threatening were divisions within the Mexico City mercantile

community setting newcomers against old-timers, regional groups against regional groups, *montañeses* versus *vizcaínos*. Factional strife erupting at the Consulado's annual election in January 1807 led Iturrigaray to challenge the electoral procedures that annually chose one *prior* (a two-year appointment), two consuls, and their deputies.

The Consulado's electoral system challenged by Iturrigaray was the product of nearly a century of responses to repeated regional conflict among Mexico City's Spanish immigrant merchants as well as persistent divisions within the community itself.[2] Perhaps reflecting both the surge of peninsular immigrants into New Spain's commercial distribution system after the War of the Spanish Succession and conflict over control of Consulado finances (it was then managing the lucrative *alcabala* collection), there was bitter infighting in 1718 that extended over the following quarter century. The economic stakes were obvious, as one viceroy reported, for "reducido Prior y consules en substancia a unos Buenos arrendadores de las alcabalas, su mayor trabajo es suplir lo necesario, y quando lo faltan los ingresos de ropa y regulan el que el 6 por ciento." To control the number of *parciales* (participants) voting between 1718 and 1728, a registry (*matrícula de los sugetos que deben tener voto*) was ordered drawn up by Madrid; eligible were "comerciantes vecinos" of Mexico City resident for a minimum of two years, married or widowed, owners of warehouses (*almaceneros*) and business offices, but neither foreigners, employees, clerks, nor shopkeepers (*tenderos*). The *matrícula* procedure was a departure from the Consulado's earlier regulations (*ordenanzas*) modeled on those of Sevilla and Burgos of the sixteenth century. By rules established in 1728, its express purpose was to limit the *matrícula* solely to *almaceneros*, specifically excluding "los que tubiesen tienda en México." The *matrícula* failed to reduce tension, and the colonial government intervened to nullify the elections of 1729, 1730, 1731 1733, and 1735, but slates of proposed officers were repeatedly dominated by the same *partido*. So, to remove "las inquietudes que se suscitaban entre Montañeses y Vizcaynos por la ambición con que ambas parcialidades intentaban superarse," a more elaborate electoral system was introduced by Viceroy Fuenclara (1742). To be sure, Fuenclara made a point of consulting "comerciantes de ambos partidos" before drafting twelve articles regulating Consulado elections in order to "arrancar la raíz de estes daños ocacionados únicamente de la ambición con que ambas parcialidades solicitan superarse y vencerse, formando porfiados empeños en lo que no deven hacerse." Fuenclara's regulations, with minor modifications, were still operable in 1807.[3]

At the heart of the system had been the indirect election of the *priores* and *consules*, whereby *matriculados* voted for thirty *electores*, who elected in turn

the officers. Fuenclara and staff decided to curb (they could not eliminate) annual disorder in the Consulado elections by accepting reality, that the contestants tended to vote according to their regional origins. To each *partido* or *parcialidad* were assigned fifteen *electores* ("cada partido deberá untar sus parciales para conferir con ellos los 15 sugetos que tubieren por conveniente proprios para electores, a su satisfacción"); the officers of the Consulado (tribunal) would then advise each *matriculado* of the names of the fifteen *electores* of his partido so that at the annual elections each voter (*vocal*) could vote for the appropriate fifteen-member slate. Meanwhile, a list of the members of each *partido* would be certified annually by four *calificadozes*—a screening necessary to eliminate merchants under twenty-five years of age, those managing *tiendas* rather than *almacenes*, and those "del comercio de Europa" [Cadiz] who had slipped out of Jalapa into Mexico City. This constituted Fuenclara's *Reglamento de alternativa*, which contained tension within bounds until 1788—all the more remarkable since Fuenclara managed to insert a clause making appeals from viceregal decisions on electoral affairs inapplicable to the local *audiencia*. *Oidores* only with difficulty could stand aloof from Consulado conflict. Henceforth, appeals could be carried only to Madrid, the "crown."

Or perhaps Fuenclara's electoral procedures functioned reasonably well because of ambiguity, intended or not, with respect to the operations of the *parcialidades* (*partidos*)—the factions. No doubt leaders of the respective factions—*priores* and *consules*, ex-*priores* and ex-*consules*—took patriarchal care of their respective adherents; they held large parties in their residences, tolerated card playing (*juego del alburez o embite*), and offered ritual gratuities in the form of "la introducida costumbre de dulces y propinas" despite admonition from successive viceregal governments. Perhaps such entertainment was designed to mollify *parciales*, many of whom were, at least until 1767, not consulted about the composition of the slate of electors. Tension seemed to abate by constant balancing of officeholders between *montañeses* and *vizcaínos*, a kind of division of perquisites and spoils of office among the leaders of each *partido*. Now fifteen electors were selected by each *partido*'s former *priores* and *consules*, without consulting the *partido* membership; by practice (on this point Fuenclara's *alternativa* was ambiguous), a *partido*'s leaders listed fifteen electors, the proposed nominees for the chief offices, and announced them at a *junta general* of their respective *parcialidades*. At this time, the practice also evolved of permitting the membership to question the selection of electors—essentially a formality since few members were willing to question openly the choice of their *partido* leaders. In theory, then, the electors chose the candidates for office, who were ratified

at the general election held during the first week of January by the whole assembled *matrícula* of the Consulado.

For reasons still obscure, the *alternativa* as a device to soften factionalism broke down in the 1780s. This may reflect the upsurge of Cantabrian immigrants and renewed competition between the *partidos* of *montañeses* and *vizcaínos*. At this time in the recently created *tribunal de minería*, the *montañés* faction requested elimination of the *alternativa*, which Madrid approved by 1788; yet in 1788 Madrid under Gálvez's guidance threw its support behind the traditionalists in the Mexico City Consulado who insisted that electors be chosen by the *decano* of each *partido* assisted by that *partido*'s former *priores* and *consules*, that they discuss the electors' qualifications publicly, and that each participant in the general convocation ("junta de ambos partidos") vote the slate of electors formally approved at the *partido* meeting.

In 1787 eighty-five voters present shattered the consensus according to which "nunca se había variado de los sugetos que ya venían propuestos de las casas de los decanos." Now twenty-nine cast their ballots for the thirty electors of the two official lists, while fifty-six chose electors other than those on the official list of *vizcaíno* electors. When the Consulado's officers (including the first conde de la Cortina) asked the Audiencia Gobernadora to sustain its procedures, the *oidores* refused to accept the innovation (*novedad*), citing Fuenclara's "ordenanza de alternativa y la costumbre." They ruled the election as "valida y subsistente la primera [elección] hecha en las casas de los gefes respectivos de los partidos, por ser conforme los capítulos de la alternativa y costumbre no interrumpida." Henceforth, the *decanos* of each partido could inform its members individually of the slate of proposed electors, without holding a general meeting of the *matriculados* of their faction.[4] The only contemporary explanation of the electoral infighting (here, initiated in the *vizcaíno partido*) was proposed years later by a lawyer for the *montañés* faction (Vicente Garvizo): "Ni los pleitos antiguos ni el presente han tenido otro origen . . . que el espiritú de dominación de los que han llegado a ser miembros del Tribunal y se creen por eso en estado de hacer lo mas conveniente en sus elecciones." More specifically he pinpointed "cierta clase de hombres que se arroguen el derecho y la libertad de ultrajar y acriminar a los que no consideran adictos a sus ideas o temen que puedan influir a su contradicción." (Certainly the opposition of the official list was well prepared, for the voting slips indicated that one person had written them.) Madrid's decision on 18 July 1788 unequivocally supported the traditionalist stance of the Audiencia and, by extension, of the former officers of the Mexico City Consulado—*decanos*, *ex-priores*, *ex-consules*, all part of a self-selecting elite.

Two points emerge from analyzing the effort by some voters to reject

the official list formulated by leaders of the two *partidos* in 1787. First, there is the unequivocal support of the Audiencia for the Consulado's position through its delegate (*juez de alzadas*) presiding over the process, *oidor* Eusebio Ventura Beleña. He immediately rejected the innovation, the Audiencia fully backed his opinion, and ultimately so did Madrid's authorities. This was not the first time that José de Gálvez, who long had maintained contacts with Mexico City's Consulado, sustained the actions of its commercial oligarchs opposed to *novedades*. In the second place, when, at the conclusion of the formal acceptance of the official (and contested) elector's list, many of those present refused to swear to uphold it, a prominent merchant, *encartado* Antonio Basoco, proposed a compromise "para que no quedase ningun partido desairado": annulment of the vote taken and, instead, placing the names of all voters in an urn from which would be drawn thirty names of "los legítimos electores"—a *sorteo* (open choice) instead of the established practice of *elección* (selection).[5] This proposal was tabled: while there remains unclear the real motive of the "occultas manos" behind the "movimiento," evidently elements within the *vizcaíno partido* (joined by some *montañeses* and *encartados*) attempted to reject their *partido*'s official list of electors and disagreed publicly with the *prior* of the Consulado, *montañés* Juan Antonio Gutiérrez de Terán.

Basoco's proposal was in fact a remarkable departure from law and custom because it substituted *sorteo,* or the voters' free choice of electors, for the traditional process of screening electors by a small group of ex-Consulado officers, then forcing their *elección* upon the whole voting body without effective review or dissent. More remarkable, however, was the political influence of the established commercial oligarchs monopolizing by self-selection the offices of *prior*, consuls, and *consiliarios* which permitted the Consulado to run its affairs without intervention from Madrid or its representatives in the colony, the viceroys, for two decades after 1787, despite repeated injunctions to change. However, legislation flowing from Madrid after 1796 during Godoy's administration (ignored by Consulado officials), along with Viceroy Iturrigaray's perception of his role and general changing conditions, led him to challenge the electoral system that Consulado officials had been manipulating deftly since Fuenclara's reform of 1742.

No doubt Madrid authorities in the 1790s and even later intended to reduce areas of tension in the colonial system and to minimize potential conflicts by offering inducements of growth (as in the case of *comercio libre*), if not fundamental reform. Whatever intentions or ambiguities real or imagined teased out of legislation, execution invariably depended upon the activity of the chief colonial officer, the viceroy. Madrid's recognition of

the role of *consulados* in major ports in metropole and colonies by proliferating them was hardly reform, but it did provide merchants a corporation reflecting local interests in commercial expansion. Madrid officials were aware of the tensions in the two oldest Consulados, at Lima and Mexico City, which explains why shortly after setting up new Consulados at Veracruz and Guadalajara in New Spain, as at San Sebastian and (under new regulations) at Bilbao in Spain, they listed a royal order (22 February 1796) reissued in 1801, mandating that Mexico City's Consulado "procediera adeante en las elecciones con arreglo a lo determinado por las Leyes de Castilla e Indias y a los estatutos de los consulados de Bilvao, San Sevastian, Veracruz y Guadalaxara." The older Consulado of Mexico City, was also enjoined to overhaul its *ordenanzas* "en presencia de las Reales Zédulas de Erección" of the newer *ordenanzas* of Veracruz's and Guadalajara's Consulados. Because the Mexico City Consulado in March 1795 had petitioned Madrid to allow it to close loopholes in its judicial prerogatives, its officers concluded that the royal order sanctioned new regulations covering litigation procedure, not administrative issues such as the conduct of elections. In fact, some Consulado members hoped to revamp all the *ordenanzas* of Mexico City's mercantile corporation ("toda la legislación mercantil"). But they were overruled by those who argued that the unique commercial conditions of New Spain, "sus usos, costumbres y demás que le diferenciaba del [comercio] de Europa," did not warrant reform. In February 1806, the Audiencia's *fiscal de lo civil* (Sagarzurieta) ruled their interpretation correct: Madrid's changes contemplated only judicial statutes, not *"la legislación mercantil general, mientras que VM no lo ordenase asi expresamente*" (emphasis added).[6] This interpretation, which permitted the Mexico City Consulado to maintain its *alternativa*, appears supported by Madrid's reiteration in December 1799 of the *alternativa* of "Criollos y Europeos" as a way to avoid a "corto número de familias" from controlling "las elecciones de oficios de república." Mexico City's Consulado, however, had an *alternativa* of "Europeos," some criollized.

Confrontation

Only months after Iturrigaray mentioned to Finance Minister Soler that he had verbal support from influential officers of the Mexico City Consulado for strict enforcement of Consolidación despite strong local protests, he advised the same officers (March 1806)—Francisco de la Cotera, (*prior* and *montañés*), Teniente Coronel Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta (*consul antiguo* and *vizcaíno*), and Juan Fernando de Meoqui (*consul moderno* and *viz-*

caíno)—that they had failed to draft new *ordenanzas* as ordered in 1796 and that further delay would oblige him to ask "las personas que merezcan . . . [his] confianza" to do so. On checking their records, the officers found that their *asesor* (Licenciado Francisco Soto Carrillo) had drafted changes in the Consulado's judicial process and thereby had fulfilled the order of 1796; however, while some merchants at a *junta general* argued that more than judicial improvements were required ("una ordenanza general comprehensiva de toda la legislación mercantil"), others insisted this was simply "un proyecto vasto." Meanwhile, the Consulado's second *asesor*, Licenciado Basilio de Arrillaga, had been commissioned to draft a general ordinance incorporating the "usos y estilos de este comercio" in consultation with unmentioned merchants. This position was contradictory; while the Consulado claimed it was required merely to draft a judicial reform, Arrillaga was undertaking a comprehensive set of new regulations.[7] Or perhaps its equivocal position might stall change until a new viceroy arrived, hopefully less demanding than Iturrigaray? Iturrigaray did not press the matter until ten months later; meanwhile, he was engaged in confrontation with the Veracruz Consulado over his policy to reduce smuggling there by closing down the port to all but convoyed coastal shipping, and with the Consulados of Veracruz and Guadalajara over the entry of neutral shipping from the United States bearing cargoes of prohibited English textiles. More to the point, he recognized that trade expansion since 1789 and the recent influx of Spanish immigrants into commercial enterprises had led the majority of Consulado *matriculados* to demand liberalization of Consulado elections, rejected only by "un numero muy corto." After all, where roughly eighty-five had voted in 1787, double that figure now surfaced at the Consulado of Mexico City's annual elections.

These are general considerations motivating Iturrigaray's decision to intervene in Consulado elections in December 1806. There were more specific factors as well. He knew that for years Madrid's Contaduria General under Pedro de Aparici had been needling the Mexico City Consulado to account for its administration ("clandestine," according to Iturrigaray) of the *avería*, a tax on imports, just as he had recently learned from the *regente* of the Audiencia, Manuel del Castillo Negrete, that 20,000 pesos in the *avería* accounts were still unaccountable; he was also aware of the Consulado's insistence that a government audit of its *avería* management be suspended.

Avería income helped finance the Consulado's operations, its *asesores*, local expenditures, and agents at Madrid both unofficial and official. Since 1796 the Consulado's officials had stalled, among other matters, reforming its accounting procedures to conform with those of the recently chartered

Consulados at Veracruz and Guadalajara and to curb its overall expenditures, for example, on two instead of one *asesor*, on high salaries, and clearly superfluous outlays. One of the basic issues, Iturrigaray felt, was the Consulado's unwillingness to recognize changing conditions, and also that "la ley debe acomodarse al estado actual de las cosas, y mayor número de comerciantes."[8] The shift from the *flota* system to the innovation of *comercio libre* (1789) had brought to Mexico City a "gran número de Comerciantes de clases distinguidas . . . beneméritos del Comercio" deliberately excluded from election to Consulado office by the current electoral system or, more explicitly, "por el ascendente de algunos particulares que se atrahían los sufragios de los Partidos para hacerse elegir a sí mismos o [nombrar] los de su facción únicamente conveniendo las elecciones en nombramientos singulares de que se havían hecho árvitros, con tanto despotismo que de un año para otro se anunciaban los que havían de ser electos para los destinos." No wonder Iturrigaray had felt compelled to eliminate the *alternativa* system "y el odioso nombre de partidos."[9]

It was indeed complaints first verbal, then written of "beneméritos individuos del Comercio" like the second conde de la Cortina and Joaquin Colla, both *montañeses*, about shortcomings of Consulado elections that triggered Iturrigaray's embroilment with the Consulado establishment. While the system tolerated "personas legalmente impedidas por parentesco y otras conexiones" in high elective office, other merchants were blocked in equally arbitrary fashion, on the ground that merchants on active duty in the *regimiento de infanteria urbana* of Mexico City (the Consulado's militia) were ineligible.[10] When the military issue surfaced, Iturrigaray was indecisive; first he sanctioned the exclusion, then—petitioned by Cortina and Colla—sanctioned their eligibility. The Consulado's officers after convening in "juntas privadas" rejected his ruling, excluded the two, and held elections by *alternativa* and *electores*, which Iturrigaray then suspended to permit Cortina to make a case for his eligibility. Iturrigaray turned to Basoco (*decano* of the *partido de vizcaínos*) and to current and past officers to review Cortina's credentials. Adding insult to injury, the Consulado's officers insisted he put his decision in writing ("no teniendo por bastante mi orden verval," an irate Iturrigaray noted). When Consulado officials asked the viceroy to seek an opinion from the Audiencia's *juez de alzadas* and *fiscal de lo civil*, oidor Sagarzurieta, Iturrigaray refused on the ground that Sagarzurieta "y sus compañeros" were close to merchants "ligados a los partidos por paysanage, amistad y aun intereses," which could expose Sagarzurieta to the "prepotencia del xefe de las parcialidades." Instead, Iturrigaray sought an opinion from Manuel del Castillo Negrete—*regente* about to sail for

Spain and a post as *fiscal* of the Consejo de Indias—who recommended that the Consulado's electoral system conform to the regulations of the new Consulados of Bilbao and Guadalajara (New Spain), which followed in their electoral procedures the *sorteo*, whereby *matriculados* chose their own electores. Iturrigaray now had approval for his innovation.

Under the new system, Iturrigaray appointed a *síndico* of the Consulado, José Gil de Partearroyo, to join the Audiencia's *juez de alzadas* to officiate at elections under the *sorteo*. He ruled that Cortina and Colla were eligible for office. However, when Iturrigaray citing his prerogatives refused to permit the Consulado to appeal his decision to the Audiencia, the Consulado nonetheless went over his head to petition Madrid to overrule him. As Iturrigaray summarized his case to Hacienda minister Soler (26 February 1807), the Consulado's "males de constitución" were intolerable since they sacrificed its "fondos con gastos infructuosos, y los comerciantes con los excesivos derechos que indebidamente están pagando a los Asesores y Escribanos, y con el entorpecimiento de sus negocios." Only new *ordenanzes* (including the *sorteo*) could uproot the "opresiva prepotencia de los partidarios en los nombramientos; o llamanse elecciones; y la general jurisdiccion que exersía el Tribunal . . . como la ha de privar de la arvitraria administración de los fondos que manejan; como havia de producir el arreglo de cuentas entorpecidas o confundidas de próposito para fines particulares . . . como de necesidad ha de dar nueva forma a su *escribanía*, extinguiendo trabas y derechos impuestos"—practices upon which the Consulado insisted for the "conservación de su sistema." He threatened to fine thirty-three Consulado members 6,000 pesos each if they failed to follow his ruling. Not since the time of Viceroy Revillagigedo in the early 1790s, who had recommended eliminating Mexico City's Consulado, had the Consulado encountered so critical a viceroy.

Three themes run through the communications sent by Iturrigaray's office to the Mexico City's Consulado over a twelve-day period in early February, and they were illustrative of Iturrigaray's vision of his duty, powers, and responsibility. Since 1796, there had been a series of legislative rulings "útiles al Real Servicio y al Público" that required of the Consulado "uniformidad con los demás Consulados en esta América Septentrional." More specifically, it was imperative to recognize "la utilidad y necesidad de variar la forma de las elecciones."[11] In administrative matters (*materia gubernativa*), Iturrigaray insisted—and this is the second theme—there was no right of appeal from his ruling, for the Leyes de Indias emphatically empowered viceroys "para hacer lo que les pareciese y vieren que conviene, y provean todo aquello que el Rey mismo podría hacer y prover de qual-

quiera calidad o condición que sea en la Provincia de su cargo." Here spoke a military officer insisting upon executing orders from Madrid despite—the third theme—"el capricho o tema de los tres individuos que forman ese cuerpo"—*prior,* two *consules*—who consistently evaded changes in the electoral system.[12]

It is a measure of the Consulado's money, connections, and influence in New Spain and the metropole that it rejected the viceroy's intervention and insisted upon appealing his decision first to the *oidores* of the Audiencia and then to the highest authorities in Spain, to the Consejo de Guerra and ultimately the Consejo de Indias. Its position was based on almost classic grounds—its customary practices, distinguished services to the empire, and its unique role in New Spain at the hub of the colony's commercial system—and ended with questioning, not of Iturrigaray's principles, but of his personal, idiosyncratic involvement in promoting the candidacy of Cortina, which is what the officers believed was his real motivation.

The Consulado's officers claimed that the electoral practices of their corporation via the *alternativa* had worked remarkably well over seven decades (exception made, they admitted, for the fracas of 1787) and that the consequent unity and harmony had made possible its "grandes servicios" to the state as well as its not inconsiderable "préstamos y donativos"—a clear reminder of its repeated financial assistance to the metropole.[13] Such importance, they continued, was grounded on those very conditions that differentiated Mexico City's Consulado from others: the new *ordenanzas* of Bilbao, Veracruz, and Guadalajara were simply not adaptable to New Spain's capital city, since "las leyes se han de accomodar a la República, no la República a las leyes." If Veracruz's "costumbres" and "circumstancias" differed from those of Mexico City, why should Mexico City's electoral system conform to that of Veracruz? Why should the matriculation requirements of Mexico City conform to those of Spain's port towns whose *consulados* enrolled all types of business men—"Hacendados, Navieros, Comerciantes por mayor, mercaderes de tienda, y dueños de fabrica"?[14] How could one compare those "cortos vecindarios" with Mexico City "opulento" in merchants and "toda gerarquía de gentes"? In Guadalajara mere shopkeepers, most of them operating *tiendas mestizas*, handling all kinds of cheap goods and foods, filled Consulado offices as *prior*, *consul*, *consiliario*. By contrast, Mexico City had a wide gamut of merchant types and could afford to choose thirty electors *solely* from *almaceneros*. Former Consulado officials were automatically counselors of current officeholders and, if necessary, their substitutes; and all *priores* had to serve beforehand as consuls. This system, the Consulado's officers insisted, produced officeholders "maduros por su edad y circun-

stancias," whereas chance under the *sorteo* system produced all too often "los menos aptos y dignos como ya ha enseñado la experiencia."[15] Moreover, in the *sorteo* sponsored by Viceroy Iturrigaray, a small group could scheme (*confabular*) to garner one vote more than half the total votes cast in order to elect its *parciales* to the detriment of those better suited to office. In this sense, the Mexico City Consulado was presenting in microcosm the case for an oligarchic republic over a democracy.

Since Iturrigaray's argument—the need to update traditional *consulado* regulations to match the standards of newly established *consulados* in Spain and New Spain—was unsubstantiated in the Consulado's judgment, were there other explanations for the viceroy's stance? Cortina and "algunos pocos díscolos" were, insisted the Consulado, alone in questioning a well-functioning electoral system of "tanta unión y *armonía*"; this was further proof that they were unfit for the offices to which they aspired.[16] So they concluded that Iturrigaray's appointees were chosen for purely personal reasons. Árias de Villafañe, *oidor* and *juez de alzadas*, was Iturrigaray's "agente y abogado"; the *regente* to whom he had turned for an opinion, Castillo Negrete, was "compadre y amigo íntimo" of troublemaker Cortina (who was Iturrigaray's *ahijado* anyway); while the síndico appointed by Iturrigaray to officiate at elections under the new rules, José Gil de Partearroyo, was an openly declared opponent of the Consulado ever since it had once recommended in the 1790s that then Viceroy Branciforte fine him 300 pesos for undisclosed reasons. As for Iturrigaray's real motives, they could be ascribed to "resentimiento" or to "repetidos casos a estímulo de intereses (de que prescinden los exponentes)."[17]

Invariably the best case against an abuse of authority is to generalize from the specific, to foretell its effect on many individuals. This technique could be particularly effective in Madrid, where in 1807 metropolitan authorities were preoccupied with the stability of colonial institutions and the loyalty of its elites. Iturrigaray's unjustified intervention in a long-established practice ensuring union and harmony, reasoned the Consulado, would disturb the Audiencia ("interesada en sostener su autoridad para que se las pasen los autos en que se apela de providencias del gobierno"), the Audiencia's *fiscales* and its *asesor general* ("de que se haya desconfiado de su integridad y luces"), the thirty electors ("de que se les privase de oficio"), the candidates for *prior* and *consul* ("avergonzados del desaire"), and every other corporation whose regulations were overturned by the whim of those who "tienen la obligación de cumplirlos" and whose "fuerza y poder" could block appeals to the Audiencia ("asilo y la torre de refugio")—the recourse of the "oprimidos."[18] To the Consulado's officers, Iturrigaray's attitude

transcended principle: the consulado's resistance he misinterpreted as personal affront, while his response to the Consulado's refusal to make Cortina eligible for office was "mui desagradable" and "desde aquel momento fatal comenzamos a sentir todo el peso de un poder absoluto y de una autoridad sin límites"[19]—guarded criticism of Spain's virtual prime minister, Godoy, already widespread.

Because Iturrigaray insisted that he could refuse to permit the Audiencia to review his decisions on the Consulado's electoral procedures, the Consulado's officers exercised the right to appeal to Madrid. In forwarding the Consulado's *representación*, the Audiencia (González Carbajal, Aguirre, Bataller, Mendieta) expressed the view that Iturrigaray should have reduced "el escándalo y expectación pública" by allowing the Audiencia to handle the issue—precisely what Iturrigaray hoped to avoid in view of the ties between merchants and *oidores*.[20] Despite the English naval blockade of Veracruz, the Consulado's appeal was in the hands of its chief Madrid agent (Jacinto Sánchez Tirado)[21] by late April; sometime later minister of Gracia y Justicia Caballero sent the material to Soler with a summary of the Consulado's case and a recommendation: Iturrigaray's real motive ("la causa occulta") was purely personal—"haberse empeñado eficazmente el Virrey y la Virreyna en que saliese consul el Conde de la Cortina . . . sin más motivo que él de predilección a particulares pretensions." In a note Caballero, long critical of Godoy's administration, recommended disapproval of Iturrigaray's role, given the "arbitrariedad e inconsecuencia" of his methods. A conservative high civil servant tied to traditionalist groups at Madrid, at least Caballero was consistent. On the other hand, Pedro de Aparici—currently needling the Mexico City Consulado for an accounting of its *avería* management—supported the Consulado but studiously avoided any suggestion of official disapprobation of the viceroy.[22]

These details may seem excessive, yet to omit them would neglect the way the accumulation of opinion—of Audiencia, Caballero, Aparici—molded the opinion of the final arbiter, the Consejo de Indias and its *fiscal*, Ramon de Posada. Predictably, the Consejo de Indias followed the opinions of Consulado, Audiencia, Minister Caballero, and finally *fiscal* Posada, who had spent years as a distinguished colonial civil servant in New Spain.[23] Two versions exist of what was Madrid's total disapproval of Iturrigaray's intervention. On 8 July Soler informed Iturrigaray that the "king," following the opinion of the Consejo de Indias, had rejected his intervention in Consulado elections and demanded "con la mayor brevedad las causas que haya tenido para semejante variación." A copy was sent to the Consulado. Four months later, on 10 November, a reiteration of disapproval was sent

to Iturrigaray, insisting upon the Consulado's "peculiares ordenanzas" but omitting demand for an explanation. Why such an omission? Perhaps Aparici disagreed with the imputed motives behind Iturrigaray's intervention, seeing them rather as an effort to force the Mexico City mercantile corporation to incorporate criollized merchants like Cortina and Colla?[24]

By mid-July 1807, then, evidently Madrid authorities, epitomized by ministers Caballero and Soler, by the Consejo de Indias and its experienced *fiscal* Posada, would not support a viceroy who antagonized powerful business and administrative bodies in the colonies. The reformist days of a second Revillagigedo were over. Imperial considerations weighed heavily in this and related decisions in 1807. For its part, the Consulado continued the tradition of rewarding friends in the high civil service on the supposition that "todo el mundo sabe que no hay otro agente más poderoso para exciter a los hombres de trabajo sino el dinero; que es las sustancia de este mundo en face de las divinas letras."[25] In July 1808 it advised Madrid agent Sánchez Tirado to draw upon 12,000 pesos held by a merchant of Cadiz, Fermín de Elizalde (soon a prominent figure in the Junta de Sevilla of 1808) to distribute to those helpful "en el punto de elecciones" and other matters.[26] The Consulado of Mexico City could sense its influence waxing once again, its powers of persuasion fortified by *gastos secretos* withdrawn from its profitable management of the *avería* tax on goods imported via Veracruz and Acapulco.

Conflict: Iturrigaray and the Consulado's Management of Avería

Madrid's explicit disapproval in July 1807 of Viceroy Iturrigaray's intervention in the Consulado election of that year was no isolated act but part of a policy reemphasized the following months by Madrid's handling of another viceregal intervention in Consulado affairs, its administration of the *avería*.

For more than two centuries Mexico City's merchant corporation had financed its operations by a tax on imports at Veracruz and Acapulco destined for distribution and sale throughout New Spain. In the sixteenth century, an embryonic Spanish state had allocated to private interests financial responsibilities beyond its capacity, an incapacity shared with other European states in the form of tax farming. To the merchants of Sevilla in their Consulado, the Spanish government shifted oversight of convoy escorts shepherding the Atlantic fleets (*galeones* and *flotas*) to and from the American colonial ports; to cover financial outlays, the Sevilla Consulado collected and disbursed the *avería*. Not strange, then, was the fact that the *ordenanzas*

of Mexico City's Consulado of 1597 included a two per one thousand (*dos al millar*) *avería* chargeable on the colony's imports to underwrite one of the Consulado's corporate functions of public utility—its resolution of disputes among merchants according to mercantile jurisprudence. At the end of the seventeenth century, the wealthy Consulado of Mexico City purchased the first of a series of tax-farm contracts, augmenting in a sense its public utility function for a still impoverished imperial state. Decades later, however, the Spanish state—inspired perhaps by the French model—began to assume greater responsibility for its fiscal operations, creating its own organization for supervising its new tobacco monopoly and reincorporating the *alcabala* farm despite Consulado interest in renewing its contract. To be sure, the Consulado's officers handled *avería* and *alcabala* administration at a profit; indeed, as has been suggested, there is good reason to believe the electoral disputes between *partidos* of *vizcaínos* and *montañeses* (1728–1742) had revolved around access to both *avería* and *alcabala* tax surpluses and their distribution. Equally valid is the assumption that Consulado officials—*priores, consules, consiliarios*—often allocated these funds to benefit themselves personally and to support the policies of the mercantile corporation and its leading members.

Those policies, as critics argued in the 1790s, excluded a sense of responsibility either for one of the Consulado's explicit functions of public utility—administration of mercantile litigation—or for an implicit function, financing the infrastructure of trade, port works, and other harbor facilities of New Spain's major entry points at Veracruz and Acapulco, along with construction and maintenance of roads and bridges feeding into the main distribution hub that was Mexico City. The physical condition of Veracruz as late as 1796, an example of such malign neglect, will be described later. Yet the Mexico City Consulado did allocate *avería* surpluses to support in part the colony's system of domestic security, the highway patrols of the *Acordada*, and to finance construction in the capital of an imposing customshouse on one side of the plaza de Santo Domingo, not far from the main square or Zócalo and the best shops clustered there in the large commercial center known as the *Parián*. The Consulado also employed *avería* surpluses to support a network of dependents in the colonial bureaucracy (in the Audiencia and in the *aduanas* of Veracruz, Jalapa, and Acapulco) and overseas at Madrid itself. When Mexico City's merchants and miners sent Gamboa and Cotera to Madrid in the late 1750s to lobby for renewal of the *flota* system, against including New Spain in what later became *comercio libre de barlovento* (1765), and against forming a monopoly mine supply company for the colony, who can doubt that their remarkable success at Madrid was

ensured by savvy distribution of *avería* funds? Nor is it surprising that the Mexico City Consulado, apprehensive over the broad powers of intervention in the colony's economic affairs with which Madrid commissioned Visitador General José de Gálvez, readily offered him 100,000 pesos to finance his expedition to Sonora. This *donativo* (really, a loan) was repaid by adding two per one thousand to what was by then the regular six *al millar* collected by the Consulado for the *avería*. There is evidence that the Consulado's interested generosity was subsequently overreimbursed; probably it contributed to Gálvez's decision in 1778 (as minister of the Indies) to exclude New Spain from the second *Reglamento del comercio libre* of that year, for which the Consulado generously rewarded him.[27]

These were, in one sense, the remote antecedents of Iturrigaray's involvement in the Mexico City Consulado's handling of *avería* funds. Proximate antecedents may be localized in the contradictory pressures surfacing in the three decades following Spain's entry in 1779 into the struggle of England's North American colonies against imperial hegemony. Wartime finance, on the one hand, quickly exhausted the Spanish state's capacity (or its willingness, once France's Estates-General appeared) to increase direct consumption taxes. This would lead ultimately to the Consolidación in Spain and New Spain after 1798; even earlier it had led to financial "quick fixes," such as repeated government borrowing from wealthy investors in the peninsula and colonies, assured by liens on revenues of colonial state monopolies such as tobacco as well as by the solidity of *consulado* fiscal operations—for instance, its *avería* administration. At the same time, for different motives, Madrid officials began to adopt a critical stance to the finances of corporations from which the metropolitan government had borrowed, such as the Consulado of Mexico endowed in theory with public utility functions although minimally executed. Not only did the new *consulados* of the 1790s also include by statute all types of agricultural, mining, and "industrial" entrepreneurs, but they were also enjoined to stimulate the economy of their jurisdictions, to prepare and publish annual balances of trade, and to oversee highway construction—activities exemplified by the Veracruz Consulado established, it will be recalled, despite the sustained opposition of the *almaceneros* running Mexico City's Consulado.

On the contrary, Mexico City's mercantile corporation appears to have enlarged its role as financial intermediary between metropolitan government and lenders in the colony after 1782, as its primary function of public utility. It began on a massive scale when in June 1782 the viceroy advised the Consulado's officials of the "urgent necesidad" of the metropolitan govern-

ment to "continuar las crecidas remesas de caudales que se habian hecho para sostener la actual guerra," and he urged them to advise immediately of the amount the Consulado could offer. At an assembly (*junta general*) of merchant notables, which included present and past living *priores*, *consules*, and "deputados de este comercio," it was agreed to propose a 1-million-peso loan repayable from colonial treasury income. "Por no poderse sacar de los fondos del Consulado con la prontitud necesaria," the Consulado proposed to solicit funds from private persons and religious and other corporations in the form of a *depósito irregular*, guaranteeing 5 percent annual interest drawn from its *avería* collections; in turn, the *avería* rate would be raised from six to ten per one thousand.[28] Once the viceroy agreed to the terms, 1 million pesos was quickly subscribed—who could resist a well-secured investment at the high and equally secured interest of 5 percent? Again, in 1790, Madrid borrowed another 100,000 pesos (still on the four per thousand of 1782) to finance its peace treaty with Algeria; by this time the colonial treasury had already amortized 600,000 pesos of the first loan. Such was the confidence established between Madrid and New Spain's investors that Madrid through the Consulado could raise two more 1-million-peso loans during the war against republican France, 1793–1794, at the same interest rate while lifting the *avería* by two increments of five per thousand. By 1796 when the review of the Mexico City's Consulado's account was initiated, the *avería* rate totaled twenty per thousand—four per thousand collected on the "universal comercio de Nueva España y sus Reinos anexos" devoted to annual interest payments on an outstanding government debt of 2.4 million pesos.[29] As with so much of nineteenth-century Mexico, dependence upon customs revenue to service government borrowing was already well rooted in the colony.

Piecing together the Mexico City Consulado's overall management of *avería* collection, disbursement, and general accounting practices from fragmentary sources was complicated. Certainly Madrid's relentless *contador general*, Pedro de Aparici, was never satisfied with reports supplied by Mexico City. He confronted an endemic problem in Spain's colonial administration: a presumably centralized bureaucracy gave extraordinary latitude to the operations of private as well as public sectors in the colonies. The exasperating flexibility of the system elicited from Aparici (or a fellow bureaucrat), on reviewing accounts submitted in 1796, the candid observation: "En este Ministerio se ignora absolutamente el producto del fondo de dicho consulado, y el importe de sus actuales gastos."[30] Short of dispatching a special auditor, Aparici had to rely upon the accounts prepared and

forwarded by Mexico City's successive *avería* treasurers all appointed by the Consulado, all officers and *almaceneros*—all members of the *vizcaíno* faction: Basoco, Icaza, Uzcola.

In accepting responsibility for the "paga del millon y sus reditos" and for an expanding role as financial intermediary, the Consulado simply relied on the *avería* apparatus in place. There were agents or collectors (*agentes*, *recaudadores*) at Veracruz, Jalapa, and Acapulco; the collectors functioned independently of the local colonial bureaucracy, although at Mexico City the collector was also the administrator general of the capital's *aduana*.[31] While collectors received a nominal salary, it was invariably supplemented by a percentage (10–20 percent) of the gross receipts of the respective customs zone, an incentive payment that silvered the link between collector and Consulado and ensured the allegiance of collectors.[32] These appointments were choice ones, for when the Veracruz *recaudador* in 1790, Pedro Antonio de Zavala y Zengotieta, was fatally ill, he proposed as replacement a *compadre* (Gaspar Ignacio de Lagarriaga); following his death, his widow vacillated between recommending a nephew (Manuel Antonio de Ysasi) and her son ("como lo exigía el mas estrecho vínculo").[33]

Although Madrid mandated in the *arancel general* of 1778 a formal valuation by article and rate (*aforo*) for the *avería*, Mexico City's *avería* agent at Veracruz levied the Consulado's tax according to its own *tarifa*. It claimed that those paying its *tarifa* were used to this system and would find inconvenient "qualquiera novedad." Moreover, in establishing charges, the Veracruz *recaudador* used as basis the volume of the container box or package regardless of the value of its contents—a kind of *palmeo*. There was further opportunity for the *recaudador*'s discretion; at Veracruz he collected the *avería* only on goods exiting for the interior, but not directed to Jalapa or Mexico City, for Jalapa had its own collector for goods sold or shipped from there into the interior, as did Mexico City. Why the Mexico City Consulado shied from "qualquiera novedad" becomes clear on reflection, for what it termed "costumbre" when properly manipulated could in fact set a lower rate on goods consigned to Mexico City's *almacenero* distributors and a higher one on goods sold at Veracruz or Jalapa. This was all the more critical after the 1780s as the commercial activity of Veracruz rapidly increased, which led to the establishment of its own Consulado jurisdiction and competition with Mexico City for hegemony over New Spain's distribution network.[34]

While we have no hard data for the gross collections of Mexico City's Consulado from all its agents, the *avería* receipts of Mexico City alone doubled between 1782 and 1790, and over the succeeding period, from 1791 to 1808, more than doubled again.[35] From these receipts were drawn what one

might term regular disbursements to collectors at Veracruz, Acapulco, Jalapa, and Mexico City and to the *tesorero* or accountant. The Consulado paid attention to employees in the Mexico City customshouse, including its superintendent (Miguel Páez de la Cadena), his successor (Felipe Clere), and its accountant (Agustín Pérez Quijano).[36] And there were supplementary payments to Consulado staff much augmented after 1782—to two *asesores* (Jośe González de Castañeda and Basilio de Arrillaga), legal counsel (*procurador* Francisco Riofrio), accountants (Arrillaga and Francisco Ignacio de Soto y Carrillo), and chief clerk (Luís Gonzaga de Ibarrola), not to mention honoraria to the *prior* and *consules* and to the *oidor* presiding at the Consulado's formal meetings (the *juez de alzadas*)—a total of 226,000 pesos.[37] And there were pensioners, some of them widows of merchants, also maintained at *avería* expense.

In addition were special monetary assignments (*cargas extraordinarias*) such as 2,000 pesos annually to support the Consejo de Indias at Madrid ("para subvenir a los gastos precisos de su dotacion"); a 2 percent annual charge on gross collections after 1802 to subsidize Madrid's newly created Departamento del fomento general del Reyno y de la Balanza del Comercio;[38] 9,000 pesos to the Juzgado de la Acordada, 3,000 to the Academia de San Carlos, and 500 pesos to the Hospital de San Lázaro; entertainment of viceroys to the tune of 2,000 pesos plus contributions to finance a viceregal visit to the excavation works at Huehuetoca for draining the Valley of Mexico; a contribution to the annual parade of the patron saint of the *partido montañés* (the Virgen de los Remedios) through Mexico City's streets; and a large annual subvention (in 1811, more than 11,000 pesos) to the merchants' Regimiento de Milicias urbanas del Comercio (to its *sargento-mayor*, and to its band).[39] Consulado officials were ostentatiously explicit about exhibiting their status to the capital city's community and their relationship to pomp and the ritual display of power. As for "alguno luxo" in the uniforms of sergeants, corporals, musicians, and drummers in their regiment, this was justified since the regiment was served by "gente del comercio Europeos [*sic*] y pudientes las más" whose "exterioridad" should match that of other corporations. The regiment's appearance, the Consulado asserted, "entusiasma y aumenta de cierto modo el Patriotismo, atrae la Juventud más principal bajo sus banderas" and, without onus to the colonial treasury, the Consulado "hace . . . un servicio importante al estado."[40]

Justification of other expenditures on what was officially countenanced as "gastos secretos" stirred Consulado officials in 1804 to be even more explicit. The Consulado wrote Soler in 1805 that "esa libertad de hacer im-

pensas secretas e invisibles como las llaman los Autores, nunca se ha permitido indistintamente a todo género de personas, sino precisamente a aquellas cuyas circunstancias de nobleza, virtud y caudal excluyen la presunción de que abusaren de esa gracia."[41] This exemplifies how a hitherto matter-of-fact technique of lobbying—bribery draped as "invisible" expenses and legitimated by royal order in 1784—reveals both the *Weltanschauung* and philosophy of an influential corporate body in a colony of a European ancien regime. Consulado officers as well as individual merchants never underestimated the psychological impact of their silver pesos in shepherding *representaciones* through New Spain's and Madrid's bureaucratic mazes to ensure favorable action. Moreover, there is reason to believe bribes were more tolerated, accepted and acceptable, and larger during the inflationary surge in Spain during the two decades after 1789, fueled mainly by colonial economic growth. Wars, after all, usually stimulate and simultaneously distort economic growth as well. But, while bribes were privately palatable, large bribes at the official level were questionable. The Consulado's detailed justification for resorting to "soborno" was its response to official inquiry about failure to report 8,000 pesos of secret disbursements, despite what Consulado officers considered "poderozas razones" legalizing them.[42] It was simply a cost of conducting commercial operations.

"Liberty" to make "impensas secretas o invisibles," began the Consulado, had always been bestowed selectively upon those whose "nobleza, virtud y caudal" assured they would not "abuse" their gracias. This presumption was "reasonable" by analogies natural to the mercantile mentality of the time: a *husband* does not limit the expenditures of a wife of "juicio y economia," and a *testator* confiding in his executor relieves him of any accounting, just as a landed estate owner honors a faithful manager by not reviewing his accounts. Consulado officials—according to the *ordenanza* of the Consulado, "ricos, honrrados, nobles, temerosos de Dios"—have not tarnished the high opinion of them held by Spain's kings, by Charles III, by the Consejo de Indias, and by past Viceroy Bucareli, all of whom could testify to the Consulado's "honor, zelo, desinterés y . . . prudente economía" in handling public funds. Never has the Consulado employed those funds to "seducir las integridad de los magistrados, ni de las personas por cuyo mano corre imediatamente el despacho de sus negocios."[43]

At a lower level, however, the Consulado found it appropriate to offer what Saint Thomas had designated as "dones temporales" to "subalternos que influyen indirectamente," or to seize "una conjuntura favorable." It is only too easy to criticize when one is unaware of the hurdles to overcome "para que llegue a despacharse un negocio que pende de la Voluntad

del Monarca," since colonial issues "después de sustanciados por muchos trámites" must then be shifted to Madrid, where it is necessary to rely upon an agent ("que ha de personarse"), a lawyer, a friend ("para que agite"), or a *valido* ("para que interceda"), and finally upon money that "como un Muelle Real la ha de dar movimiento a las ruedas de todo la Maquina." These are obstacles encountered when a petition moves through the hands of "subalternos mal dotados." Should the Consulado fail to reward the "dependiente" in the Mexico City bureaucracy or elsewhere who examines ledgers, performs different tasks, prepares tables, and puts in overtime? Everyone knows, continued the Consulado officials, that "no hay otro agente mas poderoso para exciter a 10 hombres al trabajo, sino el dinero; que es las sustancia de este mundo." (Even a superficial *explication de texte* quickly turns up the conjunction of "caudal," "rico," and "dinero" in the merchants' justification of bribery.) And here the Consulado officials cut to the fundamental moral problem of those holding "dinero a mano para gastar": Was money to be spent to "corromper la integridad de los Jueces"? Obviously not by *priores* or *consules*—"hombres de bien, experimentados de cordura y de integridad" who have sworn to dispense funds for the "bien y utilidad del Comercio que está a su cargo." Errors in our accounts, concluded the Consulado officials in their note to Minister Soler, were unintentional, traceable to merchants entering accounts "a estilo mercantil" and omitting formalities observed in the bureaucracy. In brief, the Consulado wished to preserve what a Real Céula of 16 May 1784 had authorized, "gastos secretos" up to 8,000 pesos annually.

Behind the Mexico City Consulado's rationale of techniques for defending its interests was no small amount of spleen, the result of irritation over recent royal orders insisting that the corporation and the *tesoreros* of the *avería* provide full, accurate accounts. On the other hand, Madrid officials recognized that receipts were rising (if only to meet annual interest charges of 120,000 pesos) just as the needs of the metropolitan government were; there was also the fact that the Hacienda Ministry recruited and promoted, generally speaking, more competent personnel interested in uniform accounting procedures and dedicated to government intervention to direct shortsighted businessmen to areas of potential growth. This may explain why Madrid proliferated new *consulados* in Spain and the American colonies in the 1790s, in New Spain those of Veracruz and Guadalajara.

In fact, the Mexico City Consulado triggered Madrid's interest in its *avería* management when it protested in 1795 that goods moving into the capital following the establishment of the Veracruz Consulado would have to bear the cost of two consular *averías*, Veracruz's six per one thousand plus

Mexico City's twenty. In position papers prepared for Hacienda Minister Diego de Gardoqui in 1796, Contador General Pedro de Aparici (subsequently involved with Casa Valencia in revising the intendancy system) backed by an anonymous bureaucrat noted the absence of "noticias exactas" of the gross receipts of *avería* operations, especially since the ministry "se ignora absolutamente el producto del fondo" of the Mexico City Consulado's six per thousand collections.[44] Evident on the part of the anonymous bureaucrat was a desire to protect the Veracruz Consulado from reduction in its receipts in view of the "importantes costosas obras" ordered by its *ordenanza* (article 23). By picturing the "incredible neglect" of Veracruz's harbor, docks, and general facilities in graphic terms beginning with "El Puerto de Veracruz es el peor del Universo," then treating by turn harbor, mole, water supply, seamen's hospital, and the road to Mexico City, the anonymous bureaucrat displayed an uncommon knowledge of the area and, by indirection, a highly critical stance toward the Mexico City corporation that over "tantos años" had shown no interest in the colony's major port.

Consulado officials had patently ignored official requests in 1789 and 1791 for an accounting of *avería* collections. Now, however, Consulado officials Basoco, Sánchez, and Gutiérrez de Lanzas promised Minister Gardoqui data of the period 1783–1786 demanded in 1796 and reiterated sharply in April 1798 ("sobre este asunto no . . . admitiese réplica ni escusa alguna"). The first version of the accounts was considered defective.[45] Even more humiliating to Hacienda minister Soler, as he noted in February 1801, was the Consulado's request that Madrid suspend legislation requiring any accounting and simply reaffirm its "libre uso del producto de Avería."[46]

The grounds for the request were explicit: that the Mexico City Consulado held an immemorial right *not* to furnish *avería* accounts, that it was part of its patrimony to enjoy as "dueño absoluto sin limitación, traba, ni restricción alguna," and that the "king" should recall the "grandes servicios" of the Consulado. However, since ignoring Madrid's orders would no longer suffice, Mexico City's *almaceneros* now resolved to insist on the status quo ante. But Soler refused to temporize with them as had his predecessors Lerena, Gardoqui, and Saavedra. He directed the Consulado's officials to formulate new regulations (*ordenanzas*), as directed in 1796 under Godoy's administration, based upon those of the newly minted Consulados of Veracruz and Guadalajara, to set up an *avería* accounting system (first mandated in 1791) also based on those of Veracruz and Guadalajara, and to forward punctually annual *avería* accounts to Minister Soler (*via reservada*), as did all recently established *consulados*. And to drive home his point, Soler insisted on immediate preparation of accounts covering the years since 1787,

substantiated with "testimonio de los documentos justificativos de cargo y data," along with Consulado regulations stipulating salaries and other expenses assigned with "prudente economia" and hitherto lacking.[47] The Consulado's response was continued stalling; not until late May of 1805 was a partial *avería* accounting prepared based upon 750 documents verified against original entry ledgers (*libros de asiento*) of Veracruz and Jalapa (10,196 folios of documents). Not until 1806 were Mexico City's *avería* collections itemized (requiring examination of another 25,000 folios—so claimed the Consulado).[48]

This suggests the nature of tension between Consulado and Madrid's Hacienda Ministry that Viceroy Iturrigaray inherited when he arrived at Mexico City in 1803. As New Spain's chief colonial officer and executor of policy formulated in the distant metropole, over the ensuing five years Iturrigaray found himself in the crossfire between Madrid's Contador General Aparici and Hacienda Minister Soler on the one hand and, on the other, the *almacenero* establishment responsible for the *avería* accounts of the Mexico City Consulado. True to form, the *tesoreros* delayed their initial accounting until 1798, then supplied data covering from only 1784 to 1786, which they knew would be judged deficient. Repeatedly ordered to prepare comprehensive accounts on regular schedule, they prepared reasonably accurate reports of collections at Mexico City's *aduana*, leaving those of Veracruz, Jalapa, and Acapulco incomplete. By comparison, those assembled by the secretariat of the Veracruz Consulado for its collections of the six per one thousand, 1795–1809, were far more informative about gross receipts, expenditures, and net proceeds.

The accounts of the more efficient Veracruz Consulado, which applied its receipts to both interest payments and debt retirement while simultaneously financing a large-scale program of overdue public works benefiting the trade of its port, presumably inspired Aparici to urge Soler to maintain pressure upon the recalcitrant Mexico City Consulado.[49] In March 1803 Soler approved Aparici's approach, warranted by incomplete data forwarded by the Mexico City Consulado covering its collections for the period 1782–1803 and prepared by mid-June 1806—this, after almost twenty-five years of operations.

The compiler of the accounts had to confess that "la cuenta es tan grande que acaso no lo ha havido mayor desde que se erigió el Consulado"[50]—probably no exaggeration. Records of the subscribers to the first loan (1782) secured on *avería* proceeds were deficient ("jamás me mandó tomase razón de los capitales que se recibieron"); for years, subscribers had received interest calculated some on a quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis com-

puted from the date of each subscription. In any case, the Mexico City Consulado's officers supported the *almaceneros*, who, serving as *tesoreros*, had supervised the *avería* accounts; Basoco and Icaza were "sugetos [who], giraron sus cuentas con la mayor fidelidad y exactitud en quanto al manejo de caudales." If they had failed to observe the rules followed in government bureaus, it was because they lacked personnel "suficientemente dotados que dedicados por su profesión."[51]

Shortcomings aside, the *avería* accounts of the Consulados of Veracruz and Mexico, particularly those prepared by Mexico City's *aduana*, confirmed to Madrid's functionaries the rising trend of receipts (averaging 145,653 pesos annually, 1801–1803) and heightened their suspicions of flagrant mismanagement, not to say malfeasance.[52] Total receipts from Mexico City, Veracruz, Jalapa, and Acapulco were larger than ever reported earlier, while clearly the *tesoreros* of Mexico City had retained large balances minus indication of purposes to which they may have been assigned. Fears of mismanagement were confirmed by reports of unaccounted receipts (*descubiertas*) ranging anywhere from 6,000 to more than 109,000 pesos, and of payments to collectors far beyond what the formal schedule required.[53] Especially suspicious was the Consulado's resistance to supplying data on its invisible or secret expenditures, on the ground that "poderosas razones . . . en nuestro concepto los hacen licitos."[54] In addition, the Consulado had deliberately delayed uniformizing its *avería* accounting system to conform with that of the new *consulados*, an attitude that permitted the Consulado's collector at Veracruz to use valuations (*tarifa*) differing from those of the Veracruz customs (*arancel*), and which probably generated more income than was legally justified. Instead of investing funds at its disposal for badly needed harbor and transportation infrastructure, or for amortizing the 1782 loan, Mexico City's Consulado preferred to exercise a role as financial intermediary between the metropolitan government and wealthy private and institutional lenders in New Spain, offering a high rate of interest. And there remained the knowledge that the Mexico City Consulado employed undisclosed amounts to buy Madrid's toleration of its questionable tactics. Hence, the flow of ministerial orders about proper *avería* accounts to viceroy and Consulado generated (or justified) among Consulado members the impression of "ministerial despotism."

In 1803 and again in 1804, Madrid issued requests for *avería* accounts, prohibiting further secret expenditures. In 1805 Soler (prompted no doubt by Aparici) found the accounts of the Mexico City *aduana* acceptable, but not the unsubstantiated totals for Jalapa, Veracruz, and Acapulco prepared by Mexico City's appointees.[55] Henceforth, Soler ordered, *avería* would

have to be calculated separately allowing no *descuento* or *rebaja*, while receipts were not to be spent on "objetos mui distantes del de su primitivo y único establecimiento." Efforts would have to be made to make "particulares o comunidades" accept lower interest rates, from 5 to 4.5 percent.[56] Similar themes were reiterated in February and July 1807; since the accounts still were marked by "indolencia," henceforth collectors were to have their accounts certified by Hacienda employees at Jalapa and Veracruz, and unauthorized expenditures—entertainment of viceroys, secret expenses, pensions to merchants' widows—were to be halted. When in February 1807 orders were received that salary payments to *avería* collectors in excess of the schedule were to be immediately refunded to the *avería*, Consulado officials proceeded to borrow 15,000 pesos at 5 percent interest from a consul of the Consulado (Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta) without authorization. This was, in effect, breaking the law to comply with the law.[57]

Viceroy Iturrigaray could do no less than reflect Madrid's insistence on obliging the Mexico City mercantile corporation to modify its freewheeling mode of operation. As Iturrigaray explained to Soler, his instructions to Consulado officers would have the laudable effect of "privar de la arvitraria administración de los fondos que maneja; como . . . de producir el arreglo de cuentas entorpecidas o confundidas de próposito para fines particulares."[58] By 1807 Iturrigaray had four years of experience with Mexico City's Spanish-born *almaceneros* whose expensive welcoming parties for viceroys and large unlisted disbursements (*descubiertas*) were designed to influence rather than entertain. In February 1807 the Consulado's continued unauthorized manipulation of *avería* receipts was hammered home to Iturrigaray when the *regente* of the Audiencia, Castillo Negrete (who supported Iturrigaray's involvement in Consulado elections in January of that year) uncovered a *descubierta* of 20,000 pesos in the *avería* accounts.[59] Beginning in June 1807 Iturrigaray repeatedly reiterated royal orders relative to *avería* accounts, which the Consulado's officials ignored. And he persisted despite counteraction by the Consejo de Indias (it was receiving 1,000 pesos per annum from Mexico's *avería* receipts) that ordered him to rescind the directive that the Consulado reimburse salary overpayments to its *avería* collectors.

In tandem with the solicited opinion of the Audiencia that relied upon the opinion of its *fiscal de lo civil*, Sagarzurieta, Iturrigaray now intervened further in the Consulado's *avería* management with what must have seemed ruthless directness. Henceforth its accounts had to indicate total receipts and expenditures of all *avería* collections; disallowed were the cost of entertaining viceroys, special payments to officers in the merchants' militia

(unless royal authorization could be produced), and the "gastos secretos," while the accounts of the Consulado's "primer agente" at Madrid (Iturrigaray insisted he was overpaid) required certification by the Consejo de Indias. These were at best peripheral constraints in Iturrigaray's modification of *avería* management, ever grudgingly accepted by the Consulado's *almaceneros*. What was most threatening and unacceptable, moreover, were his directives concerning where and how to collect *avería*—the core of the system guarded tenaciously by the Consulado for decades.

By shifting *avería* collection on goods entering Veracruz to customs officers there, Iturrigaray relied upon a thoroughgoing critique of the Mexico City Consulado's collection procedures and rates drafted by *fiscal* Sagarzurieta.[60] This investigation left Iturrigaray mystified by the Consulado's contention that using the customshouse schedule (*arancel*) as duty base would reduce its *avería* receipts by 50 percent, unsettle many private and corporate lenders (*capitalistas*), would sweep aside "los derechos de los capitalistas, los estilos del consulado," or—to use the timeworn Consulado bottom-line—"la posesión tranquila immemorial en que se halla." The Consulado claimed the right to collect its *avería* on goods entering Veracruz for shipment anywhere in the interior, but not on reexports or goods "consumed" in Veracruz itself. This implied arbitrary dutying by the Mexico City Consulado, an assumption supported by its assertion that *avería* charges were levied on "todos los caxones o tercios de una clase" regardless of contents. This, commented Sagarzurieta, was "la cosa mas desforme e injusta que puede figurarse," for thereby the importer of cheap ordinary goods packed in a *caxón* would be dutied the same as a *caxón* containing merchandise "exquisitos y de suprema valor." This was manifestly illegal because the Leyes de Indias stated categorically that *avería* was based upon prices current in colonial ports, not upon assumed export prices in the metropole, and was to be levied equitably ("ni cobren derechos en mucha ni en poca cantidad"). Nor was there any ground, continued Sagarzurieta, for the Consulado's main argument, that its system had the sanction of "costumbre" as well as the "consentimiento de los contribuyentes." To use one basis (*tarifa*) at Veracruz and another at Mexico City could not be sanctioned by custom when this was clearly in contradiction with the law. How could the Consulado assert it had royal approval for its system when all its accounts merely indicated what had been collected annually without explanation of the "forma se ha hecho la exacción"? In other words, how can a sovereign approve what he does not know about?

The logic of the legal mind drew *fiscal* Sagarzurieta to the inescapable conclusion based on the Mexico City's Consulado's tenacious defense of its

tarifa at Veracruz and its studied failure to provide collection details that might reveal its arbitrary assessments. If, as the Consulado officers insisted, shifting from its *tarifa particular* to the general customs schedule (*arancel general*) could induce a 50 percent drop in *avería* receipts, then in fact the Consulado had "cobrado un 40 por el arbitrario de la Tarifa," or 50 percent more than legally justified, and by extension, the *avería* had generated larger sums than imagined (or reported) for the speculation of *almaceneros* (*tesoreros* of the *avería*) and for buying influence in the colony and at court.

Despite the signs of crisis in the metropole that filtered across the Atlantic between March and September 1808, Viceroy Iturrigaray pushed ahead with implementing modifications in the Consulado's *avería* management.[61] Between March and June, the Audiencia and its *fiscal*, Sagarzurieta, supported his proposed changes, rebutting counterclaims of Consulado officials; on 24 June Iturrigaray advised the Consulado that he intended to eliminate its Veracruz and Jalapa collectors, shifting responsibility for *avería* collection to the administrator of the Veracruz customshouse and using the customs schedule in force there. Disregarding the Consulado's prediction that his intervention "trastornaría toda su economía," Iturrigaray put his plan into effect on 19 August.[62]

Less than one month later, Iturrigaray would be imprisoned at the headquarters of the Mexico City Inquisición, awaiting deportation to Cadiz in the aftermath of the coup engineered by a group of peninsular *almaceneros* of the colonial capital. And Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, who had loaned the Consulado 15,000 pesos to refund to the *avería* the overpayments to collectors, was chief officer of the Mexico City merchants' Regimiento urbano de Milicias. As for the chief customs officer at Veracruz, Boisselle y Gallardo, he complained to Iturrigaray's successor, General Garibay, in January 1809 about the efforts of the recently elected Mexico City Consulado officers—Alonso Terán, Ruiz de la Bárcena, Yermo—to hamstring his *avería* management by insisting upon the inconvenient, costly, and irritating requirements of Veracruz merchants, *arrieros*, and civil servants. Wearily, Boisselle confessed "la experiencia me ha manifestado quán lavoriosa y complicada es la recaudación del derecho de avería."[63] It should come as no surprise that by late 1808 the Consulado's officers asked Viceroy Garibay to permit their corporation to borrow funds to send to Spain to support the resistance against the French, offering as security "réditos sobre [la] avería extraordinaria."[64]

With good reason the *españoles peninsulares* dominating the Consulado de Mexico would welcome the coup d'état at Aranjuez that ended Godoy's administration and, some months later, the preemptive coup that removed Viceroy Iturrigaray.

6. New Spain's Cuban Counterpoint

Las ideas dictadas por el egoísmo de los de la Habana son conocidamente las de hacer aquella Isla el emporio de todo el comercio de la América septentrional, de que está convencido este consulado, él de Veracruz, y el comercio dela Nueva España.

Consulado de Cadiz (Simón de Ágreda, Juan Miguel de Carlos) to Junta Suprema Governativa del Reyno, 29 August 1809

Si la Junta provincial hubiese sido realidad, es incontrovertible que, en forma lícita, los puertos cubanos habrían estado franqueados a buques de naciones amigas y neutrales, sin el retardo de una década que representó la libertad commercial decretada por la RO de 1818.

Francisco Ponte Domínguez, *Junta de la Habana*

Precaver los efectos que podría producir el descontento que ha inspirado el virrey actual . . . El fiel público de Veracruz avisaba . . . que sería preciso tomar las armas ya que en México nada se resolvía para atajar el suceso.

Juan López Cancelada, *La verdad sabida y buena fe guardada*, xliii

Nothing—neither Iturrigaray's intervention in Mexico City's Consulado elections nor Madrid's inquiry (pushed by Iturrigaray) into the Consulado's financial operations and influence-buying via *avería* management—more effectively unified the *consulados* of the colony's capital and major port, Mexico City and Veracruz, than imperial trade policy implemented after the outbreak of war with England in 1804. Between both Consulados, competition seems to have waned thereafter as both, actively supported by the Cadiz Consulado, strove to block measures improvised to maintain commercial and financial contact between the metropole and New Spain: *gracias*, contracts with neutrals; stopovers (*escalas*) for sales by peninsular shipmasters en route to a final colonial destination; and, the most ominous, the burgeoning role of Havana as major distribution point for European goods supplied from the United States' and England's West Indian ports. To *alma-*

ceneros of Veracruz and Mexico City, Arango y Parreño's boast about turning Havana into the Caribbean's *almacen general* (with the "designio de abir sus puertos al comercio de todas las naciones," as the Consejo de Indias would later put it), seemed to materialize a commercial threat compounded in 1808 by the possibility that Cuba's captain general, marqués de Someruelos, might be Iturrigaray's replacement.[1] To New Spain's anxious *almaceneros*, Someruelos's policy of complacency for Cuba's *criollo* interests was precisely what made Iturrigaray's presence intolerable. Their fears were heightened by correspondence from Havana describing those residents who traded with U.S. and English merchants as "tranquilos y soberbios dando pábulo y ensanche a sus vicios y pasiones; forman conciliábulos, claman, gritan, y escriven, pretendiendo destrozar las leyes y formarse un Nuevo sistema de comercio y de cosas a su arbitrio, en perjuicio del Estado en general."[2] Economic and political developments at Havana, along with the interests involved, constitute a neglected syndrome shaping New Spain's events in the first nine months of the critical year of 1808 in Spain and America.

Cuban Aspirations and Captain General Someruelos

Decisions made by Havana's agrocommercial bourgeoisie in January–February 1808 did not break with a prior pattern of action but were precipitated by economic warfare between competing English and French imperialisms. English occupation of Havana in 1763 had increased commercial contact with English suppliers of slaves and European goods at Kingston (Jamaica) and Nassau (New Providence), and with North American (later, U.S.) exporters of food, lumber, and animals at Philadelphia and Baltimore; war at sea after 1793 galvanized neutral U.S. shippers to expand their role as intermediaries between Europe and Cuba. Beginning in the 1790s, Madrid had to authorize modifications in established precedents, which Cuban interests did not fully exploit immediately: in 1792 (Real Decreto, 22 November 1792), to export Cuban production in Spanish shipping "en derechura a los puertos extrangeres de Europa"; in 1796 (Real Orden, 23 February), to permit neutral shipping to export Cuban commodities at reduced export taxes; between 1797 and 1799, the phase of *comercio neutro* (legally ended in 1799, but maintained at Havana by interim local legislation), to "conserbar su existencia agrícola con el comercio de las naciones aliadas amigas, a veneficio de las providencias que para su franca admisión, adoptaron subcesivamente."[3] Behind this and subsequent Madrid legislation lurked recognition of the imperatives of Cuba's export economy to utilize neutral shipping "en todos los casos, y por el tiempo que considere

preciso" (1801) and to import "negros, herramienta de agricultura, máquinas de ingenios" (1804). It was probably the legality of exporting Cuban exportables in *Cuban* shipping that led to the purchase by Havana interests, 1802–1809, of scores of U.S. vessels, *fragatas* (105), barks (65), *goletas* (94), and *balandras* (21).[4] These measures facilitated Cuba's agricultural development by exploiting war-induced sugar shortages in Europe, augmented by the loss of Saint-Domingue's sugar exports. In theory, these measures threatened the interests of neither Veracruz nor Mexico City. Indeed, a *real orden* of 1786 (12 August), had prohibited reexports of European imports from Havana to Veracruz.[5]

Warfare changed all this after 1804 when uncontrollable smuggling along New Spain's coast and Havana's potential as commercial intermediary in the Caribbean induced Madrid in May 1807 to allow Havana's merchants to reexport to Veracruz so-called *sobrantes* or surplus European goods. As the Cadiz Consulado later summed up its sentiments and those of Mexico City and Veracruz, "Por espacio de muchos años a pretesto de qualquiera Guerra marítima con suposiciones de falta de los renglones de primera necesidad, han abierto sus puertos los Havaneros al tráfico extrangero, hollando las leyes que lo prohiban, y trastornando el orden mercantil de España sabiamente establecido."[6] Of course Havana interests were delighted with the removal of a "barrera que siempre se nos mantubo cerrada sin provecho de la Metrópoli."[7] But France's continental blockade ("la despótica clausura de los puertos de Europa") and England's counteraction in the fall of 1807 put neutral carriers from the United States under pressure and triggered passage of Jefferson's embargo Act of 1807. Immediately, Havana's Consulado, whose membership contained merchants *and* planters, foresaw the repercussion upon their "conductor neutral" (the United States), sensing that "habia mudado ya la esencia del comercio general entre el Nuevo mundo y el antiguo." The major outlet remaining for Cuban sugars was now the U.S. domestic market ("hoy el más appreciable que tenemos") into which Cuban producers feared the English would dump their West Indian sugars.[8] At the end of January 1808 the Havana Consulado held an open meeting of notables (Captain General Someruelos, deputies of the Ayuntamiento, sixteen leading planters, and twenty-two merchants) to confront "el suceso más extraordinario que ha ocurrido en el comercio de las Americas desde su primer descubrimiento." To attract U.S. shippers, there were proposed temporary reductions in duties on imports and exports, on condition that a high percentage of sales were invested in commodity exports like sugar. To cover deficits in the trade balance with the United States, however, Havana would expand its reexports to Veracruz and Mexico City in exchange for

silver. Meanwhile, Havana's political authorities, in cooperation with local Consulado officers and representatives of Havana's Ayuntamiento, understood that orders from Madrid might reverse their trade measures, which would upset "el orden mercantil de España."[9]

It was not, however, Spain's commercial system but the metropolitan government itself that seemed to come apart in the five months following the end of January 1808. Long before colonial newspapers reported official news culled from the censored *Gazeta de Madrid*, Havana and other major colonial cities knew of the French invasion of Portugal and the flight of the royal family there to Portugal's wealthiest colony, Brazil; of the Escorial intrigue, the *golpe de estado* against Godoy and Charles IV at Aranjuez; and of the thrust of troops from France deep into Spain, at first in the guise of friendly troops. Only a minimum of six weeks elapsed for news of European events to cross the Atlantic to the U.S. coast and from there to Havana, while rumors that filled commercial correspondence prepared merchants and friends for purposely delayed, carefully planted, and censored news items in Havana's *La Aurora* and Mexico City's *Gazeta*. Official news, however, had to be the basis of public action.

By early June, Havana knew of the March events at Aranjuez and the accession of Fernando VII, as well as the arrival of the Braganzas at Bahia (Brazil) in January of 1808 fleeing from French troops of occupation under Junot. Official news carefully omitted reporting the opening of Brazil's ports to the shipping of all neutral and friendly nations—the end of Portugal's "managed" trade between metropole and colony. Yet Franco-Spanish relations remained officially close until the three weeks, 23 June to 14 July, when Havana learned that Spain's Bourbons, father and heir, had abdicated at Bayonne in favor of France's emperor; French forces were spreading through Spain; and Madrid had been the scene of an attack upon French troops there by the "mal aconsejado populacho" on the second day of May. Only later was the "spontaneous" nature of the bloody Dos de Mayo transmogrified when "populacho" became the more respectable "pueblo." This urban riot, it seemed, had been mastered ruthlessly by the French proconsul at Madrid, Napoleon's *lugarteniente* Joaquin Murat (duc de Berg) with the publicized approval of Spanish generals, officials of the royal household, and the Consejo de Castilla. For the colonies the "momento crítico" came in July on the *official* announcement of the Bourbons' abdication at Bayonne.[10] On 15 July, Havana's political elite formally rejected Fernando VII's abdication and swore to recognize him alone and his descendants regardless of directives from Spain—"con absoluto desprendimiento de cualquer resolución que pudiesen tomar las demás provincias y reinos de la

Monarquía siempre que no fuesen conformes a este propósito." With this declaration of loyalty went a shipment of 93,000 *pesos fuertes* and 1,599 hogsheads of sugar.[11] Nonetheless, with Fernando in forced although gilded exile in southern France (Valençay), for people in the American colonies no legitimate, free head of state existed—unless, that is, one accepted the hegemony of the recently formed Junta de Sevilla, self-titled *suprema* of Spain and America, or one of many regional juntas mushrooming in the metropole. On 25 July Havana's "vecinos, hacendados, comerciantes y personas notables," including the Havana Consulado's *prior* (Francisco Tomás Pasquel), the marqués de Casa Peñalver, and widely connected Bernabé Martínez de Pinillos, proposed to Captain General Someruelos that "no deberse diferir el establecimiento de una junta superior de gobierno revestida de igual autoridad a las demás de la Peninsula de España."[12] This was a radical proposal for a colony.

Why, one may ask, was there pressure to form a local *junta superior* when the local colonial apparatus was intact. To be sure, colonial authority, for example, that of the captain general, was very broad; yet he could rule only as long as no appeal to a higher authority in the metropole materialized. An appeal would surely occur if Someruelos, after consultation with civil, military, and naval officials, adopted measures generating local opposition. On the other hand, the propriety of Someruelos's decision making might be questioned, if there materialized an unquestioned metropolitan authority claiming legitimate succession to the Bourbons. If the port of Havana were formally opened to all neutral or friendly nations' shipping, for example, to expectant U.S. and English merchants, a French-dominated government at Madrid could declare the act null and void. By the same token, once Havana's colonial authorities recognized Sevilla's Junta as *suprema*, it was likely that the commercial and financial pressure of Cadiz's merchants would oblige that Junta to overrule Someruelos and maintain current trade policy. This, one may deduce, was the logic behind the Havaneros' design to legitimate a local government vested with powers equal to those of other Spanish juntas.

The origins of the proposed junta remain understandably murky. Someruelos's predicament worsened when Juan de Águilar (*intendente de ejército* and *subdelegado general de Real Hacienda*) arrived from the metropole bearing "manifiestos, bandos y proclamas" of Sevilla's Junta announcing its declaration of war against France and an armistice with England—an extraordinary shift in Spanish diplomacy.[13] According to one complaint against Someruelos, he had directed the harbor commander (Juan de Villavicencio) to dispatch the royal navy frigate *San Lorenzo* to Veracruz bear-

ing three "diputados" bound for Mexico City: Francisco Arango y Parreño, conde de O'Reylly, and either Andrés de Jaúregui or naval lieutenant Juan Orozco; the harbor commander stalled because the request came, he stated later, "sin decirme con qué objeto."[14] Like other *peninsulares*, Villavicencio was suspicious because Someruelos was one of those Godoy appointees with "ni el talento ni la firmeza ni la provided" necessary to keep *criollos* "sugetos y gustosos" and because his appointments were given to "estos havitantes en su misma casa."[15] Someruelos seemed uncomfortably close to *criollos* or to those linked to them, to Arango y Parreño ("sindico del consulado, rexidor y alférez real . . . natural de la Havanna, y desfruta allí fincas quantiosas"), to O'Reylly ("coronel del regimento fixo . . . hombre . . . en quasi igual caso"), and to Ylincheta (Someruelos's *asesor general*), who had come to Havana in 1792 and with royal permission had recently married the *criollo* niece of General O'Farrill, Gabriela. As a group these could be judged by pro-Sevilla peninsulars and friends "por sus miras particulares, engañados . . . afectos a la Francia." No wonder harbor commander Villavicencio refused to dispatch the *San Lorenzo* to Veracruz; probably his suspicions were confirmed when, on the arrival of the Junta de Sevilla's *comisionado*, Rafael Villavicencio, with Sevilla's request for recognition, Someruelos abandoned the project to send deputies to New Spain.[16]

After eight years' service in the island of Cuba, Someruelos recognized the crosscurrents in Havana, which, if not moderated, could disrupt "la unidad de la opinión y voluntades de la Ciudad y de la Ysla." Colonial officers customarily gave way to local opinion, which in the past tended to be that of peninsular groups and their local allies dominant in the colonies. However, conditions were changing unpredictably, as sugar producers' needs seemed to diverge sharply from those of local Spanish merchants, a situation made more ominous by the recent examples of North American independence as well as violent rebellion in nearby Santo Domingo and England's omnipresence in the Caribbean. Deeply rooted regionalisms were fissioning metropolitan Spain in 1808—Someruelos knew of the mushrooming juntas in the peninsula competing for recognition as *suprema* in June and July—and these, too, might divide Havana's Spanish community, just as planter aspirations diverged from that "orden mercantil" upon which Cadiz's mercantile hegemony depended. Disturbed by the "interrupción de las relaciones con la soberana autoridad y la Madre Patria," anxious to smother the "funesto choque de opiniones," Someruelos welcomed a petition of 26 July to form a *junta gubernativa* modeled upon those of Spain, which had stirred "el espiritú y entusiasmo nacional." He had one further motivation: he was sensitive to the charge of "despotism" leveled in metropole and colonies

against Godoy and his appointees, and to the possibility that without the consensus of a *junta provincial* his discretionary use of authority might be construed as symptomatic of "ambición de poder" rather than dedication to state service.[17]

Seeking consensus, Someruelos and petitioners first sounded out the sentiments of colonial officials and local notables, a step in tune with the captain general's "tino público y templado." Probably on the advice of Arango ("una de las principales personas"), O'Reylly, Ylincheta (Arango's "amigo inseparable"), and two others, Someruelos asked the Ayuntamiento's *síndico procurador* (Tomás de la Cruz Muñóz) privately to discuss the projected junta with Ayuntamiento members as well as "vecinos más pudientes y condecorados." Quick tally completed by 27 July dampened the enthusiasm: of an expected two hundred approvals, only seventy-three were confirmed.[18] As the Ayuntamiento later explained, opposition was traceable to "resistencia a toda novedad," to "instinto," and to the resentment of those not included among the initial petitioners. Without "universal aprobación," ever fearful of "conflicto y divergencia de opinionses" which might produce "partidos," Someruelos and his circle quietly abandoned this approach too. Members of the Ayuntamiento cooperated by avoiding formal discussion of the proposal in order to maintain "la unidad de sus habitantes con los Españoles Europeos."[19]

The effort of the junta's proponents to close quickly the incident by emphasizing consensus and avoidance of innovation intentionally minimized the threat presented by such a junta to interests identifiable with Spanish colonialism. A local junta might become—to use the phrase of a defender of the Junta de Sevilla—"soberana, absoluta, independiente y tirana,"[20] adopting measures inimical to elements of the colonial structure: to tobacco growers employing few slave laborers raising a crop for shipment to Sevilla's huge plant processing cigars, snuff, and cigarettes distributed by government monopoly in the metropole; to those commercial groups of Havana linked to Cadiz and Barcelona suppliers and haunted by the inroads of English and U.S. merchants upon their oligopoly of Spain's colonial trade ("se acavará el comercio nacional y de la España con aquella Ysla");[21] and to the local colonial bureaucracy—Hacienda, Superintendencia de tobaccos, Comandancia de la Marina, and ecclesiastical corporations. Only years later was it possible for a retired quartermaster, defending the concept of Havana's junta, to spell out the major concerns that junta members might address immediately—namely, internal security, elimination of the tobacco monopoly ("sumidero de la paciencia"), and "la franqueza de nuestros puertos al Comercio con las naciones amigas."[22] And we can iden-

tify a few vocal opponents to such "novedad": Rafael Gómez Roubaud (*superintendente* of the local tobacco *factoría*), sugar hacendado José Franciso Barreto y Cárdenas (conde de Casa Barreto), Gabriel de Azcárate (agent of the Consulado de Cadiz, cousin of Mexico City *almacenero* Gabriel Iturbe e Iraeta), and a cleric who warned parishioners in the church of Nuestra Señora de Belén of impending "peligrosas medidas."[23]

It is a matter of counterfactual metaphysics to accept the Havana Ayuntamiento's argument that a local junta represented at worst a minimal *inovación* in colonial government, or that some joint action by Havana's and Mexico City's authorities (Someruelos's apparent aim in sending a *diputación*) might have forestalled later insurrection in New Spain and elsewhere in America.[24] It is, on the other hand, a matter of fact that Someruelos's failed initiatives originated in the economic imperatives ("los primordiales intereses de esta Ysla") of local planters and exporters insistent upon a political solution to an economic crisis: warehouses packed with perishable sugars, and sugar prices barely covering production and transport costs—"estagnación."[25]

Someruelos and his circle of confidants, Spanish and *criollo*, had backed away from association with highly visible, controversial political movements—hence the sub-rosa initiative to coordinate joint action with Mexico City amid the confusion of incoming news from Spain during late July, and then reserve about the aborted *junta provincial* or *junta gubernativa* there.[26] There still remained the imperative of setting in motion plans to clarify the island's commercial policy on more than a temporary basis, toward which the island's interests had been inching since the crisis of 1796–1797, and for which they now had a model in the decision of the Portuguese Braganzas on their arrival at Brazil's sugar-exporting port of Salvador (Bahia), opening that colony to commerce with friendly and neutral nations. Nine days after the junta proposal was dropped, those committed to an innovative trade policy broached the issue to a forum where majority support was unquestioned. On 5 August 1808, Muñoz (*síndico procurador*)—who had earlier circulated informally the junta proposal—formally laid before Havana's Ayuntamiento the "absoluta necesidad de abrir este puerto y el de Matanzas al comercio de los extrangeros amigos y neutrales" in order to dispose of more than 180,000 hogsheads of sugar—"la enorme cantidad de azucar que hay estancada aqui."[27] The Ayuntamiento controlled by sugar planters and exporters dutifully and predictably sought an opinion from Havana's commercial corporation, the Consulado.[28] At two successive meetings, that corporation's executive committee (*junta de gobierno*) recommended maintaining the port open on the basis established in Febru-

ary in response to the U.S. Embargo Act, to sound out "particulares" about further action, and (17 August) to delay a formal response (*informe*) to the Ayuntamiento for another thirty days in order to await news about *the* critical issue, the "pacificación con Inglaterra." Cessation of the war at sea might eliminate temporary measures keeping open Havana to non-Spanish vessels and "cerrar el puerto a todo pavellón que no sea nacional y a los aliados."[29]

Comercio Directo or *Comercio Recíproco*

Particulares meant merchants of both camps, those in favor of and those opposed to a formal, long-term policy of tolerating not *comercio libre* but *comercio directo*: the entry of foreign shipping from foreign ports with permitted as well as prohibited goods, revised customs duties on imports and exports, the outflow of reexports to Veracruz, and a permissible level of external payments in silver and gold obtainable from New Spain.[30] Someruelos and friends had learned that innovation demanded an acceptable level of consensus to suppress overt factionalism. Their first response came five weeks later (22 September) from the opposition in the form of a brief paper by merchants Francisco Layseca, Raymundo José de Queraltó, Pablo Sierra, and Ramón de Bustillo that sidestepped any basic innovation. The port of Havana, they recommended, should remain closed to friendly or neutral shipping as a matter of principle, but with one concession to reality. Despite sizable imports via Veracruz of Puebla's flour, Cuba's demand for imported foodstuffs to feed its rising annual slave imports could not be met solely by New Spain's producers and exporters, outproduced and underpriced by U.S. flours. Layseca and associated merchants therefore had to recommend that vessels laden with foodstuffs could enter Cuba's harbors.[31]

Within one week, two separate and complementary opinions were submitted by those seeking a new policy for Havana's external trade. One by Pedro Juan de Erice—*peninsular* from Navarra, business associate of Veracruz merchants Juan Bautista Lobo, Pedro Miguel de Echeverría, and Porro y Murphy, with his own correspondents at Philadelphia (Paul Siemens), Baltimore (Diego Barry), and Cadiz (Carlos Malagamba), and probably Havana's wealthiest merchant banker—who insisted that Cuba's survival required "comercio neutral" but that foreign merchants would have to export the value of their sales in Cuban products. Erice made it plain he was not speaking for himself alone, for he let it be known that merchants had been meeting in his home. Between 1792 and 1800 he is reported to have loaned to local planters at least 3 million pesos for slaves and foodstuffs, largely North American wheat and reexports.[32] The second view (which bore

seven signatures headed by Bernabé Martínez de Pinillos) undercut implicitly the fundamental tenet of merchant oligopolists of the peninsula and the colonies, of Cadiz and Barcelona, Havana, and Veracruz and Mexico City.[33] Spain's industrial production neither then nor in the near future, Pinillos and associates asserted, could fulfill Cuba's requirements in peacetime. As they candidly phrased it, "Desengañémonos: la Metrópoli no puede provehernos por ahora." Cuba's supply problem (and that of other Spanish ports in the Caribbean) could be alleviated by authorizing unrestricted intercolonial exchange (*comercio recíproco*) of any type of good carried in Spanish-registry vessels among the ports of Havana, Veracruz, Campeche, and Central America. Obviously this was designed to get around Veracruz's and Mexico City's opposition to Havana's growing reexport trade.[34]

The views of Erice, Martínez de Pinillos, and associates were at best partial approaches prepared for the Havana Consulado's *síndico*, Arango y Parreño, whom the corporation had entrusted late in August with drafting a reply to the Ayuntamiento, an *informe* examining the whole issue of an economic policy for Cuba. Arango was well suited to advance the interests of Cuban sugar producers before colonial authorities in the island or, for that matter, in the metropole. He had been exercising that role ever since the Havana *cabildo* had sent him to Madrid in 1789 as its agent, and he probably maintained contact with wealthy Cuban residents of the capital like the condes de Jaruco, whose *tertulias* functioned there as an informal lobby. By 1808 Arango was a veteran, pragmatic physiocrat, a sugar planter whose efforts at rational management would have delighted Frederick Taylor, a political economist with a solid grasp of sugar production and marketing in the West Indies and a well-honed skill at pressure politics.[35] Most essential, he had the broad if not unanimous backing of planters and merchant associates in Ayuntamiento and Consulado and, no doubt, access to their lobbying funds as well.

Arango delayed for weeks preparing what became an impressive *informe* or position paper substantiated by documents and statistical appendixes—"political arithmetic" was already the tool of the political economist.[36] Ostensibly the *informe* focused upon the immediate problems of Cuban agriculture and trade—so its title suggested—which at one point he asserted were shared with Venezuela and the Canary Islands, which had promised "La libre entrada de buques y géneros extrangeros" at reduced and simplified tariff rates.[37] His title, however, was purposely disarming, for Arango's report was an unsentimental, even hardnosed conspectus of the shortcomings of the Spanish transatlantic trade system, of the persistent structural weaknesses of one pole (the metropole), and of the mining pole constituted

by New Spain. He disarmed opponents by accepting the theory of Spanish colonialism: to locate in the colonies profitable outlets for Spanish products, to augment population and resources (*fuerzas*) of overseas possessions (loyally depicted as "estas Españas nuevas"), and to draw from them income for the finances of the "State."[38]

But then he took issue with the execution of that policy and those manipulating it. Spain had failed to keep up with the changing world "situación política y cientifica," its economy and industry were backward, and even the changes of the past four decades of "luz y beneficencia" had been resisted as constraints upon "industria nacional" and threats to colonial ties. Three centuries of Spanish history revealed that merely a policy of prohibiting certain imports could not create manufactories.[39] Fundamental to Spain's *atraso* was its transatlantic commercial system, oligopolistic merchants ("comercio nacional"), and their inefficiency as intermediaries between European producers and Spain's colonies. As principal peninsular entrepôt, Cadiz was responsible for "demoras, descaros, almacenages, nuevas y subidas comisiones . . . nuevas especulaciones sobre los mismos efectos." Benefits from commissions, freight, and insurance in handling colonial trade accrued neither to the "Nación entera . . . tampoco de la Metrópoli, ni aún de sus Provincias," but solely to Cadiz's *almacenistas*.[40] Transit duties at Spanish ports like Cadiz coupled to the costly and inefficient intermediation of *almacenistas* were responsible for the "lento progreso de la industria de nuestras Américas" and the extraordinary extent of smuggling. "Y que! Porque la Matriz no pueda provehernos de varios artículos que nos son necesarios, ha de castigar en nosotros la falta de sus fábricas y de sus producciones territoriales."[41] The thrust of Arango's observations about the long-term effects of "la imperiosa costumbre" utilized by "el poderoso cuerpo que recogía todo el fruto del sistema" was that economic growth had occurred in Spain's Atlantic colonies and that the Spanish metropole was heavily dependent upon colonial resources. Meanwhile, the "system" had left on hand in Cuba 60 percent of the previous harvest, which together with the upcoming yield of a projected 400,000 hogsheads of sugar would require between 135,000 and 140,000 tons of shipping; 75 percent of the sugar, moreover, would have to be bought by foreign, non-Spanish buyers.[42]

If the Spanish economy and its protected merchant enclave of Andalusia failed to serve the colonies, went on Arango, it was equally true that the other pole of Spain's colonial system, "poderoso México," was no model for other American zones.[43] An area exporting agricultural products like Cuba could not be made to conform to the "mismas reglas que se hace de

los países de minas y frutos preciosos." New Spain's major exportable, silver, could be stored for long periods awaiting adequate Spanish shipping, and New Spain was self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs ("encierra en su rico seno quanto el hombre necesita"). Cuba's sugar, Arango pointed out, was a perishable good, which was why the Caribbean island's survival depended upon "la continuada y ni momentaneamente interrumpida extracción de sus frutos."[44] Under colonial legislation Cuba was supposed to buy New Spain's flours, far more expensive than the U.S. product; when, however, Cuban exporters shipped their aguardiente to Veracruz in order to earn silver to cover their trade deficit, Veracruz customs officials applied what was in fact a prohibitive surtax of 27 percent.[45] Here Arango was illustrating how the countervailing nature of the process of change over the previous half century—the rapid agricultural development of once neglected colonial areas—required a fine-tuning, a new flexibility in the Spanish colonial system. Only a few colonial leaders "firmes e illustrados"—here Arango pointedly cited only such former officials in Cuba as the conde de Santa Clara and José Pablo Valiente—had disregarded the complaints of the *ignorantes* and authorized "el comercio libre y general de neutrales" in 1796.[46]

He concluded his *informe* by recommending renewal of such flexibility on a wider scale to meet Cuba's immediate requirements. First, all imports should be removed from the prohibited list, along with sharp reductions in tariff rates. Next, exchange of U.S. flours for Cuban sugars in U.S. ships should be unlimited, at least during current shipping shortages; when Spanish shipping became available, Cuba's exports should be authorized for shipment directly to friendly or neutral foreign ports. Moreover, Cuba's minor ports of Matanzas and Santiago should be authorized to trade with the non-Spanish Caribbean for slaves, cooperage, provisions, animals, and agricultural equipment. Third, New Spain's trade with Cuba demanded revision, accepting Cuban products along with reexports, and the unlimited outflow of silver from Veracruz to Havana. Arango y Parreño did not need to make more explicit to merchants in Veracruz and Mexico City that his policy recommendations might transform Havana into what they feared most, "el emporio de todo el comercio de la América septentrional."[47] In many respects, this approximated the stance of many Buenos Aires's merchants later articulated by Mariano Moreno.

His *informe*, no doubt reviewed with interested parties before formal presentation to Havana's Consulado on 29 November, received the corporation's approval and was ordered published—publicity was one way of pressuring Spanish authorities for approval. For its part, in 1809 the Havana Ayuntamiento advised its agent in Spain, Claudio Martínez de Pinillos, to

obtain legislation legitimizing its policy for trading with friendly and neutral nations; his action, as we shall see, was supported by a colonial officer of long service in Venezuela and family connections there, Estéban Fernández de León.[48]

The retreat of Havana's elites from two political initiatives, which might have authorized overdue changes or adjustments in local economic policy to favor operating within the framework mandated by the Spanish metropole, had long-range implications for developments in Cuba and New Spain or, more precisely, at Havana and Mexico City. Abandonment of a Cuban *diputación* to Mexico City and of a *junta provincial* at Havana stemmed from considerations declared, and motives unvoiced. The public explanation was Someruelos's preoccupation, as chief colonial officer of the strategic island of Cuba, with preserving a surface of harmony, if not the substance. Less public yet readily divined by Havana's elites was, first, that Havana's pursuit of economic (as against political) autonomy could be preserved and even enhanced by other means. Equally important was fear that autonomy via a local *junta provincial* might permit powerful England—even the nearby United States—to force the unthinkable upon the expanding sugar economy of Cuba's planters and merchants: termination of the African slave trade, the island's sole source of labor recruitment. To this fear must be added a weakened posture of internal security if a local junta lacking metropolitan military backup had to confront a slave insurrection.

The specter of Santo Domingo haunted Cuba's planters and their French émigré associates, just as counterparts in Spain and New Spain were haunted by the possibility of ferment below. In metropole and colonies, in Spain, Cuba, and New Spain, "reformers" of 1808 accepted the structures of imperial monarchy and, in common with earlier advocates of an enlightened *ancien régime*, intended to manage adjustment at the top in order to contain the bottom of the social pyramid: in Spain, the landless proletariat of Andalusia and, elsewhere in the peninsula, overtaxed small holders and urban artisans; in Cuba, black slaves and urbanized free people of color; in New Spain, 5 million mestizos, mulattoes, and ethnic Indians exploited by dominant whites, *criollo* and *peninsular*. Hispanic elite reformers long remained monarchist and conservative rather than republican and democratic. Their influence in 1808 and afterward explains minimal change in Spain and New Spain as well as the preservation of the structures of the *ancien régime* in metropole and colonies well into the nineteenth century.

And there was Someruelos, experienced by service at Havana, visibly identified with its planter-exporter interests, with localistic-minded Arango y Parreño, the O'Reyllys and O'Farrills, the Martínez de Pinillos, and the

Navarrese Pedro Juan de Erice and his like-minded social and business friends. In August Someruelos sponsored the thrust of Consulado and Ayuntamiento to open the port of Havana to "los extrangeros Americanos del Norte" on the basis of the "imperiosa Ley de la necesidad," but for long he had been known to Madrid's authorities as partial to the English and "Anglo-Americanos."[49] Late in 1808 he complained to the Junta Central in Spain (which by then represented the anti-French juntas) that Havana's port authorities demanded a double duty on direct imports from the United States (both the "derecho de entrada en España" plus the "derecho de salida a Yndias" and the "entrada" payable at all colonial ports), and that local sugar surplus without the immediate possibility of exports to peninsular ports depressed Havana sugar prices.[50] No wonder Havana's Ayuntamiento offered congratulations for the opportunity "vivir a la sombra de unos gefes que solo emplean su autoridad y poder en prodigarnos a manos llenas tantos beneficios."[51] Someruelos, finally, was the colonial officer who might succeed Viceroy Iturrigaray at Mexico City, were the secret instructions (*pliego de mortaja*), specifying a viceroy's successor in the event of serious incapacity, death, or resignation, opened at Mexico City.[52]

When the Junta de Sevilla's *comisionados*, Jabat and Jaúregui, left Havana at the end of August (1808) after a brief stopover on the way to Veracruz and Mexico City, they could confirm the fear of New Spain's *almaceneros* and of their distant colleagues at Cadiz and Barcelona: Havana's planters and merchants were openly organizing economic initiatives openly supported by Someruelos in order to "dar franco puerto a las embarcaciones extrangeras," which, once approved by peninsular authorities, would strip Veracruz of its long-held economic hegemony over the Spanish Caribbean.[53] On 26 August the two *comisionados* arrived at Veracruz.

New Spain's *Almaceneros* and Virrey Iturrigaray, 1808

Jabat and Jaúregui confirmed Havana's recognition of Sevilla's Junta as temporary authority in the peninsula and its American colonies, but they left a seaport community committed to a pragmatic solution for the principal colonial issue: trading with the non-Spanish world of the western Atlantic in Caribbean (Kingston, Nassau) and in "Anglo-American" (Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York) ports. While a political solution for the issue—a local or provincial junta—had been abandoned, most of Havana's business elite would not abandon pressure for an open port when contact with Spain's ports via Spanish shipping in wartime was minimal. That elite recognized that Cuba's position was akin to that of Portugal's profit-

able colony in the western Atlantic, Brazil. Moreover the two *comisionados* could not fail to note that Someruelos had the backing of most of Havana's business community and maintained his political position unchallenged by striving for consensus. Dissidents like Barreto y Cárdenas favoring Cadiz's hard line toward any modifications of Spain's transatlantic commercial system complained about Someruelos to Sevilla's Junta without immediate results. Someruelos's tactics gave him room repeatedly to authorize, subject to later peninsular approbation, an "open door" commercial policy that filled Havana's spacious bay with U.S. shipping and stimulated some merchants of its business community to reexport so-called *sobrantes* (surplus)—European-made cottons, woolens, and linens, along with Chinese linens and East Indian cotton prints—to New Spain's minor ports of Sisal, Campeche, and Tampico and its major Caribbean emporium, Veracruz.

Landing by launch at Veracruz on 26 August, *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui found the three-hundred-year-old port of Spain's most productive colony as depicted in 1796—"el peor del Universo . . . mala rada llena de escollos y bajos, abierta por todas partes y enfilada de vientos nortes y sures que reynan con increíble violencia." Man had not improved on nature. Veracruz's one mole was usually awash in times of strong winds and too small under normal traffic conditions; projecting from the mole into the harbor was a "gran peña o baja" under four feet of water on which lighters (*lanchas*, *botes*) were often smashed in rough seas. Lacking a supply of public fresh water, naval and commercial vessels obtained drinking supplies from private wells, especially from those of the San Francisco convent nestled near the mole, "operación muy prolixa y costosa." Jabat had once served as a naval officer at Veracruz and probably concurred with the 1796 observers that "parece increíble el abandono que en esto ha habido por espacio de tantos años."[54]

The *comisionados* found at Veracruz a merchant community and its Ayuntamiento far different from what they had encountered at Havana. At Havana they left behind a business community pressing for the adoption of an open-door trade policy in cooperation with Cuba's governor and captain general, despite resistance from Cadiz's agent and other *peninsulares*. By contrast, they found most (not all, to be sure) of Veracruz's *almaceneros* demanding full adherence to the closed-door policy of Spain's traditional transatlantic trade system and rejection of licensed (*agraciado*) neutral vessels and of European or Asian textiles reexported from Havana and even from Campeche as *sobrantes*. Dominant members of Consulado and Ayuntamiento at Veracruz—unlike Havana's economic elite—were seriously at odds with New Spain's Viceroy Iturrigaray, even dangerously so. Among the

dominant merchants were *almaceneros* with strong ties to Cadiz and Mexico City, like Ignacio de la Torre. He had backed the faction opposing Viceroy Azanza's execution of *comercio neutro* (1797–1799), claiming that policy was motivated by the fact that Tomás Murphy, receiving what seemed privileged shipments from neutral U.S. ports, was Aranza's relative by marriage (which was true); it was Torre and his business friends who consistently questioned the data and recommendations of the Veracruz Consulado's first and highly innovative secretaries, Vicente Basadre and then José Donato de Austria y Achútegui, even inducing Austria to consider resigning.

Less vocal, perhaps, but nonetheless present were those who favored, and no doubt flourished, under the limited trading activity permitted by Madrid's policy of licenses (*gracias, licencias, permisos*) to neutral shippers mainly at Baltimore and New Orleans, covering any type of good whether or not on Spain's prohibited list. These merchants quietly approved accepting Havana's reexports of *sobrantes*, as well as the outflow of silver carried by mule teams (*conductas)* to Veracruz from Mexico City by the two competing silver transport firms that had succeeded the bankrupt Oteiza y Vertiz company, one essentially *vizcaíno* (Uzcola-Michaus) and the other *montañés* (the Peredos). These dissident merchant constellations included Tomás and Lorenzo Murphy (brothers of Juan Murphy of the London firm of Gordon and Murphy), the business associates of José Gabriel Villanueva (who handled at Veracruz consignments sent from New Orleans and Baltimore under the Parish-Craig-Oliver *licencias*), and those at Veracruz utilizing as a correspondent at Havana Pedro Juan de Erice (Arango y Parreño's close associate). These were not committed by interest and ideology to the Andalusian complex at Cadiz and, like the Murphys, had established extra-Cadiz contacts at London, Kingston, Havana, and U.S. Atlantic ports. Moreover, Tomás Murphy was one of those Veracruz merchants competing with Mexico City *almaceneros* for Oaxaca's indigo, and investing in Guanajuato's large mining complex.

It was the dominant Veracruz group that submerged its justified distrust of Mexico City's Consulado (as late as 1800 that body was petitioning Madrid to eliminate the Veracruz corporation) in order to coordinate resistance to Viceroy Iturrigaray's inflexible execution of Madrid's often contradictory commercial policy. Not that Godoy and Finance Minister Soler were incompetent—their apparent inconsistencies resulted from expedients to meet inescapable pressures of English and French imperialists upon client or would-be client states in Europe like Spain.

Recall of *commercio neutro*, perhaps the greatest hiatus in Spain's colonial commercial history, coincident with resumption of trade with the metro-

pole following the Peace of Amiens, brought to Veracruz's and Mexico City's *almaceneros* renewed supplies of imports, good earnings, and the prospect of sustained growth within the imperial trading system. Prosperity satisfied established peninsular merchants in New Spain, and rekindled the aspirations for wealth and status of those recent *montañés* immigrants entering New Spain's commercial system. When England forced Spain to declare war in 1804 as an ally of France, the euphoria began to wane as normal ship arrivals from Cadiz, Barcelona, and Santander dwindled under the English navy's ever-tightening blockade of Cadiz and New Spain's Caribbean coast from Tampico to Isla del Carmen. English blockaders drove home the accuracy of Arango's observation that Spain's commercial system could not apply uniformly to all colonies the regulations designed for exploiting mining economies. Nonperishable silver bars and pesos could be stored indefinitely at Veracruz and Jalapa, while Havana's sugar stocks drove down the price level, reducing purchasing power, and—worse—deteriorated.

To understand the political role of the Veracruz commercial community in August and September 1808 requires an awareness of developments there inducing in many a sense of oncoming crisis. When Godoy issued a circular order prohibiting handling of English textiles in wartime, and English warships and corsairs patrolled Veracruz's long coastline, Veracruz merchants could wait out what might be another brief interval of hostilities; but now the interval turned out to be longer. Yet Godoy and Soler distributed *permisos* and *gracias*, which materialized in the form of vessels from U.S. ports delivering English and other European goods consigned to a tiny minority of Veracruz factors; or vessels came from Kingston with captured goods sold there at auction; or Havana's merchants reexported surplus goods directly to Veracruz or indirectly via Campeche.

And there was the new problem of direct trade with Spain's former gulf port at New Orleans, incorporated by the United States in 1803. Some at Veracruz, like the Consulado's secretary Quirós, envisioned more efficient utilization of extensive and undercultivated estates in the jurisdiction of Veracruz by providing acreage to capital-short, small and medium *labradores* for raising corn, tobacco, and cattle for local consumption as well as export to Cuba, and cotton for Barcelona's infant cotton manufactures—a physiocratic developmentalist view.[55] So the notion of Spanish émigrés from New Orleans colonizing coastal and highland Veracruz was attractive, all the more so when New Spain's colonial treasury might subsidize the movement. It began with Madrid's decision, on transferring Louisiana to France, to assist those who chose not to remain at New Orleans to migrate with their belongings to Cuba, where refugee French sugar planters had also

moved recently from insurrectionary Saint-Domingue. Madrid's minister at Philadelphia, the marqués de Casa Calvo, authorized shipping between New Orleans and Havana to handle migrants and their possessions.[56]

The possibilities of migration coupled to profitable exploitation of nearby New Spain's import shortages surfaced immediately. There were straightforward proposals like that of Louisiana sugar planter Juan Bautista Victor Castillón in 1805, "nativo de Francia Europea [*sic*], Provincia de Navarra," who had migrated to Louisiana in 1787, married (in 1804) Luisa de Laronda, widow of Andrés de Monaster y Roxas, colonel in the Milicias Blancas Españolas, Order of Carlos III, and a wealthy sugar planter. Castillón had donated 800,000 pesos to charitable works such as construction of New Orleans's cathedral, its Charity Hospital, the chapel of the Ursuline convent, and more. He also owned 120 slaves, a rum distillery, and claimed an annual income of 45,000 pesos yet was unhappy with the "Nuevo orizonte político . . . contrario a estas grandes obras pías, y a sus ideas," and he preferred to move to another Spanish colony along with his "excesivos fondos." From Madrid he requested a *gracia* to ship to Veracruz in wartime "los artículos de papel común y fierro de elaboración bajo pavellón neutral . . . siendo su consumo de primera necesidad . . . tanto para las Reales Fábricas de cigarros quanto para el uso público." Apparently, approval was forthcoming.[57]

There were, however, less straightforward requests designed to take advantage of Viceroy Iturrigaray's ruling of August 1806 that furnished licenses to such émigrés to remove to New Spain, along with the value of their real estate and personal belongings converted into goods acceptable under the schedule of *comercio libre* of 1778. Here a physiocrat's dream of modest hard-working colonist-farmers turned into a commercial bonanza for would-be "émigrés," but for most Veracruz *almaceneros* a maze of commercial deceit was covered by the viceroy's ruling. Some merchants at Veracruz solicited about twenty viceregal *permisos*, contacted New Orleans "émigrés" with whom they arranged to advance from 60,000 to 200,000 pesos per person for the purchase of goods at New Orleans (promising to split the profits), which were then forwarded to Veracruz as the cash value of the "émigrés" Louisiana properties. The "émigrés," who proceeded to invoice their goods for customs duties at 50 percent of real value, returned to New Orleans after the sale of "their" goods.[58] It is not surprising that Baltimore merchant Robert Oliver, following correspondence with David Parish's agent Vincent Nolte and others at New Orleans, advised Sixto Espinosa at Madrid of the "immense volume of English goods fraudulently shipped from New Orleans to Veracruz"—surely no news to irritated Veracruz importers.[59]

Direct trade between New Orleans and Veracruz under such auspices was but one facet of the problem of direct trade with U.S. ports such as Baltimore where Robert Oliver operated under *licencias* issued to his in-law (John Craig of Philadelphia) and David Parish (via Gabriel Ouvrard, and Hope and Company). When Oliver's *Matchless* arrived on 1 February 1806, Veracruz's Consulado conveyed to Iturrigaray the local business community's general "sorpresa y escándalo" that *Matchless*'s cargo contained items expressly restricted to Spanish shipping: blasting powder and mercury, mixed with "positivamente . . . infame contrabando"—quantities of cottons "principalmente Yngleses" highly marketable "por sus bellas calidades y ordinario común consumo" and once colorfully labeled "los contagiosos ilícitos efectos de la Inglaterra."[60] Had not Godoy openly warned against the handling of English goods in Spanish territory as recently as December 1804?[61] The Veracruz merchant guild urged Iturrigaray either to confiscate the items or to store them in government warehouses pending review by authorities at Madrid. The viceroy, however, refused to take the hint referring to the language of Oliver's *gracia* and ordered immediate delivery to the Veracruz consignee, Mateo Lorenzo Murphy, Tomás's brother.[62] Iturrigaray had long been suspicious of the widespread collusion between Veracruz merchants and customshouse officials, while Madrid's *licencias* clearly sanctioned any and all goods; so he remained unimpressed by the Veracruz complaints that toleration of neutral arrivals provided foreigners, "y con singularidad los Anglo-Americanos que son los que más lo frecuentan," valuable commercial intelligence about "esta preciosa colonia."[63] One may detect the Veracruz Consulado's irritation with Iturrigaray's insistence upon honoring Madrid's *licencias* issued to U.S. merchants and shippers, which surfaced later in one of the recommendations of *comisionado* Jabat on his return to Sevilla: "Debe prohibirse absolutamente," he urged, "toda comunicación mercantil de los Americanos con el puerto de Veracruz, de que se ha abusado con tanto escándalo, durante las dos últimas guerras contra la Inglaterra."[64]

Scissored by Madrid's exhortations to preserve a secular policy restricting colonial trade to peninsular entrepôt ports on the one hand and, on the other, permitting the arrival of neutral ships consigned to a few consignees and their friends, Veracruz merchants simply enlarged existing smuggling networks to find goods for persistent domestic demand. The line between fraud and smuggling had ever been blurred, and after 1796 it became more so as smuggling became the dominant mode of New Spain's external trade. Given internal shortages and large external supplies (English exporters were diverting exports and reexports to the New World in the first phase

of France's continental system), large-scale smuggling was inevitable and, with skill and luck, profitable. In wartime, wrote that sharp-eyed cleric, Bishop San José Muro from Púebla, "suben los consumos ultramarinos hasta lo increíble, como beneficio de monopolistas y contrabandistas."[65] When Viceroy Marquina left New Spain in 1803, he advised then incoming Viceroy Iturrigaray that smuggling at Veracruz was incredible and deeply rooted, smugglers' profits were "exorbitantes," collusion with the English was beyond doubt. "Había llegado el desorden a un grado intolerable," until (he boasted) his countermeasures went into effect. During brief detainment at Kingston he had been appalled at the other side of smuggling, the "asombrosa extracción de numerario para el País enemigo con particularidad en oro."[66] It did not take Iturrigaray long to realize that in New Spain "la codicia de enriquecer es general" and—with a military officer's underestimation of the tenacity of civilian opposition—he reviewed options to forestall "el contrabando y comercio ilícito, que es de tan enormes perniciosas resultas."[67]

In a long report to Soler (September 1806) Iturrigaray made clear that he was aware of the situation he had inherited and the extent of smuggling at Veracruz and along its Caribbean coast. English skiffs had been unloading at Tuxpán with the permission of local officials; English *fragatas* hovered off the port of Veracruz ostensibly to sell prize goods and exchange prisoners, really to contact unescorted coastal vessels operating from the port of Veracruz; Yucatan's governor had disobeyed orders and was allowing vessels to sail to New Orleans for foodstuffs available at Veracruz.[68] It was, of course, common knowledge that the most widely adopted technique to camouflage smuggled English cottons was to obtain customshouse papers covering imports by neutral vessels (*guías*) and then mix the legal and illegal cotton goods rendering them "incapaces de distringuirse" and "confundiendo la licitud de los unos, con la torpeza criminal de los otros."[69] Proof of complicity in smuggling (except for cases involving petty operators) was, Iturrigaray added, virtually absent, although rumors of involvement abounded. Unsubstantiated opinion linked Veracruz's Teniente Letrado Pedro Telmo Landero to merchants, three of whom were *regidores* (Mateo Lorenzo Murphy, Francisco Arrillaga, Juan Bautista Lobo) and the fourth, Miguel Cavaleri, the Ayuntamiento's *síndico personero*.[70] A traveler on the highway near Jalapa chattily commented in a letter that she had encountered four pack-mule teams (*atajos*) carrying smuggled goods belonging ("que se decía venía") to merchants José Ignacio de la Torre (Veracruz) and Francisco Alonso Terán (Mexico City).[71] At the time, Viceroy Iturrigaray was circumspect in not pinpointing smugglers by name. But after

his removal by coup, he would accuse sugar planter Gabriel de Yermo and the two silver transport companies (the Peredos and Uzcola and Michaus, *conductores de plata*);[72] in a few isolated cases he singled out officials guilty of participating in smuggling, the commandant at Tuxpán, along with naval officer Juan Jabat, who "tenía relaciones de trato y interés con comerciantes de Veracruz, y de Mexico."[73] To pack off an unreliable naval officer to serve in Spain, as he did with Jabat, was a simple matter (with, however, unsuspected delayed consequences). To sustain a series of measures contrary to what the Veracruz commercial community considered its best interests quickly soured relations between port and viceroy and between Consulado-Ayuntamiento and Iturrigaray. The viceroy was tangling with influential trade groups at the colonial capital and its major port.

The vulnerability of colonial seaports, which was highlighted by the extraordinary sums drawn from colonial (not metropolitan) treasuries in the eighteenth century to fortify Veracruz, Havana, San Juan, and Cartagena, was underscored by England's (failed) amphibious operations against Cartagena and Havana, to cite but two major operations. At Veracruz, the principal defensive point was the island fortress and prison in the harbor, the Castillo de San Juan de Ulúa, since the city's walls were judged ineffective. In 1798 (RO 10 April) Madrid directed withdrawal of the Veracruz garrison to interior highland towns in case of English assault.[74] Soon after arrival, Viceroy Iturrigaray inspected the Veracruz defenses and drafted plans, which Madrid approved. When Spain went to war with England, Madrid (RO 8 and 23 November 1804) suspended all commercial operations in and out of Veracruz in order to curb English prize taking, authorizing only the movement of mail boats, but without specie or valuable commodities like indigo aboard.[75]

These were precedents of Iturrigaray's measures, which over the next three years, 1805–1808, upset Veracruz's stake in what was becoming the major business activity of *almaceneros*, their commercial employees, port and customs officials, coastal patrols (*resguardos*), and sailors and *arrieros*: smuggling. First, foreseeing the possibility of attack by English warships and marines upon the port, in March 1805 Iturrigaray withdrew artillery units and most of the Veracruz garrison of five thousand to six thousand men to encampments near Jalapa, suspended all business operations ("ventas mercantiles") at Veracruz, and directed *almaceneros* to move their "caudales, frutos y efectos" to highland Jalapa. Presumably he aimed to avoid his shattering experience in 1794 when Spain, as part of the English-led First Coalition against revolutionary France, penetrated into Roussillon; Iturrigaray had to organize the retreat of Spanish forces from Roussillon and

found his problems confounded by civilian refugees, their families, and personal belongings. Merchants' objections came promptly against such "violentas y antipolíticas" measures, which entailed large expenditures to move goods and families into the interior and—what was critical—to disperse traders and involve the total shutdown of coastal shipping ("expediciones marítimas"). So Iturrigaray relented, partially; Veracruz would not be defended (his Madrid orders were explicit here), but he would permit commercial activity there, and he lifted all duties normally imposed on money and goods entering the interior towns of Jalapa, Orizaba, and Córdoba. Probably on the advice of customs officials, merchants were permitted to forward to Jalapa first the luxury imports (*géneros finos*) on hand lest they be mixed in with basic goods (*abarrotes*) to qualify for a lower duty on entering Mexico City. He withdrew this last stipulation when merchants protested.[76]

Second and more devastating to Veracruz merchants' "parallel" or "underground" economy were the viceroy's directives to reduce ship departures from Veracruz, for Godoy's wartime order as head of the Almirantazgo required Iturrigaray to "cerrar los puertos." With some exaggeration, Veracruz merchants claimed Iturrigaray directed the port's chief naval official, Ciriaco Cevallos, that "no se verificará la salida de aquellas costas . . . ni aún de una canoa." Iturrigaray's purpose was twofold: to offer few opportunities to English prize seekers and—most inimical to local trading interests—to inhibit smuggling in coastal waters. Cevallos understood the tactic of coastal ship captains to rendezvous with English ships; following his recommendations, Iturrigaray authorized coastwise navigation only in convoys escorted by six *lanchas cañoneras,* or royal navy frigates if available. To those who understood Iturrigaray's "sérias y eficazes Providencias," indeed the viceroy "persiguió a los contrabandistas."[77] San José Muro, a sympathetic observer, wrote immediately to Iturrigaray from Puebla about the potential reaction of those affected and even drafted countermeasures, which he would mention to no one, "temoroso de que el comercio de Veracruz descargase su indignación."[78] Only when Veracruz's Consulado dispatched an agent to Madrid to lobby the authorities to overrule New Spain's viceroy did Iturrigaray ease his restrictions to allow *escorted* coastal navigation. Mexico City *almacenero* Francisco Alonso Terán, whom Iturrigaray listed as a smuggler, later testified that Godoy feigned to understand the Veracruz position but issued appropriate orders ("que no impida la junta del comercio, ni obligue a los buques costaneros a que naveguen en comboy, ni con escolta forzada") only to countermand them secretly.[79]

It was the continuation of the war that inhibited any rapprochement

between the viceroy, convinced he was executing faithfully Madrid's orders to protect shipping and suppress smuggling, and a commercial community, convinced that viceregal measures would inevitably concentrate commercial activity at Veracruz in the hands of "casas extrangeras" (read, U.S. merchants) or a tiny minority of Spanish firms whose influence could wrangle a *gracia*. Contradictions in Madrid's strategy—virtually closing New Spain's principal seaport while authorizing the arrival and departure of neutral U.S. shipping—was more than an administrative snarl; it was becoming a matter of survival for most Veracruz merchants. It transformed exchanges between Consulado and Ayuntamiento, on the one hand, and viceroy, on the other, into a dialogue of the deaf. Iturrigaray accused Veracruz's Ayuntamiento and Consulado of exaggerating business losses, on the basis of reliable data supplied to him by Cevallos who consulted port records, and of misrepresenting the "verdadero y legítimo origen" of his directives; he complained to Madrid of Veracruz's "falta de sinceridad y buena fe."[80] Such observations in official correspondence with Madrid was leaked from the viceregal secretariat (or was reported by Madrid agents), leading Veracruz's commercial groups to conclude Iturrigaray considered them "enemigos declarados de la nación," capable of treason "o a lo menos sospechoso de tan grabe delito."[81]

An open break between Iturrigaray and the "comercio de Veracruz" was thus years in the making. Barely months after Iturrigaray's directives were being executed by an equally dedicated Ciriaco Cevallos, Veracruz's Consulado complained to Finance Minister Soler of their depressing effects upon "el comercio nacional y del reyno"; two years later (31 October 1807), as Iturrigaray still showed reluctance to relax his measures despite Madrid's orders, the corporation petitioned for Iturrigaray's removal (*relevo*).[82] It was, however, the political crisis in New Spain erupting in August 1808 that provided an opening for direct action to force the abandonment of Iturrigaray's policy.

The viewpoint of the "comercio de Veracruz" ("en su mayoría compuesta de españoles") was expressed by Veracruz's Consulado and municipal council influenced by merchants.[83] This, however, is not to assume that the business community as a whole lacked minority views about economic policy for Veracruz and New Spain once it learned that the metropole in mid-1808 (now allied to the former enemy, England) was fighting the former ally, which it had subsidized for five years, France, or to be precise, the French Empire. No doubt a few preferred to continue under the new authorities at Madrid under José Bonaparte—king of Spain and the Indies and so designated by Emperor Napoleon, to whom the Spanish Bourbons had just abdicated at Bayonne—and the Spanish ministry appointed in March and

April by now king Fernando VII. For instance, circulating among "varies personas" at Veracruz in 1808 was a long letter dated Cadiz, 14 May 1808, reminding readers of the benefits of the alliance with the French Empire: Spain's "aliado íntimo" had furnished troops to imprison Godoy, who would be kept in France until the intrigues surrounding the abandonment of Buenos Aires by its viceroy were clarified, as well as the flight of the Portuguese royal household with the national treasury; the planned flight of Charles IV and family to America, presumably at Godoy's instigation; the surrender (presumed) of Cadiz, Ceuta, and naval forces there to the English; and what Veracruzanos would recognize immediately, "la enormísima salida de caudales de Veracruz para la Gran Bretaña . . . la protección del comercio clandestino que se hace del Norte [America] y Jamayca con Veracruz y sus costas a pretexto de reales concesiones."[84]

The "varias personas" were those who would be denounced in September 1808 as "traidores del partido de la Francia, solapadores, e incubridores de las maldades del Virrey de este Reyno, Iturrigaray."[85] The canny specifics of certain details suggests this *papeleta* was designed for wide colonial distribution; Mexico City's *Gazeta* had elaborated on the defense of Buenos Aires although understating the Braganzas' precipitate departure to their major colony on the Atlantic. Others with English commercial connections would have welcomed armistice with the former enemy, even a commercial treaty and acceptance at Veracruz of English ships and goods. And there were others like the remarkably well-informed Joaquín Pérez de Arce who advocated a radical policy of economic independence that rejected Spain's "envejecida apatía" (its "decadencia" had begun when it "empezó a vestirse de mercaderías extrangeras"), France without a navy or merchant marine, and England's "amistad y comercio . . . que la ignorancia supone indispensable para nuestra subsistencia."[86] Citing—well before Ricardo—the effects of English hegemony upon Portugal ("lo puso en un estado puramente agrícola"), and the U.S. after 1784 when more English goods were imported than ever before, he urged no open trade with England.[87] How many at Veracruz and Mexico City shared this strikingly "nationalistic" perspective is still unknown; yet Pérez de Arce's viewpoint approximates Iturrigaray's admonition to Sevilla's *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui that the Junta de Sevilla sign no treaty with England without his prior review and his offhanded remark (reported, to be sure, by a critical informant) that if England defeated France, "el comercio se perdería, pués la Inglaterra se haría dueño de él."[88] At a politically fluid conjuncture, Arce opted for postponing a decision.

But the dominant Veracruz group tolerated no hesitation in accepting

the leadership of the Junta de Sevilla and its implicit promise of traditional policy solutions in confronting change, or even unexpected problems. In its first direct action, the group destroyed the French option and in the process made an object lesson or *escarmiento* of Veracruz's bête noire, Comandante del Apostadero Ciriaco Cevallos, for the benefit of his superior, Iturrigaray, and what the group considered his fellow travelers.

When the French vessel *Vaillant* hove into view at Veracruz on 10 August, Cevallos was a clear focus of local dissidence, and the French and their allies in Spain, the new public enemies. Cevallos had been one of the select young naval officers who had served under Alexandro Malaspina on his survey of colonial commercial conditions camouflaged in the guise of gathering hydrographic data like England's Cook. (Coincidentally, in August 1808 one of his fellow officers of that expedition, José Bustamante y Guerra, was passing through Mexico City en route from Guatemala to Montevideo.) At Veracruz, Cevallos had applied himself methodically as the local chief naval officer, keeping careful port records, seeing to the maintenance of the few coast guard vessels available, and executing the viceroy's directives to reduce shipping losses to English blockaders, as well as smuggling activities, while honoring the *licencias* of incoming neutral U.S. ships along with those from Havana and Kingston. To the Veracruz commercial groups that opted for massive smuggling operations to survive in wartime under blockade, the arrival of neutral ships with valuable imports reduced profit margins of those dealing in illicit goods; smuggling was, after all, neither cheap nor risk free. Cevallos, however, seemed impervious to the needs of Veracruz merchants and, like Viceroy Iturrigaray, seemed to disregard Madrid's orders to moderate port controls. To his local critics, consistently he contradicted assertions of imminent financial disaster with well-marshaled data forwarded to substantiate the viceroy's stance and undercut the merchants' complaints about "multiplicando las trabas y las dificultades del giro marítimo."[89] Animosity can feed invention, and rumors soon circulated to the effect that the *licencias* or *gracias* allocated to neutral shippers like Oliver of Baltimore and Gordon & Murphy of London were actually a device to enrich Madrid officials—Godoy, Soler, and Sixto Espinosa along with colonial officials carrying out their orders. The rumors were floated to undermine official policy by destroying the integrity of the policy makers.

Cevallos, who had accepted at Veracruz the legally sanctioned Gordon & Murphy imports consigned to the local commercial house of Tomás and Mateo Lorenzo Murphy, was tarred with the rumor of heavy involvement in "enorme contrabando."[90] It is also appropriate to ask whether vociferous anti-French sentiments at Veracruz were fueled by the operations of José

Gabriel Villanueva (alias of French-born Lestapis), local agent of Oliver-Craig shipments from Baltimore to the Murphy brothers and from the formerly French port of New Orleans, as well as by reports that, at Mexico City, the viceroy, Audiencia, and Ayuntamiento were confronting the critical issue of recognizing or rejecting orders issued by Spanish authorities at Madrid who accepted (others might say, collaborated with) French policy.[91]

In this context, the *Vaillant* from Bayonne via Martinique provided the pretext to operationalize a "spontaneous" crowd action at Veracruz. It followed the classic ground rules, so to speak, for orchestrated Spanish "popular" outbursts engineered at Madrid against Esquilache (1766) and Godoy and Charles IV at Aranjuez (1808), at Madrid on the Dos de Mayo and, in the same month, against Cadiz's governor, General Francisco Solano.[92] At Cadiz it began with what was immediately and without substantiation rumored as a threat to all, which by stages led to an explosion by a normally law-abiding people ("fiel público") who miraculously respected lives and property of all but a targeted few, with noticeable absence of intervention by security forces, and subsided with a humble petition for mass amnesty. This crowd action at Cadiz was and still remains wrapped in total anonymity.

Reports of the coming of the French warship seem to have preceded its arrival along with public outcry about the obligations to "matar a los [Franceses] en el país."[93] On sighting the *Vaillant*, the guns of San Juan de Ulúa fired warning shots (which alerted Veracruz's residents), whereupon Cevallos ordered the *Vaillant* to anchor well offshore and (to cite his report) had posted on the mole, mainly for the benefit of those who "trafican en el Puerto," "las más rigorosas providencias para impedir toda clase de comunicación con los individuos de la goleta francesa" on the assumption it carried "escritos sediciosos con el obgeto de formar partidos apartandonos de la santa causa que todos hemos abrazado." His measures to "evitar el tráfico clandestino de estos papeles" were promptly misconstrued, so he informed the Ayuntamiento that afternoon;[94] Veracruz's military governor, Pedro Alonso, did have a trunk of printed material secretly brought ashore "con la maior reserva" and deposited in the post office.

However, when the public found neither letters, proclamations, nor newspapers brought ashore by harbor officials, rumors were floated that the *Vaillant* had carried a French general along with Iturrigaray's presumed replacement, the former viceroy of New Spain during the troublesome months of *comercio neutro*, 1798–1800, Miguel José de Azanza, and that Cevallos had permitted both to come ashore clandestinely. For that matter, when Cevallos and assistants did not answer convincingly the queries of a crowd clustered on the mole demanding to know "el obgeto y procedencia

de un buque" dispatched by French authorities at Madrid, Cevallos's attitude toward the mob was reported as one of "dureza e ironía."[95] Now word circulated that a "disculpable pero equivocado fundamento"—Cevallos's "mysterious" measures to quarantine the *Vaillant*—indicated that he "patrocinaba aquellos emisarios y trataba de eludir la fidelidad y vigilancia de este Pueblo, resuelto [so declared the Ayuntamiento to the Junta de Sevilla on 26 August] a morir antes que permitir la entrada de un Francés en este Territorio."[96] The Veracruz Ayuntamiento, sensing imminent violence, claimed it scheduled a 3 p.m. meeting of *regidores*; but at 2 p.m. church bells rang and groups marching under banners and with shouts of loyalty to the Junta de Sevilla brought all the *regidores* to the town hall. With the "pueblo" assembled before the constituted authority (here, the Ayuntamiento), the first act of the ritual of *escarmiento* closed.

The phase of anonymous direct action to brush aside authority followed immediately. Asked by the "pueblo" for information about the *Vaillant*'s alleged passengers, Veracruz's military governor denied there were any and reported that the ship's letter parcels had not been delivered. Forthwith he and two *regidores* were rowed out to the *Vaillant* and then returned to the town hall, where a small crowd (*tropel*) seized and opened the parcels. Some *regidores* (they later claimed) tried to collect the letters strewn about, one from France's foreign minister Champagny to the *intendente general de Veracruz* while others read aloud the news of the abdication of the Spanish Bourbons at Bayonne and the appointment of Berg as Napoleon's *lugarteniente* at Madrid until Joseph Bonaparte could take office as king of Spain and the Indies. Champagny's statement of French policy was obviously upsetting: "El vínculo más estrecho," he had written at Bayonne on 17 May, "que unirá la Francia a la España, no podrá ser sino muy ventajoso a la colonia de América, abriendo un campo más vasto a su comercio."[97] Suddenly, eight to ten people entered to announce they had just seen representatives of the "Govierno Francés" disembark from small boats on the beach. As a party dashed to cut off their retreat, "el inmenso Pueblo que en la Plaza havía, pedía a una voz la muerte del Comandante del Apostadero."

Now came the ritual's culmination as the "fiel público" executed its collective (and, hence, anonymous) will upon the public malefactor. First, elements of the crowd hunted down "traydor" Cevallos, who managed to take refuge at the Castillo de San Juan de Ulúa; his quarters were ransacked, doors, windows, and contents tossed into the street and burned.[98] Then the mob attacked the homes of Cevallos's "particulares que tienen relaciones de amistad con el . . . Comandante." Mier's later account of the mob action mentions one of the proprietors of the buildings assaulted, Tomás Mur-

phy; it was known that Azanza was Murphy's brother-in-law since both had married sisters.[99] The demonstration burned out twenty-four hours later. Following the prescriptions of ritual, a "diputado del Pueblo" approached the constituted authority, "ofreciendo" the Ayuntamiento conditions for reestablishing "tranquilidad": pardon for the crowd's "delitos"; arms to the "people"; and prohibiting Cevallos from crossing to the mainland from Ulúa. Cevallos got the message surely driven home by the mob's order within surface disorder, and the conspicuous failure of either Ayuntamiento or military governor to call out security forces to control the crowd. He sailed away to safety at New Orleans. So terminated what *regidores* including José Mariano Almanza, Juan Bautista Lobo, and Mateo Murphy described to the Junta de Sevilla in their report of 26 August as an "inesperado suceso."[100]

But was it unexpected? Hardly, in light of the complacency and passivity of the military governor Pedro Alonso and the corporations dominated by Veracruz merchants—Consulado and Ayuntamiento. *Privately* the *regidores* communicated to Cevallos their respect for his "lealtad" and regretted "el no poder tranquilizar y desengañar el Público en la inteligencia de aquella medida [his edict posted on the mole] quanto los alborotos y desórdenes que despúes produjo." *Publicly* the Ayuntamiento made no such admission.[101] To camouflage complicity, later Viceroy General Garibay (Iturrigaray's imposed successor) would report the incident as a "movimiento popular," which was hardly condemnatory; on the contrary, Mier—no admirer of *peninsular* mercantile interests at Veracruz—claimed the operation was "promovido por la rabia de los comrrciantes," while the Peruvian cleric and researcher for Iturrigaray, Melchor Talamantes, quickly interpreted "el movimiento de Veracruz" as a foretaste of what was coming.[102] And Iturrigaray, then at odds with the Audiencia and many peninsular merchants over his responses to the unsettling politics of the metropole, ordered the editor of the official Mexico City *Gazeta* not to print reports about the "levantamiento" at Veracruz.[103] He—like Talamantes—had perceived the direction of intention of the Veracruz merchant elite.

Two weeks later, on 26 August, the *comisionados* of the Junta de Sevilla, Jabat and Jaúregui, dispatched to demand recognition of the Junta by colonial authorities at Mexico City, came ashore at Veracruz. They delivered to the Ayuntamiento "órdenes directos" never revealed to Viceroy Iturrigaray.[104] Once their "mission" was announced, "Pueblo" and "vecinos" warmly welcomed them. We do not know precisely what Jabat and Jaúregui told Veracruz merchants, "los más incómodos de toda la Nueva España contra Iturrigaray." It is a matter of record, however, that on 26 August the

regidores (who were convinced Iturrigaray might, at minimum, postpone accepting Sevilla's Junta as "suprema") sent to Sevilla two letters, one giving their version of Cevallos's *escarmiento*, the second protesting Iturrigaray's refusal to return artillery units and troops from Jalapa for a possible prolonged defense of their port. This letter ended by reiterating their petition of 31 October 1807 for the *relevo* of Iturrigaray.[105]

Irritated by Iturrigaray's refusal to modify his port policy in wartime, fearful of the commercial inroads by U.S. and other neutral merchants, disturbed further by Iturrigaray's insistence on convening a local junta or *congreso* at Mexico City—rather than recognizing immediately the Junta de Sevilla as *suprema*—to solve among other issues those linked to "comercio, navegación y minería" then fissioning the colony of New Spain, Veracruz merchants initiated a second direct action. Roughly twenty years earlier Viceroy Revillagigedo had supported efforts by Veracruz merchants to charter a Consulado despite combined opposition of the Mexico City and Cadiz Consulados; now in 1808 merchants at Veracruz recognized the fundamental stake of the colony's *almaceneros* in the established imperial trade system, and they decided to repeat the *golpe* successfully directed against the *comandante del apostadero*. Sometime after 26 August, perhaps emboldened by discussions with Sevilla's *comisionados* who had quickly left Veracruz for Mexico City, the Veracruz merchants dispatched "disimuladamente" artillery captain Manuel Gil de la Torre ("aunque mejicano, merecía mucha confianza a los europeos de aquel puerto") and twenty-seven others authorized to collaborate with Mexico City's merchants and "otros varios individuos" to remove New Spain's viceroy, General José de Iturrigaray y Aróstegui.[106] It was necessary to take up arms against their "enemigo jurado."

In resisting changing political and commercial conditions in the Atlantic by pressure-group tactics, and finally by the desperate resort to "anonymous" crowd mobilization to remove local troublesome colonial authorities, the Veracruz commercial bourgeoisie committed itself to the colonial status quo.

7. The Powerful and Insecure: Mexico City's *Almaceneros*, 1808

El áncora del partido anti-americano es México. En efecto, los Europeos allí son más fuertes y en mayor número que en otras partes. Blanco White, *El Español*, 30 January 1811

La voz del Consulado de México es la de todas los patriotas del Reino.
Juan López Cancelada in *El Telégrafo Americano* (Cadiz), 10 October 1811

La América no debe a los consulados sino la desgracia e infelicidad en que yace tiempos atrás.
Carlos María de Bustamante, *Intereses de la Puebla*

In 1808 merchants born and raised in Spain constituted in Mexico City and Veracruz the wealthiest and most influential interest group outside the colonial governmental apparatus. Economic and political leverage that merchants had utilized and still utilized left them as exposed as the *oidores* of the Audiencia de Mexico to criticism by "Americanos" or "Mexicanos," those born in the colony or "kingdom" (*reino*) of New Spain. As a group Mexico City's merchants were now wealthier and employing more young immigrant aspirants for wealth and status (*cajeros*) than ever before. Wealth, numbers, and power heightened their exposure, however, making them in 1808 more insecure about maintaining their status, more prone to imagine their fears might turn into reality. They would require no prodding from fellow Veracruz merchants to participate in direct political action to defend their presumably imperiled interests, and thereby to fulfill the prophecy of their fears.

Achievement of wealth and influence usually generates respect often combined with awe only a hair's breadth from fear and bitterness. Expansion of the colonial and international economy had, if anything, made the merchants' role paramount. In New Spain they were the *europeos* personi-

fied, who constituted a kind of ethnic enclave, endowing themselves with superiority and God-granted hegemony over locally born inferiors. They denied entry into their commercial oligarchy to most enterprising *criollos* ("americanos") and to mestizos and mulattoes; they created considerable, sometimes huge fortunes from oligopoly in trade, mining, public works (highways), and private and public finance. Many were known to have accumulated fortunes by unrespectable means, from smuggling, financing (*habilitación* or *avío*) or *repartimiento* of goods (distribution) to poor native peoples, and manipulating the price of imports. And they were leagued with that most evident symbol of metropolitan hegemony, the Audiencia de México, where few *criollos* were visible. They were, therefore, in the colonial society of New Spain, prominent, wealthy, and disliked, not to say hated. Mendiola, a *criollo* and *diputado* to the Cortes of Cadiz from Querétaro, put it unambiguously when he confessed that for long he had "entendido, penetrado y tambien disimulado, que todo el gran mal de la Nueva España . . . no reconoce sino un solo antiguo, radical, aunque no tan visible principio . . . : 'El interés mercantil está en oposición con el interés nacional.'" Miguel Hidaldo phrased it more vitriolically at about the same time: "Su Dios es el dinero."[1] Understanding how and why Mexico City's *almaceneros* reacted to the extraordinary and unsettling news from Spain in the first half of 1808 requires a review of not only their perception of *criollo/americano* attitudes but also what they construed as threats to the structures underpinning their wealth, status, and future.

The tenacity with which Mexico City's merchants and those of Veracruz supported the status quo in 1808—the institutions and structures of past prosperity—reflected their understanding of New Spain's expanding economy over the previous quarter century. While international conflict had interrupted overseas trading and induced shortages and extensive smuggling, the immediate postwar years (1784–1786, 1796–1797, 1802–1804) had increased merchants' earnings whether their operations were large, medium, or small scale; in this optic, economic activity had been (and could remain) rewarding, providing certain aberrations (*abusos*) were removed. Some distortions were external in a sense, in particular the variety of concessions extended by Madrid's ministers (Godoy and Soler) in the form of *permisos*, *licencias*, *gracias*, and *privilegios* to *peninsulares*, to neutrals, and to those merchants in New Spain in contact with Jamaica and Nassau in the British West Indies. Others were internal, such as viceregal intervention in *consulado* elections or its management of *avería* accounts, in New Spain's transpacific trade with Manila, and in viceregal passivity or toleration of Havana's trade with Veracruz and ports of western Yucatan in wartime.

Despite official reticence about the Escorial affair of October 1807, which was reported laconically in Madrid's *Gazeta* and much later in similarly bland tones in Mexico City's *Gazeta*, undoubtedly New Spain's *almaceneros* quickly learned about and interpreted it accurately as a manifestation of the groundswell about to engulf a regime and a political leader (the *poder despótico*) incapable of withstanding simultaneous pressures from England and France, metropole and colonies. Godoy's (and then Charles IV's) overthrow in the 18–19 March *golpe de estado* at Aranjuez which, incidentally, the Consulado de Mexico "celebró de un modo extraordinario," seemed to promise that under Fernando VII trade *abusos* would be curtailed, and there might even be a return to the regulated commercial system (*orden mercantil*) now imagined to have operated smoothly even after 1789.[2] News of the Bourbons' abdication at Bayonne, officially divulged at Mexico City on 16 July but probably known sooner via private correspondence, left commercial policy briefly in limbo until there arrived word of the formation of a regional government (*junta*) at Sevilla and its self-proclaimed jurisdiction (some would say, hegemony) over Spain and its American colonies. This augured that the influence of the Cadiz merchant community, and the primacy of its links overseas to Veracruz and Mexico City would be exerted at Sevilla. Meanwhile, one of Godoy's late viceregal appointments, Iturrigaray, was still in office in August 1808, still unwilling to suspend "leyes y proviciones que ofrezcan escándalo conocido" to New Spain's *almaceneros*. Bad enough that Godoy had distributed "privilegios para la navegación y comercio directo de los extrangeros en los Puertos de Indias, y toda la América se cargó de géneros extrangeros preferibles en calidad y precio a nuestros artifactos; nos vimos pues privados del despacho exclusive en las colonias." Worse was Iturrigaray himself—"la autoridad débil que cree honrar a la soberanía executando literal y ciegamente sus órdenes."

During the critical months of July, August, and early September 1808, Viceroy Iturrigaray gave no indication he would suspend Godoy's "providencias subversivas del orden mercantil." Indeed, his actions viewed en bloc could be interpreted as abandoning what *almaceneros* preferred to believe was the status quo ante. He balked at accepting any authority (in the form of a junta) that surfaced in Spain when armed resistance to French occupation forces flared. More unnerving to *almaceneros* was his equivocal stance when he received Sevilla's request for recognition as Junta Suprema. Given Iturrigaray's attitude toward Sevilla, coupled to rumors he had concealed the contents of communications sent to him by France's foreign minister, Champagny, on the *Vaillant*, conceivably he might follow the example of military officers at Madrid like generals Azanza and O'Farrill, appointed

by Fernando but who then continued to serve under (some might say, collaborate with) the duc de Berg and then Spain's new king, José Bonaparte.

At Veracruz *almaceneros* chafed because Iturrigaray fashioned a strategy of defense based upon Jalapa and the Veracruz piedmont and warehoused silver for export and luxury imports (which an English operation might threaten) at Jalapa rather than Veracruz. His countermeasures against smuggling carried out by naval commander Ciriaco Cevallos at Veracruz seriously hamstrung coastal smuggling operations in collusion with English ships in the Caribbean—the only way to supply New Spain's import demands during a sustained blockade. At the same time, to vexed *almaceneros* he seemed to tolerate a kind of smuggling by allowing would-be colonist-immigrants from New Orleans to convert their Louisiana holdings into European goods (many on the prohibited list), which they shipped to Veracruz for sale. He intervened in the profitable and oligopolized import of Asian goods shipped from Manila to Acapulco. It had become the practice of Mexico City *almaceneros* as consignees to retain the proceeds from sales of Asian imports "teniéndolos como muertos en poder de los comerciantes de este Reyno sus corresponsales y encomenderos, expuestos (wrote Iturrigaray) a los riesgos y vicisitudes que son frecuentes en el giro del comercio." Iturrigaray aimed to force these large retained sums into circulation by requiring their immediate outflow to Manila's investors and merchants; this, however, would reduce the Mexico City *almaceneros*' working capital.[3] And, finally, there was the most troublesome issue to merchants of Mexico City and Veracruz: how to halt reexport of European goods from Havana to Veracruz. Iturrigaray gave no indication he intended to restrain the volume of such Havana operations, or for that matter, Havaneros' pretension to become the Caribbean's *almacén general*, a policy all understood to be sponsored by Havana's largely *criollo* sugar producers, and one uncritically tolerated by Cuba's governor general, the marqués Someruelos. Conceivably *he* might even replace Iturrigaray in case of resignation, removal, or incapacitation.[4]

Iturrigaray's measures, serious matters to *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz, became all the more critical to the minority of *europeos* who felt their numerical significance "reducido a cero en comparación de una población de millones de naturales del país" when they examined Iturrigaray's relations with New Spain's *criollo/americano* elite.[5] *Almaceneros* among the European community were not so much frightened by the masses of indigenous people (uncommonly submissive to Europeans, who found them perennially "gente sencilla, y humilde, respeta mucho a los Españoles")[6] as troubled by what seemed the viceroy's unwarranted consideration for,

affinity toward, even deference to, influential *criollo* notables, among them Guanajuato's leading mine-owning families, such as the Obregones and Fagoagas, and their networks of consanguineal and affinal relatives, their associates, and clients among some Mexico City merchants, highly visible *criollo* bureaucrats such as *oidor* Villaurrutia of the Audiencia, and some officials of the capital city's Ayuntamiento, for example, lawyers Veradad y Ramos and Azcárate. Viceroy Iturrigaray, it was reported to Sevilla's Junta in early September, was "unido con la Ciudad [*regidores* of the Ayuntamiento] de esta Capital, y tiene algunos otros de todas clases a su devoción."[7] In view of mine owners complaints about oligopolistic pricing of their basic inputs—consequences of a commercial structure maintained by European merchants ("100 *monopolistas*") linked to Cadiz, Barcelona, and Santander interests in the metropole and supported by the power of "20 empleados de la Metrópoli"[8]—and the strong undertow of *criollo* sentiment for establishing in wartime direct trading contact with neutral United States and, by midsummer of 1808, allied English commercial interests, the European-born merchants could only conclude that viceregal support for their endangered interests and well-being was slipping, that the *oidores* of the Audiencia alone constituted an effective bulwark against the drift of viceroy and *americanos* toward the ultimate independence of Spain's most important overseas possession, and that the European merchants who liked to believe they "son allí los que mandan" were becoming increasingly isolated.[9]

A complex of factors linked to ethnicity, conquest, and the colonial economy generated the Europeans' sense of isolation that the crisis of authority in the metropole and the colony in 1808 magnified and transformed (perhaps, distorted?) into phobic insecurity. "European Spaniards" not only shared a sense of ethnic difference; they also cultivated ethnic hierarchy, an ubiquitous hallmark of imperialists and colonialists. Their ethnic qualities, they firmly believed, were of a higher order; they came to New Spain as immigrants imbued with the "sencillez y severidad de costumbres" characteristic of those of "obscure" origins in small isolated peasant hamlets (*poblaciones*) of Spain; their Catholicism was somehow purer than the pagan Catholicism of the Amerinds and was linked to the Caucasoid phenotype; they pursued a hard-driving work ethic of "plicación y trabajo" derived from their north Spanish, Cantabrian peasant milieu, which contrasted with the presumably easygoing attitude of all the native-born of New Spain. Compared with other ethnic groups in New Spain, the *europeos* were visibly successful—these were the elements imparting to the Europeans a sense of identity before those born in America.[10] *The Bitter Truth Which Must Be Told* encapsulated the daily experience of those born in the

colony. "La mayor parte de los españoles que nos aborrecen . . . son de aquellos que siendo nada en España se han venido a nuestro suelo en busca de la fortuna . . . que pasó mas ayá de sus esperanzas . . . ellos tenían desde la Peninsula un concepto bajo de los americanos; los conocieron después de un caracter humilde, sumisos a sus mandato, y oprimidos por el despotismo; recibieron en nuestro suelo un trato respectuoso que tenían en el suyo, vieron el gobierno en las manos de sus paisanos que los habían de favorecer; y encontraron con riquezas, protección y valimiento."[11]

It was Carlos María de Bustamante (son of a Spanish merchant and born at Oaxaca), a contemporary of the events of 1808, who etched in vitriol a joco-serious dialogue of relations between a "Mexican" and a "Spaniard" (whom he classified appropriately as *montañés*), a member of that regional group predominant among New Spain's immigrants at the end of the eighteenth century. He began with the "Mexican" dreaming of "cosas viejas," in the course of which he encounters "un hombre de birrete, sin duda era de Santander . . . éste con tono de individuo de los que ha muchos años gozan de voto en el Consulado de Mexico . . . Mi afeó me nacimiento y origen, maldixo mi tierra y sus naturales habitantes, me trató de incrédulo y supersticioso." Frightened, the Mexican queried "En que puedo servirle?" only to receive from the *santanderino* a tart "Yo no soi egoista, como dicen ahora; servir, sí, a Dios y a la Madre Patria." Bustamante's dialogue was not mere proto-*costumbrismo* but an effort to concretize and pillory the *montañés* view of the colonial world. So at one point, the *santanderino* adopts a confidential attitude "a que me obligan mis qualidades de Consul extraordinario y oculto, y Comisionista principal de muchas casas de Cádiz." He confessed that he expected of the "criollitos" that "como hasta aquí, lo tengan todo ultramarino. Cortes ultramarinas, Comercio ultramarino, hasta la Fee misma católica debe ser ultramarina. Conque se consigna que aquí nada se determine en última instancia y de un modo claro."[12]

All this Bustamante properly interpreted as "nuestra dependencia," which lay at the heart of a European's sense of isolation in superiority. New Spain was a colony by virtue of conquest by Spaniards, a notion symbolically refurbished every year in Mexico City in the ritual celebration of the fall of Tenochtítlan, San Hipólyto's day (13 August), and commemorated in Spain by publications like *Mexico conquistada* (1794), a turgid epic written by Escoiquiz, young Fernando's tutor, confidant, and mentor, later a major figure in the Escorial affair, which would lead to the accession of Fernando as king by *golpe de estado* in March 1808. Conquest remained a pervasive element of Spanish colonial thought and it resurfaced at the end of the eighteenth century because, one may suspect, *europeos* were convinced that

the only way New Spain could be held was the way it had been won—by force of conquest. In July 1808, Mexico City's *Gazeta* reprinted a *proclama* distributed to the Spanish insurgents of Valencia, who, taking arms against French occupation troops, were reminded that "in our veins" flowed the blood of Cortés, Pizarro, and Almagro.[13] The then editor of the *Gazeta de México*, López Cancelada, subsequently at Cadiz the untiring publicist-colonialist for the interests of the Consulados of Cadiz and Mexico City, in reprinting Valencia's proclamation purposefully nourished illusions of the grandeur and superiority of Spanish-born readers in the colonial capital and provinces. It was at Mexico City where Spanish influence was anchored ("Los Europeos allí son más fuertes y en mayor número") and where its Consulado was self-styled "cabeza del Cuerpo de comerciantes para representar y defender los derechos de estos" inasmuch as "a la cabeza toca velar por la conservación de cada uno de sus miembros."[14]

The driving force behind the success of nonbureaucratic, nonmilitary *europeos*, *peninsulares*, or *gachupines* was, of course, ambition to achieve success in business as merchants, mine owners, landed estate owners, and proprietors of textile manufacturies (*obrajes*). What their defenders portrayed as "el deseo innato en el corazón del hombre de mejorar su condición . . . el primer móvil de las operaciones humanas, y el estímulo de las virtudes sociales," *criollo* critics in New Spain labeled "codicia," which transformed the greedy into "europeos . . . altivos y soberbios."[15] To business- and success-oriented Spanish immigrants at the end of the eighteenth century, New Spain was both "rica colonia" and "basto Imperio subceptible de grandes mejoras."[16] Precisely because young and ambitious Europeans from the *montañas de Santander*, mesmerized by a mirage of New Spain's wealth, abruptly found their aspirations threatened in 1808 by the colonial repercussions of political disorder in Spain, they seized the chance on and after 29 July to advertise allegiance to Fernando VII (already confined by the French to a high-security chateau at Valençay) in order to flaunt their superiority in ways designed to cow New Spain's native-born, the *americanos*. In Mexico City, "Europeos del Comercio" formed armed units of what they called Voluntarios but others "milicia arbitraria," where "hacían alarde de su luxo según sus proporciones" and "con vestidos ridículos formaban mogiganas" excluded *americanos* too poor to purchase uniforms. In Guadalajara, one hundred "jóvenes del comercio" uniformed and mounted paraded with portraits of Fernando VII.[17]

This was the bravado of the insecure among the "Europeos del Comercio": growingly sensitive to the broad current of dissatisfaction with the "interés mercantil" among the native-born of New Spain restive about their

condition as "esclavos y víctimas de 100 monopolistas, y de 20 empleados de la Metrópoli."[18] Spaniards in the merchant community knew that *criollos* had no illusions about the modest background of peninsular immigrants ("la mayor parte de la gente que biene de España es gente común") and the economic stepladder they often climbed from obscurity to prominence.[19] "Yo me salgo de la esfera de hombre," once exclaimed Carlos María de Bustamante, "cuando revisto las pulperías, tabernas y garitos, y reflexiono sobre que aquellos infames lugares son la almásiga de donde se forman los priores y consules . . . hombres grotescos, repantigados bajo de dosel administrando justicia . . . *a maldad sabida y a mala fe guardada*."[20] Spaniards could not avoid knowing that *americanos* considered them the "dueños de todos los caudales," that *americanos* resented the fact that they exported to Spain "todo el dinero que adquieren," and that the *europeos* reciprocated by considering all native born in the colony as "viles, floxos y cobardes . . . que de hombres apenas teníamos la figura."[21]

"Los Machetes"

Nor could the Spanish community of Mexico City in 1808 forget that the native-born might transform their barely concealed resentment into open violence, as had almost happened in what official documents termed "la conjuración intentada en . . . México por los criollos contra los europeos."[22] The title was appropriate for the threat of a *golpe* against colonial authorities conceived by what a later generation would label as elements of a national petty bourgeoisie. The conspirators, their social status, their motivation and plans, as well as the response of colonial authorities—viceroys, state prosecutors (*fiscales*)—sharpen our understanding of the intensity of the response of the European commercial community of Mexico City to what members considered threats to their persons, property, and position in August and September 1808.

Authorities had learned about the conspiracy in the conventional way, through an informer, Teodoro Francisco de Aguirre, uncle of two conspirators. He immediately leaked the information of a "conjuración por los criollos contra los europeos" to Viceroy Azanza's staff; that one Pedro de la Portilla (the *cabeza*) had told fellow conspirators of reading how "se hizo la rebolución de Francia," that for two months he had thought about the "medios de ponerla en obra" and had resolved that under the auspices of a "Convención Nacional Americana" "se han de hechar los conjunados"—as Aguirre no doubt chillingly embellished his report—"sobre todos los Europeos . . . para asesinarlos." The conspirators, augmented by men

released from local prisons, would seize in their homes the "principales enemigos de los criollos"—"los oidores, los alcaldes de crimen y demas gefes." Meetings were held by Portilla in a rented house located on the Calle de Gachupines; Viceroy Azanza ordered Aguirre and two of the viceregal staff (Gregorio Martínez and Juan Manuel de Irisarri) to eavesdrop there to confirm Aguirre's charges. Their suspicions seemed confirmed. They overheard Portilla complain about *opresión*, urge his listeners to seek "lo que se llamaba libertad," followed by discussion about how to obtain weapons and "apoderarse de la persona del Virrey" once his palace guards were seized. Sometime after Martínez and Irisarri filed their report, colonial authorities appointed a zealous, experienced *alcalde del crímen*, Joaquín Mosquera y Figueroa,[23] to pursue the case energetically since Azanza, reporting to Madrid about the *delincuentes*, argued it was necessary to "cortar y extirpar en su raíz semillas tan perjudiciales con que los mal intencionados intentan seducir a los incautos" lest there follow consequences "que se dejan considerar."[24] On 9 November 1799 Mosquera and police agents rounded up eleven conspirators meeting in the Calle de Gachupines along with their assortment of five sabers, nineteen machetes, and packs of playing cards, and copies of the *Gazeta de México*, along with four plays including Calderón de la Barca's *Hombre pobre, todo es trazas* and the *Siete Infantes de Lara*.[25]

This was hardly incendiary material. Far more incriminating were papers picked up in ransacking Portilla's rooms. One was obviously a declaration of independence, in format and language reminiscent of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. The Junta Nacional Americana, ran the document's preamble, had hoped to preserve the "tranquilidad de su reino" and the "bien general de la humanidad" in order to attain "la felicidad." It had tolerated "la impiedad y soberbio orgullo" invariably shown by "Europeos" toward "la nación," hoping meanwhile to find a "medio racional [que] podía enquadernar la derecha fortuna de sus miserables havitantes" in order to avert civil war and provide the people of New Spain "la libertad de poder usar y obtener los bienes y empleos de su Patria con una partición igual." Goals so useful to "quietud universal" in conforming with the "leyes de la Humanidad" could be achieved, however, not by a "medio pacífico" but by "medios más activos para la total restauración de la America." To begin the process, on 20 October 1799, the Junta, consisting of eleven (including Antonio de la Portilla and Teodoro de Aguirre), ran the document, had appointed as captain general Pedro de la Portilla. Another document observed that the success of the "expedición" depended upon assaulting the viceroy's palace to seize muskets, artillery, and other equipment. If we assume the declaration of the Junta Nacional Americana was not a document planted by the

authorities to incriminate Portilla and associates, it seemed implausible that it was the draft of a petty merchant and municipal tax collector like Portilla. Rather, one may suspect it may have been the work of a lawyer, perhaps the Luiz Lozano who later defended the two Portillas.[26]

The eleven arrested were hardly notables of the Mexico City community. All were natives of New Spain, young (eighteen to thirty years old), petty tradesmen, silversmiths, watchmakers, small distillery owners who in some cases combined private enterprise with public employment as municipal tax collectors, municipal guards, or customshouse employees.[27] Portilla, the ringleader, who later described himself as "empleado en las rentas municipales," was a merchant of some capital for he claimed that the colonial authorities had seized an *alacena* ("en el Portal de Agustinos") with 3,000 pesos of goods, a cajoncillo ("en la calle de Santa Catarina") containing domestic wares ("*efectos del país*"), an *obraje* (textile workshop) and supplies of silk and cotton, plus 800 pesos. Another of the conspirators, silversmith Agustín de Vargas, also was enrolled as sergeant in the merchants' *milicias urbanas*. The fact that Portilla and his associates were obscure people may have worked to their disadvantage; to the outnumbered "Europeos" of Mexico City, they may have appeared as a fragment of the tinder smoking all over New Spain. Mosquera, having obtained confessions, drew up a bill of particulars for the decision by the *sala del crimen* of the Audiencia.

In view of the conspirators' expressed intention to initiate their *golpe* by rounding up high colonial civil servants in Mexico City, the indictment (*pedimento*) of three *fiscales* was a foregone conclusion. *Fiscal del crimen* Ambrosio Sagarzurieta who drafted the opinion, seconded by Francisco Xavier Borbón (*fiscal de lo civil*) and *fiscal de hacienda* Lorenzo Hernandez de Alba, recommended the death penalty, and the indictment was forwarded to Madrid for review (30 November 1799) with no sign of dissent by Azanza. (One begins to comprehend Azanza's subsequent attitude in 1808 when France's military commander, Murat, reacted to the urban riot of 2 May at Madrid.) At this juncture so overloaded was the caseload of the Consejo de Indias with similar incidents of "sublevación de Indias" complicated by "su naturaleza y multitud de incidentes y considerable número de reos" that Silvestre Collar of the Consejo had to develop a new procedure to handle them.[28] Within five months (February 1801), however, the Consejo rejected the recommendation of the death penalty in light of the accuseds' "edad, miseria, ignorancia, ningunas conexiones y corto número," a position reaffirmed more than one year later (October 1802) when the Consejo

again referred to "jóvenes inespertos, dedicados a exercicios humildes, sin educación, talento, ni suficiencia para concertar ideas de esta magnitud."[29]

The restraint of Madrid's civil servants was probably affected by distance and the realism of Viceroy Azanza's successor, Marquina. His ship bound from Cadiz to Veracruz was captured at sea by English cruisers, and Marquina was briefly interned at the bustling English Caribbean port of Kingston, where he was alternately astonished and indignant at the frequent arrival and departure of small vessels from Spain's colonial ports. Perhaps Marquina recognized that contact with foreign ports could not alone constitute a threat to Spain's colonial regime; in any event, he was shocked on arriving at Mexico City to learn of the death penalty recommended for Portilla and the other conspirators. Looking into the case, he grew suspicious of the key informant, Teodoro de Aguirre, in view of his poor record ("inutilidad") when employed by the capital's tax collector's office and worse record when employed by the colonial constabulary (Acordada), where he was accused of two unwarranted killings and irresponsible management of funds. As for the rest of the accused, whom he personally interrogated in prison, he found them "jóvenes . . . humildes . . . sin ideas, sin enlaces, auxilios ni posibilidad" of executing their plans; they were, he noted, "tímidos" and "aún sin pelo de barba." The punishment simply did not fit the crime. For Marquina had a sense of proportion and perspective far different from the root-and-branch mentality of Azanza, from that of Sagarzurieta, Borbón, and Alba and—one suspects—that of the European merchants congregated in Mexico City. Their fears, he thought, were magnified by isolation from Madrid, inadequate security forces in case of a threat to "la autoridad," the dissemination of notions of "la libertad," and by clandestine trade with English Caribbean ports "extendido según fundada opinión a correspondencias abiertas con muchas casas pudientes de este País." There was a record of "perturbaciones," less the result of "malicia" than of the "facilidad y ligereza en el hablar." To be sure, he recognized that endemic in Spain's American colonies was a spirit of envy (*emulación*) and "desafecto interior entre Europeos y Criollos," which capital punishment in any case would not eradicate. Rather, it would furnish "material de oposición y mala voluntad entre Criollos y Gachupines, que es como se explica el vulgo." The purpose of his exposition was clear; it was necessary to avoid a public trial that would inevitably sensitize the influential *criollo* public of "abogados, procuradores, escribanos . . . las familias de los Reos," who would perceive that the accused were "criollos, y los Jueces que han de sentenciar, Gachupines o Europeos." Given the *criollos*' "interior enemistad y desafecto," he

asked rhetorically, "A que ideas, conferencias, y conversaciones no se dará margen entre ellos con el frecuente examen y lectura de las diligencias?" Exemplary punishment, a kind of *escarmiento*, would be counterproductive by engendering "desagradables consequencias."[30] Marquina was a realist.

Fortunately for the Portillas and the others involved in what later became known as the "machetes" conspiracy (even the title implies an intent to terrorize the Europeans in New Spain and denigrate the movement), the pragmatic, cool-headed assessment of both the Consejo de Indias and Viceroy Marquina avoided a public trial. Instead, the conspirators were simply confined without fanfare; the two Portillas were released in 1816.[31] However, Marquina's immediate successor, Iturrigaray, who adopted years later a similarly pragmatic view of *criollo* restivity and European anxiety, had to operate under the drastically different metropolitan and colonial situation of 1808.

Comparable movements were reported in following years, all anxiety-producing. Europeans in New Spain were aware of the chasm (and it was probably widening) between the poor who "apenas alcanza lo físico necesario en comer y vestir" and the rich, and the potentially critical role of the *criollo* elite. That clairvoyant Spanish cleric and intellectual at Puebla, San José Muro, put the *europeos*' assessment well when in 1805 he minimized the threat from below by "la multitude acostumbrada a la miseria," while warning of the possibility that if the *criollos* of New Spain ("la clase española") shed their "letargo," they might provide leadership. From the Europeans' perspective, the *criollos* were "despegados, astutos" and educated, enraged that "advenedizos Samaritanos estén en posesión exclusiva de desfrutar las aguas del pozo de Jacob" and were only awaiting the "mayor occasión" to reach for the benefits of independence.[32]

One may sense the insecurity widespread in the capital's Spanish community fed by distrust of *criollos* and colonial military units, in fragments of correspondence between Spaniards residing in New Spain and friends and relatives across the Atlantic. In January 1808 a nephew of the conde de Campomanes, Tomás Antonio Rodrígues de Campomanes, wrote from Ixtlahuaca (near Xiquilco) about the large corps of colonial troops (then between fourteen thousand and fifteen thousand) stationed by Iturrigaray at Orizaba and the need to smother "las revoluciones que se esperan y amenazan de un día a otro."[33] And another *peninsular* employed in the postal service at Jalapa, Faustino Capetillo, noted on 19 July, shortly after news of the March *golpes* at Aranjuez had arrived, there was abroad a spirit of independence nourished by both English propaganda and the possibility that, by cutting "súbitamente los lazos" to Spain, merchants in New Spain

could wipe out 37 million pesos of outstanding debt owed the "comercio de España."[34] The next month (18 August) Capetillo reported plans for "una independencia criminal" with which he associated such *criollo* notables as the marqueses of Uluapa and Guardiola, Colonel Ignacio Obregón, Canon José María Beristáin, and an Ayuntamiento official Lic. Azcárate. Like the reputed schemes of Portilla, this group aimed to "quitar la vida a los europeos," he insisted. Indeed, it was the mentality of the besieged sensing an impending upheaval that induced members of the merchant community of Mexico City to see in such rumors a "concepto el más sangriento y odioso."[35]

Naturally Europeans turned to the viceroy as symbol of authority for reassurance of protection against local plotters. Instead, they found him incurably unperturbed, ever friendly with *criollos*. Some Europeans believed Iturrigaray visited the Amerindian pueblos in the vicinity of the capital, telling their "gobernadores y mandones" he might have to call upon them one day, or that he sent his elder son to advise *vaqueros* with whom he was known to hobnob to be prepared at any time to serve "a caballo armados de lanza y lazo."[36] These rumors coupled with Iturrigaray's *criollo* connections appalled "los comerciantes y . . . todos los vecinos ricos, en especial . . . los Europeos." It requires no great imagination to understand how agitated were the *peninsular* merchants in July and August 1808 to find "papeles sediciosos" threatening "los Europeos" posted nightly on street corners of the center (Zócalo) of Mexico City.[37]

The anonymous lampoons mushroomed after months of virtually no official news from Madrid between February and March, along with many rumors about Fernando's complicity in the aborted coup against Charles IV at the Escorial and about the subsequent Aranjuez *golpe* in March that thrust Fernando on the throne. Unconfirmed reports circulated among Mexico City merchants stimulating one prominent *almacenero* to complain (25 May) to a correspondent that "lo que necesitamos es la llegada de un barco de España que nos saque de las confusiones en que estamos." To reverse commercial policy and return to what was already becoming an imagined Spanish transatlantic system, merchants pinned their hopes on Godoy's opposition, on Fernando, and on his advisers and supporters. On 9 June, when Mexico City learned of the successful *golpe* of mid-March at Aranjuez and the release from prison of those implicated in the Escorial affair, the Mexico City Consulado celebrated "de un modo extraordinario."[38]

Why there was no immediate ceremony in which Mexico City's authorities could publicly swear to support Fernando VII remains obscure. Perhaps authorities awaited an official explanation to clear Fernando, first, of

complicity in the Escorial conspiracy ("esta pretendida conspiracíon"); this finally appeared on 6 July when, according to reports taken from Parisian gazettes, Fernando had participated in order to "librar la patria del tiránico despotismo de un valido arrogante."[39] Meanwhile, Viceroy Iturrigaray made no official pronouncement and, perhaps to quiet fears, left Mexico City on an official visit to New Spain's major silver mining center, Guanajuato, where among those providing hospitality was the *criollo* notable and militia commander Ignacio Obregón, colonel of the Regimiento de Aguascalientes. Obregón was present, too, when Iturrigaray learned of Madrid's urban riot on the Dos de Mayo, reported tersely in the *Gazeta de México* (25 June) as a movement by the "mal aconsejado . . . populacho de Madrid."[40] To the viceroy who followed Madrid's political maneuvering and could interpret the symbolism of a "people's" disturbance as foreshadowing political instability, the news was no doubt sobering, for he turned to the *oidores* of the Audiencia accompanying him in the Procesión de Corpus (25 June) in the capital to comment with obvious reserve, "Alguna cosa grande ha sucedido en Madrid"; and, appropriate to the occasion, he added "Vamos a encomendarnos a Dios."[41] Madrid's official press, however, gave no indication of friction with French military forces in Spain and, indeed, cooperation of Spanish officialdom with the French seemed the order of the day.

Impact of Abdications, May

Two weeks later Iturrigaray's foreboding was confirmed by official correspondence brought from Cadiz (26 May) by the *Ventura* to Veracruz after putting in first at Sisal and Campeche in Yucatan. Aboard were two passengers with commercial connections at Veracruz and Mexico City—León Achútegui and Liborio Tomás de Durana (on "asuntos propios de su comercio")—and who were, one suspects, dispatched to inform New Spain's merchants about political conditions at Cadiz and Sevilla where its Junta Suprema had been clobbered together one day before *Ventura*'s departure.[42] Official documents first published in Madrid's *Gazeta* (13, 17, and 20 May) filled a full ten pages of the usually slim *Gazeta de México* on 16 July. Madrid's highest council, the Consejo de Castilla, joined by three members (Caballero, Gil y Lemos, O'Farrill) of the Junta de Gobierno appointed by Fernando VII on departing for Bayonne to meet Napoleon Bonaparte there, had made public on 13 May a series of extraordinary documents reporting that Charles IV had retracted his forced abdication of 21 March at Aranjuez in favor of Fernando; that Fernando had also abdicated on 6 May, followed by a joint statement with his brothers Carlos and Antonio

to renounce all claims to the throne (12 May); and, finally, that Charles had then abdicated in favor of Napoleon, transferring his rights over "España e Indias" with the guarantee of the independence and integrity of Spain and "todas sus colonias ultramarinas," and designating as interim *lugarteniente*, French general Murat (duc de Berg).[43] This was what Mexican historian Lucas Alamán would later term the critical moment, for the published documents and the succession of events put in question "por precisión . . . la duda de la suerte de la Nueva España y de toda la América Española."[44]

Approval of the publication of these startling documents at Mexico City had been hammered out in a secret and stormy meeting between viceroy and Audiencia (15 July). Four days later the *criollo*-dominated Ayuntamiento of Mexico City, prodded by Verdad, claimed its "derecho . . . a tomar la voz por todo el reino y al establecimiento de su govierno provisional,"[45] while shortly thereafter Iturrigaray concluded that his colonial government required a new legitimization because the Bourbons had obviously abdicated under duress. Publication of the documents "sin una proclama que le desmintiese" pointed to either uncertainty on Iturrigaray's part or grave disunity within the viceregal governing apparatus.[46] In a climate of rumors chasing unsettling facts, *peninsular* postmaster Capetillo, nervously observing the people of Jalapa commenting on the *Gazeta*'s documents "en las calles, en las plazas y tabernas," and on the "pasquines en las casas de los Jueces y en los parages públicos," sensed that "se respire la independencia."[47] To control the flow of censored and uncensored news coming from abroad, Iturrigaray quietly ordered Veracruz officials to keep under close surveillance neutral and foreign shipping in the harbor in order to isolate New Spain from Spain's "combustión y fermentación." He followed this with a request to Benito Pérez at Veracruz for an opinion on the feasibility of dispatching a vessel "con la mayor reserva" to the United States to purchase muskets and pistols.[48]

In reporting General Murat as *lugarteniente* until Napoleon could select a monarch for acephalous Spain, and *implying* in documents made public that the Bourbons had abdicated under pressure, those Spaniards—high civil servants, disaffected aristocrats, and their clienteles—who drafted the declarations of Charles and his male heirs, created the very condition many in Madrid's political class hoped to avoid. For instance, those in Spain's military establishment, especially those with colonial exposure like Azanza and O'Farrill whom Fernando's coterie confirmed in office or appointed and who then chose to stay in Madrid to serve under Joseph Bonaparte, recognized that a dangerous vacuum of authority, however brief, might inspire competition for preeminence among Spain's powerful provincial

cores and—worse—in the American colonies, by law and tradition the conquest prize of, and subject to, the monarchs of Castile rather than to the "nation" or "state." A dubious process of succession could produce in a regionally fractioned metropole what the political class dreaded—anarchy—which may explain why many prominent military officers would chose to remain at their posts in Madrid even under the new monarch appointed by Napoleon, José I. Fractioning was precisely the effect upon New Spain's political and economic elite of the startling official documents published in Mexico City's official *Gazeta*. They brought into the open fissions yawning between Ayuntamiento and Audiencia, between viceroy and Audiencia, and—particularly—between viceroy and Consulado.

Criollos on the colonial capital's Ayuntamiento lunged impetuously at the possibility of a local assembly, claiming the "derecho . . . a tomar la voz por todo el reino y al establecimiento de su govierno provisional," while some native American communities in the Puebla area, concluding that "no tenían Rey," simply withheld their annual head tax (*tributo*).[49] For their part, the Europeans could see neither effective resistance to French forces of occupation in Spain nor the return of Fernando and his advisers from France, but they did note the diffusion in the colony of "principios que pueden terminar en la independencia."[50] The *peninsular*-dominated Audiencia reprimanded the Ayuntamiento, that it "escuse en lo sucesivo tomar la voz que no le pertenece," a position quietly (*extrajudicialmente*) circulated by Mexico City's *almaceneros* to the colony's provincial centers.[51] The *peninsulares*' anxiety, perhaps exaggerated, was certainly not unfounded, for after the *Gazeta* of 16 July appeared, the Peruvian cleric-intellectual resident in Mexico City, Melchor Talamantes, began drafting his "Ideas del Congreso Nacional de Nueva España" (read to the Mexico City Ayuntamiento on 26 July), while at Veracruz Pérez de Arce mailed to Viceroy Iturrigaray his draft of an economic policy for New Spain with a covering note suggesting colonial authorities follow the "partido de la independencia."[52] (Were the *europeos* of Veracruz and Mexico City unaware of the strong undercurrent among Havana's "hacendados, comerciantes y personas notables," which led them on 26 July to petition Captain General Someruelos to convene a "junta superior de govierno revisto de igual autoridad a las demás de . . . Espana . . ."?)[53] *Peninsulares* in the colonial civil service and mercantile elites at Mexico City could not be unmindful of the aspirations of the *criollo* elite, as interpreted by the Ayuntamiento's Verdad. These were articulated in conversation in the corridors of the always-frequented viceregal palace where Verdad rubbed shoulders with angry young lower-status *criollos* like

agente de negocios Antonio Calleja, an irreconcilable "maldeciente contra los Gachupines."[54]

To be sure, Talamantes's views about convening a colonial assembly, and Pérez de Arce's economic policy recommendations triggered by news items in the *Gazeta de México,* received no publicity. Not so the materials in handwritten *pasquines* affixed in the center streets of the capital and as well in provincial cities after 16 July. Their often-abusive anti-Spanish tone (the chilling exclamation—"Mueran los Gachupines")[55] confirmed the barely suppressed anxieties of Europeans about a "preoccupación popular."[56] The spate of flyers drew comment from a spectrum of *europeos* and *criollos*. At Jalapa *peninsular* Capetillo noted that ever since the *Ventura*'s "tristes y funestas" news, "no se respire en este Reyno más que la independencia . . . Diariamente aparecen Pasquines que manifiestan el entusiasmo de que están [los havitantes] posehidos."[57] In Mexico City, sugar retailer Salaberría (a *peninsular*) who dispensed products shipped from the Cuernavaca sugar haciendas of his patron and friend, Gabriel de Yermo, marveled at the "diluvio de pasquines colocados en diversos lugares de la Ciudad," which invited "Patricios y Europeos" to choose independence "a imitación de los Estados Unidos." The opportunity for open debate among the people on the why and how of the republic in the United States had simply transformed "los hombres tranquilos en revolucionarios" and—to use his simile—"qual centella que cayendo en un campo seco y árido, encendió Vosques y Prados, hiba difundiendo el fuego por las Ciudades y Pueblos de la Nueva España."[58] Viceroy Iturrigaray deduced that the message of the *pasquines* was "la independencia y el gobierno republicano" along the lines of the U.S. model since "el no existir nuestro soberano en su trono"—clear allusion to the vacuum of authority in the peninsula.[59] *Oidor* Villaurrutia, a *criollo*, on the Audiencia, echoed *peninsular* Salaberría, noting the stimulus to public discussion provided by reports of events in Europe, showed no empathy for those who "sin talento, sin juicio, o sin instrucción ajitan y propagan las especies perniciosas." What preoccupied him was "el pueblo bajo, y por su docilidad y por no tener que perder, está mui dispuesto a las malas impresiones."[60]

Two weeks after the *Gazeta de México* had printed the disquieting reports of the Bourbons' renunciations fueling uncertainty over the legitimacy of metropolitan authorities left at Madrid when Fernando and his cortege proceeded to Bayonne—the Consejo de Castilla, the Junta Suprema de Gobierno, Napoleon's *lugarteniente*, Murat—the *Esperanza*, which had sailed from Tarragona (Valencia) on 7 June, arrived at Veracruz with more news.

On 29 July a one-sheet edition of the *Gazeta* briefly announced that Valencia had taken up arms against French forces and an armistice with England had been declared. More disquieting details appeared in the *Gazeta* over the next three days (30 July to 2 August); in a variety of "expreso" or "extraordinario" editions, editor Juan López Cancelada drew upon the *Esperanza*'s materials that promised to settle the issue of legitimacy in the metropole and colonies in America. In an "expreso" (30 July), López Cancelada printed a "Circular a la Nación Española" issued by the "Suprema Junta" (of Sevilla) which ended with the prediction (or was it promise?) that on withdrawal of French forces and Fernando VII's return, "baxo él y por él se convocarán las Cortes, se reformarán los abusos." This may have been an unauthorized insertion by *peninsular* editor López Cancelada; that he edited news is substantiated by an item in this edition reporting that Spaniards had assassinated the *gobernador* of Cadiz (General Solano) because he was viewed as an "intrigante" and really a French, rather than Spanish, general. Anyone in Veracruz or Mexico City with Cadiz contacts knew that governor was the distinguished *Spanish* general, Solano, now eliminated by the Spanish political ritual of *escarmiento* or object lesson.

The colonial public was thus offered a pattern of reaction to a French-imposed king, a French-convoked Congress of Bayonne, and a French-dominated Junta Suprema at Madrid, namely Fernando VII (albeit a prisoner in France), a future Cortes' convocation, and the new, self-titled Junta Suprema de Sevilla. Fittingly enough, on 1 August López Cancelada reprinted Sevilla's proclamation of 29 May that disavowed Madrid's Junta de Gobierno, the Consejo de Castilla ("primer tribunal de la Nación"), and the Congreso de Bayona, and making explicit Sevilla's immunity to any revolutionary contagion—"En España no hay revolución . . . solo pretendemos defender lo que hay más sagrado." In characteristically Spanish fashion, sacred and legitimate were indissoluble. And the next day (2 August) López Cancelada printed the Sevilla Junta's declaration of war against France in the name of Fernando VII, "rey de España y de las Indias y en su nombre la Suprema Junta de Ambas" and signed "Por dispozición de la Suprema Junta de Gobierno"—evidently the Sevilla Junta. In response to the news from Spain, López Cancelada published over several days (5 to 8 August) an orchestrated series of patriotic expressions of support for the anti-French struggle, formulated by Veracruz's Ayuntamiento, by the prestigious "cuerpo de minería de la Nueva España" and by individuals of New Spain's other major mining center, Zacatecas, pointedly upset by their Ayuntamiento's "irresolución." To capture the outpouring of sentiment, Viceroy Iturrigaray now authorized the formation of militia units

under the rubric of Voluntarios del Rey Fernando VII, which were to drill enthusiastic patriots.[61]

Cancelada's reprinting of the *Esperanza*'s news would seem to meet some of the prayerful hopes of Iturbe e Iraeta and other Mexico City *europeos* for information dispelling widespread "confusion." In the 2 August edition of the *Gazeta* announcing Sevilla's support for Fernando VII, at the request of *oidor* Aguirre, Cancelada in the role of media manager tried to manipulate public opinion by publishing apparently private letters from Veracruz that claimed Fernando and others of his household had been returned to Spain, adding that the editor awaited confirmation of "tan plausible noticia." For this initiative to shape public opinion, he was immediately rebuked by Viceroy Iturrigaray who realized that at this critical juncture the credibility of his government and his own office depended upon official pronouncements from the metropole, however edited there, rather than upon locally inspired rumor.[62] Cancelada had to print a public retraction the following day, confessing he had wandered from Iturrigaray's editorial directives to publish nothing "destituido de datos fixos," only what was based upon "impreso o de oficio."[63] *Criollos* mocked quietly Cancelada's false news, joking that "nuestros soberanos se hallaban en España, pero en caxones." Why Cancelada failed to follow viceregal directives remains a matter of speculation. He may have reacted to rumors of Talamantes's manuscript on the subject of a colonial assembly, delivered to both the Ayuntamiento (26 July) and the viceroy himself (28 July); to the continued posting night after night of anti-*peninsular* flyers at the center of the capital; and to the mounting apprehension of Mexico City's *almaceneros*, the high commercial bourgeoisie, and its *peninsular* dependents now feverishly organizing units of Voluntarios and ordering resplendent (and expensive) military uniforms.[64]

By the first week of August the *peninsular* community of Mexico City was convinced that "Americanos," galvanized by "tristes e inaúditos sucesos de la Peninsula," were spreading "máximas y especies" of independence.[65] The Europeans' sense of isolation and insecurity was fed by the viceregal establishment's noncommittal attitude following publication of the Bourbons' renunciation, the "inquietudes de la tropa [que] se aumentan por instantes," and by the flood of pasquinades reminding them that "en todas partes ai discontentos, mal intencionados, ociosos y necesitados, que piensan mejorar de suerte en otra orden de cosas."[66] *Oidor* Tomás González Calderón, perhaps in his triple capacity as representative of other *oidores* of the Audiencia, transmitter of the merchant community's insecurity, and as friend of Iturrigaray, warned the viceroy that the *pasquines* were feeding "odios y venganzas contra los Europeos."[67] He mirrored faithfully senti-

ments of Mexico City's leading *almaceneros*, four of whom—Iraeta, Iturbe e Iraeta, Acha, and Basoco—had sponsored González Calderón's entry into the Orden de Carlos III in 1794. Whatever Iturrigaray's response to González Calderón, the Consulado's officers ("el comercio de esta capital") on finding after 29 July "papeles sediciosos de criollos contra gachupines que amanecieron fijados en varios parages públicos," convened a *junta de gobierno* on 6 August with the presence of European (and two *criollo*) merchant magnates of Mexico City: prior, consuls, ex-priors Antonio Basoco (also, *decano del partido de Vascongados*) and Francisco de la Cotera (*decano del de Montañeses*), ex-consuls Sebastián de Heras Soto, Francisco de Chavarri, and deputies Juan Ignacio González Vertiz, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, and Santiago García.[68]

The Junta's minutes encapsulated the business community's anxiety. The meeting opened with a review of the "inquietud, desconfianza y recelos" of the "individuos del comercio" inspired by the anonymous "papeles sediciosos," which were indicators of "una conspiración y alboroto popular que suele tener principio muchas veses por semejantes papeluchos." Clearly the ritual stages of Spain's "popular" movements were uppermost in the Junta's mind. Those present resolved to petition Viceroy Iturrigaray to eliminate the "fuego de la Discordia." Their petition in fact began with condemnation of the *pasquines* (products of a "cérebro desconcertado"), which destroyed the social element cherished by those living in an alien ambient, "aquella estrecha unión que es el alma de la sociedad." There was the threat of a "revelión popular" against "los miembros de nuestro cuerpo y a todos las personas pudientes que tienen que perder en tal caso." Textual analysis of the *oficio* suggests that while the *pasquines* pitted *europeo* against *criollo* or *americano*, the *peninsular* businessmen—at least in their formal documents—preferred to see a more universal confrontation, the division between the propertied and the penniless, between *pudientes* and the rest of society.

Iturrigaray recognized the anxieties of the merchant community, for he replied the same day. In a spare note he promised to take action, minimized the reasons for their "recelos," and recommended that the corporation ("ese cuerpo") bend efforts to strengthen "la amistad y concordia" with Mexico City's other social groups. Iturrigaray's recommendation was offered after time for reflection, for by 27 or 28 July he knew of what had happened to Cadiz's governor, Solano, for opposing the interests of the Cadiz commercial community and its Consulado, no matter how deliberately garbled was the report of Solano's assassination. Neither the "tibieza" of Iturrigaray's response nor his subsequent inaction was satisfactory to his critics. His promised repression did not materialize, nor his harsh penalties for prepa-

ration or posting of flyers that continued to flutter every dawn at street corners, nor evidence of unannounced (i.e., *extrajudicial)* directives to the Audiencia to take repressive action. Most disturbing to the business community, at a public audience (*dia de Bésamano*) Iturrigaray let drop that the Consulado had expressed its anxiety and that he had replied—or so his remarks were reported three months later by Consulado officials—that "cada uno se defendiera como pudiera." With this, the possibility of rapprochement between merchants and viceroy faded as insecurity spread among "los comerciantes y . . . todos los vecinos ricos, en especial a los Europeos y sus ascendientes que aquí llaman Españoles en contraposición a los Indios y demás castas de color quebrado."[69]

Confusion and Insecurity

If Iturrigaray's imperturbability failed to quiet the fears of the European community, over the next nine days news from abroad along with local developments had Europeans vacillating between euphoria and panic. On Wednesday (10 August) letters carried from Havana probably informed the viceregal establishment and merchants of the aborted effort by Havana's *criollos* to form a *junta superior de gobierno*,[70] on Friday (12 August) the *Gazeta* carried Iturrigaray's *proclama* that a *junta general* in Mexico City had agreed to recognize as sovereign no person other than Fernando, and on Saturday the *Gazeta* announced a forthcoming public celebration of Fernando VII accompanied by instructions from mining magnate José Juan de Fagoaga (of Mexico City's Ayuntamiento*)* on decoration and lighting of the townhouses of the capital city's *casas de carrera*. Saturday also brought the festival of San Hipólyto, when the capital's inhabitants were entertained by Escoiquiz's "comedia intitulada 'La Conquista de Mexico,'" also to mark the fall of Aztec Tenochtítlan to Cortés and his associates. One *peninsular* found the play "obscene" and claimed it lacked unity, was flawed by "lo tosco del verbo y del language," was focused upon "precisamente los aspectos que más chocan a el carácter nacional," and degraded *indios*. Nonetheless, Saturday to Monday found residents of Mexico City celebrating, Europeans and Americans mixed without distinction of class or rank—as a French version later put it, "d'une égalité parfaite et vraiment républicaine," disturbing to some Europeans whose "mermures et . . . mécontentement finirent par troubler la fête."[71]

What began Saturday afternoon for celebrating the unity of colonials and colonialized ended in a bloody incident Monday evening. Perhaps protestations of harmony were mere ritual at the outset, since celebrating

Amerindians were overheard mixing "Long live Fernando" with *sotto voce* "Y mueran los Gachupines."[72] After all, for *indios* it was the celebration of Tenochtítlan's conquest and *their* disaster. Another contemporary source captured the *criollo* spirit of "humanidad y unión con nuestros hermanos Europeos" that evaporated even before Saturday afternoon when "incautos Europeos del comercio," making much of their new militia uniforms as Voluntarios, "comensaron a excluir a los Americanos que no podían uniformarse por su miseria" from their units. The Spanish merchants' clerks complained that poor Mexicans "les ensuciaban sus chaquetas." The result was an "odiosa división de criollo y gachupín" widening despite the viceroy's precautions.[73]

Versions of what next happened coincide on major points.[74] All day Monday groups of Americans and Europeans, often mixed, thronged the streets; in the evening, *caxeros* of *almacenero* Uzcola (partner in the *casa conductora de plata* Uzcola y Michaus) decided to block the entry of celebrating *americanos* into Uzcola's townhouse on the Calle Juan Manuel. An altercation followed ending abruptly when shots were fired into the crowd of Americans below, from a balcony of the Uzcola residence, killing two. *Criollo* historian Lucas Alamán's version stated that the Americans finding their entry blocked began to throw stones and were then fired upon. *Peninsular* López Cancelada, apologist for the Spanish commercial communities of Mexico City and Cadiz and ever ready to drive a wedge between Europeans and Americans, claimed that the *criollos* insulted "Whites, threw stones and invited bloodshed." When a *criollo* acquaintance (Antonio Calleja) of one of the victims went to participate in the wake, he found the *criollos* present embittered. He had to identify himself as "enviado del barrio de Santiago" (an Indian *barrio)*. On leaving, Calleja was told he had been mistaken for a *gachupín* since he wore a *levita azul*, and been sent to indicate regret for the homicide.[75]

The incident reflected the barely submerged dislike and fear separating *peninsular caxeros* from colonial masses, *gachupines* from *criollos*, colonialists from colonized. No official action was taken against Uzcola's employees to dissipate the solidarity of bitterness among residents of the victim's barrio. Thereafter the underground campaign of handbills was stepped up, inducing (27 August) an edict by officers of the Inquisition that denounced "todos y qualesquiera . . . papeles" inciting to "independencia e insubordinación a las legítimas potestades" or to "la heregía manifiesta" of Rousseau's sovereignty of the people.[76] The gravity of the incident was not lost upon General Iturrigaray, who commented on learning of the shootings, "[Si] las cosas hiban a más, él estaría en el Balcón [del palacio virreinal] mi-

rando matarse unos a otros." Now the "Europeos del Comercio" began to stockpile weapons, shot, and gunpowder, exhausting the supplies of local gun shops—so the director general of the powder monopoly reported to the viceroy. Europeans were preparing to defend themselves against "qualquiera que intentase ofenderles."[77]

Faced with perhaps passive and apparently imperturbable Iturrigaray, the *peninsular* merchant community accepted uncritically rumors that he intended to remain viceroy of New Spain, for which he could rely upon "dos mil o tres mil hombres de lazo y machete."[78] Europeans observing Itrurrigaray's amicable relations with *criollo* notables were convinced the *regidores* of the Ayuntamiento and his *confidentes* were bent upon independence and a "gobierno republicano a imitación de las colonias inglesas."[79] Sometime between the night of 15 August and the arrival of representatives from the Junta Suprema of Sevilla at the month's end, some *peninsular* merchants of Mexico City along with emissaries from Veracruz apparently turned to the core of the colonial government's apparatus, the *oidores* of the Audiencia, whose positions—expressed in exchanges with the viceroy and in the Junta General called by him on 9 August—showed them to be critical of his view of the crisis and his plans to resolve it. They turned to *oidores* Aguirre y Viana, Bataller, González Carbajal, and *fiscal* Sagarzurieta to legitimize a preemptive *golpe* against Viceroy Iturrigaray and his circle of *criollo* friends. The paranoia of Mexico City's *peninsular* businessmen, victims of exaggerated anxiety and insecurity, led them to what a contemporary aptly termed "El primer golpe de anarquía que se dió en México,"[80] what a later generation would call a typically right-wing solution—a preemptive *golpe de estado.*

Their move may be viewed in two lights. It was a measure, first, of the precipitous decline of confidence of sectors of the powerful colonial commercial community in government officials in Spain to solve fundamental colonial issues, as well as the perception of the widening gap between Europeos and Americanos. Second, this act of treason by business communities made evident the virtual absence of "liberal" elements in the bourgeoisies of Mexico City and Veracruz, more precisely, in one of the oldest and in one of the newest Consulados of Spain's colonies in America.

8. The Audiencia de México, Iturrigaray, and Talamantes

En toda sociedad hai una Guerra sorda y contínua entre el que manda y el que obedece.
Padre Melchor Talamantes, Mexico City, 1808

Among the *ministros togados* (eight *oidores*, four *alcaldes*, three *fiscales*) forming New Spain's high court or Audiencia in 1808, the *almaceneros* of Mexico City could rely upon a hard core to block formation of a local or colonial congress by Viceroy Iturrigaray and the predominantly *criollo* Mexico City Ayuntamiento. Three among the *oidores*—*ministros togados* Aguirre, Bataller, González Carbajal—would play critical roles between mid-July and mid-September of 1808. Of the three, the youngest was Bataller (fifty-two), the eldest González Carbajal (seventy-three); all born in Spain, they received law degrees from the universities of Granada or Zaragoza and before joining Mexico's Audiencia had served on colonial Audiencias at Manila, Guatemala, or Guadalajara. By 1808 they had served on the Mexico City court an average of 14.6 years, but only one entered the Orden de Carlos III. In terms, then, of provenience, education, and length of colonial service, the three were veteran colonial civil servants who knew the Mexico City milieu and through a variety of family and personal ties were linked to the colonial capital's social and economic elites.[1]

Ministros Togados: Aguirre, Bataller, Carbajal

Key among the three *oidores*—"el capataz de todos los mercaderes de esta capital y su oráculo" as *criollo* Carlos María de Bustamante once bitingly scored—was the Audiencia's *decano*, Guillermo Martínez de Aguirre y Viana, then fifty-six and completing two decades on Mexico's Audiencia.[2]

With a doctorate from the University of Zaragoza, at thirty-one he was *oidor* first at Guadalajara, then was shifted to Mexico City to serve initially as *alcalde del crimen* (1788), later *oidor* (1792). Nephew of a former *oidor* at Mexico City, Francisco Leandro de Viana (conde de Tepa), who married a wealthy landowning *criolla* of New Spain and then retired to Andalusian properties and income from his wife's pulque-producing haciendas in the colony, Aguirre was also related to one of the Audiencia's *fiscales*, Ambrosio Sagarzurieta. When Simón Bolívar passed through Mexico City on the way to Madrid (1799), Aguirre, his host, introduced him to Viceroy Miguel de Azanza. Among Aguirre's friends were the editor of the official *Gazeta de México*, the *peninsular* López Cancelada (Aguirre was *revisor* or censor of the *Gazeta*); José Juan de Fagoaga, a *criollo regidor* who would leak to Aguirre discussions among members of the *A*yuntamiento; Juan Ruiz de la Bárcena, *almacenero* and a consul of the Mexico City Consulado in 1808, and one of those who would petition Iturrigaray in early August of 1808 to suppress the public display of anti-Spanish handbills; and Miguel de Emparán, colonel of the Regimiento de Dragones de España, lodged in Aguirre's home. In light of Aguirre's role in September 1808, Bustamante was probably not hyperbolic when he reported that Aguirre had once quipped in the colonialist mode, "En la América no hay justicia, ni la ha habido, ni conviene que la haya."[3]

Aguirre's collaborator was fellow *oidor* Miguel Antonio Bataller y Ros, like Aguirre from a family in the colonial civil service.[4] In 1808 Bataller and his father (Bataller y Vasco) had a combined colonial service of at least thirty years. The father had been *alcalde del crimen honorario y supernumerario* at Mexico City as of 1778, had risen to *oidor* (1786), and died there nine years later.[5] As *asesor general* of Viceroy Martín de Mayorga, Bataller y Vasco had headed the investigation into an Amerindian uprising (1781) at Izúcar, a reaction of native people to ruthless exploitation by local colonial officials, the *alcaldes mayores*.[6] Bataller y Ros, like his father an alumnus of the University of Granada, made his first appearance in America (1786) on the Audiencia de Guatemala (*fiscal del crimen*); a decade later and following his father's death, he came to Mexico City's Audiencia as *alcalde del crimen*, advancing in 1804 to *oidor*. That year he renewed acquaintance with a former colleague of his Guatemala days, *criollo* Jacobo de Villaurrutia y López Osorio, now *alcalde del crimen* of Mexico City's Audiencia.

The Batallers, father and son, maintained close links to the distinguished Basque mining expert, Fausto de Elhuyar, early director of Mexico City's Colegio de Minería, who recommended (1791) that Viceroy Revillagigedo appoint to the faculty of the Colegio Bataller's other son, Francisco Anto-

nio, then professor of physics at Madrid's Colegio de San Isidro.[7] Further, Miguel Bataller y Ros (the son), became "íntimo, estrecho y confidente amigo" of Elhuyar. When director general of the Tribunal de Minería, Elhuyar grew critical of members of the Guanajuato *criollo* mining elite, notably mine owners marqués de Rayas and Ignacio de Obregón (then the largest borrowers of Tribunal funds), both considered supporters of Viceroy Iturrigaray in the critical weeks from mid-July to mid-September 1808.[8] Whether Miguel Bataller y Ros shared Elhuyar's reservations about *criollo* mine owners' influence in the Tribunal is not known; what is evident is that Elhuyar managed to arrange Bataller's appointment (1809) as *presidente* of the *Juzgado de Alzadas* of the Tribunal (which Rayas opposed), and that tension existed between Audiencia and mining guild.[9] Bataller's old "amigo particular" and friend from their Guatemala City days, Jacobo de Villaurrutia, confided to him sometime between 21 and 29 July his plan to convene a colonial congress at Mexico City bitterly opposed by New Spain's peninsular economic and political elites.[10] In August this project was undoubtedly discussed at "juntas secretas" held in Aguirre's and Bataller's residences attended by representatives of the "comercio de México y sugetos principales excitados por el [comercio] de Veracruz."[11] Bataller's influence among the *oidores* was well known, so much so that when the *criollo* cleric from Peru, Melchor Talamantes, was jailed on 16 September, he wrote desperately to a friend to seek Bataller's intervention in "tratando de cortar este asunto brevemente, y dejándome libre."[12] His desperation was justified.

Along with Aguirre, Bataller rejected the plan of Iturrigaray and many *criollo* notables to convene a colonial congress in August and early September and was reported to have observed during secret gatherings of those differing with the viceroy that "era menester aqui hacer lo mismo que el pueblo de Cádiz con su gobernador."[13] This was a measure of the climate of *golpismo* and *escarmiento* spreading across the Atlantic from metropole to colonies in America; the political elite in the colony of New Spain had readily deciphered the garbled report in the *Gazeta de México* of General Solano's assassination at Cadiz. (An uncompromising, unyielding believer in New Spain's subordination to Spanish authorities in the metropole, *oidor* Aguirre was equally vocal in insisting, "Mientras exista una mula tuerta manchega en España, ésta deberá dominar a los mejicanos.") Even more unrestrained opinions about natives of New Spain ("los americanos son hombres para nada")[14] earned Bataller equally unrestrained venom from opponents, so much so that in 1813 he had to request transfer back to Spain to protect his family from the "hatred of their countrymen who have long wanted to see them dead."[15] This is perhaps what insurgent leader More-

los had in mind when, captured and brought to Mexico City for trial, he quipped on meeting Bataller y Ros face to face, "Ah! Cúanto siento no haber conocido a V. algunos dias antes!"[16]

The most interesting of the three critical *ministros togados* of Mexico City's *oidores* in terms of family and social network in the Spanish empire in 1808 was Ciriaco González Carbajal, at seventy-three the eldest, the only one to have served at Manila in the Philippines.[17] His contacts spanned three disparate areas, Manila, Mexico City, and Sevilla-Cadiz. Although his father came from the Burgos area of north Spain (the jurisdiction of Santo Domingo de la Calzada), his mother was a member of an old Sevillan family; through her he was a *pariente* of the high civil servant Francisco Saavedra and possibly of Viceroy Calleja posted in 1813 by the Regencia to Mexico City. Carbajal earned a law degree at Granada before taking up his first overseas bureaucratic post as *oidor* at Manila (1777). There he also functioned as *diputado-intendente* of the treasury, set up the government's tobacco monopoly, served as director of Manila's Sociedad Económica and established relations with the "montañés poderoso" in Manila's trade, Pedro González de Rivero; in 1802 Carbajal was forwarding funds to a relative, Nicolás González de Rivero at Madrid. At Mexico City he corresponded with an ex-*oidor* of Manila, Viana (conde de Tepa), who had retired to Andalusia, apropos Viana's nephew in the Philippines.[18] At the age of fifty-two in 1787, Carbajal sailed from Manila for Mexico City as *oidor*, serving there for the next twenty-two years. And there he met another of Viana's nephews, *oidor* Guillermo Aguirre y Viana.

At the beginning of his Mexico City tenure, Carbajal had a run-in with New Spain's mining guild. Although Viceroy Revillagigedo recommended Carbajal for one of the profitable commissions on which *oidores* customarily served, as *asesesor* of the Tribunal de Minería, the tribunal blocked the appointment. Somewhat later (1798) when Saavedra was briefly prime minister at Madrid, Carbajal was appointed honorary *consejero de Indias*. Under Viceroy Iturrigaray, Carbajal's status improved measurably as his "consejero de confianza" and "intimo amigo." For example, when the viceroy queried him about the propriety of accepting "gifts" for allocating mercury to mine owners or mercury dealers, Carbajal advised that the gifts were "gajes de los Virreyes, y que todos sus antecesores los habian recibido."[19] Iturrigaray turned to Carbajal in May 1808 to supervise research on New Spain's northern borders with the United States by a Peruvian cleric residing at Mexico City, Melchor Talamantes. So highly did Iturrigaray think of *oidor* Carbajal that, in conjunction with the bishop of Oaxaca, he recommended to Madrid that he be appointed *regente* of the Audiencia. Instead, however, the

conservative minister of Gracia y Justicia José Antonio Caballero preferred Manuel Castillo Negrete.[20]

More important, when in early August 1808 Iturrigaray made clear his determination to hold a local colonial congress to legitimize his government in view of the crisis of authority in the metropole, Carbajal advised his "jefe y favorecedor" ex-officio to avoid such "material muy delicada" and to settle issues by *acuerdo* with the Audiencia since local juntas were both unnecessary and "muy peligrosas."[21] Carbajal's advice coincided with complaints from Mexico City *almaceneros* about Iturrigaray's failure to suppress posting of *pasquines* critical of *peninsulares*. Some leading *almaceneros*, Gabriel Iturbe e Iraeta, Tomás Domingo de Acha, and Antonio Basoco (the colonial capital's wealthiest merchant banker and *decano* of the Basque *partido* in the Consulado), sponsored Carbajal's candidacy for entry into the Orden de Carlos III; Carbajal used the Consulado's Madrid agent to remit funds to his brother in the Hacienda Ministry.[22] Carbajal must have collaborated fully with the *comisionados* of the Junta de Sevilla arriving at Mexico City on 29 August. When he was recalled to Cadiz in early 1810, he was, not surprisingly, welcomed as an "oráculo" whose recommendations were followed in assigning titles of nobility distributed by Viceroy Venegas on arriving at Mexico City in the fateful month of September 1810.[23] His reception at Cadiz was also partly a reflection of the political projection of his brother, Tomás, then *intendente* of Andalusia. In the crisis of Spain's old regime, Ciriaco González Carbajal along with his brother, his brother's friend, Jovellanos, and the merchants of Mexico City and Cadiz, threw in his lot with the imperial status quo.

Support for the political stance of *oidores* Aguirre, Bataller, and Carbajal in 1808 came also from the *fiscales* of the Audiencia, notably *fiscal de lo civil* Ambrosio de Sagarzurieta y García, Galvario y Viana.[24] A distant cousin of *oidor* Aguirre y Viana, Sagarzurieta came from the Basque province of Álava and from the same town (Lagrán) as their common relative, Francisco Leandro de Viana (conde de Tepa). His father, mother, four grandparents, and six great-grandparents were also born at Lagrán; his direct ascendance reveals no colonial service. He attended the universities of Zaragoza and Alcalá, earned a doctorate, was ordained and beneficed, but then left the church for the colonial civil service. In 1786 at age thirty-six, he was *fiscal de lo civil* in the Audiencia de Guadalajara in New Spain, where his distant cousin, Aguirre y Viana, had preceded him. Six years later he moved to Mexico City's Audiencia, first as *fiscal del crimen* (1795), then as *fiscal de lo civil* (1802), and in 1810 *fiscal de hacienda* until 1821. His career at Mexico City would ultimately span three decades.[25]

Sagarzurieta cemented ties to northern Mexico's *criollo* elite. In 1804 he petitioned for permission to marry his two daughters within his Audiencia's jurisdiction, otherwise at his death he would leave "niñas infelices" since he was now a widower and they would be "solas y sin arrimo de nadie," therefore dependent upon a bureaucrat's pension (*monte pío*) both reduced and unreliable.[26] His pessimism was overdrawn, for soon he married a daughter to one of North Mexico's largest landowners and ranchers, also a supplier of cattle on the hoof for Mexico City's slaughterhouses—the *criollo* marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo of the Echeverz y Subiza family. In this sense, he emulated the pattern of his distant relative and former *oidor* Viana, conde de Tepa, who had married into a great landowning family of central Mexico whose estates produced pulque sold through the family's *pulquerías* in the capital.

There is a mosaic—hardly a clear pattern—discernible in the evidence of Sagarzurieta's position as colonial bureaucrat in Mexico City's Audiencia. In 1799 he advocated a hard line with those involved in the "Machete" conspiracy, recommending the death penalty.[27] In the months of *comercio neutro*, 1797–1799, he supported the position of the influential Torre Hermanos's commercial network linking Veracruz and Cadiz, which condemned the entry of neutral ships at Veracruz unloading cargoes of European manufactures; and much later in 1810 he also opposed Havana merchants' reexports to Veracruz. In 1805 Sagarzurieta backed the Consulado of Mexico in justifying those members who transferred to third parties their shops (*cajones, tiendas*) in the Parián at the center city, leased from the Ayuntamiento but transferred to other tenants without the consent of that corporation. Since their nominal rents remained unchanged although the value (and rentals) of the properties inflated rapidly after 1801, the Ayuntamiento lost revenues while those transferring their leases pocketed sizable under-the-table payments (*guantes*) for the transfers.[28]

Sagarzurieta's break with Viceroy Iturrigaray occurred in 1806 when Iturrigaray resolved to tax cattle-on-the-hoof entering the capital in order to finance the Huehuetoca drainage system of the valley of Mexico. Sagarzurieta protested, whereupon Iturrigaray advised that he avoid an obvious conflict of interest "porque su hija está casado con el primogenitor del marqués de San Miguel de Aguayo . . . de los principales abastecedores de México; por lo que su voz no puede ser imparcial en en este asunto, sino la voz de su familia."[29] This and other incidents of Sagarzurieta's partisanship motivated Iturrigaray to write Madrid authorities that he recognized the bonds between "este ministro y sus compañeros . . . ligados . . . por paysanage, amistad y aun intereses." *Paysanage* was an oblique reference to the

Basque background of Sagarzurieta and several *almaceneros*.[30] Such connections to an elite *criollo* family through his daughter's marriage may have led Talamantes to consider him—incorrectly, as it turned out—empathetic to *criollo* viewpoints when in August 1808 he referred to Sagarzurieta as "Ministro que goza la reputación de sabio, honrado y patriota."[31] A trusting Talamantes gave him one of four copies of his project to hold a "congreso nacional" in the colony only to have Sagarzurieta warn him to destroy it for, among other things, its references to popular sovereignty.[32]

In light, then, of the colonial civil servants' career patterns and experiences, family and bureaucratic relations, and their service in an imperial system that furthered and burnished their careers and shaped preferences and loyalties, one can understand their responses and those of the Audiencia, as *the* corporation representing the imperial state, to the unexpected and unsettling news of events in Europe, Spain, and Spain's empire in America in 1808. The fact that an anxiety-ridden, dominant segment of the commercial bourgeoisie in New Spain's capital turned to the Audiencia during August and early September 1808 to resolve the critical issue of colonial governance signifies more than one group of *peninsulares* serving overseas relying upon another. It suggests that Mexico City's *almaceneros* found in the *ministros* of the Audiencia a bulwark of the imperial state system and living symbols of the relationship between a dependent overseas territory and its distant metropole. Only the *oidores*, it would seem, might legitimate the *golpe de estado* contemplated to preserve the relationship between overseas colony and metropole.

In the colony of New Spain, power and authority were concentrated in the Audiencia and in the office of viceroy. Primary was the figure and office of viceroy, who received the largest bureaucratic salary and, along with the emoluments and privileges of high office, bore correspondingly the heaviest responsibility. In a real sense, he personified the imperial presence ("the crown") in the colonial state. In the eighteenth century viceregal tenures averaged about five years; Iturrigaray's immediate predecessors over thirteen years (1789–1802) averaged much less, for there were three viceroys (Branciforte, Azanza, and Marquina) in seven years. Theoretically powerful, viceroys were in practice constrained by legal codes, by "the crown" (i.e., by prime ministers, cabinet secretaries, the Consejo de Indias), and in the colony by the *ministros* on the Audiencia. A frank and graphic portrait of Viceroy Calleja once derided him as "reducido a un hombre lleno de oropeles ('el coco da mudo a los niños') que nada puede decir ni dictaminar, sino al tenor de lo que le aconseja el asesor, de lo que le parece a los Fiscales, de lo que propone el tribunal de cuentas, de lo que apoya la audiencia, y de

lo que decreta la Junta Superior de Real Hacienda."[33] Other factors signal the extent to which viceroys throughout most of the eighteenth century had to rely upon *asesores*, *oidores*, and *fiscales*: the virtual absence of a viceregal archive containing complete, reliable sets of orders, decrees, *cedulas*, and *provisiones* from Madrid or, for that matter, of locally issued legislation (viceregal *bandos*). Behind the relatively transient viceroys stood the eight *oidores*, four *alcaldes*, and three *fiscales* of the Audiencia as councilors, judges, and, for local purposes, legislators.

By 1808 the provenience of *oidores* and subordinates of Mexico's Audiencia was predominately peninsular. Born in the peninsula, the product of the Spanish university system and legal training, conditioned by a secular metropolitan and imperial mentality, *oidores* brought to colonial posts loyalty and dedication to the system that formed them. Occupying posts over years of colonial service before promotion to the Audiencia de Mexico reinforced *oidores*' sense of importance, power, and influence; Audiencias in New Spain and elsewhere were the "core of the administrative system" whose unbroken presence generated a "long line of corporate tradition."[34] An *audiencia* combined multiple roles (critics termed this "la reunión de un poder desmedido en los tribunales de justicia") as highest local court of appeal, as interpreter of legislation created in the peninsula, as creator of local regulatory legislation provisional in nature until confirmed or overruled by Madrid. Most important, an *audiencia* represented administrative continuity far from the imperial core and as such enjoyed a "remarkable degree of freedom and independence."[35]

Over the last half of the eighteenth century beginning under Charles III's ministers, two contradictory currents swirled. One was the trend to modify the geographic provenience of *audiencia* personnel by raising the percentage of peninsula-born *oidores*. This may be interpreted as affirmation of metropolitan hegemony, a policy to curb the influence of the colonial milieu or to forge an imperial civil service with a "federative" mentality—these were not contradictory. After all, Aranda—and he was not alone—fancied an integrated civil service of colonials in peninsular posts and *peninsulares* in colonial posts. At bottom was the assumption that only a Spanish background could ensure peninsular hegemony and loyalty to the imperial system. Running counter to this trend was the presence of added personnel—*asesor general*, *intendente*, Hacienda bureaucrats—who reduced an *audiencia*'s jurisdiction.[36] Sharp differences of opinion between viceroy and *oidores* surfaced between 1797 and 1808, no novelty to be sure; yet one should not overlook Viceroy Miguel de Azanza's conflict with *oidor* Francisco Xavier Borbón over the issue of Azanza's handling of neutral ship-

ping at Veracruz, or Iturrigaray's vigorous effort to block the Audiencia's intervention in the confrontational elections in Mexico City's Consulado in 1807, miffing the "Audiencia como interesada en sostener su autoridad para que se le pasen los autos en que se apela de providencias de gobierno, los fiscales y Asesor General sentidos de que se haya desconfiado de su integridad y luces."[37] Such differences, however, did not break with the basic practice of viceregal consultation with the Audiencia, the consensus of the Real Acuerdo.

Moreover, *oidores* continued to provide a pool from which viceroys drew to oversee local corporations. Supplementary appointments (*comisiones)* provided not inconsiderable additions to regular *oidor* salaries: service on the mining guild, the Consulado, and the protectorate of Indians or as overseer of the property of Spaniards dying intestate (*juez de bienes de difuntos*). And there were possible gifts or bribes to sway judicial opinions in the area of criminal and civil justice. On the other hand, to *criollos* of New Spain in the first decade of the nineteenth century, the Audiencia symbolized metropolitan hegemony, its *ministros* perceived as "una aristocracia peligrosa," and their often arbitrary judgments seen as "repetidas y notorias injusticias . . . por Empleados que no eran nativos de allí, y que sólo habían sido conducidos para hacer su fortuna."[38] The sentiments of *criollo* lawyers trained in Mexico City were summed up by one of them, Bustamante, perhaps overly bitter: "Entré en la carrera de abogado, observé más de cerca la conducta de estos buytres togados, y me desvelaba por el momento en que cayese su dominación."[39]

Yet Bustamante's strictures, understandable in a *criollo* lawyer striving to make his way in Mexico City's *peninsular*-dominated judicial circles, should not minimize the record of distinction made by peninsular members of the Audiencia like *oidor* Eusebio Ventura Beleña, or Ramón de Posada y Soto, *fiscal de hacienda* for thirteen years. Beleña, a native of Alcarrea (Castilla), where he was born in 1736, earned a doctorate in civil and canon law from the University of Sigüenza, intended to take orders, but switched to civil service and a long career in America.[40] As a *subdelegado* under José de Gálvez in the 1760s, he supervised the deportation of Jesuits from the Guadalajara area of New Spain; after four years as *oidor* at Guatemala City (1773–1777), he went to Mexico City, first as *alcalde del crimen*, then *oidor* of the Audiencia. His summary of twenty-three years of civil service in America prepared in 1788 lists nineteen years in New Spain at Puebla, Guadalajara, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Mexico City (here, twelve years).[41] As *oidor* (1784–1792), he also served on the mining guild (*asesor* and later member of its *junta de arreglo*), helped settle the bitter electoral conflict among the Consulado's

merchants (1787), acted as interim viceroy in the five months following the unexpected death of José de Gálvez's brother, Viceroy Matías de Galvez. Testimony to his doctorate in law and abiding interest in jurisprudence was his learned two-volume *Recopilación* published at Mexico City in 1787 and dedicated to the deceased viceroy's son, Miguel de Gálvez y Saint-Maxent. For distinguished service, Beleña was posted to Guadalajara as *regente* of that Audiencia (1792), where he died that year.

Beleña's Mexico City service overlapped (1779–1792) that of equally distinguished and, perhaps ultimately more influential, Ramón de Posada. A native of Oviedo, a fellow Asturian, and relative several times removed of peninsular civil servant and prestigious public intellectual Gaspar de Jovellanos, the relationship was close since both were preoccupied with agrarian issues, Jovellanos even corresponding with Posada apropos his *Proyecto de ley agraria*.[42] While serving at Mexico City, Posada married a sister of the superintendent of the Casa de Moneda, who linked him to Viceroy Gálvez.[43] Like Beleña, Posada as *fiscal de hacienda* churned out or supervised the preparation of an impressive volume of briefs and opinions, in all 29,129 documents by his own count over the period 1781–1787.[44] As *fiscal*, he rejected attempts to fix the price of wheat exports to Cuba (1781–1783) and opposed the practice of selling local colonial posts (i.e., the *tenientazgos* of *alcaldes mayores*); as *juez del juzgado de Indios* he autocratically diverted the funds accumulating in Indian *cajas de comunidad* to the purchase of shares in the government-sponsored Banco Nacional de San Carlos but deftly sidestepped the issue of *comercio libre*'s impact upon the external trade of New Spain when Viceroy Revillagigedo II asked for his evaluation. Posada's relations with Mexico City's peninsular merchant community were excellent, to judge by letters of *almacenero* Gabriel Iturbe e Iraeta thanking Posada for repeated "favores y distinciones" to himself and his relatives; his judicial scrupulosity evoked from the secretariat of the Cadiz Consulado a lament to the effect that "una vez que el Sr. Posada tiene que examinar" an issue, "será asunto largo."[45] Posada was recalled to Madrid in 1793 to take over the Consejo de Indias's New Spain desk (its *fiscalía*), where he supported the effort of reformers Casa Valencia and Aparici to revise the controversial *Ordenanza de intendentes*.[46] Member of the *cámara* (1798) and then *consejero* of the Consejo (1803), he later served as vice-president of the Compañía de Filipinas (1806–1808). In 1808 he rejected Azanza's invitation to attend the French-dominated congress of Bayonne, explaining his refusal to a Mexican resident at Madrid who did attend, José Joaquin Moral y Sarabia.[47]

In general, then, limits upon Audiencia jurisdiction—one of the administrative trends of the late eighteenth-century imperial system—were

counterbalanced by the increase in Audiencia personnel to a complement of fourteen and by the distinction of a few *ministros togados*. In mid-1808, after almost three centuries of operation, *ministros*, whether *oidores*, *alcaldes*, or *fiscales*, of the Audiencia enjoyed a sense of authority and responsibility generated by precedent and tradition since "desde la conquista . . . el consejo de las audiencias, llenas en lo común de ministros de proveded, sabiduría y experiencia, ha sido el que generalmente, ha llevado al término de salud y fidelidad y arreglo de estas posesiones en los acaecimientos de la mayor crisis y conflicto."[48] As *fiscal de hacienda*, Francisco Xavier Borbón phrased the consensus of the Audiencia in August 1808: the colony of New Spain had only to "vivir obedeciendo con sencillez" following the directives issued by the viceroy in consultation "con este Real Acuerdo compuesto de ministros, los más sabios, celosos y prácticos, e integérrimos." It would appear that the *ministros* of the Audiencia were engaged in a kind of bureaucratic resurgence in 1808 to recover a former authority embedded in what *oidores* preferred to call "la Constitución fundamental de estos dominios."[49] Indeed, some *ministros* believed that the colonial *audiencia* represented a surrogate *cortes*, rendering unnecessary Viceroy Iturrigaray's search for a new authority in the form of a colonial assembly of town council representatives of all New Spain at Mexico City—a *congreso nacional*. There did exist a "constitution" in the premodern sense of a corpus of law defining the tie between metropole and colony, hierarchy, status, and function. "Constitutionally" New Spain belonged by conquest to the crown of Castile and was technically not part of "Spain," just as in the peninsula Andalusia was a province conquered and administered by Castilla. Admittedly this was the viewpoint of a peninsula-trained *oidor*, *alcalde* or *fiscal* but not shared by many military officers imbued with late eighteenth-century protonationalism that emphasized the "nation" over its constituent parts.

In 1808 the Audiencia de Mexico would emerge as the critical political corporation endowed with multiple functions. Both as corporate body and through individual *oidores*, it was linked to, and interacted with, metropolitan and colonial interests. One or more of its *ministros* might empathize with positions adopted by the *criollo* elite with whom some, like Jacobo Villaurrutia, were *emparentado*: as a corporation, however, the Audiencia adopted a uniform pattern of loyalty to the imperial system and to the hegemony of the peninsula or, if necessary, to one of its provinces or *reynos*. In the period July to September 1808, Audiencia, peninsular military officers, and peninsular merchants at Mexico City shared a mutual distrust of the loyalty and tactics of *criollos* in Mexico City's Ayuntamiento, the "novilísima ciudad."

Novilísima Ciudad versus Audiencia

The suspicions of *ministros togados* and, no doubt, of resident peninsular merchants were initially aroused by a report that on Friday, 15 July, when news of the Bourbons' abdication had arrived but was not yet published, the Ayuntamiento debated a proposal by one *regidor*, Juan Francisco Azcárate: that the Ayuntamiento swear loyalty only to Fernando, rejecting support for Napoleon or those whom he might designate in his place. Azcárate's proposal was rejected.[50] Yet that night the Audiencia adopted the same proposition, although Iturrigaray may have already thought it should be approved by a local *junta general*.[51] In this fashion began three weeks of interaction between Ayuntamiento and Audiencia, of mounting suspicion and tension, which closed when *oidor* González Carbajal pleaded with Iturrigaray (and failed) to abandon any plan to convene a local *junta general* or *congreso*.

Three days after Viceroy Iturrigaray with Audiencia approval permitted the *Gazeta* to print (on Saturday, 16 July) the official documents detailing the Bourbons' abdication, Mexico City's Ayuntamiento held a *cabildo extraordinario* and, in effect, proposed what it had rejected on 15 July. The proceedings indicated anything but spontaneity. From the outset two *criollos*—who in 1805 had figured prominently as drafters of protest against the Consolidación—*síndico del común* Francisco Primo Verdad y Ramos and *regidor* Juan Francisco Azcárate—expressed the Ayuntamiento's position. Verdad y Ramos led off, proposing the Ayuntamiento formally express support for the viceroy's measures; he was immediately followed by two *regidores*, the marqués de Uluapa and Azcárate, who read *representaciones* that the Ayuntamiento a few days earlier had commissioned. Azcárate's was more fully elaborated and received approval for presentation to Viceroy Iturrigaray. Two major points were made in Azcárate's redolent baroque style: the Bourbons' abdications were null "por ser contra la voluntad de la nación" and, until Charles and Fernando returned to a fully liberated Spain, Viceroy Iturrigaray should remain "provisionalmente encargado del govierno del Reyno." These propositions needed endorsement from the city of "Mexico en representación del Reyno como su metropolis."[52]

That afternoon (19 July) the *cabildo* proceeded to the viceregal palace to present its resolution. Iturrigaray and his staff recognized that reference to "Mexico en representación del Reyno" might strike *ministros togados* as subversive; hence, that afternoon Iturrigaray asked the Audiencia how he should respond, given "la gravedad de estas materias" and their possible effect upon "el público y los ayuntamientos foráneos."[53] The Audiencia re-

sponded predictably on 21 July, bridling at the pretentiousness of the phrase "Mexico en representación del Reyno"; it would have no part of an oath to support the authority of the viceroy since, the *ministros* argued, nothing happening abroad had undercut his authority. The *oidores*' view was circulated "extrajudicialmente" by Mexico City's merchant elite, according to López Cancelada.[54] Iturrigaray supported these views, and there the matter rested. The initiative of Azcárate and Verdad y Ramos had, it seemed, been countered effectively.[55]

However, the *regidores*' pretention to represent the colony of New Spain was revived by reports unexpectedly appearing in the *Gazeta de México* (31 July), of juntas forming in Spain, a *junta superior* at Valencia and, at Sevilla a *junta suprema*. On 1 August the *Gazeta* reprinted a proclamation of Sevilla attacking the political bodies Fernando had confirmed at Madrid before departing for Bayonne, all subsequently collaborating with French authorities, namely the Junta de Gobierno, Consejo de Castilla, as well as the Congress of Bayonne. And the next day appeared Sevilla's declaration of war against France in Fernando's name and, in his absence, in the name of the Junta Suprema de Ambas, clear reference to the Junta de Sevilla. Again the Ayuntamiento seized the initiative. On 3 August in a *representación* to the viceroy, it rebutted the *oidores*' critique. Revealing a new *criollo* sense of importance, the *regidores* reiterated their claim to constitute the "cabeza de todas las Provincias de la Dominación Española en la América Septentrional" ever since the conquest, just as Burgos had remained the leading city of the northern provinces of the peninsula. An oath to support Viceroy Iturrigaray was, the *regidores* claimed, no more than what Sevilla and Valencia had done, and they too, like Mexico, were commanded by a viceroy or captain general and an *audiencia*. Nonetheless the *regidores* tactfully retracted their pretension (it was also tactically wise) to act "en representación del reyno."[56] Two days later (5 August), heartened by the example of juntas proliferating in the metropole, the *regidores* returned to their prior position that "estos exemplos inocentísimos . . . y muy útiles a la Causa pública, presentan lo que debe hacerse en México." At the moment New Spain had to take defensive measures and create governmental bodies with sovereign function ("las autoridades que Mandan"). The *regidores* urged Viceroy Iturrigaray to form a *junta de gobierno* ("realizar el medio adoptado por la España") composed of viceroy, *audiencia*, archbishop, *ayuntamiento*, religious and secular bodies (the mining and merchant guilds), nobility, notable "citizens," and high army officers.[57] For the first time, "citizen" replaced "subject" in public political discourse.

The *regidores*' response to the Audiencia's earlier put-down, by citing the metropolitan juntas as precedent, was ominous enough to the *oidores*. More threatening was the viceroy's handling of the Ayuntamiento's two *representaciones*. He forwarded them to the Audiencia with a new twist, a covering note informing the *ministros* of his decision (phrased unambiguously as "Decidida . . . la convocación de la junta general") to hold the *junta general* proposed; *oidores* were simply to advise under what circumstances the Audiencia would participate, and how the viceroy should handle the meetings.[58] In committing his decision to an official document addressed to the principal corporate political body of the colony, Iturrigaray signaled his was part of a considered policy for what he and others in his entourage foresaw as a deepening crisis of authority in Spain.

Iturrigaray's action must be interpreted, as surely Mexico City's integrated peninsular elites did, as more than an exchange between viceroy and *ministros togados*. Its significance reflects the immediate context. Nine days earlier (27 July) the *Gazeta de México* had published the composition of Madrid's—and imperial Spain's—Junta Suprema de Gobierno, a list including two former colonial viceroys, Azanza (New Spain) and Gil y Lemos (Peru), along with ministers Caballero, Montarco, Amarillas, Árias Mon, and Piñuela—well-known high civil servants, hardly second-rank political placemen. Presumably all had received Fernando VII's approval before he departed from Madrid on the road to Bayonne. Yet on 1 August the *Gazeta* also printed a denunciation of Madrid's Junta Suprema de Gobierno by Sevilla's Junta Suprema, signaling a division of legitimacy in Spain with predictable colonial repercussions—the reaction when news circulated locally of the arrival at Veracruz of the French vessel, *Vaillant*, from Bayonne that generated the rumor that General Azanza might soon replace Iturrigaray as viceroy.[59] Meanwhile, Mexico City's *oidores* probably learned of the manuscript by Melchor Talamantes (years before commissioned by Iturrigaray to research New Spain's borders with the expansionist United States), that spelled out the formation of what he chose to call a "congreso nacional," and which he handed to a *regidor* (Manuel de Cuevas, Moreno de Monroy Guerrero y Luyando, a *criollo*) sometime between 24 and 28 July, requesting he present it to fellow *regidores* of the Ayuntamiento.[60] Further, to clarify his position vis-à-vis Madrid's political leadership, on 28 July Iturrigaray prepared a *carta circular* to the provinces asserting that New Spain's authorities would recognize only Bourbons as the ruling family, a decision shortly to be ratified by "una junta general *que se va a celebrar en Mexico*" (emphasis added). Exactly when the *oidores* first learned of this new commitment is not

known; later they claimed that on 28 July Iturrigaray had abandoned his independent stance for one subservient to "[los] que lo rodeaban [quienes] lograban la oportunidad de alucinarlo."[61]

Certainly Iturrigaray's correspondence with the Audiencia on 5–6 August confirmed *peninsulares*' fears of collusion between viceroy and *regidores*, and of its purpose. Iturrigaray expected an immediate response to the Ayuntamiento's proposal for a *junta general*, and he got it within twenty-four hours. On 6 August the *oidores* advised suspending the call for a *junta general* until rumors of Fernando's presumed safe return to Spain were verified and until Iturrigaray could supply specific details about the corporations to be present, persons, formalities, and aims of the proposed junta.[62] For his part, an impatient viceroy responded the same day, telling the *oidores* (what they surely knew) that the inspiration of the junta was his own and—as if to drive home his independent judgment—not "un pensamiento nuevo" derived from the Ayuntamiento's petitions. In a calculated aside at *oidor* Aguirre, responsible for approving (as official censor) what editor López Cancelada had printed in the *Gazeta* (2 August), he referred to the false report of Fernando's safe return to Spain as without foundation, the product "del deseo o por la vulgaridad de que creo VV. SS. Muy distantes." It was necessary, he insisted, to organize a provisional government or "congreso" of "autoridades y personas más practicas y respectables de todas las clases de esta capital," suitably empowered to adopt "sovereign" measures dealing with "ramos importantísimos" such as "navegación, comercio y minería."[63]

Here, *motu propio*, Iturrigaray had put in the forefront his own preoccupation, and no doubt that of New Spain's *criollo* mine owners, with the immediate future of the colony's key economic sectors, mining and external trade. By striking coincidence, on 5 August just across the straits of Yucatan, Arango y Parreño and the *regidores* of Havana's Ayuntamiento agreed on "la absoluta necesidad de abrir este puerto [Havana] y él de Matanzas, al comercio de los extrangeros amigos y neutrales."[64]

By specifying a provisional government along with leading economic issues to be treated if not resolved, Viceroy Iturrigaray grated a raw nerve of interests in both colonial government and economy, in Audiencia and Consulado, among *ministros* and *almaceneros*. *Oidores* and *fiscales* saw the political preeminence of the Audiencia and what it represented—imperial hegemony of the metropole—undermined, while the capital's merchant elite, apprehensive of Havana's expansionist commercial designs supported in western Yucatan by merchants at Campeche and Mérida, dreaded a revival of *comercio neutro*. That Iturrigaray at Mexico City and Someruelos at Havana simultaneously confronted similar issues of external trade hardly re-

quires collusion as explanation; yet *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz were surely cognizant of the aspirations of the Havana business community. One may speculate that Iturrigaray hoped that a provisional government in New Spain might take positions, which he sensed neither Sevilla's nor Cadiz's interests would tolerate, in order to maintain in New Spain the surface unity of *criollos* and *peninsulares*. Rejecting the *oidores*' objections to a *junta general*, Iturrigaray notified them on Saturday (6 August) that its first meeting to review these issues would be held the following Tuesday morning in the viceregal palace fronting Mexico City's great plaza or *zócalo*, flanked on the palace's left by the offices of the Ayuntamiento.

One *oidor* now made a last-minute effort at friendly dissuasion; on Sunday Ciriaco González Carbajal pressed Iturrigaray to drop his junta project. Carbajal was now senior *oidor* (*decano*) with more than two decades of civil service at Mexico City. Perhaps their birth and formative years in lower Andalusia (the Cadiz-Seville area) explain the apparently cordial relationship established as soon as Iturrigaray took up his post at Mexico City. Carbajal had another, a collective dimension: a senior colonial bureaucrat in his own right, he was also part of the politico-bureaucratic family elites rooted in the metropole. Tomás, his brother, was at this time well-known poet, intellectual, and friend of fellow civil servant Gaspar de Jovellanos. Assigned to the Hacienda de Indias in the 1790s, Tomás supported the creation of new Consulados in America (e.g., at Caracas) and corresponded about that issue with his distant relative and then intendant at Caracas, Francisco Saavedra. Interest in economic policy may explain his joint appointment (with Vicente Alcalá Galiano) as censor of the widely respected *Correio mercantil de España y sus Indias*, one of the significant innovations of the early years of Charles IV's reign. (Tomás, later joined at Cadiz by Ciriaco, would loyally serve Regency and Cortes, 1810–1813.) In brief, Ciriaco González Carbajal was well positioned to make a last effort to block the convening of a colonial junta by his "gefe y favorecido," Viceroy Iturrigaray. This, to be sure, does not eliminate the possibility that fellow *oidores*, Aguirre y Viana or Bataller y Ros, may also have so recommended.

In analyzing Carbajal's letter of Sunday (7 August), one is struck by the impact of the formation of juntas at Sevilla and Valencia on Mexico City's political elite. Carbajal had to prove the irrelevance of those juntas to New Spain's situation. In the peninsula the Bourbons had been removed, the spontaneous juntas automatically became the nation's "cabeza," and their few members (*vocales*) insured ready agreement. In New Spain, to the contrary, the political order had not been challenged; in fact, it would be dangerous to assemble many representatives ("multitud de vocales"). Bitterness

might be generated among those colonial "cuerpos" not invited to send representatives; and were no consensus achieved in the course of debate, "males inevitables" would ensue as differences were transformed into party issues. Carbajal closed by assuring Iturrigaray that his motives—presumably the search for unity in authority—were above question, "pero acaso en los medios puede consistir el mal."[65] Carbajal's cryptic "el mal" and "males inevitables" may have been an oblique expression of his support for the preoccupied *almaceneros* of Mexico City's Consulado, who, it must be recalled, had petitioned Viceroy Iturrigaray only the previous day (6 August) to order police action against distributors of handbills urging *criollos* to attack *peninsulares*. Iturrigaray's projected *junta general* scheduled for Tuesday, 9 August, threatened to legitimize the grievances of Mexico City's *criollo* elites by providing them a public forum. Carlos María de Bustamante's awareness of the obvious tension between "americanos y europeos" and of the viceroy's differences with Audiencia and Consulado over how to control the scheduled junta were probably behind his subsequent recollection that "preví desde principios de agosto de 1808 el espantoso rompimiento que iba a haber entre americanos y europeos."[66]

It is not known if Iturrigaray answered Carbajal (the presumption is that he did). On Monday (8 August), thirteen *ministros* of the Audiencia (one failed to sign) reluctantly advised the viceroy that they would attend a *junta general* scheduled for the next day, although circumstances, they felt, did not warrant it. They rejected responsibility for its possible outcomes and—further reflection of preoccupation with Sevilla's position—reiterated the need to "obedecer" Sevilla's Junta Suprema or any other in Spain claiming sovereignty.[67] This was a last-minute effort to block calling for either an assembly of Mexico City's notables or its probable sequel, a colonial congress. Like the *peninsulares* in government and business, the *ministros togados* recognized growing support for such a congress since 5 August when the *Gazeta* had published a resolution to this effect passed by Veracruz's Ayuntamiento.[68] And that evening at the Mexico City townhouse of the intendant of San Luis Potosí, one of the *oidores*, the *criollo* Árias de Villafañe, was told by Melchor Talamantes, "La junta de mañana es dirigida a que Vmds, no son nadie."[69]

Iturrigaray's Junta General

Undeterred, Iturrigaray went ahead with his plan, and on Tuesday, 9 August, he opened what was surely the most notable assembly ever called in the capital of New Spain in almost three hundred years. In the gathering of

seventy-four were four *criollo* mine owners (three from Guanajuato—Joaquin and Ignacio Obregon, and José Mariano de Sardaneta y Legazpi—and one from Pachuca, Romero de Terreros) and five *almaceneros*. Among the latter were the *decanos* of the *montañés* and *vizcaíno* partidos in the Consulado (Francisco de la Cotera and Antonio Basoco), Basoco's brother-in-law and cousin (the second marqués de Castañiza married to a member of the Fagoaga mine-owning family), and Vicente Gómez de la Cortina (second conde de la Cortina) and Tomás Domingo de Acha. Castañiza and Cotera were natives of New Spain. Other than the viceroy, no military officers were listed.

At the outset Iturrigaray took charge, prefacing his address by pointing out that the seating arrangements of corporations and individuals "cuya colocación y orden de asientos" would be kept to avoid prejudicing "los derechos de preferencia y distinción que cada uno conservaría ilesos." Pointedly Iturrigaray sought to cultivate the ceremonial symbolism of political hierarchy: on his right were seated *oidores* and *fiscales* representing the most important colonial political body; on his left were archbishop, cathedral canons, and inquisitors representing the colonial ecclesiastical establishment; and between them, facing the viceroy, the Ayuntamiento and "demás empleados, gefes y concurrentes." In what was described as a "discurso enérgico,"[70] Iturrigaray set the tone of discussion, emphasizing that strength ("fuerza") derived from "union" and planning, that "virtú" did not consist of sheer impetuosity, and that it was necessary to consider the Ayuntamiento's proposals. He was followed by the *síndico del comun* of the Ayuntamiento, Verdad y Ramos, who in turn was rebutted "con diversos fundamentos" by the Audiencia's three *fiscales* (Robledo, Sagarzurieta, Borbón). Neither the minutes (*acta*) nor the published version of the sense of the meeting (*proclama* of 12 August) provided details of the content of Verdad y Ramos's address or of the *fiscales*' counterpoints, but these may be gleaned from the written exposition that the *fiscales* would prepare months later.

The kernel of the meeting's *acta* and *proclama* was a careful, even artful, legal definition of forms by which New Spain's political corporations might choose to accept Sevilla's or any other metropolitan junta as *suprema* over Spain and its Indies. By an "impulso general" (so the *acta* reads), the Junta General would swear to recognize as *supremas* only those "inauguradas, creadas, establecidas, o ratificadas por . . . Fernando VII, o sus poderes legítimos."[71] The definition of terms of recognition appears to indicate a spontaneous yet clearheaded approach. Nonetheless, to some of the colony's political elite like *intendente* Riaño in New Spain's important min-

ing town of Guanajuato, who carefully analyzed every nuance of the *acta*, the definition might generate "alguna siniestra inteligencia que conviene evitar."[72] Implicit in his *oficio* to Iturrigaray before circulating the *acta* in his intendancy was Riaño's judgment that the definition might undermine what the elites in his jurisdiction valued, "la unión estrecha con la junta o juntas supremas existentes en nuestra peninsula." It is significant that the *proclama* made only the most oblique reference to Iturrigaray's intention to hold a *junta general* of representatives of the principal jurisdictions of New Spain, encoded in the cryptically worded last paragraph referring to future developments that would require "otras tantas providencias."[73]

To the *ministros togados* of the Audiencia, to merchants' representatives and others present at the Junta General who were dedicated to the preservation of peninsular interests, what probably generated lasting anxiety were not just the constraints on recognition of Sevilla's Junta and references to the Ayuntamiento's (rather than the Audiencia's) spontaneous expression of loyalty to Fernando VII.[74] More troubling, minutes (*acta*) and *proclama* had omitted that the Ayuntamiento's *síndico* Verdad y Ramos, despite "general desaprobación" had revived the Ayuntamiento's plea for a colonial assembly to fill the vacuum of authority produced by Fernando's imprisonment.[75] At the Junta of 9 August, the three *fiscales* of the Audiencia offered an unrehearsed rebuttal that months later they refined in writing. Given the generally repetitious nature of their argument, a summary does not distort the individual presentations.[76] Their rejection of a local, colonial junta, they claimed, was based upon the reasoning that conditions in New Spain differed from those of Spain: consequently there was no basis for citing Spain's *ley de partida*, which applied only to a "pueblo que tiene el derecho de juntarse en Cortes." To the contrary, New Spain along with all Spanish America constituted a "pueblo subordinado" acquired by the "derecho privilegiadísimo de conquista" and therefore was "una verdadera colonia de nuestra antigua España"; colonials need only "vivir y gloriarse en la dependencia, sumisión y obediencia las más profundas." From the standpoint of the Audiencia, moreover, the legal framework of "dependencia" was far from oppressive because—in the words of one *fiscal*—"gritan la amabilidad y dulzura de nuestra legislación, cuyo suavísimo yugo han besado siempre fieles desde la conquista admirando . . . una quietud y sucesiva prosperidad inalterable." *Criollo* lawyer Bustamante, who heard fiscal Borbón so express himself, reported this "nonsense" was delivered with "aquel garbo y brio que da la ignorancia auxiliada de una voz altisonante y pulmonar."[77]

By law, then, New Spain as colony lacked the "derecho a ser convocado, y asistir con voto" to a *cortes* to be convened in the metropole.[78] Fur-

ther, to assemble in the colony, a junta of representatives would lead to "monarquía popular"—a small step from the dangerous concept of popular sovereignty ("opinion sediciosa y crimen de verdadera traición")—and to ideas disseminated by the likes of Rousseau and Montesquieu. Such ideas merited proscription since by permitting the individual to participate in the selection process of a ruler ("*príncipe*"), they contributed to "libertad y independencia"—and independence was at the root of original sin. As recent events in France had shown, liberty and independence in tandem undermined religion and state, throne and property, in seeking a "chimerical and impracticable" equality.[79] The chain mail of state and church, authority and faith so typical of Spain's old regime was uppermost in the peninsula-formed mentality of the *fiscales*.

From such considerations two conclusions flowed. Since the legitimacy of New Spain's political structures and leaders was unquestioned and unaffected by the metropole's instability, the viceroy retained broad powers, needing no new authority or legitimacy conferred by a local assembly. Even in matters normally outside viceregal jurisdiction, the "Constitución fundamental de estos dominios" allowed for viceregal action providing he obtained prior consent from the *ministros* of the Audiencia, "los más sabios, celosos y prácticos, e integérrimos."[80] Second, until the return of Fernando VII to Spain, the colony of New Spain had to subordinate itself to Sevilla's Junta Suprema or any other in Spain that "represente legitímamente la soberanía."[81]

This, however, was precisely what the viceroy and presumably his supporters among the *regidores* hoped to avoid. Eleven days after the Junta General, Iturrigaray prepared a memorandum (*minuta)* setting forth the decisions taken there and addressed pointedly to Sevilla as merely another *junta de gobierno*. After stating the terms agreed upon for New Spain's recognition of junta or juntas as *supremas*, he noted that Sevilla ("ese congreso") lacked the requisites of sovereignty. To be sure, Sevilla's Junta had yet to make any specific claim to sovereignty, and even the Audiencia's members might grudgingly accept Iturrigaray's position. Here, however, the exercise of viceregal authority stemming from conflict over legitimacy in the metropole threatened to become discretionary to *ministros togados* and *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz, who were suspiciously tracking decisions, actions, and ceremonial of viceroy and confidants, real or presumed. Not only did Iturrigaray question Sevilla's claim to hegemony as *suprema*; he also questioned Sevilla's authority to negotiate international arrangements—"el ajuste de una Pas sólida y duradera" with England as reported in the *Gazeta de México*. In the *monarquía*'s current weakened situation, his *minuta* in-

sisted unequivocally, Sevilla should not "cierre tratado alguno definitivo con respecto a esta América antes de que examinado por mí . . . preste mi anuencia y consentimiento."[82] This phrasing was deliberately opaque, yet it is possible to speculate that Iturrigaray and others hoped to forestall Sevilla and Cadiz groups from yielding extraordinary concessions in commercial agreements with England.

If the contents of this memorandum were leaked by peninsular postal officials (as often occurred), the Audiencia could readily tie Iturrigaray's statements to those expressed directly to the *ministros togados* two weeks earlier concerning decisions to be made about critical issues of economic policy, such as "navegación, comercio y minería." The closing lines of Iturrigaray's memo indicated he was ready to make "otras tantas providencias" that contingent developments might require.[83] Indeed, Iturrigaray, his staff members and associates must have agonized in formulating his memo to Sevilla's Junta, for one month later he expatiated voluntarily on why "la Junta de Sevilla havía de contar con él para la paz que se hiciese con Inglaterra." To quote fully from someone in the carriage bearing Iturrigaray—accused by the Audiencia of treason—and his family to Veracruz for deportation to Cadiz, Iturrigaray is reported to have feared "que se podía hacer en este Reyno un comercio sobresaliente, mandando Buques de aqui . . . para todas partes, no admitiendo embarcación de otros Reynos; y que de éste podían llevar cueros, azúcares, algodon, grana y añil." Merchants in New Spain might even be able to bypass Manila merchants to trade along the China coast. Moreover, his cautionary measures would neutralize having a Bourbon from Naples come to New Spain as had been rumored, "pues si venía él [Genaro] de Nápoles, estarían con él comerciantes Yngleses, y serian dueños de nuestro comercio y que esto veríamos pronto."[84] Overtones of colonial Brazil's experience following the arrival of the Portuguese royal family in late 1807? Or Iturrigaray's refraction of the writings of the Peruvian cleric-intellectual researching the border question with the United States, whose political manuscripts were now circulating in the capital?

"Espíritu inquieto": Talamantes

By midsummer of 1808, Melchor Talamantes y Baeza was a mundane cleric-intellectual circulating at the margin of the capital's political and commercial elite networks; he could savor not only the opinions of the petty bourgeoisie frequenting the milieu of Mexico City's busy Portal de Mercaderes, its shops, cafés, and public card-playing "casas de diversion"

but also, in the corridors of the nearby viceregal palace, rubbing shoulders with members of the viceregal secretariat, with *regidores* and *oidores*. Born at Lima in 1765, he was put in the care of a Fray Manuel de Alcocer y Yzaguirre between the age of ten and fourteen when he "tomó el hábito." He earned a doctorate in theology at the Universidad de San Marcos and, apparently well connected to Lima's elite circles, worked on official matters ("los negocios que se despacharon") for then viceroy Gil y Lemos (or so he claimed). In 1795, as a member of the Orden de la Merced, he was assigned and accepted income from a trust fund (*capellania*) ceded by a cleric, perhaps an uncle, presbyter Miguel Baeza. Three years later he left Lima for Spain under circumstances still unclarified. He may have slipped out of Lima to avoid imprisonment for embezzling his convent's funds—the version offered by clerics in Mexico City (Beristáin y Souza, Manuel Mercadillo, Andrés Bonilla) who disliked him. He stayed at the Mercedarian monastery in Guayaquil, then obtained travel documents from Guayaquil's governor before proceeding to Mexico City. Another version has it that he left Lima for Spain intending to obtain permission to leave his order. Or he may have simply found constraining his "espíritu inquieto y bullicioso" the religious conformity of his order; if one may trust Beristáin, Talamantes was ever ready to join in any "chisme, asonado o insurrección, *tam intra, quam extra claustro*." In 1799 he entered the capital of New Spain, presented his papers—certification of his Lima degree, permission to leave the Lima monastery of his order, plus travel documents—to Viceroy Azanza, who then asked Mercadillo to treat him as a guest at Mexico City's Convento de la Merced. There Talamantes produced his *patente* signed by the Lima provincial of his order, indicating Talamantes intended to proceed to Spain at the end of hostilities between Spain and England. He maintained correspondence with his mother and relatives at Lima, still receiving their letters in 1808.[85]

Details of Talamantes's activities over the next six years are fragmentary. If we are to believe his highly critical superiors at the Merced, friars Mercadillo and Bonilla, Talamantes performed his religious duties perfunctorily ("no asistío a actos de comunidad") and months passed without his celebrating mass, although he liked to prepare sermons. A sermon ("Panegirio") on Santa Teresa seems to have evoked contradictory responses; Mercadillo judged that it contained observations "insultantes a hombres piadosos" and ordered that they be eliminated before preaching, although a fellow cleric found his work substantial. Predictably the straightlaced provincials of the Merced found him an undesirable guest—"amigo de disenciones y discor-

dias; díscolo, altanero, sobervio, atrevido, amante de insultar a los sugetos más condecorados, de mayor lustre y honor en la religión," one who had acquired a "mal nombre por espíritu inquieto, revoltoso y fascinante."

Others entertained a more complimentary opinion of this restless cleric-intellectual who, "por sus vastos conocimientos se le detuvo al pasar por aquella capital [Mexico City] con destino a Europa."[86] Talamantes confessed he was an inveterate writer constantly jotting down thoughts on "la mayor parte de lo que bien medita," which earned him the reputation of "literato" (even critics acknowledged his "alguna instrucción" and high opinion "entre no pocas gentes"), which brought him into contact with Padre Juan Ignacio Villaseñor y Cervantes, probably a relative of the marqueses de Guardiola (Cervantes y Cevallos), and led to an invitation to frequent the *tertulias* in their townhouse as well as *tertulias* of another elite criollo family, the marqueses de Uluapa (Acevedo y Cosío). (The marquesa de Uluapa was a frequent companion of Viceroy Iturrigaray's wife.) When the ex-intendant of Puno (Peru), Colonel José González y Montoya, passed through Mexico City in transit for Spain in February 1807, he was hosted by *oidor* Jacobo Villaurrutia "por la Antigua amistad de nuestras familias." There he met Talamantes, who often came to "hacer la partida de Tresillo." Talamantes impressed González with his knowledge of Lima's *casas ilustres*, of New Spain in general, and his research on New Spain's northern boundaries, and González therefore consulted Talamantes frequently in preparing his travel memoirs. To González, Talamantes's status in the capital was enviable: Talamantes mixed with the "primeros Sugetos de México," frequented the "primeras casas," carried himself well, displayed his "talento e instrucción superiores" to advantage—in brief, confessed the colonel, "no me pesaba tal compañero." González also frequented the Mexico City townhouse of another eminent *criollo*, the Guanajuato mining magnate marqués de Rayas.[87]

In 1808, nine years after entering the capital of New Spain, Talamantes—politically engaged, articulate, argumentative, and probably indiscrete—moved comfortably at various social levels. At a lower level there was José Ibargoyen, fifty year-old bachelor, retired from a post in Hacienda, who joined Talamantes in *tertulias* over six years (1799–1805) at the home of a Juan Ayarzagoitia. Talamantes valued Ibargoyen's friendship, referred to him as an honorable *vizcaíno* of philosophical bent, just as he prized contacts with Padre Juan Ignacio Villaseñor y Cervantes. Among other acquaintances was *reloxero* Ramon Blasio, a *madrileño*, whom Talamantes probably met exercising his penchant for conversation "al encuentro en el

Portal [de Mercaderes], en la Plaza, o en algun caxón de mercaderías con algun o algunos amigos."[88]

At the next and slightly higher level Talamantes was on friendly terms with the director of the Renta del Tabaco and *consejero honorario de Hacienda* Silvestre Diaz de la Vega (from whom he borrowed books), with wealthy *criollo* mine owners Colonel Ignacio Obregón and the marqués de Rayas (Sardaneta y Legazpi), and with New Spain's wealthiest merchant banker, the *peninsular* Antonio Basoco, whom Talamantes once praised as "Europeo del mayor honor: hombre poderoso y benéfico, amigo." Also Talamantes utilized the services of the Murphy brothers, Tomás and Mateo, Veracruz merchants with connections to the *criollo* mining elite of Guanajuato. However, from the viewpoint of Mexico City's troubled *oidores* and *almaceneros* in mid-1808, most troublesome were Talamantes's contacts with the *criollo regidores* of the Ayuntamiento. In the salons of the marqueses de Uluapa and Guardiola, Talamantes could chat with *regidores* Manuel Cuevas Moreno de Monroy Guerrero y Luyando (brother-in-law of the marqués de Uluapa), Juan Francisco de Azcárate y Lezama, and Francisco Primo Verdad y Ramos.[89] The marqués de Guardiola was captain of the viceregal guard, the Compañía de Alabarderos, and welcomed Talamantes as a frequent visitor at his soirées on the recommendation of surgeon Felix Villagrán, who praised Talamantes "qualidades oratorias." Talamantes was certainly known to all the *regidores*, who, in 1807 "por una libre y espontánea oferta," certified "sin excepción de alguno" his excellent qualities in a reference forwarded to Madrid. Finally, at the highest level, there were Talamantes's contacts with *ministros togados* of the Audiencia, *fiscal de lo civil* Sagarzurieta ("un amigo respectable, de cuya sinceridad, honor, bondad y buena fe estoy tan convencido") and *alcalde del crimen* Jacobo Villaurrutia who came from a *criollo* family of extended social connections. Talamantes also knew Villaurrutia's brother, Ciro, a *prebendado* of the Mexico City cathedral. Was Talamantes boasting when he claimed that he often played cards with "quatro o cinco Señores Ministros con quienes ha tenido el honor de concurrir"?

Talamantes's obvious qualities of "literato"—intellectual, conversationalist, politicized cleric—led Viceroy Iturrigaray to give him two official assignments on viceregal affairs.[90] While there is no evidence of direct contact between viceroy and Peruvian cleric, the official posts may have facilitated Talamantes's contacts with the viceregal staff and perhaps with Iturrigaray's chaplain, French-born Juan Saint. The first appointment came when Jacobo Villaurrutia, also coeditor with *criollo* lawyer Carlos María de Bustamante of the *Diario de Mexico* founded in 1805, needed a censor to check materials

submitted for publication; Talamantes was recommended to Villaurrutia as "uno de los literatos mas visibles en dignidad y literatura" and "más a propósito para el cargo de censor."[91] In his capacity as censor, Talamantes often visited Villaurrutia's residence, visits that tapered off, claimed Villaurrutia, following Talamantes's second official assignment in January 1807. On orders from Madrid first issued in 1805, Iturrigaray needed a qualified person to establish the "verdaderos antiguos límites orientales y septentrionales" of northern New Spain with the vast Louisiana territory just sold by France to the United States. Iturrigaray, to whom Talamantes was recommended as a person "de talento y una instrucción muy finos," designated Talamantes as "comisionado principal" of the boundary commission along with an assistant, naval officer González López de Haro.[92]

Talamantes's research led him to accumulate manuscripts located in viceregal and religious archives as well as books, to study English (he owned a "Gramática Ynglesa"), to hire a *criollo* copyist, and to draft a research design or "plan" of his forthcoming report. Discovering that Madrid's repositories held "una gran copia de noticias antiguas y modernas" covering his area of research, he requested the materials through official viceregal channels; but perceiving delays in processing this demand and the required approval (*vista*) of the *fiscal de lo civil*, a never-shy Talamantes wrote directly to Spain's prime minister and foreign affairs secretary, Pedro Cevallos, enclosing a copy of his petition. Here we learn he had been researching official correspondence between Mexico City and Madrid over the period 1785–1798, covering both royal orders received and "cartas por la vía reservada."

Meanwhile his research activities exacerbated Talamantes's barely amicable relations with members of the capital's ecclesiastical establishment. His request through formal channels to consult local copies of Raynal and Robertson—both on the Inquisition's *Index*—were denied by officers of the Inquisition, Prado y Ovejero and Sainz de Alfaro y Beaumont (nephew of the archbishop of Mexico, Lizana y Beaumont); other volumes he managed to borrow from acquaintances, Villaseñor y Sanchez's *Teatro Americano* from Díaz de la Vega and the Spanish translation and abridgment of Adam Smith from Villaurrutia's uncle, *regidor* José María Fagoaga[93] (an acquaintance of the recent visitor to New Spain, Alexander von Humboldt, and godson of Antonio Basoco's uncle and father-in-law, marqués de Castañiza). In turn, Fagoaga, from an old *criollo* family long involved in Guanajuato and Zacatecas mining enterprises and the management of Mexico City's mint, was close to other *criollo* mine owners, such as the marqués de Rayas. On the other hand, Talamantes's research commission liberated him from conventual residence and the Merced's discipline; his evident need of

working space to house research materials and to accommodate a copyist justified moving from the Merced to a nearby apartment, where he kept up a daily writing schedule until 11 a.m. after which he would circulate in the center city for two hours, followed by more work until early evening. Again he would leave his residence between 6 and 10 p.m. to visit and chat with friends.

Some sixteen months after his appointment to the boundary commission, Viceroy Iturrigaray ordered Talamantes to hasten preparation of his final report and reduce requests for research materials in the viceregal files ("libros del archivo").[94] In late May 1808 he was directed to contact the Audiencia's *oidor decano*, Ciriaco Gonzalez Carbajal, who would henceforth oversee his research; Talmantes, however, simply neglected for weeks to report, to Carbajal's obvious annoyance. In fact, Talamantes abandoned boundary research once news of the Escorial affair of late October 1807 began to circulate in New Spain, officially reported in the *Gazeta de México* of 9 June, but probably known from private correspondence weeks earlier. In Mexico City's intensely politicized elite circles, few could avoid inferences of widespread destabilization in the metropole on reading in the same edition of the *Gazeta* about the Escorial affair and its inevitable sequel, Charles IV's abdication at Aranjuez five months later. This opened an extraordinary period in the history of New Spain when for the first time "se trataba en Mexico la materia [a policy for the colony] . . . en conversaciones particulares que no podían ocultarse al Govierno y"—as Talamantes insisted—"a los Señores Ministros de la Real Audiencia."

One week after news of the abdications at Bayonne appeared in the *Gazeta* of 16 July, Talamantes was putting finishing touches on one manuscript followed later by a second, both dealing with policy recommendations for the colony of New Spain during Spain's crisis of authority. In the weeks after the 9 August Junta or possibly earlier, *ministros* and *almaceneros* must have learned from those present at *tertulias* in the *palacios* of the capital's wealthy *criollo* families that the Peruvian Mercedarian, Melchor Talamantes, was circulating to select *regidores* and *ministros togados* position papers sketching his views about holding a "congreso nacional" in the colony—views that at some point seemed to match those of *criollo regidores* and Viceroy Iturrigaray, and that "le hacían sospechoso a los . . . que veían las cosas muy en claro."[95]

9. Melchor Talamantes: *Criollo* Exponent of New Spain's Interests

La independencia de las Américas no las salbaría de otra dependencia muy infeliz.
Talamantes in García, ed., *Documentos históricos mexicanos*

[Talamantes] trazó al Virrey la idea de llevar a efecto la celebración de Cortes apesar del dictamen del Acuerdo. Audiencia de México to Madrid, 18 November 1813

In the course of ransacking Talamantes's rooms in the morning following the coup of 15 September, Mexico City's security forces found among his spare furnishings manuscripts, periodicals, and books.[1] Obviously he had been ruminating about the extraordinarily disturbing news of Spanish, European, and U.S. developments and refining his interpretation, for his three principal manuscripts (only one bore a date) were, one may deduce, completed in about three weeks after 23 July. The manuscript of "Congreso Nacional del Reyno de Nueva España" is dated 23 July but was sent to *regidor* Manuel Luyando ("uno de los miembros más beneméritos")[2] one month later, on 24 August, for presentation to the Ayuntamiento; this manuscript had been inspired by the Ayuntamiento's session of 19 July when there had been floated the possibility of forming a colonial assembly.[3] Opposition from *ministros* of the Audiencia during the first *junta general* (9 August)—when "un Ministro," whom Talamantes once called "sabio, honrado y patriota" and later identified as Guillermo de Aguirre, had posited that New Spain as a colony had no claim to "representación nacional ni puede congregarse en Cuerpo para organizarse y regenerar su Código Legislativo"—had inspired Talamantes's rebuttal in the form of a second major manuscript, "Representación Nacional de las Colonias. Discurso Filosófico."[4] Internal evidence suggests it was rapidly drafted in three to four days (11–14

or 15 August) although the dedication to the Ayuntamiento as "capital del reyno" bears the date of 25 August. Talamantes with some foresight had signed the manuscript of the "Congreso" with the initials T.M.F., and to the "Representación" affixed "por Yrsa Verdadero Patriota."[5]

The rapidity with which Talamantes drafted the "Representación" in three days in mid-August measures in part his effort after 23 July to organize his thoughts (at least so he confessed in prison) about ways to reinforce "más y más la unión de las Américas con la España" and to marshal arguments "a favor de la influencia de la España sobre sus Colonias" as well as for and against "independencia."[6] Since these points were part of his confession in a manuscript drafted in the prison of the Inquisition, 28–29 September, he emphasized his intention to refute accusations of supporting New Spain's independence; he could be trapped, otherwise, by any ambiguity in his seized papers.[7] His approach was sketched out in prison as "Plan de la Obra Proyectada," which—he confessed to his interrogators—he had intended for publication with a subsidy to be provided by "un Europeo del mayor honor; hombre poderoso y benéfico, amigo," elsewhere identified as a merchant banker, the *criollized peninsular* and *encartado* Antonio Basoco. The "Plan," he said, was the focus of "todos sus apuntes, reflecciones y meditaciones," so much so that it "tenía embebida su alma."[8]

Other, more general factors permitted Talamantes quickly to draft his major manuscript. By the second half of July 1808 he no longer needed further research and reflection. His sequestered books and papers suggest he had acquired an uncommon knowledge of the history of New Spain and certainly of its northern provinces,[9] of the composition of the colony's civil and religious hierarchy, and of the perennial, now heightening friction between *criollos* and *peninsulares*, colonials and colonialists, over office, status, and income. Research in the legislative records and correspondence in the viceregal archive had alerted him to a wide variety of local and metropolitan issues. As for the sources of his political philosophy, they were probably the authors in his library, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the Spanish priest Nuix; practical politics he may have gleaned from his interest in the background and recent history of the United States, the course of the French Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath, and Spanish political institutions and processes.

Contacts with the *criollo* elite in Mexico City and correspondence with many outside the capital (with Roque Abarca, *intendente* of Guadalajara)[10] sensitized him to a spectrum of the colony's economic problems that bedeviled mine owners and merchants alike: an assured supply of inputs like mercury (his papers included a volume of "Reprecentaciones del Tribunal

de Minería");[11] the highly inflated cost of basic imports of goods and wares such as textiles, hardware, wines, and brandies; and the large outflow of silver to cover deficits on current account aggravated since 1806 by peso remittances to the metropole generated by the enforcement of the Consolidación—in short, decapitalization of the colony. It is significant that among his sequestered papers was a translation of Thomas Jefferson's recent presidential message (2 December 1807)[12]—news already traveled fast—urging the U.S. Congress to pass the Embargo Act, whose operation was drying up New Spain's imports from U.S. ports. Hence the prominent role in Talamantes's analysis of the United States as temporary commercial intermediary, not to register the troublesome reexports from the "Isla de la Habana." Finally, he had acquired a healthy respect for England's commercial development and its international influence, for he cited England's dominating effect upon Portugal since the seventeenth century when that country had slipped from Spanish control only to "pasar en cierta manera de una dominación a otra" bearing along "los grandes tesoros del Brasil."[13] This he must have culled from what he claimed was a borrowed copy of *The Wealth of Nations* from the library of José María Fagoaga (found among his books) that he hoped "podía auxiliarle con sus ideas económico-políticas y ministrar algunas reflecciones útiles en lo que este autor trata de Colonias."[14] Talamantes was no superficial reader and his reference to Adam Smith indicates he must have examined his chapters on "Digression on Silver," on the "Mercantile System," and especially on "Causes of Prosperity," where Smith praised "the most perfect freedom of trade . . . between the British colonies of America and the West Indies." The issues that interested this Peruvian cleric-intellectual could cause concern among Mexico City's *almaceneros*.

Talamantes's view of colonial economic issues and their solution could logically be construed by peninsular commercial interests in Mexico City as indicators of the *criollo* elite's disaffection with the state of the Spanish transatlantic system. In his "Congreso Nacional" of 23 July, Talamantes advocated a colonial assembly on the ground that such a body alone could legitimately authorize "la abertura de mil canales de abundancia y comodidad que permanecen obstruídos"—a hyperbole that could immediately disturb Mexico City's *almaceneros* with its reference to *comercio libre*.[15] Moreover, an expanding economy could generate revenues to sustain the operations of the colonial government and subsidize the embattled government or governments overseas—the provincial juntas—in the metropole.

Talamantes's projected "Congreso" had to confront a fundamental economic issue in mid-1808—how to stimulate the economy of New Spain to end "la interrupción del comercio interior y exterior."[16] For the domes-

tic sector, he advanced measures readily interpretable as protective of New Spain's interests. First, a moratorium on the settlement of commercial accounts between Spain and New Spain until a special tribunal ("de Compensaciones") composed of two jurists and three "comerciantes distinguidos" could review the conflicting claims of creditors and debtors.[17] To be sure, this tribunal could also be interpreted as a threat to repudiate metropolitan creditors mainly at Cadiz. Equally protective of colonial interests was his recommendation that the "Congreso" suspend the Consolidación program: specifically, the Juzgado de Capellanías y Obras Pías would recover its former jurisdiction, compensation would be arranged for those affected by the Consolidación, and a comprehensive accounting would be prepared, covering persons and corporations litigated by *juntas de consolidación*, its gross receipts, and—most important—the volume of Consolidación remittances to "Europe."[18] (Talamantes seemed aware that remittances had been handled primarily by non-Spanish intermediaries.) Third, the bitter factionalism in Mexico City's Consulado leading to Viceroy Iturrigaray's intervention in the 1807 elections, as well as his subsequent official rebuff by Madrid, was not lost upon the colonial capital's political elite or, for that matter, upon Talamantes himself. It is not strange that he hoped the "Congreso" would eliminate the *alternativa* in "las elecciones tanto de los Consulados como de cualesquiera otros cuerpos"[19]

Talamantes's proposals for handling of New Spain's external trade by the "Congreso" touched issues highly sensitive to Mexico City and Veracruz *almaceneros*, already perturbed by the inroads of Havana's reexports and by the unexpected influx of U.S. shipping at Havana, a major Gulf port after 1805. Talamantes saw the colony's economy struggling with shortages of basic imports of alcoholic beverages, textiles (constituting most annual imports by value), and mercury. The "Congreso" therefore would spur prospecting for local mercury deposits—here spoke Talamantes the *limeño*—even supply Peru's "inagotable" Huancavelica's mercury mines with finance and technicians in return for future shipments. More upsetting to those benefiting from the Spanish transatlantic trade system were his recommendations for procurement of imported goods and wares. He envisioned "La Isla de la Habana" [*sic*] as a "depósito que nos guarde las mercaderías de Europa" as well as a major shipping and defensive point.[20] To supplement Havana as a source of imports, moreover, New Spain "se abrirá comercio directo" with Jamaica and especially with the United States, which, he had no doubt, would open its ports to maximize "las ventajas que les proporciona nuestro comercio y la alianza que deberemos hacer con ellos." Indeed, his proposed "Congreso" would proceed to commission an emissary to the

United States, and to England as well, to arrange a mutual defense treaty and a commercial agreement, both of limited duration. Hopefully, England would send a small naval squadron, financed of course by New Spain's treasury, to defend the colony's Gulf coast against French warships.[21]

To judge by his "Congreso Nacional" draft, until 23 July Talamantes avoided open criticism of Spanish economic policy for its colonies in America and of its principal beneficiaries, Spanish *almaceneros* in the metropole and New Spain, at Cadiz and Mexico City. The hardships caused by executing Consolidación legislation were expressed by Talamantes in terms of complaints (*representaciones*) by anonymous individuals and corporate bodies. Opening direct trade with the United States and Jamaica was only an unavoidable response to "interruptions," the contingency of war at sea, rather than to long-endured, frequently criticized policy and practice. However, after the first *junta general* of 9 August and Iturrigaray's undisguised intention to convoke a colonial assembly, Talamantes's criticism turned more explicit. In his "Representación Nacional," Talamantes thrust at Spain's colonial policy, which, he asserted, had overlooked the long-term interest of the American colonies for the shortsighted policy of "sacar de ellas a toda costa quanto dinero se pudiese, sin escuchar, como ha sucedido a las veces, los clamores de los particulares, de las familias y de los Cuerpos"—clearly he meant the Consolidación's enforcement, which affected largely *criollo* interests. Similarly, and again briefly, he attacked the principal and highly visible beneficiaries of colonialism in New Spain—*almaceneros* from the peninsula—when referring to its perennial trade deficit with the metropole, the maintenance in the colonies of "un comercio pasivo, embarasando su industria y protegiendo el Monopolio y agiotage exercido por los Europeos, con irreparables perjuicios de los habitantes de las Indias."[22] These sentiments were widespread in Spain's American colonies; in the charged climate of 1808, they frightened Mexico City's whole peninsular community.

Assuming that Talamantes's manuscript, his "Plan," subtitled "Lo que conviene a las Américas: estar siempre bajo la Dominación Española," was drafted under the constraints of imprisonment and imminent criminal prosecution, then we may discern his real sentiments about two economic issues, first of all, Spanish colonial policy and its beneficiaries. Here, by indirection, he criticized peninsular hegemony over New Spain's trade and the low technological level of its artisan industry, for the two were linked inextricably. Providing one disregards the exaggerated cover-up of the colony's peninsular *almaceneros* and metropolitan economic policy, there is an underlying current of criticism. Did "Españoles de Europa" established in

New Spain dominate commerce "en perjuicio de los criollos"? This situation was due not to Spaniards' innate qualities ("activo," "mas frugal," "mas contenido"), but rather to the *criollos*' "propios defectos." In a kind of "culpa nostra," Talamantes (now in prison) asserted that "el criollo pierda y disipe, el Europea concerva y adquiere, en una palabra que el Comercio esté todo an manos de los últimos."[23] In the same vein, Talamantes advanced the proposition that New Spain's textile manufacturers, despite three hundred years of operation and ample supplies of quality raw wool and cotton, remained technologically backward because of, first, failure to cut labor costs by technological innovation and, second, the very "genio de los Americanos mismos"—the age-old European canard of the congenital inferiority of New World peoples.[24] Perhaps here Talamantes aimed to soften his earlier criticism of "Monopolio . . . por los Europeos" and Spanish merchants' lack of commercial expertise?

As for the "Plan's" handling of the inseparable issues of defense and trade arrangements with England, here a strident note contrasts markedly with the brief reference in an earlier draft of the "Congreso Nacional" to direct contact with Jamaica and London. Under a section subtitled "La independencia de las Américas no las salbaría de otra dependencia más infelis," Talamantes posed the problematique: England's sea power could protect the colony of New Spain, but at what price? For England was now the "Maestra del Comercio" and in competition with its merchants "nuestros Españoles de Europa son unos niños." Under such conditions, New Spain would share the fate of Portugal and its colony in Brazil, where England's protection had led to the unequal exchange of colonial "treasure" for English cloth and other wares. If New Spain obtained English naval assistance, then the colony would "pasar en cierta manera de una dominación a otra"—clear reference to the opening of Brazil's ports in late 1807, briefly noted in a recent issue of the *Gazeta de México*. Of course, Talamantes was foresighted in contemplating the prospect of the imperialism of free trade, and in New Spain he was hardly unique. Veracruz's Pérez de Arce and, for that matter, Viceroy Iturrigaray and members of his circle shared the same awe of English commercial expertise and its associated threat of economic imperialism.

There was little novelty in *criollos* like Talamantes and his local contacts criticizing the structures of Spain's imperial transatlantic economy. Such criticism had been the burden of *proyectista* writings since Uztáriz and Campillo (to mention only the most obvious) in providing a framework for commercial adjustments in the last half of the eighteenth century. What *was* novel in New Spain in 1808 was the possibility that a political movement originating in the colony, rather than in the metropole, might cause

fundamental economic changes in Spain's transatlantic trade. In the collapse of metropolitan authority over the political process, that possibility was realizable. Moreover, pressure from the *criollo*-controlled Ayuntamiento of Mexico City for the temporary autonomy of the colonial state assumed threatening proportions when viewed in conjunction with the flood of anonymous *pasquines* on city walls, violence between *peninsulares* and *americanos* at the townhouse of peninsular *almacenero* Uzcola, the public stands of viceroy and *regidores* at the Junta General of 9 August, and gossip at *tertulias* in *criollo* townhouses that reached Audiencia *ministros* and Consulado *almaceneros*. The repercussions of Talamantes's political analysis in his manuscripts and of salon conversational bits cannot be minimized.

"Qué autoridad hay hoy en este Reyno?"

Although by 23–28 July Talamantes, like other residents of New Spain's capital city, had only official reports of the Bourbons' voluntary abdications at Bayonne, he immediately concluded in his "Congreso Nacional" that this constituted a case of "dominación extrangera" of Spain's *reynos*, "de la coacción y cautiverio de nuestros Reyes, y de la opreción de la Metrópoli" surely to be extended by the French across the Atlantic to the colony of New Spain.[25] This assumption raised the issue of the colonial response to the Bourbons' action. To Talamantes the colonial state could legitimately claim the right of autonomy in order to "llenar los huecos" produced by anarchy in the metropole and the absence of an "autoridad monárquica." Like Spain itself, New Spain had to fall back to its "primitivas instituciones . . . las fundamentales de toda sociedad civil."[26]

Particularly striking in the "Congreso Nacional" and symptomatic of *criollo* attitudes in general is the immediate assumption that in New Spain as in Spain itself a vacuum of authority had developed or, to put it negatively, that an unqualified and spontaneous rejection of colonial authority structures in place was legitimate and feasible. Here surfaced the underlying *criollo* antipathy to the Audiencia's *ministros* as an embodiment of imperial authority and chief elements of imperial continuity in the colony. "Que autoridad hay hoy día en este Reyno?" Talamantes questioned rhetorically?[27] Where or who held the sovereign power to legislate? Not viceroys, who "están restringidos por las Leyes, y sus facultades sólo tienen extension para ciertas cosas." Not *audiencias*, since they "tienen el poder judiciario dependiente de . . . los Consejos y del Rey." Furthermore, whatever "poder gubernativo" *audiencias* enjoyed was carefully circumscribed by law. And,

in any event, could or should monarchs allocate to another body "derechos inherentes al Cuerpo de la Nación"?[28]

So Talamantes's logic and direction of intention led him to an indisputable source of authority under novel conditions of 1808, to the "Poder Legislativo," which was the "voz nacional" ("el fundamento y origen de las sociedades"), to a *cortes* or "Congreso Nacional que se desea en la Nueva España."[29] Early in the manuscript of the "Congreso National," not only is it evident that a colonial assembly could legitimately frame legislation, but more critical was the authority it, rather than a viceroy or an *audiencia*, was empowered to commission a diplomatic representative sent abroad from New Spain to obtain military and naval assistance and make commercial treaties. Drawing upon knowledge of U.S. history gained in his research on New Spain's Texas-Louisiana boundary question, Talamantes recalled pointedly that the French monarchy had recognized the independence of the United States and then signed a commercial treaty but only after "las Colonias Anglo-Americans se formaron en Cuerpo" as the "voz nacional."[30]

Talamantes's "Congreso Nacional" parsed the destabilized political situation of Spain and its empire as a tactic to convince readers of the utility of an interim colonial assembly. Curiously he considered neither viceroy (and what required no explanation) nor *audiencia* empowered to initiate such an assembly. Instead he displayed his affinity for the position of the *criollos* who dominated the Ayuntamiento, the "Ciudad"; in fact he was endorsing the proposition advanced by its *síndico del común*, Azcárate, who had urged the Ayuntamiento "en representación del Reyno como su metropole" to convince Viceroy Iturrigaray on 15 and again on 19 July to reject the Bourbons' abdications.[31] Talamantes hoped the "Ciudad" to whom his "Congreso" was dedicated would review and accept his analysis and then initiate action. No doubt he expected the *regidores* to call for his "Congreso tan combatido por unos pocos, y tan justamente deseado por todas"—because his "Congreso" twice specified the categories of "autoridades constituidas"—to participate in the projected assembly.[32] Included were officers of tribunals such as Consulado officials, *oidores*, and *alcaldes* of the Audiencia, although they would constitute at best only a small voting bloc. Talamantes was explicit, even gratuitously so, in his lack of confidence in the Audiencia, some of whose *oidores* might transform it into "una Aristocracia peligrosa."[33] The opposition of certain *ministros* to a colonial assembly and their insistence upon their unlimited exercise of authority, he could only ascribe to "espíritu de ambición," to a propensity to place "interés personal" over the public good ("patria"), and to wrap themselves in a mantle of "virtud, celo y jus-

ticia para . . . ocultar miras pérfidas y malignas." All the *oidores*, he claimed, did not share equally in "ilustración, inteligencia, rectitude, integridad, bondad y prudencia"; in fact, a few *ministros* because of their "dirección e intenciones" inspired no confidence in their capacity to cope with the "muy árduos, difíciles y delicados negocios del día."[34] Were there no colonial assembly, no viceroy, nor opening of those official instructions appointing a successor viceroy (*pliego de mortaja*) and hence "no debiendo regir entonces las determinaciones dictadas para el caso en el Reynado anterior," viceregal command would devolve upon the "Aristocracia peligrosa."[35] If Talamantes may be considered representative of many Mexico City *criollo* notables, he, and they, were declaring a no-confidence vote in the dominant faction within the Audiencia, headed by Guillermo Aguirre y Viana. Here was the narrow fault separating Audiencia from viceroy and Ayuntamiento that, over the following roller-coaster three weeks, widened into a chasm of incomprehension, antipathy, and ultimately violence.

In the three weeks between 23 July (the date of the "Congreso Nacional" manuscript) and the deduced completion of the manuscript of "Representación Nacional" around 15 August, official news from Spain reprinted in Mexico City's *Gazeta* (no doubt private correspondence provided further details) induced Talamantes to refine his fundamental analytical points, certainly not to abandon any. For example, between 29 July and 12 August the political elite of Mexico City read of outbreaks of anti-French violence in parts of Spain; of the apparently spontaneous formation of juntas in regional capitals of the provinces of Valencia (Valencia), Andalusia (Sevilla), and Aragon (Zaragosa); the Junta de Sevilla's denunciation of the administrative bodies—the Junta de Gobierno, Consejo de Castilla—functioning in Madrid occupied by French forces; and vague references to future convocation of a *cortes* balanced by the duc de Berg's announcement of how the 150 deputies of the Diputación General to a Bayonne congress would be selected. The "Congreso Nacional" had been drafted when New Spain knew only of the compliant abdication of the Bourbons; the "Representación Nacional" three weeks later buttressed Talamantes's argument for a local or colonial assembly convening in the capital of New Spain, as an autonomous colonial body, because of French military control of the capital of Spain, imminent occupation of the whole peninsula by foreign troops, and the breakdown of a centralized imperial governmental structure. When Fernando VII had left Madrid for Bayonne in mid-April, an uncontested governmental apparatus of authority functioned for Spain and its American empire: but only weeks later Fernando's abrupt abdication and internment in France provoked Spain's gravest political schism since Spain's War of

Succession, as uncontainable interest groups in Andalusia, Valencia, Aragon, and Asturias competed for control of both Spain and its "Indias," the colonial possessions. The long-simmering crisis of the old regime in Spain, and between metropole and colonies heating up over the last quarter century of unequal growth in the Atlantic economy, and of war and its distorting effects, now exploded into international war, civil war, and—shortly—bitter colonial divisions.

A Case for Colonial Autonomy

The news from Europe predictably reinforced Talamantes's confidence in his analysis. For him, the occupation of Madrid was decisive since it was the "Ciudad Capital, Corte del Reyno, residencia del Gobierno Soberano y de las primeras autoridades constitudas," but it was now controlled by the French. Further, this threatened the established state religion of peninsula and colonies alike. In these two senses alone, autonomous colonial action was now fully justified.[36] Second, loss of the imperial capital and its governmental bodies had dissolved the "Cuerpo principal" into its principal provinces—so Talamantes interpreted the situation in the metropole—undermining the central political structures that always had barely contained regional centrifugal forces. Not only was "la nación rigurosamente en la anarquía," without a national government, but the provinces were adhering to their "diferentes leyes, fueros y privilegios," resurrecting their "costumbres primitivas," intolerant of subordination to any other province, divided by rivalry between "el Vizcayno con el Andaluz y Montañéz, entre el Valenciano y el Navarro."[37] Ingrained regional sentiments and interregional rivalry, an observant Talamantes foresaw, could not be contained within the metropole, while the colonies dominated by peasant emigrants from isolated peninsular provinces carried to New Spain (perhaps then refined) their microethnic differences. Were New Spain to recognize the authority of one peninsular province over another, postulated Talamantes, then "habitando hoy en las Américas un número considerable de Europeos de diferentes Provincias y Reynos de España . . . atraherían a su seno la competencia, la rivalidad y la Discordia."[38] This is what Talamantes derived from the bitter factional legacy of electoral contests in religious and civil corporations in the colonies—typically, the contest over Consulado elections in Mexico City in 1807. Talamantes approved the vote of Mexico City's Junta General of 9 August to withhold recognition of any peninsular junta with pretention to the title of "suprema" without legitimate juridical basis.[39]

In his "Congreso Nacional," Talamantes argued that the departure of the

Bourbons left the political elite of New Spain no course other than to convoke a colonial assembly. Subsequent news only confirmed his conviction, all the more since (as he now expatiated) the "Código de las Indias" covered relations solely between metropole and colonies—for example, prohibiting "el Comercio directo con los Extrangeros restringiendolo a la Peninsula de España." Matters internal to New Spain were, on the other hand, covered by "regional" legislation determined by purely local conditions—"clima . . . alimentos . . . habitantes . . . circunstancias locales."[40] The major obstacle to a local assembly as legitimate surrogate for the peninsular political vacuum, he proceeded to argue in both the "Congreso Nacional" and later "Representacion Nacional," remained certain *ministros* of the Audiencia: after the strong opposition to such an assembly voiced at the Junta General of 9 August by *oidor* Aguirre y Viana and the three *fiscales*, Talamantes's antipathy was unrestrained.[41] He labeled those who claimed that the Leyes de Indias sanctioned no local political initiatives such as current conditions necessitated, as "algunos ministros, o vergonzosamente tímidos, o demasiado ambiciosos, o ignorantes de los principios elementales del derecho público."[42] Discord among the members of the capital's elites came from "esa ambición desordenada de algunos ministros" to dominate, "mortificando a los débiles, moderados y prudentes que gimen en el silencio" while the *ministros* ordered "disposiciones hostiles, tomadas secretamente por muchos . . . y con enorme injuria de las pácificas poblaciones de esta América." The position supported by these *ministros*, that in the current situation only they constituted political legitimacy and authority, was an "opinion aristocrática, sediciosa y prejudicial al Estado."[43]

Talamantes was startlingly frank and curiously insensitive to the local political climate in the closing days of August 1808 when the short *apertura* for tolerating discussion of critical political issues was evaporating as the viceroy, his staff, and *criollo* connections seemed intent upon pursuing an autonomous course with respect to the mushrooming juntas in the metropole. Or was he in fact insensitive to the relations of power in that political climate? Talamantes's scribe (Truxillo) was reluctant to make copies of the "Representacion Nacional" because of its acerbic references to the "Señores Oidores," and he confessed to Talamantes that he "tenía recelos de escribirlos." Apocryphal or not, the amanuensis reported that Talamantes had rejoined with a sly smile: "Si Ud. hubiera copiado otras cosas que yo he escrito?"[44]

Here caution is needed to put Talamantes's observations about the "aristocratic" bent of the Audiencia's *ministros* in proper setting. Repeated references to that faction should not lead to the conclusion Talamantes and

like-minded *criollo* notables like Jacobo de Villaurrutia of the Audiencia entertained democratic, much less egalitarian notions. To the contrary, Talamantes made explicit his distance from Rousseau's *Social Contract* whose "principal error político" was allocating to the people the exercise of citizenship.[45] Rousseau had forgotten that peoples' "ignorancia e impotencia" obliged them to speak through their legitimate representatives, the real citizens who were the peoples' "tutores." Accordingly, the seven categories of potential participants in Talamantes's projected "Congreso" ("individuos que deben componerlo") included only members of the political, economic, military, administrative, and ecclesiastical hierarchy of the colony of New Spain. For a definition of citizen Talamantes cited approvingly Aristotle's exclusion of the "pueblo ínfimo" because of its "rusticidad . . . ignorancia, grosería, indigencia y la dependencia necesaria . . . respecto de los hombres ilustrados y poderosos."[46] Liberty in the optic of Talamantes and his *criollo* elite counterparts was simply incompatible with ignorance and poverty, an attitude persistent throughout the following century and beyond.

Talamantes's manuscripts were more than the product of personal analysis and reflection by an eighteenth-century *literato* enjoying (as he put it well) "el tiempo cómodo y desahogado."[47] After all, Talamantes cultivated a variety of social and intellectual contacts among various strata of Mexico City's society, mainly the *criollo* elite with a sprinkling of well-placed "Europeos" like *almacenero* Basoco and Audiencia *fiscal* Sagarzurieta, and there is little doubt that his major "obras" (as he termed his manuscripts) incorporated *criollo* opinion shared to varying degrees by his circle of *criollo* acquaintances. How else explain his decision in the last week of August and early September of 1808 to show them to a select few, to have the "Congreso Nacional" read at a session of Mexico City's Ayuntamiento, and to present a copy to *ministro* Sagarzurieta.

During July and August there were no orders to tolerate unrestrained discussion of the pros and cons of New Spain's predicament, particularly the advantages and disadvantages of interim colonial autonomy in the face of disarray in the metropole. Yet there now existed, perhaps for the first time in New Spain's three centuries of colonial rule, de facto, if not de jure, limited freedom of discussion. Now Talamantes felt free to debate issues with acquaintances of street and salon, draft manuscripts, and even circulate them to friends in and out of the capital in the weeks after 23 July when—to capture the climate in Talamantes's graphic wording—"se trataba en México la materia con toda libertad, tanto en las Juntas Generales como en conversaciones particulares que no podían ocultarse al Govierno y (he pointedly observed) a los Señores Ministros de la Real Audiencia." The Audiencia

took no repressive action then against the Ayuntamiento's *regidores* or the viceroy for their public views. Given the tolerant attitude during July and August of the "primer Tribunal de este Reyno"—the Audiencia—toward the "libertad que era común a todos," what should restrain a *literato* like Talamantes from distributing manuscripts that discussed, to use his words, "con poca diferencia lás mismas ideas y proyectos que se ventilaban?"[48] But by time Talamantes distributed his manuscript (between 11 August and 8 September), the political climate in which he had begun his first manuscript ("Congreso Nacional") and initiated the "Representación Nacional" was changing more rapidly than he perceived or wished. The brief weeks of uncensored private and public discussion and writing would not return to New Spain for more than a decade.

Plausibly the climate of toleration began to wane with publication of the decision voted at the first Junta General (9 August) and publicized three days later in Iturrigaray's *Proclama . . . a los Habitantes de México*, which revealed differences between propeninsula and procolony factions. That Junta, it will be recalled, defined restrictively conditions for recognition of a Spanish junta as "suprema" ("inauguradas, creadas or formadas por S.M. o lugares tenientes legítimos autenticamente"); perhaps misinterpretation of these restrictions led Guanajuato's Intendente Riaño (29 August) to warn Viceroy Iturrigaray they might "motivar alguna siniestra inteligencia." On 20 August Iturrigaray sharpened the differences when, writing to the Junta de Sevilla, he reiterated New Spain's conditions for recognition and proceeded to admonish Sevilla's authorities to sign no treaty with England concerning "esta América" without his prior "anuencia y consentimiento."[49] Meanwhile, tension between Europeo and Americano factions flashed as a result of the bloody incident in the capital outside the residence of the Spanish *almacenero* and *conductor de platas* Uzcola, more *pasquinades* spearing *peninsulares* fluttered on center-city street corners, and anxious merchants and their employees bought arms and gunpowder as they were drawn into the vortex of a self-fulfilling prophecy of disaster. We cannot date precisely one of the last of Talamantes's manuscripts, but probably at the end of August—and reflecting *criollo* attitudes—he reacted to the imperious tone of Sevilla's authorities who insisted on "pretensiones con la opulencia de las Américas"—colonial funds.[50] Then Talamantes distinguished two types of union between Spain and New Spain, between metropole and colony, "la una de amistad y confraternidad, la otra de dependencia y subordinación." No peninsula-born *ministro*, *almacenero* or *caxero*, needed an interpreter of Talamantes's preference.

Written in the climate of weighing alternate responses to reports of po-

litical collapse in the Spanish metropole, Talamantes's two major "obras" were handed out when toleration was ending. Precisely when he should have become cautious, he delivered copies of his "Congreso Nacional" to Audiencia *fiscal* Sagarzurieta about 15 August, to *regidor* Luyando on 24 August, and at later and indeterminate dates to the Ayuntamiento's *síndico* Azcárate, the Audiencia *alcalde del crimen* Villaurrutia, and the Guadalajara's intendente, Brigadier Roque Abarca;[51] others in the capital may have also seen copies or certainly learned of their contents, *regidor* Verdad y Ramos or Padre Juan Ignacio Villaseñor y Cervantes.[52] Consulado members probably learned of Talamantes's "Congreso Nacional" since *caxeros* working for *almacenero* Dosamantes along with the son of a Consulado staff member, Basilio de Arrillaga, also frequented the townhouse of the marqueses de Guardiola.[53]

The response of two readers to the "Congreso Nacional" should have alerted Talamantes that his views of colonial issues could not publicly be accepted by *criollo* acquaintances or even tolerated by a *ministro* of the Audiencia whom Talamantes considered empathetic, as the chasm widened between the viceroy committed to establishing a new basis for exercising interim colonial authority and the Audiencia equally committed to preserving the traditional colonial administrative structures of power. At a meeting in the home of the marqueses de Uluapa, Talamantes promised to send to *regidor* Luyando a "papel," which was duly delivered along with a covering note requesting the manuscript be read aloud at the next Ayuntamiento session.[54] Letter and manuscript bore the pseudonym "Fardonay." No sooner had Luyando begun to read the anonymous "Congreso Nacional" to the assembled Ayuntamiento, an unidentified *regidor* shouted that it should be sent forthwith to the viceroy; later, however, the Ayuntamiento voted to destroy it on the spot. Significantly, the anonymous manuscript was quickly assumed to be the work of Talamantes. *Síndico* Verdad commented to Luyando, "Este papel parese del Padre Talamantes" and later insisted "este papel fijamente será del Fraile Talamantes," to which Luyando added, "sin que nadie le contradigera." Luyando did not inform Talamantes (which seems odd) of the Ayuntamiento's rejection until 27 or 28 August, when Talamantes again encountered the *regidor* at the residence of the Uluapas. When he raised the issue, Luyando—ingenuous, sly, or self-protective—claimed he asked Talamantes "de que papel hablaba?"[55] Or is it that by the end of August Luyando simply showed the extreme caution of *criollo* notables like *regidor* Azcárate and the marqués de Guardiola, who now considered Talamantes "un Cándido y que acaso su Candor podía perjudicarle y"—what was worse—"perjudicar a otros?"[56]

Luyando's report should have hardly surprised Talamantes, who had just suffered the reaction of *ministro* Sagarzurieta, to whom he had given a copy of the "Congreso Nacional" around 15 August.[57] Talamantes justified his action on the ground that the best way to serve one's *patria* was to offer "Gefes y Magistrados" opinions they could evaluate, far better than propagandizing the "pueblo" with explosive ideas.[58] When handed the "Congreso Nacional," Sagarzurieta noted the title and commented on the spot that he disapproved of *congresos* and juntas; although their original aims were well intentioned, they later "degeneran como sucedió en Paris con la Asamblea de los Notables."[59] The passage of twenty years had given even those on the distant periphery of the Atlantic system time to digest the significance of the French experiment in representative government. Sagarzurieta did not contact Talamantes about his manuscript for almost two weeks, probably until Mexico City's Inquisitors put out an edict denouncing the subversive nature of popular sovereignty. Then he informed Talamantes that since the "Congreso Nacional" contained "proposiones relativas a la Soberanía del Pueblo," the work should not be distributed. After some reflection they decided to destroy it. Sagazurieta did it in the presence of Talamantes. This occurred three days before Talamantes asked Luyando about the *regidores*' reaction.[60]

Warned and chastened by such responses, Talamantes apparently was more circumspect in distributing his second manuscript, the "Representación Nacional," with its strong criticism of the *ministros* of the Audiencia. Talamantes himself commented that it "comprehendía los principales argumentos que debía rebatir en su obra";[61] completed about 15 August with a dedication again to the Ayuntamiento dated 25 August, it was never formally submitted since "ni se pensó en remitir jamás dicha obra al Ayuntamiento de México" because this would be—he later claimed—"un grado sumo de incensatés, para poner a vista de tantos individuos obra semejante."[62] This, however, did not restrain him from contacting and delivering copies to at least two more *criollo* notables in influential posts. To Jacobo de Villaurrutia of the Audiencia he presented the "Representación Nacional" on 10 September, warning that it should be shown to no one else; earlier, on the evening of 8 September, he had slipped another copy to *regidor* Azcárate in the crowded billiard room of the Guardiolas' residence "sin que las demás personas que estaban allí lo persibieran." It was already dangerous to distribute his manuscripts, for Talamantes carried his copy to the Guardiolas' home concealed carefully under his cloak.[63] These measures of concealment indicate Talamantes recognized how tense had become the political climate in the capital and that he was perhaps already a marked man. Nonetheless,

he increased his exposure to possible retaliation on or about 8 September when in the course of an evening chat with Viceroy Iturrigaray's chaplain, Padre Juan Saint, Talamantes had mentioned the "Representación"; the next day Saint sent a note indicating the viceroy wanted to examine his manuscript. Two sources confirmed this: Talamantes's scribe Truxillo, who was ordered to prepare the copy, and his acquaintance Vejarano, who reported Talamantes as saying "lo componía para entregarlo al Sr. Virrey."[64]

We can now understand why the Audiencia years later (1813) insisted that Talamantes "trazó al Virrey la idea de llevar a efecto la celebración de Cortes apesar del dictamen del Acuerdo," and why the colonial government printed in 1816 a manifesto in which it asserted that Talamantes ("hombre de carácter inquieto, de ideas revoltosas y de opinión entre no pocas gentes") influenced "las deliberaciones del Virey directa o indirectamente, y de cualquier modo que fuese, las providencias de aquel Gefe eran tan conformes a los proyectos de Talamantes, y estos tan identificados con las especies que propusieron todos los entusiastas."[65] By 8–10 September, however, the Audiencia's *ministros* had learned of the *sentimientos* of the Junta de Sevilla, and their plans to solve the situation in the colony were under way.

10. Sevilla's *Comisionados* and Mexico City's Juntas

A la junta establecida en Sevilla puede decirse deve la America su tranquilidad por el cuidado que se ha tomado en darnos sus avisos sin mezclarse en otra cosa añadiendo subsistan las mismas autoridades. Juan de Villavicencio to Luna, Havana, 19 September 1808

La disunión o llamese Cisma que parece ha principiado en la Antigua España y que transciende a la Nueva sería muy difícil sino imposible apagar.
García, ed., *Documentos históricos mexicanos*

El nombre de Fernando VII bajo el cual se establecieron las juntas de España, sirvió para prohibirnos la imitación de su ejemplo y privarnos de las ventajas que debía producir la reforma de nuestras instituciones interiores.
"Manifesto que hacen al pueblo mexicano los representantes de las provincias de la "América Septentrional," 6 November 1813

[Anonymous to Sevilla's *comisionados*] No os canseis; la comisión . . . está reducida a contarnos un cuento, y pedir una limosna.
Suplemento al número 5 del *Telégrapho Méxicano* (Cadiz), 30 June 1813

On 26 August the two representatives (*comisionados*) of Sevilla's self-styled Junta Suprema debarked at Veracruz two months after sailing from Cadiz, authorized to present to Viceroy Iturrigaray and the principal corporate bodies of the colonial establishment a request for recognition as interim ruling body of Spain and its overseas possessions, as "Junta Suprema de España y Indias." The arrival of *comisionados* Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui and Juan Jabat was welcome to those in New Spain hungering for an end to the vacuum of imperial authority created by the Bourbons' formal abdication at Bayonne and transfer of executive, monarchical authority to France in the figure of the emperor of the French, General Bonaparte. Not that *almaceneros* of Veracruz and Mexico City had lacked prior reports of

developments at Sevilla and Cadiz as of mid-May, probably furnished by merchants León Achútegui and Liborio Tomás de Durana on their arrival at Veracruz on 12 July. Achútegui had commercial relations with Mexico City merchant Santiago García, a captain in the Regimiento del Comercio of the colonial capital sponsored by the Consulado. The news brought by Achútegui and Durana could hardly quiet the sense of crisis shared by peninsular *oidores* and *almaceneros*, fueled by what they considered the viceroy's apparent collusion with certain *regidores* in seeking to convene a local, colonial junta; by resolutions defining bases for recognizing a metropolitan junta as approved on 9 August; and by Viceroy Iturrigaray's letter to Sevilla's Junta (with copies to the Juntas of Valencia and Zaragoza) to the effect that Sevilla's "congreso" lacked "los enunciados requisitos para representar la Soveranía de nuestro amadísimo Monarca."[1] His letter of 20 August, to be sure, had not yet been made public. It was still in the Veracruz post office when the *comisionados* came ashore; given the covert opening of mail by postal officials, the letter's contents were probably divulged to Jabat and Jaúregui. And no doubt Jabat's naval service at Veracruz before returning to Andalusia in 1805 led him to acquaintances in the Veracruz merchant community for advice about the political situation, factions, and leadership in the capital of New Spain.

Sevilla: Junta Suprema de España e Indias?

By August's end, the issue of recognition of one of several metropolitan competing juntas was no longer new. At the end of July had come news of the formation of Juntas at Sevilla and Valencia; then Sevilla had entitled itself "of Spain and the Indies"; third, the three *fiscales* of Mexico City's Audiencia during the debate at the junta of 9 August had suggested recognizing Sevilla's Junta as "suprema." However, recognition of Sevilla's primacy was a decision that Iturrigaray and his supporters were not ready to make. News of the assassination of Cadiz's governor, General Solano, by that port's "mobs" coupled to the choice of *comisionados* by Sevilla's (and presumably Cadiz's) Junta along with the behavior of Jabat and Jaúregui at Veracruz could hardly close the distance between New Spain's viceroy and Andalusia's would-be hegemonic Junta, between Iturrigaray backed by the Ayuntamiento's *regidores* and Guillermo Aguirre and other *oidores*. This was a setting for conflict rather than for rational solution as New Spain's elites wrestled with the failure of Spain's *fernandistas* behind the *golpes de estado* of Aranjuez to organize an uncontested imperial authority in the metropole.

The genesis of Sevilla's Junta can be traced to the unpredictable break-

down that invariably glitches complicated political planning. An objective of Fernando's backers—once the French gained custody of the Bourbons at Bayonne—was formation of a central government, regency, or junta, somewhere in unoccupied Spain to assume authority over metropole and colonies. As we have seen, a *junta central* would materialize later, in September 1808. Meanwhile, Madrid's organized anti-French movement, the Dos de Mayo, immediately touched off regional juntas, complicating the situation in the peninsula when Jabat and Jaúregui left Cadiz on 25 June for the Canaries, Cuba, and New Spain. To preserve a prime objective of the inspired anti-French movement, the myth of popular spontaneity, Sevilla's Junta proclaimed itself as the outcome of a people's action. Sevilla, closely orchestrated with Cadiz, grasped immediately the necessity of contacting colonial capitals and their political elites especially in the "northern" section of the American empire at Havana and, through Veracruz, at Mexico City, to assure two objectives: to scotch the formation of autonomous colonial juntas replicating those of Spain, and to secure the financial backing of Spain's wealthiest American possession, New Spain.

These objectives were closely intertwined although obscured by Sevilla's insistence upon unqualified acceptance of its hegemony as Junta Suprema. Pressure from Sevilla and Cadiz interest groups for New Spain's recognition in the summer of 1808 mirrored the centuries-old links (and antagonism, too), between Lower Andalusia and especially the most productive colony of Spain's transatlantic commercial system in the eighteenth century. Sevilla's self-styled Junta Suprema desperately required a financial base to support the peninsula's military resisting the French army of occupation. Moreover, control over colonial specie inflows could strengthen Sevilla's claim to supremacy over competing peninsular juntas. Initially a loan from London's merchant bankers was rejected in expectation of "remesas progresivas de los caudales de América"; later, when floating a loan became unavoidable, "los productos de las Aduanas de Cadiz" were backed by the "productos de las Aduanas de México y Veracruz." In the meantime, on 28 June Sevilla's Junta turned to Cadiz merchants for a loan. Sevilla's viability as a rallying point of Spain's resistance to French occupation depended upon New Spain's silver pesos.[2]

Even greater was Cadiz's economic stake in New Spain's recognition of Sevilla as Junta Suprema. Most colonial trade flows were still funneled through Cadiz despite the growing participation of other peninsular ports, at Barcelona and Santander, included in the imperial trade system after 1765 and informally earlier. In 1808, continuation of Cadiz's virtual monopoly of New Spain's (and the other colonies') transatlantic trade hung upon the

skill and ingenuity of Sevilla's Junta in obtaining the subordination of colonial political bodies resisting commercial exchanges bourgeoning between Veracruz, the United States, and English Caribbean ports. Income generated by Cadiz merchants' entrepôt function had been the source of Cadiz's large-scale participation in metropolitan government finance, which expanded during the impressive trade growth of the 1790s. Roughly 20 percent of Cadiz loans to Madrid over the eighteenth century occurred in seven years, 1793–1800. However, the tight English blockade of Cadiz, 1805–1808, sliced Cadiz imports by 99 percent compared to those of the peak interwar years, 1802–1804, which were also years of massive silver shipments from New Spain; but in the first six months of 1808, Cadiz received no silver shipments. Cadiz claimed its region held at least 66 percent of *vales reales* in circulation (one-third by purchase at time of issue, the balance at discount) whose value fluctuated with the volume of silver imports on government account collected by taxing the greatest silver producer in the world, New Spain, and from recent receipts of forced sales of church properties there under the Consolidación.[3] Sevilla and, of course, Cadiz knew of the operations of New Spain's *comisión gubernativa de* Consolidación, and of covert methods devised by finance minister Soler and Consolidación's director Sixto Espinosa to transfer New Spain's Consolidación receipts under the cover of U.S. neutral merchant shippers and English merchant bankers to England and Europe.[4] Also there was a large volume of earnings retained in New Spain (between 15 million and 30 million pesos) by Spanish merchants after the renewal of hostilities in 1805.

After all, the bishop-elect of Michoacan, Abad y Queipo—who had an uncommonly sure grasp of *consolidación*'s operations in his diocese—was in Sevilla in the week following formation of its Junta and probably furnished estimates of Consolidación receipts at Viceroy Iturrigaray's disposition. Lucas Alamán later put the figure at about 14.5 million pesos in mid-1808.[5] Such information, one may presume, must have induced Sevilla's Junta immediately to contact London merchant banker William Gordon (of the Anglo-Irish firm of Gordon & Murphy) to claim more than 1 million pesos of New Spain's Consolidación transfers, which Sevilla promised to distribute in part to *vales* holders in Spain. No wonder Sevilla judged that upon New Spain's Viceroy Iturrigaray "depende en gran manera el logro de los fines a que debe aspirar la Suprema Junta," that Mexico City's *criollos* were convinced Sevilla would balk at no measure "con tal que se asegurase la presa interesante" [New Spain]; that *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui were confident their role was to "procurar por todos los medios posibles la sumisión absoluta de este Reyno" to Sevilla; and that *comisionado* Jabat wrote

gleefully (24 September 1808) that he was about to return to Cadiz with "buenos millones."[6] As the peninsula-born marqués de Casa Alta—relative and confidant of Viceroy Iturrigaray—wrote from Mexico City to the head of the Junta Central, the aging Floridablanca, the two *comisionados* wanted to "llevar consigo quanto dinero huviese del Rey y quanto pudiese exigirse do los Particulares de esta América," which required "la aboluta sumisión y obediencia" of Mexico City's authorities to Sevilla's Junta. Here was the problem: Iturrigaray proffered financial support to Sevilla and other metropolitan juntas but would not offer "ciega obediencia" to a peninsular junta lacking the legitimacy stipulated at the 9 August Junta.[7]

The *Comisionados*

To New Spain's political cognoscenti—viceroy and staff, *oidores*, *regidores*, *almaceneros*, *mineros*, and the capital's lawyers and clerics—the social origins, networks, and career patterns of the *comisionados* debarking at Veracruz, Jaúregui and Jabat, signaled the designs of Lower Andalusia's foremost cities, Sevilla and Cadiz. Both were linked to lower Andalusia's trading groups, both had colonial experience, and both, as officers in Spain's armed forces, had aligned themselves in late 1807 and 1808 unequivocally with those of "aristocratic" privilege coalescing behind Fernando at the Escorial and its aftermath. Such were the semiotics of bonding and networking characteristic of the old regime, few among Mexico City's political elite doubted the position of Sevilla's—and for that matter, Cadiz's—*comisionados* vis-à-vis the issue dividing New Spain's elites: an interim colonial assembly.

Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui y Aróstegui was now forty-one, born at Pamplona (Navarra), son of a Navarrese military officer who had served in the Caribbean and North Africa, in the Portuguese campaign (1761–1762) under Aranda, as captain general of Chile (1773–1780), and then as Peru's viceroy (1780–1784) during the Amerindian insurrection under Tupac Amarú. Manuel Francisco, a captain in the Reales Guardias Españolas attached to the royal household, married in 1803 a daughter of a prominent Cadiz merchant, the marqués de Casa Layglesia. It was Layglesia who supplied newly appointed Viceroy Iturrigaray funds to cover outfitting and travel expenses to Mexico City for himself and his wife (also his cousin), Maria Inés de Jaúregui y Aróstegui. Jaúregui was therefore both Iturrigaray's brother-in-law and, through his mother, an Aróstegui, his cousin. Following involvement in the Escorial affair and subsequent role in the *golpes* at Aranjuez in March 1808, Jaúregui proceeded to Sevilla where in mid-

June Andrés Miñano of Sevilla's Junta informed him of his appointment to the commission to New Spain to obtain that colony's recognition and subordination. There were obviously no reservations about Jaúregui's commitment to what he later termed the "fundamento de nuestro [comercio] ultramarino."[8] Jaúregui claimed that he had insisted that the Junta de Sevilla empower him to remove Iturrigaray if he refused to recognize Sevilla as "suprema," and that he also requested an associate *comisionado* (or *adjunto*) to accompany him. This turned out to be naval officer Juan Jabat, recently arrived at Sevilla, far more zealous in executing their commission than now Colonel Jaúregui.[9] Or was Jaúregui selected only to protect Iturrigaray from Jabat's zeal?

Juan Jabat y Aztal, later tagged the "alma" of the commission, typified in career and networks spun by marriage and interest those who fabricated the webs between metropole and colonies and defended the Spanish transatlantic system. In 1808 he was sixty-eight, *capitán de navío* in the royal navy, and had served at Veracruz for seventeen years after arriving aboard a mercury transport (*azogue*) in 1788. Eleven years later, as *capitán de fragata* and commander of coast guard vessels patrolling Caribbean waters off Veracruz, he had made acquaintances among the merchant community and the Consulado de Veracruz, whose first secretary, Vicente Basadre, now surfaced as secretary of the Sevilla Junta in 1808. As coast guard officer in 1800, Jabat had ordered to sea a subordinate (Benito Prieto Solar) to capture English vessels smuggling off the Veracruz coast; the seized ships and cargo were then sold at auction, and prize monies shared unequally. A judicial controversy ensued over whether part of the seized property was legitimate prize (thus subject to distribution) or purely contraband or smuggled goods (proceeds to the government alone). Details of the case are spare; Jabat was tried before a naval court for a prize settlement judged unduly partial to him, his share was confiscated, his property embargoed, and the incident gave rise to rumors of Jabat's sudden wealth as the product of a "famoso contrabando."[10] There is evidence that in 1802 the silver register of the *Argonauta* recorded a transfer of 3,000 pesos on Jabat's account to a Cadiz agent. Also recorded were transfers by members of the Hernández de Alba family, Lorenzo (father) and his daughter, Maria Josefa, married to Veracruz merchant Pablo Martín de Jaúregui. Jabat had married Maria Josefa's sister, María Guadalupe. By marriage to a Hernández de Alba and years of naval service at Veracruz, Jabat was returning to a Veracruz commercial network including Jaúregui, Felix de Aguirre, Torre Hermanos, and others with commercial ties to Cadiz and to comparable groups at Mexico City, all opposed to modifying the Spanish transatlantic commercial system.

Not surprisingly, one of the *comisionados*' informal representatives at the center of the Mexico City colonial administration was veteran *fiscal de Real Hacienda* Lorenzo Hérnandez de Alba. At the height of the controversy over enforcement of the terms of *comercio neutro* by Viceroy José Miguel de Azanza in the late 1790s when neutral vessels were bringing goods from Hamburg consigned to the Murfi brothers, and reexports from the would-be *almacén general* of Havana, Alba had warned Azanza—and underlined—that to "Abrir el Puerto do Veracruz sería . . . *lo mismo que cerrar los de España*."

Rhetoric aside, colonial authorities knew that most of the vociferous defenders of Spain's commercial system were engaged in widespread smuggling along the Veracruz coast; and that those involved in the smuggling rings included naval personnel. Jabat's involvement in dubious prize money left him under a cloud, a situation not improved when Iturrigaray arrived and attempted to execute to the letter Madrid's orders to suppress Veracruz's smuggling operations. This may explain Iturrigaray's observation in 1808 to a longtime friend, General Tomás de Morla at Cadiz, about Jabat "a quien encontré en México quando vine al virreinato y me costó trabjo sacarlo para que fuere donde el Rey tenía mandado y por poco fué necessario azerlo con la furerza como consta de expdiente."[11] By the time Jabat was ordered to leave Veracruz for Spain in 1805, it was rumored he had "trato de intereses con muchos comerciantes de Veracruz y con algunos de México por haber estado aquí antes"; and, when Jabat returned to Mexico City in 1808, *almacenero* Gabriel Iturbe e Iraeta wrote his Veracruz correspondent that Jabat was the "marino . . . que tu conoces."[12] Back at Cadiz in forced retirement after 1805, Jabat kept petitioning both the naval ministry and—when contraband prosecution was shifted to the jurisdiction of the newly created Almirantazgo in 1807—Godoy (as the *almirante*) to review his case, seeking to "vindicar su honor de la nota que ha subido." Only weeks after the Escorial affair was publicized, Gil y Lemos, pro-*fernandista* naval secretary and ex-viceroy of Peru, countersigned a royal cedula restoring Jabat to "su buena opinión y fama o la nota que pudieran causar en ellas las expresiones de haber faltado a la verdad y sorprendido la justificación de S.A." Iturrigaray probably received a copy of the cedula, for one was filed in the viceregal archive.[13] Four months later Gil y Lemos ordered (6 May) Jabat to carry official news of the Madrid uprising of the Dos de Mayo to Sevilla, where its Junta was formed. In June that Junta first promoted him to *capitán de navío* and then ordered him to join Colonel Jaúregui on the commission to Mexico City.[14] Together they sailed from Cadiz on 25 June in company with another of Sevilla's *comisionados*, naval officer Rafael de Villavicencio,

who was directed to Havana where his brother (Juan María), *comandante general del Apostadero*, was esteemed as "personage de más significación en el grupo reaccionario." Juan María de Villavicencio denounced to the Junta de Sevilla the faction at Havana consisting of Arango, O'Reylly, Ylincheta, and Capitán-General Someruelos for their attempt to convene a Cuban junta.[15]

Jabat and Jaúregui came ashore at Veracruz in the afternoon of 26 August, three weeks after leaving Havana, eight weeks at sea after leaving Cadiz. They presented to Veracruz authorities Sevilla's digest of the "novedades ocurridas" in the metropole and advised them of their mission—all of which, they reported, had elicited strong local approval from the "vecinos que [quando] supieron el objeto de nuestra misión manifestaron universalmene su jubilo, sus ardientes deseos, y sus votos por la salud y prosperidad de la Madre Patria."[16] That same afternoon they advised Viceroy Iturrigaray by express mail of their intention to inform him "instructiva y verbalment" of events abroad—Napoleon's seizure of Spain's government "con engaño y falzedades," Spain's declaration of war against its former ally France, and an armistice with former enemy England—by now stale news long since received from Havana by Iturrigaray.[17] The sole item of new information, and hardly surprising, was that the *comisionados* had brought along eight hundred quintals of mercury and that another five thousand would shortly arrive shipped by order of the Junta de Sevilla. That Junta expected the ships to return immediately with *caudales*, a request later presented verbally to the viceroy "sin un oficio ni credencial." Clearly, New Spain's financial support was critical to Sevilla's hegemonic pretensions over Spain's Atlantic empire.[18]

Deepening Viceroy Iturrigaray's distrust of the *comisionados*—aside from what he recalled of their careers, their *fernandista* connections, and their careful selection by Sevilla's Junta—was the absence of written instructions addressed to him from Sevilla, which, as the *comisionados*' letter of 26 August made clear, they would present *verbally* to the viceroy. The only tenable interpretation of this intended departure from the ritual of protocol was that by committing nothing to paper, Sevilla's authorities served notice to Iturrigaray they had given extraordinary latitude to Jabat and Jaúregui in executing their commission. Did Iturrigaray conclude then (what he later reported) that the two carried an "orden reservada"—what Jabat himself also referred to as "la reservadísima"?[19] The Junta's letter to Iturrigaray avoided reference to recognition of Sevilla as "supreme," obviously the main objective. For his part, Iturrigaray probably had in hand a letter dated 18 July from the military governor of Cadiz, General Morla, recommending (or was it warning?) him that "ponga esas vastas Provincias a devoción de su

metropolis Sevilla: que nos socorran . . . dineros por Dios: somos amigos de los Ingleses: sealo vm."[20] The *comisionados*' letter implied doubts about Iturrigaray's readiness to recognize Sevilla as "suprema" and his wariness of English commercial expansion. And the *comisionados*' behavior during their brief stopover at Veracruz confirmed Iturrigaray's suspicions, for he observed that "para él [Ayuntamiento de Veracruz] traxeron los comisionados ordenes directas que entregaron sin haberse presentado al Virrey, ni dadole conocimiento de su commisión."[21]

From pieces of this mosaic, Iturrigaray, his staff, and friends could deduce the *comisionados*' objective and strategy. Since Sevilla's authorities distrusted Iturrigaray, their *comisionados* would present the case for Sevilla's recognition only before a large audience where *oidores* and *fiscales* could manage debate to Sevilla's favor. Fears of Sevilla's treaty making with England from a position of inequality—which Morla had addressed obliquely by writing to Iturrigaray "somos amigos de los Ingleses"—might be dispelled by reporting that Sevilla's Junta had dispatched its own representatives to London to arrange a treaty "sobre bases notoriamente ventajosos para nuestro comercio."[22] To assemble supporters for the recognition of Sevilla's Junta as "suprema," Jabat and Jaúregui would network peninsular *almaceneros* at Veracruz and Mexico City and, in the colonial capital, would consult closely with Sevilla's dependable *oidor decano* Guillermo de Aguirre, "fuerte columna de la Patria" to peninsular immigrants, but to *criollos* like Carlos María de Bustamante, "capataz de todos los mercaderes de esta capital, y su oráculo."[23] And if the viceroy still balked at full support for Sevilla's Junta Suprema, Aguirre would have to convince the Audiencia ("a quien encargaban el Mando") to legitimize the removal of the viceroy—what Iturrigaray described as "algun caramillo."[24] In this case, arrangements for a viceregal replacement traditionally detailed in the *pliego de mortaja* prepared years earlier by the Consejo de Indias in the time of Godoy, could be suppressed on the assumption the replacement might be the captain general of Cuba, Someruelos, who had authorized maintaining the port of Havana open to neutral and friendly shipping along with reexports of surplus imports to Veracruz. Given the discretion and implications of these *ordenes reservadas*, understandably Jabat and Jaúregui chose to present their case verbally to the viceroy and a *junta general*. Otherwise Sevilla could be seen as legitimizing the illegitimate, a *golpe de estado* against constituted authority.

Viceroy Iturrigaray divined Sevilla's intentions from the *comisionados*' letter and reports of their contacts with Veracruz *almaceneros*, many of them embittered by the viceroy's measures to control smuggling ("las providencias . . . para sus comercios clandestinos"), and he could deduce how grave

was the *comisionados*' omission of the issue of recognition.[25] This constituted in fact the ritual of implied threat, which lent credibility to Morla's implicit warning. Iturrigaray could see his position as viceroy was now the object of attack by the privileged commercial interests of Cadiz and Sevilla, which had welcomed the aborted *golpe* at the Escorial, the successful twin *golpes* at Aranjuez, and the *escarmiento* of General Solano, and which were now maneuvering Sevilla's Junta and its claims to imperial hegemony. News of the formation of a national government—a regency—in Spain might have resolved Iturrigaray's dilemma in late August and early September, but the hope did not materialize. Now he had to handle representatives sent by a Sevilla Junta whose supporters at Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City had consistently obstructed long-postponed changes that many among new Spain's economic and political elites (not exclusively *criollo*) hoped to initiate. New Spain's elites did not minimize what motivated the Junta de Sevilla—the Junta de Cadiz "compuesta en la mayor parte de comerciantes interesados en que subsistiese el monopolio, que aislaba en casi ellos sólos todas las producciones y comercio do la América."[26] Further, no sooner had the *comisionados* set foot at Veracruz, they confabulated with merchants "que los comisionados a su paso por aquella ciudad les despertaron los que tenían . . . y tuvieron bastante influencia para disponer a algunos Magistrados del Acuerdo."[27] Could Iturrigaray and his Mexico City supporters dovetail Sevilla's demands with their intention to convene a colonial assembly although they were convinced that Sevilla's Junta would not permit "tomar con secreto, y expedición las medidas oportunas para la paz, tranquilidad y seguridad" in the colony of New Spain?[28]

After posting their letter to Iturrigaray, Jabat and Jaúregui set out for Mexico City via Jalapa and Perote that evening, arriving three days later in the evening of 29 August. Presuming they should lodge themselves where they could readily be reached, Jaúregui went to the viceregal quarters of his cousin-brother-in-law and sister, while Jabat installed himself (on Sevilla's instructions?) in the home not of the Audiencia's presiding officer, *regente* Catani, but in that of his cousin, the *oidor sub-decano* Guillermo de Aguirre, whom critics considered "el capataz de todos los mercaderes de esta capital" and supporters "fuerte columna de la Patria."[29] There Jabat could take the political temperature of the colonial capital in conversation with Aguirre and his friend and fellow *oidor*, Bataller; with Aguirre's army officer house-guest, Colonel Emparán; with the editor of the *Gazeta de México*, Juan López Cancelada, who shared his own "apuntes prolixos" with "uno do los comisionados"; and with those Mexico City's *alamaceneros* who often used Aguirre's residence for "juntas secretas."[30] (These unannounced meetings

may have begun when *regidores* first broached the convocation of a colonial assembly in mid-July, and continued when the inflammatory, hispanophobic pasquinades circulated in August.) The next morning (30 August) Jabat and Jaúregui presented their instructions verbally to Iturrigaray, commencing what was in reality a dialogue of the deaf, since Jabat and Jaúregui were forewarned by Veracruz contacts of Iturrigaray's "repugnancia de reconocer y obedecer a esa Junta Suprema" while the viceroy knew the *comisionados* "han traído cartas de la Junta para varios oydores y magistrados."[31] The *comisionados* presented Iturrigaray with the "necesidad de adherirse y unirse este Reyno . . . con la Junta Suprema"; reported on the "sumisión y obediencia" they had obtained in the Canaries, Puerto Rico, and Cuba; and finally requested what was essentially "subsidios."

Iturrigaray, however, answered that Mexico City's Junta General of 9 August had insisted on clear legitimization by Fernando or his legitimate lieutenants of one junta in Spain before Mexico City could grant recognition; he preferred to hold a second junta on the next morning (31 August) to review what were announced as "asuntos importantes" to reexamine the 9 August positions.[32] Obviously, Iturrigaray would not grant Sevilla's *comisionados* time to generate a groundswell of opposition to his proposal for a colonial assembly; on the other hand, he was emphasizing the collective authority of Mexico City's corporate bodies to make decisions in the absence of a single, legitimate metropolitan authority.

Mexico City's Juntas Generales, August and September

The Junta held in the viceregal palace at nine on the morning of 31 August was even more path-breaking than the preceding Junta of 9 August. That Junta had seen the confrontation between corporations and notables resident in the colony; on 31 August, however, there were in addition representatives from one region of the peninsula, Andalusia, who were introduced in order to insist upon compliance with their orders now contested. For those in the colony representing metropolitan authority, this was a novel, probably upsetting experience: the metropole's very authority was in question. Moreover, the Junta of 31 August must have been preceded, there is no reason to doubt, by strategy sessions of the two main factions: in this sense the Junta functioned as a prologue to the representative oligarchical governments of independent Mexico in the nineteenth century. At their planning session the *regidores* of the Ayuntamiento must have coordinated their voting; for their part the *oidores* of the Audiencia and their colleagues worked out their strategy in Aguirre's home in the presence of Aguirre,

fellow *oidor* Bataller, the *fiscales* Robledo, Sagarzurieta, and Bourbon, *comisionado* Jabat, and a cleric close to the mercantile community of Mexico City and Veracruz, Dr. Matías Monteagudo.

One of the Audiencia's *alcaldes*, *criollo* Jacobo de Villaurrutia, went in the early evening of 30 August to the residence of *decano* Aguirre (where he encountered among others Jabat and Bataller) to find out what Iturrigaray meant by "asuntos importantes" in calling for a junta meeting; he was informed by Aguirre, Jabat and Bataller that the main issue was Sevilla's claim to sovereignty, which they intended to support. Their rational for "materia tan grave, tan importante y tan delicada" Villaurrutia found unconvincing. He went home to draft a statement of his position.[33] Surely Iturrigaray and his staff could sense the factions crystallizing among the elites of New Spain's capital and the possibility that Jabat and his supporters among *oidores* and other corporations might reverse or seriously water down by debate the resolution of the 9 August Junta.

When those invited to the second Junta had filed in and taken their seats—Audiencia (*regente*, *oidores*, *fiscales*, *alcaldes*), ecclesiastics (archbishop, cathedral canons, inquisitors), *regidores* of the Ayuntamiento, army officers and representatives of the capital's Amerindian *parcialidades*—Viceroy Iturrigaray opened the session by presenting Sevilla's materials ("una proclama y dos órdenes en tono soberano")[34] for recognition of its sovereignty, which he followed with his questioning of Sevilla's tactics. He underscored the "cláusulas imperativas del despacho," that materials had been addressed to the governor of Veracruz but neither *oficio* nor letter to him. His confrontational stance (*resistencia*) toward Sevilla and its *comisionados* was now public.[35] Did he aim to avoid formal presentation of the *comisionados* to the Mexico City Junta? It was one of the Audiencia's *fiscales*, Robledo, who rose to request they be introduced (which implies a planned strategy). Now Jabat made his case for Sevilla's recognition in the two functions to which Sevilla laid claim as "suprema"—war and finance—emphasizing that because of its "calidad, proporción para la marina en sus puertos, más proximidad a las Américas, más recursos por lo abundante y rico de las Andalucías," other juntas in the peninsula had granted it sovereignty.[36] If such action by Spain's other juntas had not yet been officially reported, it was, he claimed, the effect of a breakdown in communications—which was clearly misleading. Sensing the disbelief of some junta members, Jabat (later supported by Jaúregui) now added that Fernando's cousin at Naples had been invited by Sevilla's Junta to come to that city to legitimize its claims.[37] When *oidor* Bataller now intervened to ask Jabat if all the peninsula's juntas had indeed recognized Sevilla's hegemony, Jabat answered unequivocally

in the affirmative. Iturrigaray then asked Jabat and Jaúregui to withdraw to permit debate to commence.

Once again the *ministros togados* of the Audiencia advanced the interests of Sevilla and Cadiz. Not the Catalan *regente*, Catani, but *oidor* Aguirre, supported by almost all the other *ministros* and by two *criollo regidores* (José Juan de Fagoaga and Agustín de Villanueva), took the floor to rescue the *comisionados*' proposals from rejection.[38] Aquirre proposed to recognize Sevilla as "soberana" in the two functions, military and financial, as Sevilla had stipulated. Opposition then came from three speakers. The first, Iturrigaray, insisted that according to the Leyes de Indias, New Spain was subordinate only to the Reino de Castilla; besides, "la España está an anarquía, todas son juntas Supremas, y así a ninguna se debe obedecer." This must have been interpreted by some as representing the influence of Talamantes's manuscripts. The second, a representative of the mine owners' tribunal, wealthy *criollo* notable Sardaneta (marqués de San Juan de Rayas) from Guanajuato, showed no deference to the Audiencia that he, of "menor linaje," was expected to display; instead, he insisted that sovereignty was indivisible.[39] The third voice of opposition came from within the Audiencia, from Jacobo Villaurrutia, *criollo* and *alcalde del crimen*, whose family was part of New Spain's colonial elites. An independent-minded civil servant who rejected "la máxima del egoismo . . . de que para resguardarse y ponerse a cubierto el individuo lo más seguro es arrimarse al mayor numero,"[40] Villaurrutia offered what he considered an independent opinion, which, however, by virtue of his family's social rank and the support he received from other *criollo* notables present—*regidores* Azcárate, hacendados Uluapa, and mine owners Rayas and Regla—could not fail to be interpreted as representing *criollo* interests.[41] Can we assume the well-informed community of peninsular civil servants, merchants and ecclesiastics in Mexico City were unaware of participants in the *tertulias* at the Uluapa residence, who included the Peruvian cleric Talamantes then distributing his manuscripts to *regidores* Azcárate and Luyando, even to Villaurrutia himself?

Villaurrutia's first point was unobjectionable: New Spain should support those resisting French forces anywhere in unoccupied Spain, and public funds and private donations should be shipped immediately to Sevilla. His second point, however, was controversial, recommending unambiguous backing for the position of Viceroy Iturrigaray and of most *criollos* present: withhold sovereignty from Sevilla until Fernando had legitimated it. His third point was indeed inflammatory, since it called into question the authority of New Spain's colonial government. In common with Iturri-

garay's position, Villaurrutia denied to a *junta general*, formed solely by the capital's corporate authorities and notables, authority to recognize Sevilla as supreme; to the contrary, for this purpose and "otros puntos de igual entidad," Viceroy Iturrigaray was required to assemble representatives of all New Spain in a "diputación." Meanwhile, to handle new problems (*novedades*), a small provisional junta representing "todas las clases" should advise and consult ("proponiendole y consultandole") with the viceroy.[42]

In broad perspective, Villaurrutia's formula matched the reaction of juntas materializing in the metropole: the abdication of the Bourbon monarchs at Bayonne had devolved decision making to regional bodies. In New Spain only a *diputación* of representatives of the colony's Ayuntamientos might preserve sovereignty for the monarch of Spain and the Indies. Clarification of this position came from another *criollo* present, the Ayuntamiento's *síndico procurador del común* Verdad y Ramos. The Junta de Sevilla, he reasoned, should not be recognized as the "autoridad suprema": it was fundamentally illegitimate, "debiendo su erección a la executiva conmoción del pueblo."[43] New Spain's *criollo* elite was not democratic. A local *congreso* or *junta general* representing the constituted authorities (the Ayuntamientos) would forestall any recourse to popular sovereignty. Villaurrutia, it is now clear, was in fact confirming the viewpoint of another *criollo*, Talamantes, expressed in his "Congreso Nacional" and elsewhere: that neither Audiencia nor viceroy was a repository of decision making in the colony; and that the relationship between Spain and New Spain should not be grounded upon "dependencia y subordinación." Villaurrutia was attacking the fundamental structures of empire.

When the time to vote came, the resolution of the 9 August Junta was partially reversed, the very risk Iturrigaray had probably envisioned. The position of Aguirre and his largely peninsular supporters was upheld, as a majority (49 to 26) accepted the sovereignty of the Junta de Sevilla in matters of war and finance, code words, first, for resisting the French and, second, for Sevilla and Cadiz to set economic and foreign policies. Among the majority were significant *peninsular* and *criollo* figures—criollized peninsular mine owner Pérez Galvez and *criollos* like the five members of the extended Fagoaga family,[44] merchants Basoco (along with his *criollo* kinsman Castañiza) and Cortina, and *criollo* estate owners Aguayo and Castilla. Probably piqued by this implicit repudiation of the 9 August resolution that temporarily had confirmed Iturrigaray as "poder lexítimo" and "lugarteniente" of Fernando, Iturrigaray riposted by reading into the record his letter of 20 August sent to the Junta de Sevilla.[45] This, it will be recalled,

explicitly constrained Sevilla's authority in economic policy and treaty making, Iturrigaray insisting that his was the responsibility "durante la presente constitución de Nuestra Monarquía" to examine treaties with the English entered into by Sevilla's "congreso."[46] When read immediately following the voting, Iturrigaray's letter—comparable to Rayas's comment—seriously questioned the concept of partial recognition or divided sovereignty demanded by Sevilla and advocated by Aguirre and others, especially when Iturrigaray observed that the Junta de Sevilla "parece no tener . . . los enunciados requisitos para representar la Soveranía de nuestro amadísimo Monarca."[47]

At the close of so critical a Junta General, Iturrigaray's points could not go unchallenged. Rebuttal came from a representative of New Spain's colonial ecclesiastical establishment, doctor of theology Matías de Monteagudo. Native of Cuenca (Spain), member of the Oratorio de San Felipe Neri, Monteagudo had come out to Mexico City twenty-five years earlier; outspoken critic of *criollo* Padre Mier's sermon on the Virgin of Guadalupe in the early 1790s and protégé of former archbishop of Mexico Núñez de Haro, Monteagudo had held a chair in the University of Mexico. In August 1808 he was disturbed by the violent hispanophobic pasquinades tolerated by Iturrigaray; at the end of August, merchants from Veracruz planning to take direct action against Iturrigaray's policies were reported to have met frequently in Monteagudo's chambers in the convent house of the Oratorio. To the evident annoyance of Iturrigaray (who interrupted him at least twice), Monteagudo questioned Iturrigaray's intention to limit Sevilla's treaty-making authority. When Iturrigaray rose to close the meeting, he declared "ya se acabaron las juntas, ésta sera la última."[48] He spoke too soon.

That evening before the minutes of the day's Junta were drafted, a special delivery mail arrived from London aboard the English bark *Discovery* via Jamaica addressed to Viceroy Iturrigaray, with letters from two *comisionados* sent to London by the recently created Junta de Oviedo representing the province of Asturias.[49] The letters dated 21 June described the general situation in the peninsula where even small towns had spontaneously formed juntas, the formation of a junta in the provincial capital of Asturias (Oviedo), its warm reception by English authorities, and—like Sevilla's Junta—the self-assumption of the title "suprema y soberana," which was coupled to a request for financial support to pursue the struggle against French forces of occupation.[50] Iturrigaray now had an opportunity to retrieve what the Audiencia's *ministros togados* had won only that morning—partial recognition of Sevilla. Early the next morning (1 September), Iturrigaray called a

Junta General for 4 p.m. to review what he opaquely termed "un asunto importante del servicio," then drafted a reply to Sevilla's impatient *comisionados*, Jabat and Jaúregui. They were not invited to attend that afternoon's unexpected Junta General.[51]

Probably to the surprise of those present that afternoon, Iturrigaray opened the Junta with a reading of the letters sent by Oviedo's *comisionados*. Clearly Jabat and Jaúregui had been misleading the day before, not to say lying ("mentiras rotundas algunas de las proposiciones que con mucho desembarazo sentó de positivo Jabat," as one critic later phrased it) when they had affirmed that other peninsular juntas had recognized (or were about to recognize) Sevilla's Junta as *suprema*.[52] Iturrigaray drove home this point by recalling "se ha verificado lo que les anuncié . . . ayer; la España está en anarquía, todas son juntas Supremas, y así a ninguna se debe obedecer."[53] The situation reported by Oviedo's *comisionados* surprised the *ministros togados* and generated contradictory responses by the Audiencia. First the three *fiscales* urged withdrawal of what had been granted Sevilla the day before—partial recognition; but then *oidor* Aguirre, seconded by Bataller, disagreed, insisting that the previous position stand.[54] Aguirre reasoned that Oviedo's Junta had limited its assertion of sovereignty to Asturias, while Sevilla's, in Fernando's name, "gobernaba" unoccupied *reynos* like Andalusia and Castilla la Nueva in its capacity as "suprema de España y . . . las Indias."[55] Iturrigaray, he suggested, should set an example for the peninsular juntas to unite behind Sevilla. At this point the Ayuntamiento's *síndico procurador del común*, *criollo* Verdad y Ramos, sought to undermine Sevilla's claim to sovereignty by underscoring the illegitimacy of its origin, "debiendo su ereccion a la executiva conmoción del pueblo"—the sovereignty of the people.[56]

This was the opening Iturrigaray wanted, for here he chose to read aloud the draft of his letter to the Junta de Sevilla for delivery by Jabat and Jaúregui. The *comisionados* of Sevilla had completed their mission, he declared, and should return to Sevilla in the vessel that had brought them, or await the arrival of the ship carrying mercury. There was a striking omission in this letter—his plan to convene a colonial junta or *congreso*.[57] According to one (not unbiased) account, only the *regidores* voiced strong agreement with Iturrigaray's message. To cut off an attempt to bring the debate to a vote, Iturrigaray as presiding officer declared he had called the junta merely to "enterarlos."[58] The peremptory tone of his declaration was heightened by his closing aside—"Yo soy gobernador y capitán general del reino: cada uno de V. SS guarde su puesto, y no extrañarán si con alguno . . . o algunos, tomo providencias." Iturrigaray probably had in mind measures he

contemplated enforcing against the authors of the "anónimos y pasquines amenazantes" in order to avoid further "derramiento do sangre," as had occurred outside the residence of the merchant Uzcola.[59]

In any event, the ambiguity of his closing remark was interpreted by the opposition as "la sorpresa sangrienta que nos preparavan las diavólicas disposiciones de . . . Iturrigaray y sus secuaces."[60] In a word, he was misunderstood, all the more since Iturrigaray made no move to bridge the gap between his position and that of the Audiencia's *ministros* backing Sevilla's Junta. When *regidor* and *síndico* Azcárate suggested that the minutes of the 1 September Junta record unanimous support for the nonrecognition of Sevilla's Junta, Aguirre retorted that since Iturrigaray had not asked for a vote, no statement of support was needed. That evening Iturrigaray clarified his intentions and further widened the gap: he issued a circular ordering the Ayuntamientos of all New Spain to empower the Ayuntamientos of the provincial capitals to represent them in a forthcoming *congreso general*. And the next morning (2 September) he so informed the Audiencia's *ministros*, asking them to provide opinions on how the colony's towns should be represented, either through their own *diputados* or those of provincial capitals (*cabeceras*). Finally, and at the same time, he requested all present at previous Juntas (of 31 August and 1 September) to put their viewpoints (*votos* or *pareceres*) in writing.[61]

Analysis of the vote of 31 August and of the positions taken on 1 September indicates a sharp shift from partial recognition of Sevilla on 31 August (a majority of forty-nine) to a minority on the following day—Oviedo's effect.[62] As long as the issue of recognition concerned only one peninsular junta, Sevilla's, a majority (albeit with limitations of sovereignty) had been mustered by *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller. But when competition materialized overnight in the form of Ovieda's unexpected request for recognition by the colony of New Spain, the Aguirre-Bataller voting strength collapsed as key *peninsular* and *criollo* elements chose to recognize no junta in the metropole. The shift was dramatic. In effect shifting to the position of Iturrigaray, Villaurrutia and Verdad were *criollo* hacendados Aguayo and the *mariscal* de Castilla, *criollo* mine owners like the Fagoagas (Francisco and his cousin José María), criollized *peninsular* merchant Basoco plus his brother-in-law–cousin Castañiza, the *peninsulares* conde de la Cortina, mine owner Pérez Gálvez, Archbishop Lizana y Beaumont, and Inquisitor Prado y Ovejero. Meanwhile there remained two hard-core blocs: one behind Aguirre and Bataller (Elhuyar, Garibay, San Román, and Santiago), another behind Iturrigaray and Villaurrutia (Verdad, Azcárate, Uluapa, Rayas and Regla, Medina, and one Fagoaga). Most noteworthy was the shift of criollized

peninsular merchants Basoco and Cortina, and mine owner Pérez Galvez: prestigious elements of the *almacenero* community were separating from the *peninsular* merchant majority of Mexico City and Veracruz.

To account for the extraordinary impact upon Mexico City's notables of the documents issued at London by Oviedo's *comisionados*, Queipo de Llano and Andrés Ángel de la Vega, leads to two sets of explanatory factors. On one level, the surface or explicit one, Oviedo's request for recognition as *suprema*—and for financial support too—flatly contradicted the previous day's testimony of Sevilla's *comisionados*, that other metropolitan juntas had accepted, or were about to accept, Sevilla's hegemony over Spain and its colonies. The communications just received from Oviedo's agents at London simply destroyed the plausibility of Sevilla's *comisionados*. Of course no *vocal* present would openly accuse Sevilla's *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui of lying, at least not publicly; but this is what Viceroy Iturrigaray had in mind when he reiterated on 1 September that Oviedo's documents supported his stated view that no effective central government existed in the peninsula, only *anarquía*. This position brought the advantage of justifying Iturrigaray's and the *criollos*' belief in the necessity of a local *junta general* or *congreso* to establish the sovereignty of the elite rather than of the people. At another and deeper level, too, Oviedo's Junta symbolized to many among Mexico City's notables attitudes and aspiration for change long gestating among the elites of Asturias, and embodied in regional sentiments barely restrained by eighteenth-century Bourbon "centralism" or "ministerial despotism."

An Asturian Model of Change

The roots of Spain's nineteenth-century liberalism are detectable in aspects of eighteenth-century controlled reformism ("reforma de abusos") associated with Asturian civil servants–public intellectuals Campomanes and Jovellanos, and continued in the early nineteenth century by Asturian oligarchs José María Queipo de Llano (conde de Toreno) and Agustin Argüelles and by Álvarez Flores Estrada. Queipo de Llano, Argüelles, and Flores Estrada expressed Asturian upper-class resentment of nonrepresentational monarchy that privileged one region over others and—in economic policy—concentrated the benefits of the transatlantic trading system in Lower Andalusia at Cadiz. Their ideology and careers were intertwined. When Oviedo's *comisionado* Queipo de Llano arrived at London in June 1808, he encountered fellow Asturian Agustin Argüelles, a former official English translator at Madrid, bureaucrat in the Consolidación administra-

tion under Hacienda Secretary Sixto Espinosa, and briefly Godoy's secret agent sent to London via Lisbon possibly in 1804. With justification they have been called members of the "tribu asturienne des LLano et Valdés." Fellow Asturian Jovellanos later recalled Argüelles from London to serve on Spain's Junta Central finally formed in the fall of 1808. Both Queipo de Llano and Argüelles became classic exponents of early nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy in Spain, protagonists of representative government in the form of the Cortes of 1810–1813, and critics of Bourbon political institutions and economic policy. But even before the publications of Queipo de Llano and Argüelles, there appeared in 1808 the critical assessment of the colonial policies of Spain's old regime by another Asturian, Flores Estrada, a member of the Junta de Oviedo that chose Queipo de Llano and Andrés Angel de la Vega as its *comisionados* to London. Flores Estrada and Queipo de Llano had fled together to Oviedo after the Dos de Mayo at Madrid.[63] Flores Estrada shared with Queipo de Llano and Argüelles an Asturian background, class affiliations and sentiments, mutual friendship, and—the essential—an Asturian critical approach to politics and political economy in many respects influenced by the English model of constitutional monarchy and economic development.

Close reading of Flores Estrada's penetrating critique of metropolitan and imperial institutions, his *Exámen imparcial de las disensiones de la América con la España* (1811), reveals an unexpressed yet widely held attitude shared by those present in Mexico City at the 1 September Junta.[64] While those notables who resisted Sevilla's demands obviously could not grant Oviedo recognition and leadership, the Junta de Oviedo's very existence embodied their hope for the basic adjustments that Sevilla and Cadiz interests had never countenanced.

In two sectors, polity and political economy, the aspirations of New Spain's *criollo* oligarchs and those of Asturias in the metropole coincided, if we assume that Flores Estrada's publication represents faithfully the mentality of his class and region. Asturians of his generation were, first of all, critical of the formal, apparent concentration of political power ("tan monstruoso poder") characteristic of preconstitutional government in both metropole and colonies. In Spain, Flores Estrada found "una injusticia chocante y escandalosa el que los Reyes exercisesen las funciones peculiares de los tribunales de justicia"; in Spain *and* the colonies "la causa principal de casi todos nuestros males provenía de haber sido amalgamadas . . . las diferentes atribuciones del poder legislativo, judicial y executivo" in one corporation (*audiencia*) or person (viceroy or captain general).[65] Close to Mexico City's *criollo* aspirations for greater participation in local government was

the Asturian position that without a legitmate "autoridad suprema" in Fernando's absence, only natives (*naturales*) of a given territorial jurisdiction could authorize a substitute. Without a new legitimization, neither established corporations nor persons could exercise sovereignty. "En virtud de qué titulo o de qué razon," Flores Estrada asked rhetorically, "podían los Vireyes o Audiencias exercer las prerrogativas del Soberano?"[66] And even closer to the position of Viceroy Iturrigaray, and his staff and supporters at Mexico City, was Asturians' antagonism to the pretentions of Sevilla and Cadiz to enjoy overall hegemony, and their dislike of Lower Andalusia's pressure-group tactics. Flores Estrada castigated, for example, the Junta de Sevilla for sending *comisionados* to Cadiz and elsewhere with "órdenes verbales, o por escrito" to imprison or—if necessary—assassinate members of the opposition.[67] Antagonism toward Sevilla and Cadiz—Andalusia considered as national symbol—reflected sentiment widespread in the peninsula, and even stronger in the American colonies, that Andalusia's commercial and agricultural interests simply should not subordinate the national interest to their powerful regional interests, even in moments of acute crisis. How else could Viceroy Iturrigaray, born in Andalusia and former military commander there, interpret the assassination of General Solano at Cadiz and the Sevilla *comisionados*' attitude toward him?

The Asturians' position on economic policy also could not fail to incorporate the aspirations of many of Mexico City's *criollos* and even a few peninsular associates. Flores Estrada was part of the Asturian mainstream eager to remove outmoded economic constraints (*abusos*), an attitude visible in the writings of Campomanes and Jovellanos, later of Canga Argüelles. He was critical of economic policy first rooted in bullionism and later supplemented by mercantile exclusivism that allocated "el comercio de tan vastos Dominios a solo una porción muy corta de comerciantes de la peninsula"—a kind of "privilegio . . . local" best typified in the eighteenth century by the growth and prosperity of the port of Cadiz. Asturians preferred the English growth model—"un modelo de sabiduría"—because England had tolerated manufactures in its American colonies along with "libertad de comercio"; understandably Flores Estrada was vague about the details of such liberty.[68] And even when Madrid had relaxed somewhat controls over its transatlantic commercial system in 1778 and afterward, producing extraordinary gains through what he chided as a mere "simulacro de libertad," it failed to sustain economic liberalization.[69] In the sense that Mexico City's and Oviedo's interests coincided in seeking adjustments to new conditions—a degree of autonomy in the long run, in the short run a claim to local sovereignty, both coupled to economic liberalization—the as-

pirations of the two oligarchies were comparable. It is not strange that both the Junta de Oviedo and Iturrigaray along with the *criollos* seeking a local *congreso* met the same fate, as *criollo* pamphleteer Mier later noted. They fell victims to irreconcilable divisions and, ultimately, to force.[70]

A Vision of Interim Autonomy

Following the unexpected swing of votes toward nonrecognition of Sevilla's Junta, Viceroy Iturrigaray moved rapidly to consolidate his and his supporters' position in order to forge a local basis of sovereignty in the absence of a central, uncontested, legitimate "autoridad suprema" in Spain. The confrontational positions of both factions in Mexico City were now visibly hardening and even the Audiencia itself was divided between a majority view led by hard-liners like Aguirre and a minority represented by Villaurrutia.

Iturrigaray, it will be recalled, had requested on 2 September written opinions (*pareceres*) from those present (*vocales*) at the critical Juntas of 31 August and 1 September.[71] On the same day he received the response of the Ayuntamiento's *sindico procuardor del comun, criollo* Verdad y Ramos—close collaborator of the viceroy. It was succinct: no "ovediencia" to Sevilla was required since its formation was illegitimate, "debiendo su erección a la executiva conomción del pueblo"—his viewpoint on 31 August subsequently reinforced by communications from the Junta de Oviedo.[72] Aguirre's *dictamen* came the next day (3 September). Because only Sevilla's Junta had claimed title to "Suprema de España y de las Indias," New Spain's authorities should recognize its sovereignty only in the two functions to which it had limited itself without setting "otra condición y circunstancia" over its treaty-making powers.[73] And responding to the evident tension fueled by the war of pamphlets in the capital's streets, *oidor* Aguirre injected a new warning note. Failure to support Sevilla would "introducir un espíritu de partido que tarde o temprano produciría una division de ánimo, rivalidad y otras mil consequencias que se dexan estender."[74] He did not need to expatiate upon these to the viceroy. And on 4 September came the opinions of New Spain's leading clerics. Archbishop Lizana in a cautiously worded statement counseled delaying recognition of any junta until further news from Spain; Inquisidor Prado y Ovejero admitted switching from recognition of Sevilla (31 August) to a wait-and-see policy on 1 September.[75] But, unlike the archbishop, Prado y Obejero vigorously warned Iturrigaray not to follow Villaurrutia's recommendation for a convocation of "Diputados de las ciudades" of New Spain. Echoing Iturrigaray's perceptions of local

conditions, Prado compared New Spain's caste and class differences to a "Cuerpo Ileno do muchos y dibersos humores a quien no se puede tocar sin riesgo de un fatal contraste por la multitud de Castas y recíproca rivalidad de que adolecen aún los mismos Españoles."[76] The comparison was appropriate.

Certain themes developed by Verdad y Ramos for the *regidores*, and by Aguirre for the *ministros togados*, crop up in Viceroy Iturrigaray's letter (3 September) to the Junta de Sevilla reviewing the activity of Jabat and Jaúregui and summarizing the consensus of the two juntas over which he had just presided. He had sensed on 31 August "diversidad de dictámenes," but once Oviedo's case was aired, he had no choice but to suspend recognition of Sevilla, hopefully until there materialized in Castilla—this specificity was significant—a junta "a que por Ley constitutional y fundamental está inseparablemente adicta esta Colonia." Rejection of popular sovereignty ("soberania del Pueblo") voiced by *criollos* Verdad and Talamantes as well as by peninsular *ministros togados* also preoccupied the viceroy, who foresaw that recognition of Sevilla or any other junta in Spain, reputedly activated by the "people," afforded an unwelcome precedent for similar action in New Spain.[77] An unquestionably legitimated peninsular authority was needed; without it, the choice of one junta over another by New Spain's constituted authorities threatened to split the colonial body politic along two planes of cleavage. In the first case—here echoing both *oidor* Aguirre and *inquisidor* Prado—Iturrigaray confessed to Sevilla that he was disturbed by "la desunión o llámese Cisma que parece ha principiado en la Antigua España y que trascienda a la Nueva donde sería muy difícil sino imposible apagar un fuego que seguramente avivarían sus mismos habitantes Europeos diversamente adheridos a los payses a que debieron su Cuna."

For those who had followed Mexico City's bitter Consulado elections, which repeatedly pitted *montañeses* against *vizcaínos*—a custom Iturrigaray's intervention had failed signally to dampen—this allusion too needed no expatiation. There was, Iturrigaray also noted in his summary to the Junta de Sevilla, an even more serious cleavage resulting from the absence of a recognized peninsular authority, a "división de partidos" some of whose members were disseminating "sorda pero peligrosamente" concepts of independence and republicanism on the model of the "Anglo-Americanos" [the United States]. These were the reasons, concluded Iturrigaray, why Jabat and Jaúregui should now reembark for Sevilla as soon as possible.[78] On the next day (4 September) to underscore the "imparcialidad, rectitud y justificación" of his procedures, Iturrigaray reported to Sevilla that the viewpoints of the *vocales* of the Juntas of 31 August and 1 September now

in hand revealed a "plurality" for nonrecognition.[79] Further, cognizant of the demonstration effect of New Spain's stance upon other Spanish colonies, Iturrigaray had copies of his 3 September letter to Sevilla distributed within New Spain to Veracruz, Yucatan, and Guanajuato, and without, to Guatemala, Lima, and Manila; none however dispatched to Havana.[80] Yet in neither his letters to Sevilla of 3 and 4 September nor those to his former superior and army colleague, Tomás Morla at Cadiz, did Iturrigaray mention his intention to proceed with a local *congreso*. This cannot be dismissed as oversight; at best, it was a notable omission.

For what Iturrigaray had deliberately omitted lay at the core of the preoccupation of opponents of a local *congreso*. For their part on 3 and 4 September the Audiencia's *ministros togados*, including *fiscales* Bourbon, Robledo, and Sagarzurieta along with *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui, all wrote Sevilla's Junta that the viceroy insisted on calling a *junta general* of *diputados* representing New Spain's Ayuntamientos, what the *comisionados* elevated to the stature of "Cortes."[81] In separate letters to Cadiz *and* Sevilla, Jabat was more explicit. In a brief note (3 September) to "muy estimado amigo" Eusebio Antonio de Herrera (Sevilla's representative at Cadiz), Jabat expressed confusion about Iturrigaray's intentions ("la resolución definitiva que tomará este virrey"), mentioned *partidos* created by the viceroy's policies, and referred to obstacles in using "las reservadísima que trajimos" since the *comisionados* could rely neither upon the archbishop (his health and character were at fault) nor on the Audiencia, because "no se puede contar con el secreto de sus deliberaciones respecto del Virrey"—perhaps an allusion to Jacobo de Villaurrutia.[82] Late that night Jabat added a hasty postscript on learning from post office officials (perhaps *administrador de correos* Andrés de Mendívil) that a special mail courier was about to ride to Veracruz with Iturrigaray's dispatches.

Iturrigaray, he felt, would convene representatives of New Spain's town councils "a manera de Cortes." Although his goals remained obscure, he consulted constantly with *regidores* ("la Capital") and had "algunos otros de todas clases a su devoción." Yet Jabat was encouraged that "las gentes sensatas opinan mal." He had just been informed that the Audiencia would resist "vigorosamente" Iturrigaray's call for a colonial assembly whose success was problematic. Jabat's closing recommendation was unambiguous: "Es absolutamente necesario en este Reyno la persona de un Nuevo Virrey."[83] Similar views were expressed in his letter (*reservada*) the next day (4 September) to Francisco Saavedra, now president of Sevilla's Junta, with a new twist: only the *regidores*—promoters of this and "otros desaciertos"—knew the real objectives of convening a colonial assembly. This letter, like

the one to Herrera, closed on the same ominous note. "Yo veo un Virrey malquerido que ni pide ni admite Consejo. Veo la división y recelo que las líneas que se ban tirando se dirixen a la independencia"; the only remedy was "un Nuevo jefe, de opinión, puro, justificado."[84] Later the Junta de Sevilla's vice-president, Fabian de Miranda, would concur that "hay verdadera necesidad que quitan aquel virey." Miranda also circulated excerpts from Veracruz merchant correspondents who asserted that the local naval commandante Ciriaco Cevallos had participated in "enorme contrabando," which explained why Cevallos "se irritó contra el Pueblo y contra otros."[85]

Jabat's confidence that the Audiencia would resist Iturrigaray's plan implies that *fiscales* Sagarzurieta, Borbón, and Robledo had shown Jabat their *dictamen* based upon the *Recopilación de leyes de Castilla*, rejecting the concept that a colonial assembly might "representar la voz de todos los Pueblos" of New Spain.[86] The viceroy lacked a mandate from the "Soberano"; in extraordinary circumstances, the Audiencia's *oidores* in *acuerdo* could always fall back to the role performed by the Cortes in Spain—providing counsel to the viceroy. Besides, Iturrigaray had failed to provide an agenda, a list of the issues to be resolved by his colonial assembly. And there remained the recent historical record, the *fiscales* observed, the unforgettable precedent of the "revolución de Francia," which had commenced with the convocation of the Estates-General in 1789, then destroyed the French monarchy, and ultimately placed Napoleon on the throne. Iturrigaray received a copy of the *fiscales*' opinion on 6 September, as if he needed to learn of the majority opinion of the *ministros togados* among whom Villaurrutia was known as the principal dissident. In fact, the *oidores* appear deliberately to have excluded all four *alcaldes del crimen* from discussion of the *fiscales' dictamen*, thereby eliminating Villaurrutia's dissenting voice.[87]

A Viceregal Resignation?

The collision course set at the 1 September Junta that promised to pit those favoring the convocation of a colonial assembly against those preferring Sevilla as "autoridad suprema" seemed abruptly suspended by Viceroy Iturrigaray's volte-face on 5 September.[88] In a letter in his own hand to the *ministros togados,* Iturrigaray (like *oidor* Aguirre) discerned factionalism splitting the colonial capital's elites—the formation of *partidos* each lining up partisans just before the 31 August Junta when Sevilla's *comisionados* were introduced—which, commented Iturrigaray, "me hace creer la animosidad y empeño con que algunos se explicaron." Equally unsettling were "las voces que van esparciendo," for instance, the rumor spread by

oidor Aguirre that the *regidores* considered coming "a este Palacio, quitarse las Espadas, y besarme la mano, cosa que . . . fué todo el contrario." Then came his bombshell: he intended to "hacer dexación del virreinato," turning over command temporarily to army commander Pedro Garibay until the customary secret instructions indicating a successor (*pliego de mortaja*) were opened.[89] He wished to return to Spain to "vindicar mi honor y hacer ver en la Metrópoli que he sido en este Reyno un leal vasallo"; he was probably aware of Jabat's unflattering assessment of his performance. He closed by requesting the Audiencia's opinion of his intention to resign.[90]

This would seem the reaction of an aging colonial officer and veteran of long military service confronting difficult choices—"no hallaba arbitrio para decidirse entre ellas [razones]," as Iturrigaray's secretary phrased it[91]—fearful that his decisions might shatter the fragile unity of the colonial elites and warming to the notion that he might "lograr el descanso de mi espíritu" as he learned that Europeans in Mexico City were stocking available supplies of firearms and munitions.[92] Including a copy of his proposed resignation submitted to the Audiencia, Iturrigaray reported confidentially to General Morla (the replacement at Cadiz of assassinated General Solano) what must have been uppermost when he contemplated resignation: Jabat and Jaúregui had brought from the Junta de Sevilla letters addressed to "varios oydores y magistrados" but none to him, and both "están intrigando y asiendo partido entre las gentes queriendo darse un ayre de representantes y de protectores do la buena causa quando en este reino no la ha avido ni puede aver la mala." He confessed that he had a "gran desconfianza" of both *comisionados*, especially of Jabat, and he feared they might "armar algun caramillo" because they questioned his "onor," causing "malas resultas" to himself and his family. With even more candor Iturrigaray advised Sevilla's Junta that Jabat and Jaúregui had generated at Mexico City "sin duda por las instrucciones que traigan, o porque vengan a desconceptuarme, un género de fermentación nada provechoso para la quietud del reino." Iturrigaray, one may conclude, had submitted his proposed resignation ("oficio muy reservado de letra del virrey") to the Audiencia—leading edge of opposition to his intention to a form an interim colonial basis of sovereignty via an assembly of notables—because he deduced that the *comisionados* from Sevilla were authorized to eliminate him just as Godoy had been removed at Aranjuez in mid-March, and later General Solano at Cadiz. Did Iturrigaray also fear that a *golpe de estado* against him (whose planning was underway after, if not before, the 1 September Junta) might so harden divisions in New Spain's political elite that conflict would be irrepressible? It could not have escaped

Iturrigaray that Mexico City's European community had been stockpiling arms for weeks.

To the *ministros togados* outvoted at the 1 September Junta and "temiendo sucesos terribles, sin arbitrio para remediarlos," Iturrigaray's proposed resignation came as "una luz que todo lo aclarase, y un camino por donde allanar y vencer todas las dificultades" in order to gain the recognition of Sevilla (and, by implication, Cadiz) and to derail Iturrigaray's and the *regidores*' insistence on convoking a colonial junta.[93] Quickly the *ministros togados* held a session on 7 September "reservadísimo aún para algunos de sus individuos" (only eleven of the Audiencia's fourteen members attended) to formulate their *parecer*.[94] Reviewing Iturrigaray's resignation in all its "aspectos, relaciones y consequenicas," *fiscales* Sagarzurieta, Borbón, and Robledo concurred that, according to a Real Orden of 30 October 1806, Viceroy Iturrigaray could proceed, in which case the instructions designating a successor (*pliegos de providencia* or *mortaja*) would be unsealed. Since it was common speculation among Mexico City's political class that the *pliegos* might designate Havana's Captain General Someruelos (or the *presidente* of Guatemala, Saravia), the Audiencia along with supporters among the *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz had every reason to prefer as Iturrigaray's replacement someone less pliant than Someruelos to *criollo* interests or, to be precise, less reluctant to open colonial harbors in wartime to the shipping and cargoes of friendly and neutral merchants, and less permissive of Havana's reexports to Veracruz and Campeche. Mier is probably reliable in quoting Iturrigaray to the effect that he believed the *pliegos* would name as his replacement Someruelos or Saravia, but hardly the octogenarian Garibay. The "ambiciosos e intrigantes" *oidores* took matters into their own hands and alerted Garibay "que se tuviese dispuesto."[95] In any event, Iturrigaray's proposal (what Jabat called his "falso paso") should not be minimized, for the episode figured prominently in Jabat's version of the critical days, 5 to 15 September.[96]

In the evening of 7 September Iturrigaray received the Audiencia's favorable opinion. An "incómodo" viceroy[97] still wavering between hard alternatives called in his *secretario de camara interino* Manuel Velázquez de León, and stunned him by confessing his intention to resign with the Audiencia's approval. Velázquez de León was a career civil servant of more than a decade of service in the viceregal secretariat. A *criollo* on both parents' sides, he came from a long-established colonial family network engaged in mining enterprise. In the 1760s his uncle, Joaquín Velázquez de León (Manuel married his daughter), had been critical of Francisco Gamboa's effort to

give *almaceneros* of the Mexico City Consulado a monopoly of mining supplies as well as credit, and in the late 1760s he served under *visitador general* José de Gálvez in Sonora, where he surveyed mining properties. Savant, mathematician, and skilled mining technician, Joaquín Velázquez de León was instrumental in establishing New Spain's Tribunal de Minería, drafted its regulations with *peninsular* Lassaga, and served as the tribunal's director for a period.[98] *Criollo* notable interwoven in the social fabric of Mexico City's notables of the Ayuntamiento, with family links to New Spain's restive mine-owning oligarchs, experienced in the colonial politics of viceregal administration, and clearly a confidant of Viceroy Iturrigaray, Manuel Velázquez de León was one of Iturrigaray's conduits to the *regidores* who esteemed him a "persona de carácter."[99] A quick-witted Velázquez, foreseeing the "funestas resultas que acarrearon de facto las intrigas de los Oidores para hacer recaer el mando en el ochentón Garibay," counseled Iturrigaray that his resignation could be construed as "indecoroso" and even "arriesgado."[100] Indecorous, because a viceroy's appointment came from the king, who alone could accept his resignation. Playing skillfully upon a military officer's sense of honor, he introduced personal factors: since it was common knowledge that Iturrigaray was vigorously hale despite his sixty-six years, resignation might be misinterpreted as "debilidad o flaqueza de ánimo, o acaso a otros principios de peor interpretación" and would stain his "reputación en el Servicio de Rey."[101]

More important, he continued, Iturrigaray's resignation would be risky, since so unprecedented an event might shatter "la quietud pública." Velázquez de León came up with a suggestion. Since, after all, the *ministros togados* had provided only an opinion, his resignation could be shelved if "algunos de los cuerpos o autoridades constituidas" begged him to withdraw it. Iturrigaray found this indecorous since he would appear eliciting such a response, whereupon Velázquez accepted the charge. "Instado de su carácter de paz y armonía," fearing "turbulencias peligrosas" such as the "división de partidos" as a consequence of resigning when a "multitud de anónimos y pasquines" were circulating, Velázquez scribbled off that evening a note to the *regidores* (yet made no copy) probably addressed to the Ayuntamiento's political leaders, *decano* Antonio Méndez Prieto, *síndico* Verdad, *procurador general* Agustín Rivero, and Talamantes's frequent host, the marqués de Uluapa. A hasty gathering of *regidores* produced a commission that went directly to try to convince Iturrigaray to abandon his resignation, certainly not to bring it up at the forthcoming Junta of 9 September. Iturrigaray agreed to postpone a decision until he could clarify reasons for resigning at a special junta. No doubt Méndez Prieto and other *regidores*

knew that the *oidores* were interested in the viceroy's resignation and even anticipated an *oidor*'s motion to this effect.[102]

Iturrigaray never expressed formally the motives for postponing his decision. An explanation was offered by a *criollo regidor* of Mexico City, a mine owner and former *asesor* of the Tribunal de Minería, José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros. To his brother, Francisco Beye de Cisneros (*abad* de Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe) Iturrigaray once had confided that he "sabe qual ha sido mi buen modo de pensar en público y en secreto"[103]—a relationship that later led to Francisco's imprisonment. Under the pseudonym "Facundo de Lizarza," José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros later claimed Iturrigaray was motivated by the *oidores*' resistance to opening the *pliegos* were he to resign, and by their decided preference for Garibay. By manipulating an aged straw man, General Garibay, the "egoismo y parcialidad" of certain *ministros togados* would permit the Audiencia to control New Spain.[104] On 8 September the *oidores* learned what Velázquez de León had done, probably via an ally on the Ayuntamiento, *regidor* José Juan de Fagoaga. Still there remained the possibility that Iturrigaray might proceed with his resignation, perhaps making an announcement on 9 September when a junta would convene to hear a summary of the written opinions and discuss details for selecting *diputados* to the contemplated *congreso*.

That Iturrigaray intended to proceed with his "junta de diputados del Reyno" was clear on 2 September when he formally asked the Audiencia to advise him about the proper method for the colony's "pueblos" to select their *diputados*: whether to designate individuals and have them proceed directly to Mexico City, or to authorize the Ayuntamientos of provincial capitals to represent them through *diputados* already in the capital. The *ministros togados* promptly arranged a special session specifically excluding *alcaldes del crimen*, thereby avoiding the viewpoint of Jacobo de Villaurrutia who, it was now well known, supported the viceroy's proposal. Predictably the Audiencia approved the opinion of *fiscales* Sagarzurieta, Borbón, and Robledo. They rejected the "congreso o junta de las ciudades y villas" of New Spain on two grounds. First, they judged that the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Castilla*, which provided for the convocation of *procuradores* from cities, towns, and *lugares* at royal command, did not apply to a colony. Instead one had to turn to the colonial code, the *Leyes de Indias*, which assigned political matters (*gobierno*) to a viceroy in consultation with the Audiencia, the established practice, and the *fiscales*' obvious preference. In the second place, all assemblies, whether "juntas, congregaciones, asambleas, cofradías," were dangerous as the history of the early sixteenth century in general, "los bulliciosos . . . en Castilla . . . las llamadas comunidades," as well as the recent

French Revolution in particular had proved. The recourse to violence in history is never far from the lawyer-bureaucrat's affinity for order. Such assemblies would be especially dangerous at this juncture in New Spain; the *fiscales* concluded with the observation that they could have extended their views further had the viceroy indicated "las materias de que habían de tratar los diputados"—an intentional jibe at Iturrigaray's ever-vague agenda for his proposed assembly. The *fiscales*' opinion was drafted and approved twenty-four hours or less after receiving Iturrigaray's request; it is not clear why it required seventy-two hours to order a copy delivered to the viceroy.[105]

Meanwhile Iturrigaray also received written statements (as he had requested) from, among others, two *europeos* and one *criollo—oidor* Aguirre and cleric Monteagudo, and mine owner Rayas. Aguirre avoided reference to the forthcoming *congreso*, limiting his remarks to a reaffirmation of the "razones de utilidad" for limited recognition of Sevilla's sovereignty.[106] Monteagudo, praising Aguirre's "clara profundidad de que no era común en dificultades nuevas y complicadas," tried to rebut the interpretation of Iturrigaray and the *regidores* that the "pueblo" had formed the Junta de Sevilla. This Junta, insisted Monteagudo, was rather the handiwork of "Magistrados, autoridades y personas respetables" carried out in the name of the "Rey y de la Nación." And in an ambiguous comment apropos a local junta in New Spain promoted by what he termed "los publicistas"—perhaps a jab at *criollos* Azcárate, Verdad, and Villaurrutia—he predicted it would prove neither "ebangélico ni christiano."[107]

Strong support for Iturrigaray's position, on the other hand, flowed in from *criollo regidores* like Agustín Rivero and Azcárate, and from the *vocal* representing the Tribunal de Mineria, *criollo* mine owner Rayas. Unlike Aguirre and Monteagudo, Azcárate and Rayas explicitly linked rejection of Sevilla's Junta to the convocation of a local *congreso*. Rayas made a point of expressing resentment at the way those of "qualidad, representacíon, y autoridad"—a reference to *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller, both *peninsulares*—tried to browbeat their opposition. At the 9 August Junta (the first), Rayas recalled, all *vocales* had sworn to recognize only a legitimated peninsular junta, and, as *alcalde del crimen* Villaurrutia had shown, Sevilla lacked such legitimacy. Asked Rayas: How could a "Pueblo Religioso" (New Spain's assembled notables) retract its oath? He then moved logically to support Iturrigaray's "convocación de los Representantes de los Ayuntamientos y demás personas constituidas del Reyno y que tienen voto en Cortes."[108]

These conflicting viewpoints preceded the fourth (and last) junta, which formed a coda to Mexico City's political ferment, touched off in mid-July by news of the Bourbons' abdication at Bayonne. For at least one week it

had been evident that Iturrigaray wanted the *vocales* to agree on *how* to select diputados to the proposed *congreso* and form an interim board until the full assembly met. His reasoning was evident: he required an assembly to validate his decisions ("quedar . . . a cubierto") if there arrived other demands for recognition from, for example, Carlota (queen of Portugal and Charles IV's daughter), from the king of Naples (a relative of Charles IV), from Napoleon or his representative in Spain (Berg), from Fernando himself via an "orden reservada," or in the form of a *providencia* from the Consejo do Ordenes at Madrid—important choices difficult for the viceroy to make unassisted.[109] To be sure, Iturrigaray accepted the principle that viceroys were expected to consult with the Audiencia to produce a *real acuerdo*, but he recalled that years before when he had scrupulously followed the Audiencia's "uniforme dictamen," Madrid had rebuked him "porque no estaba obligado a conformarme con él" according to the Leyes de Indias.[110]

From the conflicting viewpoints received in the preceding week and from the Audiencia's reception of his proposed resignation, Iturrigaray and supporters were probably not startled by renewed confrontation at the 9 September Junta for which, as by now usual, no agenda had been circulated.[111] To impress upon the assembled *vocales* the necessity of his *congreso*, Iturrigaray initiated the meeting by asking *oficial mayor de gobierno* Felix Sandoval to summarize the opinions received apropos positions taken at the previous Juntas of 31 August and 1 September. When objections were raised by Archbishop Lizana and others that their positions were misrepresented, Iturrigaray had their communications read out, counterbalanced by those of his supporters including that of Rayas. Once a clear plurality was recorded supporting nonrecognition of the Juntas of Sevilla *and* Oviedo—precisely the position advocated by Villaurrutia—Iturrigaray brought up his major preoccupation, the *congreso*. As debate heated up, Iturrigaray made public the opposition of the Audiencia's three *fiscales* who had underscored the risks of colonial assembly, and had recommended reliance upon the traditional practice of consultation (*acuerdo*) between viceroy and Audiencia.

At this point the Audiencia's spokesmen, first Bataller followed by Aguirre, turned upon Audiencia member Villaurrutia, "promovedor de la junta del reino," for justifying a *congreso*. Aguirre insisted that he address three principal points: the need for a junta, its utility, and the sources of authority to convoke it. Villaurrutia volunteered to satisfy Aguirre's points provided he be given three to four days to draft a position lest "se me interprete mal alguna proposición en material tan grave"[112]—an allusion to the fact that Inquisidor Prado y Ovejero had "misinterpreted" Villaurrutia's earlier remarks in support of Iturrigaray's Junta as "sediciosas . . . peligro-

sas y del todo inútiles" and which might be construed as favoring a "democracia." The issue of New Spain's cities and towns selecting *diputados* was pursued when an unidentified *vocal* interjected that an *ayuntamiento*'s *diputados* represented only the *estado llano*. Mexico City's *síndico procurador* (Agustín Rivero) rejoined that he was empowered "representar a las demás clases," and he was backed up by *criollo* militia officers, colonels Ignacio de Obregón and Joaquín Gutiérrez de los Rios and, amid the ensuing "confusión y voces," by a lone voice threatening "Si no se convoca a las ciudades, ellas se juntarán." (The Audiencia's *fiscal* Sagarzurieta retorted that this was a "proposición sediciosa.") It was the customarily cautious, contradictory Archbishop Lizana, uncomfortable with the politics of confrontation, who could see what was happening when he mused aloud, "Si el tratar solamente de las Juntas del reino produce esta division, hasta donde llegará si se realicen?" He announced that he was withdrawing support of Iturrigaray's Junta and shifted his support to the position of the Audiencia.[113]

Despite the schism fissioning Mexico City's elites up to this moment in the Junta of 9 September, the tactics of those blocking a local *congreso*, led by *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller, their three *fiscales*, along with clerics Lizana, Prado, and Monteagudo, had effectively postponed a decision. Further, it remained possible that the issue of a local *congreso* might disappear if Iturrigaray announced—as his reply to the *oidores* implied—his resignation. Unexpectedly the *regidores* blasted this exit. *Decano* Méndez Prieto rose to ask the viceroy to exclude the general public, fascinated by the Junta's open discussion, by closing the salon's doors. Speaking for most of the *regidores* (the Ayuntamiento's *alcaldes* did not follow the majority of the *regidores*), he "understood" that Iturrigaray had resigned or, if not, contemplated it.[114] The consequences, he predicted, would be serious. Injecting this "cosa notable" may or may not have caught Iturrigaray unprepared. He responded by confessing he had considered resigning because of age and the drain of constant decision making but failed to mention his discussion with Velázquez de León or the *regidores*. Then, whether on the spur of the moment or by design, he made public the principal considerations behind resigning: he had surmised that the Junta de Sevilla via its *comisionados* intended to remove appointees of the "antiguo gobierno" and—shrugging his shoulders—he was honored to be such an appointee. His was now a public stance of not yielding to Sevilla's *comisionados* and their message; perhaps he was worried about the *criollo* elite's dissatisfaction with the inflexible policies of the commercial interests at Sevilla and Cadiz?

But he did not proffer his resignation. *Regidores* Rivero, Verdad and Talamantes's host, the marques de Uluapa, embellished Méndez Prieto's

exhortation. When they sat down, there was a long, "profundo silencio" broken by neither *ministros togados* nor clerics, perhaps because they still hoped Iturrigaray might resign.[115] Besides, still another junta would have to meet again to examine Villaurrutia's promised justification for holding a colonial assembly.

Villaurrutia's "Exposición"

Villaurrutia left the 9 September Junta General and directly began drafting his response to the major points stressed by the Audiencia's political spokesmen, Aguirre and Bataller. How to explain the readiness of an *alcalde del crimen* of the Audiencia de México, a *criollo*, to expose himself at this critical juncture by supporting Viceroy Iturrigaray's determination to convoke a colonial junta in New Spain, and by challenging the Audiencia's spokesmen at the Juntas of 31 August and 1 September as well as the two *comisionados* of the Junta de Sevilla? In fact, Villaurrutia could afford to be independent-minded, given his paternal ascendants' colonial service, family status, and networks in New Spain, as well as his own career at the University of Alcalá de Henares (Spain), and in colonial service at Guatemala City and Mexico City. Probing the networks of family and career—collective biography—demonstrates the social patterns produced by centuries of Spanish colonialism in metropole and colony.

The Villaurrutia family's roots were in the Encartaciones of Cantabrian Spain (the pueblo of Zalla or Zaya) sandwiched between the Basque provinces and Santander's *montañas*, birthplace of some of New Spain's wealthy and prominent in 1808, like Mexico City's merchant banker Basoco (married into the *encartado* family of Castañiza) and Cuernavaca's sugar magnate, Gabriel de Yermo (nephew and son-in-law of the *encartado* family of the Bárcenas).[116] (In the seventeenth century a Villaurrutia ancestor, Maria de Villa-Loizaga y Urrutia, Hurtado do la Cuadra y Salazar, had married Pedro de Yermo y Santa Maria.) Villaurrutias nurtured their ties to the Basque country and their entailed estate (*mayorazgo*) there, claiming their *derecho de vizcaynía* as *vecinos* of Zalla. The Basque connection provided a tool of career advancement, for Villaurrutia's paternal grandfather (General José Villaurrutia y Salado, Hurtado de la Cuadra y Hurtado de Yarto) obtained an appointment as *gobernador* of Tlaxcala when his relative, Sebastian de la Cuadra was *ministro de estado* under Philip V. Cuadra, when *prefecto* of Madrid's influential Basque Congregación de San Ignacio—he was the esteemed "jefe de los Vizcaínos"—favored Basques in his appointments. Villaurrutia's *criollo* father, Antonio Bernardino de Villaurrutia y Ortiz de la

Torre, a *letrado* of the Consejo de Indias, began his colonial career in 1742 as *oidor* of the Audiencia de Santo Domingo (where his children were born), moved in 1763 to the colony of New Spain as an *oidor* of the Audiencia de Mexico, and, after fifty years of colonial service, retired in 1792 as *regente* of the Audiencia de Guadalajara.

Jacobo de Villaurrutia y López de Osorio was one of five children born during his father's service in Santo Domingo.[117] One died young; Ciro Ponciano entered Mexico City's ecclesiastical establishment as *medio racionero* of the cathedral, where he had a long career; Antonio graduated from the University de México; went to Spain, where he helped found Madrid's Academia Literaria Española (1785); then served in South America on the Audiencia de Charcas (1792–); and in 1806 was advanced to New Spain as *regente* of the Audiencia de Guadalajara. A sister married into the Fagoaga mining family (to the first marqués del Apartado, Francisco Manuel Fagoaga y Arozqueta, Iragorri y de las Heras), while her niece by marriage (María Teresa de Castañzia) became the wife of merchant banker Antonio Basoco, another *encartado*.

As for Jacobo (born 1757), he spent his first seven years in Santo Domingo, the next six at Mexico City. As a page, he accompanied retiring Archbishop Lorenzana to Toledo and was prepared to enter the church but then shifted to the law. At the University of Alcalá de Henares he studied under Francisco Javier Lizana y Beaumont (in 1808 archbishop of New Spain), whose other students included lawyers later to serve on Mexico City's Audiencia along with Villaurrutia, namely *oidor* Bodega and *fiscal* Sagarzurieta.[118] While in Spain he married the daughter of a civil servant Ramona de la Puente y Calera (a relative of Archbishop Lorenzana) and was *corregidor* for five years at Alcalá de Henares before taking a post overseas as *oidor* on the Audiencia de Guatemala, where the began his colonial career in 1792. There, over the next twelve years with the collaboration of the "elemento criollo más ilustrado" he helped found a symbol of the Spanish enlightenment, a *sociedad económica* (quashed in 1799 by conservative Secretario de Gracia y Justica José Antonio Caballero); emerged as "defender of local [colonial] interests"; and was reported to compare favorably the cotton textiles of Guatemala and Puebla with English imports.[119]

In 1804 he was shifted to Mexico City's Audiencia as an *alcalde del crimen* (in his own words, "uno de los puestos primeros en el orden civil") where he managed to pursue his abiding avocation, the advancement and popularization of culture, regional and European.[120] One year after his arrival, with a distant relative (*criollo* lawyer Carlos María de Bustamante) as editor, Villaurrutia as director obtained Iturrigaray's approval of a second Mexico

City periodical, the *Diario de México* (1805–1812), designed, he once wrote, to "fomentar la lectura . . . ofreciendo gratis todas las noticias y anuncios económicos y curiosos, útiles e importantes al público o a los particulares, y un artículo de varia lectura en que desde luego se empezaron a insertar salpicadamente algunas noticias políticas de Europa."[121] Iturrigaray later removed Villaurrutia as the *Diario*'s director without explanation (his wife's uncle replaced him), to the evident satisfaction of Juan López Cancelada, editor of the *Diario*'s older competitor, the *Gazeta de México*.[122] López Cancelada and Villaurrutia mirrored the cleavages in Mexico City. The former was an unabashed partisan of *peninsular* interests and self-identified with *ministros togados* and *almaceneros*; the latter reflected the aspirations and attitudes of the colony's *criollo* oligarchs for a more participatory colonialism.

Thus, on returning to Mexico City after an absence of thirty-four years, Villaurrutia fitted comfortably into an extended family network of Villaurrutias, Fagoagas, Castañizas, Basocos,[123] and an equally extended network of *criollo* friends among civil servants, mine owners, *almaceneros* who were merchants and often merchant bankers, prominent figures such as *regidores* José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros (his brother and Villaurrutia's were both in the Mexico City clerical establishment), Azcárate and the marqueses de Uluapa and Aguayo, wealthy mine owners such as the marqués de Rayas and the conde de Regla, and of course, the Peruvian cleric Melchor Talamantes. Nothing better reveals Villaurrutia's sense of assured status—a factor in his decision to respond to the *oidores*' challenge—than his avowal two years later in early 1810 to mentor and friend, Archbishop-Viceroy Lizana y Beaumont—that "tiene mi familia un derecho no remoto a un mayorazgo bueno en Vizcaya, y mis hijos le tienen tambien cercano, por su madre otros varios, capellanías y obras pías de familia de alguna consideración, y muchas relaciones distinguidas e ilustres . . . un hermano Regente de la Audiencia de Gudalajara, otro prebendado de esta Catedral, una hermana y sobrinos, todos ricos, bien arraigados, y distinguidos con honores y graduaciones." Small wonder that Villaurrutia could disavow "todo espíritu de innovación en el orden de la sociedad."[124]

Villaurrutia drafted his response to the issues pinpointed by *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller between 10 and 13 September, probably with some outside opinion, and he delivered it to the viceroy's offices with a covering note expressing his sense of obligation to "manifestar a V. E. sin respeto a nadie, el juicio que formé," noting that he recognized "La materia es en sí extraordinaria."[125] Villaurrutia sensed, one must presume, that his "exposición" carried more weight than the opinion of just another *vocal*. For on 31 August at the third unprecedented Junta General he had publicly dis-

sented from the opinion of the Audiencia's leadership as well as of the two *comisionados* from Sevilla in supporting, and then vowing to justify, the viceroy's preference for convening what Villaurrutia chose to term a "junta o diputacíon de representantes." Only such a "junta representativa del Reyno" rather than a *junta general* of Mexico City's notables, could "ligar a todo el Reyno," and he went on to urge Iturrigaray on 31 August to "convocar una diputación de todo él."[126] Villaurrita's grand design, it seems, was to voice the aspirations and opinions of the colony's moneyed class, represented by the *regidores* of the provincial capitals.

Of course, this represented a minority view on 31 August, but it did garner support of the Ayuntamiento with the exception of two *regidores* (oddly enough his nephew, José Juan de Fagoaga, and Agustín de Villanueva).[127] Unwittingly Villaurrutia had become—along with *regidores* Azcárate and Verdad—a spokesman for the opposition to the Junta de Sevilla, with the advantage of impeccable credentials. Unlike *criollos* Azcárate and Verdad, not to mention Talamantes, *criollo* Villaurrutia had been trained at two Spanish universities (Alcalá and Toledo), had held a civil service post in the metropole, and then served on two colonial Audiencias, the second being the most prestigious in Spain's overseas empire. Most important, here was a *criollo* civil servant *within* the prestigious and politically powerful Audiencia, and ready to contradict, and even confront the most influential of its *ministros togados*. No wonder Melchor Talamantes visited Villaurrutia four times between 9 and 15 September, making available copies of his "Congreso Nacional" and "Representación National . . . Discurso Filosófico"—both also examined by Azcárate; hence, at the last meeting of the Junta, Talamantes sought Villaurrutia's opinion of his "Representación Nacional." Months later Villaurrutia, now under judicial inquiry and confronted by Talamantes, first denied ever seeing his "Representación Nacional," only to confess forty-eight hours later that he had discovered his copy but "asegurando no haber leído de él más que lo preciso para conocer que era él que se buscaba."[128] Talamantes was in prison and Villaurrutia was not.

Villaurrutia's "exposicion" allocated much space to spelling out the necessity of a local junta, which, he recognized, would be the result of political instability in Spain where "circunstancias no an permitido aún la reunion de estas autoridades [juntas], ni su mutual libre comunicación, para reconocer en qual de ellas resida como punto céntrico o piedra angular la suprema autoridad para el exercicio de la soberanía en todos los dominios de SM Católica." Premature recognition of one of the competing metropolitan juntas might have unforeseen consequences, stimulating "emulación" and—perhaps worse—a "funesta división" in the colonies induced by inap-

propriate policies. In Villaurrutia's view, none of Spain's juntas could sidestep "gravísimos errores" in administering "America," because they lacked "conocimientos y datos antecedentes," not to mention access to relevant documentation in Madrid's ministerial archives.[129] There were, too, more practical reasons for a colonial junta—the nature of the legally defined roles of viceroy and Audiencia. By statute a viceroy had to consult an *audiencia* over issues of administration ("Gobierno en el orden común"), whereas measures concerning economy and defense ("politica, estado y guerra") fell outside normal *audiencia* jurisdiction. Were new responsibilities placed upon the Audiencia de Mexico, it would have to curtail one if its major functions, judicial review.

Second, an *audiencia* normally functioned not as a decision-making body but as a consultative one, advising the viceroy who alone made decisions. Here Villaurrutia recalled Iturrigaray's reiterated observation that a viceroy confronting unusual problems ("extraordinarias . . . ocurrencias") needed a spectrum of counsel far broader than that furnished by custom and law, namely, by an *audiencia*.[130] The *Leyes de partida*, Villaurrutia pointed out, directed a ruler to obtain counsel not only from "sabedores de derecho" (here he meant the *ministros togados*) but also from "sabedores de política" present in a "junta representativa del Reyno" where many issues could be debated fully and opposing interests conciliated with a measure of harmony. Far more acceptable to the colony as a whole would be viceregal decisions incorporating opinions of "diversas clases de personas . . . diversos intereses, y . . . diversas provincias."[131] A viceroy solely dependent upon the *audiencia* would have to choose carefully the issues submitted to *ministros togados*, while his very selection of issues could give rise to "las inteligencias pre [*sic*] siniestras de la malignidad y tal vez a la desconfianza"—the fear of many *criollo* notables and of Viceroy Iturrigaray of cleavages in the colonial body politic.[132] Like other members of New Spain's political elite, Villaurrutia remained apprehensive of the ripple effect of upper-class divisions that might generate interclass conflict among "descontentos, malintencionados, ociosos, y necesitados, que piensan mejorar de suerte en otro orden de cosas, o en el desorden mismo"—in brief, the "pueblo baxo" ever subject to "las malas impresiones."[133] At the core, Villaurrutia the *criollo* was ever the elitist.

In contrast to his extended coverage of conditions abroad and in the colony, justifying a colonial assembly, Villaurrutia barely presented its specific purposes or utility. Brevity was perhaps in inverse proportion to importance and sensitivity to major economic interests. The junta would, first of all, address the problem of external relations with England to maintain

peace, with the United States (which, he felt, France might mislead), and with France if only to assure its government that New Spain would accept neither French hegemony nor a French-imposed dynasty; next, Villaurrutia argued, the junta would act as interim surrogate for Madrid's Consejo de Indias to resolve cases still pending; and, third, it could determine trade policy ("comercio") whose current stagnation crippled both the colonial economy and state revenues, as well as formulate measures stimulating internal growth.[134]

Ever the seasoned civil servant, Villaurrutia skillfully avoided encroaching upon Audiencia jurisdiction, for he refused to address the issue of the method of selecting *diputados* to represent New Spain's cities, towns, and villages in the proposed colonial assembly. After all, this was the problem posed by Iturrigaray to the Audiencia in the Junta of 2 September, to which the *ministros togados* had not directly replied. Instead, Villaurrutia proposed that this point might be settled by an interim or provisional junta to function until the colonial assembly met. On this point, Villaurrutia was quite specific: the junta should be composed of twenty-four members, two from the Ayuntamiento, two from the colony's titled nobility, and two from the "estado llano," one respectively from landlords (*hacendados*), mine owners, lawyers, and university faculty—here *criollos* would constitute a majority; the Audiencia would supply three, "comercio" (the *almaceneros* of the Consulado de Mexico) one, with the balance distributed among clergy, military, and the "gobernador del estado."[135] Evidently Audiencia and Consulado would—even with allies among clergy and military—constitute a minority. In fact, the composition of this provisional junta approximates the membership of a junta proposed by Villaurrutia to Iturrigaray, and by him at the first Junta General (9 August)—namely, archbishop, prelates, and *cabildo eclesiático*; some *oidores*; the Ayuntamiento; and nobility and titled nobility, along with representatives of mining and commercial corporate bodies. This had been mentioned by Villaurrutia to a colleague on the Audiencia, *oidor* Bataller.[136] Villaurrutia delivered his position paper on 13 September; it was still atop Iturrigaray's desk (*bufete*) on the night of 15 September "sin haberle dado curso alguno."[137]

Neither *ministros togados* of the Audiencia nor Sevilla's *comisionados* had to await formal presentation of Villaurrutia's "exposición" to recognize the threat to the established order posed by Villaurrutia's views. Like Iturrigaray and Azcárate, Verdad and Talamantes, Villaurrutia was now a marked man, not to mention the marqueses de Uluapa and Guardiola, Colonel Ignacio Obregón, and Canon Beristáin, who had been "fingered" by Capetillo on 18 August. Within days, Jabat and Jaúregui, for example, would

recommend (24 September) to the Junta de Sevilla the "jubilación o separación" of Villaurrutia on the ground he was a "criollo partidario del Virrey, y que en las Juntas y por escrito sostuvo las nulidad [*sic*] de un Congreso Americano."[138] Others, among them Iturrigaray's secretary, *criollo* Manuel Velázquez de León, discerned the anxiety of the influential opponents of Iturrigaray's convocation of a colonial assembly. Aware that the *regidores* intended to present their own *exposición* in behalf of an assembly (Verdad was drafting his on 12 September),[139] disturbed that Iturrigaray had received advice yet made no signs of changing his mind about resigning, Velázquez de León urged Iturrigaray in the morning of 15 September not "diferir un momento la disolución de la Junta." According to later testimony, he reported that Iturrigaray was finally convinced of the logic—and power—of the Audiencia's position and would make a public announcement on 16 September of his abandonment of the projected colonial assembly. This would never occur. Late in the evening of 15 September, Iturrigaray, his wife, children, and many of those suspected of being his associates were arrested, the objective of a coup that weeks earlier, at least by 1 September, "ya estaba formada, o muy avanzada."[140]

Over eleven months between the Escorial affair of October 1807 and Mexico City's unprecedented fourth and last Junta General (9 September), Spain's situation in Europe disintegrated in a cascade of events: the *golpe de estado* at Aranjuez in March, abdication of the Bourbon dynasty and the Congress of Bayonne, French military intervention, and Madrid's Dos de Mayo and its *sequelae* of peninsular regional responses. As the Spanish crisis deepened, it sent shock waves across the Atlantic, which shook its most important overseas possession, New Spain and its capital, Mexico City. It is more than historical coincidence that Fernando's tutor and later *éminence grise*, counselor, and crises manager Juan de Escoiquiz was both author of a flamboyant epic poem in praise of the conquest of New Spain and political "projector" who helped draw the French into the Spanish vortex by shrewdly capitalizing on Spanish weakness and French imperialism. Escoiquiz and fellow crisis managers planned to preserve the *ancien régime*, even to reverse changes accepted over preceding decades in metropole and colonies. Planning, however, often produces unplanned effects, and the intervention of Spanish crisis managers would undermine in the long run what they intended to preserve, the ancien regime in Spain and the extensive overseas empire.

Spain and New Spain shared at the end of the eighteenth century a common phenomenon: pervasive regionalism nurtured during the century despite efforts at political centralization, state building, or "modernization."

Unlike the regions of the peninsula, however, New Spain was geographically distant and, while politically subordinate to the central government at Madrid, economically controlled by Lower Andalusia's major port, Cadiz.

Execution of the grand design of Spain's crisis managers in 1808 temporarily eliminated the Bourbon dynasty as source and symbol of supreme authority, but no immediate replacement materialized. This unexpected lacuna loosed currents of regionalism in metropole and colony that became uncontainable. In the peninsula, juntas mushroomed in provincial capitals at Sevilla, Valencia, Oviedo, and Zaragosa; overseas in New Spain came a surge of protonationalist regionalism rife among the native-born elite, while simultaneously fractioning the "European" or peninsular community, its *partidos* of *montañeses*, *vizcaínos* and "criollized" *peninsulares*. The consensus of New Spain's power elite of *criollos* and *peninsulares* that for centuries had effectively suppressed the lower classes now threatened to shatter—or so it seemed to the resident Spanish minority.

Yet it was evident that the *criollo* elite never intended to call upon the lower orders in colonial society to seek popular support for convoking their colonial assembly. Too memorable still were those anxious moments in 1767 when mineworkers at Guanajuato and Pachuca had rioted, in the wake of the unexpected expulsion of the Jesuits, over a variety of labor issues, and had to be contained by Gálvez's "shock and awe" reprisals. In 1808 the colony's *criollo* oligarchs, joined by Viceroy General Iturrigaray, wanted no "popular sovereignty," nor would they make overtures to "el pueblo"—certainly not with the memory of the recent outcome of the convocation of France's Estates-General in 1789. There was also the effect of Floridablanca's counterrevolutionary policy supported by the metropole's clergy, grandees, nobility, estate owners, merchants, and merchant bankers—in particular, those clustered in Lower Andalusia's major centers at Sevilla and Cadiz.

Metropole and major colony shared another phenomenon, military-as-bureaucrats whose appointment to high political office constituted a striking innovation in the highly visible personnel of Spanish eighteenth-century administration, and a precedent for the nineteenth century. In 1808 many "bureaucratized" military like Azanza, O'Farrill, and Mazarredo in Spain, in America Someruelos and Iturrigaray—executors of enlightened despotism like their predecessors Las Casas and Revillagigedo in the 1790s—foresaw the disruptive consequences of unrestrained regionalism, the politics of disunity, and the perils of popular participation. This may explain why at Madrid generals Azanza and O'Farrill served first Fernando, then Napoleon's *lugarteniente* (Berg), finally Joseph Bonaparte. For them the nation's structural continuity regardless of dynasty was preferable to discontinuity

and anarchy generated by civil and international war. Under the symbol of monarchy as *the* authority, structural continuity might be assured, and selective change engineered despotically, from above rather than from below.

In the colony of New Spain, however, temporary absence of an imperial authority required a different approach because the power elites in the colony were profoundly divided. The *Europeos* wanted to preserve the fundamental political and economic structures of Spain's transatlantic empire, hence the *ministros togados*' insistence upon recognizing solely the Junta de Sevilla. On the other hand, General Iturrigaray, after years of contacts with the *criollo* elite to which his wife's colonial experience probably contributed, concluded that the persistence of the colonial system required the consensus of the colony's elites, both *europeo* and *criollo*, possibly through a colonial assembly, also propounded by the native-born elite and associates. In the short run, some consensus might bring temporary structural adjustments, particularly in the sensitive area of economic policy, something the *peninsulares* in Audiencia and Consulado rejected, In the long run, a *congreso* might produce a new consensus by minimizing—if it could not totally eliminate—the "mala voluntad entre Criollos y Gachupines" (at least until the metropolitan situation clarified).

Such differences were at the core of debate over Sevilla's imperious claim to hegemony over the colonies, and over the propriety of a local, colonial convocation. What Iturrigaray considered a road to consensus, his opposition interpreted as yielding to local interest groups eager to dismantle the colonial system by undercutting "el comercio nacional y de la España." Certainly this is how New Spain's power elite of *oidores* and *almaceneros* interpreted developments in their colony and overseas by 9 September, when Sevilla's *comisionados* were finally directed to return to Cadiz without the recognition of Sevilla's sovereignty in defense and finance, and the viceroy rejected the opportunity to step down. Preservation of the colonial status quo now required removing the chief political authority through the ultimate tactic, the *golpe de estado* institutionalized in the tradition of the *motín de Esquilache*, more recently the *motín de Aranjuez*. This was terrorism organized by the established orders against a high military bureaucrat whose policy was misunderstood, in the first weeks of September 1808. To understand the resolution of the crisis of New Spain in 1808, we have to turn to Iturrigaray and the anatomy of the *golpe de estado* in the late evening of 15 September.

11. Viceroy Iturrigaray: *Criollos* and a Viceroy's Grand Design

América ha sido un terreno feraz que ha dado caudales a todos los Gobernadores con tal que los quisiesen recibir, aunque no los robasen ni exigiesen; siendo esto muy antiguo, y que tenía raíces muy profundas. Marqués de Rayas

[Las Juntas de Sevilla y Valencia] instaladas en el desórden y en la agitación de los pueblos, apenas reconocidas en el pequeño recinto de las provincias de su nombre, compitieron no obstante por gozar la investidura de Soberanos en el vasto continente de Colón, Monstruoso aborto de la ambición más Desmesurada!
"El Supremo Congreso Mexicano a Todas las Naciones"
In Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*

Quien será él que tenga don de acertar en todo, principalmente en tiempos de confusión, y de extraordinarias y complicadas circunstancias? Iturrigaray, 9 November 1808

No tengo porqué me remuerda la conciencia.
Iturrigaray to Francisco Beye de Cisneros, Cadiz, 23 June 1809

Teniente General José de Iturrigaray y Aróstegui, viceroy of New Spain (1803–1808), typified many of the *militar*-bureaucrats formed in the age of Charles III. Both parents were of the gentry or petty nobility of the Basque province of Navarra (in the Valle del Bastán); born at Cadiz (1742), early in life he entered military service and at the end of a long career was posted at the age of sixty to high colonial office. Like contemporary fellow army officers Azanza, O'Farrill, Morla, and Solano, he would be overwhelmed in the conflict between ministerial modernizers and supporters of the Spanish establishment, one group reformist oriented and the other traditionalist, one Bourbon and the other Austrian, one *militar* and the other *golilla*. His career in New Spain becomes comprehensible when viewed through this optique of conflict. The career ended when, as *militar* and realist, forced

like other military colleagues to choose pragmatic reformism or inflexible immobilism, he opted for unavoidable adjustments to maintain the Spanish imperial system. Dedicated to the monarchy and its imperial structures, he was attacked by traditionalists but respected (even cultivated) by the colonial elites whom he tried to retain within the colonial system.

Spain's state-in-formation during the eighteenth century was subjected to multiplying interest-group pressures, domestic and foreign. There was constant pressure not only to unify recalcitrant regions by framing national policies and enforcing them (or trying to) but also to preserve established interests while incorporating new pressure groups sited mainly on the peninsula's periphery that were eager to exploit the precious metals, raw materials, and consumer demands of Spain's overseas possessions in the last decades under late commercial capitalism. The Spanish form of patrimonial monarchy was also divided between meeting defense requirements at home and overseas and the greed of its privileged clienteles, between demands for change in the colonies and for the status quo (or was it really rollback?) in the metropole. The divisions were concretized in specific issues, none more fundamental to the Spanish transatlantic empire than trade, first in the form of *comercio libre* and later *comercio nuestro* and then, in that trade's last phase, *comercio directo*.

Iturrigaray, *Militar*

As bureaucrat, the *militar* was gradually incorporated into the high civil service to improve structures and personnel of the old regime. He would, it was anticipated, bring to civil administration an up-to-date mentality, expertise, and dedication to state service—to the "nation" (the word was losing its former purely regional ethnic content). This is what the conde de Aranda, twice *primer ministro* and founder of the elite artillery school, intended when he wrote in 1782 to the then heir apparent (later Charles IV) of the need for "Un Dios, un Rey, un Grey"—the unity of state and society. Candidates from Spain's regions were to pass through the homogenizing educational process of military schools, acquiring a national rather than regional perspective to be applied throughout their service and carried into peninsular and colonial administrative posts. Whether they were immune to local interests remains moot—the theory was otherwise. Long before 1759 and the accession of Charles III, military officers of gentry status were being inserted into colonial administration; however, military became more prominent in the aftermath of England's occupation of Havana (1762–1763) when young army officers were posted to the Caribbean and New Spain—

O'Reylly, Azanza, Crame, and others—to survey and overhaul harbor defense works, to train local armed forces, and—more important—to probe and refurbish what was now seen as the malfunctioning administration, as intendants. The policy became strikingly apparent at the close of Charles III's reign when in 1788–1789 recently appointed naval minister Antonio Valdés posted to high colonial office army officers such as Viceroy the second conde de Revillagigedo and intendants Flon and Riaño in New Spain, and Luis de las Casas y Aragorry in Cuba, while Malaspina's expedition was dispatched to America ostensibly for hydrographic research but really to report on colonial conditions in the discreet (it was hoped) fashion fifty years earlier of naval officers Antonio de Ulloa and Jorge Juan. But Malaspina was not discreet, and he paid for it.

Basic to indoctrination of the military, as Aranda's dictum made clear, was the *militar* as forger of the nation over its regions, as instrument to erode that bedrock of the preconstitutional state: deeply rooted rather than vestigial regionalism. No Spaniard of the political elite could forget the disasters of regional divisions during the War of Succession when the peninsula's eastern provinces—Aragón, Cataluña, Valencia—fought the Basque provinces Galicia, Castilla, León, Extremadura, and Andalusia. In the last third of the eighteenth century, it was well known that *consejos*, *audiencias*, and *chancillerías*—the collegiate politico-administrative nodules of the old regime fashioned under the Hapsburgs (the "Austrians")—provided shelters for regional pressure groups. To the *militar*-as-bureaucrat, the nation was more than the sum of its parts; nation formation and national security required regional sacrifices if the whole were to be defended. The Spanish imperial system was superior to any mercantile part: specifically, short-term financial hardships, a *militar* would argue, to be endured by the Cadiz business community in Andalusia as a result of Madrid's economic policy adjustments might in the long run induce national benefits. From this national perspective flowed a stance critical toward the secular claims of Lower Andalusia (of Sevilla and Cadiz) to political and economic hegemony over the Spanish transatlantic system.

Despite autochthonous elements of the military bureaucrats' nationalism, one cannot overlook the attraction of what were considered external models, found in French army, and English naval, officers. Association with French armed forces by many Spanish military bureaucrats in Madrid's ministries in 1808 was hardly servile adulation of things French; it reflected the apparent success of the Napoleonic sequel to the French Revolution, which could be interpreted as carrying out adjustments long postponed by successive Bourbon ministries. In this light, Spain, like prerevolutionary France,

suffered the contradictory effects of "enlightened" despotism; Napoleon and his associates were efficient (at last) military authoritarians rather than ministerial "despots," executing overdue adjustments with order despite the resistance of pressure groups, many of them regional. As the Spanish past bore witness, uncontrolled regionalism under external stimuli could turn into internal war and inevitably into anarchy. In 1808, moreover, many civil servants in the peninsula and colonies feared that the colonial elites might no longer remain passive in the absence of an uncontested "suprema autoridad" in the metropole.

This was the attitude and mentality of many high military in colonial posts at the end of the eighteenth century. If the imperial system were indeed greater than the sum of its parts, its preservation might require more than lip service to a new and potentially uncontrollable interest group, the *criollo* notables in the Spanish Empire in America, in particular, to *criollos* controlling major economic sectors. At this juncture, certain military in the administration of metropole and colonies recognized that preservation of the transatlantic system might be divorced from preservation of Lower Andalusia's privileged position in it. Put another way, Andalusia was not Spain, nor Sevilla and Cadiz, Madrid. As we shall see, this would become a fundament of Viceroy Iturrigaray's decisions in the summer of 1808. Like army officer Someruelos at Havana, army officer Iturrigaray believed that *criollo* allegiance to the Spanish imperial system was essential; and as a member of the Navarrese gentry on both maternal and paternal sides, presumably he understood that controlled, responsible representative bodies like Navarra's Cortes could exist within the Spanish monarchical system and, by extension, within the empire. This is a useful approach in analyzing the career of Viceroy Iturrigaray.[1]

Iturrigaray: Background and Networks

Selection of Iturrigaray in 1803 to replace Viceroy Marquina (who had requested recall) was probably based upon varying criteria. He was an officer of considerable field experience at a time when the defense of New Spain against possible English (in the Caribbean) and U.S. incursions (through Texas) preoccupied Madrid. Second, he was a known quantity to influential groups of Sevilla and of the peninsula's most important maritime city, Cadiz. And, third, through his mother (an Aróstegui y Larrea) and his wife (a Jaúregui y Aróstegui), he was linked to well-established Navarrese in Cuba.

In 1803 Iturrigaray y Aróstegui, Gainza y Larrea was sixty, a veteran of

forty-three years of military service. His parents were *navarros* who were married in the Guipuzcoan port of San Sebastián, where his father appears as *regidor perpetuo*. His father, a civil servant, was posted to Cadiz, where Iturrigaray was born (1742) and raised. There his father served as *agente* of the Real Compañía de la Havana, a privileged company founded by another *navarro*, Martín de Aróstegui y Larrea, related to his mother and presumably his wife. José Iturrigaray and two brothers entered military service, José in (1759) as *cadete* in the infantry, rising to the rank of captain (1777) of *carabineros reales* and brigadier (1789), and serving with distinction in Spain's campaign against France (in Roussillon, 1793–1795) as *teniente general*. By 1801 he had campaigned in Portugal (1762), at Gibraltar under French command (1782), in France (1793–1795) and twice in Portugal (1792 and 1801), where he commanded a unit of the Army of Andalusia based at Ayamonte. As officer of *carabineros*, participant in the siege of Gibraltar, and commander at Ayamonte on the Portuguese frontier, one may surmise he learned much about the operations of merchants handling smuggled goods. Finally between 1800 and 1802 he was second-in-command of Andalusia under General Tomás Morla. Perhaps there was more than customary courtesy when the Cadiz Consulado congratulated Iturrigaray (then governor of the Cadiz military zone) on his appointment as viceroy of the most important colonial trading partner of Cadiz, the kingdom (*reino*) of New Spain.

Iturrigaray's career, his youth at Cadiz, and his last peninsular post there provided an opportunity to know the Spanish metropole and a key province, Andalusia. Presumably through late-in-life marriage to his far younger cousin twice removed, María Inés de Jaúregui y Aróstegui (then twenty-two), he acquired a grasp of colonial reality. María Inés's father, Teniente General Agustín de Jaúregui y Aldecoa, had served for eleven years in South America, first as captain general of Chile (1773–1780), then as viceroy of Peru (1780–1784) during those years of massive Indian uprisings in the Central Andes under Tupac Amarú, only to be overruled later by viceroys Escobedo and Avilés. Meanwhile, Agustín de Jaúregui had noted that Spanish colonialism survived in the Central Andes by employing loyal local militia, many of them mulatto units, recruited on the Peruvian coast and officered by *criollos*. Arósteguis and Jaúreguis also formed part of the Havana sugar planter-merchant elite at the end of the eighteenth century.[2] María Inés's uncle, Juan Tomás de Jaúregui y Mayora, was a prominent Havana merchant, an officer of the Havana Consulado in 1794, and in 1797 partisan of *comercio neutro* in the hope that Cuba might maintain commercial contact with nearby U.S. ports. His son, Andrés de Jaúregui y Arostal, was one of

three proposed emissaries (the other two, O'Reylly and Arango y Parreño of the local planter elite) who almost went to Mexico City in 1808 to propose the formation of colonial juntas, and in 1810 he joined Arango as one of Cuba's *diputados* to the Cortes. The contemplated junta of Havana might have opened briefly Cuba's ports "al comercio con las naciones amigas." In a real sense Iturrigaray and his wife brought to the capital of Spain's principal overseas possession during the critical five-year period, 1803–1808, a grasp both of the peninsular and colonial worlds, their interest groups and their politics. Iturrigaray was a product of the Spanish military tradition of the late eighteenth century, a professional soldier with perhaps stronger ties to the officer corps than to the nobility, imbued with a sense of discipline and the unquestioned execution of orders, experienced as administrator of Andalusia, and by marriage connected to a family of colonial experience with familial and business ties in Cuba. Age aside, he was well fitted to be sent out to the principal colonial post in the Spanish Empire in America of the time.

As former commandant of Andalusia, Iturrigaray offered further advantage to both the government and the private sector, recognition that Lower Andalusia's business interests accorded high priority to Cadiz's virtual monopoly of peninsular trade with the colonies in America. No doubt Cadiz's formal monopoly had been eroding throughout the eighteenth century, a process accelerating with adjustments in imperial trade policy after 1765; still, in 1802 Cadiz controlled perhaps 80 percent of registered imperial trade, while its merchants were more rather than less optimistic about preserving their port's commercial preeminence despite competition from Cataluña's Barcelona, and Castilla's Santander. Peace in 1802 accompanied by a high volume of silver imported on government and private account fueled the optimism of Cadiz businessmen about the potential of colonial economic growth, the profits of Cadiz as entrepôt, and the capacity of Madrid to maintain a credit structure based upon Cadiz's large holdings of treasury bills (*vales reales*), many held by members of the local merchant community. Further, one may presume that Iturrigaray's contacts at Cadiz as well as his wife's Cuban connections sensitized them to divisions in that community generated by Francisco Saavedra's resort to *comercio neutro* in 1797 and its fears of English penetration of the Spanish Caribbean through the ports of La Guayra and Cartagena, Havana and Veracruz. A career army officer, Iturrigaray could not fail to share reservations about England's aggressive foreign policy and its ever-present threat not only to the Spanish colonies in America but also to Spain's principal (and by now century-old) continental ally, France, whether Bourbon, republican, or Napoleonic im-

perial. These considerations one may reasonably impute to Iturrigaray's imperial conspectus on departing in late 1802 from Cadiz with his family and a small retinue and on arriving at Mexico City, where he was received with the customary wealth of ritual in which officers of the Mexico City Consulado participated on a lavish scale.

Iturrigaray also formed business contacts at Cadiz with the firm of the marqués de Casa Laiglesia, which advanced him funds for personal expenses, to outfit himself and his family for the viceregal post at Mexico City. There were personal ties too: Iturrigaray's brother-in-law Manuel Francisco Jaúregui y Aróstegui, an officer in the Guardias Reales, had just married María Joaquina de Laiglesia e Izquierdo, Casa Laiglesia's daughter. Probably Iturrigaray also had contacts with Cadiz merchants associated with Laiglesia, namely Vea Murguía, Simón de Ágreda (a brother, Diego, was an *almacenero* at Mexico City), and Manuel Álvarez Campana (formerly a *socio* of Torre Hermanos of Veracruz and Cadiz). Once installed at Mexico City, Iturrigaray relied upon the services at Cadiz of merchants Manuel Álvarez Campana, Bartolomé Alsázua, and Murphy for handling shipments of Guatemalan indigo, a product of his initial investment speculation. Some of such earnings financed the services of a Madrid agent, Ceraín, via the Casa Murfi of Madrid. Such networks reveal that a Spanish *militar* and high administrator, no matter how distinguished his military credentials (and perhaps *because* of them), was inevitably part of a wider world of government and commercial enterprise.

New Spain's Mine Owners and the "Criollization" of Viceroy Iturrigaray

Iturrigaray's association with the predominantly *criollo* mining industry of New Spain began early in his viceroyal administration, increased over his five-year tenure, and sensitized him to the near- and long-term needs of the colony's main economic sector, the most valuable in the colony's relations with the outer world. The industry's key input was imported mercury, basic to processing New Spain's low-grade, high volume ores. Allocating to mine owners both regular and extraordinary allotments drew viceroy, wife, and staff (in particular his wife's maid and his *secretario de cartas* Ortega) into frequent contact with leading mine owners, merchants, and other intermediaries and led Iturrigaray to favor the largest silver producers—the long-established *criollo* mining family networks based upon Guanajuato's enterprises, and those of Zacatecas's Veta Grande complex, too.

Iturrigaray seems to have relied upon the *contador general de azogues* to

allocate mercury introduced irregularly during wartime by Portuguese, U.S., *and Spanish* registry vessels.[3] At Veracruz he designated as agent for receipt of mercury shipments José Mariano de Almanza, one of the few *criollo almaceneros* there.[4] Throughout the eighteenth century, as Fonseca y Urrutia's manual on New Spain's tax system indicated, management of the *ramo de azogues* was the source of constant friction, which worsened when demand grew and supply turned irregular. *Criollo* José Beye de Cisneros (aka Facundo de Lizarza), close to mine owners and to Viceroy Iturrigaray, underscored the major effect of the war with England (1804–1808), which induced "la falta del preciso ingrediente del azogue."[5] To reduce shortages, the Gordon & Murphy contract of 1806 required the firm to freight government-owned mercury from Cadiz to Veracruz, while Sevilla's *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui, to ensure the success of their mission to Mexico City, made much of the eight hundred quintals of mercury accompanying them and of the stock of more than sixty thousand quintals they claimed held by merchants in reserve at Cadiz and Sevilla.[6]

There was little difficulty distributing regular allotments calculated on normal annual silver production. At the end of 1807, the *contador general de azogues* sent Iturrigaray a list of sixteen petitions for "las cantidades de azogue que han pretendido los mineros que se surten de esos Reales Almacenes," to which he appended an "informe mío y asignación que me parece por ahora en atención a la escases." Routinely, Iturrigaray approved his allocations often with a notation that he maintain in reserve "el suficiente repuesto de aquel ingrediente para socorrer a los individuos que ocurran en los succesivo."[7] In addition, Iturrigaray facilitated in 1807 direct mercury shipments to the Bolaños mining center hitherto dependent on Guadalajara (or Zacatecas) for its supplies.[8] However, he could not sidestep the political quicksand of mercury distribution when confronting "asignaciones extraordinarias para Minas, y negociaciones de crédito a quienes no pueden señalarseles en sus respectivas caxas con la abundancia que demanda el beneficio de sus metales."[9] Handling such allotments, the viceroy found that his discretionary power ensnared him in colonial networks of competing mine owner factions, their merchant associates, varieties of influence buying, and subornation, not to say outright corruption. Carlos María de Bustamante was basically accurate when he commented that "se hizo un tráfico indecente, público y escandaloso de este efecto pagandose por gratificación una onza de oro por razón de cada quintal . . . Éste ha sido uno de los medios de robar de los gefes," and he added "muy antiguo."[10]

In theory, special allocations could be made without risk of favoritism. In practice, probably to ensure high levels of mining output, a viceroy

might favor "mineros de negociaciones conocidas." The most influential silver producers included those *criollo* mine owners with large-scale operations at Guanajuato (the Obregón and Sardaneta families), Pachuca (Romero de Terreros), and the Guanajuato-based *criollo* proprietors of Zacatecas's "Veta Grande" mine (Fagoagas). These *repartimientos extraordinarios* were obtained by offering one gold ounce per quintal of mercury to members of the viceregal retinue, a long-established practice justified by Sardaneta (marqués de Rayas) when he testified that "no me faltan fundamentos para creer que los domésticos, interlocatores en semejantes solicitudes, y no S.E [Iturrigaray], eran los aprovechados . . . estas gratificaciones se sabe haberlas establecido en su tiempo, various de los Señores sus antecesores, y que también fueron comunes y corrientes entre otros Ministros de Real Hacienda."[11] We have the testimony of Iturrigaray's wife's *chihuahua* (maidservant Juana Aranguren) that "generalmente se valían de ella los que pretendían azogues . . . que por su consecución se hacían obsequios de onzas de oro, unas veces para Iturrigaray, y otras para la virreyna aunque éstos no las pedían, sino que los pretendientes hacían dichos obsequios voluntariamente." Under further questioning Aranguren named among those offering *gratificaciónes* Ignacio Obregón, Lorenzo Noriega, José María Fagoaga, José Martínez Barenque, Mateo Palacios, and Manuel Urquiaga. Colonel Obregón she singled out for his "mucha intimidad con los virreyes" and because "diversas veces les havía llevado cuantidades de onzas de oro dimanadas de las concesiones de Azogues y (she added slyly) que por el juego le hacía la virreyna."[12] For his part, Viceroy Iturrigaray was candid, even graphic in reporting how he entered the web of colonial interest and privilege (or was it mutual corruptibility?). When the first bribes (*gratificaciones*) were exchanged for special mercury allotments, Iturrigaray turned to *oidor* González Carbajal, who commented dryly "Que sí, pués eran gajes de los Virreyes, y que todos sus antecesores las habían recibido."[13]

González Carbajal's advice was buttressed by the official deposition of Iturrigaray's *apoderado*, mining magnate Sardaneta (marqués de Rayas). First, he confirmed the customary "abuso" of extraordinary allotments by viceroys and high colonial officials; while legislation prohibited such collusion, Madrid failed in general to "hacerse escarmiento ni devolución alguna." Second, and more significantly, allotments "segun la necesidad de cada individuo" were in practice impossible since "hay ciertas minas ricas . . . que pueden sacar tantos metales como azogues que se proporcionen por lo que con tanto afán procuran lograr la mayor cantidad de dicho ingrediente." Tangible results of such pragmatism over equity to the metropole and its Caribbean possessions substantiated viceregal practice since mine owners

"de negociaciones conocidas son los que multiplican la plata y la amonedación, siendo de esta clase los sugetos a quienes repartió Iturrigaray extraordinariamente los azogues." And while he thereby accumulated roughly ten thousand gold ounces, mine owners were productive and pushed official coinage to "términos espantosos nunca vistos," to a level between 20 million and 27 million pesos annually. In the third place, the practice of unequal mercury allotments enabled Iturrigaray to ship to Spain alone in 1807 around 41 million pesos, to Campeche and Havana another 1 million, "a más de 14 rezagados en caxas y otros gastos menores."[14] It was left to Iturrigaray's wife, daughter of former viceroy of Peru Agustín de Jaúregui, to justify with beguiling simplicity the "regalos" offered by "hacendados del Nuevo Mundo." Hacendados, she felt, were sharing "algunos efectos de su cosecha, pues como en la Peninsula los frutos que se recogen consisten en granos, vinos, aceites, etc., allí los de los mineros son de oro y plata en cuyas especies acostumbran hacer sus regalos."[15] The concept of precious metals as "harvestable" was the product of centuries of Hispanic dependence upon New World mining wedded to an Old World agrarian mentality.

Two aspects of Iturrigaray's role as arbiter of supplementary mercury allocations to New Spain's mine owners merit further detail. Major allotments (650 quintals) went to a relative newcomer to Zacatecas, the peninsula-born Fermín de Apecechea via the intermediation of Colonel Ignacio Obregón who took a 6.5 percent commission. By far the more frequent extra allotments (803) went to Guanajuato's mining magnates, to the conde de la Valenciana, the conde de Casa Rul (402 quintals), and to José María Fagoaga (400) and the marqués de Vivanco. Whatever the merits of Guanajuato's assignments, Iturrigaray privileged that mining center over Zacatecas; similarly, preference was shown a small group of Mexico City *almaceneros* linked to mining or freighting silver between Mexico City and Veracruz: merchants Diego Movellán, Francisco Cortina González, Juan Fernando Meoqui, and Manuel García Herreros, as well as the newly formed Basque *casa conductora de plata* of Antonio Uzcola and Martín Ángel Michaus, along with New Spain's wealthiest merchant banker, Antonio Basoco. To these *criollos* or criollized *peninsular* figures should be added mine owners' intermediaries such as Ignacio Obregón, Francisco Maniau, Juan Francisco Azcárate, and Veracruz's *almacenero* Almanza. There seems, therefore, some factual basis for charges framed by the Guanajuato mine owners José de Septién and José María Chico (along with others) that Iturrigaray's assignments favored six recipients at Guanajuato and four at Mexico City.[16]

Whether one terms the viceroy's earnings in assigning extraordinary mercury allocations as "regalos, "gratificaciones," or sheer bribery, this in-

come enabled him to liquidate debt contracted with Cadiz merchant Laiglesia and to accumulate more than 500,000 pesos invested not, as Laiglesia suggested, in Guatemalan indigo exports but in the capital fund of the Tribunal de Minería "para que"—in Iturrigaray's own words—"con rédito de 5 por ciento pudieren vivir con desaogo su mujer y hijos."[17] By accident or design, this was one outcome of Iturrigaray's sustained attention to New Spain's silver mining sector from his first days as viceroy, when he advised Finance Minister Soler he needed more mercury supplies since mining was the "uníco medio de que se restablezca" the colonial treasury, industry, and trade to pre-1797 levels.[18] It was also how civil servants serving in New Spain and other American possessions managed to retire comfortably despite "sueldos . . . limitados."[19]

Motivated by Madrid's repeated injunctions to maximize transfers of New Spain's governmental silver after the renewal of warfare with England in 1804, by his own assessment of the critical role of mining in the imperial economic system and doubtless by personal investment preferences, Viceroy Iturrigaray developed over his five-year tenure at Mexico City an identification with New Spain's silver mining sector and its leading mine owners. Ineluctably this drew him into networks of long-established *criollo* oligarchical families whose kinsmen were clerics, civil servants, militia officers, and lawyers who were en bloc—a fact no doubt recognized by Iturrigaray and his wife—the enduring structures of Spain's colonial hegemony in New Spain and Peru.

When Iturrigaray arrived at Mexico City, Alexander von Humboldt had already deduced the long-range consequences of New Spain's mining conditions, the fact that principal mines such as Guanajuato's "Valenciana" and the "Veta Grande" of Zacatecas confronted a cost squeeze upon net income. Continued profitability in processing a large volume of low-grade ores necessitated a steady supply of mercury imports channeled to the most productive enterprises, and a leveling-off of the spiral of inflation in the cost of other basic mining inputs. Around 1801 after years of mercury shortages and stockpiling of unprocessed ores, the Tribunal de Minería "pretendia . . . que se le permitiese hacer contrata con alguna potencia neutral" (the United States?) to guarantee mercury shipments, a course of action rejected in a royal order (10 October 1801); similar demands were contemplated in 1806, which Viceroy Iturrigaray rejected. In 1805, it should be recalled, the tribunal—never hesitant in expressing its membership's aspirations—joined the territorial oligarchy to elaborate the negative consequences to mining enterprise of applying the Consolidación in New Spain.

It was not lost upon Viceroy Iturrigaray, who had ordered an investiga-

tion into the origins of anti-Consolidación complaints and learned that the *representación* of the Tribunal de Minería (1805) had been drafted by *criollo* Domínguez. Iturrigaray suspended him until Madrid overruled his decision and rebuked "con poco decoro" the tribunal for its protonationalism, warning that henceforth it "excuse tomar la voz por todo el reino."[20] Evidently Iturrigaray had to recognize the desire of Guanajuato's large-scale *criollo* mine owners to draw upon their guild's loan capital as well as upon the colony's religious foundations for infrastructure and working capital to maintain their financial independence of Mexico City's Spanish merchant capitalists, financing (as *aviadores*) operations of new-entry mining entrepreneurs at Zacatecas, many of them now *montañés* rather than *vizcaíno* in peninsular origin.

Given his considerable investment in the lending operations of the mining guild and (in 1807–1808) the preferential nature of supplementary mercury allocations, Iturrigaray could hardly be insensitive to the chance that his growing friendship with mine-owning families like the Obregóns and Sardanetas might be interpreted as favoring a powerful group of *criollo* mining oligarchs and their criollized peninsular associates such as Uzcola and Michaus, Basoco and Castañiza—what could be considered *partido* the *vizcaíno*. At Veracruz, this faction's partisans agglomerated *criollo* merchants Almanza and Lobo along with the maverick *malagueños* Tomás and Mateo Lorenzo Murphy. It is not implausible, then, that the counterfaction (or *montañés*) *partido* of miners and merchants, Apecechea, Pemartín, and Iriarte of Zacatecas, along with Mexico City *almaceneros* Francisco Alonso Terán, Heras Soto, and others, might fear in 1808 that the *vizcaíno* group might opt for direct contacts with English merchant houses and shippers in the Caribbean to secure mercury and other indispensable imports in quantity and reasonably priced.

A strong presumption may therefore be advanced that Iturrigaray's financial and social connections to *criollo* mine owners, his probe of a Zacatecas treasury official's financial collusion (what today we term as a scam) with Zacatecas mine owners, his disquieting inflexible execution of Madrid directives to permit U.S. and English shipping at Veracruz to introduce a large volume of imports and to facilitate in return precious metals outflows—all tied Viceroy Iturrigaray, in the optique of *montañés* miners and merchants, to *criollo* and other notables in Mexico City in the eight critical weeks between 15 July and 15 September 1808. To be specific, to Verdad y Ramos, Juan Francisco Azcárate, and Francisco and José Beye de Cisneros, to Colonel Ignacio Obregón (half brother of the conde de Valenciana) whom Talamantes labeled "uno de los que más se oponían a las intenciones

del Real Acuerdo," and to another and outspoken *criollo* mine owner, José Mariano de Sardaneta, marqués de Rayas.[21]

In 1808 Rayas's relationship with the *peninsular* mine-owning group competing with *criollos* at Guanajuato and Zacatecas and within the Tribunal de Minería itself was barely cordial. According to a contemporary *criollo* lawyer, Carlos María de Bustamante, Rayas was criticized by "gachupines y oydores" because as *administrador general* of the tribunal he had serious policy differences with the director, the *vizcaíno* mining authority Fausto de Elhuyar, who was "enemigo de todo criollo y singularmente" of Rayas. Elhuyar felt Rayas had misused his position to borrow excessively from the tribunal's capital fund. Elhuyar was, according to Bustamante, also a "tertuliano perpétuo" of *oidor* Bataller, colleague of influential *oidor* Aguirre y Viana.

Rayas's relation to Iturrigaray became public in the course of Mexico City's juntas between 9 August and 19 September 1808. Iturrigaray, to ensure a representative cross section of New Spain's interest groups and corporations, asked the Tribunal de Minería to designate two representatives; of those designated, Rayas and Elhuyar—the tribunal made a balanced selection—only Rayas attended, not Elhuyar ("por ausencia forzada"). On two key issues Rayas differed vehemently with the influential *ministro togado* Aguirre and the Spanish merchants and mine owners he represented. On 31 August, Rayas argued that the Junta de Sevilla, whose *comisionados* were present, could not represent New Spain solely in matters of "guerra y hacienda," since on 9 August Mexico City's Junta General had agreed to recognize only a peninsular junta so designated by Fernando VII or his legitimate representatives, since in principle sovereignty—intrinsically "única . . . indivisible . . . independiente"—could not be fractioned.[22]

Second, and a more serious issue, Rayas made no bones about supporting Iturrigaray's call for a colonial *congreso* to resolve pressing issues—for instance, mercury imports—raised by the absence of a legitimate supreme authority in the metropole. This facet of Rayas's participation in the *juntas generales* should not be minimized. For a mine owner of New Spain to confront *ministros togados* of the powerful Audiencia in the course of an unprecedented series of *juntas generales* required the ambience that Iturrigaray apparently encouraged. As a *criollo*, Rayas attended the juntas with a sense of uncomfortable deference before the legally expert and forensically experienced *oidores*, who tended to dominate proceedings. Hence Rayas was grateful to Viceroy Iturrigaray for encouraging general participation as revealed in his statement to Iturrigaray (5 September) explaining his position: "La prudencia y decernimento de V. E. ha abierto la puerta" to other-

wise reticent *vocales* (like himself) at the 31 August Junta where Iturrigaray had detected "la poca libertad que allí nos dejaban a los que ocupabamos *menor* rango."[23] Here was the voice of one of New Spain's prominent mining families venting nonetheless *his* sense of deference before the overpowering "qualidad, representación y autoridad" of the Audiencia's *ministros*. Rayas confessed to a sense of reticence in expressing "ideas, siendo mui diferentes, o se habían sofocado por medios impolíticos al empezarlas proferir . . . o habrían obligado a cuestiones en cuya ventilación . . . toma su partido la voluntad en el recentimiento de la expresión del gesto, o del tono . . . vicios que seran inevitables mientras los Convocados no entienden la total igualdad de su representación."[24] Circumspectly, Rayas did not specify "ideas . . . diferentes," limiting himself to endorsing the opinion of *criollo ministro* Villaurrutia, along with Iturrigaray's proposed "convocación de los Representantes de los Ayuntamientos y demás personas constituidas del Reyno que tienen voto en Cortes."[25]

Rayas's performance on 31 August and subsequently cannot be considered purely an individual expression of *criollo* dissent with the theses of *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller, who were backed by the Audiencia's three *fiscales*, some mine owners, and most (if not all) the *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz. To his opponents, Rayas figured as one of a wider circle of fellow travelers frequenting his Mexico City residence to discuss issues of the day with like-minded members of a social network: fellow *criollo* mine owners Ignacio Obregón and José María Fagoaga; *criollo* lawyers José Mariano Ruíz de Castañeda, Carlos Camargo, and Julian de Castillejos; ex-*intendent* of Peru Colonel González (an admiring acquaintance of Peruvian cleric Melchor Talamantes); *peninsular almacenero* Miguel Ángel Michaus; and clerics including the Franciscan Fray Venancio Silva, ex-Jesuit Padre Frangueti, and Rayas's personal chaplain (Padre Agustín Soria). In a real sense Rayas encapsulated support of *criollo* notables and some *peninsulares* in the colony of New Spain for Viceroy Iturrigaray's rejection of the Junta of Sevilla (and behind it, Cadiz), as symbols of an unreconstructed colonial order.

Since, in the absence of Elhuyar, Rayas's position expressed "con ardor" on 31 August, as well as his statement to Iturrigaray five days later, could be construed as the official position of the Tribunal de Minería, Rayas's opposition within the tribunal had to disown him. As an opponent of Iturrigaray's proposed congress would later phrase it, Rayas and fellow travelers Villaurrutia, Fagoaga, Verdad, and Azcárate were recognized as "sugetos bien conocidos en esta capital y sus enlases y amistades breve hubieran acarreado a la multitud de otros de su clase, y estos a muchos que en pocos

días rapidamente hubiera propagado el fatal veneno por toda la Nueva España."[26] So the tribunal's two *diputados*, Marcelo José de Anza and Juan Antonio Terán, tried to distance the official position of the tribunal from Rayas's personal view, and director Elhuyar concurred out of concern that the public "quedaría dudoso qual era él del Tribunal general." At a tribunal meeting, Rayas was voted down, his viewpoint labeled purely personal and even dangerous, capable of triggering "movimientos de los Pueblos, proyectos varios, empeños en sostenerlos, rencillas, caprichos, y variedad de Partidos siempre temibles en épocas de rebolución e inquietud."[27] The tribunal's rejection of Rayas's position was to be communicated to Iturrigaray, but by then he had been "separated" from his office.

Years later, Rayas's forthright position was applauded as "un acto de herocidad" in standing up to "el poder de la Real Audiencia, de los españoles, y de toda la parte influyente de México." At the time, Iturrigaray considered Rayas an incarnation of mine owners' support, as the "cabeza del . . . Tribunal." And this is the point: Iturrigaray could believe a local congress convoked to handle issues concerning mining, trade, and shipping carried the backing of a prestigious, largely *criollo* corporation, despite its evident factionalism. Indeed, when removed from office by coup d'etat, Iturrigaray—unlike viceregal predecessors who usually selected Mexico City's Spanish *almaceneros* to represent them with powers of attorney (as *apoderados*)—turned immediately to the Tribunal de Minería to accept his power of attorney "por el conocimiento que tengo de sus apreciables circunstancias." Informed that the tribunal could accept no responsibility for purely personal matters, Iturrigaray expressed the wish that "ora con poder ora sin él, esperaba que le auxiliara en lo que cupiese y les viniese bien." So Iturrigaray turned to the tribunal's director, Elhuyar, and its *administrador general*, Rayas, as his defenders. Only Rayas accepted. He organized at Mexico City the defense of Iturrigaray, managed his investments, and forwarded derived income to Iturrigaray and his heirs.

That Iturrigaray turned first to the Tribunal de Minería and then to Rayas, who had backed his positions during the *juntas generales* of Mexico City's notables in the weeks after the 9 August Junta, is a reliable measure of the viceroy's learning experience in office over the five years that he and his family resided in the capital of the colony of New Spain. He had come to the realization that mining was the critical sector of the colony's economy and, by extension, that the needs of mine owners had to be paramount in policy making. This was all the more unavoidable at the most critical moment in the history of Spain's transatlantic empire, when it was under pressure in the peninsula and colonies from both English and French ag-

gressive expansionist forces, and when England's former American colonies already played a vital intermediary role. The interests of New Spain's mine-owning networks, as well as Iturrigaray's conspectus of the external pressures exerted by trade groups abroad in the United States, England, and France, provide keys to understanding why Iturrigaray would withhold *full* recognition of Sevilla's Junta. In a letter of 5 September 1808 to the Audiencia's *ministros*, he explained that in light of imperial legislation requiring consultation in "asuntos arduos" between viceroy and Audiencia (the Real Acuerdo), the situation of the royal family in Europe, and the insistence of Sevilla's agents, he had to conclude that the Junta de Sevilla "no se reconozca como soberano por este Reyno, porque me lo dicta así mi honor y conciencia, y porque tengo jurado en presencia de N. S. . . . en la Proclama de Nuestro Católico Monarca, con las voces reptidas de Castilla, Nueva España, y por Nuestro Rey D. Fernando VII."

Given Iturrigaray's perception of the complexity of New Spain's economy, nonrecognition of a *suprema autoridad* at Sevilla or Oviedo did not imply that the colony could simply isolate itself from Caribbean and Atlantic contexts. Recent attempts to do so had failed—for example, execution of Madrid's orders for the defense of the Veracruz coast and protection of its shipping. Attempts to control smuggling by forceful countermeasures exerted by an efficient, single-minded naval officer like Ciriaco Cevallos had produced a conspiracy by Veracruz commercial interests ritualized as "popular" reaction against a colonial official presumably trucking with the French—a mini-coup in which Cevallos had narrowly escaped the fate of General Solano at the hands of the Cadiz "mob." Needed was a policy of limited, managed external contacts with the United States, England, even France to minimize the deepening effects of blockade—shortages of basic imports, inflated price levels, excessive profiteering (particularly as it affected the inputs of silver mining), and the inevitable presence of foreign shipping and merchants along New Spain's Caribbean coasts, the colony's Atlantic face.

Iturrigaray's Grand Design

Iturrigaray and close associates now sought consensus on loosening the Spanish transatlantic system but with minimal penetration by foreigners. A policy of pragmatism, however, does not necessarily win over established economic and political interests, more specifically mercantile and bureaucratic; to *ministros togados* and Mexico City and Veracruz merchants such pragmatism spelled unnecessary concessions to powerful protonationalist

criollos and the few associated *peninsular* elements whose loyalty to the colonial system was now questionable. Fear was blossoming into self-fulfilling prophecy.

Iturrigaray, along with a coterie of officials, mine owners, and a few merchants, was aware of decades of U.S. penetration of the Caribbean, especially after 1783. U.S. ships were appearing at English, French, and Dutch island ports and in growing numbers at Havana; after 1797, U.S.-introduced good were reexported from Havana to Sisal and Campeche on the Yucatan coast, and to Veracruz where U.S. shipping after 1805 entered under cover of Madrid's contracts with neutral commercial firms. Carrying out Madrid's covert policy of permitting U.S. merchant vessels and English warships to enter Veracruz had bared Iturrigaray to unfounded charges of collusion with Madrid's ministers Soler, Espinosa, and Godoy for personal enrichment—charges that those leveling them knew were unfounded. The U.S. presence was visible in a variety of mechanisms. U.S. ships during the English blockade after 1805 had provided a major source of information about European events and policies, although major developments there required confirmation by official communication or by the *Gazeta de Madrid*. Moreover, U.S. shipping multiplied at Veracruz and Tampico and on New Spain's west coast at Guaymas, where illicit imports often reached more than six figures in value. After the U.S. purchase of the Louisiana territory from France (which had just received it from its Spanish ally), these contacts were augmented by the entry of merchants and reconnaissance parties into North Mexico and by commercial penetration from the burgeoning entrepôt at New Orleans.

This extraordinary territorial and maritime expansion of the "Anglo-Americanos" under republican institutions and enterprise after independence, the reality of republican survival in an Atlantic world of monarchy, provided a magnet to some *criollo* elements in New Spain, if not among the notables then among lesser lights scattered among inquiring clerics, lawyers, and small landholders—the "clases medias" predominantly colonial born. Republican-inspired progress of the Anglo-Americans—what Jovellanos once saw as the "designios ambiciosos" of the United States to "unir a su imperio el reino de Mexico"[28]—threatened to infiltrate underpopulated northern New Spain, at Santa Fe and Taos, and lead Madrid officials to direct Viceroy Iturrigaray to sponsor research on the colony's northern frontiers with the United States and thus to the appointment of Peruvian cleric Talamantes as researcher.

Yet the territorial and commercial aggression of the United States was not as real and present a threat as English naval power, English ships, and

English goods (what Mexico City merchant Iturbe e Iraeta called "el gran poder de los ingleses") to New Spain and its metropole across the Atlantic. In war and peace there was the English naval station and smuggler's haven off the Andalusian coast at Gibraltar; in wartime there were the constraints of English blockaders progressively more effective as Spanish naval forces proved ineffective or, after the disaster of Trafalgar, virtually disappeared. Critics and admirers of England's economic power exercised through unequal treaties did not have to look far afield for examples of its application; they witnessed the results of what Ricardo later praised as comparative advantage in the economic exchanges between England and Portugal. No doubt Viceroy Iturrigaray shared the observation of Pérez de Arce at Veracruz in 1808 concerning England's commercial hegemony over Portugal; after all, Jovellanos (no Anglophobe) as late as 1810 envisioned England dominating Spain's American possessions via "tratados" and "peligrosas condiciones."[29] Iturrigaray knew of the commercial and financial operations of the Murphy family's networks at Cadiz, Madrid, London, Jamaica, and Veracruz as well as its London house; did he know that one of Mexico City's *almanceneros* whom he supported in an election bid in the Consulado, the second conde de la Cortina, probably maintained contact with William Pitt through a J. D. R. Gordon ("private correspondent") briefly resident in New Spain? Nonetheless fear of English economic penetration as well as military aggression did not curb his readiness to seek adjustments within the Spanish imperial system precisely to reduce the effects of English foreign policy.

As an experienced military officer who had served in Portugal under Aranda and later under France's duc de Crillon at the *campo de Gibraltar* in 1782, Iturrigaray—like his colleague at Cadiz, General Morla—could foresee the contours of English strategy in wartime: occupation of Spain's major Atlantic port of Cadiz or an amphibious operation against New Spain's principal Atlantic-Caribbean entry point at Veracruz. Hence, at Madrid's orders and his own tactical assessment, Iturrigaray emphasized training New Spain's armed forces (among whose officers were mine owners like Colonel Ignacio Obregón), planned to make Orizaba and Jalapa rather then Veracruz major defense points (to the rage of most Veracruz businessmen), and positioned major units there. His military expertise and personal tact earned him the esteem of *criollo* militia officers but inspired among *peninsular* critics in 1808 fears of an uncomfortably close association between an independent-minded viceroy and protonationalist *criollo* officers. Iturrigaray's readiness to cooperate with New Spain's *criollo* elite during war with England after 1804 would seem to parallel the recommen-

dations of Bernardo de Iriarte in Spain on learning that English forces had seized Trinidad in 1797. Madrid's guiding principle, Iriarte had then noted in a fashion reminiscent of Aranda decades earlier, should be "atraher los ánimos de los vasallos de las respectivas provincias de Indias" by treating them like "verdaderos Españoles habitanes de la Peninsula," even to accord them "gracias y franquicias especiales." He went on to specify removing constraints on "comercio y tráfico recíproco" between metropole and overseas possessions, including lowering import and export duties.[30]

Iturrigaray's ingrained suspicion of English intentions should not be extended to assume he had no reservations about French interests and policy. Of course, there existed in New Spain a persistent undercurrent of admiration for the French, who had recently overthrown *their* Bourbon monarchy in order to alter their institutions, only to have England and other European nations intervene. As a French watch dealer (*reloxero*) established at Veracruz once blurted out in a *tertulia* at the height of the French revolution, "Ellos [the French] están en su casa en donde como dueños pueden hacer lo que les diese la gana, y lo estraño es que los vecinos quieren incomodarlos sin irles ni venirles."[31] That admiration resurfaced when Napoleon Bonaparte came to incarnate the revolution consolidated and triumphant. Reports of Fernando's scheming against Charles IV in the Escorial affair and his coup d'état in March 1808, followed by the Bourbons' abdication in May, may not have made imperialist Napoleonic France any less admirable. Before the French occupation of Spain in 1808, it was common at Mexico City to place "el retrato de Napoleon Bonaparte en las funciones públicas en la puerta . . . entre colgaduras." Even later, Abad y Queipo—observant *peninsular* cleric in Michoacan—was hardly exaggerating when he reported in May 1810 that there still were admirers of Napoleon among "nuestros americanos"—"una turba inmensa de idólatras admiradores, que lo contemplan el héroe mas famoso de la historia, el regenerador del mundo, omnipotente e irresistible en sus empresas."[32]

To a nationalist military officer like Viceroy Iturrigaray, however, preservation of the Spanish Empire required independence from expansionist France under Napoleon Bonaparte. To prove the point, Iturrigaray made available to the Audiencia's *oidores* communications received at Veracruz, carried there by the *Vaillant*—whose arrival had led to the anti-Cevallos riot—addressed on 17 May 1808 by France's foreign minister Champagny at Bayonne to New Spain's authorities. Champagny claimed, "El vínculo más estrecho que unirá la Francia a la España no podría ser sino muy ventajoso a la colonia de América, abriendo un campo más vasto a su comercio." At that time, some in New Spain interpreted this as a promise of the "felicidad

que se le habrá de seguir a Nueva España con el comercio abierto de los extrangeros."[33] In fact, at this moment French policy was designed to permit French interests to exploit Spain's existing transatlantic system rather than open it to competitors. Indeed, neither French nor English designs offered a long-term solution for the shortcomings of New Spain's economy or the survival of the Spanish Empire.

In mid-1808, to Iturrigaray and his circle observing developments in the metropole, scanning lists of officials remaining in Madrid's ministries, and striving to identify their presumed political preferences, factions, and future allegiances from the *Gazeta de Madrid* and the *Mercurio*,[34] it was plausible that prominent figures among ministers, military, nobility, and aristocracy associated with Charles IV and Godoy might accept the departure of incompetent Bourbons and the installation of Joseph Bonaparte as new ruler along with ministers and corporate bodies like the Consejo de Indias ready to cooperate with French counterparts to pursue war against England and its continental allies. There was, moreover, no reason to believe cooperation with the French Empire implied radical structural change in the peninsula or its relations with the American colonies; on the other hand, it was conceivable that Joseph Bonaparte's Consejo de Indias (as Iturrigaray once commented publicly, José was "Rey de España y de las Indias"), by promising continuity of policy and confirming existing bodies like the Audiencia de Mexico, might earn recognition from its *ministros togados*. These *oidores*, Mier once suggested, "no se consideran sino como un destacamento del Consejo de Indias a cuyas ordenes estaban."[35] Many apparently believed that Audiencia members felt that, if the French were to occupy Spain, the American colonies should accept the new regime. To quote a statement attributed to influential *oidor* Aguirre, "una mula manchega que quedase mandando en Espana, fuese el Napoleón, ése se había de obedecer en América."[36] In this case, however, the English blockade would tighten, New Spain's import shortages worsen, smuggling would be uncontainable, and disaffection permeate New Spain's elites, especially its mine owners. In sum, Iturrigaray had to conclude that he had to create within the colony a new locus of authority to legitimate his grand design to preserve New Spain within Spain's imperial system.

Iturrigaray's design can be pieced together from his discrete statements officially and informally in July, August, and the fall of 1808. Its fundamental element rejected the political authority of the Sevilla-Cadiz axis for at least two reasons: first, because its claims were contested by other peninsular juntas, which highlighted peninsular disunity and the breakdown of whatever centralization had occurred under the Bourbons and, in the

second place, because Iturrigaray realized that Cadiz commercial interests would make no concessions to colonial interests of the sort long proposed by realistic nationalists at home like Bernardo de Iriarte. Iturrigaray's next basic consideration concerned his authority to make interim arrangements with neutral (United States) and friendly or allied powers (England), facilitating New Spain's imports of basic goods in a quantity adequate to meet the demands of the mining industry. Treaty arrangements might allow foreigners, principally the English, limited access to the consumers of New Spain; Iturrigaray, however, intended to protect the Veracruz and Mexico City merchant houses—almost all of peninsular origin—from overwhelming English competition, otherwise "comerciantes ingleses . . . serían dueños de nuestro comercio, y que esto veríamos pronto."[37] Were recognition of Sevilla's or Oviedo's sovereign authority granted, as Iturrigaray observed ambiguously, their representatives might offer "concesiones de malas consequencias," that is, inimical to existing colonial interests. Perhaps he arrogated to himself and associates too much foresight? How else interpret his offhanded comment that "Mexico tenía porvenir commercial con solo tener buques propios" and that in pursuit of this goal "su principal proyecto había sido no permitir la entrada de buques de nación alguna para que no se sacase nada del reino; estimularía luego la construcción de barcos y entonces comerciaría con Europa por una costa y Acapulco y San Blas con Asia y Filipinas." Here are overtones of Pérez de Arce's nationalism and of the *criollo* José Beye de Cisneros.

The third element of his design stemmed from Iturrigaray's protonationalism, military indoctrination and experience, his fear of Spain's rooted regional interests and of internal or civil war and consequent erosion of the empire in America. A consensus obtained by convoking a local, colonial *congreso* in New Spain might in the short run satisfy *criollo* notables in general and the mining family networks in particular and limit infighting, factionalism, or "partidos" fragmenting (or threatening to fragment) *peninsular* civil, military, and ecclesiastical officials, as well as the *peninsular* business community centered in its corporation, the *peninsular* consulado. Conceivably such consensus might also dampen what Iturrigaray perceived as the growing influence of the republican ideal inspired by example and contact with the nearby United States. It was not lost upon shrewd observers in New Spain, like cleric San José Muro at Puebla or the Veracruz Consulado, that with independence, England's former North American colonies had removed imperial economic constraints to produce what the Veracruz Consulado enviously (even fearfully) viewed as "rápidos progresos . . . así en la industria, artes y comercio, como en el aumento de su

población y fuerza," which menaced "nuestra celosa lealtad." Muro spotted the causal connection between England's imperial economic *rigor* applied to its former colonies and the subsequent "insurrección Anglo-Americana," and we know that in discussions with Mexico City suspicious *almaceneros* like *montañés* Francisco Alonso Terán, Iturrigaray "hacía frecuente memoria" of the Anglo-Americanos.[38]

Political Economists: Abad y Queipo and Beye de Cisneros

Two of Iturrigaray's contemporaries concretized the aspirations of many of New Spain's mine owners and landowners for limited economic liberalization, to which Iturrigaray seemed to respond in 1808: bishop-elect of Michoacan Abad y Queipo and José Beye de Cisneros, later representative (*diputado*) of Mexico City at the Cortes, 1810–1813. No radical, critical of French revolutionary measures against the old system of privilege, Abad y Queipo's underlying philosophy committed him to support Spain's imperial system but—and here he shared the belief of many figures of the Catholic enlightenment in Spain such as Asturians Jovellanos and Flores Estrada—stripped of its excesses (*abusos*). His reading of Montesquieu and his own reflections on recent French events taught that effective eradication of abuses in the old order could avoid the overthrow of the whole system. As *juez de capellanías* of his bishopric, nominal *sacrtstán* of the mining center of Guanajuato, friend of prominent *criollo* mine owners like the marqués de Rayas, Abad y Queipo was well equipped to draft in 1805 Valladolid's protest against the Consolidación applied to New Spain. At the end of May 1810, disturbed by reports of urban uprisings at La Paz, Quito, and—closer—Caracas against a colonial system that the recently installed *Regencia* at Cadiz did not promise to modify, Abad y Queipo made clear how much he understood the need to eliminate social and economic inequities (*abusos*) in his ecclesiastical jurisdiction and, by extension, in the colony of New Spain as a whole. Worried by indications of an "estado de fermentación," he sent the Regencia on 30 May 1810 an analysis of New Spain's situation accompanied by recommendations for policy changes.[39]

Like Iturrigaray two years earlier, Abad y Queipo viewed the society of New Spain as deeply divided. On the one hand, property owners both "gachupines y criollos" were fractioned by "la rivalidad y division"; on the other, 80 percent of the population ("indios y castas") was landless, often homeless, generally "abjecto y miserable" who "envidian y aborrecen a los españoles por su requeza y dominio."[40] Even a small shock to public order might trigger what had obsessed Iturrigaray, "una espantosa anarquía" as

"Santo Domingo" [Haiti] had recently shown. To avoid the division between whites (*españoles*) and Indian and *casta* masses, the *tributo personal* or head tax should be abolished. More critical, to reduce friction caused by concentration of economic power (*estanco*) among heavily capitalized peninsular merchants ("de capitales gruesos") to the prejudice of small- and medium-sized shopkeepers ("de capitales muy cortos") and the mass of colonial consumers, he recommended abolition of all license fees. Perhaps his major attention was directed to what Iturrigaray had referred to as "comercio" and "navegación"—which Abad y Queipo addressed as the "sistema de estanco de monopolio y de inhibición general" in place since the sixteenth century. Here he entered a plea for a "Nuevo sistema, más justo y más libeal," an elaboration of the "sistema de comercio libre" of 1789. Not only should all ports in Spain trade with "todas las regiones del mundo"; the same should obtain in the American colonies consonant with—here spoke the reformism of the Asturians—"aquellas modificaciones" required by Spain's needs and other nations' practices. Like Iturrigaray, Abad y Queipo realized his recommendations would invite the opposition of the "monopolistas de Mexico, Veracruz, Cadiz y Barcelona," and while he warmed to the "gachupines que se enriquecen en la América por sus talentos y virtudes," he warned the *Regencia* at Cadiz to disregard monopolists' complaints as "despreciables . . . iníquos."

Abad y Quiepo's *representación* of 30 May 1810 was not pigeonholed on receipt at Cadiz; there the Consejo de España e Indias created immediately a commission, two of whose four members had served in New Spain during Iturrigaray's tenure and whom he respected: Manuel Castillo Negrete and Ciriaco González Carbajal (a third member, José Pablo Valiente, had served in Cuba). That nothing came of Abad y Queipo's effort only confirms Iturrigaray's foresight in 1808.

In many respects, *criollo* José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros came closer than *asturiano* Abad y Queipo to mirroring the outlook and preoccupation of New Spain's *criollos* and its mine-owning segment.[41] Cisneros and fellow *criollo* Guridi y Alcocer had offered on 23 July 1808 to justify convoking New Spain's *autoridades* at Mexico City, the forerunner of Iturrigaray's projected *congreso* of *diputados* from the colony's principal urban areas. The climate of opinion in Mexico City in mid-1808, the confusion widespread among *criollo* and *peninsular* notables on receipt of mixed signals from the metropole, and the options deduced were encapsulated by Cisneros in 1811 when he referred to "elocuentes y nerviosos escritos" received from Spain in which "se negaba enteramente, o se ponía en duda la legitimidad de los gobiernos, y se hablaba de sus miembros del modo más infamante; pero al

mismo tiempo el más especioso, sino el más verdadero: todo por impresos y manuscritos auténticos, y no en corto número, de los mismos españoles." All too evident was "la falta de armonía o positiva oposición en que estaban varias provincias con el mismo gobierno, y la púbica desconfianza que había de su conducta, y en alguno se convidó expresamente a los americanos a imitar el exemplo de Cadiz en la instalación de su junta." In a barely veiled gibe at *peninsulares* among *oidores* and *almaceneros* resident in the colonial capital, he recalled the "arbitrariedad y despotismo" of the "encargados del mando" who insisted "voz en cuello" that if French forces under Napoleon effectively dominated the peninsula "sucumbiendo la España debían las Américas entregarse al usurpador como colonias a quiences no restaba más, que seguir la suerte de su matriz." This was clearly critical of the initial attitude of *oidores* Aguirre, Bataller and others.

Critical as was Beye de Cisneros of elements of Spanish colonialism—its bureaucratic inflexibility, economic constraints, and its effects upon both colonies and metropole—his stance was that of the loyal opposition quite similar to that of Asturian Abad y Queipo in New Spain and, in Spain, Asturian Flores Estrada: the colonial system was worth preserving, if not some of its parts. America, Beye de Cisneros felt, "no pretende, ni menos la ruina de España y suya; y por eso no puede desentenderse del empeño de impugnar su comercio libre, como ruinoso a ambas." For the colonial system was cemented together by "parentesco, religion, comercio, intereses" and only undermined by "el interés particular . . . pensiones establecidas . . . empleos." His was the conspectus of an educated, informed *criollo* of New Spain molded by lessons drawn from the recent relations between England and the North American colonies before and after 1783; he was tied to New Spain's mine-owning oligarchy, in constant contact with *criollo* peers in the colony's capital and, through his cleric brother, Francisco, conversant with the anxieties and preoccupations of Viceroy Iturrigaray. Iturrigaray once wrote to Francisco, "Nadie mejor que Vm. save qual ha sido mi buen modo de pensar en público y en secreto." One may hypothesize that Iturrigaray's guarded references to restraining the Junta de Sevilla's treaty-making powers and to his proposed arrangements with the United States, England, and even France to solve trade problems during the crisis of authority in Spain reflected his interaction with *criollo* notables such as José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros, as well as Verdad, Azcárate, Villaurrutia, and the marqueses de Rayas and Uluapa.

It has been established that José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros under the pseudonym of Lizarza would defend ex-viceroy Iturrigaray in the *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray* (1811), a rebuttal of López Cancelada's

criticism of Iturrigaray, his *Verdad sabida*, which had lauded the role of *peninsular* merchants at Mexico City in 1808. Beye de Cisneros probably also prepared, under the initials S.T.O.G., a rebuttal of López Cancelada's *Ruina de la Nueva España si se declara el comercio libre con los extrangeros*. Beye de Cisneros's *Comercio libre vindicado de la nota de ruinoso* (1811) bares the roots of what could surface only in the climate of Spain's first empire-wide cortes that tolerated open discussion of colonial issues in imperial relations. In 1808 Viceroy Iturrigaray could only guardedly refer to economic issues affecting New Spain's *criollo* elites; three years later, Beye de Cisneros could publish a wide-ranging critique of Spain's transatlantic economic system, which he coupled to policy recommendations for preserving it. Like many *criollos* of his generation in New Spain, Beye de Cisneros was no revolutionary.

Prominent in Beye de Cisneros's thought (and reflected earlier in Iturrigaray's laconic statements) were lessons drawn from the failed "model" of another empire's colonial conflicts and their resolution—England's mishandling of its former North American colonies. Despite protests of the "Ingleses americanos" against the "imposición de gravámenes" of a colonial system that was "inícuo y odioso," England's "gobierno injusto sobstinado" (here read Spain) had resisted adjustments, then lost its colonies. Derived from that historical experience was the principle, "el no sacrificar algo a tiempo, es el seguro medio de perderlo todo"—a perception informing Iturrigaray's position, too. Otherwise, cautioned Beye de Cisneros, America's discontented would discover the hypocrisy of Spanish colonial policy at a moment of crisis: "La política con la América debe ser prometerles siempre mucho, pero jamás cumplir nada sino de palabra."[42] By implicit analogy, this was the current impasse in the metropole's relations with its American colonies; and while Beye de Cisneros's *Comercio Libre* ostensibly concerned itself with all the American possessions, in fact it emphasized the impact of Spanish colonialism upon New Spain.

Comercio Libre is a *criollo*'s shorthand for the operation of the Spanish transatlantic system from Mexico City's viewpoint, comparable to the outlook of *criollo* Arango y Parreño at Havana. To Beye de Cisneros, the Spanish system for too long had relied upon "monopolio detestable," which in its dual aspect of monopoly-monopsony guaranteed the fortunes of a few through their "comercio nada industrioso," by constraining the American colonies to satisfy its import needs "de una sola mano," which was at the same time the "única compradora . . . de sus frutos." A system in theory equitable to "ambos mundos," in practice had utility for neither the colonies nor the metropole; it served only the private interest of "pocos dueños de grandes capitales."[43] Such "comercio exclusivo y de monopolio"—and here

one detects the critical analysis of an informed *criollo* scanning the economic landscape of the Spanish metropole—had failed to form in the peninsula's ports a corps of independent merchants; instead, the ports (read Cadiz) were dominated by Spaniards acting as agents of distant foreign firms or by resident foreign commercial houses, both repatriating profits. The few Spanish firms, for their part, preferred to reexport high-value foreign imports "de utilidad segura"; many were involved in "hacer correr . . . como nacional un género extrangero" often manufactured in France or elsewhere in Europe but bearing stamps of "Spanish" manufacturies.

Like his Havana counterpart Arango y Parreño in 1808, Beye de Cisneros analyzed the effects of Spain's transatlantic system upon the metropole from the perspective of England's industrialization process. This led him to observe that merchants in Spain (he meant Cadiz) "en nada contribuían al adelantamiento de la industria nacional" nor had they incentivized the metropolitan economy as a whole. Attracted by the "seguridad de ganancia en . . . negociaciones mercantiles . . . en el comercio de Indias," Spaniards had shunted capital and labor away from agriculture; and lacking "apoyo ni habilitación en los comerciantes," there was no incentive in the peninsula to "inventar manufacturas, perfeccionar fábricas, cuidar de máquinas, y establecer un sistema útil de economía." Instead, they preferred a secular pattern of financial security—"enriquecerse con ser en la peninsula compradores, y en América vendedores de los géneros extrangeros."[44] Obviously drawing upon conditions he witnessed daily in the largest and wealthiest urban nucleus of the Spanish overseas empire, Mexico City, Beye de Cisneros commented that such was the concentration there of Spanish immigrant "legiones de mozos" that "casi era lo mismo decir cuerpo de comercio, que congregación de Europeos."[45]

Yet in this crisis of Spain's imperial system, *criollo* Beye de Cisneros, like his counterpart *criollo* Arango y Parreño, did not intend to abandon the system totally or make just minimal adjustments necessary for its preservation. The system's utility had been reduced by the influence of one peninsular entrepôt and its region, by Cadiz and Lower Andalusia, the Cadiz-Sevilla regionalist axis politically resurgent after May 1808 as Madrid's authority collapsed. For too long, he implied, Cadiz had made its commercial interests virtually synonymous with those of the "peninsula," the "metrópoli," the "monarquía." Now he proposed a substitute vision of the system, a federalist approach in which "Nación y Patria" were no longer the property of Cadiz and the peninsula. His perspective projected the "nación" as an "agregado . . . el conjunto de todo cuanto comprehende la monarquía"[46]

Underpinning his revised system was an expanded version of an earlier

imperial adjustment, the "pequeña libertad del comercio" or its "ligera extension" created by Galvez's Reglamento del Comercio Libre extended to New Spain in 1789. Its pervasive stimulus to New Spain's imports, and its exports of silver and other products, had been demonstrated by one of New Spain's "mejores vireyes" (the second conde de Revillagigedo), who refuted the counterarguments of the "vecinos de Cadiz."[47] Here Beye de Cisneros reflected the *criollo* illusion of idle resources neglected by the imperial economic order, what Adam Smith categorized as the vent for surplus. Underutilized resources could be tapped to produce textile fibers, especially raw cotton, demand for which was growing in both Europe and the Far East; settled areas of New Spain, such as Coahuila. Acayucan and Cosamaloapan near Veracruz, could be brought into production by bringing to New Spain immigrants skilled in weaving from Spain and other Catholic areas of Europe. In addition, cattle ranches in Texas would be able to export beef from the port of San Bernardo (Galveston) to Cuba and other Spanish Caribbean islands.[48] To East Asia would go products from New Spain's Pacific coast, pearls, otter skins, pine tar, and iron ore, as well as cotton grown in Sonora and the Californias; such exports to Canton, Amoy, and Macao would supplement China's imports of raw cotton from the Persian Gulf, Java, and the Philippines.[49] Trade with the Far East would lower incentives for smuggling along the Pacific coast of Sinaloa, Nueva Galicia, and Sonora—at Guaymas in early September 1808 one such smuggling operation had led to the outflow of 1 million pesos.[50] Meanwhile, according to his calculations, from China could be imported a product never absent from the preoccupation of *criollos* associated with New Spain's mine-owning oligarchy, mercury for processing silver which imparted "el movimiento necesario de todo."[51] In normal times, he pointed out, mercury imports (between twelve thousand and twenty thousand quintales per annum) were shipped from Spain and Austria requiring an annual specie outflow from New Spain of 500,000 *pesos fuertes*; imports from China in exchange for New Spain's commodities could alleviate wartime shortages and reduce the capital outflow.[52]

To release New Spain's natural and human resources required a refinement of Gálvez's Reglamento of 1789 along the pattern of "la pequeña libertad concedida últimamente" to Cuban planters and exporters. Beye de Cisneros, like Viceroy Iturrigaray and others of Mexico City's political and economic elite, had to scrutinize Someruelos's trade policy adjustments for the Havana planter and business community ever since *comercio neutro* of 1797 and its official recall in 1799. Bowing to local pressure, Someruelos had by no means fully complied with the reversal of wartime policy; he authorized the entry of friendly and neutral shipping in Havana and other colonial

ports, a policy resented by the Mexico City and Veracruz merchant groups.[53] In 1808 Iturrigaray advanced the possibility that by creating in New Spain a shipbuilding industry to handle its foreign trade, he contemplated thereby limiting potential economic penetration by foreign merchants. Beye de Cisneros also referred to a "gran comercio directo con la Europa [española]" as well as—this was significant—to the "libertad del comercio que quiere la generalidad" of New Spain or, at minimum, a "comercio libre arreglado."[54]

Neither proposition was mutually exclusive; each, however, was a break with established practice. Like Iturrigaray, Beye de Cisneros favored local ship construction, utilizing California's excellent timber, and a school for training pilots; his plan stipulated ceilings on New Spain's imports of non-Spanish goods, lower colonial export duties, a cap on precious metals exports, and the provision of incentives to New Spain's primary product exporters.[55] The results of such "comercio libre arreglado" would leave to peninsular merchants resident in New Spain imports of Spain's agricultural products ("frutos"), "muchas manufacturas privilegiadas" and reexports of foreign goods to other colonies in Spanish-registry shipping. Spanish ships would still return to peninsular ports with New Spain's "preciosos frutos," while customs duties would be collectible in both colonies and metropole since "subsistirá el cobre de las aduanas."[56] Beye de Cisneros was, in effect, proposing substantive adjustment rather than radical change in the Spanish transatlantic economic system which might facilitate New Spain's economic growth, always directing "mayor atención . . . al importante ramo de la minería, que haría salir de las entrañas de sus ricas tierras cuanto más se pueda de oro y plata para sostenerlo todo y felicitar a la nación."[57]

In this fashion—fitting together Iturrigaray's laconic statements with the fuller expositions of Abad y Queipo and Beye de Cisneros—one may reconstruct the basic elements of Viceroy Iturrigaray's grand design to preserve New Spain within Spain's imperial system. These elements, when joined to Iturrigaray's decision on 1 September, supported by many junta *vocales*, to send back *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui to Sevilla without recognition of its hegemony, and to his insistence on holding a local *congreso*, were fitted together by Iturrigaray's opponents in the Audiencia and commercial communities of Mexico City and Veracruz into a near and present threat to the political and commercial order of imperial Spain. To his anxiety-ridden opponents, Iturrigaray's convocation of *diputados* would constitute "un gobierno propio" in which (as it was put in retrospect two years later) "ni el comercio tendría trabas, ni los empleos se adjudicarían más que a los hijos del país, ni el dinero . . . se extraería."[58]

Iturrigaray's handling of Sevilla's *comisionados* with the backing of most

Ayuntamiento members and *criollos* like mining *diputado* Rayas and Ignacio Obregón confirmed in the eyes of merchants and civil servants at Veracruz and Mexico City that the viceroy was following advice sure to bring "consequencias funestas." To this perception one must add that Iturrigaray had created around his figure, whether as reflection of his "style" or simply by design, an aura of "populist" protector of New Spain's lower orders. The superficial harmony of "criollos, gachupines e indios" that he appeared to have achieved became to his worried opponents not a tactic in a strategy cementing otherwise conflictive interests to the imperial system but its opposite—preparation for the destruction of the established colonial order. Such was the end product of Viceroy General José de Iturrigaray's belated efforts to implement the late eighteenth-century *militar* understanding of how to secure colony to metropole.

12. Anatomy of a Colonial Coup d'État: Mexico City, 1808

El nombre de Fernando VII, bajo el cual se establecieron las juntas en España, sirvió para prohibirnos la imitación de su ejemplo y privarnos de las ventajas que debía producer la reforma de nuestras instituciones interiores.

"Manifesto que hacen . . . los representantes de las provincias de la América Septentrional," 6 November 1813. In Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 5:212, n. 92

Entre los hechos escandalosos que después de la conquista ha acaecido en los dominios que posee la nación en ambas Américas, no se citará una igual al último acaecido en México.

Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui, 20 August 1809. García, ed., *Documentos históricos mexicanos*, II, 292

Desengañémonos, la audiencia de Méjico de 1808 aceleró la revolución . . . el que es causa de las causas, es causa de lo causado.

Carlos María de Bustamante. In *Águila Mexicana*, 15 May 1822

Sé que conviene propender a la moderación y suavidad, pero tambien sé, que solamente el rigor salva muchas veces los Estados.

Gabriel de Yermo to Junta de Sevilla, 12 November 1808
In Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:659

The coalescence of Iturrigaray's grand design to modify the colonial order in the interest of New Spain's landowning and mining proprietors came in stages and conditioned the response of traditionalists in government and business. In the crisis of the old regime in 1808, immunization of the formal institutions of the metropolitan and colonial state against structural change required dissimulation, through manipulation of "people's" participation—the role of the "pueblo" was legitimate but definitely not that of the "soberanía del pueblo"—and wherever possible through avoidance of the formal military apparatus of the state, which did not exclude recourse

to individuals of the armed forces, of course. The preemptive coup by established interests had yet to acquire legitimacy; it was unacceptable to confess that a coup d'état had resulted from "disgruntled civilians knocking on the barracks' doors."[1] The confluence of the interests of businessmen, politician-bureaucrats, and the military, which produced France's Brumaire, was just emerging as a phenomenon of the capitalist state. Professional anatomists of the preemptive coup of revolution and (much less) counterrevolution, lay in the distant future.

This is not to argue that the political elite of New Spain and Spain in 1808 could overlook preemptive actions or *motines* in Spain since 1766. There was the coup d'état that forced the departure of Esquilache (1766), the aborted coup at the Escorial (October 1807), and the successful coup d'état against both Godoy and Charles IV himself (March 1808) ostensibly to block the retreat of the Bourbons to Sevilla and flight to a colonial refuge, probably New Spain. Subsequently in 1808 the mirage of the "pueblo" as exterminating angel eliminating unreliable personnel was attributed to action by the "mob" against Cadiz's military governor, General Solano, and against the ex-*intendente* of Cuba (Viguri), who had returned to Spain; and, in the case of New Spain, to the Veracruz "riot" against naval commandant Ciriaco Cevallos. In August and September of 1808, Mexico City's political elite had models for mobilizing force to block unwanted change. For the forces of order, the near future seemed reversible.

As far as the embattled partisans of the colonial status quo in New Spain were concerned, by the end of August the first stage of response to the breakdown of authority in the metropole closed with the problem: By what peninsular authority could a pseudo "popular" action be legitimized at Mexico City? The shifting positions at the Juntas Generales of 31 August and 1 September triggered the traditionalists' second stage of response to news from Europe. One may deduce that by 3 September plans for a coup were crystallizing.[2] Iturrigaray's intention to resign on 5 September may have slowed their planning, for the Audiencia's *ministros togados* welcomed his intention, which "se presentaba como una luz que todo lo aclarase, y un camino por donde allanar y vencer todas las dificultades."[3] To their consternation, however, he changed plans probably on deducing that the Audiencia had no intention to open the *pliegos de providencia* naming his successor. When Iturrigaray made clear at the fourth Junta General on 9 September that he had abandoned his intention to resign, planning for the coup d'état went forward.

A Recapitulation

The coup d'état at Mexico City to remove a viceroy, choose and control his replacement, and modify policy illustrates how colonialism and imperialism made a metropole and its wealthiest colony, Spain and New Spain, resonate simultaneously. Six months after a coup d'état at Aranjuez had toppled the government of Charles IV and his adviser-confidant Godoy, another conspiracy engineered by equally tradition-bound forces overseas at Mexico City removed and deported a viceroy who had been in office for five years, simultaneously jailing or intimidating those associated with him in action or thought. And there the similarity ends. At Aranjuez, *fernandistas* decapitated a government, incapable of preserving Spanish interests from English and French pressures, that hoped to take refuge in the colony of New Spain. Across the Atlantic, the *golpistas* of Mexico City and Veracruz tried to block the viceroy's initiatives to preserve the core of Spain's colonial system. In both instances, however, established interests wanted no fundamental change or even adjustments.

In mid-June 1808 the Junta de Sevilla and the Cadiz Consulado agreed that, to achieve hegemony over other peninsular juntas in the absence of a regency or other widely acceptable central corporative body of governance, it was imperative to have access to New Spain's public and private funds and secure the English government's undivided support. Sevilla dispatched two *comisionados* to obtain the recognition of its hegemony and the subordination and—above all—the financial backing of New Spain's colonial government and leading citizens. The agents could use either persuasion or force ("la reservadísima") since the Junta de Sevilla, despite its self-titled status of "suprema" over Spain and its American possessions, lacked powers of uncontested sovereignty. It dared not dismiss Viceroy Iturrigaray by a fictitious *real orden*.

Although we do not know who at Sevilla was responsible for the selection of Jabat and Jaúregui, we may surmise why their selection occurred. Jaúregui had been involved in the aborted coup at the Escorial in October 1807 and its sequel, the twin coups at Aranjuez in March. Then he proceeded to Sevilla. His military career, social background (son of a viceroy of Peru), and political reliability were unquestionable, and he was the brother of Iturrigaray's wife. He could be, therefore, Sevilla's instrument of persuasion as fellow army officer and close kinsman; that Iturrigaray and his wife later kept him at arm's length is irrelevant. Jaúregui requested a co-agent in case of accident or death; this, he asserted, is why Jabat joined him. Certain Sevilla and Cadiz interests selected as co-*comisionado* the antithesis of per-

suasion, Jabat, which implies he was the choice of Cadiz merchants with commercial correspondents at both Veracruz and Mexico City. Perhaps he was also recommended by the former secretary of the Veracruz Consulado, Vicente Basadre, who had requested his own reassignment to Spain in 1805, and who in 1808 was secretary of the Junta de Sevilla. In addition, Jabat's knowledge of the interests and politics of Veracruz merchants was considerable in view of his prior service there.

Sevilla's choice of Jabat confronted Viceroy Iturrigaray with an adversary, since Iturrigaray had shipped Jabat back to Spain in 1805 for gross misconduct as a naval officer—probably his collusion in what Iturrigaray and naval commandant Cevallos had tried to suppress along Veracruz's Caribbean coast: widespread smuggling. To choose Jabat as co-*comisionado* to Mexico City, where he quickly emerged as the dominant agent, signaled to the politically savvy of the capital and the colony's principal port that the commercial policy of Sevilla and Cadiz would favor the status quo, that trade with Cuba, Jamaica, and the United States would be halted, and that resistance to Sevilla's demand for recognition as *suprema* would place Viceroy Iturrigaray immediately at risk. May one go further, to argue that by choosing Jabat, certain interests of Lower Andalusia aimed to remove Iturrigaray by force, thereby preventing the possibility of his resignation and an orderly succession based upon the *pliegos de providencia* or *mortaja*, which, it was widely held, might officially designate Cuba's controversial captain general, the marqués de Someruelos, as his successor?

The *comisionados*' performance on reaching Veracruz and later Mexico City lends credence to the view that Sevilla intended to provoke Iturrigaray's intransigence. Debarking at Veracruz, they forwarded no formal communication to the viceroy—a major slight—but did talk to receptive Veracruz merchants, probably Jabat's old acquaintances. Perhaps Basadre had suggested others; it is known that a group of Veracruz merchants had sent agents to Mexico City at the end of August to push for the ouster of the viceroy. At Veracruz the *comisionados* learned that Iturrigaray would not recognize Sevilla's Junta as "supreme." Once at Mexico City, Jaúregui was the guest of his sister and brother-in-law, Iturrigaray, which was unobjectionable; but Jabat, probably following instructions, lodged with *ministro togado*, Aguirre y Viana, the center of bureaucratic-political opposition—along with oidor Bataller and the three *fiscales*—to Iturrigaray's insistence upon unprecedented *juntas generales* and convocation of a local *congreso* of *diputados* representing the colony's Ayuntamientos. Jabat's controversial career at Veracruz, his abrupt rehabilitation by Navy Minister Gil y Lemos at the end of 1807, his designation as a *comisionado*, and his performance on ar-

riving at Veracruz and Mexico City rendered him virtually preprogrammed to irritate rather than placate New Spain's viceroy.

In the weeks following official reports of the self-removal of the Spanish Bourbons published in the *Gazeta de Mexico* on 8 June, Viceroy Iturrigaray had pursued a course to maintain New Spain's internal order. In fulfilling instructions received over five years to remit the colonial government's silver receipts to the metropole, he had grasped the critical role of the colony's mining economy and its impresarios, most of whom were *criollos* with extended social networks reaching into middle and lower ranks of the civil and religious bureaucracy, and who were faithfully represented by articulate and visible *regidores* of the capital's ayuntamiento and by Verdad and Azcárate, who had solid legal backgrounds. Through a variety of contacts, including his secretaries, *criollo* Velázquez de León and *peninsular* Rafael Ortega; through such acquaintances as the marqués de Rayas and other mine owners who were also militia officers, like Colonel Ignacio Obregón; through his personal chaplain, who was no narrow-minded cleric, Juan Saint; and perhaps through his Genoese cook, Santa Ágata, who showed no restraint in his café conversations—Iturrigaray could detect protoregionalist sentiments surfacing as metropolitan authority across the Atlantic disintegrated. Further, throughout August there were signs of barely contained violence: in the *escarmiento* of Cevallos at Veracruz; during the pamphlet war, which elicited the formal protests of Mexico City's Consulado officers; and in bloodshed, when a bystander was shot by bullets fired from the residence of *almacenero*, *conductor de plata*, and militia officer, *peninsular* Antonio Uzcola. Last and hardly least, the agents now faced an unavoidable challenge: Could a decorated, honored military officer, viceroy of Spain's principal overseas possession, abandon his well-advertised plan to opt for temporary autonomy during the crisis of the metropole, at the insistence of a naval officer whom Iturrigaray did not respect, dispatched by Lower Andalucian interests heedless of the profound changes taking place in the Atlantic and colonial worlds?

Through August and the first weeks of September, Viceroy Iturrigaray's motivation in convoking a consultative *congreso* of representatives of New Spain's provincial capitals was avoiding the divisive effects of social and economic issues in the colony. There were the divisions of New Spain's elites, between a majority of *criollo* mine owners and a minority of *peninsular* latecomers at Guanajuato and Zacatecas, and between well-established *peninsular* merchants—mainly "criollized" *vizcaínos* and *encartados*—and *montañés* latecomers. And there were the divisions latent in the peninsula and surfacing in the competition between Sevilla and Oviedo over New

Spain's recognition and access to its funds; the regionalist sentiments of New Spain's resident Spaniards—*vizcaínos*, *encartados*, *montañeses*, *catalanes*—not to overlook the tinder of class and status friction among those born in New Spain, among *criollo* elites, mestizo small farmers, ranchers, *arrieros*, pack peddlers, and the Indian masses, some forced to work the mines. A consultative body drawn from New Spain's elites in the principal cities promised an alternative to "inquietud y fermentación" of unresolved interest group and class conflicts, to "una guerra civil."[4] Class conflict was never discounted by the colony's elites. When the *criollo* Primo y Verdad postulated that during the exile of the Spanish monarch sovereignty devolved upon "el pueblo"—he meant the "autoridades constituidas"—*peninsular* Aguirre, an *oidor*, reminded him this meant "el pueblo originario"—the restive, marginalized masses of *indios*.[5]

Convinced of his alternative, the viceroy refused to react to rumors of Veracruz agents and others conspiring in *conventículos* along with *ministros togados* of the Audiencia to remove him. His attitude reflected his conviction that "no tengo porqué me remuerda la conciencia"—strikingly similar to General Solano's *morgue* when confronted by the Cadiz "mob."[6] Perhaps, too, Viceroy Iturrigaray discounted an imminent coup because there were signs that the principal colonial corporate bodies of Mexico City troubled by his proposed *congreso*, Audiencia and Consulado, were disunited. A *criollo* member of the Audiencia, Villaurrutia, responding to the criticism of *peninsular oidores* Aguirre and Bataller, offered to justify a "junta del reino . . . en si extraordinaria"; there was one reserved, dissident *oidor*, Bodega, and it was common currency in September 1808 that the Audiencia "en su seno tenía hombres sospechosos, por los que los Togados fieles nada podían providenciar sin exponerse a perder."[7] It was a prominent *almacenero* of the Mexico City commercial community, Miguel Ángel Michaus, who leaked to Iturrigaray that a coup was in the making, and other prominent merchants—Antonio Basoco, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, Joaquín Colla, Diego de Ágreda, Ángel Puyade, and (now resident in Mexico City) Tomás Murphy—shared his disapproval of an imminent coup. Or perhaps Iturrigaray, relying upon the loyalty of colonial regiments officered by such figures as *criollo* mine owner Colonel Ignacio Obregón, had no fear of the ill-disciplined *peninsular caxeros* in the recently formed *Voluntarios de Fernando VII*. In any event, Iturrigaray failed to foresee that the twin pillars of the colonial regime, Audiencia and Consulado, backed by *comisionado* Jabat would find a competent surrogate to execute their coup.

Through a classic network of colonial civil servants, a lawyer, probably anonymous agents planted in the colony, and disaffected merchants of

Mexico City and Veracruz, a surrogate was found. Once political goals are defined, the human instruments to achieve them can be enlisted; it is tempting to call their selection process a technicality. However, a preemptive coup d'état is an act of force in the context of order; it is an act by the forces of order, and as such the prime movers within the established order require obscurity lest the legitimacy of the very order be questioned. Hence the mythology of the coup requires a respectable figure or figures up front, while the interests moving or directing the figures remain veiled. How the surrogate, in this case Gabriel Joaquín de Yermo (historian Alamán's "cabeza que les dirijiese")[8] was pinpointed may demythify the leading figures and reveal the prime movers of the coup d'état removing Viceroy Iturrigaray.

The Atlantic linkage between Europe and America, between Spain and New Spain, is exemplified by the influence of Sevilla-Cadiz upon Mexico City in 1808. It is dubious that *ministros togados* Aguirre, Bataller, and Carbajal supported by *fiscales* Robledo, Sagarzurieta, and Borbón would have participated on the night of 15 September without the approval of *comisionado* Jabat. Aguirre and associates understood that metropolitan authorities would not leave them dangling in the wind in case of failure. Probably after the 1 September Junta General, through a network of intermediaries—the Navarrese lawyer, Licenciado Juan Martín de Juanmartiñena, Guipuzcoan sugar retailer José María de Salaberría (also an officer in the Esquadrón Provincial de Mexico, which the Consulado subsidized), members of the Mexico City ecclesiastical establishment, and *ministros togados* Aguirre and Bataller—sugar planter Yermo was transformed into the highly visible leader of the coup d'état, ideated and ultimately controlled by the Audiencia in close collaboration with a few *almaceneros* in the colonial capital and the major port city of New Spain.

The Audiencia's Intermediaries

Of three probable intermediaries between the *ministros togados* and their ultimate surrogate, the most obvious was Juanmartiñena followed by Salaberría. That well-informed *criollo* critic of New Spain's Audiencia, Carlos María de Bustamante, once pinpointed Juanmartiñena as "director," "agente principal," and "promotor principalísimo" of Yermo's coup. Catani, the Catalan *regente* of the Audiencia, considered him the "forjador" of Yermo's *representaciones* and other communications to the Junta de Sevilla.[9]

Juanmartiñena initiated his legal studies at Pamplona, capital of his native province of Navarra, and then, following the classic peninsular pattern, emigrated around 1791–1792 to Oaxaca, invited by his successful, enterpris-

ing merchant uncle, Juan Bautista Echarri, a prominent intermediary in the cochineal trade via Veracruz and "uno de los más ricos cosecheros de granas." Native of Aldaz in Navarra, Echarri had studied at Pamplona's university, then spent two years as student of theology at Burgos, and earned a bachelor's degree in common law (1755) at Oñate. Emigrating to Oaxaca, Echarri served as *alcalde mayor* of Tehuantepec (1762–1769) and then turned merchant and *aviador* of the *alcalde mayor* of the woolen weaving center of Teotitlán del Camino. It is not surprising that in 1794 Echarri supported the brief defending *repartimiento de mercancías* drafted by a *fiscal* of the Audiencia de Mexico, Lorenzo Hernández de Alba (Jabat's father-in-law). In Oaxaca, Echarri was joined by his two brothers, mine owners Juan Felipe and Juan Francisco, whose financial agent at Mexico City was their nephew, Juanmartiñena. Through his immigrant uncles, Juanmartiñena was niched into a network of business interests in cochineal and mining sectors and in the hub of New Spain's economic activity, Mexico City.

After several years in Oaxaca, Juanmartiñena shifted to the capital, read law at the *bufete* of a well-known *criollo* lawyer, Waldo Indalecio Bernal ("uno del los más famosos letrados de sus días"), and married Bernal's sister-in-law. Accepted before the bar, Juanmartiñena became legal representative of "los primeros comerciantes de dentro y fuera del capital," who—as Bustamante phrased it—"protected" him. Significantly, in 1810 Juanmartiñena, joined by fellow lawyer José María Covarrubias, was attorney for a dissident *partido* (*montañés*) of the Consulado de Mexico in that year's elections. Juanmartiñena also became counsel for one of the most entrenched colonial interests, Cortés's descendants who possessed the "Estado y Marquesado del Valle," in this capacity supervising collection of the rents (*censos*) of their properties. One of the *censuatarios* was the proprietor of a Cuernavaca sugar estate, the wife (a Bárcena) of her cousin and sugar planter, Gabriel Joaquín de Yermo y Bárcena, another emigrant from the Encartaciones (Gueñes) of northern Spain. Juanmartiñena served Yermo as lawyer, a role he continued under Yermo's heir, Gabriel Patricio de Yermo (né Patricio Bárcena) until he abandoned Mexico City for Navarra after the collapse of New Spain's colonial status in 1821.

A second contact between Audiencia *ministros* and Yermo once Jabat, Aguirre, and Bataller had agreed to remove Iturrigaray by force rather than suasion was another client of Yermo, thirty-seven-year-old Juan Manuel de Salaberría. Born in 1771 to a middling prosperous Guipuzcoan family ("de medianas proporciones"), Salaberría had a better-than-average education to judge by the literate autobiographical account of his role in 1808. Or did Juanmartiñena draft this, too? At the age of eighteen he left Guipuz-

coa for Puebla in New Spain, invited by a close relative, an *oficial real* at Puebla, who in 1791 found him a job as *compañero del administrador* of one of Yermo's sugar properties in the Cuernavaca valley. Roughly eight years later for reasons of health, he migrated to the colonial capital; we have no data for the next four years until the English blockade established in late 1804 prevented his return to the peninsula, so he claimed. He then chose "el giro del comercio," investing his savings and capital advanced by "benefactor" Yermo "que siempre me ha beneficiado en mis urgencies, para mis giros."[10] He became a Mexico City sugar retailer, probably providing an outlet for Yermo's output. At the same time he became standard-bearer of the cavalry squadron of the regiment financed by the "comercio de esta capital"—the Consulado—which also paid the security guards of the viceregal palace that dominated Mexico City's impressive central plaza (*zócalo*) and its great mercantile mart (*parián*) with its many retail shops.

As a *peninsular* emigrant from Guipuzcoa, sugar retailer and officer in the merchants' militia designed to maintain public security in the capital, Salaberría identified with anxious Spanish civil servants, army officers, *almaceneros*, and churchmen in July, August, and September 1808. The "diluvio de pasquines colocados en diversos lugares de la Ciudad" un-nerved him and the *almaceneros*, who complained to Viceroy Iturrigaray. Equally disturbing were reports that Colonel Ignacio Obregón mentioned frequently the viceroy's "predileccíon . . . a la causa de los Americanos oprimidos" and what Salaberría considered the dangerous aspirations of figures around Iturrigaray—cleric Talamantes; *togados* Villaurrutia, Villafañe, and Fagoaga; *licenciados* Verdad and Azcárate; mine owner marqués de Rayas—"todos . . . bien conocidos en esta capital, y sus enlases y amistades breve hubieren acarreado a la multitud de otros de su clase." He did not need to say *almaceneros* explicitly when he asserted "los ricos a su propio dinero temían para ser asesinados."[11] Obsessed by a sense of impending crisis, Salaberría was on guard duty at the viceregal palace on 12 August, he later confessed, when he decided that the viceroy had to be set aside in order to "ayudar a la España afligida, con los caudales que aquí estaban detenidos, sin los quales hera imposible sacudir el yugo Francés."[12]

Elements within the Mexico City clerical establishment furnished a third network that ultimately led *oidores* and *almaceneros* to Yermo. There is no evidence linking Archbishop Lizana y Beaumont to the planning stages of the coup—indeed, Iturrigaray considered him a friend;[13] but if the archbishop, out of timidity or confidence in Iturrigaray, would not give prior acquiescence to the *oidores*' operations, other clerics did. Apparently his nephew, Inquisitor Alfaro, alerted what Mier acidly called the "Comuni-

dades Europeo-iliteratas" of Carmelites and Franciscans to be ready to parade through the streets were there a popular reaction against the imminent coup. Peninsular *almaceneros* frequented the Franciscans, many of whom were their spiritual "directores"; by his own admission, Yermo sought out the counsel of "varios teólogos y juristas."[14]

Among the "teólogos" offering advice was the well-known canon, Dr. Matías Monteagudo, member of the Oratorio de San Felipe Neri, no minor figure in Mexico City's ecclesiastical establishment. Three Monteagudos appeared in the capital in the 1780s, Matías, Antonio, and Andrés, under the patronage of then Archbishop Núñez y Haro. Matías came out in 1783, and Antonio served as Haro's secretary. Matías Monteagudo left Cuenca, became known in Mexico City for his criticism of Fray Servando Teresa de Mier's controversial sermon on the Virgin of Guadalupe, and, with the backing of his "amo," Haro, obtained a chair in the University of Mexico. He prepared reports for the *contador* of the mail service, Rafael de Lardizábal, who forwarded them to his nephew in Spain, Miguel de Lardizábal, at this time the legal representative of Catalan merchants at Veracruz.[15]

Dr. Matías de Monteagudo as a vocal of the *juntas generales* called by Viceroy Iturrigaray in August and September 1808 supported *oidor* Aguirre, who favored recognizing Sevilla's Junta as *suprema*. At the 31 August Junta, Monteagudo criticized Iturrigaray when the viceroy admonished Sevilla to make no treaties without his prior review.[16] Like Salaberría and other *peninsulares*, Monteagudo had been disturbed by the Hispanophobic pasquinades of early August in the colonial capital and by rumors that "los barrios respetables . . . querían levantarse contra los gachupines."[17] He had many contacts with Mexico City's Spanish *almaceneros* and *caxeros*, some of whom joined him in religious exercises often held in his quarters in the convent of San Felipe Neri. At one or more such gatherings there were present the "twenty-eight" agents sent by Veracruz merchants to the capital to urge the removal of the viceroy.[18] Another version asserts that Yermo spent several days "de retiro," not with Monteagudo at San Felipe Neri, but with a Padre Campos in the Convento de la Merced; in any event, López Cancelada referred with reason to "los sacerdotes que dirigían la conciencia de Yermo." Precisely who was Yermo's confessor is perhaps beside the point. Alamán and Mier agree that Yermo discussed his plans with a confessor, that he sought a "retreat" in a monastery (where he might meet associates without arousing undue suspicion), and that no cleric leaked to the viceroy or staff that a coup was in the making.[19]

Via these intermediaries—an influential lawyer (Juanmartiñena), a sugar retailer and ex-hacienda administrator (Salaberría), and clerics in con-

tact with important and unimportant laymen (Campos, Monteagudo)—Aguirre and Bataller of the Audiencia, with the collaboration of the "comercio de México y sugetos principales excitados por él de Veracruz," were able to locate someone to execute what they planned in secret.[20] As Beye de Cisneros put succinctly the *oidores*' covert operation, "En esta situacíon . . . cierta porción de europeos buscó a don Gabriel de Yermo, hombre que se ofrecía como más ostensible a la facción que aspiraba a dominar, por que no era decoroso que la real audiencia se descubriese, bastando que baxo de mano acalorase las gestiones de los descontentos."[21]

It was more than indecorous for the Audiencia to take a public role in initiating the forcible removable of a viceroy without royal sanction. It was illegal and, worse, could set a dangerous precedent. The *ministros togados*—Aguirre, Bataller, González Carbajal, and Sagarzurieta (Aguirre's distant cousin), who were prime movers behind the plot to remove the viceroy—had no intention to publicize their conspiratorial role, as they tried to make clear after 15 September. However, evidence abounds of their role despite the joint efforts of the Audiencia and Sevilla's *comisionados* to minimize it. The very structure of colonial administration gave the Audiencia as corporate body a political prominence, prestige, and authority, placing it at the center of an enterprise dedicated to the preservation of the status quo or even a rollback. This was the significance of *comisionado* Jabat going directly to Aguirre's residence on arriving at Mexico City on 29 August; in effect, Jabat's presence promised legitimation by Sevilla's and Cadiz's representatives of the action by the Audiencia's acknowledged dominant member.[22] One must recall that *fiscal* Sagarzurieta had examined carefully Talamantes's "Congreso Nacional" and concluded that Talamantes's "congreso o junta" might follow the fate of the well-intentioned French convocation, the Estates General of 1789—fears no doubt Sagarzurieta shared with Aguirre and other *oidores*.[23] It could not long be concealed from an ever-watchful public that secret meetings, which included members of the merchant community, were held with Aguirre and Bataller and that sometime after 1 September "algunos oidores" were engaged in a "conspiración." But only much later did it become public that "algunos ministros principalísimos en la revolución formaban la decision" to work with the person ready to "servir a la ambición de algunos oidores sus amigos"—Yermo.[24] Historian Alamán put it appropriately: "Todos estaban resueltos a darlo [golpe], pero les faltaba cabeza que los dirijiese y pronto la encontraron."[25]

"La Cabeza que los dirijiese": Gabriel de Yermo

Gabriel Joaquín de Yermo y la Bárcena had many qualities as potential director of a colonial coup d'état. He was an *encartado* emigrant from Güeñes to the colony of New Spain at the close of the eighteenth century; in 1793 there were twenty-three vecinos of Güeñes reported overseas in New Spain. A microregion of growing population, Güeñes lost the political and economic advantages of inclusion in the jurisdiction of Vizcaya in 1740; Godoy was held responsible for the refusal of the Madrid authorities to return Güeñes to Vizcaya—another example of what many denounced as "ministerial despotism."[26] Demographic growth and the jurisdictional conflict may account for the high rate of male emigration and perhaps Yermo's readiness to misinterpret the positions of "Godoy's" appointee in New Spain, Iturrigaray. Two uncles (Juan Antonio and Gabriel de Yermo y Larrazábal) had preceded him to New Spain. Juan Antonio (who married a Bárcena) prospered as a merchant at Mexico City, was elected *consul* of the Consulado (1785). As "uno de los [mercaderes] más acreditados," he drafted a report on the potential effects of the extension of *comercio libre* to New Spain (1788), as well as another on the overall agricultural situation of the colony. He joined in the 1780s two other influential *almaceneros* (Basoco, Dongo) to settle an issue dividing the Tribunal de Minería and, along with *almacenero* Francisco Martínez Cabezón, was an *albacea* of recently deceased Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez. In the closing years of his life Juan Antonio became a sugar planter in the Cuernavaca valley. His brother, Gabriel, figured among the many *almacenero* critics of *comercio libre* in the early 1790s.

Gabriel de Yermo y la Bárcena married a daughter of his uncle (*and* his aunt), María Josefa de Yermo y la Bárcena, who brought in her dowry two large sugar estates. Yermos and Bárcenas had intermarried in Spain and in New Spain, a not exceptional example of the tenacity of kin alliance melded with property accumulation. Gabriel de Yermo concentrated on sugar and *chinguirito* (sugar brandy) production on his wife's Cuernavaca properties, marketing through Mexico City retailers such as Salaberría, and exporting to Europe via Veracruz perhaps through such established Veracruz *almaceneros* as José Ignacio de la Torre and Bárcena. In addition to this enterprise, Yermo developed business relations with the prominent rancher family of northern Mexico, the Sánchez Navarros, who supplied cattle for Yermo's Mexico City fresh meat contract; in 1806 the Sánchez Navarros held a credit of roughly 100,000 pesos against him.[27]

Yermo's enterprises in the Cuernavaca Valley and elsewhere made him a "persona de respeto" and a local and presumably neutral arbiter in busi-

ness quarrels among fellow *encartados* and their *montañés* associates. For example, he was the unofficial arbitrator in a case involving a loan by Mexico City *almacenero* José Martínez Barenque for stocking a *tienda* on a sugar estate owned jointly by fellow *encartados*, his cousin Pedro Martínez Gil and Manuel de Landeta. In reaching a settlement, witnesses testified for both parties, among them "mulatos," indios," and "españoles de Castilla"—the latter Spanish immigrants employed as hacienda administrators, or storekeepers borrowing from merchants like Martínez Barenque, a former *cajero* of Yermo and frequent borrower from the funds of the *montañés* Congregación del Santo Cristo de Burgos of Mexico City. Martinez Barenque and Landeta had emigrated from Rasines immediately to the west of the Encartaciones.

Yermo's operations as sugar *hacendado* and cattle buyer do not seem to have led to daily contact with Mexico City's *almaceneros*, which was not the case of his prominent uncle Juan Antonio. Yet there is ground to believe he shared the *almacenero*'s misgivings of Iturrigaray's and Someruelo's policy of permitting reexports of European goods along with sugar and *chinguirito* from Havana to Veracruz, to the "ruina del monopolio colonial que les enriqueció."[28] Iturrigaray's investigation of smuggling by a "pandilla" at Veracruz may be the basis of his charge that Yermo was involved in "negocios de contrabando" in high-value linens (*olanes*), and of Lizarza's comment that many Veracruz *almaceneros* backed Yermo's *golpe* to protect themselves.[29] To charges that he had "generosamente" increased his wealth by trading in "los contrabandos que me facilitó el desórden de la guerra marítima," Yermo retorted with pride that he was "puramente un agricultor industrioso" whose wealth came "exclusivamente de . . . mis haciendas, mejoradas en mi poder extraordinariamente."[30]

Yermo's marriage to his cousin, María Josefa de Yermo y la Bárcena, reinforced his ties to the Bárcena family of sugar *hacendados* in the Cuernavaca Valley. In 1693 a Cristóval de Bárcena was managing the "Atlacomulca" hacienda of Cortés's descendants; Yermo's father married in Spain a Bárcena, as did uncle Juan Antonio, but in his case probably in the colony. Since Bárcenas appear as merchants in Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz—all contemporaries of Yermo—he was understandably sensitive to issues involving *peninsular* merchants in the main centers of Spain's transatlantic system. Critics associated Yermo with "mucho de los europeos avecinadados en Veracruz enteramente sometidos" to his "ideas e intereses, porque sólo así lograban mantener una preponderancia exclusiva para continuar en el escandaloso contrabando."[31] Indeed, Yermo's position on colonial trade matches the attitude of most *peninsulares* in the Veracruz and Mexico City commer-

cial communities. Writing to the Junta de Sevilla days after his coup, Yermo justified his prominent role by criticizing several of Iturrigaray's decisions, including his refusal to defend the port of Veracruz against possible English occupation and his toleration of "comercio prohivido" with England and its Caribbean island ports by accepting "licencias, permisos y disímulos" with a latitude "de un modo escandaloso a las Américas y a la Europa" that led to the entry of foreign shipping and thereby facilitated an extraordinary specie outflow reported in the *Gazeta de Mexico* and in Veracruz's published annual trade balances. "Una conducta semejante . . . solamente favorecía a unos pocos individuos," Yermo opined, "agraviando y arruinando al resto de los vasallos, era preciso que atrajese el odio y la detestación de todo hombre que conservase algun resto de sentimiento de honor, religión, patriotismo y moralidad."[32]

Beyond question, Yermo was upset by Viceroy Iturrigaray's decision to republish "el ignominioso manifiesto," first printed in Madrid's *Gazeta* on 31 March 1808, in which Fernando confessed his complicity in the aborted coup at the Escorial against his father, an incident that Yermo insisted no one could believe since "todos los hombres sensatos" considered the confession the product solely of Godoy's "calumnia e intrigas."[33] Yermo was also troubled by Iturrigaray's ambivalent response to reports of Charles IV's abdication at Aranjuez in March, and later by his rejection of the Junta de Sevilla's bid for full recognition by the government of New Spain. He was suspicious of Iturrigaray's relations with the influential leaders of the Mexico City Ayuntamiento, in particular with *criollo* lawyers Azcárate and Verdad, his populist-like cultivation of native American "gobernadores y mandones," and his cavalier disregard of Hispanophobic pasquinades and the resulting "inquietud y fermentación" in the capital. Probably reflecting his residence in rural areas, Yermo sensed the anticolonialist sentiments widespread among New Spain's *criollo* lower-level clerics, curates poorly paid, overly taxed, and in daily contact with the underprivileged, exploited Indian masses.

On these grounds, then, Gabriel Joaquín de Yermo was an ideal defender of the *almaceneros* of Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz haunted by inroads of European goods in transit from Havana, Baltimore, and Kingston; of *peninsular* immigrants (many *montañés*) blocked by established *criollo* mine-owning families; and of *hacendados* of the Cuernavaca Valley who wished to protect domestic markets from strong Havana competition. This context makes intelligible Yermo's indictment of Iturrigaray's "seductoras y revolucionarias ideas." In background (immigrant from a Cantabrian region of small peasant proprietors), in enterprise (aggressive sugar planter and

contractor for Mexico City's meat supply), and in social and business ties at various levels, Yermo typified the self-made, prospering entrepreneur from Spain whose success earned him in certain quarters—here López Cancelada—"el concepto de ánimo y acierto en quantas cosas ponía la mano."[34] In this sense he resembled the French and Swiss businessmen who had bankrolled the coup d'état of Brumaire at Paris nine years earlier and resorted to the reason of force to preserve wealth and status, in cooperation with equally self-interested representatives of legitimate authority—survivors of the Directoire like Barras and Sièyes. Momentarily Yermo became the spearhead of established imperial and colonial interests. In point of fact, he and his co-conspirators were cleverly manipulated by *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller who lacked official peninsular sanction to remove Viceroy Iturrigaray.

Although recognizably dominant in the Audiencia, *ministros togados* Aguirre and Bataller, certainly supported by González Carbajal, Sagarzurieta, and Robledo as symbols of legality and the colonial establishment, discreetly hovered in the background of the coup against the viceroy, all the while manipulating the *peninsular hacendado*, Yermo, to center stage. The mercantile community pursued the same strategy. Within days of Yermo's coup, the Audiencia on 24 September attempted to deflect charges of its complicity by labeling faceless "gente armada" as responsible for the removal of Iturrigaray; it was a facade of neutrality sustained weeks later in November when the Audiencia singled out "los espíritus" inflamed by the viceroy's actions as responsible for the "resolucion de todo lo acaecido." Comparably neutral language, it will be recalled, described officially Fernando's role in the forcible removal of Charles IV at Aranjuez as the result of "la abdicación del Rey su padre," whereupon Fernando "tomó las riendas del gobierno." On the other hand, Iturrigaray had no doubt that Sevilla's Junta had authorized his removal and that "así lo hizo la audiencia," just as others mentioned "cierta porción de europeos" who had sought out Yermo. Not until two years later, in 1810, an anonymous letter from Mexico City to the Regencia at Cadiz asserted flatly that the "autores unos y cooperadores otros" of the coup at Mexico City in 1808 were "Oidores Aguirre y Bataller, el fiscal Sagarzurrietta [*sic*], el Coronel Emparán (que vive con Aguirre) y el comerciante Dn. Gabriel de Yermo." These were the colonial officials—to which one must add Jabat—and others whom Yermo's own accounts implicate as his manipulators, bearing in mind that the *oidores* sought a facade of noninvolvement.[35]

Repeatedly Aguirre and Bataller conferred with Yermo, if not before then certainly after, the crucial *juntas generales* of 31 August and 1 September, Yermo insisting that they concretize their patent "deseos y buena intención"

by deciding to "decretar la separación y prisión" of the viceroy.[36] They put him off, however, by their "modo de discurrir pusilánime y melancólico."[37] Aguirre followed the same line, for when Salaberría (Yermos's confidant) raised the possibility of a coup, Aguirre "me prohibió que digese en público que había tenido con él semejante conversación."[38] Yermo traced their reluctance to authorize a coup to fear of bloodshed and that there might remain "unos males positivos"—serious doubts about Iturrigaray's "ideas traidoras" no matter how strong were the "datos y presunciones" incriminating him. The *oidores*' contradictory tactics understandably confused Yermo: on one hand, Bataller "no se detenía en consentir en la sublevación de este reino," while recoiling, on the other hand, from official approval "por el terror del derramiento de sangre."

Apparently the *oidores* did not mention that neither they nor the Junta de Sevilla had authority to order the dismissal of the viceroy of New Spain; only much later did Aguirre confess that Yermo and his conspirators provided (in Yermo's words) "*lo que le falta a la ley*."[39] Meanwhile, they led on Yermo by agreeing that "el mal no tenía otro remedio," while refusing to guarantee that those participating in the projected coup ("los Buenos vasallos") would be immune from prosecution by the Audiencia. In sum, in case of failure, Yermo—not the *oidores*—would be dangling in the wind.[40] Not surprisingly, Sevilla's *comisionado* Jabat, who shared viewpoints with Aguirre and Bataller, expressed a strikingly parallel position. When Yermo revealed his plans, Jabat judged them risky, noting that in case of failure "las consequencia habían de venir sobre él que hiciese cabeza." But when Yermo visited him later to warn that he intended to proceed, Jabat "convino en que el caso no admitía otro remedio."[41]

Yet it would be inaccurate to conclude that the *oidores* intended to dissuade Yermo. To the contrary, Yermo recalled that Bataller, whom he found "tan penetrado de las causas y de la necesidad" of a move against Iturrigaray, commented that it was "menester aqui hacer lo mismo que el pueblo de Cadiz con su gobernador" Solano.[42] Subjected to this skillful programming, Yermo felt secure enough to inform Bataller in the early evening of 15 September that the coup would occur that night, whereupon Bataller disassociated himself theatrically. "Se escandalizó, lamentó y reprobó la resolución," insisting that he had never shared Yermo's "modo de pensar en el particular," while confessing he could offer no other "expediente para la conservación del reino." In any event, at some point Bataller did inform Yermo that the legitimation he sought could come only "De orden del Rey."[43] Yet Bataller promised that under no circumstance would he leak to anyone that a coup was imminent. Carlos María de Bustamante did not ex-

aggerate, such evidence indicates, when he later insisted that the "autoridad superior" represented by Viceroy Iturrigaray was usurped by "un acuerdo do oidores."

To have been more accurate, Bustamante should have added to the charge, as well as by consensus of many *almaceneros* in the *montañés partido* or moiety of the Mexico City Consulado—the Spanish merchants that Lucas Alamán had in mind when he wrote that "echaron los ojos los principales comerciantes que formaban el partido español" upon Yermo to liquidate the viceroy. Moreover, in addition to the "principales comerciantes," the *montañés partido* aggregated a significant number of other peninsular immigrants to New Spain, who, inspired by the prosperity of recent interwar years (1801–1804), hoped to make their fortunes within the unchanged structures of the Spanish colonial system. This was neither the first nor the last example of an oligarchy of successful comprador bourgeois actively backed by new, poorer aspirants to fortune. Small merchants as well as clerks (*cajeros*) of Mexico City's *almaceneros* and storekeepers formed a pool from which Yermo and his group recruited their armed men.

Yermo's closest conspirators were two family members, his half brother (Juan Antonio de Yermo) and his nephew (Patricio Bárcena), to whom might be added his attorney, Juanmartiñena, whose family and legal affairs involved him with merchants of Mexico City and Oaxaca. To this core can be added an outer ring of reliable friends of lower status, "primeros dependientes" with whom Yermo maintained "relaciones de Amistad," fellow immigrants from Spain's Cantabrian coast.[44] Santiago José de Echeverría, Juan Manuel de Salaberría, and José Martínez Barenque were by now midlevel retailers in the capital whose commercial operations, militia service, and general contacts made them known to many of the hundreds of immigrant *cajeros* who had recently enrolled in the ten companies of *Voluntarios de Fernando VII*, the so-called *chaquetas* whose showy uniforms and aggressive attitudes antagonized many native-born residents of Mexico City in the month of August.

Martínez Barenque was a Mexico City merchant who provided credit and goods to hacienda *tenderos* in the Cuernavaca Valley. As *alcalde de cuartel* in the capital, he was in frequent contact with the *tenderos* and *cajeros* of his jurisdiction and was also an officer in the Consulado's *regimiento urbano*, its militia unit. In the summer of 1808 he participated in religious exercises conducted by the influential *catedrático*, Dr. Matias Monteagudo. Joining him in the retreat was a Guipuzcoan, Santiago José de Echeverría, one-time *tesorero* of the *vizcaíno* Confradía de Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu; Yermo was a guarantor (*fiador*) when Echeverría borrowed from the funds of the

Convento de la Encarnación. In addition Echeverría was business agent (*correspondiente*) and held power of attorney (*apoderado*) of a Veracruz merchant who dealt with Cadiz firms like that of Pablo Fraile de Santa María; Echeverría, too, was an officer of the Voluntarios. Third among Yermo's *primeros dependientes* was another Guipuzcoan, Salaberría; former employee on one of Yermo's cane plantations, Salaberría had moved to Mexico City and into trade there. Yermo confessed that Salaberría "desde mis primeros pensamientos me acompañó y auxilió en un todo."[45] Officer of the Consulado's *regimiento urbano*, Salaberría was on guard duty at the viceregal palace in August and September.

For obvious reasons, Yermo had to avoid recruiting exclusively among officers and rank and file of the Consulado's military units. The merchants' militia was politically fissioned, although many *almaceneros* remained convinced that Iturrigaray's policies posed a serious threat. Among the "ricos comerciantes," however, were criollized oligopolists of *montañés* and *vizcaíno partidos* who abstained from participation in an antiviceroy operation. Among these were the *vizcaíno* Michaus, the respective *decanos* of both *partidos*, Antonio Basoco (*encartado* listed among *vizcaínos*) and the *criollo montañés* Francisco de la Cotera, along with *peninsulares* Diego de Ágreda, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, and Ángel Puyade. Obviously Yermo could not draw upon members of the regular army units ("tropa") since he felt that "todos los soldados son del país, y en qualquiera acontecimiento de sublevación se arrimarán más bien a los Patricios que a los Europeos y al Gobierno." So he diversified his recruitment by tapping into units of the Voluntarios, many of whose members were *cajeros* employed in the "comercio de ropas"—"en la mayor parte Europeos"—and with a reputation of indiscipline and disorderly conduct. Under constant supervision of their Spanish employers and merchant patriarchs for twenty-four days of every month, they spent their five to six days of liberty on "el juego, la bebida, las conversaciones obscenas."[46] To recruit them, Yermo operated at two levels. He consulted "con antecipación" "Españoles de más influxo, representación y poder," that is, "algunos ricos comerciantes para que se pudiera contar con sus dependientes" while his "primeros dependientes" and their friends—Martínez Barenque, Echeverría, Salaberría, Uzcola, Canalías, Ondraeta, and Cobían—won over the *cajeros* of the Voluntario's companies.[47] The final assault force, according to Viceroy Iturrigaray, was composed of residents of Mexico City and Veracruz along with those who "asistieron sin antecedente, ni notícia de lo que ivan a hacer, de los quales estava la mayor parte."[48]

Behind the operation executed by assault groups of commercial em-

ployees was careful planning in which *ministros togados* and merchants collaborated with the commander chosen to command the coup. The Junta General of 1 September was disturbing enough. When the viceroy failed to resign, as promised, at the 9 September Junta and an *alcalde del crimen*, *criollo* Villaurrutia, volunteered to draft shortly a justification for Iturrigaray's convocation of a local, colonial source of interim legitimacy—a congress of deputies chosen by New Spain's principal *ayuntamientos*—the conspirators had to fix a date for their coup *before* 16 September, when a fifth junta would review Villaurrutia's promised position paper. *Oidores* and *almaceneros* had approximately two weeks to organize the overthrow of the viceroy and install a substitute of *their* choice. As Beye de Cisneros [Lizarza] observed with the accuracy of hindsight, "La prisión del Virey necesitaba partido entre los Oidores . . . partido con los gefes que mandaban las tropes acantonadas . . . se necesitaban relaciones con los jefes de serenos, comisarios de acordada, guardias del resguardo del tabaco, y alcabalas."[49]

To maintain the conspirators' security, there coalesced a small working group consisting of a few *ministros* of the Audiencia—a group that "con propiedad puede llamrase Ministerial" (Aguirre, Bataller, Carbajal, and Mesía, plus *fiscales* Sagarzurieta and Robledo),[50] archbishop and inquisitor general (Lizana y Beaumont and his nephew Sáinz de Alfaro y Beaumont), a select number of *almaceneros* drawn mainly from the Consulado's *montañés partido* (Francisco Alonso Terán, Antonio Uzcola, Lorenzo García Noriega, Roque Pérez Gómez, José Lláin, and perhaps a representative from Veracruz like Manuel Gil de la Torre), and General Pedro Garibay.[51] Also closely involved in the planning was Sevilla's *comisionado*, Jabat, whose participation certified eventual legitimization of the coup by the Junta Suprema de Sevilla and the consensus of the Cadiz community. Those in the Audiencia and Consulado considered opponents of the coup were deliberately excluded from discussions: *alcalde del crímen* Villaurrutia, *regente* of the Audiencia Catani, *oidor* Bodega, and the *decanos* of the two *partidos* of the consulado, Basoco and Cotera—not to mention representatives of *criollo hacendados* and mine owners resident in the colony's capital.

Key elements of the plan may be deduced from the way the coup was executed. A kind of "hit list" was drafted identifying Iturrigaray's associates (his *secretario* Rafael Ortega and *auditor de guerra* Cristo y Conde) and those viewed as supporters of the viceroy's policies—Azcárate and Verdad on the Ayuntamiento, cleric-intellectuals Talamantes, Canon Beristáin y Souza and the Abad of Guadalupe, and Francisco Beye de Cisneros. These were marked for imprisonment. Through Llaín and the Veracruz merchants temporarily in the capital like Gil de la Torre and Rafael Canalías, Vera-

cruz authorities were alerted to await the prisoners for quick deportation (*bajo de registro*) to Sevilla to stand trial. Perhaps *oidor* Aguirre's house guest, Colonel Emparán, contacted Spanish army officers then in the capital, for example, Colonel Félix María Calleja.[52] And there was the critical element of public relations, primarily the preparation of a manifesto or proclamation to appear immediately in the official gazette; its publication was left to its *peninsular* editor, López Cancelada, "uno de los conspiradores . . . muy impuesto de todo."[53] Evidence suggests that Juanmartiñena drafted the *golpistas*' official explanation of the coup. He—or whoever drafted the justification—was instructed to couch it in the most general terms, omitting reference to specific groups or individuals participating, while announcing that Iturrigaray's replacement, General Garibay, would only be temporary.

At the next level were those charged with carrying out the coup, Yermo and those he selected and organized. Here is where Yermo's qualities seemed exceptional to those who masterminded his choice. Although not a conspicuous member of the Mexico City merchant community and its Consulado, his patronage of former employees of Cuernavaca sugar haciendas now resident in the capital as small-scale merchants, some officering companies in militia units and most in contact with *peninsular cajeros* and petty bourgeois, was vital to the execution of the coup. Critics would have few good words for Yermo's clientele—"Los más de ellos son aventureros, muchos caxeros y muchos jugadores sin destino," who on their own were "incapaces de formar planes, ni tienen fuerza, ni crédito para emprender negocios de tanta importancia."[54] Iturrigaray's friend among mine owners, marqués de Rayas, had even stronger opinions about these "hombres exóticos, emigrados los más; casi todos sin licencia; criminales muchos, y sin una sola de quantas circunstancias son necesarios para llamarse un hombre patricio."[55] Yermo's client–co-conspirators were able to recruit among the Voluntarios, while Yermo contacted partisans among the capital's *almaceneros* to arrange the participation of their clerks. Some *almaceneros* were reluctant to commit themselves or their *cajeros*; some who did may not have known the real purpose of the recruitment.[56] Furthermore, through the intervention of *oidores*—"los Jueces mayores que son los Togados"—pressure was applied on the capital's *alcaldes de barrio* to elicit the participation of "tenderos de pulpería, boticarios u otras gentes de igual clase."[57]

In this fashion Yermo was able to commit to the assault between two hundred to three hundred armed men. While only a small group might penetrate the palace, a larger number was needed to take into custody night watchmen (*serenos*) entering the *zócalo* along with late evening strollers,

herding them until the operation was secured, and controlling access to the *zócalo* the following morning. Yermo assigned his "confidentes, amigos y dependientes"—Martínez Barenque, Echeverría, Salaberría, Llaín, José María Maruri[58]—to lead the prearranged squads, some directed to penetrate the palace and others to round up the opposition. Little was left to chance: it was even arranged that members of the Franciscan and Carmelite orders would be available to "apaciguar al pueblo que temían se alborotase"—standard practice of crowd control by organizers of "popular" protest movements.[59] Finally, Yermo entrusted his wife and children to the care—predictably—of an *encartado* priest, "eclesiastico de sus parientes," José Saturnino Diez de Sollano, in case he died in the coup.[60]

In retrospect, given the number involved in the planning stage and the fairly wide recruitment for the operation, it is surprising that only three "leaks" to Iturrigaray were reported. One of the conspirators with a troubled conscience revealed the plot to Iturrigaray, "manifestándole que el plan consistía, suponiendole capaz de una cobardía, en hacer que se arrojase por una ventana a la calle para pregonarle traidor desde luego."[61] There was an anonymous note from the suburbs (Tacubaya) to Iturrigaray's friend, mine owner Colonel Ignacio Obregón, reporting that *oidores* Aguirre, Carbajal, and Bataller "estaban intrigando con los de Veracruz y Mexico" to imprison Iturrigaray along with Obregón and an unidentified person.[62] Third, from another informant who accosted him on the main stairway of the viceregal palace, Iturrigaray learned that "la Audiencia trataba de prenderlo."[63]

When Iturrigaray mentioned this on encountering *fiscal* Borbón, he replied—according to Iturrigaray—"con el mayor nervio la desechase, por que todos los Individuos de la Audiencia le amaban y darían sus vidas por él."[64] Yet the viceroy took no defensive measures. Perhaps he reasoned that *oidores* and their backers would not risk mobilizing an effective armed force when militia units trained by Iturrigaray for the defense of the Veracruz coast were nearby; or perhaps, realizing that interest groups at both Madrid and Sevilla wanted his removal, he was resigned to his fate in the hope of avoiding open fission and conflict between and among the colony's *peninsular* and *criollo* elites, "no queriendo dar la señal para una guerra, que podría acabar en civil."[65] His conscience, as he would later declare, was clear. There is, finally, another plausible explanation. His *criollo* secretary, Velázquez de León—who had dissuaded Iturrigaray in the evening of 7 September from resigning—testified that he went to the viceroy in the morning of 15 September to urge him to abandon his projected convocation of a colonial assembly; they then called in the *auditor de guerra*, *criollo* José Antonio del

Cristo y Conde, to opine. Iturrigaray then agreed to announce his change of heart at the junta scheduled for the next day, 16 September. Did he believe this might dissuade the plotters?[66] That evening the coup was executed.

The Assault and Aftermath

Following Yermo's afternoon conversation on 15 September with *oidor* Bataller, the coup was set in motion when Yermo and co-conspirators began to notify "algunos del comercio" between 8 and 11 p.m. to assemble at the "Portales de Mercaderes y de las Flores" of Mexico City's grand square or *zócalo* at 11:30 p.m.[67] There they could be screened from the viceregal palace by the large edifice of the *parián*, the merchants' mart. Salaberría shadowed the viceregal family to the theater and, when the performance ended, went home to find it "llena de gente combidada por mí," whom he led to Yermo's residence. Salaberria checked the sentinels at the viceregal palace, returned to Yermo's home warning those waiting "a que no hablasen, ni fumasen, o hiciesen ruido," then led them to the *zócalo*. Eventually several hundred armed men came from units in the capital—from the Regimientos de Comercio, Pázcuaro, and Caballería de Michoacán, from the Esquadrón Urbano and Tocineros, as well as from the Voluntarios.[68] Between 11 p.m. and 12 midnight as armed men—some had been drinking heavily—appeared under the *zócalo*'s arcades and gathered at the Callejón; street lamps were extinguished and *serenos* and unsuspecting passersby sequestered and confined in the *parián*.[69] Symbolic? While undressing in her apartment in the viceregal palace, the viceroy's wife noted groups of men on the other side of the *zócalo*, mentioned this to Iturrigaray who paid no attention.[70]

Precisely at 12:30 Yermo and five assault platoons walked from the Portal de las Flores toward the palace where, by prior agreement with the officer of the guard, a door had been left ajar. One platoon disarmed sentries, replacing each with four other armed men. At the same time "un trozo del paysanage" led by artillery captain Luis Granados alerted artillerymen who seized five cannon, which they loaded with shrapnel and positioned in the main patio of the palace where they could fire upon any group forcing the main entries.[71] With the ground floor secured, platoons mounted staircases to the second floor to seize Iturrigaray, his family, and his private papers. One platoon went to the living quarters of Ortega (Iturrigaray's correspondence secretary), another invaded the viceregal apartments. According to the account of Yermo's confidant, Salaberría, a group he called "el pueblo" used musket butts to smash locked doors, located Iturrigaray, his daughter, and eldest son in a locked room near the grand salon used for the re-

cent Juntas Generales. Using axes on the door, the squad encountered the viceroy barefoot beside his bed; when his eldest son aimed a pistol at the assailants, he was warned that if he fired, "la mayor tajada de su cuerpo habia de ser como un maravedí." Pushed into the salon and into one of the chairs arranged for the Junta General scheduled for the next day, Iturrigaray demanded to know by what authority he was detained. "El pueblo" was the reply, according to Salaberría, with "De orden del Rey, por traidor a la Religión, a la Patria y a nuestro Soberano Fernando VII."

The illegality of the act was obvious since there was no royal order. The assailants now forced the viceroy to open his office and hand over the keys to his desk where they found copies of his *reservada* correspondence and jewelry purchased for the queen, María Luisa. The keys were given to one of the group, Ramón Roblejo y Lozano, known in Mexico City as a dealer in watches and their repair (*reloxero*) and reported to be one "a quien movían y favorecían ocultamente . . . alguno que otro del Acuerdo."[72] Among the documents seized were official papers: a report prepared under former Viceroy Marquina (Iturrigaray's immediate predecessor) evaluating the performance of the Audiencia; protests by the mining tribunal, the *cabildo eclesáastico* of Valladolid, and by *hacendados* of the province of Mexico against the Consolidación; Soler's reprimand of Iturrigaray's intervention in the 1807 elections of the Consulado de Mexico; orders to Iturrigaray to press the Consulado for an accurate accounting of its *avería* funds; and—with reference to the events immediately preceding the coup—Villaurrutia's *parecer* just drafted (13 September) defending the convocation of a colonial body and to be discussed at the junta of 16 September, along with a collection of pasquinades ("anónimos"), some removed from public places, others hand-delivered to Iturrigaray.[73] Meanwhile, alerted (or awakened) by Yermo's men, Jaúregui—*comisionado* of Sevilla and brother of Iturrigaray's wife—escorted his sister and her small children to the viceroy, and all awaited the gathering of the symbols of authority: archbishop, inquisitor general, *oidores*, and other selected notables along with Field Marshal Garibay. It was now 1 a.m., the initial (and violent) phase of the operation had been executed in roughly thirty minutes, and only the ritual of legitimizing the illegitimate remained to close New Spain's first coup d'état.

This began at 2 a.m. when—symbolically enough—the door to the grand salon reserved for the Real Acuerdo was smashed open to permit the entry of *oidores*, archbishop "y otras personas eclesiásticas y seculares condecoradas." They had been awakened by "gente armada" (so reported the Audiencia), who informed them that viceroy and family had been detained and that the intention was to strip Iturrigaray of his post and appoint a

substitute.[74] As the notables were escorted through the *zócalo*, armed men were much in evidence since "las bocas calles y el real palacio por fuera y dentro estaban ocupados por la misma gente armada del paisanage, que así en la escalera como en los corredores y en la sala de la Audiencia, reiteraban la separación del Virey" and his replacement by Garibay.[75] Now came the culmination of the coup d'état. In response to "demands" of the "gente armada del paisanage," admitted to the salon, Iturrigaray was removed from office and Garibay installed; he took office on the spot. Couriers were now dispatched to insist that "gefes militares y políticos, prelados y cuerpos" in the capital assemble at 11 a.m. for the ritual presentation of the new viceroy. Form rather than content would legitimize the illegitimate.

Yet what had been to this point a covert, illegitimate action had to be imposed upon the urban public through the display of force controlled by the colonial and imperial authorities. In the orders now executed, the degree of pre-coup planning surfaced. Armed men rounded up intellectuals pinpointed as committed to Iturrigaray's plan to convene a local *congreso*—Ortega (Iturrigaray's correspondence secretary), Cristo y Conde (*auditor de guerra*), Beye de Cisneros, prominent *criollo* cleric Beristáin y Souza, Talamantes, Azcárate, and Verdad; they failed or stopped short of jailing mine owner Colonel Ignacio Obregón.[76] By 5 a.m. this phase was completed. Simultaneously a joint order signed by *ministros togados* and the archbishop alerted Mexico City's convents and monasteries to be prepared for riot control. Artillery pieces—symbols of the force controlled by the participants in the coup—were shifted from the viceregal palace to positions covering streets leading into the *zócalo*, the nearby Casa de Moneda (mint), and Iturrigaray's place of detention, the residence of Inquisitor General Prado y Ovejero. Two *peninsular* colonels, Felix María Calleja and Joaquín Gutierrez de los Rios, were put in command of the "multitud armada de paisanes" with orders to intersperse them among regular army units; among their junior officers was a *criollo* lieutenant from Michoacan, Agustín de Iturbide y Aramburu.

The extent of preplanning is underscored by the fact that only at 6 a.m. was the Audiencia's principal dissenting *ministro togado*, *criollo* Jacobo de Villaurrutia, informed of what had occurred hours earlier; the Audiencia aimed to achieve consensus by exclusion of dissent—"passive environmental control."[77] The coup d'état had now proceeded without hitch, for at dawn "el nuevo Gobierno ya estaba todo organizado," the coup already seemed a "cosa de sueño," and by midmorning residents of the largest city in the New World found the main plaza ringed with cannon and sentries, the streets of the center of the capital controlled by "patrullas del paisanage muy

armadas," and the doors of the leading commercial houses locked tight.[78] The public observed that the "comercio de ropas" was closed down "con el motivo de alternar en las guardias sus individuos mezclados y estrechamente unidos con los de otras clases de los patricios."[79] Everyone could deduce that "Hallandose este comercio muy desazonado a causa de las secretas inteligencias del . . . Virey . . . Iturrigaray, se conmovió y resolvió con el mayor sigilo el aprehenderlo."[80]

Display of power in the streets of the colonial capital was complemented between 10 and 11 a.m. when Audiencia and Archbishop Lizana reappeared at the viceregal palace to ceremonialize their handpicked viceroy. Reports of this ritual omit Yermo's intervention, probably part of the Audiencia's strategy to minimize if not obliterate his salient role as Sevilla's and Cadiz's representative and that of the capital's commercial community in the coup d'état. Yermo's performance in what was expected to be a brief ritual of "reconocimiento y obediencia" must have been both unexpected and unwanted, a presumption supported by the fact that Yermo made an oral rather than written presentation of nine benefits (*gracias*) that he hoped the Audiencia would bestow upon the colony. These benefits explain why Yermo was prepared, in the first place, to assume responsibility for carrying out (if not masterminding) the coup, recognizing the ferment among New Spain's less privileged strata, and attempting to ensure "la tranquilidad de todo el Reyno en las actuales circunstancias."[81]

The benefits that, he claimed, encapsulated "la voz del público," responded to widely felt grievances whose resolution might justify support for the overthrow of Viceroy Iturrigaray and his tactics of accommodation with *criollo* and other local interests. They reveal an unsuspected facet of Yermo, visible here as informed sugar planter and regional power broker or *cacique*, whose sole qualification as master *golpista* would appear to be the capacity to cobble together an armed force of recipients of patronage and clientelism. To the contrary, as *vizcaíno encartado*, sugar planter, cattle buyer, and Mexico City's fresh meat provisioner, he had an uncanny, pragmatic grasp of colonial reality and a conservative's flexibility to make unavoidable concessions. Here the major concerns of the capital's *peninsular* commercial community were notably absent; these he reserved for a private communication to the Junta de Sevilla a few days later, as we have noted. Rather, he preferred to highlight the issues concerning fiscal policy and key elements of the colonial pact.

Of nine *gracias* that he wanted the Audiencia to proclaim, the first four were designed to protect the meager incomes of the mass of New Spain's clergymen "cuya mayor parte es de pobres que apenas tienen con que sus-

tentarse" and whose justified complaints were both "públicas y constantes." He proposed tax relief measures such as suspension of the annual tax on benefices, the ecclesiastical "subsidy," a 15 percent charge on funds assigned to chaplaincies and *obras pías*, coupled to total suspension of all aspects of the Consolidación process. He targeted the lower clergy for two interlocked reasons: their "carácter y especial veneración" shaped the "opinion, ánimo y acciones" of New Spain's people and gave them an unparalleled "ascendiente . . . en el Pueblo"; and, second, they were a persistent source of "discontento y ribalidad a los europeos" and—worse—were "tambien adictos a la independencia."

His second set of policy changes combined tax changes on selected agricultural and animal products—namely, imposts on slaughtered sheep and on consumption of popular alcoholic beverages like *pulque* and *aguardiente*, which he joined to broad-scale recommendations to ensure "libertad de todos los objetos del cultivo y de la industria." Aware of widespread "resentimiento con que han mirado y miran siempre las prohbiciones . . . odiosas," Yermo offered the pragmatic appraisal that elimination of customs controls would not significantly depress the volume of European imports. Here one detects Yermo's contacts with the Veracruz and Mexico City commercial communities, and his knowledge of the composition of imports handled by *peninsular* commercial houses. Essays in olive tree cultivation, he recalled, had been a virtual failure because of soil conditions, while New Spain's vineyards which required irrigation had been successful only in a few localities, such as Parras and the "Pueblo de los Dolores" (its well-known cura, Hidalgo, was not mentioned). Nor had the performance of textile manufacturing enterprises (the *obrages*) been any more promising: import substitution of common Asian linens in a period of wartime shortage (1797–1801) had generated a local product noncompetitive pricewise, while woolen goods producers (aside from common textiles locally made and consumed by low-income groups) had not been able to shift to higher quality because of labor costs and (here surfaced the colonialist mentality of the *peninsular*) the "calidad de los operarios, gente floxa y abandonada que no trata sino de llenar el día y ganar el jornal que se baste para su miserable manutención . . . desnudos no necesitan meter el vestuario en sus calculos." In sum, he concluded, the flow of imports from the metropole would barely be affected, and hitherto prohibited economic enterprises would not progress anyway. However, the recommended *gracias*, if implemented, could calm "los espíritus inquietos" and undercut efforts to "esparcir el descontento y las ideas de independencia."

There was, finally, one of Yermo's proposals that reveal him as prag-

matic businessman sensitive to the political facets of the coup he had just carried out to preserve intact major colonial interests. His last *gracia* was both political and tactical: not to open the *pliego de mortaja* since it had been prepared under the direction of that *traydor*, Godoy, and might install "algun sugeto de su facción sospechoso y traydor que nos pusiese en nuevos peligros." Did he and others suspect that the *pliego* might designate as Iturrigaray's replacement Cuba's Captain General Someruelos, whose trade policies troubled Havana's *peninsular almaceneros*, or the *intendente* of Guadalajara with whom the troublesome *criollo* cleric from Peru, Talamantes, corresponded, namely Roque Abarca?[82] Whether prepared for, or surprised by, Yermo's presentation of a kind of *cahier de doleánces*, the political core of the Audiencia now supported by *regente* Catani and other *ministros togados* adopted the tactically correct line at Garibay's swearing-in. They sidestepped debate and left Yermo with the impression (so he noted the next day) that "accedió el Real Acuerdo haciendo el mismo juicio y calificación." Within eight weeks, however, he would complain to the Junta de Sevilla that only two *gracias* requested had been forthcoming: suspension of Consolidación and rejection of the time-honored ritual of opening Madrid's *pliego* to replace an incapacitated viceroy. Probably the *ministros togados* and associates had planned to announce such concessions in any event.

There is no reason to believe that the Junta de Sevilla had instructed *comisionado* Jabat to agree with their possible collaborators in New Spain to accept the designate in the *pliego*—the choice of Charles IV's ministers—as Iturrigaray's replacement. Moreover, when Iturrigaray had proposed resigning in early September, he spelled out that Garibay would be only an interim replacement, reason enough for *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller not to open the *pliego*. Yet the ritual of office prescribed, at least at the outset, adherence to tradition, which must have been part of pre-coup planning; in other words, a departure from ritual had to be done in stages. Indeed, even as Yermo was making his presentation to the Audiencia, the presses were printing a *proclama*, repeated in a special *Gazeta Extraordinaria* datelined 7 a.m. of that morning but undoubtedly drafted beforehand by Juanmartiñena or López Cancelada with the approval of Aguirre and Bataller.[83]

It was deftly worded, offering a rational for the coup, veiling the *golpistas*, touching on the delicate question of the *pliego* and indicating implicitly that the Audiencia was in charge of the situation. It opened with a raison d'état, "la necesidad no está sujeta a las leyes communes." The "persona" of the viceroy had been seized by the "Pueblo" insisting upon his "separación" for reasons of "utilidad y conveniencia general," demands to which Real Acuerdo, archbishop, and "otras autoridades" had yielded; in accordance

with a royal order of 31 October 1806 (no specifics were proffered), Field Marshal Pedro Garibay was in command "interin se procede a la avertura de los pliegos de providencia." Rest assured, ran the proclamation, of the Real Acuerdo's "vigilancia."[84] Sometime the same day Garibay explained the situation to the intendant of Guadalajara, Roque Abarca, in comparably sanitized language. I have just been called to the Real Acuerdo, he wrote, and informed that Iturrigaray had been "detained" in the viceregal palace by a "movimiento popular" and then "separated" from command "con la anuencia" of the Real Acuerdo, the archbishop, and other notables. The *pliego* went unmentioned, which, in the light of the events of the next day, was not accidental.

By early morning of 17 September, twenty-four hours after the Mexico City public had awakened to the sight of cannon in the *zócalo*, *chaquetas*, or *cajeros* of the Voluntarios mounting guard around the viceregal palace, at the corners of the *zócalo,* and patrolling surrounding streets, and the doors of major commercial houses closed, the embittered wit of the colonialized—and usually their only weapon—reacted to the overwhelming display of force paraded the day before by the pillars of the colonial state, bureaucracy, and business. It was perhaps prophetic of events later that day that passersby in the *zócalo* found posted at the entries to the *parián*, that symbol of the wealth of *peninsular almaceneros*, a handwritten one-liner: "Hic est populus."[85] (So much for the attempt to capture the hitherto rejected concept of popular sovereignty.) Obviously the cover story of *oidores* Aguirre and Bataller designed to ascribe their coup d'état to the "pueblo" had been blown away. Yet this did not deter Cancelada from editorializing heavy-handedly in the *Gazeta* of that day that "el público" was relieved, even self-congratulatory for the removal of Iturrigaray, and that the capital's residents credited the "tan feliz suceso" to New Spain's patron saint, the Virgin de Guadalupe. Encouraged by the passivity of the capital's residents to the events of 16 September, emboldened by his close collaboration with *oidores* and Yermo, Cancelada printed on the front page of the *Gazeta* a reminder of the "feliz suceso" of the previous day when the "noble Pueblo Méxicano" had seized Iturrigaray and petitioned the Audiencia to appoint ("nombrar") as his replacement, Garibay. To this, however, Cancelada added a footnote, that this action was the work of "*todo el Comercio de México*," that the "Juventud española" had united to "proteger los hombres de bien," and—making his point even more explicit—that "Los mismos comerciantes y dependientes continuan montando guardia y patrullando."[86]

Cancelada's first public display of his attachment to *peninsular* business interests at Mexico City and Cadiz—there were later demonstrations when

he served as publicist and lobbyist at Cadiz—triggered instant repudiation from the cautious *oidores*. They forced him to recall all undistributed copies of the *Gazeta* of 17 September and to circulate a *Gazeta Extraordinaria* printed that day confessing he had published the *Gazeta* without submitting the galleys to prior censorship. To be sure, the capital's streetwise public needed neither pasquinades nor gazettes to recognize the prominent role of *peninsular* merchants and their employees in the coup d'état. The point is, the *oidores* foresaw that Cancelada's insensitivity and candor would circulate throughout the political elite of New Spain as an official admission of the role of *peninsular* mercantile interests, not "el pueblo," in forcibly removing the chief colonial officer appointed by Madrid.[87] To be sure, Cancelada was publicizing what was already common knowledge, "Pues, ellos [los europeos] habían executado la grande empresa, era preciso que fuesen tambien quienes la sostuviesen."[88]

The *oidores*' quick apparent rejection of Cancelada's praise for the capital's commercial oligarchs, coupled to the initial proclamation of Garibay's appointment as provisional until the opening of the *pliego*, suggests that *oidores* and their collaborators among merchants, clergy, and army officers were simply following a prearranged strategy and tactics. The impression of control is misleading, however, for there is evidence that not until five days after the coup did the *oidores* appear in full control of a situation they had sanctioned and created. Improvisation, in fact, first occurred on 14 September when it was feared that a commercial employee might reveal the plot; this led the plotters to postpone the coup for one day.[89] There was more improvisation in the early morning of 16 September when Audiencia, archbishop, and notables hurriedly gathered in the viceregal palace. Some among the merchants present insisted that the Audiencia be assigned the viceregal office, which the *oidores* managed to deflect by announcing that Garibay would replace Iturrigaray until formal opening of the *pliego*.[90] The issue seemed settled when the proclamation was posted on street corners in the late morning of 16 September, then reprinted in the special edition of the *Gazeta* of that same day. Yet the initiative of editor López Cancelada on 17 September in publicizing without Audiencia approval the prominent role of the "comercio de Mexico" along with the "juventud española" in the coup indicates that the *oidores* were not fully in command despite their immediate reprimand of López Cancelada.

By proclaiming Garibay's temporary installation on 16 September, the *oidores* were now committed to revealing the contents of the *pliego de providencia* as ritual required. We know that the *pliego* had been seized among Iturrigaray's papers, possibly opened;[91] if not, the *oidores* could reason that

the *pliego* nominated one of the nearby chief colonial officers, that is, either the captain general of Guatemala, the *presidente* of the Audiencia of Guadalajara, or the captain general of Cuba, the marqués de Someruelos. Neither *oidores* nor *almaceneros* would accept Someruelos, Abarca had been communicating with Talamantes, and the third was an unknown quantity.[92] There was more security in sticking to Garibay; moreover, Garibay was "Viejo, de cortes alcances . . . a quien por lo mismo el acuerdo le podía manejar a su discreción."[93] The ritual of the *pliego* was inescapable, unless suitable excuses were available. Here was no problem, for the *oidores* could point to "circunstancias . . . no . . . comunes, sino mui extraordinarias e imprevistas por las leyes," to "popular" pressure, and to Sevilla's ubiquitous *comisionado*, Jabat.[94]

Ritual is what the *oidores* staged in the morning of 17 September when six of eight *oidores* and three *fiscales* assembled.[95] The Audiencia had been in session about one hour, according to the minutes of the *oidores*, when "el Pueblo de esta Capital" respectfully presented "pedimentos relatibos a la quietud pública" and an unidentified member of the "multitud de gente" petitioned that no *pliego* be opened since it had been prepared "en el tiempo que gobernaba la España don Manuel Godoy" and since the "multitud" was satisfied with "el digno Gefe," Garibay. These demands were seconded by "Gefes Miliatres" present, eight colonels and two lieutenant colonels, providing the military sanction mentioned by Yermo's close collaborator, Salaberría.[96] Then the *oidores* (according to Jabat's account, not the Audiencia's minutes) asked for Jabat's opinion. Cued in beforehand, Jabat ("de los mas ardientes en promover la conspiración") recommended the *pliegos* remain unopened, and Garibay concurred since the "Junta de Sevilla no apetecía otra cosa que un Gefe que mandase y conservase en Paz este Reyno."[97] By supporting the coup, Jabat carried out what he later claimed he was sent out for, namely to "insurreccionar la América."[98] Unanimously the *oidores* then agreed not to open *pliegos*, to maintain Garibay *por ahora*, to seek approval from the "Suprema Junta, o Autoridad que exerza los deerechos de la Soberanía de Castilla e Indias," and to publish these decisions "segun las circunstancias."[99]

Publication of these decisions in the *Gazeta de México* had to be delayed four days, until 21 September. To rationalize abandonment of the promise of 16 September to open the *pliego* later, the *oidores* referred to unspecified "graves fundamentos"; they did not state major factors reviewed in their unpublished *acta* (minutes)—the pressure of the "pueblo," the approval of army officers, and the sanction of the Junta de Sevilla through its *comisionado*.[100] Why, however, the four-day delay? Apparently *oidores* and their

merchant collaborators were unsure of the reaction of the colonial capital's residents to the conspicuous role of elements of the *peninsular* commercial group—the "comercio de ropas" had not been open for business because its members had been on guard duty since the night of 15 September.[101] On 19 September the *oidores* permitted López Cancelada to print a total fabrication to reduce the impact of their coup: Fernando had escaped from French forces and, escorted by Spanish troops, had returned to Spain.[102] The next day the *oidores* agreed in a special session that Garibay merited their full confidence because "mayormente habiendo manifestado y acreditado su adhesión a este real acuerdo en cuanto ha occurrido."[103] In brief, the circumstances appropriate for public announcement of the long planned refusal to open the *pliego* were evident by 21 September. Neither then nor in succeeding days did mass reaction to the coup d'état materialize in Mexico City. Eight days after New Spain's first coup d'état, Jabat could write to his friend at Cadiz, Eusebio de Herrera, that New Spain was remarkably tranquil, people were thanking the Virgin de Guadalupe for what had happened, confidence in the new governing authority had stimulated patriotism, and—he predicted confidently—"los donativos serán quantiosos." Yermo had accurately foreseen that "no habría una [persona] que se moviese a una contrarevolución."[104]

López Cancelada's and Jabat's reports of the apparent insouciance of Mexico City's public toward the 16 September coup mirrored self-delusion masking reality. They could have interpreted local passivity, astonishment, and "stupor" as evidence that neither Ayuntamiento nor viceroy had ever aimed to undermine the colonial system; this, however, would strip the coup of any claim to legitimacy, the "especioso velo de la necesidad."[105] Instead, they chose to interpret post-coup passivity as popular acquiescence,[106] for it fitted conveniently the colonialist mind convinced that the colonialized could be easily manipulated, that they were a "manada de animales cuadrúpedos sin derecho alguno para saber [la] situación política."[107] This soothed consciences and dispelled some doubt and, when reported to the Junta de Sevilla, might render the coup more palatable to critics there.

In fact, surface passivity masked public shock. Mexico City residents were not fooled by the *Gazeta de México*'s references to "multitud" and to "pueblo"; they understood them as code words for "los que componían la . . . Audiencia de Mexico; los principales del Comercio; y todos los Españoles de más influxo, representación y poder . . . en aquella populosa ciudad." The reaction can be measured in the remarks of a petty, unlicensed commercial agent from the provinces frequenting the corridors of the viceregal palace, Antonio Calleja, who awoke on 16 September to discover

"sobre las armas el Comercio, las tropas todas guarneciendo la ciudad, y el vecindario amargado con estos." An urban population already aware of the "odiosa division de criollo y gachupín . . . vió con dolor y sopresa lo sucedido" but undertook no "movimiento alguno."[108] Calleja's perception was repeated at a different social level when Mexico City's *criollo* elite also recognized that "tiraniá se quitó la mascara."[109] Raz y Raz Guzmán, good friend of the marqués de Rayas, later recalled that the "gravedad de este suceso, y el conocimiento . . . de enemigos tan poderosos, esparcía desde luego un pavor en toda la ciudad, de manera que todos formidaban, y nadie se atrevía ni aún hablar."[110] Rayas, for his part, raged at the "canalla" of three hundred men "emigrados los más, casí todos sin licencia, criminales muchos" who had made the coup possible, just as he raged at the "ninguna uniformidad y pusilanimidad de estos Naturales." Rayas could afford to vocalize his bitterness; *oidor* Aguirre ("el autor de tanta maldad") would not touch him out of fear he "traería armadas todos los operarios de las Haciendas."[111] Rayas's reaction should not be taken as representative of the mining community, at least not at Zacatecas. Informed by his Mexico City correspondent—probably the prestigious merchant banker Antonio Basoco—the administrator of the Veta Grande mining complex, Isidoro Sarachaga, commented on 30 September that he had received "noticia" of the viceroy's imprisonment and others who "seguían sus ideas e intenciones contra la fidelidad con que debían proceder con nuestro soberano y nación" By the imprisonment of these "traidores . . . se extiripe . . . la [semilla] de los franceses que con capa de buenos hombres están perjudicando en este reino" influencing "muchos españoles que los protegen y tal vez son peores que los mismos extranjeros, y alguna parte de dichos perjuicios estamos sufriendo en Zacatec as."[112]

Others who "soplaban la discordia en conversaciones" had to be more circumspect, turning instead to the "atrevidos pasquines contra los Gachupines pidiendo las cavezas de varios en particular, y en general de todos."[113] Within two weeks of the Mexico City coup, Garibay's government had to denounce publicly the flood of "anónimos, pasquines o libelos" circulating in the capital and provinces produced by "espíritus inquietos, genios malignos y revoltosos."[114] But when in ensuing months none of the *criollo* elite made public denunciations of the September coup, handbills "en figura de cedula de communión" were found posted in Mexico City's cathedral and other churches of the capital castigating the inactivity of the *criollo* elite with "Libertad, cobardes criollos."[115] There *was* fire under the ashes.

The Junta de Sevilla and its *comisionados* in Mexico, along with *oidores*, *almaceneros*, and commercial employees, lumped together as "un enjambre de monstruos togados y comerciantes embrutecidos," had sought to prevent

what they magnified into a "conjuración o rebelión contra la patria."[116] In the short run, their coup ensured that New Spain's silver pesos both public and private would finance resistance in Spain to French occupation forces, but it also accelerated the inevitable violence two years later in 1810.[117] "Los españoles de Mexíco dieron el primer ejemplo, despojando al virrey Iturrigaray, de que una autoridad podía ser atropellada, sin que el cielo lanzase sus rayos sobre la tierra; y esta lección terrible dejó ya profundas impresiones en el ánimo del pueblo."[118] And the "pueblo" would have the last word.

In the long run, the coup destroyed the illusion that had led people to tolerate the old regime, what career diplomat Hauterive of the French foreign ministry in 1800 had pinpointed as capable of veiling the imperfections of inherited structures—"ancienneté . . . obscurité de leur origine . . . appareil de l'autorité qu'on leur attribue." In France the Revolution had shattered this "illusion qui avait si longtemps reculé la catastrophe." By the same token, in New Spain the coup d'état of September 1808 destroyed the webs of toleration, the "illusion" of tradition. As Hauterive put it well, "En vain cherche-t-on a rassembler le débris épars des institutions abolies: rien ne peut faire renaître cette ancienne illusion qui jusqu'alors avoit maintenu leur caducité."[119]

In the colony of New Spain, in the two years between 15 September 1808 and 16 September 1810, reality would destroy illusion. And when the curate of Dolores mobilized the mestizo and *indio* marginalized in September 1810 to march on the mining capital of Guanajuato, initially the decolonization of Mexico would lack a representative body, a new national power center.

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13. Junta de Sevilla, Consejo de Castilla, and the Genesis of the Junta Central

Todas las naciones han mirado con invidia nuestra posesión de las Américas, sino la pueden poseer él que se hagan independientes . . . es natural fomentan clandestinamente dicha independencia . . . Los males de España, esto es, de la peninsula *se ven* . . . Pero es preciso precaverse de los que no se ven, de lo que pueda suceder aunque no *se vea*. Anonymous, 1809

Qué de inconvenienes [y] divisiones dentro y fuera del Reyno, quantas pretensiones . . . quanto descontento, y quan justo en nuestras Américas, llamadas ya a tomar parte en el Gobierno actual. Donde irian a parar talvez entonces nuestras Cortes, nuestra libertad . . . los derechos de Fernando? Anonymous, Pamphlet, 1809

Las causas remotas de la disolución de la Junta [Central] . . . ya existían quando aún no habían nacido los visabuelos de sus vocales.
Calvo de Rozas, *Reglamento que dió . . . le Suprema Junta Central*

La crisis consiste justamente en que lo Viejo muere y lo Nuevo no puede nacer, en ese terreno se verivica los hechos morbosos más diversos. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks* [Turin]

Sevilla's claim to sovereignty over Spain and America, specious at the time *comisionados* Jabat and Jaúregui left Cadiz for Veracruz and Mexico City in late spring of 1808, was further belied as events unfolded on both sides of the Atlantic. Faced with the refusal of other juntas in the peninsula to accept Andalusian claims to hegemony, and England's reluctance to recognize Sevilla's exclusive claims, Sevilla reluctantly joined the movement to form a sovereign *central* junta of resistance to be constituted by representatives of the supreme *provincial* juntas.

The Junta de Valencia

The project was articulated in mid-July by the Junta de Valencia after correspondence among provincial juntas. The Valencian Junta, like others established at the end of May, had been the sequel of a self-styled "popular" insurgency that quickly sanctioned the conservative leadership of incumbent authorities supported by representatives of local corporate elites. Captain General José Rafael de Vasco y Pascual—conde de la Conquista de las Islas Batanes[1]—immediately took the presidency of the Junta, joining the archbishop (Joaquín Capman), the regent of the local Audiencia (Vicente Cano Manuel) and the *intendant* (Francisco Xavier de Aspiroz).[2] The orientation of the Junta expressed in its manifestoes was decidedly pro-English, inclined toward a conservative, constitutional, but federative form of governance, committed to limited reform and deeply preoccupied with the preservation of the empire.

The problem was France. Since the settlement of Basel, one junta's manifesto reported, a cabal of "oligarchs" in France had forced "intolerable demands on the Spanish Treasury"—hardly hyperbole—that threatened Spain's security in peacetime and finally put France in the hands of a "soldier of extraordinary audacity" who soon proclaimed himself emperor. The manifesto noted, moreover, that Bonaparte was profoundly mistaken in believing that "le era fácil esclavizar a la España y conservar sus colonias." It was already evident that, after causing Spain the loss of its navy at Trafalgar as well as millions in money, soldiers, and other resources, French persistence in its plan—here the manifesto was remarkably prescient—would cause "la pérdida absoluta de nuestro patrimonio y del de la Europa toda que son las Américas, se levantarán en ellas diferentes dinastías, que harán independientes y formidables estas mismas colonias." Ultimately, it claimed, "Gran Bretaña adquirará una preponderancia que jamás habrá tenido." On the other hand, Valencia argued, Great Britain "no puede calcular sus intereses de modo alguno sobre nuestras costas sin hacer nuestra felicidad . . . la industria, la agricultura y la mayor parte de nuestros capitales han sido el resultado de algunos años de paz con esta Nación." Today, opposing the tyranny of Napoleon was "solo una Isla, cuya forma constitucional la eleva sobre el resto de los demás Gobiernos, ha sido la única barrera a su ambición . . . la energía y consequencia de plan de estos isleños serán el escollo donde se estrellen los intentos de este escándalo de las Naciones."[3]

The Junta de Valencia opened immediately the ports of Valencia and Murcia to English merchant vessels and sought London's cooperation in dispatching ships to blockaded Veracruz to secure New Spain's adherence

and financial support. Another manifesto appealed to *criollo* elites, the "Vasallos . . . del mismo Monarca," since their "abuelos y padres son porciones nobles de nosotros," stressing that *Españoles Americanos* formed with the metropole "un solo cuerpo."[4] Kinship, loyalty, and pesos of the Spanish Empire in America were Valencia's immediate preoccupations.

London, however, diplomatically evaded Valencia's request for the release of any Spanish vessel seized as a prize and dispatched to seek colonial recognition.[5] Frustrated in communicating with the colonies by delayed English cooperation and mortified by its own failure to protect hundreds of French residents at Valencia from mob action,[6] the Junta de Valencia in mid-July circularized other provincial juntas, insisting on "la necesidad de no perder un instante . . . en ponerse de acuerdo sobre la urgentísima medida de la reunión de la Autoridad." Any autonomous reaction to French occupation was irresponsible; instead, what was required was quick formation of a sovereign body consisting of two deputies from every provincial junta; otherwise, it foresaw that the recent agreement on objectives and policies between the Juntas of Sevilla and Granada risked creating a mere "conjunto de gobiernos separados" open to pressure from the people—"puestos a las convulsiones y desórdenes que trae consigo la influencia popular, débiles por consequencia y fáciles de subyugar unas por otras." A single, united body would function in the absence of Fernando VII since victory over French occupation might be far off; meanwhile, it asked, what body in the metropole would be available to conduct foreign affairs and coordinate military resistance?

Above all, the Valencia junta argued, we must focus on one fundamental point—a major preoccupation of the junta: "la conservación de nuestras Américas y demás posesiones ultramarinas." Again, rhetorically: "A qué Autoridad obedecerán? Cual de las Provincias dirigiría a aquellos países las órdenes, las disposiciones necesarias por su gobierno, para el nombramiento y dirección de sus empleados, y demás puntos indispensables para manter su dependencia?" Metropolitan Spain had to display the continuity of unified authority to the overseas possessions. Without such a body, "cada Colonia establecerá su Gobierno independiente como se ha hecho en España." We have to remember that "su distancia, su situación, sus riquezas, la natural inclinación a la independencia, las podrán conducir a ella, roto, por decirlo así, el nudo que las unía con la madre Patria." Inevitably, "nuestros enemigos conseguirían sin más medios que el de nuestro descuido lo que no hubieran podido lograr con todos los esfuerzos de su poder." And to drive home its point: "Esta sola consideración bastaría para hacer ver que el establecimiento de una Autoridad Suprema, y una Representación Nacional, es

no solo lindispensable, sino urgentísima."[7] The colonies were wagging the body of the metropole.

Valencia's Junta then recommended that a national junta be located distant from the major theater of warfare, close to ports through which contact with the colonies might be maintained—although some Junta members would exclude Cadiz.[8] It should have, it specified, sovereign authority in all matters of the jurisdiction of so-called high government: foreign affairs, armed services, finance, and colonial administration. The Junta reprimanded those who criticized the Consejo de Castilla—a jab at the Junta de Sevilla. And in a clear reference to the Escorial affair, predicted that, on the occasion of the liberation of Madrid, "no parece dudable que el primer tribunal de la Nación que contribuyó con tanto celo para salvar la inocencia de Fernando Séptimo y ponerle sobre el Trono, convocaría las cortes." If the critics in the Junta de Sevilla succeeded in sowing widespread distrust of this organ of government, the seeds of Spain's dissolution would indeed have been planted.[9]

French Disaster

Madrid's liberation, the contingency mentioned by the Junta de Valencia, in fact occurred scarcely two weeks later—to general astonishment. It followed another memorable and unexpected event, the victory of Spanish forces mustered in Andalusia over the troops of General Dupont at Bailén on 19 July. Both developments radically altered the political situation in the peninsula. While victory at Bailén strengthened the prestige of the Junta de Sevilla, the retreat of José's government from Madrid weakened its claim to national hegemony and hastened formation of a national *fernandista* governing body elsewhere.

In retrospect, the victory at Bailén although not inevitable was to an extent predictable in view of conditions in Andalusia. It was the outcome of the disorganization of the French high command at Madrid, pressure on Dupont to move by forced marches to occupy Cadiz, and the preparations for resistance by insurgents in Andalusia. The military strategy for defeating Dupont had been conceived and elaborated from the moment Sevilla opted to form its junta—probably even earlier. Three days after the uprising at Sevilla, the first issue of the *Gazeta ministerial de Sevilla* appealed to Andalusians to "conquistar una patria. Sean las campiñas del Alto Betis nuestras llanuras de Marathón. Sean las gargantas de Sierra Morena nuestras Termópiles!" Subsequent issues described the advance, then halt, retreat, and final encirclement of Dupont's forces in the dramatic language of an event

foretold. A month earlier, the *Gazeta* had accurately covered the situation of Dupont's exhausted troops and the occupation of strategic passes through the Sierra Maestra by Spanish forces, cutting off retreat from Andalusia. The article concluded: "Ignoramos qué partida podía tomar este general para escaparse."[10] Francisco de Saavedra's diary records the vigorous recruitment and training of soldiery, the organization and deployment of veteran units, and the tactics that misinformed the French about the size of insurgent *fernandista* forces confronting them.[11]

No doubt Bailén was also the result of Spanish planning, intelligence gathering, and popular participation, but there were also the factors of French overconfidence and even arrogance, poor intelligence, and tactical errors. In May and June of 1808, the French high command at Madrid became disorganized. Despite Murat's phases of euphoria after Bayonne and the display of force suppressing Madrid's uprising on the Dos de Mayo, his position in the capital remained precarious. As commander in chief of all French forces in Spain with responsibility for the security of the capital, his charges were considerable. Lines of communication—to Bonaparte at Bayonne, with garrisons spread over the peninsula—were intercepted.[12] Forced to consult with the Spanish military and dependent on its cooperation for basic supplies, Murat found frustrating effecting seemingly simple matters as shifting from Madrid units of the Guardias Reales—their presence he considered a security threat. And as Bonaparte's temporary representative as head of the Spanish state and president of the Junta de Gobierno, he had to deal with key civil servants in the high administration. Pedro Cevallos—Murat early on tagged him as an enemy of France—had remained as minister of foreign affairs, momentarily substituted by Francisco Gil y Lemos, whose poor performance might be charged to age, health, and Francophobia. At Hacienda (Azanza) and Guerra (O'Farrill) officials appeared cooperative after Bayonne but clearly focused on the core of their national agenda: the convocation of a constituent assembly at Bayonne and sending commissioners to the colonies, both steps delayed by insurrection in the provinces and lack of finance. Caballero, an opponent of both Azanza and O'Farrill, feigned support but seemed to have little influence. As for the key governing authority, the Consejo de Castilla, it appeared willing to cooperate in maintaining security but obstructed Murat's other initiatives.[13] Above all, the Madrid government's financial situation frustrated Murat and heightened the strategic importance of securing the port of Cadiz to assure the loyalty of the colonies and appoint a new viceroy to the wealthiest American colony, New Spain.[14]

Bonaparte, aware of Cadiz's commercial and strategic role, had already

urged the occupation of the port. He now advised Murat to order Junot at Lisbon to send six thousand troops to Cadiz to reinforce Dupont's thrust into Andalusia. Junot replied, however, that he would comply only at the direct order of Bonaparte.[15] Murat—worried by reports of *fernandista* ferment and anti-French violence in Andalusia, English troops arriving at Gibraltar, secret contacts between the Spanish military and the English along the Mediterranean coast—delayed ordering Dupont to move south until he obtained Junot's formal compliance. Yielding finally to Bonaparte's impatience and troubled by reports of insurrection at Sevilla, Murat ordered Dupont to proceed by forced march to Sevilla to join a force from Portugal.

Dupont's troops left Madrid, moved through the province of La Mancha without incident, and neared the mountain pass through the Sierra Morena at Despeñaperros. The unopposed movement of his force made Dupont overconfident; to hasten his advance, he left behind at Santa Cruz de Mudela a large reserve of supplies. Once in Andalusia, however, he found the center of what had been Pablo de Olavide's colony at La Carolina deserted, and at Andújar (7 June) came reports of insurrection at Sevilla. Still confident, he followed the Guadalquivir River downstream to Alcolea, where he overcame a joint Spanish force of militia, regular troops, and partisans, and pushed on to Córdoba. Although the city surrendered, there were small-scale attacks on the French soldiers and counterviolence. Then came disquieting news: about to leave Córdoba for Sevilla, Dupont was paralyzed by reports of superior Spanish and English forces blocking his line of march, by skirmishes in his rear, and by the desertion of a regiment of Swiss Guards under the command of General Redding to Spanish resistance groups.[16] So he withdrew to Andújar to await reinforcement, to secure the provisions in the rear, and to cover the rearguard at Jaén. Advancing slowly under the hot Andalusian summer sun to Bailén with hungry, thirsty, and overdressed soldiery, and finally encircled without the hope of immediate reinforcements, Dupont surrendered to the resistance forces on 19 July.

Worse followed. Ambiguous, contradictory terms mark Dupont's hasty acceptance of surrender. They covered repatriation of commander and troops in Spanish vessels and the withdrawal of other French forces from Andalusia. However, the *gobernador* of now insurgent Cadiz claimed no obligation—in addition to lack of ships—to evacuate French prisoners, because they had entered Spain illegally. They would remain confined aboard Spanish vessels in Cadiz bay and local fortresses for more than a year.

Repercussions of the unexpected surrender at Bailén on all aspects of the situation in Spain were disproportionate to France's military setback.

Bonaparte's shock and then anger were matched only by the euphoria throughout the unoccupied peninsula of the Spanish victory. Earlier—despite few field reports—the chance that presumably uncommitted Spanish army officers in Andalusia might join the insurrection were dismissed as "ridiculous"; Bonaparte never forgave Dupont for this unexpected defeat.[17]

News of Bailén reached Bonaparte as Joseph Bonaparte entered Madrid to rule as king under the new dynasty. Within days of his arrival, however, most of the members of his cabinet along with the French garrison departed precipitately to positions beyond the Ebro at Vitoria, Álava's provincial capital.[18] Reviewing the fluid conditions of occupation, the French concluded that "la guerre d'Espagne . . . a tout à fait changé de nature" and would become "une guerre régulière avec les troupes et une guerre de brigandages."[19] The conclusion was accurate: occupiers usually label resisters brigands; here, however, the Spaniards would coin the last word, *guerrilleros*. Now Bonaparte decided to take overall command of the forces of occupation to crush the Spanish opposition.

This was the decisive moment. Discussion probably had involved consulting the best-informed (some like Bourgoing) experts on Spanish affairs in the French high command and foreign office, on two options. The first, military and strategic, required commitment of troops and money for an indeterminate period, precisely when Bonaparte's concern was central Europe; the second, withdrawal north of the Ebro and south of the Pyrenees, endangered communications with Lisbon. Hovering over all deliberation was the issue, at least for the French, of national prestige. To this point, French imperial armies in Europe—St. Domingue aside—had suffered no major defeat comparable to Bailén.

Whom Bonaparte questioned about Spain's domestic situation remains obscure. Perhaps his decision to commit more troops to a full-scale peninsular war exemplifies pure arrogance of power? Or was it an attitudinal matter? If not before, then certainly after the Spanish Bourbons' intrafamily discord at the Escorial was made public, Bonaparte viewed that dynasty as discredited, and replaceable. One outstanding French historian put it tersely: Bonaparte never was interested in Spain, and if he was, "il ignorait tout d'elle."[20] Yet one cannot overlook many in French political, military, and intellectual circles who knew Spanish counterparts, admirers of philosophical, political, and military publications in French: among the Spanish elite were the reform-minded, impressed by the institutional changes of the early revolutionary days. In General Bonaparte they found a leader who accepted the changes and promised stability thereafter, and—like Azanza, Urquijo, and O'Farrill and other like-minded nationalist Spaniards—they

would accept French cooperation in putting into effect long-postponed reform projects.

For Spanish supporters of José I, the impact of Bailén was catastrophic. At initial news of the disaster, "los ánimos empezaron a vacilar," recalled Miguel Azanza and Gonzalo O'Farrill.[21] Above all, the hurried departure of José and collaborators produced the predictable, as "muchos de los que habían prestado una absoluta acquiescencia al nuevo orden de cosas" reassessed their position in the unexpected, fluid situation. Many "sobresaltados con las amenazas del pueblo y sus atroces venganzas, o consultando su posición personal y relaciones e intereses de familia, o favorecidos de la circunsstancia de no haber hecho nada que diese a conocer su opinión política," chose to remain in Madrid.[22] Meléndez Valdés summed it up: "La infausta batalla de Bailén acabó de perdernos; sin sua el delirio hubiera sido pasagero."[23]

A primary concern to those, Spaniards and French, who retreated with José to the north, was the colonial impact of a prolonged struggle, an intersection of international conflict and civil war, which now seemed unavoidable. Or perhaps neutrality might be a solution? During the exodus northward, Azanza, Urquijo, and other cabinet members drafted a proposal later presented to Bonaparte at Paris: accepting the provisions of the Bayonne treaty with France, Spain would still negotiate a condition of neutrality with London according to earlier treaties in the hope that "esto calmaría nuestras fundadas zozobras sobre la suerte de las posesiones de America." And in late summer they approached General Castaños, Francisco de Saavedra, and Pedro de Cevallos—they had chosen to remain in order to join the insurgent groups—warning of the broad effects of resisting French troops.[24] These gestures were clearly as futile then as their repetition would later be. For his part, Cevallos had made clear his decision: by early September Cevallos had had printed and widely distributed his studiously crafted manifesto urging Europeans everywhere to take arms against the French under Napoleon; and shortly the newly installed Junta Central would assume sovereign authority with an oath of loyalty to the exiled Bourbon, Fernando VII.

The Junta de Sevilla's Colonial Design

The sudden retreat from Madrid of José I and close supporters at the end of July accelerated the establishment of a countergovernment, a *fernandista* affirmation of national unity and resistance to the French occupation. Sevilla now shifted its tactics, supporting Valencia's proposal of a

single body, a *junta central*. At the same time, however, it rejected one of Valencia's major assumptions, that once Madrid was liberated, the old regime's Consejo de Castilla would proceed to convoke a *cortes*, which, in turn, would create a regency. To make its case, Sevilla repeated charges of its manifesto of 2 June denying the Consejo's prerogatives on grounds of its recent "delitos atrocísimos contra la Patria." The Junta de Sevilla also rejected a *cortes*, asserting that many of the cities traditionally represented had taken no initiative to defend the nation. It asserted that legitimate power resided in the provincial "supreme" juntas themselves; and in responding to the complaint that Sevilla had assumed unwarranted superiority over other juntas, the Andalusian Junta stated that it had merely utilized advantages of geography and other factors for the interests of the nation. It had—unilaterally, to be sure—assumed authority over the colonies to keep "las Américas . . . aquella parte tan principal de la Monarquía Española" and trusted its efforts might merit "alguna consideración."[25]

Denial of hegemonic aspirations and professions of dedication to the national interest were decidedly inconsistent with Sevilla's *secret* instructions—formalized on 24 August—to its deputies to the Junta Central.[26] These consisted of seven articles plus subordinate paragraphs. Article 6 (nine paragraphs) dealt with the metropole's—and Sevilla's—special, secular interest, "Las Indias y su Navegación." These clearly indicated the intention of the Junta de Sevilla to imprint its "Andalusian" design on the recently created sovereign body and would effectively strip the interim national, central government of substantive powers.[27]

The Sevillan group viewed the deposed government as essentially federative in nature. The constituent "supreme" provincial juntas would retain power over regional matters as well as undisputed control of their deputies to the Junta Central. The "supremacy" of these provincial juntas embraced all aspects of "el gobierno civil, político, militar y económico de las provincias de su jurisdicción" (Art. 7). Their power was extensive: the organization and maintenance of military forces on land and sea within their jurisdiction (Art. 5, paras. 10–14) and "la administración de la Real Hacienda en todos sus ramos, de los donativos y de qualquiera fondo público, ecclesiastico o secular . . . y a la provisión de todos sus empleos" (Art. 5, para. 18). And since the funds of the General Treasury will consist of "no más que los sobrantes líquidos que den a él las Juntas Supremas respectivas, es muy fácil y sencilla la cuenta y razón" (Art. 5, para. 20). Reserved to the central body were foreign affairs and coordination of military policy. Given the inflow of colonial remissions concentrated in Andalusia, evidently the Junta de Sevilla would play the dominant role in peninsular affairs. Gaspar

Jovellanos—wary of the Sevillanos—would later point out that "la Junta de Sevilla, después de reservarse en sus instrucciones una no pequeña porción de este ejercicio, aspiraba todavía a establecer una especie de constitución federal, y se afanaba por propagar en los demás esta ambiciosa idea."[28]

In colonial affairs Sevilla's control promised to be far more comprehensive. Instructions to its deputies made explicit the principle that those colonies, wherever Sevilla's *comisionados* succeeded in having its authority acknowledged "en todo o en parte," would be "*governadas por esta Junta Suprema de Sevilla y dependientes de ella* como lo son Córdoba y Jaén, las Yslas Canarias y demás reunidas de la Junta Suprema de Sevilla, y dependiente de ella" (Art. 6, para. 1) (emphasis added). In colonies where no such commitments were attained, juntas would be fashioned to exercise power "en la manera que lo gozan las Juntas Supremas de España"—directly subordinated to the Junta Central (Art. 6, para. 2). While the Junta Central would appoint viceroys and captains general, they would be selected from candidates proposed by the *regional juntas in whose jurisdictions the colonies lay* (Art. 6, para. 4) (emphasis added).

Sevilla's (really, Cadiz's) reach for power over transatlantic trade flows is clearly defined: although trade with the colonies would be open to all Spain's ports, "las licencias para navegar y todo lo a esto perteneciente, se harán por las juntas supremas respectivas de los puertos de donde se haga la vuelta" (Art. 6, paras. 5–6). In other words, once Sevilla's sovereignty was recognized, either "wholly or in part"[29] by authorities at Mexico City, the colony of New Spain would be subordinate to the Junta de Sevilla now empowered to nominate its viceroy, and Cadiz together with Veracruz would shape its external trade. Sevilla's deputies to the Junta Central were ordered to implement these secret instructions, consult their parent body in case of doubt, and consent to their periodic replacement semiannually. Sevilla's thrust for "special consideration" in the Junta Central might at last legitimate a hitherto informal colonial hegemony, political and commercial, that the Reglamentos del Comercio Libre of 1778 and 1789 had—at best—only loosened.

The Junta Central de España e Indias, however, would not be subordinated to the aims of the Junta de Sevilla, as Andalusian interest groups and their allies hoped. In the first place, other juntas were not about to concede to Sevilla a dominant role in the new central government that they had denied it earlier as autonomous juntas. Second, the Consejo de Castilla, now reentering the political scene after the French retreat from Madrid and eager to resume its commanding position, perceived a greater threat to its leader-

ship and the integrity of the *monarquía* in Sevilla's antagonism and hegemonism than in the Junta Central still in the process of creation. "La Junta de Sevilla se ha abrogado unas facultades que ni el pueblo lo ha concedido ni ha podido conceder, titulandose vana y quiméricamente Junta Suprema de España e Indias," it complained in late August.[30] It grew more impatient in mid-September: "Son gravísimos los daños que causan al Estado las juntas provinciales, y todos, al parecer, son de imputar a la Junta de Sevilla . . . la soberanía[que]no la puede transmitir el pueblo de Sevilla, como carece de ella . . . es una conspiración contra los tribunales supremos." The provincial juntas, it insisted, must confine themselves to a single, exclusive goal, the military defense of the nation.[31]

Despite opposing initially the pretensions of Sevilla and other provincial juntas, however, the Consejo de Castilla ultimately threw its weight behind the empowerment—studiously excluding the legitimation—of the Junta Central. This position was the result of a complex political counterpoint during August and most of September as the Consejo struggled to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of those Spaniards in the resistance still suspicious of its former support of the French-imposed José I.

In fact, the Consejo de Castilla was earlier in a precarious situation, to be precise, at the end of July. The original *fernandista* strategy in the crisis of French occupation had assumed that the Consejo, essential to the "precious heritage of monarchy," would remain at Madrid under José, while the peninsular *audiencias* would govern in unoccupied provinces. The *fiscales* of the Consejo appear to have been surprised by the abrupt departure from Madrid of José and his officials; they found it hard to believe that Dupont's surrender forty leagues to the south of Madrid at Bailén might alone account for the abandonment of the capital "sin que el Consejo ni la Sala de Alcaldes . . . hubiese llegado siquiera a verle."[32]

The position of the *consejos* remaining at Madrid was uncertain. In reality, the unexpected flight of José's government to Vitoria nullified the Franco-Spanish settlement at Bayonne, framed to preserve constituted authorities from radical change in return for the dynastic substitution. Now the predictable French reoccupation of the capital would be an act of conquest freeing José's government from constraints imposed at Bayonne.[33]

In early August, then, the Consejo de Castilla's sole option was to merge with the insurgent government preferably a regency and, failing that, unity with an interim body that hopefully would proceed to create a regency. Its initial moves to recover authority included formal notice of the flight of José with his partisans from Madrid to all the *juntas provinciales*, includ-

ing the lesser ones subordinate to their supreme regional juntas; appeal to them to send representatives to the capital to cooperate with the Consejo in the "national cause" (4 August); declare null and void the Constitution of Bayonne, especially two major provisions, the abdication of the Bourbons and transferal of the throne of Spain to Napoleon; and prepare to defend its record in the aftermath of Bayonne.[34] Frustrated and perhaps chastened by criticism of its appeal of 4 August for unity, and by the failure to reach an agreement with the Junta de Sevilla to form a national government under its aegis,[35] the Consejo appealed at the end of August to the deputies sent to the Junta Central assembling at Madrid. "Es absolutamente necesario," it declared, "que los Españoles . . . saben . . . desprenderse, por el bien del Estado, de un mando que tomaron únicamente por conservarlo para su Rey y Señor natural, depositandolo, en la forma y modo que estima la Nación misma en Cortes, o por medio de Diputados de las Juntas . . . en las personas o cuerpos que elija, y que el Consejo será el primero a reconocer." Thereby, it suggested, the old regime's governmental structure under the Consejo might be reconstituted—"todo recobra su antiguo estado, sin necesidad de otras novedades muy difíciles de organizar aún con mucho tiempo."[36] The Consejo was, in effect, subtly recommending an assembly of deputies of provincial juntas, chosen in the oligarchical fashion of the traditional *cortes*, which might preserve the old—now threatened—regime.

The Consejo's tactic for legitimizing—in fact, taking control of—what now seemed developing into a national, popular "revolution" against an occupying power was, surprisingly enough, articulated by Juan Pérez Villamil, who, on the day after the Dos de Mayo at Madrid, had called for insurrection in the provinces. Three months later, in his *Carta sobre el modo de establecer el Consejo de Regencia del reino con arreglo a nuestra constitution* printed at Madrid (1808), he criticized the provincial juntas on the ground that they had not recognized the Consejo as representing the government in exile and aimed to forge "una representación desconocida y por ella el alto poder de intervenir en el establecimiento de un gobierno que supla por la persona augusta del Rei." Most provincial juntas, he asserted, had been formed not by *ayuntamientos*—in his eyes, the duly constituted representatives of the "people" and therefore of the "nation"—but by the common folk, the *populacho*, and in the course of mob action. Their legitimacy was questionable and even destabilizing since "se les puede recusar la obediencia sin quebrantar en esto ni lei ni constitución." In his worst-case scenario, other provincial juntas might appear on a comparable basis, take any title, and assume unjustified authority. They could neither legitimately represent

the nation nor act in the name of its members. To firm his opinion, Pérez Villamil stressed that during Fernando VII's exile it was essential to adhere to the existing constitution, law codes, and—the core of his argument—the constituted authorities. This could be achieved only through cooperation of provincial juntas that—their illegality aside—clearly held power through "peculiar circumstances" and, with the cooperation of the Consejo, might form an interim body to convene a *cortes* in the traditional form to elect a regency. A *regencia* would prosecute a war of resistance and, conflict over, the *cortes* would disband for two years, reconvening to debate a new constitution drafted by the regents. A governmental trinity, so to speak, of Consejo, Regencia, and Cortes over time would preserve the old regime.[37]

The Consejo did not rely solely on this outreach to the obviously reluctant provincial juntas and tried to form the regency itself, consisting of military officers (all generals): Gregorio de la Cuesta (captain general of Castilla la Vieja and a former *gobernador* of the Consejo), the duque del Infantado (*presidente* of the Consejo), and Francisco Javier de Castaños, commander of the army in Andalusia who came to Madrid at the end of August. Castaños's refusal to cooperate ended this tactic.[38] At this point the Consejo's political leverage was further reduced by a maneuver of the Junta de Sevilla that proposed the new Junta Central assemble, not in Madrid in the shadow of the former conciliar bodies, but at the royal residence at Aranjuez, fifty miles away. There the delegates chosen by provincial juntas met on 25 September, under the presidency of Charles III's aging prime minister Floridablanca, confronted multiple problems: internal organization, definition of powers, policy choices, prosecution of the resistance, and the Junta de Sevilla's Andalusian design for the American colonies. And there, too, the Consejo de Castilla, wary of Sevilla's hegemonism and encouraged by support within the Junta Central, approved the new sovereign body and decreed that its acts have the force of law throughout the *monarquía*—even as it continued to deny its own legitimacy by urging the dissolution of provincial juntas, and the convocation of a *cortes* in order to achieve its persistent objective, a *regencia*.[39]

At issue in the conflict over a government of resistance to French occupation was control of colonial policy, whether by a national or regional body. This struggle had sharpened over the previous century, in particular after 1778 when the Reglamento del Comercio Libre seemed a serious threat to Cadiz's role in Spain's transatlantic trade system. The Junta de Sevilla supported the Junta Central in order to preserve its hegemony in colonial affairs; for its part, the Consejo de Castilla wanted to preserve Spain's trans-

atlantic empire from disintegration as an inevitable consequence of preserving Cadiz's dominance, its hegemonism. In the end, the Consejo had to compromise by giving conditional sanction to the Junta Central, hoping it would ultimately give way to the Regencia. The clash of interests insured the viability of the Junta Central only momentarily, until January of 1810.

Junta Central: Between Absolutist and Representative State

Establishment of the Junta Central de España e Indias had transcendent consequences in Spain and America, for it created an ambient in which seeds of "liberalism" could flourish. In the tension between Junta Central and Junta de Sevilla, colonial policy would play an important role.

Miguel Artola has suggested that the initial session of the Junta Central at Aranjuez on 25 September 1808, was really a coup d'état ending Spain's old regime and introducing a Spanish form of liberalism. The Junta Central constituted "una institución que al atribuirse una soberanía nacional, creaba un Nuevo Estado Español."[40] And indeed it is difficult to escape the conclusion that in the effervescent political situation in the summer of 1808 after Bayonne, a significant mutation occurred in Spain's political process. Elements of that change had long been evident in the opposition to "poder omnimodo" of government ministers, on the one hand, and to the concentration of judicial, legislative, and executive powers in the Consejo de Castilla, on the other. A quickening interest in reviving the Cortes and establishing a written constitution of separation of powers, civil rights, and protection of a free press had been discernible since the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

The conjunction of these tendencies as a visible force on the Spanish political scene was mainly the consequence of the eclipse of traditional organs of authority after Bayonne. In rejecting dynastic substitution imposed by France, *fernandista* Spain lacked not only a visible executive but also the traditional apparatus of administrative, legislative, and judicial controls employed by the authorities at Madrid, and their provincial and colonial extensions. The solution to this problem had been suggested ambiguously, obliquely, even unintentionally by *fernandista* crisis managers when they insisted that only the Spanish nation convened in *cortes*, or a comparable representative body, could legitimate the abdication of the reigning dynasty. More ambiguous still was Fernando's alleged instruction that the Junta de Gobierno left behind in Madrid, or an *audiencia* or *chancillería* in unoccupied territory, call a *cortes* to select a regency. The failure of this trajectory and the consequent unexpected fragmentation of power among competing

provincial juntas exacerbated the constitutional crisis and would stimulate a national debate about the elements and instruments of national sovereignty.

Absent the established mechanisms of governance, surveillance, and censorship, the summer of 1808 witnessed an explosion of pamphlet literature, which brought public, virtually unfettered discussion of political issues hitherto limited to Spain's small, political, social, and economic elites. A central issue of the debates involved contrasting perceptions of the social contract, then assumed to bond ruler and subjects. At one extreme were divine-right absolutists who held that the contract by which the Spanish people had irrevocably surrendered their natural rights to the monarch continued in force during his exile, as did Spanish law and unwritten constitution: in short, Fernando remained king in all his power. A regency formed by existing authorities and according to existent law could only prosecute a war of resistance, postponing potential reform of abuses to the end of hostilities and the return of the exiled monarch.[41]

At the other end of the spectrum was a radical minority that claimed the Bourbons—by abdicating—had broken their contract with the Spanish people, who by recognizing Fernando as king, could now legitimately draft a new contract more in keeping with their interests.[42] Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas represented this point of view in the Junta Central, where he argued that Bayonne had broken with the structures and institutions of the old regime, that the people's recognition of Fernando VII after Bayonne was "como una nueva elección . . . no havía autoridad, no havía Código anterior que pudiese atar la voluntad nacional." In fact, by revalidating existing laws, the nation acted "sin despojarse de la facultad de abrogar las Leyes . . . que no fuesen conciliables con las mejoras concedidas por la razón ilustrada y con las que reclamava la condición civil y política del ciudadano."[43] Between such contrasting approaches fell a moderate and pragmatic range of opinion. Without assuming a formal break in the existing social contract, it preferred an interim representative government, empowered to conduct war and—a real breakthrough—convoke a *cortes* to create a constitution and elect a regency to function until the return of the exiled Fernando as constitutional monarch. To all sectors of public opinion, the concept of a *cortes*, although variously conceived, promised to sanction a legal authority in the crisis of the *monarquía*.

Bonaparte's design to substitute smoothly a presumably disgraced dynasty with another was metamorphosing into an unexpected design of a much modified structure of monarchy in Spain. In the political vacuum created at Bayonne, a war of opinion—ideated by Escoiquiz in 1794 and refashioned by crisis managers behind the Bayonne strategy to preserve the old

regime—escaped from the tutelage of the *fernandistas* and acquired a new and contradictory dimension: it became a dynamic of change. Public opinion was now a force to be reckoned with in prosecuting the war of resistance against France and in designing a domestic policy. However, leaders now emerging found no inconsistency in the new direction of events. Manuel José Quintana, editor of the *Semanario Patriótico* and the Junta Central's opinion molder, announced in early September 1808 in the initial issue of his periodical. "La opinión pública . . . es la que ha hecho nacer las circunstancias en que nos vemos los Españoles, la que derribó al Favorito . . . la que puso en el trono a un Príncipe idolatrado . . . la que ha producido los prodígios de valor que acaban de obrar nuestras provincias . . . [y] la que coronará nuestros esfuerzos con la independencia y soberanía que ibamos a perder, y ella en fin consolidará nuestra fortuna con una organizaación interior que nos ponga a cubierto por mucho tiempo de los males que hemos sufrido." Prematurely boastful, perhaps; in such auspicious circumstances, warranted.[44]

Despite the trauma of the Junta Central's birth, its hesitant and incomplete separation from the old regime and seemingly absurd formalities, it would survive long enough to lay the groundwork for a national *cortes*. It did not expire immediately—so Jovellanos hoped—"in the arms of the Cortes"[45] but constituted the major factor that made possible the Cortes that two years later convened in September 1810 and furnished its basic agenda. In retrospect—aside from its vicissitudes, shortcomings, and failures by early 1810, as well as those of the Cortes itself—by 1814 a liberal political sensibility had been fashioned in Spain.

By no means, however, was it the birth of liberalism in Spain. Rather, formation of the Junta Central represented a tentative and contradictory commencement of the struggle for a representative government immediately buffeted by conflicting interests. Among these, far more significant than has been recognized, were those associated with the colonies, interests that had played an essential role in its establishment and continued to affect its actions and collapse. In this regard it is relevant that the Cortes, to which the Junta Central would direct so much of its energy, would materialize fully nine months *after* the Junta had folded under the attacks of its opponents and given way to the regency desired by Spain's conservative elites, while liberal members of the Central were imprisoned or hounded out of Andalusia. Support for the Cortes coalesced at a moment of crisis caused by news that two important American colonies had rejected a *regencia* and opted for autonomy—to colonialists in the metropole, virtual independence. Strangely and contradictorily, liberalism in Spain was impelled and

repelled by the intractable colonial problem permeating and plaguing the politics of empire. The intersection of tradition, colonialism, and liberalism as a result of French radicalism and then Bonapartist expansionism is a salient feature of the crisis of Spain and its Atlantic empire in the first decade of the nineteenth century.

14. Junta Central: Ideologues and Ideology

Las Indias por su situación, estado, necesidades y relaciones han de hacer por fuerza el oficio de colonias con su matriz. Martín de Garay, "Apuntes sobre el papel de Casa Flores"

La locura de algunos pocos [aristócratas] sin talento aún para el manejo de sus caballererízas.
Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, *Representación . . . al Congreso nacional*

Y escrito está en el libro del destino, Que es libre la nación que quiere serlo.
Manuel José de Quintana, *Pelayo*

Dios le libre a usted de los extremos de reformas.
Gaspar de Jovellanos, "Carta a Antonio Ponz"

Although the conservative aspirations of the Junta de Sevilla and Consejo de Castilla concerning the new Junta Central would prove well founded, and Miguel Artola's assessment that it opened an era in Spanish history essentially correct, the social origins and outlook of the thirty-five men in this new sovereign body were hardly revolutionary or even antitraditional, and certainly not united in their political views. Most were figures of the nobility (five *grandes*, fifteen titled nobility, and four hidalgos), lawyers (eight), and clerics (six), and only one can be clearly identified as a member of the fourth estate.[1] The political experience and views of the members varied widely, from the long career of the aged conde de Floridablanca, now *presidente* of the Central until his death in December 1808, to the experience of Antonio Valdés and Gaspar de Jovellanos as state secretaries, and the career of Martín de Garay in provincial intendancies. Most, however, had limited experience in national affairs or even local leadership roles. None had served in a colonial administrative post; Valdés alone had experience in colonial administration but afar. Those who markedly influenced the decisions of

the Junta Central—Garay, Jovellanos, Valdés, Calvo de Rozas, and Quintana—came to their role and mildly heterodox opinions by different paths.

Garay and Valdés

Martín de Garay, *diputado* from Extremadura and then secretary-general of the Junta, played an early and decisive role, given the age and health of its *presidente*, Floridablanca.[2] In the course of a career in the army and as intendant in Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, Extremadura, and finally Murcia, Garay acquired a reputation as dedicated civil servant and advocate of the reform of municipal administration and taxation.

As a progressive army bureaucrat in a provincial post, Garay was dismayed by his country's escalating crisis. In early May 1808, when intendant of Extremadura, he welcomed General Solano's mobilization of military units in the wake of Madrid's Dos de Mayo and quickly backed the *fernandista* Junta de Badajoz, which sent him as a *diputado* to the Junta Central. Made the Central's secretary-general, Garay's "luces naturales, fácil despacho y práctica de negocios le dieron sumo poder e influjo en las deliberaciones de la junta" as Floridablanca's influence waned, so recalled Toreno.[3] More frustrated advocate of enlightened despotism than liberal in the current sense, Garay perceived in the Junta Central an opportunity to undertake reforms he had often proposed when serving in various intendancies. While insisting on the subordination of the provincial juntas to the Central, he urged them to collaborate by "proponer las mejoras de que sea susceptible cada ramo de los que componen el gobierno municipal, que por su variedad e incoherencia de principios, de reglas y aplicaciones, es un verdadero Proteo que muda de forma a cada paso." The provincial juntas should give particular attention to "las reformas más ventajosas sobre los propios y arbitrios, privilegios y exenciones de cada provincia que son más una carga verdadera para las vecinas que una franquicia en la que las goza," impeding the development of agriculture, industry, and trade. To remedy this situation, the juntas, he urged, should formulate "un plan uniforme de gobierno y de administración."[4]

Clearly Garay was primarily a reformer of civil administration, while his knowledge and interest in colonial affairs seems limited to their connection to the metropole's finances. Cognizant of the overall importance of the colonies to the metropole, as a confirmed colonialist he resisted any concession of autonomy in fiscal matters to the elites in the colonies, the "American Spaniards." "El mayor mal que podía hacerse a los americanos seria igualarlos con los españoles en los ramos de Real Hacienda," he would write years

later, still through a colonialist's prism in 1816, adding "alli no se conoce más que algunas rentas fundamentales indirectas todas . . . Los defectos que hay pertenecen a la conducta de los empleados que nunca puede ser muy pura en un país de mucho lujo y demás inmoralidad." Equality between metropole and colonies—then under consideration by the Central—"resultará una Monstruosidad política que jamás se haya visto en establecimientos ultramarinos antiguos ni modernos." His opposition was categorical: "Las Yndias por su situación, estado, necesidades y relaciones han de hacer por fuerza el oficio de colonias bajo del nombre de España Americana y no es posible humanamente identificar ni igualar a las colonias con su matriz."[5] The empire would have only a name change; there was no incompatibility between administrative reformer in the metropole and hard-line colonialist.

This hard-line approach appears at odds with the position of the Central in 1809 when Garay had to sign proclamations declaring Spain's overseas possessions no longer colonies and seemed to grant Españoles Americanos the same rights as those of Españoles Peninsulares. These manifestoes, however, were in fact written by Manuel José de Quintana, publicist and secretary of the Junta responsible for drafting its legislation. Quintana's influence on Garay at this time has been recognized, but its significance is not clear, nor was the political situation of the Junta Central as it confronted oncoming French troops and the challenge to its sovereignty posed by Juntas at Sevilla and Cadiz.

At an even darker moment for *fernandista* prospects when the French neared Sevilla late in 1808, Garay is credited with a plan to remove the Junta Central to an American colony—the Braganza option.[6] That possibility, never acceptable to most metropolitan policy makers, was eliminated when the Junta was replaced by the Regency, which, with the Junta de Cadiz, would determine colonial policy until the outbreak of revolt in the colonies and the convocation of a *cortes* in 1810. By then, however, the Junta Central had been terminated, and its leading members vilified, forced to take refuge elsewhere. Garay fled to Mallorca, where he remained until 1814 and the restoration of Fernando VII.

Once Fernando returned, Garay would serve as secretario de Hacienda, where he continued to push tax reform and his projected income tax. His erstwhile associate on the Junta Central, Quintana, and his recent biographer Dérozier accused him of a kind of opportunism and, worse, betrayal. From another perspective, rather than a disillusioned liberal or political chameleon, he remained a reform-minded military bureaucrat of Aragonese stamp of the old regime who kept a vision of controlled progress in the interest of metropole and empire. His experience centered him on metro-

politan reform to clear the path for economic growth and the colonialism he never questioned.

Another figure who had matured in the service of Charles III and would play a significant role in the Junta Central was Antonio Valdés y Fernández Bazán (1744–1816), *diputado* from the Junta de León to the Junta Central. Valdés could claim an Asturian lineage whose members had occupied prominent posts in the civil service and military.[7] His father, Fernando, had been an *asistente de Sevilla* and member of the Consejo de Hacienda. Antonio entered the royal navy in 1757, in 1762 participated in the defense of Havana against English amphibian forces and was taken prisoner by the English in 1763. In twenty years of active duty, he rose to increasing responsibility, becoming navy secretary in 1783. There, despite financial constraints, he managed to expand the naval forces, improve personnel, and decrease dependence on foreign suppliers for equipment.[8]

Perhaps because of his record in running a tight administration, on the death of Colonial Secretary José de Gálvez in 1787 Valdés was given one of the two secretariats into which Gálvez's post was now divided. Leaving the navy, he became colonial secretary responsible for overseas defense, finance, trade, and naval communications. With a zeal reminiscent of Esquilache's years under Charles III plus experience in naval posts, he undertook major reforms in colonial finance and the structure of colonial trade. At the outset, he demanded precise and regular information on colonial revenues, existing funds, and annual balances. "Es imposible," ran a decree of his ministry on 30 July 1787, "que por el Ministerio de Guerra y Hacienda de mi cargo pueden expedirse con el acierto correspondiente las debidas providencias en beneficio común de los vasallos de esos dominios y justo incremento del erario sin una exacta individual noticia de todos los productos de las rentas, cargas con que se halla y su líquido annual descontados los gastos."[9] Somewhat later, on 27 December 1787, he demanded quarterly reports from the Casa de Contratación at Sevilla on all aspects of colonial trade "para tener idea de la Balanza de comerecio de este Puerto con América." The reports had to indicate "la abundancia o escasez de los géneros y frutos de Europa, especialmente los nacionales y los de América, sus precios y demás que conduzca a este fin."[10] Other measures were designed to reorganize mercury distribution to colonial mining centers and to curtail the political influence of the Consulado de Cadiz by an inquiry into its lobbying fund. Such initiatives hardly won the Consulado's support, and it instructed its Madrid agent to keep in reserve four boxes of fine chocolate normally given influential civil servants at Christmas, which "recusó admitir el Exm. Sor. Don Antonio de Valdés." Valdés had made clear he was not for sale.[11]

Far more perturbing to traditional interest groups in the Cadiz-to-Veracruz trade were decrees of 1789 extending *comercio libre* to New Spain and Venezuela and—equally significant—appointment of activist, reform-minded viceroys, Francisco Gil y Lemos to Peru (1790), José de Ezpeleta to Nueva Granada (1789), and the conde de Revillagedo (1789) to the empire's key colony, New Spain. Valdés also sponsored Alejandro Malaspina's expedition to American waters partly to record hydrographic data, inquire about raw materials for the metropolitan economy, and generate information on colonial trade in general. To no small extent, that sponsorship was unfortunate for him. Undoubtedly it served those eager to remove him, Caballero, for example, and as a result Valdés resigned his secretariat in 1797, but not with royal disfavor. He did remain on the Consejo de Estado eventually retiring to his native Burgos; there he observed the political crisis brewing under Godoy and kept contact with similarly disaffected civil servants like his nephews Vicente de Eulate y Valdés, Cayetano Valdés, and José Ramirez.[12]

No doubt Valdés was au courant of the political instability at Madrid in March 1808, probably in contact with the duque del Infantado when he passed through Burgos on the way to his estates in Santander and thence to France. He hosted the Bourbons en route to Bayonne and tried to dissuade Fernando from crossing into France to meet Bonaparte. A letter of 19 April written by Valdés and Eulate suggests a plan of widespread insurrection against French occupation was well advanced and Burgos one of its command centers.[13]

After the Dos de Mayo at Madrid and the spread of insurrection, Valdés left Burgos on the pretense of joining the Assembly of Notables at Bayonne, really to go with Eulate to Palencia and then, joined by Ramirez, to León. There the provincial Junta de Castilla y León named him its *presidente*, declared its independence of the government at Madrid, and proceeded to request aid from England. The Junta de Castilla y León along with those of Asturias and Galicia favored a *junta central* over a regency, which opened a conflict between the Junta de Castilla and the captain general of Castilla, Gregorio de la Cuesta.[14] León's insistence on breaking with the still legitimate government at Madrid authorized by Fernando would also be the root of discord at Mexico City between autonomists and colonialists and the coup d'état against Viceroy Iturrigaray in September 1808. A regency at that initial stage of insurrection in Spain might have postponed the insurrection that erupted in New Spain two years later.

Cuesta, a determined regency advocate, accused the Junta de Castilla y León—accurately, in fact—of taking independent action in approaching

the English. On learning of the formation of the Junta Central, Cuesta appointed himself and Valdés *diputados* to the Central. This, however, Valdés rejected, asserting that the selection of *diputados* belonged to the Junta de Castilla over which *he* presided. In turn, Cuesta arrested and imprisoned Valdés and a fellow *diputado*, the conde de Quintanilla. What was at stake between Cuesta and Valdés was the omnipresent issue of how to preserve the Spanish Empire and its resources overseas. To Cuesta, the *fernandista* strategy of taking the road to Bayonne would fragment Spain and sever its colonies—the prediction of Urquijo—and this seemed imminent. To Valdés preservation of nation and empire demanded a major innovation, a consensus on the question of long-overdue reforms and redefinition of political power. Reconciling these two approaches would not come easily. The Junta Central brought charges against Cuesta in the fall of 1808; in retreating from Aranjuez, it brought along Cuesta under guard until reaching Mérida (Extremadura), where he was liberated by "demand of the populace" and appointed *capitán general* of Extremadura.[15]

Valdés—like Garay and Jovellanos—was product as well as agent of enlightened "ministerial despotism," whose supporters sought to weaken the barriers to effective change in the last decades of the reign of Charles III and even the initial years of Charles IV. Disillusioned with the possibility of viable reform within Spain's existing structures, Valdés had come to see the revival and enhancement of the *cortes* as *the* instrument of national consensus capable of instituting and sustaining a policy of national independence, development, and imperial consolidation. According to Toreno, Valdés believed the *cortes* alone could effect comprehensive reform such that—excluding the ecclesiastical establishment and the *monarquía* of Fernando VII—"no debería dejarse institucion alguna ni ramo de administración por reformar, por estar todos viciados y corrompidos."[16] If Valdés's objectives were in fact radical, the record suggests he was cautious in attaining them. For instance, in his public stance on the proposal of Calvo de Rozas in April 1809, Valdés like Jovellanos defined the task of the *cortes* not to create a new constitution—a reasonable proposal—but to revise the current institution. How else interpret "No me parece conveniente annunciarlo en estos términos, sino ceñirse a observar las Leyes fundamentales del Reino y corrgir los abusos."[17]

Committed to a *cortes*, Valdés accepted as well colonial representation in it. The colonial question was a prime consideration of Valdés in his decision to participate in the Junta Central, but not divorced in his view from other issues facing the Central. We have noted that, when colonial secretary Valdés had viewed peninsular economic development linked closely to

that of the colonies in America. To this end, reconciliation of colonial and metropolitan interests was essential to Spain's imperial future: *criollo* elites had to participate in the *monarquía*'s decision making. When in charge of colonial affairs Valdés had tried to restructure commercial relations between metropole and colonies by also creating new *consulados* overseas that incorporated landowners (many *criollos*) and merchants as members, by extending intercolonial exchanges and modifying commercial practices. Now, under pressure, he perceived an even greater challenge, political reform of the *monarquía* as a whole.

Gaspar de Jovellanos

If Garay projected the priorities of the former "Aragonese" or "military" faction of Aranda by supporting the Junta Central, Jovellanos, *diputado* from Asturias, brought to the new sovereign body the more cautious but no less committed approach to reform characteristic of the Catholic enlightenment that had emerged from the confrontation between reform and reaction under Esquilache in the first decade of the reign of Charles III.

In his liberalism as well as in his traditionalism, Jovellanos was the product of his Asturian heritage. Younger son in a large family of Gijón's lower gentry, like many Asturians of similar status Jovellanos initiated his career through networks, sponsorship of well-placed relatives, and subsequently the support of influential patrons. Among the first was Romualdo Velarde y Cienfuegos, bishop of Ávila and patronizer of young Asturians, who facilitated Jovellanos's entry into the Colegio Mayor de San Ildefonso at the University of Alcalá, then a center of the Spanish enlightenment. There he made lasting friendships, none more lasting than that of Juan Árias de Saavedra. On his way to take up a *canongíá doctoral* in the cathedral of Tuy (Galicia), Jovellanos passed through Madrid then coping with the *motín* against the reformist marqués de Esquilache. There young cleric Jovellanos, influenced by his friend Árias de Miranda and his cousins the marqueses de Casa Tremanes, turned from a religious vocation to become a civil servant. After a year's residence in Madrid in the critical aftermath of the *motín*, Jovellanos obtained a minor position in the Audiencia de Sevilla, subsequently rising to the position of its *alcalde del crimen*.

Jovellanos's ten years in the capital of Andalusia coincided with the unsettling intendancy of Aranda's protégé from Peru, Pablo de Olavide, whose aggressive program for improving agrarian, educational, and penal policy in a community of small landholders in the Sierra Morena ended in trial by the Inquisition in 1778. As a young lawyer Jovellanos admired

Olavide's sponsorship of the intellectual renaissance of Sevilla. But Olavide's fate was cautionary; Valdés neither testified in Olavide's behalf nor was present at the inquisitorial *autillo* at the trial's end. His Sevillan exposure seems to have confirmed his reluctance to endorse state intervention in agrarian reform exemplified by the unsuccessful Andalusian program managed by Olavide.[18] On the other hand, his own critical reaction to the backwardness and poverty, the mining complex, economic rigidities, and political impotence of his native Asturias predisposed him and other Asturians to somewhat progressive views. Much of his evolving liberal economic ideology—advocacy of deregulation to encourage individualism in economic development, which he coupled to political conservatism, and fear of radical, destabilizing government intervention joined to enduring faith in change through education—was confirmed and articulated as the result of his Andalusian years.

Called to Madrid in 1778 by fellow Asturian Pedro, conde de Campomanes, then at the apex of his civil service career, Jovellanos served first as an *alcalde de casa y corte* of the prestigious Consejo de Castilla and then *fiscal* of the Consejo de Órdenes while pursuing an active role in Madrid's royal academies, especially the influential Sociedad Matritense de Amigos del País. In Spain's era of good feeling under the Bourbons—the 1780s—he drafted lucidly written *informes* and *dictámenes* on economic and related issues, forming an oeuvre that enhanced his reputation among Spain's enlightened political and intellectual elites as exponent of a renovated "España Posible" achievable through compromise, social collaboration, and incremental reforms.

Yet despite distaste for political activism and preference for cautious adjustments, Jovellanos would be an early victim of the euphoric vision of Spain punctured in the early 1790s as the impact of revolution in France seeped through Spain. While working in his beloved Asturias on a commission of inquiry into the province's coal fields and on establishing a new Colegio de Órdenes, he learned of the arrest of friend, benefactor, and Madrid banker Francisco Cabarrús for undercover exports of silver. Obtaining quick authorization from another friend, naval secretary Antonio Valdés, to return to Madrid to support Cabarrús, he found Campomanes unwilling to help. True, Jovellanos had failed to obtain the placet of his superior, Antonio Porlier, in the Gracia y Justicia Ministry, where Jovellanos was assigned, and he had to return to Madrid; Porlier now commissioned him to establish a philanthropic institute back in Asturias.

After seven years managing the Instituto Asturiano for regional development, Jovellanos was returned to Madrid by chance—the unexpected

vagaries of a new political alignment. In the political climate there created by Spain's realignment with France of the Directoire in 1796 and then the ascendancy of General Napoleon Bonaparte, a rehabilitated French-born Cabarrús returned to favor. It was rumored that his influence was responsible for Jovellanos's appointment to head Gracia y Justicia; the circumstances of his appointment suggest that a shake-up of the cabinet—Francisco de Saavedra to Hacienda and then as first secretary (prime minister)—reflected the severe governmental financial crisis caused by the recent conflict with France and exacerbated by English efforts to block the flow of colonial silver from the colonies in the western Atlantic.

Two controversial measures were considered to resolve this situation. First was the temporary suspension of Spain's transatlantic trade legislation to permit neutral shipping from neutral ports to ship Spanish-owned cargo to the colonies in America, carrying back silver on government and private accounts. This *comercio neutro* phase began shortly after Saavedra's appointment to Hacienda. Next came a measure to improve government finance by selling selected ecclesiastical properties, the so-called *fondos pios* of public utility, with due compensation to the church corporations affected.[19] To be sure, during the eighteenth century the low productivity and often mismanagement of church-owned and leased rural holdings had drawn the attention of analysts of peninsular agriculture. During the war against France in 1794, the alienation of selected religious holdings was aired, reviewed in the summer of 1798 (wartime again, now against England) by a group headed by Francisco Cabarrús that included Saavedra, Jovellanos, and Urquijo, and enacted in a decree of 19 September. Although Saavedra and Jovellanos, both seriously ill, were not present, it seems reasonable to conclude that Jovellanos, whose influential, carefully scripted *Informe . . . en el expediente de reforma agraria* had just been distributed, was brought into the ministry on the assumption he might favor legislation selling some church holdings to peasant farmers. Large secular-owned estates were, of course, left unaffected.

Jovellanos's ill health and undisguised distaste for the political turmoil in Madrid ended his ministerial tenure—Goya's portrait probably tells it all—soon followed by his internal exile. José Antonio Caballero, his successor at Gracia y Justicia and defender of the dogma and material interests of the conservative not to say reactionary ecclesiastical establishment, was the prime agent of his exile in 1801 to Mallorca, where he was kept until the post-Aranjuez change of political climate. His exile left a lasting impression on this Asturian intellectual, reformist, and admirer of England's constitutional *monarquía*. Government service left him disillusioned: "La repug-

nancia natural e invincible que siempre he tenido a todo lo que es mando o gobierno" was confirmed, he later confessed, by "el doloroso escarmiento con que fué castigada la única condescendencia que tuve para admitir alguna parte en él."[20]

Associated with nascent liberalism in politics, Jovellanos has also been ranked as an economic "post-mercantilist" and political "progressive traditionalist."[21] The difficulty in categorizing his positions suggests the transitional and contradictory currents of his era as well as the special impress of his Asturian background. Familiarized at the university at Alcalá with enlightenment in France, at Sevilla he studied English and contemporary English political thought, read Adam Smith, and worked out his physiocratic view of an improved and "liberated" agriculture as the basis of national prosperity. He incorporated Smith's definition of national wealth as the product of skilled labor and commercial expertise. While accepting laissez-faire as the driving force behind individual initiative, however, he was cautious to the point of contradiction in applying new currents to the peculiarities of Spain's agrarian economy. In Asturias he observed how even modest inflows of silver remitted from the American colonies by emigrant Asturians, or invested by returning *indianos*, were a major factor in the inflation of land prices and multiplication of entailments (*mayorazgos*), without raising productivity in the metropole. As he explained, "El primer objeto de estos indianos es arraigarse comprando tierras, labrando casas, fundando patrimmonio y ligando a una vinculación perpétua los frutos de su trabajo." He had to add that in those rare instances where some petty tradesmen managed to accumulate a small capital by trade, "no conocen mejor empleo de su fortuna; todo el mundo se mete a terrazguero, profesión, si no es más útil, por lo menos el más dulce y cómoda de cuantas se conocen."[22] Typically he cautioned against the abolition of *mayorazgos* in no small measure because of possible impact on the Spanish nobility and the petty bourgeoisie's striving for status. "Bella idea si se pudiera realizaar, si no la resistiera nuestra venerable constitución, sin una libertad ilimitada y repentina estuviese sujeta a iguales inconvenientes, si en los mayorazgos no se cifrase un sólido apoyo de la nobleza monárquica, un saludable estímulo al afán y a la industria de los que aspiran a ella, y un irrefregable testimonio de la protección que ha concedido las leyes a la libertad del aplicado e industrioso ciudadano." And he closed with his ever cautious approach to change: "Dios le libre a usted de los extremos en materia de reformas!"[23]

Let's step back for a moment. By the late 1789s Jovellanos had a distinguished record as civil servant, literary figure, and political economist of sorts—certainly enough to qualify as a member of the government's

development bureau, the Junta de Crédito y Comercio. His grasp of the imperial economy was competent; his knowledge—and admiration—of England was considerable; and his interest in Asturias's underdevelopment vis-à-vis England sensitized him to the volume of national manufactures in England's exports. Floridablanca's administration had hoped to present to European critics a Spanish economy growing rather than stagnating; this is why *comercio libre* of 1778 and of 1789 were designed to enlarge colonial outlets for Spanish products and why, in the published statistics of Spain's exports to the colonies in the late 1780s, the percentage of "national" goods seems exaggerated, given the state of metropolitan manufactures. Since imports of foreign-made textiles—French, English, Silesian, and Genoese—were largely reexported to America, the Junta de Moneda y Crédito had to justify their legal status in Spain's transatlantic, "regulated" trade. This clarifies why Jovellanos tried to reconcile the irreconcilable in his *dictamen* on the "export of foreign woolens to our colonies." If his logic seems convoluted, the goal is clear—somehow such reexports had to be justified.

Nowhere were constraints of family connection, regional identity, career associations, and traditional concepts more evident than in Jovellanos's perception of the relation between Spain and its overseas empire. A product of marginal Cantabrian Spain, its underdevelopment, isolation from the centers of power, and dependence on those centers for the survival kits of civil service employment and economic opportunity in metropole and colonies, Jovellanos accepted existing imperial arrangements, tailoring his nationalist position to the existing structures of the empire: an essentially agrarian metropolitan economy lacking an exportable volume of domestic manufactures, exploiting its colonies by monopolizing their external trade. This was proving to be a dysfunctional colonial compact and a nationalist's dilemma.

Consistent with his physiocratic emphasis on agriculture as the foundation of demographic growth, commerce, and industry, Jovellanos envisioned a logical progression from productive agriculture to prospering manufacture and growing domestic demand.[24] Small-scale cottage industry, not large manufacturies, would minimize class conflict, an approach he shared with Campomanes. Once these phases of growth unfolded, the colonies could fulfill their primary function as protected outlet for the output of the metropole and source of its raw materials. Only then might domestic production seek foreign markets. In his own words, "El primer objeto de la industria de una nación es surtirse a sí misma, el segundo, formar sobrantes para surtir a sus colonias ultramarinas, y el tercero multiplicar estos sobrantes buscando su consumo en cualquiera parte del mundo."[25] As two corollaries of his conception of Spain's colonial compact, Jovellanos postulated

that a nation of inadequate manufacturing capacity did not need colonies, and therefore they could not promote Spain's woolen manufacture. "Si se supone una nación cuya industria esté al nivel de sus necesidades y no tenga sobrante alguno, ciertamente que esta nación no necesitará colonias, a lo menos para este primer objeto . . . de nada la sirvan las Américas para fomentar las manufacrturas de paños, mientras los productos de este ramo de industria no suban sobre la cantidad necesaria para su consumo interior." He went one step further, arguing that without an exportable volume of domestic woolen goods, there was no justification for preserving a monopoly of colonial markets. Otherwise, smuggling by more developed European economies would capture the distant colonial market.[26]

Jovellanos's solution to this nationalist dilemma was pragmatic: turn a metropolitan shortcoming into a source of revenue for government and the private sector. Simply label reexports "national" and assign duty to them accordingly. In reality, this was the policy tolerated under Floridablanca in the 1780s. Again, in Jovellanos's words: "Cuando una metrópoli no tiene en la industria nacional o en algun ramo de ella sobrantes con que abastecer las colonias, la buena economía quiere que las abastezca con productos extrangeros para asegurarse de su comercio exclusivo . . . debe contentarse con un comercio de economía . . . siempre para ella de considerable utilidad, porque sobre los derechos que adeuda el género extrangero a la entrada, sobre las comisiones, almacenajes y conducciones que paga hasta los puertos de salida, contribuye a su majestad los derechos de ésta y los de entrada en los puertos de las colonias, y éstas son propiamente ganancias nacionales, y mantienen un muchedumbre de manos intermedias, indispensables en esta especie de comercio."[27] This reasoning justified maintaining Spain's peculiar colonial compact.

Jovellanos took pains to reconcile this apparent deviation with his original premise. "Los productos de la industria extrangera, una vez admitidos entre nosotros, deberian reputarse como nacionales, no solo porque están en manos españolas, sobre las cuales, y no sobre las del extrangero, recaen los ulteriores gravámenes que se les impongan, sino porque representan aquel deficit del sobrante de nuestra industria que necesitamos para completar el surtimiento de las colonias."[28] Necessity if not theory dictated that Spain sacrifice "las primeras ganancias industriales" for "todas las gracias mercantiles . . . hasta que llega a las del último consumidor."[29]

To counter objections to his recommended dependence on foreign textile manufactures to supply Spain's colonial demand, Jovellanos insisted his solution would not "favorecer lc concurrencia de los psaños extrangeros con los nuestros, porque siempre estará en nuestra mano gravar a aquellos hasta

hallar un nivel favorable a estos."[30] Every nation used protective tariffs, he noted, to encourage domestic industry, but he warned that customs duties beyond this legitimate purpose would invite smuggling. The prevalence of non-Spanish goods in the colonies, after all, could only be explained by smugglers attracted by price differentials due to unnecessary government imposts rather than by peninsular producers marketing foreign goods labeled as their own manufacture. Who could believe they would resort to "un fraude que hubiera frustrado el consumo de sus propios paños" or that—if national products were unsalable—a Spanish manufacturer "aventurase el consumo de los productos de su industria para facilitar él de la extrangera?" And if merchants proved to be smugglers, "cual es la causa que los impelió a buscar por medio de un fraude los géneros extrangeros, caros y arriesgados, y dejar los nacionales, baratos, lícitos y favorecidos con tantas exenciones y franquicias?"[31] To eliminate legal distinctions between national and foreign products, Jovellanos would abolish resort to marks (*contramarcas*) on national products on the ground they represented an added onus to the domestic producer, whom Jovellanos presumed to be an artisan in a cottage industry who lost time and money in costly formalities.[32]

In claiming his "system" would not inhibit domestic manufactures, Jovellanos not only ignored his earlier assumption that Spanish-made goods could not compete quality- or cost-wise with foreign products in the colonial marketplace; he also overlooked that profits in non-Spanish exports to the colonies far exceeded those earned in handling domestic items, whether in the metropole or colonies. Balancing foreign with domestic manufactures in Spain would inhibit domestic production. There was another consideration: protective tariffs invited fraud in the form of smuggling; this, he interpreted as the negation of enlightened self-interest. This position was entirely congruent with that of merchants in the Consulado at Cadiz, entrepôt of Spain's colonial trade.

To be sure, this pragmatic loosening of his country's colonial trade system to meet Spain's peculiar role as economic dependent of Europe's more developed economies and colonial power had been earlier articulated by Jovellanos, apropos another textile import, fine muslins used in *mantilla* production for a luxury market. Prohibition was ineffective: the country lacked a cotton manufacture and "sería empeño ridículo querer trasplantar entre nosotros las industrias del Oriente . . . que ha negado la providencia a esta parte del mundo." Providence—and muslin imports—drew to the metropole "esos ríos de plata . . . desde los montes de América." To capture the gains of this trade, he then proposed a chartered company to trade directly with Asian producers, what in fact became the Compañía de Filipi-

nas. Between the handling of muslin and later woolen imports, Jovellanos's economic vision did not change; he would shape old structures to meet current pressures. More to the point: he chose *not* to ask why protection would not produce the industrial capacity required.

A comparable vision appears in Jovellanos's approach to the structure of Spanish politics. The English model seemed compatible with Spain's heritage: in the old and largely ceremonial *cortes* he found an institution comparable to the English Parliament that he interpreted as representing the nation as a whole. This option—a somewhat expanded legislative body of the *monarquía*—was what he envisioned in 1780 when he analyzed the country's political structures to identify what might be modified to meet changing conditions in the Atlantic world.[33] There was no vision of a democratic revolution in his *Weltanschauung*.

Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas

Calvo de Rozas, a consistent liberal in the Junta Central and active protagonist of a *cortes*, constitution, and especially freedom of the press—consequently, a major target of the traditionalist opposition—reached the Central at Aranjuez as a *diputado* from Aragon. Aragonese by neither birth, family, nor career, he owed his selection to the influence of Juan Rebolledo de Palafox and the *fernandista* faction.[34] When Palafox fled Bayonne in late May to initiate insurgency in Aragon and was chosen captain general, he appointed Calvo de Rozas interim intendant of Aragon and secretary of the Cortes of Aragon, convened briefly by Palafox to elect a provisional junta. In August, Palafox picked Calvo de Rozas, his brother Francisco de Palafox, and the conde de Sástago to represent the province in the Junta Central.[35]

The paradox of Calvo's association with the aristocratic, conservative Aragonese faction and his subsequent role as vanguard of liberalism in the Junta Central has no easy explanation.[36] Calvo's career to that point scarcely prepared him to be a client of the Palafox family. He was born in Ranero (Valley of Carranza), part of the Encartaciones de Vizcaya, in 1773, where his father was *síndico procurador*; Ramón—brother and lawyer—was on the Audiencia and later the Junta de Valencia.[37] The brothers were not unique in leaving the valley for government and trade.[38] Notable among the emigrants from Ranero were two wealthy Mexico City *almaceneros*. Juan de Guardamino and Lorenzo Angulo de Guardamino, Calvo de Rozas's godfather and an *almacenero* whom Viceroy Revillagigedo consulted about the impact of *comercio libre*.[39]

Although we have few data on Calvo de Rozas's business career, he

could describe himself in 1804 with obvious justification as a "respectable merchant"—respectable enough to be director of the Sociedad de Comerciantes de Madrid formed under Charles IV to supply grain to Castilla la Nueva during the 1802 subsistence shortage.[40] Then the Junta de Moneda y Crédito asked him to help draft "el plan y regla baxo los quales debía formarse un consulado general en Madrid." A shareholder in the Banco Nacional, he was designated along with Manuel García de Herreros to review the bank's "operaciones, vicios o males" and recommend administrative reforms.[41] By the early 1800s he was a well-known merchant enjoying the confidence of reform-minded civil servants at the capital and a consultant on trade and financial policy.

In probing the origin of Calvo's economic and political views, it is noteworthy that his career coincided with the rise of two other *encartados* from the Carranza area, Juan Francisco de los Heros y Herrán (conde de Montarco) and Manuel de Negrete y de la Torre (conde de Campo Alange). Montarco was nephew and protégé of Juan Antonio de los Heros y Fernández de la Sierra, who amassed a fortune trading with several American colonies and became a director of the influential Cinco Gremios Mayores de Madrid and a founder of both the Sociedad Vascongada de Amigos del País and Madrid's Real Sociedad Económica.[42]

In two treatises on the trade and industry of Spain in 1775 that were later published in the *Semanario erudito de Valadares* in 1790, there is a source of Calvo's outlook on his country's commercial practices. From a vantage point, so to speak, in Spain's transatlantic commercial world, Juan Antonio de los Heros y Fernandez de la Sierra was critical of its oligopoly and uncompetitive performance. In advocating a *consulado general* at the capital to coordinate and oversee national trade practice and policy, he stressed the training of young men in the theory, politics, and practice of trade.[43] Commissioned by the Junta de Moneda y Crédito to examine Aragon's bankrupt Real Compañía de Comercio y Fabricas, Juan Antonio went to Zaragoza, where he concluded that the company, like others, had failed because of inadequate know-how, particularly lack of market orientation, inflexible pricing policy, and excessive expenditure on materials and salaries.[44]

Calvo was undoubtedly aware of the career of his countryman and far more influential nephew, Juan Francisco Antonio de los Heros y Herrán, a *fiscal* of the Junta de Comercio y Moneda in 1784 and the Consejo de Hacienda in 1785. Conde de Montarco as of 1789 and *consejero* of the Consejo de Estado in 1795, he was briefly *gobernador* of the Consejo de Castilla in 1804.[45] Calvo's trajectory as merchant and government consultant along with references to his reports suggest he was influenced by the example and

writing of Juan Antonio Fernández de los Heros and favored by the patronage of the conde de Montarco.

In the course of his military provisioning operations Calvo probably purchased from Luis Rebolledo de Palafox y Melci (marqués de Lazán) a permit for imported grain. He dated his association with the elder of the Palafox brothers to 1798 when he alluded in 1811 to "las pruebas no interrumpidas de estimación que le he dado en el espacio de trece años," intimating a mutual relationship that may have involved the merchant's economic services and the trust of José de Palafox in Calvo's "conocimientos" and "probidad incorruptible."[46] A personal attachment is also implied in a reference to Calvo in 1808 as "el mayor y más verdadero amigo que tengo, y que de su talento hay muy pocos que le aventajen."[47]

It would seem that, in Madrid's ambient of political and ideological flux and social mobility in the 1790s, the ambitious Madrid merchant and the aspiring young Aragonese army officer shared a friendship based on more than mutual interest. Possibly key to the relationship between Palafox and Calvo was Basilio Boggiero, an Escolapian cleric believed to have had a formative effect on the Palafox brothers and who, as a matter of fact, accompanied them to Madrid. A cosmopolitan cleric, Boggiero apparently imparted in his young charges not only pride in their forbears' military and political activities but in addition some concepts prevailing in the stimulating ambient of Zaragoza in the 1780s, the heyday of the city's Sociedad Económica. The stimulus provided by Aragon's Real Compañía de Comercio and the expansion of transatlantic trade under Charles III whetted the aspirations of fresh bourgeois elements, as well as those of the established landholding elites, for regional development and the benefits of colonial trade. Boggiero's preoccupation with Spain's colonial possibilities was a reflection of these heightened economic expectations; the colonial interest was based on the return of his nephew, Andrés de Boggiero, from colonial service as *gobernador militar* in the Audiencia de Charcas (then Upper Peru). No surprise, then, that among the issues reviewed by the short-lived local "Cortes" of Aragon convened by José Palafox early in June of 1808 and inserted in its agenda by Calvo and Boggiero was the promotion of their province in the empire's transatlantic trades. Thus, a shared interest in the future of Spain's *monarquía*, empire, and Aragon may have joined Calvo de Rozas and José de Palafox well before 1808.[48]

After the Dos de Mayo, Calvo shipped his family to Zaragoza and then joined it in late May. He was quickly appointed intendant and secretary of the hastily assembled Cortes of Aragon by Palafox, now Aragon's captain general. Calvo was then chosen with Francisco de Palafox and the conde de

Sástago as Aragon's *diputados* to a Junta Central Suprema in mid-August; Palafox's influence and perhaps Calvo's expertise in military procurement may have led to Sástago's elimination when Aragon's *diputados* had to be cut to two, to Sástago's irritation. Sástago wanted no Junta Central but a far more elitist regency.[49]

Undoubtedly the radical approach of Calvo, Sástago's fellow *diputado* for Aragon, was behind Sástago's condemnation of the Central. Calling for a *cortes*, Calvo asserted that the treaties of Bayonne signed by the Bourbons had dissolved all prior contract between monarch and nation and, consequently, "no havía autoridad, no havia código anterior que pudiese atar la voluntad nacional." In any case, if existing law had in fact been revalidated, Calvo reasoned it was "sin despojarse de la facultad de abrogar leyes . . . que no fuesen conciliables con las mejoras concedidas por la razón ilustrada y con las que reclamava la condición civil y política del Ciudadano."[50]

Oddly, there is little evidence of Calvo's radicalism before the formation of the Junta Central. Contemporaries like Toreno, and even those of liberal views, would later recall him as a real maverick—"hombre de áspera y enérgica condición . . . encarnaba en su pecho, con apariencia de tibio, el entusiasmo y fervor de un alma impetuosa y ardiente."[51] Conservative Alcalá Galiano was more explicit and far less charitable—Calvo was, after all, a merchant: "Se había dado a conocer por lo atrevido de sus proposiciones y allegandose a los que pedían reformas y Cortes, más por su instinto revolucionario que por tener él hasta allí ideas fijas sobre tales puntos, siendo persona de cortísimo saber y criada para la profesión de comerciante."[52]

Perhaps Calvo's emergence as champion of a *cortes* representing the whole nation and its colonies, a free press, and of a new constitution responded to his growing frustration with military defeats that he could trace to intense regional rivalry, factional intrigue, profound dissatisfaction with the government and society of Spain's old regime, and his interaction with other members of the Junta Central, especially Garay, Jovellanos, and Quintana. Despite his connection to the Palafoxes, Calvo quickly joined Garay in criticizing the *grandes*. As early as November 1808, Calvo joined Garay in castigating the pillars of the old regime—aristocracy and clergy—for refusing to share the financial costs of defense against occupying forces.[53] Later, in analyzing the collapse of the Junta Central and its sequel, revolt in the American colonies, Calvo excoriated the role of the aristocracy in the two-year crisis of 1808–1810. While distant causes of the Central's collapse had sapped Spain for more than three centuries coupled to the recent "explosión en las colonias con otros muchos males que ahora no se tocan, y el tiempo si Dios no lo remedia irá desencadenando," it had been left to the "locura

de algunos pocos sin talento aún para el manejo de sus caballerizas . . . la temeridad [de] sujetar en sus manos enerbadas y flacas . . . los terribles embates del timón del navío en medio de la tormenta" and to rebuild their own fortunes on the ruins of the nation.[54] Was Alcalá Galiano here dismissing Calvo as a merchant representing a small segment of a small bourgeoisie?

Manuel José Quintana

A full generation younger than Garay, Valdés, or Jovellanos, who had made their careers during the decades of Charles III, Manuel José Quintana, secretary and publicist of the Junta Central, made his later, in the reign of Charles IV, in an ambient of conflict and crisis that abruptly ended the so-called euphoria of the late 1780s.[55] Witness and actor in the crisis-ridden years of Godoy's ascendancy, Quintana the poet, like Calvo the merchant, was prepared in 1808 to seize the opportunity to put into practice ideas nurtured by his and the previous generation over decades of frustrated expectations. Minor figures until 1808, each assumed a role in the new central government through personality, ability to articulate concepts, and personal connections. Calvo as protégé of José de Palafox, Quintana as friend of Jovellanos and Garay, and Quintana through literary skills, and Calvo through "entusiasmo y fervor," as Toreno etched them, would have catalytic roles in the political developments of the conjunctural crisis of that moment.

Quintana (1772–1857), elder son of a lawyer trained at Salamanca and subsequently attached to the Consejo de Castilla and Consejo de Órdenes, followed his father to study law at Salamanca. There, influenced by progressives of the stature of Meléndez Valdés, Jovellanos, José Cadalso, and Pedro Estala, he absorbed contemporary European intellectual currents that he combined with wide reading in the European classics and Spanish literature. In 1796 he was *fiscal substituto* of the Junta de Comercio, Moneda y Minas—the late Bourbon government body that employed so many talented Spaniards—a post he held until 1808; at the same time he pursued an avocation of dramatist, poet, and sometime government censor of the theater. Along with his generation whose early enthusiasm for French political ideology turned to fear at the meteoric rise of General Bonaparte, Quintana turned to poetry and drama as a form of political protest against external threat and internal paralysis gripping Spain. As dramatist he was inspired by Vittorio Alfieri, whose message urged "les hommes doivent apprendre au théâtre a être libres, forts, généreux, pleins d'exaltation pour la véritable vertu, incapables de supporter quelque violence que se soit, ar-

dients patriotes, véritables connaisseurs de leurs propres droits."[56] Such a heroic figure, eager to join the struggle of liberty against tyranny, was the leitmotif of Quintana's five-act tragedy, *Pelayo*, in which Spain's legendary protagonist of resistance to Moorish occupation was given vibrant contemporary significance by the popular actor Isidro Máiquez in Madrid and the provinces after its first performance in 1805.[57] In 1797, well before the success of *Pelayo*, Quintana had expressed the same message in an unpublished ode to another resistance figure, Juan Padilla, the heroic *comunero* defender of local rule against Hapsburg and foreign rule in the 1520s whom Quintana gave poetic resurrection "exalter la liberté et le droit sacre qu'à l'humanité de prétendre."[58]

After the coup at Aranjuez, Quintana's two poems of resistance to French occupation, "À España en Abril de 1808" and "À las provincias españolas armadas contra los Franceses," were published in a widely circulated pamphlet, *España libre*. Then in August the government press published his *Poesías patrióticas* which included the two poems and the ode to the legendary Padilla. Quintana was already the bard of Spanish resistance. In late September when the Junta Central had to formulate its position to the nation, a patriotic Quintana at Madrid had the prestige to urge his friends on the Central to forgo the dry ministerial language of the past in favor of a direct appeal to all Spaniards.[59] Garay welcomed his patriotic appeal and Quintana, still without official status as Junta member, used his talent to create the Junta Central's first eloquent manifestoes to Spain, Europe, and Spanish America. However, not until the following January, after military defeats and the ongoing political crisis, was Quintana appointed the Junta's secretary and *oficial mayor* with responsibility for drafting decrees, coordinating its committees, and monitoring relations with provincial juntas. It was obviously a position of great responsibility and political leverage that Quintana proceeded to develop.[60]

As Junta publicist and information officer, Quintana hoped to transform the *fernandista* aspiration of a restored old regime—the Spain Europe's elites had scorned—into a nationwide movement to end decline and widespread poverty. As he phrased his vision, "No quería . . . que ella siguiese siendo víctima de una arbitrariedad ciega que por más de tres siglos la estaba consumiendo . . . que un pueblo destinado por su situación, si no a ser el primero de Europa, por lo menos el más independiente y el más rico . . . no quería en fin que siguiesen por más tiempo influyendo tristemente en nosotros las leyes, las costumbres, las instituciones . . . que a tal estado nos habían conducido. Y que nos habían hecho la irrisión de todas las naciones ilustradas." He emphasized, however, like other Spanish progressives, that

change could be controlled, that the national "regeneration" his manifestos outlined would avoid the recent internal dissidence and violence of France "whose ill success must be an object lesson to even the most daring" and which had led him to moderate his own vision. Abandoning those "deseos esteriles y ilusiones imposibles" widespread in 1807 and 1808, he played a prominent role in the newly liberated press as editor, with José Blanco y Crespo, of the Junta's official voice, the *Semanario Patriótico*.

The basic elements of Spain's protoliberal "revolución" were spelled out in the *Semanario* over the weeks preceding the first gathering of the Junta Central at Aranjuez on 24 September. In the Junta's prospectus, Quintana and Blanco emphasized a liberated press guiding public opinion to secure independence, liberty, and structural change such that "nos ponga a cubierto por mucho tiempo de los males que hemos sufrido." To achieve these ends, the editors proposed the formation of a central government appointed by the nation's *diputados* assembled in a general *cortes*. The *Semanario*, however, was careful not to distance itself from traditional governing authorities; it praised the Consejo de Castilla for refusing to publish or circulate the Bayonne constitution, and its decision to support the Junta Central. Accordingly it applauded Pérez Villamil's position that "todo poder constitucional emana del pueblo," while rejecting his view that provincial juntas were illegitimate—because the *populacho* had participated, and that the traditional *cortes* structure be kept, but only to elect a regency. The *Semanario* proposed that the new, more representative *cortes* not disperse until it had framed a new constitution, law and commercial codes, a system of taxation, and a plan for public education. There was no reference to change in land tenure or agrarian reform.

On the other hand, the first issues of the *Semanario* brought up the colonial question. In fact, the first issue affirmed the importance of the colonies by asking "si es verdad que la peninsula florecía principalmente por las Americas, quien podrá calcular el grado de esplendor a que va a llegar? Qué comercio más brillanate que él de España? Aquellas ricas colonias ya están eternamente identificadas con la metrópoli, y la extensión y brío que tomará en breve nuestro comercio resuscitarán más gloriosa nuestra marina, enteramente destruida por la amistad de los Franceses." Such was the promise of an alliance with England. To achieve this, a central authority was essential, otherwise the claim of sovereignty by provincial juntas would bring "the ruin of the nation." Citing the bishop of Orense, Quintana and Blanco warned of the vulnerability of the colonies and the virtual impossibility of protecting them.[61]

Perhaps such concerns led the editors to publish a statement by the

brother of French-born General Santiago Liniers, the viceroy who had organized the resistance to English amphibious forces at Buenos Aires in 1807. Applauding the *fernandista* opposition to the French occupying forces in the peninsula, Liniers appeared to suggest that the relationship between the projected new governing body in the metropole and the American colonies be based on physiocratic principles and reciprocal interests. He praised the "sabio Reglamento de comercio libre" because it had saved "enteramente la humanidad de aquella distante región, dando valor a sus abundantes producciones [y] nos hizo dejar tranquilos a los Indios y convidarlos a disfrutar de su cornucopia de abundancia" until recently denied them by the "vergonzoso monopolio de la contratación de Cadiz."[62]

Quintana's grasp of colonial issues was vague when he joined the Junta Central. From the decades of enlightenment in Bourbon Spain he inherited the belief that Spain might reach parity with other European powers by pulling its colonial bootstraps—his concept of the unity of the empire. "La idea de poder y preeminencia metropolitana no vacila en el pensamiento de Quintana, como tampoco su clara idea de la unidad."[63] He was deeply influenced by the reaction of Spanish intellectuals to Raynal's criticism; but unlike *fernandistas* like Escoiquiz and others who accused Raynal of denigrating Spain's colonial record, Quintana sided with the neo-Lascasianos, who, in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, viewed the exploitation of native peoples and blacks as one aspect of Spain's economic, social, and political backwardness to be addressed in rejecting the *ancien régime*.[64]

Junta Central: Between Traditionalism and Liberalism

Jovellanos, Garay, and Valdés—despite varying origins, experience, views, and visions—came to the Junta Central with established reputation and predictable performance that promised they would not overstep the bounds of calculated prudence. They were part of a small coterie of bureaucrat-intellectuals, the *proyectistas* of the eighteenth century and, after about 1780, reformers. Predictably cautious were other *junteros*. Pedro Cevallos (Estado), charged with overseeing essential government functions, cooperated with Godoy, would serve as prime minister under Fernando VII and—briefly—José I until he published at the end of August his detailed denunciation of Bonaparte, and encouraged Spain's insurgents to resist French occupation. Antonio Cornel had been war secretary (1799–1800); José Escaño made his career in the navy, participated in Godoy's Almirantazgo of 1807, and was on the aborted alternate Junta de Gobierno that Fernando appointed before leaving for Bayonne. Benito Hermida (Gracia y Justicia) had been on

the Consejo de Castilla, retiring (ostensibly for reasons of health) to Zaragoza, where he translated Milton's *Paradise Lost* and mediated on restructuring the *cortes*.[65] Saavedra (Hacienda) had been "Caracas's" intendant, then in charge of both Hacienda and Estado in the two crisis years of 1798 and 1799. Simultaneously finance minister under the Central and *presidente* of the hidebound Junta de Sevilla, Saavedra represented expertise in the all-important colonial issues and acceptance by Sevilla (and, of course, Cadiz). Most legitimating was the Junta Central's *presidente*, the prestigious conde de Floridablanca, Charles III's prime minister (1778–1789), and Murcia's *diputado* to the Central, whose leadership conferred upon the new government an aura of administrative continuity and stability.

Among this coterie of administrative and well-born respectability, Calvo and Quintana, businessman and poet-journalist respectively, would become exceptional figures whose "temeridad y ilusión" led even friends to label them "imprudentes."[66] The courage behind their "imprudence" and literary skill moved the Junta Central forward rather than backward at critical junctures. Rather than leverage by this small and ill-defined minority, however, it was the nature of the crises confronted that impelled the Junta Central to adopt hesitantly progressive, liberal reforms in 1808 or 1809.

On reflection, the emergence of liberalism in Spain after Bayonne seems predictable.[67] To be sure, within the old regime elements of critical thought laced the *informes*, *dictámenes*, and *consultas* of civil servants at home and in the colonies, and some *proyectista* manuscripts did appear in print. With the collapse of constituted authorities in 1808 liberal currents became a visible, then viable, force. England's aristocratic parliamentarianism and French constitutionalism shaped by Montesquieu attracted Spain's titled nobility, gentry, and small bourgeoisie from whom were recruited high civil servants. Violence accompanying revolutionary change in France dampened the enthusiasm of many who had found in its initial phases a model of political change. Hesitant, often contradictory vagaries of policy after 1789 and particularly after 1797 alienated many among the political class, no matter their political orientation. Many of Godoy's critics, whom he often exiled to the provinces—a venerable procedure—attributed the failure of reformist initiatives to *his* personal ineptitude and resort to ministerial despotism, rather than the intrinsic shortcomings of the old regime itself and its exposure to the transatlantic polity of an era of profound international instability.[68]

Among critics, the idea of resurrecting and restructuring the traditional *cortes* exercised a profound, almost magical attraction. From the 1780s onward, isolated voices—of Jovellanos, León de Arroyal, José Marchena, and others—advocated reform of traditional institutions as a necessary adjunct,

if not precondition, of economic and social change.[69] For instance, Francisco Martínez Marina probed Spain's constitutional heritage with the undeclared but clear aim to find political explanations *and* solutions of contemporary issues. Protégé of Jovellanos and Campomanos, Martínez Marina presented a treatise on the *cortes* to the Real Academia de Historia—he was the director, 1801–1804. Although the censors—Pérez Villamil happened to be one—considered his work too politically sensitive for publication at a time when a reedition (1805) of the *Novíssima Recopilación de las Leyes de Castilla* had simply omitted any reference to the convocation of a *cortes*, it was published in the *appertura* of late 1808 along with Marina's *Carta sobre la antigua costumbre de convocar las Cortes de Casstilla para resolver los negocios graves del Reino*.[70] It was the grave constitutional crisis precipitated by the abdications of Charles IV and Fernando VII at Bayonne that opened the issue of constitutional reform to general debate in a literal explosion of pamphlet literature.

Not the appearance of a new political perspective alone, however, moved the Junta Central to consider a controversial political innovation. Rather, a succession of military defeats by French occupying forces grafted to political divisions and reports of colonial unrest provided the immediate incentive for the activism of Quintana and Calvo de Rozas between the fall of 1808 and the winter of 1809. The remedy for provincial rivalry and internal division in metropole and colonies appeared to be a government in Spain truly representing those challenged to bear the burden of resistance to occupation—all the people. Not only the desirability but sheer necessity of a resurrected and refashioned *cortes* where they would be represented offered the hope and expectation of solving the immediate political crisis, its causes, and uncertain consequences. This project became the central focus as well as bitter source of friction during the Junta Central's stormy fifteen-month existence.

As of late September 1808, few were the signs of the direction events would take. Victory at Bailén and the withdrawal of José I's government from Madrid generated the conviction that victory was near.[71] For most gathering at Aranjuez under *presidente* Floridablanca, structural continuism took priority over political innovation. *Diputados* to the Central swore to defend Catholicism, sovereignty, and the exiled Fernando's right to be king and to preserve the *monarquía*'s privileges, laws, and customs.

The Central's first moves were reassuringly restorationist: suspension of the sale of certain church holdings, installation of the bishop of Orense as *inquisidor general*, recall of the Jesuit Order to Spain, and restoration of press censorship.[72] For many dismayed by these initial decisions, Jovellanos

prepared a legal justification: the Junta enjoyed no authority greater than that of its constituent provincial juntas, which, he carefully underscored, were "no erigidas para alterar la constitución del reino, ni para derogar sus leyes fundamentales, ni para alterar la jerarquía civil, militar ni económica del reino." He clarified his reasoning: "La Junta Central no representa verdadera y propiamente los reinos" except in the limited issues for which for which the provincial juntas had been established. Instead, the Central should move ahead to form a regency under whose authority it would confine itself to preparing for the convocation of a *cortes* that would convene *after* French troops had evacuated Spain or, at the latest, by September of 1810 when, Jovellanos appeared confident, a *fernandista* victory would have been achieved.[73]

Jovellanos's conservative justification—endorsement of a Junta Central of limited power—was rejected by a majority of the *diputados* gathered at Aranjuez who favored a declaration of the full sovereignty of their new body governing in the name of Fernando VII. Some correctly feared the imminent return of French troops, this time under Bonaparte's direct command, and for this and other reasons questioned the wisdom or possibility of calling a *cortes* to elect a regency. In any case, they had no antecedent for a *cortes* to represent the whole nation as against regional juntas where privileged orders or persons had been dominant. While traditionalists hoped to legitimate the regency through a resurrected, old-style *cortes*, most saw this as a source of greater division, instability, and military weakness. The question remained: How could a more representative *cortes* be organized? What would be the basis of representation in the metropole? And more troublesome: Did not the colonial elites, whose support was essential to the *fernandistas*, merit adequate representation? Clearly, resurrecting a truly national *cortes* would require time and debate.

In this light, the formation and durability of the Junta Central was the consequence of interrelated factors. There were many: the reaction of the Central to London's rejection of its claims to sovereignty; the desperate military situation; the Consejo de Castilla's rejection of emergent hegemonism on the part of the Sevilla-Cadiz axis; misgivings regarding the convocation of a *cortes*; and the regional aspirations of the provincial juntas represented in the Central not to overlook the personal ambitions of their *diputados*. Moreover, there was the many-faceted colonial question entwined in the factors affecting the operations of the Junta Central in the stormy months of its existence.

The presence of Quintana and others on the staff of the Junta Central who shared his views guaranteed confrontation with Sevilla and Cadiz over

sovereignty—the subordination of provincial juntas to the Central. Quintana brought to his role two elements. First, progressive (contrasted with conservative) nationalism, where the interests of both nation and colonies were preeminent over those of Cadiz. To be clear: he would not accept the drive of Sevilla-Cadiz to dominate the Central. Second, Quintana believed the colonies were indispensable for the economic "regeneration" (in our current terms, growth) of their metropole, and securing their loyalty to the metropole demanded major concessions in Spain's transatlantic trade structures—precisely what the Andalusian interests had resisted, and would continue to resist. It followed that to overcome that resistance, the political role of provincial juntas, like that of Sevilla and Cadiz, would have to be circumscribed. For the Junta Central to be an effective national counterforce to Andalusian insistence on sovereign power, in Quintana's optic, colonial representatives on the Junta Central, the regency, and ultimately in a restructured *cortes* would be imperative.

15. Junta Central versus Junta de Sevilla: The Colonial Question

Pero es preciso precaverse de lo que puede suceder aunque *no se vea*. A los Americanos se deve convidar, obsequiar y premiar para que escriban allá el buen trato . . . y por este medio unirnos más y más. Nosotros somos perdidos sin las Américas y ellas son más felices independientes—cuidado no las perdamos.

"Un Español Honrado," Pasquin to Junta Central from Gobernador de Cadiz

En las clases alta y media . . . se puede descubrir una disposición a observar los acontecimientos y darse partido con el que venciere ultimamente en esta contienda.

H. Wellesley to George Canning, Sevilla, 15 September 1809

As the Junta Central began to organize a government, examine the credentials of its membership, and create and then instruct committees about policy and collaboration with portfolio ministers, the Junta de Sevilla refused to relinquish its claim for control—over regional, financial, commercial, judicial, and military affairs—above all, over the colonies that recognized its authority "wholly or in part."

This problem, the result of the Andalusian Junta's deliberate obfuscation and secretiveness as well as the fact that its deputies were preoccupied with concerns other than colonial issues, surfaced when the Junta Central reviewed the deputies' delegated powers. If the Junta were indeed to exercise sovereignty in the name of Fernando VII in exile, its members had to be empowered to decide national questions independently, without prior restraint or required consultation with their own juntas lest they be abruptly recalled. Those provincial juntas which had provided their deputies with credentials and powers differing from the Junta Central's criteria had to replace them.

Consider the policy of the Junta Suprema de Sevilla. Its deputies were

given secret, detailed instructions: they had to follow them strictly, consult their respective juntas on key issues, and expect to have one deputy replaced every six months. Although the deputies from Sevilla withheld their instructions, the Junta Central learned—indirectly—of constraints on their freedom of expression in the Central's deliberations and—again indirectly—sought to persuade Sevilla to withdraw them. On 16 September, Castaños asked Francisco de Saavedra to release Sevilla's deputies from their commitment to follow their secret instructions.[1] Three days later the Junta de Sevilla revised its *diputados*' instructions, now omitting the restrictive clause that prohibited the exercise of their powers "sino con arreglo a las Instrucciones que se les han entregado."[2] However, in examining the revisions to Sevilla's deputies' instructions, the Junta Central was struck by the curious additional phrase, "con las facultades que se les dan y comunican"; this the Central inferred to mean (from a note in the original *expediente*) that the Junta de Sevilla had informed "verbalmente el verdadero sentido de la clausula."

In fact, Sevilla had ordered that "se escriba carta separada a dichos dos diputados en que se les diga que . . . si presentadas a tiempo oportuno sus instrucciones en la Junta Central, la mayor parte de sus diputados juzgase que deven reformarse algunos artículos o variarse, acceden a ello . . . dando aviso a esta Junta Suprema. Esta cesión no se entiende ni pueden hacerla jamás en las leyes fundamentales . . . las quales deberán sostener con todo el vigor."[3] The Junta Central, unaware of other unmentioned constraints on the *diputados*, now accepted the credentials of the representatives from Sevilla.[4]

While historians have interpreted Sevilla's vague language as indicating that it rewrote its original instructions, Jovellanos—intimately involved in this issue—concluded that the Junta de Sevilla only removed from its instructions that its representatives seek its opinion on key issues while it "ratificó y remachó" the balance of its instructions.[5] In Jovellanos's opinion, although Sevilla gave its deputies "libertad de opinar . . . tan lejos estaba la Junta [de Sevilla] de revocar las demás limitaciones, contenidas en las primeras instrucciones, que aún quiso que se presentasen en tiempo oportuno, sin embargo de que la mayor parte de ellas, no solo se referían a aquella libertad, sino tambien a otros puntos que eran esencialmente contrarios a la institución de un govierno uno, supremo, soberano, y conforme a la constitción de un reyno."[6] Subsequent events would support this view.

Whatever the significance of Sevilla's maneuvers at the formation of the Junta Central, the core issue—its special status and prerogatives—soon reemerged, this time overtly. In mid-October, after the Central issued a

circular stating that the "derechos de todas las provincias son y deven ser iguales,"[7] Sevilla immediately claimed an exception to this principle. As it expressed its position, "Sevilla y las Andalucías se persuaden de que [en] cumpliendo con lo que era obligación suya ha adquirido algún mérito particular." Its claims to exceptionalism: it had played a major role in the success of the insurgency by drafting guidelines in the *prevenciones* of 2 June, by victory at Bailén precipitating the withdrawal of the French from Madrid, and by manifesting support of the Junta Central on 3 August—hence its astonishment, real or feigned, that the Consejo de Castilla, which on 12 August had expressed debt and gratitude to the Junta de Sevilla for liberating Andalusia from French occupation, only a few weeks later (1 October) demanded that Sevilla be subordinate to the Central.

Sevilla expressed even greater dismay at the Junta Central's declaration of the equality of all supreme provincial juntas. Some—at Córdoba, Jaen, Granada—had been subordinate but now had their own representatives there. The ominous consequences of this *trastorno* became evident in incidents of insubordination and flagging efforts for the "national cause." The Junta de Sevilla reiterated that it had informed the Junta Central that Manuel de Mier, *contador de provincia* at Sevilla, had disobeyed its orders; now Juan Joaquin de Moreno, naval commandant of nearby Isla de León, had again flouted Sevilla's orders by seizing and then redirecting to the Junta Central dispatches that Sevilla had addressed to its commissioners-agents sent to Havana, Caracas, and Mexico City. It complained that "las sospechas de infidelidad en nosotros que indican manifiestamente esta detención" damaged their junta's honor. "Podía caver infidelidad a las Américas en esta Junta Suprema a cuyos desvelos extraordinarios se deve su conservación? And it insisted, "La injuria es pública, y pública ha de ser la satisfacción."[8] The Central's early days were indeed ominous.

By the end of October, Sevilla was downplaying the Junta Central, "no es más que el medio que han eligido y puesto en ejecución aquellas [juntas provinciales] para el fin heróico" of defending what it termed "la revolución" of the Spanish people against France. The provincial juntas "conservan, pues, toda su autoridad y gozan en su plenlitud de todas las calidades y prerogativas de esta propiedad." Sevilla's deputies could not abandon their oath to follow instructions that, the junta explained, had to remain secret for one reason only, "para que no pareciese era nuestro ánimo preocupar y ganar la opinión pública."[9]

Of course, the secret instructions had emphasized the intention of the Junta de Sevilla to retain authority over those colonies that formally recognized it and to control their trade. On the other hand, the Junta Central

had made clear from the outset its intention to assume full control of colonial affairs, although there had been rumor of granting the colonies some representation in the Junta Suprema Central de España e Indias itself. In fact, as early as 27 September Pedro José Fernández de Córdoba had sent a memo to *Presidente* Floridablanca recommending that a few Americans then resident in the peninsula be named to the Junta Central with the same status as peninsular members.[10] One month later, perhaps responding to this initiative or with the intention of undercutting Sevilla's colonial hegemonism, the Central proposed that every viceroyalty and captaincy general in America send a representative to the Central and requested the Consejo de Indias suggest how to implement its intention.[11]

Meanwhile, however, Sevilla continued to send orders to its agents in the colonies and withhold incoming mail from the colonies. Indeed, in early November the junta's *Gazeta ministerial de Sevilla* proceeded to boast that among "las grandes empresas que esta Suprema Junta tomó a su cargo . . . la de conservar las Américas a nuestro soberano Fernando VII" had been successful, proven by news of the "ardiente entusiasmo" for Fernando arriving everywhere from America—"prueba eterna de su prudencia y previsión en haber adoptado el título de Junta Suprema de Gobierno de España e Indias."[12] Responding to the Central's requests for news from the colonies, Sevilla now instructed its *diputados* to assure the Central it would be kept informed of colonial developments: "Como no dudamos que nuestros comisionados a Indias dirigirán a esta Junta Suprema los pliegos que remitan, pueden VV. EE. asegurar a la Junta Central Suprema los más prontos avisos de todo."[13]

But as reports arrived at Sevilla of serious confrontations between its commissioners to the colonies and elites there, the Junta Central's concern grew. Especially perturbing was the situation in New Spain at Mexico City. Sevilla's choice of Juan Jabat as a member of its commission charged with obtaining the support of Viceroy Iturrigaray could be interpreted by those knowledgeable of colonial affairs only as an invitation to conflict rather than unity. And, indeed, by late November reports of the impasse between commissioners Jabat and Jaúregui, supported by the Audiencia de México, and Iturrigaray, backed by the Ayuntamiento, began to arrive at Cadiz and then Sevilla. On 22 November Fabián de Miranda informed Sevilla's *diputados* at Aranjuez of the situation in New Spain as of the previous September.[14] Summarizing correspondence from commissioners Jabat and Jaúregui, and between Viceroy Iturrigaray and the Audiencia, between July and early September, Miranda—speaking for the Junta de Sevilla—supported the com-

missioners' position, that Iturrigaray be removed. His successor, Miranda stressed, should be "de autoridad, de talentos, de pureza, y de desinterés y fidelidad heróica." As Sevilla's Junta justified its position, Iturrigaray's lack of these qualities was evident in his failure to accept immediately the supremacy of the Junta de Sevilla, which "usó de la sobeana autoridad que tenía, y le mandó unirse a ella y obedecer." Miranda's—that is, the Junta de Sevilla's—advice to the Junta Central was categorical: immediately replace Iturrigaray, noting the availability of many competent Andalusians. No doubt thinking of the influential peninsular *almaceneros* in the capital of New Spain, Miranda praised the patriotism of what he called "el Pueblo siempre leal y fiel preservador de los males que pudieren seguirse a aquellas provincias." Those evils, he added, were demonstrated by rioters at the port of Veracruz, who forced the flight of Iturrigaray's responsible naval subordinate, Ciriaco de Cevallos, tarred by Miranda as "notorio contrabandista."[15] In reality, the merchant community at Cadiz, operating through the Junta de Sevilla, had assumed a self-granted "sovereign authority" and thereby signaled to the commercial groups at major colonial centers—in this case, Mexico City, Veracruz, and Havana—that it would inflexibly maintain Spain's imperial transatlantic commercial system. The road to what became the 17 May decree of 1810 was open.

From this correspondence, clearly prominent figures at Sevilla and Cadiz assumed—if they did not already know—nine weeks after the event that Iturrigaray had been removed and that the tactic employed was masked as a "popular" movement. A subsequent undated, anonymous "nota sobre los extractos de los papeles" just incoming from New Spain tried to clear Jabat and Jaúregui of direct responsibility for the dramatic deposition of a viceroy. It argued—perhaps foreseeing the basis of Iturrigaray's defense—that although "las gestiones del Ayuntamiento y la conducta equívoca y tortuosa del virrey en sus primeros pasos" did not necessarily imply "la intención de separarse de la obediencia del Rey en caso de que bolbiese a Espana," nonetheless "los Europeos . . . considerando que los gérmenes esparcidos y excitados o protegidos por el Ayuntamiento y el virrey, producirían malas resultas, qualesquiera que fuesen sus intenciones secretas, creyeron que ninguna cosa cortaría más de raíz el que la destitución del virrey. Ésta no podía hacerse sin una especie de sublevación, como se verificó; y conducido por buenos principios, y apoyada por el Real Acuerdo, produjo el fin deseado."[16] A preemptive coup by Europeos—significantly not the *pueblo*—overseas in a wealthy colony in America was now presented as a *sublevación* with the prior placet of the Audiencia at Mexico City and the Junta de Cadiz-Sevilla.

The *gaditano* merchant community was assured its interests in the Spanish Empire's most profitable colony would remain—to the extent possible in the wartime Atlantic system and its Caribbean subsystem—protected.

Details of Iturrigaray's removal were not to arrive until a month later when Juan Jabat returned to Cadiz aboard—note the significant change—HMS *Diamond*. In the meantime consideration of the situation in New Spain was interrupted by military reverses in the peninsula.[17] On 22 November, the very day Fabián de Miranda gave Cadiz's version of events in New Spain to the *diputados* of the Central at Aranjuez, the rout of *fernandista* forces on the northern front at Tudela on the Ebro opened the way for a rapid French thrust to Madrid. Soon the Junta Central had to begin its erratic retreat first to Badajoz near the frontier with Portugal and then—purportedly at the urging of Jovellanos—to Sevilla, arriving in mid-December. There it resumed efforts to confirm its overall sovereignty in uneasy tandem with interest groups at Sevilla and Cadiz.

While the Central's retreat to Sevilla seemed initially to enhance the political leverage of that local junta, the prestige of the Central's leadership, the apparatus of power with which it surrounded itself, and the influx of well-known, experienced civil servants abandoning Madrid, created a counterweight to the Andalusian Junta, whose distinguished members, notably Saavedra and Cienfuegos, shored up the Junta Central's insistence on undivided sovereignty. News that colonial authorities were recognizing the government of national resistance, complemented by the unloading of millions of silver pesos from Veracruz, further enhanced its authority. This was also the moment for Cadiz, bypassing the Junta de Sevilla, to seek independent status and influence *within* the Central. Last and certainly not least, the addition of Manuel José Quintana as publicist and then *oficial mayor* of its secretariat gave the new central government a remarkable voice to express and project aspirations for reform and for effective military resistance shared by many within the Junta Central and the public at large.

Quintana had already applied his considerable literary skill to edit Garay's manifesto of 26 October.[18] Praising provincial juntas for surrendering to the Junta Central their claims to sovereignty, his manifesto promised in return to reform "los Códigos civil, criminal y mercantil," to consider "proyectos para mejorar la educación pública," and—dear to Garay—to propose "arreglos económicos para la mejor distribución de las rentas públicas y su recaudación." "Revolution" in Spain unlike that of France—a leitmotif of the new liberalism—would restore the fundamental laws of the *monarquía*, enshrine civil liberty, promote prosperity, and render "las relaciones con nuestras colonias estrechadas más fraternalmente y por consiguiente

más útiles."[19] On 1 January 1809 Quintana followed this prior appeal to the nation with another manifesto, this time addressed to all Europe, that exalted eloquently the message articulated in lawyerly detail by Pedro de Cevallos the previous September.[20]

To solidify further its authority, the Junta Central also issued that day a comprehensive *reglamento* outlining a "plan uniforme de gobierno y de administración" designed to eliminate "todo rastro de preponderancia" among the provincial juntas—obviously aimed at the Sevilla-Cadiz axis. It reduced the size of the regional bodies, which were assigned the status of Juntas Superiores Provinciales de Observación y Defensa, and limited power; their function was defined as advisory and their special responsibility was "proponer las mejoras de que es susceptible cada ramo de los que componen el gobierno municipal, que por su variedad e incoherencia de principios, de reglas y aplicaciones es un verdadero proteo." This was an attempt to effect change at the grass roots. Equally expressive of Spain's eighteenth-century *reformismo*, championed by Garay as well as Antonio Valdés, was the provision that provincial juntas curb freedom of the press on issues external to their jurisdictional responsibilities.[21] This was unacceptable to Andalusian interests.

Predictably, the Junta de Sevilla, backed by juntas critical of limiting local authority, now renewed an escalating attack on the directives of the Junta Central. "El Reglamento de 1 de Enero nos despoja de toda esta autoridad cuyo origen [presumably in the insurrectionary days of May] es sagrado," Sevilla complained on 18 January, astonished that after having "libertado y conquistado la Patria" it should be stripped of the powers that had permitted it to save the nation.[22] Two weeks later its message was more explicit. "Creamos, en verdad . . . salvar a la nación . . . a VM. pero no imaginamos que fuésemos despojados de unas facultades dirigidas principalmente a sosterner a VM. y ayudarle en el gran peso del Gobierno de la Monarquía, tanto más quanto estas facultades, no solo son compatibles, sino que son necesarios a la soberanía que VM. exerce justamente."[23] A week later it complained that the Central "ha hecho separar progresivemente del conocimiento de esta Junta varios ramos que tenía a su cargo y que el Pueblo le impuso al tiempo de su erección . . . el peligro e interés de la Patria, no permiten deje de reclamar."[24] The vehemence of Sevilla's complaint was a measure of how the Cadiz merchant community intended to preserve control over imperial commercial policy as well as those essential remissions from colonial treasures along with private sector loans and gifts in wartime.

One may ask, Precisely what were the powers assigned by the "orphaned people" of Spain to the Junta de Sevilla in its unexpected—but very

welcome—state of sovereignty? How might exercising sovereign powers "save" the nation and assist the Junta Central "en el gran peso del Gobierno de la Monarquía" now in turmoil? Which were the "ramos que tenía a su cargo y que havía desempeñado con el mayor acierto?" We know that the Junta de Sevilla's *secret* instructions to its *diputados*—never withdrawn—reserved to itself virtual control over financial, military, judicial, commercial, and religious affairs throughout its jurisdiction, which, it insisted unilaterally, embraced all the American colonies that chose to accept its hegemony "in whole or in part." Reluctantly it had to accept, however, that Jaen and Cordoba were now outside its jurisdiction, and it protested the Junta Central's intervention in its self-assigned sphere of judicial, military, and financial affairs of the *reino* of Sevilla, including the port of Cadiz, and particularly in the sensitive area of communications with its "commissioners" in the colonies in the western Atlantic.

Sevilla, Madrid, and the Colonies in America

In retrospect, the six years between 1808 and 1814, from insurrection against an occupying power to the restoration of the old regime, were *the* hour of the Sevilla-Cadiz axis maturing since the late fifteenth century when the Castilian-Aragonese coalition became the foundation of the Spanish *monarquía*. In fact, given the control—a port *monopolio* exercised first by Sevilla and after 1670 by Cadiz—over the Spanish Empire's transatlantic trade system complemented by Andalusia's agrarian sector, the multisecular interplay between the *reino* of Andalusia and the "central" government at the new capital of Madrid has warranted analysis by historians Carande and Haring, Dominguez Ortiz, García Baquero, and Bernal, among others.

Over the eighteenth century the port of Cadiz prospered from colonial demand and large remissions of silver *pesos fuertes*. Its prosperity attracted competition from emerging peninsular ports—Barcelona, for example, and to preserve its stake it employed lobbyists in the capital of the empire at Madrid to monitor colonial policy and policy makers. From the 1790s onward, two sources threatened Cadiz's virtual monopoly of Spain's transatlantic trade: merchants in other peninsular ports and, overseas, counterparts in colonial ports ("America") eager to broaden exchanges with English traders in the Caribbean and "Anglo-American" counterparts from the United States. Exchanges with English and U.S. merchants and shippers intensified particularly after 1804 at Caribbean ports—Havana, Veracruz, Cartagena, and La Guayra; the collapse of the central government at Madrid as a consequence of the French occupation, then retreat to Andalusia offered Cadiz's

merchants, shippers, and financiers an opportunity to recover broad control of trade with the American colonies. The colonial situation was more volatile; it required suppression of movements for temporary "autonomy" until the peninsular situation stabilized, which the Cadiz mercantile community interpreted as undermining the long-established structures of transatlantic trade and only a hair's breadth from independence—decolonization as had just occurred in Britain's North American colonies. This is why Cadiz had sent *its* commissioners, with the approval of the Junta de Sevilla, to New Spain to block any indication of autonomy on the part of Viceroy Iturrigaray and the colonial elites he seemed—or so it appeared to wealthy Europeos Españoles, Mexico City's *almaceneros*—to cultivate.

Confrontation between the Junta de Sevilla and the Central resurfaced at the end of December when HMS *Diamond* entered Cadiz with one of Sevilla's commissioners to New Spain, Juan Gabriel Jabat, also Ramon Robledo y Lozano, and 4 million *pesos fuertes* on government and private accounts loaded at Veracruz.[25] News of the imprisonment of Viceroy Iturrigaray spread. Two days later, on 25 December, Jabat was debriefed at Sevilla by the *presidente* of the Junta de Sevilla, Francisco de Saavedra, for general information and recommendations. He reported the widespread support for Fernando VII that he and fellow commissioner Manuel de Jaúregui found in the Canaries, Puerto Rico, and Cuba; in Mexico City, however, were many *criollos* "conspiring to make that country independent of the peninsula" and Iturrigaray shared their sentiments. Jabat transformed the possibility of temporary autonomy of the colony into its independence, which justified Iturrigaray's removal and secured the loyalty of New Spain. Then came his recommendations. To prevent a recurrence of such a crisis and instill "un terror y respeto para lo venidero," the government should send the colony a competent army officer to support and, if necessary, replace sexagenarian General Garibay, whom local authorities had appointed viceroy. Iturrigaray and associates should stand trial and the Ayuntamiento of Mexico City should be abolished immediately, replaced by a *consejo* of six *Europeos* plus six loyal Criollos. *Oidor* Guillermo de Aguirre y Viana merited promotion to the Consejo de Indias, and the leader of the coup d'état (Jabat used "revolution") a title of nobility.[26]

Over several weeks Jabat drafted memoranda proposing a broad review of the economy and administration of New Spain, including at one point the suggestion that "en atención al mérito que acaba de contraher a favor de la buena causa," he receive an appointment as *gobernador* and *intendente* of Veracruz. However, Antonio Cornel, who, as secretary of war, was consulted by the Junta Central, indicated the impropriety of his appointment;

instead, Jabat was offsided as ambassador extraordinary to Turkey.[27] He was probably removed from the scene to deflect examination of his role in destabilizing New Spain and end officious, self-serving actions on his return—both considerations raised embarrassing questions about the Junta de Sevilla's prominent role.

What about the other peninsular agent dispatched with Jabat, participant in the ouster of Viceroy Iturrigaray, Ramón Robledo y Lozano, who had also returned to Cadiz aboard the *Diamond*? Now he played a less conspicuous but more effective role as liaison between commercial interests at Mexico City, Cadiz, and the Junta Central at Sevilla. Initially limiting his sights to obtain appointment to a lucrative post in New Spain as reward for his services, by June 1809 his options improved remarkably.[28] In late June he entered the Orden de Carlos III and thereafter abandoned any intention of returning to New Spain.[29]

His changing aspirations may have been shaped by judicious use of funds brought from New Spain and supplemented by remissions from Veracruz.[30] These were detailed by Iturrigaray when imprisoned at Cadiz: Roblejo, he claimed, received a total of 60,000 pesos contributed by wealthy parties in the colony of New Spain, which could be verified by customshouse records.[31] That Roblejo was receiving and disbursing large sums (and possessed identifiable jewels) is corroborated by correspondence between him and the *tesorero* of the Consulado de Cadiz, José Fernández de Cosío, his financial agent forwarding correspondence from Veracruz. Sign of his close tie to Cosío: Roblejo entrusted his daughter to him in his absence.[32]

Although Roblejo spent on personal interests, he also disbursed funds to contact, acquire information about, and try to influence members of the Junta Central. Cosío wrote him in early January about his propaganda activities: "Ya estará VM cansada de acer [*sic*] estados para todos esos Señores de lo ocurrrido en México"; a week later, on referring to bribes to third parties and his *introducciónes* to members of the Central, he added that "los Sevillanos han encontrado en VM una mina."[33] Over subsequent months Roblejo's largesse paid off in influence along with confidence in Cosío.[34] Although their frequent correspondence rarely mentioned details of political events—"las cartas no son para política" as Cosío warned—evidently Cosío tried to use Roblejo's "muchos conocimientos con los Sres. de esa Suprema Junta" to push family interests. However, Roblejo's chief function was intelligence gathering and influence: "No olvida VM de remitirme todas las representaciones sobre Rexencia [*sic*]," he would request in 1809.[35] In May of that year, during critical debates in the Central apropos a *cortes*, Roblejo

informed Cosío of the forthcoming visit to Cadiz of Pedro de Rivero, a key member of the Junta Central, and urged Cosío to contact him.[36]

The Junta Central was understandably perplexed—not to say suspicious—about the coverage (and evident parti pris) of the situation in New Spain provided by Jabat and Roblejo. On 31 December it inquired cautiously of the Junta de Sevilla about more specific materials since the deposed former viceroy of New Spain was imprisoned at Cadiz, "si ha recibido algun proceso formado por el Acuerdo d le Real Audiencia de Mexico contra el Virrey Don Josef de Iturrigaray o algun otro papel concernientes cosas y negocios de aquellos dominios." Also requested were the originals of all correspondence received at Cadiz from New Spain. Manuel Gil, *vicepresidente* of the Junta de Sevilla, had to confess a curious omission, "ningún proceso formal ha llegado a esta Junta Suprema"; although, he added reassuringly, correspondence from other colonies in America had brought news that they recognized the Junta de Sevilla. With regard to New Spain, however, "no savemos por qué causa no se nos ha contestado aún ese Reino." As for providing the original correspondence requested, he had to add that none could be forwarded in view of volume and copying difficulties.[37] Gil's opaque response was hardly convincing.

In fact, however, on 2 January 1809 the Junta de Sevilla reversed itself and provided Garay an inventory of the four *legajos* of documents held by the colonial division of the Junta de Sevilla. Then ten days later Juan Fernando de Aguirre, as if to mollify the irritated Junta Central, passed along recent correspondence from Cuba, Panama, and Cartagena, plus private, unofficial, correspondence from Mexico City.[38] Yet even when Iturrigaray arrived as a prisoner aboard the *San Justo* from Veracruz, weeks had to pass before the Junta Central had in hand the indictment that the Audiencia de México had delayed so long to prepare. In the interim, however, the Junta Central took the bull by the horns and, by an extraordinary and dramatic move, decided to block Sevilla's efforts to impose its colonial policy on the Junta Central.

The Decree of 22 January: America as Integral Part of the *Monarquía*

Confronting Sevilla's stonewalling coupled to its insistence that it participate in "la parte que le toca en la conservación de la Nación,"[39] the Junta Central announced a startling initiative in colonial policy kept under wraps since October 1808 when it had proposed to the Consejo de Indias that the

Central include in its various *consejos* American-born Spaniards (Españoles Americanos). On 22 January it decreed that "los vastos y preciosos dominios que España posee en las Indias no son propiamente colonias o factorías como los de otras naciones, sino una parte esencial e integrante de la monarquía española" and as such "deben tener representación nacional e inmediata a su real persona, y constituir"—here came the radical innovation—"parte de la Junta Central Gubernativa del Reino por medio de sus correspondientes diputados."[40] Addressed to vice royalties and captaincies general of America, the decree called for the nomination of candidates by the *ayuntamientos* of the colonial capitals and subordinate districts (*cabezas de partido*), by lot and ultimate election by the Real Acuerdo of each colonial capital.

This measure, despite limitations from the colonials' viewpoint, would have an extraordinary impact on developments in the Spanish Empire and Spain itself. Seen by some historians primarily as expressing gratitude for the colonies' support for Fernando VII and especially for the colonies' financial contributions now arriving, others have interpreted it as a political counterresponse to the parliamentary representation offered the colonies by the French-crafted Constitution of Bayonne.[41] Still others, like the Mexican insurgent leader, Ignacio Rayón, would claim that lessons learned from revolution in England's North American colonies were a determining factor in the decree.[42] Liberals like the conde de Toreno held that Spain's overseas possessions had always been an integral part of the *monarquía*, "debiendo atribuirse el olvido en que a veces cayó a las mismas causas que destruyeron y atropellaron en España sus proopias y mejores leyes."[43] Less well disposed toward the Junta Central, England's clairvoyant and hardheaded envoy Henry Wellesley came close to the truth in mid-1810 when he recognized, "La admisión de las colonias a la participación de gobierno de la representación de la madre patria parece haber sido sugerido sólo como un expediente para asegurar a la Junta en la continuación de su autoridad activa, y que no tiene conexión con ninguna mira extensa o liberal de política o gobierno." He predicted that "cuando en las colonias llegue entenderse el verdadero estado del gobierno de la madre patria, es imminente el peligro de una conmoción en esta parte importantísima del imperio."[44] His hindsight *and* foresight were accurate.

Undoubtedly many factors shaped the Junta Central's 22 January decree, even though its timing and language reflected the profound crisis in colonial policy created by Andalusia's drive toward hegemonism. By early 1809, encouraging flows of financial aid were already arriving from the colonies; a combination of relief, gratitude, and the expectation of more to come undoubtedly warmed peninsular sentiments toward the colonies. Quintana's

rhetorical statement of the previous September to the effect that "aquellas ricas colonias ya están eternamente identificadas con la metrópoli" appeared confirmed—and probably a pious hope on his part. For the French had recently reoccupied the capital, and there was the persistent doubt about which "government" in the peninsula would gain the colonies' allegiance. It was rumored that the French government—imitating England's handling of the Portuguese royal family—might send Charles IV overseas to Mexico, and consequently orders were issued not to allow him under any circumstances to debark at Veracruz.[45] In incorporating the Spanish colonies as "integral parts" of the *monarquía*, the Spanish and French architects of the Bayonne Constitution clearly had in mind the earlier insistence of England's North American colonies for representation in parliament. Clearly, too, the immediate pressure to issue the decree of 22 January responded to the need to affirm the authority of the Junta Central in colonial America in the face of Andalusian hegemonism. Lastly, the Junta Central's opening to America appeared to offer a middle way between the provocative path of Sevilla's commissioners to New Spain and the dangers implicit in calling a *cortes* either with or without representatives from the colonies. To *criollo* conservatives, the vetting of their candidates could be hopefully interpreted as responding not only to "principios de razón y justicia sino . . . los de buena política para conservar a España aquellos vastos dominios, tanto más seguro quanto más consideración se les tenga."[46]

Beyond such considerations, however, the language of the 22 January decree raised expectations in the colonies. It fueled later criticism, too, by colonials, who called it an empty promise, and by colonialists, who accused the Central of promising more than it could or even should deliver. Antecedent provisions of the previous 26 October and the subsequent *consulta* of the Consejo de Indias of 21 November had been couched in the cautious opaque terminology of the government's "benignidad" and barely publicized.[47] Compare these with the 22 January decree declaring that Spain's "dominions" in America were not really colonies or factories but were, quite unlike those of other countries, an essential *parte integral* of the *monarquía* and far beyond a mere invitation of token representation in an interim government. That decree proclaimed the intrinsic equality of Españoles Americanos and Españoles Europeos at all times and in all spheres; it emphasized that the colonies were dominions, not commercial enterprises solely benefiting the metropole.

Who drafted the January decree remains unclear. Perhaps Quintana, who was officially *primer oficial* of the Central's overall secretariat and unofficially publicist responsible for editing decrees; it may also have received the

imprint of Quintana's friend and associate, Ignacio García Dávila, *oficial segundo*. Months later, García Dávila felt the source of colonial loyalty was partly reaction to French aggression against a captive king, Fernando VII, and to a greater degree to the "royal orders of the Junta Central" inspiring in the colonies "las máximas liberales que únicamente podían hacerles confiar de un Gobierno ilustrado y paternal y esperar el remedio radical de las vejaciones y oprobio que tantos años están sufriendo"—no small confession of contrition.[48]

In a wider context, the 22 January decree seems the first substantive liberal statement of the *fernandista* government but implied more than stated and thereby promised more than actually declared or deliverable. In this sense, Antonio Capmany—no progressive—was correct when later he accused Quintana of exceeding his responsibilities in the secretariat, compromising the Junta Central with "arengas, más académicos que populares," and never losing an opportunity "echar un parafón de doctrina filantrópica y de principios de filosofía liberal."[49] On the other hand, even Quintana's friend and fellow editor of the *Semanario Patriótico* would tar him with "vanity and ignorance" at the Junta Central.[50]

Despite its limitations, the 22 January decree providing for colonial representatives on the Junta Central did strengthen the authority of *fernandista* governments in the American colonies. Above all, as an open declaration of supremacy over Sevilla, it reinforced the Junta Central's authority in the peninsula. Henceforth Andalusia's powerful colonial interests within the Junta de Sevilla had to employ more oblique tactics to pursue their objectives. And they were well situated to do so. Besides dominating the space where the interim government now functioned, those interests also enjoyed ties to the Central. Saavedra, by combining presidency of the Junta de Sevilla with his post as Hacienda secretary in the Central, tried to reconcile or at times condone the interests of the national government conflicting with Andalusian interest groups. Above all, as political pragmatist, Saavedra must have considered his peculiar and ambivalent position as vital to the preservation of the *monarquía* and its empire.

The basic collaboration of Sevilla and Cadiz to defend common imperial interests was evident when, on 27 January, the Central's representative at Cadiz, marqués de Villel, requested instructions on handling the imminent arrival of the ex-viceroy of New Spain, charged with disloyalty, aboard the *San Justo*, commanded by the marqués del Real Tesoro, which had departed Veracruz in early December. Apprehensive of violence by Cadiz "mobs" against Iturrigaray, the Junta Central ordered that Iturrigaray remain prisoner aboard ship pending further instructions.[51] *San Justo* anchored on 1

February, and Villel informed the Junta Central that the official indictment prepared by the Real Acuerdo in Mexico City was held by the ship's commander, Real Tesoro. When, despite repeated requests, the indictment still had not been turned over, the Junta Central finally learned it had had been mailed instead. Meanwhile, Villel wrote the Central that Real Tesoro, well informed about the situation in New Spain and "knowledgeable" of Iturrigaray, wanted to talk to the Central.[52] It is reasonable to surmise that while the Junta de Sevilla digested the contents of the indictment, Real Tesoro offered to draft what he termed a confidential report confirming the accounts of Jabat and Roblejo y Lozano. Fittingly rumors now circulated at Cadiz and Sevilla exaggerating the wealth that Iturrigaray had left in New Spain and his support of Ciriaco de Cevallos, former naval commandant at Veracruz who, falsely accused of collaborating with French agents and attacked by a "mob," had fled the port—presumptive proof of guilt.

Imprisoned in the fortress of San Sebastian at Cadiz for a year, eventually Iturrigaray would be cleared of the charge of disloyalty (*infidencia*) but not without lingering attacks by those involved from the outset in the *escarmiento* at Mexico City that removed him. For instance, three weeks after entering Cadiz, he was the secondary target of a "mob" action against the Junta Central's Cadiz agent, Villel. The event confirmed his worst fears. From the prison of San Juan de Ulua at Veracruz, he had written a friend at Cadiz, General Tomás Morla, of potential threats to his life "si a mi llegada me pasan del navío a un castillo, puede esto costarme la vida que sentiré perder antes de poner todo en claro."[53] Learning on his arrival that the Junta Central was nearby at Sevilla, he felt somewhat relieved.[54] However, it soon became clear that the Central, weakened by Sevilla's relentless drive for domination that was bolstered by the financial resources of Cadiz's mercantile elites, was in no position to provide the ex-viceroy of New Spain a fair hearing. The Junta Central's leaders, Iturrigaray later concluded, "suavizó el Aparato [de los facciosos] pero nada menos de remitir comprovante o cosa que pudiera aclarar el suceso de la conspiración porque no la había."[55]

The Central-Sevilla clash flared because of the collapse of the central government at Madrid, which had monitored and balanced conflicting interests of "traditionalistas" and "proyectistisas." Floridablanca had used his authority and the support of Charles III to quiet dissidents; after 1789 the national and international situation made it impossible for Godoy or anyone else to dampen friction. French occupation of Madrid simply brought these issues into the open.

At last Cadiz could exploit the government's fragility to exert its leverage, at the moment unrestrained by more foresighted civil servants at Madrid in

the late eighteenth century. Without explicit claim to dominance in colonial policy making, Cadiz's commercial and associated financial groups might preserve their intermediary role with the colonies as well as maximize their leverage as banker of an unstable state. Their pressure-group tactics would prove even more dangerous to the *monarquía* and its empire in America than Sevilla's overt hegemonic tendencies. The area of confrontation between the merchants of Cadiz trading with the colonies and the Junta Central was quickly demarked, as so often in the past, when the Central intervened in Cadiz's management of customs revenue collections and allocation. It would result in the dramatic *escarmiento* of the Central's representative at Cadiz, the marqués de Villel, and to unending confrontation between the central or national government and the Andalusian port that for more than a century had dominated Spain's system of "regulated" transatlantic trade with its American possessions.

Junta Central and Cadiz

If the Junta Central began to break through Sevilla's hegemonism early in 1809, it was less successful in asserting authority over the fulcrum of traditional colonial interests, the trading community at Cadiz. Cadiz had never accepted the Junta de Sevilla's domination more than tacitly and had been permitted to influence its policies in return for support. The selection of Sevilla's commissioners to the colonies resulted from this reluctant collaboration. When, however, the self-styled Junta Suprema de España e Indias at Sevilla failed to be recognized by London or other peninsular juntas, and once provincial *diputados* gathered at Aranjuez to create the Junta Central, the Junta de Cadiz sought direct representation in the new national government, sending two of its own *diputados*. The tactic failed because the Junta de Sevilla was bound to oppose a move that might further weaken its leverage, and because *diputados* to the Central insisted on the principle that only *supreme* provincial juntas could send *diputados* to the new national body.[56] Conservative merchants at Cadiz, dissatisfied with Cadiz's subordinate status and anticipating difficulties with the newly installed national junta, looked ahead to the formation of a regency. "No quiera Dios acabe de establecerse para quitar quisquillas y contraposiciones que pueden sernos sumamente perjudiciales," wrote the Cadiz Consulado's secretary in mid-September to its Madrid agent, responding to news of the formation of the Junta Central.[57] That the Cadiz Consulado was still hopeful a regency might materialize was suggested days later when it instructed the Junta de Sevilla to send its *diputado* to the Junta Central "or to the regency."[58]

Unwilling to support Cadiz's aspiration for direct representation on the Junta Central, Sevilla—divining what concerned Cadiz's commercial interests—compromised by offering to transmit Cadiz's views on "materias de comercio y en lo perteneciente a las Américas" to the Central.[59] In fact, Cadiz utilized this channel to advance its views on fiscal and colonial issues until the Junta Central's dispiriting retreat to Sevilla at the end of 1808. That fall Cadiz emerged the winner in confronting the Junta de Sevilla and General Tomás de Morla over the issue of English textile imports; soon it triumphed again when the Junta Central tried to intervene in Cadiz's operations, particularly to impose its decisions on the sensitive issues of customs revenue collection and the management of funds incoming on government account.

When the Junta Central issued its Reglamento of 1 January 1809, reducing the authority of the Junta de Sevilla to equality with other provincial juntas (retitled *juntas de observacion y defensa*) and allocating it *nine* members, it also transformed Andalusia's juntas under Sevilla's jurisdiction into *juntas subalternas de partido* limited to *five* members. Cadiz, however, was made an exception to the rule for subalternate or district juntas. Like that of other juntas, its authority was limited to consultation, finance, and public security, but it was allotted more members than other district juntas and could set up committees to deal with specific issues (Art. 6). Most essential, now Cadiz had to respond directly to the Junta Central rather than the Junta de Sevilla (Art. 16).[60] Once the Reglamento appeared, the Junta de Gobierno y Vigilancia de Cadiz created a second junta of five of its members, a Junta de Vigilancia y Seguridad Pública—all drawn from the armed forces. Cadiz now had two juntas, one "de gobierno" and another responsible for political and military security. But not only was the creation of a second junta a violation of the 1 January Reglamento, but the powers claimed exceeded those specified in Article 6 of the Reglamento.

Probably responding to objections of the Central or Junta de Sevilla, in mid-February Cadiz tried to justify again its actions and renewed pressure for direct representation on the Junta Central. Cadiz, its junta argued, should not be treated "como si fuera una humilde aldea," requested parity with Sevilla and other *juntas superiores de observación y defensa*, and pointed out it had originally been created as a sovereign, independent junta like Cordoba and Jaen, which now had representatives on the Central. Only "por efecto de su docilidad y prudente cautela" had it agreed to respect the Junta de Sevilla as its superior. It listed its services to the national cause in money, grains, and cloth for the army and in maintaining public order, securing the surrender of the French fleet in its harbor, and seizing French properties and consulate documents, "evitando las desórdenes que en una

Plaza de Comercio pudieran originarse de este trastorno de los negocios." Above all, it pointed to its status as head (*cabeza*) of a maritime district with its own *intendent* and stressed its unique relationship with the *monarquá*, a relationship entitling it to special consideration as a *junta superior provincial*.[61] Before the Junta Central had time to reply, however, there was resort to the reason of force: an insurrection by anonymous ringleaders, following the time-honored pattern of political *escarmiento* ostensibly of one individual, erupted in Cadiz causing withdrawal of the Junta Central's representative there and concessions to Cadiz's repeated demands for independent status.

The *Motín* de *Villel*

The background is clear. Soon after issuing the 1 January Reglamento, the Junta Central had assigned, as it did elsewhere, a high commissioner with broad authority to implement its decisions and policies. As high commissioner, the marqués de Villel, *diputado* from Catalonia, was instructed to strengthen Cadiz's defensive works, transfer to the Balearics a large contingent of French prisoners from overcrowded pontoons and hospital ships in the bay, accelerate judicial procedures to reduce the number of prison inmates, and provision the city of Cadiz—a tall order by any standard. Even more important, Villel had to cover the financial needs of the national government—the Junta Central—by calculating the volume of remissions from the American colonies over preceding months, and preparing for the imminent arrival from Veracruz of 9 million *pesos fuertes* (6.5 million on government account) for immediate deposit in the national government's treasury. Of course, Villel was expected to oversee the efficient collection of customs revenue, too.

Villel set about energetically, focusing initially on the sensitive area of fiscal operations at Cadiz, now more than ever in the eighteenth century Spain's leading port astride the empire's transatlantic trade system. He lost no time: "Luego que llegó a esta Plaza, pidió y recogió estado exacto de los caudales y efectos pertenecientes al Rey de los que hubiesen llegado de América desde principios de Junio, cuia noticia elebó a VM prooponiendo convendría que todos los caudales se pasasen a tesoreria de la Real Hacienda inmediatamente; que se ejecutava lo mismo sucesibamente con los productos líquidos de todas rentas; que se procediese a la venta de los frutos que habían llegado de América correspondientes al Rey existentes en la Real Aduana, pasando así mismo su importe a la tesorería de la Real Hacienda, y que se prebiniese al tesorero de ella se remitiese semanalmente al minis-

terio un estado de ingresos, saladas y existencias de caudales."[62] Villel had been forceful, and influential mercantile cadres at Cadiz were not hesitant to push back—forcefully.

As if Villel's Catalan origin, status as *grande*, and overriding authority were not enough to alienate the defensive and secretive traders of Cadiz, rigor in discharging his commission inevitably bred resentment, then anxiety among a restive population that included elements intimately linked to Andalusia's sophisticated smuggling networks.[63]

Probably in reacting to the appointment of a high commissioner and rigorous execution of his instructions, not to overlook constraints on Cadiz's political clout mandated by the Reglamento and imposed by Villel, the Junta de Gobierno at Cadiz had fashioned its separate Junta de Vigilancia y Seguridad Pública. Events would suggest that the vigilance exercised and the security defended by Cadiz constituted its counterpunch to the Junta Central's intrusion into its political and economic space.

What might be the "Motín de Villel"—another suspect "popular" crowd action—began, according to the embellished account of a Cadiz historian, when "enemigos personales, o algunos de los que querian desacreditar a la Junta Central," spread the rumor that Polish soldiers after Bailén had deserted to Spanish forces and were en route to Cadiz to replace local militia units.[64] On 22 February a crowd rounded up by unnamed individuals (rumored to have organized the mob action against General Solano) moved to city's gates to intercept the file of Polish soldiers. When no Poles appeared, the mob headed instead to the home of Villel to demand action to repel them. Although Villel acquiesced, the mob, now incited by some members, declared Villel's authority terminated and then proceeded to proclaim as joint *gobernadores* of Cadiz octogenarian General Felix Jones and a prominent cleric Mariano de Sevilla, the *guardian de los capuchinos* at Cadiz.[65] The mob now insisted on examining Villel's correspondence but was deterred by the appearance of another popular clergyman, Antonio Cabrera,[66] who suggested that Villel be taken to the Casas Consistoriales "where the Junta de Gobierno and Ayuntamiento awaited him." Accompanied by the menacing crowd, Villel feared he might suffer the fate of General Solano but was rescued by the appearance of "Voluntarios Distinguidos," militiamen commanded by the conde de Casa Rábago, a member of Cadiz's two juntas and son-in-law of the deceased prominent Cadiz merchant, Francisco Fernández de Rábago.[67] At the Casas Consistoriales, Villel admitted his "errors" and appealed to the Junta de Cadiz and the Ayuntamiento for confidence in his loyalty; outside, however, the crowd continued to denounce him, insisting he be sent to the Capuchins' convent. Assisted by Casa Rábago and an

aide but barely protected by the Voluntarios, Villel was brought to the convent and held incommunicado by Voluntarios and members of the crowd.

General Jones and *guardian* Mariano de Sevilla now exceeded the crowd's demands. Not only did they dismiss the customs guards' commander, José de Heredia, and those who had helped Villel crack down on smuggled goods and fraud, but they vowed to find and prosecute so-called traitors, that only the Voluntarios would defend the port and serve nowhere else, and that Villel's correspondence would be opened.[68] The mob joined by Voluntarios then went to the fortress where Iturrigaray and Carrafa were confined and moved them to the convent; meanwhile, local prison inmates were freed, but Heredia, unlike other prisoners, refused to escape.[69] According to historian Adolfo de Castro, the Voluntarios now chose to restore order and dispersed the mob "with a few gunshots," while Mariano de Sevilla along with other popular clerics calmed the crowd with oratory and ritual customary in such episodes. Voluntarios occupied the residence of the *gobernador* along with the customshouse and entered the Convento de Capuchinos at Mariano de Sevilla's invitation where they arrested leaders of the mob who had accepted the Capuchins' hospitality.[70] For his part, Villel refused to leave the convent until cleared of all charges.

The Junta Central responded by commissioning two members of the Consejo de Castilla to go to Cadiz to investigate what had happened. Following trial, High Commissioner Villel was judged innocent.[71] He was given a public vindication of his conduct by curiously contrite Cadiz authorities: municipal dignitaries escorted him on 4 April from the convent to the cathedral for a Te Deum, then to the Casas Consistoriales, where the *procurador mayor* of Cadiz, Joaquin Antonio de la Huerta, eulogized Villel and condemned those who had led the mob. In fact, the fireworks and festivities accompanying Villel's official exoneration celebrated what was really the victory of Cadiz interests over the Junta Central personified in High Commissioner Villel.[72] After Cadiz's handling of Villel, clearly he could not remain there. He soon returned to Sevilla to continue as Catalan *diputado* until the dissolution of the Central a year later. The Junta Central chose not to fill Villel's post. The *motín* had accomplished what its instigators wanted: the *gobernador* of Cadiz had no rival authority. Of the two proclaimed by the rioters as co-governors of Cadiz, cleric Mariano de Sevilla quickly disappeared; in his stead as secretary and mentor of octogenarian General Felix Jones appeared none other than Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui, who had returned to Cadiz with his imprisoned brother-in-law, ex-Viceroy Iturrigaray, on the "San Justo" in early February.[73]

The "Motín de Villel" ended the Central's active intervention in the eco-

nomic affairs of the Junta de Cadiz. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Central on 3 February had denounced any "movimentos tumultuarios y bulliciosos" at Cadiz and later wanted to terminate the two juntas probably and logically because they were responsible for the *motín*. The Junta de Cadiz months later itself noted that the "Junta de Observación y Defensa" had been "dissuelta por causa de los movimentos populares de . . . 22 y 23 de Febrero."[74] Furthermore, there are indications that the rioters turned against the Junta de Cadiz for allowing the Voluntarios, assisted by Mariano de Sevilla (him they wanted to "arrastrar por las calles"), to enter the Capuchin convent to seize mob leaders and protect Iturrigaray and Carrafa. There were hazards in mobilizing the lawless residents of the port city's poorest quarter.[75] Nonetheless, General Jones urged the Junta Central at the end of February to reinstate the two juntas, a request reiterated in early March.[76]

The Junta Central did not yield to Cadiz's demands for resurrecting Cadiz's two Juntas apparently dissolved in the course of the Villel riots. It proceeded to authorize the two investigators of the *motín* and the overall situation at the port city to consult with *Gobernador* Jones on resurrecting the local Junta de Gobierno according to the Reglamento of January 1809. Consejeros de Castilla Villagómez and Moyano—the investigators—recommended a single, new Junta de Gobierno y Vigilancia following the Reglamento (Arts. 6, 7, 16). However, the investigators interpreted broadly these articles by granting the junta considerable autonomy—"la distincíón e independencia de que ha gozado en su último estado, sin sugetar sus determinaciones a otro examen que el de la Suprema Junta." Unlike district or subalternate juntas whose members could not exceed five, Cadiz was granted nine and could create subordinate committees to handle specific issues. But unlike the *juntas provinciales superiores* enjoying considerable autonomy, the Cadiz junta came under the direct authority of the Central in essential matters such as financial and commercial policy. More specifically, the new junta would have to avoid action or decision conflicting with the limitations specified in the 1 January Reglamento.[77]

Cadiz resisted this solution, probably because it fell short of independence from Sevilla in some matters and in others subordinated it too strictly to the Central. The Central, fearing to antagonize the Junta de Sevilla by granting Cadiz parity with it, now solicited Sevilla's views of Cadiz's pretensions.[78] Sevilla's opposition was predictable: Cadiz wanted to escape its jurisdiction in order "formar para sí una especie de colonia aislada, lo que equivale a trastornar el orden establecido por las Leyes Reales, Ordenes y Reglamentos."[79] Cadiz, on the other hand, countered that failure to

achieve equal status with Sevilla, Jaen, and Córdoba "debilita la prontitud y energía con que era asistida la causa pública adcemás de tener paralizado el cumplimiento de sus empeños, por estar *las recaudaciones* afectas e él"[80] (emphasis added). In the Central's desperate financial bind, the implication—or threat—behind this position was evident: Cadiz's cooperation in economic and financial matters would require recognizing its special interests in any formulation of colonial policy. This was its bedrock stance.

Exploiting apparent ambiguity in the Central's orders and the stalemate on its special interests, Cadiz in early June set itself up as Junta de Observación y Defensa on a par with other provincial juntas, citing a Central order of 3 June designating it a "junta superior."[81] However, it delayed so informing the Junta Central until 5 July. Only a brief draft of a reply implies the Central's hesitancy in responding to Sevilla's statement. A note appended to a draft of the Central's reply denied Cadiz's claim to parity with the *juntas superiores provinciales*. "La Junta de Cadiz padece una visible equivocación en suponer que se la ha declarado Superior," it asserted, because actually the Central had left the issue "unresolved." The only attributes distinguishing the Cadiz Junta from subalternate *juntas de partido*, the Junta's writer elaborated, were those recommended by the *consejeros* of the Consejo de Castilla, Villagómez and Moyano, granting Cadiz nine instead of five members along with the right to communicate directly with the Junta Central in matters of critical importance.[82] The status of the Junta de Cadiz remained unresolved, however, until the Central dissolved in early 1810, when a new Junta Superior de Gobierno de Cadiz concentrated decision making in a small group of merchants who would dominate the Regencia created by the Junta Central as it expired.

Financial Insecurity

Division, ambiguity, and weakness apparent in the Central's relations with Cadiz derived largely from its dependence on customs revenues, colonial remittances, and loans that the merchants of Cadiz in their Consulado were determined to control as a condition of support for the national government and as a guarantee of its special interests. The deliberate *escarmiento* of Villel, assassination of Heredia, and dismissal of personnel of "questionable" loyalty to the Junta Central's Hacienda secretary, Francisco Saavedra (considered mainly responsible for what Cadiz merchants in the colonial trades dismissed as the "infamous" *comercio neutro* of 1797–1799), were the root of Cadiz's alienation from the Central. The Consulado concurred with the Junta Central's denunciations of the "dilapidación continua y mons-

truosa" committed by the ousted Godoy regime but remained suspicious of its rhetoric on reforming the empire's commercial, judicial, and criminal codes.[83] More alarming still was the Central's decree of 22 January 1809 rejecting the colonial status of Spain's overseas dominions, now declared integral parts of the *monarquía*. Conservative Cadiz interests would figure prominently in forming the first regency early in 1810 while disclaiming "parte alguna de las desgracias que a la nación trajo el azaroso gobierno de la Junta Central." But they did confess candidly they had anticipated the moment when, "disuelto el simulacro del gobierno que representó la Junta Central," Cadiz itself would become the "asilo de la independencia española" and play a determining role in national policy making.[84]

Cadiz and Financing the Central

Earlier in 1808, when still at Aranjuez, the Central pursued multiple initiatives to strengthen credit at home and abroad and acquire financial support in Spain and England. Later, in October, it formally recognized the national debt and tactfully accepted "todas las obligaciones contrraídas por la corona que forman el patrimonio de una porción considerable de familias."[85] That same October Floridablanca announced measures for transferring from London 2 million pesos on deposit there in the Caja de Consolidación and for negotiating a loan with English investors. In the interim, Cadiz appealed to the "nobleza, estado eclesiástico, comunidades religiosas, comercio y capitalistas particulares" for a short-term 1 million peso loan—20 million reales—to cover immediate military outlays until remissions from the colonies could arrive. The Consulado did manage to lend the Central in October 4 million reales, soon repaid in February with funds shipped from Veracruz.

Excluding the 4 million reales advanced by the Cadiz Consulado, however, appeals to peninsular investors for financial support brought a disappointing response. Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, *diputado* from Aragon delegated to raise funds in Madrid, had to report the capital's merchant bankers would provide no financing unless joined by aristocracy and clergy. His aggressive campaign to impose quotas on the wealthy Cinco Gremios Mayores, court aristocrats, and the "onzas esquecidas" of the *fondos pios* of the ecclesiastical establishment was cut short by resistance to his arm-twisting tactics—he was quickly reassigned elsewhere—and by reoccupation of the capital by French forces.[86] Aside from the widespread illiquidity, affluent Madrid residents were reluctant to commit themselves to a national government whose power seemed at best precarious and—to

England's later ambassador Wellesley—at worst disastrous.[87] Madrid's affluent wanted to back a winner. In fact, the Cinco Gremios Mayores collaborated with the French-sponsored government, while the Compañía de Filipinas conditioned a loan of 6 million reales on the security of immediate reimbursement by Sevilla's royal mint.[88] Outside the capital the results were no better; hard-pressed provincial juntas were not only incapable of financing the national government but were reduced to preempting their districts' government revenues—income from the Escusado and Consolidación deposits. A particularly promising source of finance was eliminated in mid-November when the Junta Central confirmed a decree suspending further sales of church real estate, even ordering the return of payments to purchasers, and of the properties of the *fondos pios*.[89]

The Spanish insurgents expected the English government to underwrite their war effort. An inventive if less than realistic scheme to obtain London's support was proposed in October and November 1809 to the Junta Central's Hacienda minister Saavedra by two wealthy Cadiz merchants. Pedro Antonio de Aguirre and Miguel Lobo y Campos proposed an "empréstito político y mercantil" of £10 million from English investors on the assumption that Spain alone could not possibly finance resistance to French occupation and that only England could do so. Further, they posited that England, now as Spain's ally, was particularly obligated to do so; they reasoned that the English government's credit—despite a large public debt that would "never be repaid"—could remain strong with the support of its industrial and commercial sectors. Menaced by the French colossus, "La Inglaterra conoce que la defensa de la independencia de España es un apoyo de la suya propia."

There could be, therefore, no doubt that London would consent to lend Spain £10 million were the funds adequately secured and with appropriate oversight. Spain, moreover, "por las inmensas riquezas de su propio terreno y *por la posesión de todas sus Américas*" (emphasis added) was an especially secure investment. Aguirre and Lobo were quite specific, proposing that London raise the loan "por cuenta de España sobre sus fondos públicos y deuda consolidada a 21.3% pagando España este premio afianzado con hipoteca especial." Alternatively, Spain could open the loan under the guarantee of the English government on the same terms. In either case, the loan would be a nominal £15 million, and effectively £10 million, with repayment at the convenience of the Spanish government. Again, colonial resources were the heart of the proposal: interest would be secured on Cadiz's customs revenues and, if necessary, on those of Veracruz and New Spain "aunque nunca en calidad de deudores primarios, sino como fiadores . . .

para intervenir sólo . . . cuando la Aduana de Cadiz no pudiere pagar." Finally, the loan funds could be transferred from England in precious metals or merchandise—"lienzos, géneros o en armas."[90] This proposal obviously featured a double advantage for the Spanish government, particularly for the city of Cadiz: it would commit England to support the Cadiz entrepôt, which would service the debt and, second, disincentivize English overtures to colonial independence movements in the American colonies or involvement in large-scale smuggling operations there.

When London demurred at granting a far smaller loan of £10 million pesos *unless* there was the Spanish government's commitment to open its colonial ports to English traders, it was evident that the Aguirre-Lobo project was dead in the water. Furthermore, the Spanish government's efforts to access Consolidación funds retained at London met an unexpected obstacle when London's merchant bankers would not release the specie in their Consolidación accounts. To be sure, earlier Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, the Junta de Sevilla's envoy to London, had been rebuffed when he tried to claim those funds because agents of the Junta de Asturias and that of Galicia disputed Sevilla's claim. However, the Junta Central had solved that problem, and in late October and early November the marqués de Fuerte Hijar, director of the Caja de Consolidación at Madrid, forwarded drafts on those funds to the London merchant banking firm of Gordon & Murphy; the firm's Madrid agent, Juan Murphy, dispatched an agent to claim payment in London. Now appeared another obstacle: the precipitous retreat of the Junta Central in early December coupled to the reoccupation of Madrid by French forces renewed doubt about the legitimacy of claims on Consolidación funds.

The fate of the Junta Central remained uncertain during December, and even after its retreat and reorganization at Sevilla many doubted whether it could effectively assert authority over the competitive Junta de Sevilla. When Sevilla's agent Apodaca, by now also accredited as the Junta Central's representative in London, approached Foreign Secretary Canning at the end of December, matters still moved ahead slowly. English authorities first told Apodaca that Fuerte Hijar's drafts had emptied the Consolidación pool at London. Next he learned that Madrid's drafts would no longer be honored; then, that funds would be released to the Junta Central only on condition that the English government stand behind London merchant bankers refusing to honor future claims; that commissions owed the London bankers would be deducted from each claim honored; and that ultimately a notice of final settlement of accounts would be provided the Spanish government. There was an obvious cover-up, and Sevilla's agent

recognized his inadequate grasp of these financial shenanigans: "La ofuscación que presenta este negocio . . . y del que absolutamente no tengo instrucción alguna," a discouraged Apodoca wrote Saavedra, which led him to ask Saavedra to send "sugetos comerciantaes de probidad y inteligencia que tomen y liquiden cuentas y aun litiguen en estos tribunales los derechos de nuestro gobierno."[91] Nor was the Central's financial situation helped by the fact that by retreating to Sevilla it had lost contact with the normal apparatus of government—"los Consejos, las Secretarías con todos sus individiuos, la Tesorería General, las oficinaas de Consolidación, los archivos y cuantos documentos podían necesitarse." As Saavedra graphically described the situation, the *fernandista* government of resistance was "una máquina que pierde muchas de sus ruedas."

There came some improvement. Signing a formal alliance with England on 9 January 1809 and reaffirming trade exchanges based on the commercial arrangements of 1782 improved considerably the Junta's financial situation. The Central sent Foreign Secretary Pedro de Cevallos and the conde de Villafuertes as his assistant to negotiate financial aid. Although Consolidación funds were subsequently released, the Central lost confidence in London's willingness to provide subsidies. After an initial subsidy of about 1 million pesos, London put a high price on a Central request for a 10 million-peso loan; scarce English funds were allocated to subsidize resistance in central Europe to French demands, and London's capacity to respond to the Central's request would have to depend on privileging English trade with the colonies in America.[92] Such insistence on access to Spain's colonial resources, reiterated in following years, no Spanish government would be either able or even ready to accept.

This stance implied that impoverished, war-torn Spain must rely almost wholly on colonial remissions on government account and on customs revenues from the colonial trades at Cadiz to cover military and civil expenditures. First, it meant that the *fernandista* government, like previous ones, would necessarily have to depend on colonial income instead of that currently provided by short-term loans from Cadiz merchants. They had for long managed colonial trade, had been involved in the collection and distribution of customs revenue there in return for loans to the government, and could under current circumstances bank on a dominant role in imperial commercial policy decisions. Second, preservation of the Cadiz-Veracruz transatlantic trade axis in its century-old oligopolistic form, an issue at Aranjuez in March 1808, became an unquestioned assumption at Sevilla at the beginning of 1809. Finally, in the short term, at least, the economic needs of *criollo* elites in the staple-producing colonies, for example at

Buenos Aires and "Caracas," would have to remain subordinate to interests in the mining colonies associated with the exchange of precious metals for imports of foreign goods.

As the Junta Central's financial situation worsened, Sevilla's Junta determined to handle colonial specie inflows on royal account at Cadiz as well the port's customs revenues. In March 1809 the Junta de Sevilla had to turn to the Consulado and Junta de Cadiz for a 1 million peso loan at 6 percent secured on the next remittances from America. Although the Consulado agreed to raise the amount requested and even waived interest, public response was disappointing—"defectuosa." For its part, the Junta Central had to comment bitterly that "no puede persuadirse aqui [que] los que fueron tan francos en prestar a un gobierno dilapidor y corrompido sumas inmensas . . . dexen de hacerlo ahora a un gobierno justo y liberal . . . [para] salvar la patria . . . y poniendo a la vista los caudales con que se ha de reintegratar." Subsequent appeals to subscribers on 24 and 26 April did finally complete the subscription, yet on 3 May the Junta Central had to appeal again to the Cadiz merchants: no matter the expected arrival of colonial funds, unexpected demands made another loan necessary. Within days the subscription was opened.

The beleaguered Central was operating from hand to mouth at the sufferance of Cadiz merchants who preferred to rebuild their capital. It turned to the colonies. Saavedra, the Central's Hacienda secretary, had to repeat procedures initiated by Sixto Espinosa under the Godoy administration: he authorized the English government to dispatch agents aboard royal navy vessels to Veracruz where they would purchase pesos in return for thirty-day sight drafts (exchequer bills) on the Bank of England.

Over roughly sixteen months, the Junta Central obtained from Cadiz about 208 million *reales de vellón* (about 10 million *pesos fuertes*) in two types of loan. The first consisted of interest-free sums between October 1808 and November 1809 totaling 47.7 million reales, of which all but 3.7 million were quickly repaid with colonial specie. The second type was three interest-bearing loans of 160 million reales: the first 20 million required pressuring the Cadiz merchant community where 15 (18 percent of 315 merchant subscribers) accounted for half the 20 million subscribed. Emboldened by continued colonial specie inflows in the second half of 1809, the Junta Central sought another loan repayable on specie from Veracruz. Then, in December, a third offering, the largest, of 120 million reales was taken up by the Cadiz Consulado.

16. Financing the Resistance in Spain

El nuestro [comercio] con la América no puede mantenerse baxo otra forma . . . Si se altera en sus relaciones esenciales, triste Espana el dia que suceda.

El comercio de Cádiz . . . en 12 de octubre (1811)

Los eminentes servicios que a la causa pública ha hecho en todos tiempos . . . el vecindario de Cádiz. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios* (1811)

Los comerciantcs, estc exército de la opresión ultramarina, cuya vanguardia está en Cádiz, el centro en los puertos de América, y la retaguardia en sus capitales.

Servando Teresa de Mier, "Carta . . . ," *Semanario patriótico americano*, 13 September 1812

He aqui a la América en la parte principal de su felicidad que es el comcrcio a suerte de dos docenas de consignatarios de Cádiz. Carlos Maraí de Bustamante, "EI Yndio Mexicano"

Si ese Reyno [Nueva España] nos ayuda como hemos menester, será el, y Cádiz, el restaurador de la monarquia. Francisco Escudero de Isasi, Cádiz, 1 May 1810

The general destabilizing factor over the last two decades of the Spanish empire in America was the two great wars in which Spain supported France against England, first between 1796 and 1801 and again between 1804 and 1808, after a prosperous interim in which "la industria, la agricultura y la mayor parte de nuestros capitales han sido el resultado de algunos años de paz."[1] When in 1808 Spain abandoned its traditional ally, France, the transformation of England from enemy to friend reinforced the process of destabilization under different forms. The Spanish Empire in America still remained a major area in the conflict of the two superpowers of the time, in terms of raw materials and silver, consumer demand and growth potential (if somewhat exaggerated). Colonialism has an internal resilience that crises external to the system seem alone able to shatter.

Two wars at sea—blockade, naval combat, and privateering—affected unevenly Spain's colonial system. Deeply affected were the Caribbean's core and periphery: New Spain and Cuba at the core and, at the periphery, "Caracas" (Venezuela), "Nueva Granada" (Colombia), and the islands of Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. During both conflict episodes, English, continental European, and Asian products seeped into the Spanish imperial commercial system via large-scale smuggling, neutral shipping, and, after 1804, via special contracts arranged by Spain's Caja de Consolidación. The system was also penetrated by the presence of English warships at Veracruz authorized to load government and private silver shipments for English ports, often routed via Jamaica. Such apparent incongruities in wartime reveal the underlying structures that government policy must respect and even serve. The flexibility of Spanish commercial policy was the product of necessity; the special contracts with neutral trading firms, 1804–1808, facilitated the transfer of government and government-appropriated church funds from New Spain as well as the inflow of imports, which otherwise would have seeped through proliferating smuggling channels.

The authorized presence of neutral and then enemy shipping—mainly U.S. and English, respectively—in colonial harbors during the second war with England (1804–1808) marked a departure from Spanish policy. Such shipping and freight movements opened new commercial circuits as well as created the problem of their management or elimination once Spain broke with France in May 1808. Spain now supported (and was supported by) its former hegemonic antagonist, whose expansionist tendencies had first forged and then sustained the eighteenth-century pattern of Franco-Spanish collaboration. From the 1760s onward, the Spanish government had persistently deflected French and English pressures for colonial trade concessions, on the principle of developing and exploiting colonial resources for the presumed benefit of commercial, agricultural, and would-be industrial entrepreneurs in the peninsula, by exercising an imperial system of apparent monopoly, comparable to France's *exclusif*.

However, once England became an ally in Spain's resistance to the French occupation, how could English military and financial support be secured without yielding commercial concessions at a time when the persistent English government "tried to persuade the Spanish government that intercourse with South America is indispensably necessary for . . . obtaining . . . the means of continuing its aid to the Spanish cause" by specifying "some lowering of restrictions on colonial trade which had been made in favor of neutrals . . . be extended to an ally?"[2] Could Spain's recently formed Junta Central, enjoying at best tenuous legitimacy, afford to toler-

ate another wartime expedient like that issued in 1807, permitting Havana's merchants to reexport to Veracruz presumed surplus imports (*sobrantes*) sent from the peninsula? This, like neutral trade in wartime, was another rupture in commercial policy. In the third place, even after prohibiting neutral shipping entry to Spanish colonial ports, as well as Havana's reexports to Veracruz, would it be possible at major harbors such as Havana and Veracruz to control smuggling (mushrooming to an unheard extent everywhere in the Caribbean) when much of the metropole was occupied or under imminent occupation, when French forces occupied Barcelona's small industrial zone, and when Spanish merchants in the unoccupied zones of the peninsula lacked shipping—even if we assume they could arrange cargo?

Junta Central

These were prominent issues facing the Junta Central formed in September 1808, and on the success or failure of its colonial policy, especially trade policy, depended the survival of the Spanish colonial system, the Junta's capacity to resist the French-backed government at Madrid, and—to many contemporaries—the survival of Spain as a European state of significance. All recognized the importance of Spain's major colonies in America, New Spain and Cuba. New Spain alone contained half the population under Spanish colonial rule in the New World; over a thirteen-month period (March 1807–April 1808) the English navy withdrew at Veracruz 11.5 million *pesos fuertes*, or hard dollars.[3] Spain, England, and anti-French Europe depended on New Spain's silver exports, while the Junta Central searching for a financial basis depended on customs revenues of Mexico City and Veracruz, as well as the loans and "patriotic donations" of their mercantile, mining, landowning, and corporate church bodies. As the perimeter of the resistance of the Junta Central and its successor (the Regencia) shrank first to Lower Andalusia and then to the port of Cadiz, the Junta Central came under the influence of that ally of the merchant groups overseas at Mexico City and Veracruz, namely the Cadiz Consulado "alrededor del Supremo Poder, velando todos sus pasos sobre el ramo [de comercio] viviendo, tratando, discurriendo familiarmente con los administradores públicos."[4] New Spain and Cuba became the primary foci of colonial decision making, first for the Junta Central and then the Regency over nine months from late January to the opening of the Cortes in September 1810.

To be sure, crisis in the metropole involved structures and attitudes, and it was symptomatic of conflict between traditionalism rooted in Spanish society, religion, and preconstitutional monarchy and a reformism of few

achievements and many articulate ideologues. Yet the Spanish phenomenon was also rooted in the crisis of relations between metropole and colonies, relationships paramount to policy makers throughout the eighteenth century. In the effort to preserve the allegiance (and financial backing) of the colonies in America between 1808 and 1810, the policies of successive metropolitan authorities—Junta Suprema de Sevilla, Junta Central, Regency, and then Cortes—oscillated between traditionalism and reformism passing through the compromised zone of moderation. Periodically, the necessity (and hope, too) of ensuring the backing of influential groups in the colonies provided Spanish liberals the chance to inject their views on the shifting nature of imperial relations.

Yet proposals for change were never intended to be synonymous with liberation, only with more tolerable levels of colonial subordination to the metropole. At its birth, Spain's nineteenth-century liberalism was tempered by colonial issues and required reshaping economic policy from *comercio libre* to *comercio directo*, from colonial ports trading only with the metropole to trading with friendly and neutral ports. At the core of the debate was how best to preserve opportunity overseas for enterprise along with mobility for emigrating Cantabrian and Catalan peasants from Asturias, the *montaña*, the Basque provinces, and Cataluña. The pressure-group politics of wealthy and influential mercantile networks at Mexico City, Veracruz, Havana, and Cadiz shaped decisions concerning *the* critical colonial issue between 1808 and 1810: the politics of colonial trade.

The immediate problem of Spain's provincial juntas, called into existence to repudiate the legal government at Madrid and then support the national government of resistance or Junta Central, was revenue—taxes, customs duties, domestic and foreign loans, even patriotic donations—to support military forces of resistance scattered over the peninsula. Withdrawal from Madrid (31 July) of the upper echelons of José I's government, following the unexpected surrender of French troops at Bailén, left intact at Madrid much of the Bourbon administrative apparatus until French forces reoccupied the capital. Meanwhile, the Junta Central remained at Aranjuez, only later shifting to Sevilla. Over four months, August to November of 1808, the Junta Central could utilize Madrid's finance bureaucracy—"los Consejos, las Secretarias con todos sus individuos, la Tesorería general, las oficinas de Consolidación, los archivos y cuantos documentos podian necesitarse."[5] Francisco Saavedra's later recollection of those months of respite probably exaggerated the degree of bureaucratic efficiency attained; still, compared to the disorder in 1809 and 1810 when the Junta Central had to operate out of Sevilla, those months were indeed a time of administrative routine, a

time to explore domestic and foreign funding while Consolidación funds and lay and religious donations came across the Atlantic from the colony of New Spain. Meanwhile, in a proclamation to the "nation," Garay and Quintana prepared the way for a financial appeal by denouncing the economic policies of the former government of Charles IV, its "dilapidación continua y monstruosa," which had "agotado todas las Fuentes de la prosperidad, obstruido los canales que llevan el alimento y la vida por todos los miembros del Estado, disipado los tesoros."[6] Jovellanos, who should have been more knowledgeable and discerning, blamed Godoy for wasting government resources in "misteriosas negociaciones, vergonzosos agiotajes, y escandaloso monipodio."[7]

Early in October 1808, the Junta Central issued a circular inviting contributions to the forces of resistance struggling for "la común felicidad e independencia de toda España" in the form of subscriptions (at 4 percent interest or, hopefully, interest free) to a public loan of 1 million pesos (20 million *reales de vellón*). This would cover current outlays until 2 million pesos of Consolidación funds retained at London could be recovered and then a loan floated there by the London government or private investors. From these proceeds contributors to the 1 million peso loan would be repaid. Under the reassuring signature of Charles III's distinguished minister recalled from retirement, Floridablanca, the circular appealed first to Spain's "Nobleza, empezando por los Grandes, que forman el primer cuerpo," then to clerics as well as religious corporate bodies, to "Comercio y Capitalistas particulares" and in general to "los poseedores de grandes patrimonies y riquezas."[8] En bloc, these status and income groups formed "the moneyed people in Madrid" and elsewhere in the peninsula.

To inspire confidence as a responsible government, the Junta Central took other measures to reassure potential lenders. On 13 October it promised to honor all obligations of the preceding government—"pago de viudades, sueldos, vitalicios, intereses de vales"—followed one month later (18 November) by suspension of public auction of church real estate expropriated under Consolidación.[9] That the new government could field armies and honor the national debt while abandoning this major revenue source failed to inspire confidence. Contracts for provisioning Spain's armed forces had long been farmed out to merchants like the marques de las Hormazas and corporate bodies like the Cinco Gremios Mayores of Madrid; the state lacked government cadres capable of handling such operations. Moreover, early attempts to borrow 20 million reales from Madrid merchants and such capital-rich religious funds as the Memorias de Iturralde proved fruitless. Merchants were unwilling to lend "si no han de dar en proporción los

grandes y los ricos."[10] Matters were not improved by the French reoccupation of Madrid and its ministries in late November, severing the Junta Central's links to the civil service and its records. Now the Junta Central was, to quote Hacienda Minister Saavedra, like a "máquina que pierde muchas de sus ruedas." While fiscal reforms were contemplated during 1809—elimination of multiple provincial taxes and state-run monopolies, reduction of customs rates and national imposts (*renlas generales*), and recalculation of total government revenues—Saavedra had to turn in the short term to the colonial funds deposited at London and to the English government and private investors for operating income.[11] The response of private investors in the Consulado de Mexico was impressive, as Marichal has noted. In 1809 its wealthy members sent the Junta Central large sums: Antonio Basoco, 200,000 silver pesos; Francisco Alonso Terán, 200,000; Tomas Acha, 150,000; Sebastian de Heras Soto, 100,000; Gabriel de Iturbe, 100,000; conde de la Cortina, 50,000; and Gabriel de Yermo, 50,000. Fifty other merchants sent smaller sums.[12]

No doubt having resisted French designs to absorb the Spanish Empire into its coprosperity sphere, Junta Central officials had no intention of escaping into an English embrace. This became clear in a 26 October proclamation seeking broad support for the "revolución española" which, it assured, would resist the French.[13] The Junta Central also vowed not to become hooked on English financial infusions, knowing the price would include commercial concessions in the American colonies. And while some of the Junta's supporters, its spokesman Manuel de Quintana, for example, viewed the Consolidación program as an "atentado a la confianza y crédito público," the bureaucracy of both the Junta de Sevilla and the government of national unity in the Junta Central had no reservation about claiming the millions of colonial *pesos fuertes* scrupulously collected by New Spain's Junta de Consolidación under deposed Viceroy Iturrigaray.[14] Sevilla's agents dispatched quickly to London, Juan Ruiz de Apodaca and Jácome, early reported that William Duff Gordon, of the merchant banking firm of Gordon & Murphy, promised to hand over New Spain's Consolidación receipts in his possession to a legally constituted national government in Spain. In competition for these funds with the Juntas of Asturias and Galicia, Saavedra (for the Junta de Sevilla) emphasized that Sevilla would disburse them "unicamente a la paga de los intereses vencidos de los vales rcales" wherever coupon holders resided in the peninsula. In fact, most *vales* claimants were reportedly in Andalusia.[15]

Wary of the proliferating local juntas in the peninsula, London authorities simply suspended the transfer of Consolidación deposits to the penin-

sula until a government of national unity could materialize. Cadiz's merchant community had long been aware of the operations of Juan Murphy (of Malaga), his banking interests at Madrid, his London firm of Gordon & Murphy and its role (along with such firms as Reid, Irving, or Gómez de la Torre, Pérez Mazarredo, or that of Tastet Brothers) in contracting with Madrid's office of Consolidación to withdraw government silver from Veracruz since 1806. Cadiz merchants—Pedro Antonio de Aguirre and Miguel Lobo—were probably behind Sevilla's decision to send agents to London early to claim the "sums of money belonging to the Spanish government and brought by English merchants to Great Britain from South America in the course of the past year."[16] The agents reasoned that the French invasion had fused "los recursos y la fuerza de las dos naciones" and that England's financial assistance was a "necesidad política.[17] And then when the Junta Central appeared, it too immediately laid claim to the Consolidación funds with Gordon & Murphy and Reid, Irving, dispatching to London former prime minister Pedro Cevallos.[18] Collaborating with Apodaca and Jácome, he managed by late November 1808 to have London officials authorize the transfer to Cadiz of about 2.5 million pesos in silver; in December, both London firms indicated they would hand over "to the government now accredited in the name of Ferdinand VII" roughly 2 million pesos—"the moneys and effects . . . belonging to the Spanish Consolidación Fund."[19] This was neither the first nor the last time New Spain's financial resources kept afloat its metropole.

Since large-scale transfers of silver from New Spain via England under contracts with so-called neutrals ended with the formation of a provisional government in the metropole—between March 1807 and April 1808 English warships sailed from Veracruz with almost 1.5 million pesos[20]—the Junta Central had to authorize new access to New Spain's silver not only to support England's war effort against Napoleonic France but also as token of gratitude for England's "grandes remesas de dinero efectivo . . . enviando exorvitantes cantidades de moneda" to subsidize the Junta Central. In April 1809, Hacienda Minister Saavedra, suspending "lo que prescriben nuestras Leyes de Indias," authorized English warships to transport agents to Veracruz to buy silver pesos at current exchange rates in return for thirty-day sight drafts on the "Banco Ynglés"—English treasury bills.[21] Over the next nine months, it was reported, "the quantity of specie shipped from that port [Veracruz] . . . has exceeded 60 millions" and the observer added, "What a valuable country!"[22]

The presence at Veracruz of England's silver-purchasing agents was designed to finance the London government's operations at home and on the

European continent. The Spanish government, of course, had to fend for itself. True, colonial revenues obtained in New Spain from taxation and Consolidación ultimately made their way to Cadiz; meanwhile, the Junta Central had to finance immediate expenditure. Of necessity, the Junta relied upon the financial resources of the peninsula's leading center of trade and finance, the merchant community of Cadiz, a dependence opening the resistance government to "los cálculos y especulaciones de la codícia mercantil" and to political blackmail on policy issues affecting that community's trade with the American colonies.[23] Cadiz's financial resources drawn from transatlantic trade and the mutual interest of kindred groups at Veracruz and Mexico City clarify Cadiz's influence after 1808, first under the Junta de Sevilla, then the Junta Central, and, after January 1810, under the Regency.

Cadiz: State Finances

These resources were no recent phenomenon. During the eighteenth century, Cadiz had serviced multiple financial operations inherited from its predecessor commercial corporate body, the Consulado de Sevilla, disbursing interest payments to claimants (many of dubious antecedents) on funds long collected under import duties known as Lonja, Balbás, and Infantes, and to loans Cadiz had made in 1705 to the new Bourbon regime.[24] The record of Cadiz financial commitments to the Bourbon state in the first half of the eighteenth century is obscure, far more so than that of the financially powerful Cinco Gremios Mayores of Madrid. Gifts (*donativos*) and grants (*servicios*) were made as recompense for illegal trade stratagems causing loss of government customs revenue; the Consulado de Cadiz once claimed cumulative "donativos graciosos" to Madrid over the period 1716–1750 totaled 180 million reales, probably a much inflated figure.[25] In 1811 Cadiz asserted such loans over the whole eighteenth century amounted to 329 million reales (59 million alone in the years 1793–1800), to which it added another 119.5 million between 1805 and 1808—most repaid with interest.[26]

Despite such Consulado claims, evidence abounds of the declining leverage of the Cadiz community on colonial trade policy clearly after 1759. Major modifications—the Reglamentos of 1765, 1778, and 1789—as well as the striking wartime expedient of *comercio neutro* (1797–1799) testify to Madrid's capacity to reject the Cadiz community's immobilism. Yet there is no doubt that economic pressure from Cadiz's Consulado was behind Madrid's abandonment of *comercio neutro* in 1799, perhaps recompense for Cadiz's significant participation in three "voluntary" *donativos* in the 1790s—repaid, incidentally, by 1803 on colonial revenues shipped to Spain.[27] More than

one-third (174.1 million *regles vellón*) of Cadiz "loans" to the Spanish state between 1700 and 1808 (458.5 million) occurred in fifteen years after 1793.[28]

Over the course of the eighteenth century, the volume of funds held on deposit by the Consulado de Cadiz's treasury grew. Some such deposits were funds in escrow, pending settlement of bankruptcy proceedings (*quiebras*, *concursos*). Indication of the size of its investment pool cropped up in 1793 at the onset of more than a decade of massive government deficits;[29] this induced Hacienda Minister Gardoqui to advise Cadiz of the government's need to borrow 1 million *peso fuertes* (20 million reales). To this Consulado officials reported on deposit 748,850 *pesos fuertes* (14.9 million reales) of which only 8 percent consisted of government paper, the interest-bearing treasury notes (*vales reales*). Consulado officials offered 600,000 *pesos fuertes* (12 million reales) "de sus proprios caudales" as a *servicio pecuniario* and on terms foreshadowing those of more than a decade later.[30] Thereafter the already archaic term for a loan—*servicio*—disappeared from the Consulado's lexicon. One suspects the mentality did not.

The Consulado agreed to supplement its 12 million reales by raising 8 million from local merchants (*individuos del comercio*) at annual interest of 4 percent—still a modest but not the lowest rate. Repayment would be drawn from two duties on colonial trade flows: 1 percent on exports to and imports from the American colonies, plus 0.5 percent on imports of colonial silver and gold (*consulado antiguo*)—both collectible at *all* peninsular ports of entry.[31] Next, while Cadiz customs officials would continue collecting the duties, the chief customs officer (*administrador*) would deliver receipts monthly to the Consulado's treasury, a practice apparently inaugurated when the Consulado had provided a *contribución extraordinaria* to Madrid from 1779 to 1781 to finance arming corsairs during war with England in support of the independence of the North American colonies.[32] The terms proved so mutually satisfactory that four years later (1797) the Consulado loaned 40 million reales at 6 percent; but this time the Consulado tied its offer to a policy demand—namely, that Madrid withdraw a concession allowing shipment in neutral vessels to the colonies of one thousand tons of non-Spanish products for each 1 million reales lent to the Spanish government.[33] (Did this contribute to the policy reversal of 1799 that withdrew *comercio neutro*?) In 1800 the Consulado subscribed to another 40 million reales of what Madrid called a 300 million *subsidio extraordinario*.[34]

The extent of the Cadiz community's liquidity, despite acknowledged wartime losses in shipping and goods, had inspired Godoy's government in 1801 to propose that the Consulado provide a 20 million reales loan to finance naval operations, guaranteeing prompt repayment "a los 8 dias de

la llegada de los primeros caudales de America." This time the Consulado dragged its feet, declaring shortage of funds and finally requesting 20 percent interest—an extraordinary counterproposal;[35] perhaps Cadiz merchants remained embittered by Madrid's insistence upon *comercio neutro* (1797–1799) and their perception of lack of official status—as they put it, "poca atención [con que] son considerados los comerciantes de este pueblo."[36] The counterproposal affronted Godoy, who lost no time informing Consulado officials that the government would never forget this rebuff. Unexpectedly the exceptionally large (and of course encouraging) inflows of colonial silver on government account following the Peace of Amiens permitted accelerated amortization of the 20 million reales loan of 1793 by 1803.[37] Colonial economic growth and a peaking of New Spain's silver output coincided to restore confidence in the Spanish government's financial management.

These details of a decade of wartime finance yield a pattern of interaction of state and society, between the Madrid government's Finance Ministry and investors at Cadiz, both the merchant community and the Consulado itself. Repeatedly the government had approached the most important commercial and financial center of peninsula and empire. Controlling a high percentage of colonial trade flows, Cadiz attracted venture capital from the rest of Spain. Its customs revenues were Spain's largest and consisted of a high proportion of colonial silver; consequently holders of the government's interest-bearing treasury notes preferred to send them to Cadiz to assure interest payment in specie; Consolidación itself reportedly sent *vales* there to be discounted for silver. This accounts for the boast made in 1811 that as much as one-third of outstanding *vales* was held in the Cadiz area; confidence in the Spanish government's solvency remained a multiple of New Spain's silver outflows.[38] Further, the Cadiz Consulado, perceiving the government's financial problems, could demand high interest and virtual autonomy in its payouts to subscribers to those government loans which it managed; bookkeeping legerdemain would go undiscovered until some distant government audit. Perhaps more critical—witness the demand by the Consulado in 1797 that neutral cargo be prohibited—financial power could support correspondingly large political pressure. This general pattern developed rapidly in the four critical years after 1805 and helps explain the Cadiz group's revived influence by June 1810.

Renewal of hostilities between Spain and England in late 1804, plus revenue shortfalls complicated by the subsidy payments to France's Trésor Public, triggered the decision at the end of 1804 to extend Consolidación to New Spain and other American colonies. But returns on this operation were delayed; it was necessary to seek more immediate sources of liquidity

other than an unpopular resort to consumer tax increases. The Hacienda Ministry turned desperately to the merchants and their Consulado at Cadiz to finance a loan, then to administer it along with a second, nationwide loan. No longer were Madrid's Cinco Gremios Mayores and merchant bankers the government's principal financial instruments. Cadiz was now metamorphosed into peninsular Spain's financial capital; in its own words, "Esta plaza es la que más se ha distinguido en subscripciones."[39]

The Cadiz Consulado's management of what became a series of government borrowing operations began in 1805. In that year, first, the government requested that Cadiz merchants lend 1 million pesos to guarantee operations of the Caja de Consolidación pending the arrival of revenues from New Spain and other American colonies. Second, the government requested that Consulado manage a public offering of 50,000 shares (200 reales per share) bearing annual interest of 5.5 percent over eight years, redemption of 6,250 shares annually.[40] Interest payments and amortization were secured on a new tax on exports and imports—the *derecho de subvención*—collectible in both colonies and peninsula. Sales opened at Madrid and then spread to other cities and towns of Spain, where they were sold by Consulados or by local Consolidación agents. After the first three months (July to October), the offering seemed a financial disaster; only 4,052 shares were taken up, with Cadiz and Madrid speculators absorbing 60 and 33 percent, respectively. The proportion of paper *vales* to silver in the initial proceeds (8,102,000 reales) in 1805 is not recorded; years later a government auditor categorized them as silver.[41] But by quickly improving terms, employing the intermediation of the Cadiz Consulado, and in the absence of alternate speculative operations in colonial cargoes as a result of the English blockade, the Spanish government finally succeeded, between January 1806 and January 1807, in placing the balance of outstanding shares.

Inducements to investors were attractive: at first only 40 million reales (20,000 shares) were marketed; interest rates discriminated between purchase in silver (12 percent) and *vales* (6 percent), payable each trimester; hopefully full redemption one year after termination of hostilities would be shorter than the eight years originally indicated in the 100 million issue. The inducements worked, for the 40 million offering was snapped up in two weeks and induced Madrid to follow up with two further issues of 20 million issues, from March to May 1806 and July 1806 to January 1807. To bolster potential investors' confidence, the Consolidación office conferred management of the loans specifically upon the Consulado's *prior* and two *consules*, stipulating they retain their elective office until liquidation of the loans and a thorough audit.[42]

TABLE 16.1
Cadiz: Financial Surrogate for Government, 1805–1807
(in reales)

Date Issued	Specie	*Vales*	Total
July 1805	8,570,000	—	8,570,000
January 1806	2,982,656	37,017,343	39,999,999
February 1806	848,543	19,151,456	19,999,999
July 1806	982,528	19,047,138	19,989,666
June–August 1806 (consul)	56	8,809,944	8,810,000
May 1807	321,876	8,912,118	9,233,994
Total	13,735,144	94,308,846	108,043,990

Source: José Manuel de Aparici to Secretaria de Indias, 20 May 1815. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2320.

To sum up: 50,000 shares of the 100 million reales loan of 1805 eventually were taken up in four public offerings spread over eighteen months, July 1805 to January 1807, the proceeds (90 million reales) going to the Caja de Consolidación at Madrid. Interest and annual redemption (by *sorteo*) were covered from proceeds of the specific new tax, *derecho de subvención*, collectible in peninsula and colonies. Further, by reissuing redeemed shares, an additional 22.4 million reales were obtained to meet government outlays to maintain the Ceuta garrison and the royal navy. State and trade were fused through government finance to a degree, one suspects, never before attained by Cadiz merchants, overshadowing the role of the Madrid-based Cinco Gremios Mayores and the Compañía de Filipinas. Intractable government deficits were rendering the Cadiz Consulado indispensable to government operations by the spring of 1808.[43] In all, Cadiz obtained for government disposition at least 108 million reales, 95 percent in paper *vales* as canny speculators hoarded silver and invested dubious paper (Table 16.1).[44]

If the distribution of 1805 is used as a surrogate for total geographic distribution of the lenders, Cadiz investors held at least 60 percent; an official audit later posited "un corto numero de vecindarios de Cadiz . . . dió el total de vales."[45] One may conclude that over the two years, 1806–1808, *vales* holders turned in their treasury notes or shares bearing a higher interest rate secured, not on further sales of ecclesiastical real estate or expropriation of church liquid funds, but on receipts of duties collected on trade flows of Spain and America, the *derecho de subvención*. Investor (or was it speculator?) confidence in government finance, at least until 1810, was confirmed by the inflow of *derecho de subvención* receipts.[46]

It is impossible to be more than proximate in calculating receipts of the *derecho de subvención* collected in peninsula and colonies in America. Review

of accounts presented by Consulado officials to a government audit reveals that the rate of exchange, *peso fuertes* to *reales de vellón*, varied between 17.1 and 18.2 reales per peso delivered at Cadiz net of "revaja de derechos reales, flete [usually 5 percent] y demas gastos." In years of financial turmoil, 1805–1810, the Spanish government could not obtain a critical audit of the financial manipulations of the commercial corporation upon which it relied for funding current operations. For its part, the Cadiz merchant community was never reluctant to advertise its patriotism by publicizing "los eminentes servicios que a la causa pública" it had made "en todos tiempos."[47]

An audit was finally undertaken in 1815 at the end of the French occupation and on the return of the nonconstitutional Bourbon monarchy. José Manuel de Aparici y Prado, *contador general* of the Consejo de Indias, was sharply critical of the *prior* and *consules* of the Cadiz Consulado who had handled subscriptions, *subvención* receipts, and payouts. He uncovered instances of fraud in listing subscribers and accounting for disbursements; everywhere he found "la oscuridad, confusión y desorden en su extensión." For example, a *consul* of the Consulado, Simón de Ágreda, had subscribed to the loan despite legal prohibition, then collected interest (89,866 reales) on 400,000 loaned and repaid. Moreover, Consulado officials had inflated their personnel rolls and raised salaries "sin expresar quienes son los tales empleados, quienes los nombró, con que autoridad, quando y con que dotaciones"; the Cadiz Consulado, insisted Aparici y Prado, "no ha pensado en otra cosa que inventar gratificaciones por qualquiera comisión." As a result, the national interest had suffered only for the "utilidad de un corto número de vecindarios dc Cádiz." This devastating assessment of 1815 hardly matched the Cadiz Consulado's flamboyant self-promotion four years earlier in its *Demonstración de los distinguidos servicios . . . por la sagrada causa de nuestra independencia nacional*.[48]

These reservations notwithstanding, an assessment may be hazarded on the basis of Consulado accounts prepared in 1809, 1811, and 1815.[49] First, as to total receipts and the respective contributions of Spanish and colonial collection of the *derecho de subvención de querra*: of the total (51.3 million *reales de vellón*), collection in the metropole represented 73.6 percent, the American colonial share 26.3. Colonial collections, however, merit two observations. First, they were all in silver (13.5 million reales), while silver was undoubtedly minimal in the Spanish collections as well as in the proceeds of the 50,000 shares of six loans (5.1 million reales); in point of fact, colonial collections were higher than 13.5 million, since between 2 and 3 reales per *peso fuerte* disappeared in duties, shipping costs, and commissions between American ports and Cadiz. Second, and more significant, the

principal sources of *subvención* revenues in Spain and America were Cadiz and Veracruz, Cadiz supplying 37.5 percent of Spain's collections, Veracruz 48.2 percent of American receipts. In other terms, here was proof that the financial core of the Spanish Empire over five years, 1805–1810, was in the American trades for which the port of Cadiz was the main entrepôt. Small wonder there was an effective alliance among the merchant communities of Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City in the greatest crisis of Spain's imperial system, and how accurate was the observation by the Cadiz community that its fate was linked to the colonial trade, "pues siendo el [comercio] de este Puerto con las Américas el único apoyo de su subsistencia."[50]

In fact, Cadiz's position as leading emporium of colonial trade before the Bourbons' abdication in 1808, and as the sole peninsular port of significance not occupied by Franco-Spanish forces after 1808, permitted its merchants and Consulado to expand their role in financing the governments of national resistance, first the Junta de Sevilla, then the Junta Central, finally the Consejo de Regencia—and to exert leverage on commercial policy, especially in 1810.

So it was that in June 1808, within weeks after the Junta de Sevilla was formed, two agents—*sevillanos* Andrés Coca and Victor Soret—were ordered to explore financial support, whether gifts or loans, in Cadiz's merchant community and merchant guild.[51] Sevilla's political elite must have been aware of Cadiz's merchants' rancor over the commercial expedients of the trio of Godoy, Soler, and Sixto Espinosa: their contracts, first with Ouvrard (1804), later with Gordon & Murphy and other English merchant banking houses, to carry on neutral trade during the conflict with England; the entry of English warships at Veracruz to load silver for English ports; the concessions granted the Compañía de Filipinas to ship Asian and English goods from English ports directly to select Spanish colonial ports; and—last but hardly least—the government's unwillingness to rescind the orders of 1806 and 1807 permitting Havana's merchants to reexport imports from the neutral United States to Veracruz and Campeche. Nor could the Sevilla Junta be unaware that Cadiz's attitude was shared with the wealthy merchant groups overseas at Veracruz and Mexico City.

Yet one could hardly expect members of the Cadiz community to finance Sevilla's Junta without the assurance that other provincial juntas would also recognize Sevilla's claim to hegemony over both Spain and the Indies. "I think the merchants will scarcely advance more money," predicted Gibraltar's governor Hugh Dalrymple in mid-June 1808, "whilst there is no National Government the credit of which can be pledged for repayment."[52] The Cadiz Consulado did not explicitly reject the proposal of Coca and

Soret; first it was used as a vehicle to point to the "notorio descrédito" of the pre-May (Godoy) government's commercial policies that had generated "una desconfianza tan general en esta Plaza hacia todo cuerpo político" and absorbed so much of the Consulado's funds that there were now none available for the "amortización del todo, ni parte de los muchos millones en que se halla empeñada, ni para el pago de sus intereses."[53] At a moment when the Spanish state was crumbling, the Cadiz establishment would support a government only on its own terms. Consulado officers López Martínez (*prior*) and Ágreda and Miguel de Carlos (*consules*) then questioned Sevilla's proposal, which had omitted indicating the loan's size, interest rate, terms of amortization, and the tax basis of repayment—the security. An acceptable proposal, they pointed out, required "bases tan claras que no admitan interpretaciones ulteriores ni den lugar a temores de falta de pago que se promete a los prestamistas de su capital."[54] Equally reluctant to lend to the Junta de Sevilla were English investors who also singled out that Junta's opacity about "the sum of Money . . . actually wanted . . . the nature of the securities . . . and the mode in which these securities are to be given."[55] Even when rather generous terms were offered to Cadiz in July 1808—a request for 2 million pesos at 12 percent interest, secured on Cadiz's customs receipts—only one subscriber came forward to offer 1,000 reales, so the Cadiz Consulado reported, to purchase a 50 peso subscription.[56] On the other hand, political expediency dictated some financial support to Sevilla; so between May and August 1808 the Cadiz community provided to Sevilla in financial assistance 18.9 million reales, 10.8 in gifts, and 8 in an interest-free loan.[57]

Toward the Junta Central, Sevilla's successful competitor for national recognition, the Cadiz community proved somewhat more supportive financially. Its support became all the more critical after an initial effort in October and November 1808 to borrow at London 15 million (10 in specie), a proposal advanced by two prominent merchants of Cadiz, Miguel Lobo and Pedro Antonio de Aguirre. They hoped their operation would be backed by England's Exchequer ("sobre fondos publicos"), its Consolidación funds, and the further security (only as a last-ditch inducement) first of the Cadiz's customs and then the backup of those of Veracruz and Mexico City. They proposed their loan as "político y mercantil" since the Junta Central would be able to draw upon it for specie, bullion, textiles, or military equipment.[58] English authorities rejected it as preposterous; the failure deepened the Junta Central's dependence upon the Cadiz establishment.

Cadiz did provide two forms of financial support over the sixteen-month existence of the Junta Central. The first consisted of interest-free loans be-

tween October 1808 and November 1809—47.7 million reales, of which all but 3.7 million were rapidly repaid with colonial specie arrivals.[59] Of a second type were three interest-bearing loans totaling 160 million reales. The first of these (1 million *pesos fuertes*) required sales pressure on members of the merchant community; only 57 (18 percent) of 315 subscribers accounted for 50 percent of the 985,000 pesos offered.[60] Emboldened by colonial specie inflows in the last half of 1808—England was now an ally and Spanish shipping could again link the American colonies to Spain—the Junta Central requested a second 1 million real loan repayable in silver shipments from Veracruz. Then in December the third and largest offering of 120 million reales was apparently made by the Cadiz Consulado.[61] The merchant guild, to be sure, used the occasion to reiterate opposition to the special favors granted to the Compañía de Filipinas authorizing shipments between England and Veracruz; the Consulado complained that its objections "no eran atendidas tanto como convenia."[62] Rapid servicing of 44.2 million reales of the interest-free loans must be credited to the influx of specie on government account shipped from America, principally from Veracruz.

Toreno concluded accurately that the Junta Central repaid "en general las anticipaciones del comercio de Cadiz o de particulares, con los caudales que venian de America," but he tacked on the reservation that "no por eso se dejó de aumentar la deuda."[63] In all, over a fifteen-month period, the Cadiz merchant community mobilized roughly 207.6 million reales (10.4 in *peso fuertes*) for the Junta Central and probably amortized much of this from 146.8 million reales in government income from America and in duties on precious metals imports entering Cadiz between March and October 1810.[64] In view of the capacity of the Cadiz community to finance the Junta Central, the Regency that succeeded it assigned to the Junta de Cadiz—by now sole financial center of Spain, which could "a la sazón . . . auxiliar con fondos al Gobierno"—full responsibility for the government's finances. When the Junta promptly appropriated the cash balance in the possession of the Consulado, that body insisted the Regencia guarantee repayment on specie brought by "los primeros [buques] que vengan de Indias."[65] To the Spanish cleric and long-term resident in New Spain, Abad y Queipo, in 1810 the Cadiz Consulado's "codicia mercantil" was the "escollo en que cestrelló la nave del gobierno de la Suprema Junta Central."[66]

Regencia

As the regents shifted to the Junta de Cadiz responsibility for government finance, they continued their predecessor's financial strategy, seeking

subsidies or loans from the English government and London's merchant bankers, from the Cadiz merchant community, and from the empire's wealthiest colony, New Spain. In reality, "La regencia solo podía contar con las entradas del distrito de Cádiz y con los caudales de América," as Toreno put it.[67] The regents relied upon New Spain as a kind of collateral; as the struggle continued against the French and their Spanish allies in the peninsula, the resources of New Spain and the preservation of its trade for the oligopolists of Cadiz remained a paramount concern of most regents. They had no other real option.

In seeking to tap English financial sources, the regents proved no more resourceful than the Junta Central. In 1809 the Junta Central, foreseeing the large shortfall between expenditure and income, had asked for a loan of £18.3 million from London bankers, backed by the security of the English Exchequer.[68] Although this attempt failed, the financially strapped Regency sought another amount (£10 million) early in 1810, which it later realistically reduced by 80 percent to £2 million.[69] For their part the English hoped that the promises to the American colonies, first by the Junta Central and then the Regency, of equality of status might translate into the entry of friendly nations' merchant vessels into Spain's colonial ports. In fact, England's minister at Cadiz, Wellesley, thought in April 1810 "that this was the moment for concluding a commercial arrangement with the Spanish government" in the form of a loan in exchange for direct trade between English ports and those of the Spanish colonies plus an across-the-board customs reduction by Spain to 11 percent on prices in ships' manifests.[70] However, the regents had no intention to allow financial needs to force them to tolerate arrangements vaguely reminiscent of the unequal treaty clauses of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and truly reminiscent of the commercial treaty that the Portuguese government in colonial exile at Rio de Janeiro had just negotiated with Admiral Strangford. Strangford's treaty making, in the Spanish view, was "much in favor of the English" and "prejudicial" to Portuguese interests.[71] The regents abandoned their negotiation, claiming such trade concessions would stir the "odio de toda la nación"—shorthand for the influential pressure group at Cadiz.[72]

That group's economic leverage grew under the Regency, which inherited the financial problems of the Junta Central. Shortly before the Junta's collapse at the end of January 1810, the Cadiz Consulado reminded the Junta of the Consulado's "extensos e interesantísimos encargos con que se le ha honrrado relativos a los 6 empréstitos que ha habierto . . . para socorro del Estado, su administración, pago de intereses."[73] These were overwhelming reasons for the financially troubled Regency to accept the Junta de Cadiz's

offer (hardly disinterested) in March 1810 to manage its finances, including the registry and allocation of all incoming colonial revenues. These concessions were far from insignificant: over nine months, January to October 1810, colonial income represented fully 58 percent of the Regency's total receipts from all sources.[74]

In its own right, the Cadiz mercantile community held or managed considerable capital. The community claimed to include "los mayores capitalistas" in Spain, roughly 175 resident merchants, as many as 55 reputedly worth at least 1.5 million pesos—each small perhaps by Mexico City standards but considerable by those of Spain.[75] Merchants at Cadiz, first of all, then held in deposit funds sent by merchants in the colonies for the purchase of goods available in Europe; at the end of November 1810 such deposits were, conservatively estimated, about 3 million *pesos fuertes*.[76] Second, ever since the spring crisis of 1808 and the French invasion, Cadiz merchants had directed their colonial correspondents to retain their sales earnings and commissions pending stabilization of the international situation; thereby they could truthfully inform the regents that "la mayor parte de caudal efectivo o en moneda, perteneciente a este comercio se halla detenido en América."[77] Further, some Cadiz merchants—as merchants often do—had simply transferred their funds abroad for safekeeping. As the Junta de Cadiz explained in June 1810: "En Cádiz . . . con motivo de la invasión de los franceses en Andalusia, todos habían procurado poner su dinero a salvo enviándolo a las Américas o a Inglaterra."[78] Third, it was well known that residents in the Cadiz area held a disproportionately high percentage of the government's treasury notes or *vales*—one estimate put the figure at 40 million *pesos fuertes*.[79] There are grounds for believing that the Junta de Cadiz, in managing the Regency's finances, allocated much of that income immediately to interest and redemption of *vales*; in the five weeks after Ciriaco Gonzalez Carbajal's arrival at Cadiz, along with 4.5 million *pesos fuertes* from New Spain's colonial treasury, the Junta de Cadiz disbursed 4.2 million.[80] The size of the capital resources of the Cadiz community induced the Veracruz agent of the Cadiz Consulado, Juan Manuel Muñóz, to observe that the regents could find among its members "los prontos auxilios que presta al Gobierno . . . para sostener la sagrada causa de la Nación."[81] In this fashion the Regency muddled along in 1810; the English, aware of its dependence upon the Cadiz merchant community, considered the relationship a "lamentable proof of the weakness of the government."[82]

On close analysis, however, the Regency's dependence upon the Cadiz community was in reality dependence upon "los remeses de América," which in 1810 meant principally upon New Spain—its trade flows, its loans and

donations.[83] Of prime importance was the trade between Spain and New Spain, Cadiz and Veracruz. Relying upon Cadiz data, Veracruz absorbed 43 percent of all Cadiz exports to the American colonies from 1802 to 1810; in the critical years, 1808–1810, the percentage rose to 49 percent.[84] Veracruz data indicate exports of silver and colonial staples to "Spain" in the amount of 105.3 million *pesos fuertes*, from 1802 to 1810, precious metals representing fully 74 percent of the total.[85] A considerable sum of precious metal moved abroad through neutral shipping and was absorbed by English and French interests, both public and private; still, Veracruz data show 30.1 million *pesos fuertes* directed to Cadiz between 1808 and 1810.[86] For the same two years other estimates are as high as 50 million.[87] "El oro y la plata que se han hecho la común medida de las cosas comerciales," as the Consulado of Cadiz articulated its dependence upon the American colonies in late 1809, "son la más rica producción de nuestras lanas, y la saviduria del gobiemo está en recivir la mayor cantidad possible de aque!los preciosos metales, y en impedir que el extrangero se los lleve . . . lo que se llama balanza mercantil."[88] Over nine months, February through October of 1810, American silver on public and private account constituted at least 58 percent of all government receipts administered by the Junta de Cadiz at the request of the regents.[89]

New Spain's Financial Salience

Trade flows aside, over three decades before 1810 New Spain's merchants and church corporate bodies had generously responded to Madrid's appeals for financial assistance in wartime with impressively large sums, enhancing the colony's importance to metropolitan finance and reinforcing its role as "la porción mas poderosa y floreciente del Nuevo Mundo."[90] To help cover deficits of the Spanish government in two wars, from 1779 to 1782 and 1793 to 1795, New Spain's merchant and mine-owner guilds alone loaned 9,850,130 *pesos fuertes* followed by another interest-free 395,663 in 1798–1799. For the period 1782–1809, New Spain's treasury accounts list both interest-free and interest-bearing loans totaling 10,245,793 *pesos fuertes* by residents and corporations. (This excludes Consolidación transfers [10,496,397] and subsidies [24,324,841 *pesos fuertes*] to Spain's Caribbean colonies and the Philippines.)[91] For one metropolitan need or another, New Spain's residents sent the metropole and its colonies a minimum of 44,671,368 *pesos fuertes* in twenty-seven years, 1782–1809. And in the first six months of 1809 there came another 3 million pesos, of which 2 million came from Mexico City merchants.[92] Furthermore, in early May, González Carbajal, ex-*oidor* of Mexico and soon-to-be special adviser to Hacienda Minister Hormazas

on conditions in New Spain, arrived at Cadiz with 4.5 million *pesos fuertes* for the Regencia.[93]

This financial response motivated no doubt the Junta Central's plan to borrow the huge sum of 20 million pesos from "el comercio de Nueva España" at 6 percent, an interest rate the government boasted was "sin ejemplar." On 10 January 1810 the expiring Junta Central issued an appeal (countersigned by Hacienda Minister Hormazas) to the "patriotism" of the people of New Spain to subscribe to the 20 million *peso fuerte* loan. Administration of the loan and its ultimate servicing was assigned to New Spain's now three Consulados, directing "el cuerpo en general del comercio de Nueva España tome a su cargo la dirección y relación de esta empresa" through a seven-member junta (the merchant guilds would select six). Entrusted to this Junta was the selection of the type of security for interest payments and amortization; it could choose "qualesquiera que sea la renta de su corona en esos dominios que la junta elija" including "algun derecho sobre los géneros, efectos y frutos de importación y exportación por las Aduanas . . . " Such was the fragility of the Junta Central in January 1810 that it had to allow the Consulados to set the interest rate higher than 6 percent if necessary, as well as the rate of redemption.[94] In this fashion, the crumbling Spanish state in lower Andalusia handed over to the private sector in its wealthiest colony, just as it had to the Cadiz merchant community, large sectors of public finance. This occurred, despite criticism by Hacienda Minister Soler in 1805 of the Consulado de Mexico's mismanagement of the *avería* tax; his ministry's investigation had uncovered that the Consulado's officers had been diverting *avería* receipts "para objetos mui distantes del de su primitivo y único establecimiento."[95] The Junta Central's order was received at Mexico City in March 1810 and implemented by the Audiencia (then acting as viceroy). By the end of 1810, the Junta's operations netted 1.5 million *pesos fuertes*.

The regents also sought individual and corporate financing to supplement the 20 million peso subscription. In May the Regencia, convinced that in its wealthiest American colony, New Spain, "ha de hallar los recursos necesarios para la guerra," reiterated its plea for "una suscripción voluntaria y general." Evidently the resources of New Spain figured as prominently in the regents' financial calculations as they had in the Junta Central's. When, for example, the Regencia learned of the rebellion at Caracas in April 1808, it voiced confidence in "noticias particulares" (presumably the private correspondence of merchants) that assured that the people of New Spain would make "las más activas diligencias" to arrange the "auzilios pecuniarios de que tanto necesitamos."[96]

Mexico City would finance counterrevolution in America. The confidence was not misplaced. In the spring of 1810, a vigorous campaign aimed at religious corporations, minor clerics, high-, middle-, and low-level government employees, and merchants and mine owners produced by June donations of 1.8 million *pesos fuertes*; by the year's end, more donations, including large contributions by such peninsular *alamceneros* as Ágreda and Heras Soto, recently ennobled by the Regency, netted another 540.000.[97] In fact, the volume of individual donations (2,379,000) of 1810 surpassed by far subscriptions handled by the Mexico City Consulado under the 20 million peso flotation (1,570,261).[98] There was, finally, an indirect channel through which New Spain's funds financed the Regency's resistance to Franco-Spanish forces in the peninsula. It is plausible that the London government's toleration of the reluctance of the Junta Central and then the Regency to grant trade concessions in the colonies to English interests responded to the Regency's readiness to permit the English treasury to continue purchases of silver from New Spain's private sector. Earlier, in March 1809, it will be recalled, the Junta Central had authorized such operations at Veracruz, where the English government designated as its agents merchants Almanza and Arrillaga.

Tomás Murphy, International Merchant Banker

It was logical that one year later the English government, desperate to finance European allies as well as the needs of the East India Company in the China trade, decided to expand the 1809 arrangement. In March 1810 it approached the Regency "upon a matter on which so essentially depends the facility with which Great Britain can continue to assist the Spanish armies." With its approval, the English treasury then contracted with Spanish merchant Ignacio Palyart, Tomás Murphy's (sometimes Murfi) London agent, to purchase from private sources at Veracruz up to 10 million *pesos fuertes* offering thirty-day sight drafts in treasury bills; Tomás and Mateo Lorenzo Murphy were designated as local agents, and their operations as an extension of their 1806 contracts.[99] Not the least immediate problem in executing his newly won contract was the refusal of the Real Audiencia Gobernadora of Mexico City (acting as interim viceroy) to authorize his operations since the Junta Central had earlier arranged Cochrane's contract; Murphy's contract was considered unauthorized extension of Cochrane's, granted in 1809. So the Audiencia insisted upon confirmation by the newly installed Regency because of the "discrédito y nulidad de todas las disposiciones dictadas por la Junta Central."[100]

Murphy also had other problems. By contracting to purchase silver at 48 pence per peso for resale at 52 to the English treasury, Murphy stood to gross roughly 8 percent. At this price, however, he reported, "very few dollars have been procured."[101] Murphy found in June 1810 few silver sales at Veracruz since merchants there, he reported, had "escasas nociones . . . de las ventajas que pueden disfrutar poniendo su dinero en los fondos públicos" at London; his operations suffered as well from the "want of arrivals from Cadiz with orders for the merchants to embrace the opportunity which offered at advantageously placing their funds in England."[102] In London, Palyart had a more accurate, less self-serving explanation of the Veracruz situation. Knowledgeable Veracruz merchants knew the Cadiz rate was 60 pence per peso rather than the 48 Murphy offered at Veracruz since English consul Duff (related to London's William Duff Gordon?) was selling "a surplus quantity of bills" at Cadiz. Even deducting 6 pence per peso to cover shipping and insurance, Veracruz silver sellers could still earn 6 pence over Murphy's quotation. If the Murphys raised their rate (as they later had to), they lowered their profit margin. On the other hand, a practical Palyart knew that "we cannot expect to force the importation of these [pesos] directly into this country unless we bid higher for them than it may suit the Spanish merchants to do."[103]

Seven months following the Regency's approval of their contract, the Murphys still reported difficulty in buying silver at 49 pence, and HMS *Helder* had to sail from Veracruz on 10 October with the "miserable sum of $169,898." Twelve hours later their disappointment vanished when an express mail from Mexico City arrived "bringing . . . orders to ship 250,000 dollars more on board"; had *Helder* delayed its departure, the Murphys boasted that they could have shipped 500,000. Mexico City's sellers of silver (mainly *almaceneros*) were inspired, the Murphys reported, by a "very unfortunate circumstance . . . recently occurred, [which] has made several people in this Kingdom anxious to remove their funds to England." The "unfortunate circumstance" was the massive anticolonial insurrection that had spread from Dolores to Guanajuato in the major silver mining core of New Spain. New Spain's wealthy residents, miners and merchants, feared that troops ordered to suppress the "insurrection may not do their duty from their being all natives of this country, and probably disposed to espouse the cause of what they call independence."[104] On one of the next English warships departing Veracruz went silver purchased from two of the wealthiest mining families of Guanajuato—Sardaneta and Obregón—and from the Veracruz merchant, Vija y Gibaxa. Peso sales thereafter were brisk, allowing Tomás Murphy to ship to England between July 1810 and April

1811 almost 1 million silver pesos.[105] Nine years later (1819) the last shipment of silver under the 10 million peso contract was loaded at Veracruz for England "con cuya suma queda completa la de los 10 millones concedidos al gobierno Ynglés."[106]

The Murphys' ever-extending operations at Malaga, then Veracruz, Jamaica, and Cadiz, and finally at Madrid and London turned a minimal profit of between 360,000 and 600,000 pesos on a volume of about 6 million. In no small degree, such returns were a measure of the family's manifold operations, uncommon among businessmen in the Spanish transatlantic system. Tomás Murphy at Veracruz along with brother Mateo Lorenzo and Juan, the banker at Cadiz, Madrid, and London (where he had established Gordon & Murphy), and perhaps Diego of Charleston, South Carolina, represented a merchant group atypical of the general run of entrepreneurs at Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City at the end of the eighteenth century. Their Anglo-Irish background (father Juan had left Waterford, Ireland, for Malaga) brought contacts with London, Jamaican and U.S. Atlantic ports, giving a scope and direction to their business affairs rarely found in the Spanish transatlantic system. Without retracing here the career of Tomás Murphy commencing with his correspondence with the second Conde de Revillagigedo over the effects of *comercio libre* of 1789, the Murphys symbolized an entrepreneurial type invariably suspect at Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico, outsiders threatening to the Cadiz commercial establishment. In the critical years 1808–1810, when Cadiz merchants foresaw that the Junta Central would be pressed to find safety at Sevilla and then within their port city, thereby presenting an opportunity to reassert their waning political influence, the Murphy brothers' far-flung enterprises foreshadowed *comercio directo* between colonial and foreign ports, to which Cadiz and its associated interests remained inalterably opposed.

Overall, New Spain's trade and capital flows were impressive by standards of the time, generated by a handful of mine owners and perhaps forty thousand mineworkers and their families, by 1.5 to 2 million effective consumers of European and Asian imports, and by about two-hundred-odd merchants in Mexico City. Their loans after 1782, it must be noted, were administered by the Mexico City Consulado in which predominated Spanish immigrant businessmen drawn largely from the impoverished gentry of Asturias, the Montaña de Burgos, and the Basque provinces of northern Spain. *Peninsulares*—merchants and merchant mine owners—shaped the investment strategies of New Spain's well-capitalized ecclesiastical corporations such as the Inquisition, convents and nunneries, brotherhoods and sodalities, and chantries. In 1810 the peninsula-born *almaceneros* in Mexico

City formed one of the wealthiest groups in the Spanish Empire in America. In joining forces with the merchant groups of Veracruz and Cadiz to preserve the Spanish transatlantic trading system against structural changes, they constituted a powerful lobby pressuring the recently created Regency desperately seeking legitimacy by "ofreciéndonos y asegurándonos el remedio de nuestros males." By the spring of 1810, the major preoccupation of merchants in Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz was how to contain the insistence of Havana's merchants and planters (and those of Caracas, too) on recognition of their need to trade directly with neutral and friendly nations, mainly the United States, England, and its continental allies.

17. Dissolution of the Junta Central

Las causas remotas de la disolución de la Junta [Central] . . . son el botefuego que produjeron la explosión en las Colonias . . . Las causas próximas fueron . . . la locura de algunos pocos sin talento aún para el manejo de sus caballerizas . . . la endeblez que . . . una Junta soberana que exercía las facultades de . . . Fernando VII . . . ya se llama federal, ya tutora o regente, executiva, legislativa y judiciaria por falta de una constitución verdadera . . . atentaron levantar el edificio de su fortuna sobre las ruinas de la patria.

Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas, *Representación al Congreso Nacional* (1811)

One year after its creation at Aranjuez, the Junta Central's authority, never substantial, was tenuous. Created in the euphoria following victory at Bailén and withdrawal of the French from Madrid, it was the product of conflict, not consensus. In August 1808 Andalusian dominance was viewed as the major threat confronting *fernandista* Spain. The Consejo de Castilla, its prestige near nadir after the royal renunciations at Bayonne, had accepted the Junta Central as the lesser evil without conceding its legitimacy or abandoning the objective of a presumably more traditional regency. There was the opposition from Cadiz, of course; at the same time the Junta de Sevilla challenged the Central's assumption of sovereignty in its own fashion, for it supported the Central while insisting on its privileged role in Andalusian and colonial affairs. None of these contradictions were resolved in subsequent months as fresh sources of tension flourished. Gradual reoccupation by French forces of much of Spain isolated or alienated many provincial juntas, strengthening their autonomist/federalist stance. The Junta Central's withdrawal to Sevilla inevitably increased its links to the dominant Andalusian interests despite its formal opposition to the privileged position sought by Sevilla and Cadiz.

Nowhere were the Central's weakness and subservience to these enclaves

of Spanish traditionalism more evident than in dealing with colonial repercussions of the metropole's unprecedented situation. Heir to customary dissension between "American" and "European" Spaniards that were heightened by the heavy-handed performance of Sevilla's commissioners to the colonies, the Central could not dispel them or—this was critical—pursue a policy independent of Andalusian and particularly Cadiz commercial pressures. Lower Andalusia was Spain's wealthiest region, and Cadiz its major port because of the volume and value of its colonial trades. Such pressures were not new but now met weakened opposition. Consequently there was disunity in the peninsula and alienation in the peripheral colonies—Venezuela ("Caracas") and Buenos Aires—where authorities rejected orders to close colonial ports to trade with foreigners. The many invitations to juntas in the peninsula and colonial authorities in America, to send carefully screened representatives to participate in the Central's work backed by declarations that colonials now enjoyed the rights of peninsular Spaniards, raised expectations without resolving conflicts of interest. To many, for this desperate situation, a national congress, assembly, or *cortes* seemed the sole hope of forging a broad, national authority accepted and obeyed in metropole and colonies, in Spain and America.

The resolution in May 1809 calling for a *cortes* or national assembly and its wavering implementation in late summer and early fall, far from alleviating the crisis of the Junta Central, further exacerbated internal divisions and external opposition. To multiple charges of military incompetence, financial maladministration, political fragility, and ineptitude or self-seeking was added divided opinion on timing, composition, agenda, and, above all, the legitimacy of convoking a congress designed to provide legitimacy. Factions—they were yet hardly parties—that now became openly confrontational were not far different from the groups surfacing in the summer of 1808, but developments in the intervening year had altered their assessment of the political situation and their relative positions.

Dialogue of the Deaf

For instance, the Junta de Sevilla, still hoping to dominate a weakened Junta Central, quickly opposed calling a *cortes* and in no uncertain terms. "Desde que esta Junta manifestó su deseo y propuso las reglas para formar una Suprema Central Gubernativa que rigiese los graves negocios de la Monarquía," Sevilla affirmed in early July, "dió bien a conocer el concepto que formaba de esta Asamblea nacional y que esperaba de sus luces y tareas el mejor desempeño de la Soveranía que depositava en ella sin necesidad

de hechos que la desengañasen." And then came its complaint: "Pero no alcanza a conocer qué lugar puede ocupar en estos el Real Decreto publicado para la celebración de Cortes. En él no encuentra una sola palabra que termine el Govierno que haya de regir la monarquía conforme a sus leyes fundamentales." Other juntas held other views.

Next month, August, the Junta de Valencia circulated its manifesto opposing a *cortes* on different grounds. Rejecting a *cortes* "segun el antiguo rito," it questioned the legitimacy of a congress to assemble while much of the peninsula was in enemy hands and one that would consist of *diputados* selected by what it considered random sampling of the nation. Following this line of opposition, its "acuerdos no podrán obligarles cuando queden libres."[1] In addition, the Valencia group challenged the right of the Central's Comisión de Cortes and subordinate committees to elaborate form and agenda of the future Cortes, a role it claimed pertained to provincial juntas. Like Sevilla, Valencia assumed a markedly decentralized or federalist position in asserting that since May 1808 sovereignty had passed to those juntas. Sevilla emphasized autonomy that included overt hegemonic pretensions, apparently basing itself on the curious proposition that Spain—absent its monarch—was momentarily a virtual republic and that Fernando's return would automatically restore the traditional, "absolutist" monarchy. Valencia, on the other hand, had a different vision, a future political order of greater regional autonomy where permanent curbs would reduce "absolutism" and where regional interests might have greater voice than under the *ancien régime*.[2]

Valencia's position was a reaction to the Central's recent legislation reestablishing what Valencia labeled the "edificio gótico" of the Consejo de Castilla. It had in mind that the Central had filled certain ecclesiastical vacancies in Valencia whose incomes had formerly been allocated to financing military hospitals and discriminated against Valencia in distributing funds inflowing from the colonies in America.[3] As Valencia put it in mid-September in accentuating the need to break with elements of the old "gothic" regime, "La Junta entiende que el voto de la Nación al levantar el grito de la libertad no ha sido el de consagrar los establecimietos del antiguo gobierno según el pie en que los han dejado los antiguos reyes, sino el de mejorarlos."[4] The Junta de Valencia recognized discrete signs of Andalusian domination; the Central now at Sevilla was becoming captive of the "gothic" elites of Castilla and Andalusia.[5]

In fact, aristocratic and administrative elites at court, who only a year before had attempted but failed to impose a regency solely to prosecute the resistance and maintain the *ancien régime*, now perceived that the Cortes

and constitution in preparation by a heterogeneous core of leftist liberals, *ilustrado* reformers, and a handful of colonial crisis managers threatened the old regime of privilege and hierarchy. Reinforced and refocused by the recently reconstituted *consejos* now joined in the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias—that tradition-bound faction behind the regency, what we may call the regency "party"—now took advantage of repeated military defeat and the disarray of the Junta Central.

These conservatives took the offensive on 20 August when Francisco de Palafox, Aragon's *diputado* to the Central, made public that his instructions called for nothing more nor less than the appointment of a regent; since other *diputados* had ignored similar instructions over the preceding months, it was now obvious to the Aragonese group that the nation's survival required the dissolution of the Junta Central and the appointment of Cardinal Luís de Borbón, uncle of Fernando VII, as regent.[6] Simultaneously the Consejo Reunido echoed and elaborated Palafox's proposal: the critical situation of the nation, it asserted, derived from the failure of the Junta Central to cooperate with the Consejo de Castilla to establish a regency. Moreover, the Central's efforts to subordinate provincial juntas had failed as proved by the continuing hegemonism of Sevilla and the autonomy and disobedience of Valencia and other juntas "imbued with the idea of equality." The people of Spain, far from sharing such delusions, had resisted French occupation in order to live "bajo las leyes e instituciones que sancionaron" their forefathers—in short, under the old regime. Furthermore, autonomy-minded juntas had sought to conceal their enthusiasm by "democratizandolo y preparandolo para hacerlo instrumento de los males a que pueda conducir un patriotismo mal entendido." Now it was imperative to concentrate power in the hands of one, three, or five regents, abolish provincial juntas, and reassert the authority of courts and *ayuntamientos*. The Consejo de Castilla's position, articulated in an opinion of its *fiscales* just before Palafox presented his representation, was published and widely circulated in its *consulta* of 26 August.[7]

Leftist liberals and centrist moderates, autonomists-federalists and centralists, rallied to counter the Consejo de Castilla's attack on provincial juntas. Their reactions to the differing positions of Valencia's Junta and the Consejo de Castilla revealed the distance separating a radical liberal minority led by Calvo de Rozas from conservative liberals and moderates represented by Jovellanos, Valdés, and Garay. In "raising the flag of opposition to the government," the Junta de Valencia gave hope to the French enemy, a Quintana manifesto asserted late in October. Far from being the source of Spain's misfortunes, the Junta Central could claim credit for preserving the

independence of a free Spain and the state itself together with its colonies. The autonomy advocated by the Junta de Valencia, according to Quintana, was destructive of both the "fuerza y actividad" of Spain as a great state and the royal rights of Fernando VII. As for the claim that the Junta Central had achieved no reforms and was focused on preserving its powers, the announcement of the forthcoming Cortes and the careful planning of its agenda and selection of regents proved the contrary.[8]

In turn, Calvo de Rozas condemned the Consejo's call for a regency. The Consejo was ill advised, he maintained, in advancing its demand at a moment of renewed crisis, when the constituent parts of the body politic showed dangerous tendencies "obrar por si solos y como en un sistema federativo," and when the Junta Central was seeking a new consensus by surrendering "su poder, que, recivido del Pueblo, no deviera de volver sino al mismo Pueblo, representado en Cortes." Calvo, sensitive to the situation in the colonies, emphasized the risk in changing the form of government "en vísperas de ver reunidos a la Junta los embiados por las Americas que vienen a estrechar sus vínculos con la Metrópoli de un modo desconocido hasta ahora." The colonials' hopes would be frustrated by exclusion from any new government, he warned."[9]

Above all, Calvo articulated an impassioned plea for liberalism in Spain, one that moved beyond the reformism of the "absolutist" *ilustrados*, not to mention those defending an inviolate *ancien régime*. He accused the Consejo "de no haver conocido el carácter de nuestra revolución, o haver olvidado los días y los motivos en que nació, para pretender modelar su marcha . . . por un Código" no longer capable of binding the national will. Dissecting the Bayonne fiasco, he found that "la nación recobró su primitiva independencia desde que vió su existencia, su suerte y su libertad dependientes de los esfuerzos que hiciese." Recognition of Fernando as king and revalidation of existing laws did not prevent the nation from abrogating those inconsistent with reform measures dictated by "la razón ilustrada" and "la condición civil y política del ciudadano." Enlightenment and respect for the citizen led him to an eloquent plea for freedom of the press as essential to the formation of enlightened public opinion. Calvo argued that lack of press freedom was the primary cause of the crisis in Spain's government, and it was essential that "la opinión pública, que nunca es bien formada ni bien fortalecida sino quando se cria libremente, descubre el mérito oculto, manifieste la incapacidad o el demérito disimulados, rectifique errores y equivocados conceptos, y sostenga su autoridad, la más respetable y poderosa de todas"—especially at moments of political crisis. Put another way, an informed citizen was *the* antidote to absolutism. As he put it, now that the

Cortes was about to assemble, public opinion was the essential protection of the public interest against "las voces del partido interesado en desacreditar nuestras intenciones para favorecer sus intereses," against "las pasiones que interesan en la subsistencia de los abusos." No faction was named, but the target was obvious. Calvo proposed that the Cortes assemble soon, on 1 November, and press freedom be declared immediately.[10]

As in the spring of 1809 when Calvo's call for a general *cortes* produced the ambiguous decree of 22 May, setting in slow motion the Junta Central's hesitant steps toward a national congress "sometime in 1810," so Calvo's subsequent motion on 14 September for immediate convocation of the Cortes and the end of press censorship resulted in another compromise. Center-right Jovellanos, now in September as earlier in May, vacillated between his liberal, *ilustrado* principles and his legal traditionalism. Although still supporting a regency, he now detected behind the Consejo's demand "el objeto descubierto de ambición que amenazaba a la patria con peligrosas ocurrencias."[11] In other words, go slow. Once again joining other moderates of the center-right, he sponsored a compromise incorporated in a 19 September decree setting up a Comisión Executiva (to take office on 1 November) where authority would be concentrated pending the meeting of the Cortes now set for the next year, 1 March 1810. Eliminating the Junta Central's deliberative responsibilities placed decision making in the hands of the commission and the portfolio ministers.[12]

Personnel changes enhanced conservative influence in the Junta Central. Martín de Garay was replaced as secretary-general by Pedro de Rivero; the marqués de Astorga was succeeded as president by the archbishop of Sevilla; the marqués de Hormazas took the place of Francisco de Saavedra as finance minister; and the secretariat-general, where Quintana and García Malo had played such important roles, was stripped of many functions and subordinated to the strict oversight of the ministers with portfolio. In this fashion, rightist ministers like Hormazas at Hacienda became decision makers.[13]

Nonetheless, the Junta Central's *comisión de cortes* and its subcommittees continued work on the Cortes to be announced on 1 January 1810 and meeting on the Isla de León near Cadiz on 1 March. Under the leadership of Antonio Ranz Romanillos, the legislative committee stepped up work on the draft of a constitution, incorporating the fundamental principle of the separation of powers. Jovellanos's public instruction committee favored Calvo's proposal to end state censorship. And the simmering conflict over trade policy between the Cadiz-Veracruz mercantile axis and the staple-exporting groups of Havana, Caracas, and Buenos Aires was aired and for-

warded for analysis and opinion by a veteran colonial civil service officer, Estéban Fernández de León, former intendant of Caracas and advocate of further liberalization of Spain's transatlantic trade.

Conservatism Resurgent: General Romana

While the Junta Central's reorganization and renewed focus invigorated public opinion of the moment and provided a brief respite, conservative advocates of a regency remained dissatisfied and influential. In fact, leadership of the newly formed executive commission that took office on 1 November fell to hard-line conservatives like the marqués de la Romana, who only two weeks previous had urged even the memory of the Junta Central be wiped from record.[14] On 14 September, Romana, president of a committee elected to rewrite Jovellanos's draft of instructions for the *comisión executiva*, prepared a widely circulated critique of the Junta Central and its proposed renovation. This reform, he insisted, failed to justify its inherent illegitimacy as well as its democratic ideology and violated the basic constitution of the Spanish monarchy and the sovereignty of Fernando VII. Not only, he argued, was the Central illegitimate, but also venality and ineptitude undermined its authority. Romana proposed the election of a highly empowered regency of one to five members, elected from within or outside the Central, to manage the country in consultation with a small body representing the Cortes-to-be-called. Meanwhile, his regency would continue the resistance and maintain the integrity of monarchy in Spain and the colonies in America, guided by established legislation until the return of Fernando VII. It would appear that Romana's proposed regency was really designed to postpone indefinitely convocation of a *cortes* until the defeat of French forces of occupation.[15]

This reactionary proposal the Junta Central tried to parry with its own manifesto drafted by Quintana and published on 28 October. Representative of the pro-*cortes* coalition—it was more than faction—he tried to refute the foremost conservative, Romana, by citing the disastrous divisions engendered by previous regencies and, implicitly, the forces of regionalism. Countering Valencia's claim that the current crisis made impossible an accurate representation of Spain as a nation, Quintana declared that not only was a "complete and sufficient" representation possible but that the depth of the current crisis offered no alternative. As he asked rhetorically, when could it be more appropriate and necessary than "cuando una guerra obstinada tiene apurados todos los medios ordinarios, cuando el egoismo de los unos y la ambición de los otros debilitan y entorpecen la acción del

gobierno . . . cuando se aspira a destruir por sus cimientos el principio esencial de la anarquía, que es le unidad, cuando ha hidra del federalismo, acallada bien felizmente en el año anterior con la erección del poder central, osa otra vez levantar sus cabezas ponzonosas?"[16]

Despite efforts of liberal as well as centrist backers of the Cortes, the marqués de la Romana was elected president of the new Comisión Executiva that took office on 1 November and included Rodrigo Riquelme, Francisco Caro, Sebastián de Toscano, José García de la Torre, and the marqués de Villel—all markedly conservative.[17]

As liberals foresaw, Romana's conservative leadership proved both unwilling and unable to rein in internal political divisions inspired by the intrigues of competing factions or to improve the deteriorating military situation. At this point, the conde de Montijo reentered Spain from refuge in Portugal (where he had fled after his failed coup at Granada) and rejoined his cousin, Francisco de Palafox, in more plotting to form—like Romana—a regency. Rapid imprisonment of Montijo and Palafox at Sevilla did not dissuade Romana from supporting a conservative faction, led by his brother at Valencia, that insisted that Romana become regent.

In the end, however, the disastrous military collapse of Spanish resistance forces at Ocaña precipitated the dissolution of the embattled Junta Central. Ocaña—following hard upon the collapse of Austrian resistance to French armies and England's failure to establish a foothold on the European continent—opened Andalusia and Sevilla to French occupation. It was the prospect of imminent occupation that destroyed the little support still retained by the Junta Central. Once more rumors spread that the Central might take refuge in America and that moving to the Isla de León on the Bay of Cadiz confirmed that option.[18]

And, indeed, evidence suggests these widespread rumors and anxiety were not unfounded. Despite generalized belief in the impregnability of Cadiz—"almost an island" between the ocean and the Bay of Cadiz—just the "remote" chance of its capture by the French moved Martín de Garay to support a "gran plan" for a possible flight of the Spanish government across the Atlantic to an American colony. The conde de Tilly, preoccupied—like Godoy in the critical months of 1808—with the fate of the colonies, was rumored negotiating with the English at Gibraltar for transporting Spanish expeditionary forces to America. Whatever the basis of such reports, the Junta Central's formal statements did not exclude that option—the road taken in late 1808 by the Portuguese government, moving royal family, royal household, and high civil servants to its colony in Brazil.

García Malo and the Colonies

The gravity of the crisis and the dilemma confronting the Junta Central after Ocaña emerge in a memo to the Junta Central of early December 1809, drafted by Ignacio García Malo, a Junta staff member and one of Quintana's close associates. Malo attributed the crisis to military and political mistakes of the Junta Central since its inception. He criticized the prevalent delusion that resistance and patriotism alone might prevail against the French. Combined with an equally misplaced reliance on regular troops and large military engagements, such faith had led to one defeat after another. Consistent guerrilla warfare, he argued, might have maximized the advantages of *fernandista* forces in local skirmishes and preemptive strikes. Above all, Malo blamed *fernandista* military and political leaders "thrown together by chance or by intrigue" for failing to maintain the élan responsible for initial victories. That enthusiasm, destroyed by repeated and fruitless sacrifice, was now difficult to restore. Rural communities were, Malo felt, unlikely collaborators for destroying roads used by enemy forces for a variety of reasons—"ya sea por los grandes sacrificios que han hecho hasta ahora y cuyos resultados por desgracia no han correspondido a sus deseos y esperanzas, ya por no interrumpir las relaciones comerciales e industriales con los países ocupados, que el hábito y el interés les han hecho siempre mirar como necesarias e indispensables"—inevitable phenomena in an internal war.

In García Malo's view, the Junta Central confronted an even greater danger, "la disolución del Gobierno en unos momentos en que el terror tuviese abatidos y consternados los ánimos." Like Quintana, he feared the consequences. "Reducida en este caso a los Gobiernos provinciales, tomaría fuerzas el federalismo, comenzaría la anarquía sus estragos." The sole remaining option was moving the government to safety "donde nunca puede ser comprometida." In this light, Malo advised an organized retreat to the Isla de León and its facilities for accommodating the government; there enemy forces would not be able to prevent a withdrawal to adjacent Cadiz "donde se estrellaría todo el poder de sus armas." Colonial funds and general assistance could support an ongoing resistance there. Moreover, he had to add, if all efforts to retain a foothold in the peninsula failed, the colonies in America would offer a secure refuge.[19]

On the other hand, Malo warned of the danger inherent in this path, the reaction of Spain's principal ally, England, Europe's major economy, to a severely weakened Spanish transatlantic empire. To use his formulation: "Podrá convenir a sus ideas mercantiles y exclusivas de navegación que el Gobierno que representa a Fernando Séptimo se traslada a América?" So

he questioned hypothetically: "No podrían con pretexto de comiseración y generosidad, paliar sus intenciones secretas y tomar el partido de darnos una acogida que figurando ser momentánea y necesaria para preparar la recepción, fuese perpétua, excitando ella partidos que la embarazen?" And then he mused further: "Entrará en sus cálculos políticos fomentar lass ideas de independencia?"[20] The issue of retreating overseas could have disastrous consequences, and decision makers required expertise.

As for the possibility of movements for colonial independence, in Malo's view only timely reform might prevent them. "Sabemos que apenas se divulgó en las Américas la agresión de la Metropolí por el infame Napoleón, cuando se sucitaron aquellas ideas de independencia que son tan naturales a los hombres, y mucho más estando dominados con cetro de hierro." At the risk of exaggeration, he was summarizing the causal relationship of what had happened in mid-1808 at Mexico City. Malo, however, was encouraged: "Por un fenómeno político tan prodigioso que parecería increíble [indeed, it *was* unbelievable], si no fuese tan patente, se han mantenido hasta ahora unidas a la Metropolí y fieles a nuestro desgraciado y cautivo Rey."[21] The explanation of this extraordinary phenomenon of colonial loyalty Malo found in the "esperanza de que el nuevo orden de cosas, reformando las bases constitutivas del Estado, alcanzaría a aquellos países," a hope that had so far smothered the germs of independence. The liberalism of the Junta Central had contributed in no small way to hope of "el remedio radical de las vejaciones y oprobio que ha tantos años están sufriendo."[22] But peninsular developments had prevented the Central from making explicit its underlying principles to the colonies until this moment of imminent "pérdida de la Peninsula y la imperiosa necesidad de que el Gobierno la abandone cuando ya sus esfuerzzos sean impotentes." Once again, the colonial situation inspired clarification of reform in the metropole.

Malo called for immediate abolition of the corpus of "contribuciones, cargas y trabas onerosas que más les incomodan y repugnan"—for immediate selection of *diputados* to form a national government; for awarding "gracias y mercedes honoríficas . . . a los sujetos que hayan dado pruebas más evidentes de adhesión . . . a la metrópoli"; for replacing unpopular and unjust colonial civil servants; and, in sum, for convincing assurance to colonial elites (*españoles americanos*) of the metropole's dedication to their interests. In addition, Malo wanted official agents sent overseas to the colonies to survey their political and economic conditions with the "óbjeto secreto (que debe estar muy reservado) para no malograr los efectos [de] conciliar a favor del Gobierno todos los ánimos que pudiera emancipar la intriga interna y externa, nacida de la misma perplejidad e indecisión en que necesariamente

se hallarían aquellos naturales, si de antemano no se previene la autoridad bajo la cual han de permanecer unidos" and "inculcar siempre las máximas de cuanto importa a la tranquilidad de aquellos Dominios; conservarse unidos para su adorado Rey Fernando Séptimo bajo un gobierno justo y liberal fundado en leyes constitucionales; persuadirles de la intención en que está nuestro infeliz Monarca, ayudado de la Junta Suprema, de salir de su cautiverio y refugiarse a aquellos países leales y constantes en el amor a su Soberano"; and, finally, to upset the designs of the English, the Portuguese court at Rio, North Americans, and any other country, denouncing emphatically the horrors of the French Revolution. It was no small agenda of grievance to be remedied.

Malo's memo concluded with the prediction that "Cualquiera que sea el éxito de la majestuosa contienda que con tan heróico tesón sostiene el pueblo español contra su feroz opresor y los esclavos que le auxilien"—a jab at Spanish collaborators with the regime of José I—"siempre será seguro y de una indubitable utilidad el resultado de las medidas que quedan indicadas." On the other hand, should the homeland succumb, the colonies in America under Fernando's *liberal* rule, Malo assured his readers, would achieve such a state of prosperity that Europe and the despot Napoleon "clamarán por estrechar con él a cualquiera precio nuevas relacions," while the colonies would restore liberty and peace to Spain.[23]

Malo's memorandum was prepared in December as French troops pressed south to Sevilla and, in January, followed the decision to evacuate the government to the Isla de León near Cadiz. Efforts to prepare an orderly move to the Isla notwithstanding, the Junta Central began to move by 20 December. On 24 January at Sevilla, a "pupular" movement liberated Palafox and Montijo, who, with Francisco de Saavedra and Romana, took over a self-styled Junta *Suprema* de Sevilla, which asked for the support of other provincial juntas. Saavedra, however, quickly joined the Centrales on the Isla de León, confident that nearby Cadiz offered a "punto de defensa insuperable donde se recogiesen con seguridad los restos de la monarquía, donde"—one must note the sheer bravado—"a su tiempo . . . se saliese a recobrar Sevilla, la Andalucía, y tal vez toda la Peninsula." In the meantime, the "pueblo" and authorities of Sevilla would accept French occupation and thereby preserve the "precious heritage of the monarchy."[24]

Once installed on the Isla, the Junta Central tried to assemble its now dispersed members—some had been incarcerated, others hidden—to face the new crisis. Some Centrales, like Calvo de Rozas, now advocated maintaining the Central intact until the Cortes would meet as scheduled on 1 March. "No habría habido entonces, disensiones en *América*" (emphasis

in original), he recorded what turned out to be a long year later, clear evidence of the interlock between satisfying the colonies and finally opening a national assembly. However, few of the twenty-odd Centrales on the Isla shared Calvo's prescience or fortitude—or perhaps his faith in the possibility of opening the Cortes within a month's time. His misgivings aside, on 27 January Calvo proposed that the embattled Junta Central turn over its authority to an interim regency while retaining a consultative function until the Cortes met and established a regency; wisely he rejected ongoing roles for any Centrales.[25] Meanwhile, at nearby Cadiz, developments took place with transcendent impact on the coming Regencia.

While the Junta Central discussed the formation of a regency on 27–28 January, Cadiz heard of a "popular" movement at Sevilla and reports (published by order of General Francisco Xavier Venegas y Saavedra, Cadiz's *gobernador*) of the dispersal of the Junta Central. This was the opening some *gaditanos* wanted. There was a "popular" riot and on 27 January the revival of a Junta Suprema de Gobierno de Cadiz, under Venegas's presidency, which immediately claimed supremacy in Spain and the colonies—and, depending on circumstances, might upstage the imminent Regencia.[26]

Aware of its precarious situation, the Junta Central sent General Castaños to Cadiz to ascertain the reaction of the Junta, Ayuntamiento, and Consulado there to the formation of a regency foretold. Castaños was about to return to Sevilla with a favorable reply when he received an urgent appeal from nearby Isla de León to help disperse "rioters" insistent that Castaños have full authority (*mando*) and that members of the Central be punished, even executed. This was a demand undeserved and foreshadowed Cadiz's readiness to establish hegemony over any refugee government quartered in the wealthiest, busiest, trading center of Spain's Atlantic empire. Castaños managed to disperse the "rioters," and the Junta Central immediately advanced the formal installation of the Regencia to 31 January. Appropriately, the victorious commander of the forces of resistance at Bailén, Castaños, was appointed interim president.[27] Spain's military were stepping onto the political stage.

On 29 January the Junta Central announced the names of regents it had selected and in a final decree set 1 March 1810, for the opening of the Cortes, selection of *diputados*, and its organization and program. Charging the incoming Regencia to make this responsibility its priority, the Central printed a final *edicto* clarifying the circumstances surrounding its dissolution and a farewell message to the incoming Regencia summarizing its achievements.[28]

18. Regencia and Junta de Cadiz

Al disolverse la Junta [Central] y empezar la Regencia pasada, todo el mundo vió que la España estaba en inminente riesgo de perder las Américas. El gobierno español no supo emplear otros medios que una proclama de la Junta de Cadiz de órdenes secretas a los gobernadores (piedra principal de escándalo en aquellos payses) para entretener a los americanos con palabras.

Blanco White, *El Español*, 30 January 1811

At the beginning of February 1810, the situation in Spain was desperate. French troops entered Sevilla, whose Junta, reassuming its claim to sovereignty, ordered municipal bodies to accept French occupation and recognize the government of José I at Madrid. The Junta de Sevilla's *presidente*, Francisco Saavedra, before abandoning Sevilla for nearby Cadiz, ordered the duque de Alburquerque to move his small army corps from Extremadura south to defend Cadiz. Alburquerque's move eased the immediate threat to the isolated port city, which now relied entirely on English naval support and on reinforced defense of its narrow approach by land. With the occupation of Malaga by French troops, French control of Andalusia neared completion. Now official communication with unoccupied peninsular areas was possible only by sea.

The political situation was more chaotic than the military. In the face of revolt in Sevilla and at nearby Isla de León, the Junta Central had hurriedly formed the Regencia long demanded by conservative critics. But the Regencia's composition and political agenda were recognized neither by its own members, by the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias, nor by the Junta de Cadiz that had been created on 30 January with its claim of sovereignty. At this point, events seemed to support the rumor sent out to the colonies in America that *fernandista* resistance to French occupation had collapsed.

Rumors of the demise of the *fernandista* government of resistance proved premature. English determination to bleed French forces on its southern flank and the determination of *fernandista* crisis managers to keep a foothold in the peninsula and thereby preserve the unity of metropole and colonies now overrode the internal crisis. A semblance of unity was achieved, however, by major concessions to conservative elements ready to take advantage of the nationwide crisis. Recognition of the Regencia by the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias was balanced by a denunciation of the agenda handed it by the Junta Central and by persecuting the disbanding members of the Junta Central. The Junta de Cadiz's recognition of the Regencia was delayed not only until measures were taken to prevent the unauthorized departure of any member of the Junta Central to the colonies in America but also until the regent representing colonial interests was replaced by someone more amenable to the concerns of Cadiz. The degree to which the independence of the Regencia was compromised by these concerns, added to early rumors of the collapse of the *fernandista* government, would have fateful consequences overseas in those colonies already chafing at the failure of the Junta Central to address their grievances. The colonial issue would occupy the attention of the metropolitan government during 1810 as much or more than the military or financial concerns with which it was already closely related.

In December 1810 Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas reviewed the year's major developments: establishment of the Regencia and its repudiation by juntas overseas at Caracas and Buenos Aires, outbreak of insurgency in New Spain, and the hasty convocation of the Cortes at Cadiz. He concluded that "pocos habrá que duden lo que la experiencia desagraciadamente nos ha enseñado, esto es, que hubiera sido más conveniente que continuando la Junta Central en el exercicio de sus funciones, se hubiesen reunido las Cortes, como tenía dispuesto, el día 1 de Marzo; *no habría habido entonces disensiones en la América*."[1] The duque de Alburquerque was more specific and frank in placing blame for the new crisis. The Regencia, he claimed, "desde el primer momento de su existencia ha estado esclavizada por la Junta de Cádiz."[2] The two observations, representing widely divergent political viewpoints, highlight the narrow base of the new government and its vulnerability to the influence of the Cadiz merchant community. If that influence was condoned by Saavedra as a regent,[3] it was clearly intolerable to many in the colonies who would later consider all the regents "puppets of the Junta de Cadiz."[4]

Regencia: Composition

Formation of a regency, surreptitiously and ambiguously proposed at Bayonne and then rejected by leaders of the insurgent antioccupation forces as insufficiently representative of the general interest of monarchy and empire, was the last resort of the Junta Central in its confrontation with old elites—regional, sectorial, and colonial—who made up the Spanish imperial establishment. The five regents of the Regencia, ideated to rally faltering public opinion in disparate constituencies in metropole and colonies, were even less prepared than the Junta Central to deal effectively with issues dividing *fernandista* Spain. Regents Castaños and Escaño, prestigious army and naval officers, came with little political experience aside from their role in the armed forces. To be sure, Castaños, *presidente* of the Regencia, had commanded insurgent forces that had defeated Dupont's troops at Bailén. Saavedra, a figure of some repute, was later dismissed by Toreno as "de corte influjo como regente, debilitada su cabeza con la edad, los achaques y las desgracias."[5] Calvo de Rozas, who also questioned Saavedra's capacity, hoped nonetheless that his presence in the Regencia might neutralize Andalusian opposition.[6] Orense, while enjoying widespread acceptance for refusing to participate at Bayonne and for his "santidad" as bishop, remained first and foremost a cleric of limited, conservative views.

Estéban Fernández de León, regent "por consideración a las Américas" although born in the metropole, had been a colonial civil servant of almost forty years in his role as intendant at "Caracas" (Venezuela), where his family had spread its network in the eighteenth century. Hopefully he might bridge the gap between *criollo* elites—he understood why they complained—and obdurate peninsular merchant interests. Trouble was, León had incurred the animosity of the Consulado de Cádiz for backing *comercio neutro* legislated in Saavedra's brief ministry at Madrid (1797–1799). And there was his outspoken brother Antonio—a member of the Audiencia de Caracas, advocate of a colonial junta in 1808, and defender of *criollos* against charges of infidelity drawn up by Joaquín de Mosquera y Figueroa; Antonio—arrested at Caracas and shipped to Spain for trial—had just been exonerated of such charges by the Junta Central.[7] Given the role of Cadiz under the Regencia, Fernández de León's participation as a regent was precarious at the outset and even dangerous to the Regencia itself.

The Regencia's fragility was initially startling when Fernández de León was abruptly displaced by Miguel de Lardizábal, who, though born in the colony of New Spain, had spent more than fifty years in the metropole; the explanation (or excuse?) was that León was not American-born. The real

reason was otherwise. Scarcely had the composition of the Regencia been made public on 29 January than Lardizábal, as New Spain's representative to the Junta Central, immediately wrote to Pedro de Rivero, general secretary of the Central, and to Saavedra, *presidente* of the Junta de Sevilla then retreating to the Isla de León, doubting that New Spain would recognize the Regencia "en cuyo nombramieto no ha tenido parte su representante, y de cuyos individuos ningún es Americano." His target was obviously Fernández de León. It is improbable Lardizábal forgot that "America" had recently been declared an integral part of the *monarquía*. León, who had accepted appointment to the Regencia on 29 January and took the oath of office two days later, attended Saavedra's swearing in on 3 February.[8] On that same day the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias at Cadiz, and after consulting the Regencia, quickly approved Lardizábal's contention, citing the principle adopted in the fall of 1808, when the Junta Central had authorized the presence of American *diputados* in a "legal government."[9] Then, on 4 February, the Regencia suddenly declared it had accepted the resignation of Fernández de León on grounds of poor health and "por no ser natural de nuestros dominios de América"—the justification of Lardizábal on 30 January. Lardizábal was named to replace him.[10]

Although this substitution was presented as a concession of the Regencia to *criollo* elites in Spain's most important colony, and the Junta de Cadiz advertised the new regent as "un nuevo y precioso lazo para estrechar la fraternidad de sus dominios de América con los de España,"[11] the Regencia's performance would have more serious consequences than was generally perceived in early February, when "la irregularidad y misterio de este acto se disimuló por la impaciencia con que se deseaba ver instalado un gobierno que pusiese límites a gran número de pretensiones y tentativas que bien pronto hubiera acarreado la anarquía más espontosa."[12]

Although the criticism was recorded by liberals in exile years later, probably reflecting the wisdom of hindsight, no doubt many questioned Lardizábal's claim to represent New Spain nearly a half century after he had sailed from the colony of his birth to pursue in the metropole the career of civil servant hardly related to colonial affairs. Among the political classes, those aware of Lardizábal's career, connections, and political convictions must have seen in the replacement a stratagem of privileged interests embedded in the old regime's conciliar bodies, in Basque regionalism, and in the Consulado de Cadiz and its projections overseas in the colony of New Spain.

"Irregular and Mysterious Appointment": Miguel de Lardizábal, Regent

The extended Lardizábal family exemplifies the opportunities for upward social mobility open in the eighteenth century to the gentry of peripheral Spain via colonial service and business enterprise. The family originated in Idiazábal (Guipuzcoa) and spread to other rural communities along the road from Vitoria to San Sebastian in central Guipuzcoa. The first generation to move from modest local status to prominence in the empire's civil service comprised three Lardizábal y Elorza brothers: Martín, Juan Antonio, and Francisco Ignacio.[13] Francisco Ignacio, father of Miguel de Lardizábal y Uribe, benefited from the rapid career advancement of his older brothers, both attending the prestigious Viejo Colegio Mayor de San Bartolomé at Salamanca in the first quarter of the century. During their years of residence there, Juan Antonio (1703–1722) and Martín (1717–1743) associated with politically and socially influential José de Carvajal y Lancaster (1717–1729) and José de Rojas y Contreras (1719–1733). Martín, after a brief appointment to the Audiencia de Zaragoza, was sent overseas to Caracas with extraordinary powers to root out smuggling operations breaking into the monopoly of the recently established chartered enterprise of Basque investors, the Compañía Guipuzcoana, which lasted sixty years; its mode of operations left a residue of bitterness among Venezuelan estate owners whose output the company exploited and exported. On returning to the metropole, Martín went to the Consejo de Indias in 1740 and died three years later. Juan Antonio left the University of Salamanca in 1722 for the bishopric of Puebla in the colony of New Spain. He took along "en consorcio" his fifteen-year-old brother, Francisco Ignacio, whom he managed to place on a hacienda in his bishopric owned by the *decano* of the Audiencia de Mexico and probably a relative, José Joaquín de Uribe y Castejón, who also held the lucrative post of *superintendente de alcabalas y azogues.*[14] Service in Spain's colonial administration was not designed to impoverish a civil servant. After eleven years in the colony, Francisco Ignacio married Uribe's twelve-year-old daughter Isabel María; twenty years later and still in New Spain, he was invested in a silver mine, proprietor of Mexico City real estate, and father of three daughters and five sons.[15]

One son, Miguel de Lardizábal y Uribe, born in 1744 on his father's hacienda in Tlaxcala, was schooled in the colonial capital, then followed the path of an older brother, Manuel, to study law overseas at the Universidad de Valladolid. Manuel was assigned to the prestigious *casa de alcalde y corte*, moved up to the Consejo de Castilla, gained membership in the Real

Academia, and authored a much-cited tract on penal reform.[16] Accepted in the Orden de Carlos III in 1793, he was a *segundo oficial mayor* and favored briefly at the court of Charles IV. One year later, however, young Godoy exiled him and brother Miguel from Madrid; they returned to the capital only after the coup d'état in 1808 that ousted Godoy.

His exile occurred when Godoy replaced the conde de Aranda as result of discord over Spain's policy toward the French Convention, and the precise cause of Manuel's ostracism is unclear. On one level, it may have sprung from Lardizábal's opposition to personnel shifts in the government, or perhaps to his career ambitions.[17] On another, deeper level, Lardizábal's exile when Aranda was eliminated from the political scene may reflect the contest between aristocratic and regional interests within the Aragonese faction at Madrid, and the bureaucratic, commercial, and church elites associated with the *golilla* faction of Floridablanca. In this context it is significant that Lardizábal's exile was attributed to close contact with Juan Acedo Rico, conde de la Cañada, then *gobernador* of the Consejo de Castilla, a confidant of Godoy. Cañada had been involved in the intrigue removing the two aging holdovers from the reign of Charles III, Floridablanca and Aranda, and early on backed the abrupt rise of the young, politically naïve royal guardsman Godoy, whose favor with the royal family might turn him into a tool of the conservative *golillas*.[18]

In the aftermath of Aranda's dismissal, high civil service shifts reveal the influence of the *golillas*. Cañada was a prominent figure in the Francophobic war party critical of Aranda and pro-French policy. On learning at Madrid of Louis XVI's execution, he had hurried to the royal residence at Aranjuez to join the faction urging Spain to join the war against the French Convention as a member of the first coalition led by England. He had campaigned for volunteers and funds for the war effort, approved seizure of French commercial houses, and was proud to have urged young Godoy to replace Aranda, pointing to young William Pitt's career in England. However, Cañada's influence proved short-lived. He and his faction lost influence when French troops advancing into northern Spain forced Madrid to end its war and really with France, under a government of the revolution, as support against expansionist England. And Cañada's fall from grace may have contributed to Lardizábal's internal exile.[19]

It is also possible that the Lardizábal brothers were involved in the confrontation between the central government and the Basque provinces, which, during the war against France, had refused to support certain military measures because they violated regional *fueros* (rights).[20] Lardizábal was tied by birth and marriage to Basque regional elites. In 1798 he was in

Guipuzcoa, and two years later the prestigious Real Sociedad Vascongada appointed him director of its seminary, which had been battered by the war against France and its aftermath; it was put under government administration after the Basque insurrection, the Zamacolada.[21]

Critical of Godoy and a traditional *vizcaíno*, Lardizábal was clearly sympathetic to the anti-Godoy undercurrent strengthening after 1800 and probably an activist in the *fernandista* movement before the crisis of 1808. Later he would recall the fear he experienced in the ministry, where he covered the French desk, on following carefully "todos los sucesos" of the revolution in France.[22] At that post he must have contacted Pascual de Vallejo, Pedro de Macanaz (also removed by Godoy in 1794), and those who joined with Escoiquiz in working out an anti-Godoy strategy. In Guipuzcoa he was also related to regional leaders participating in the events of 1808: Juan Antonio de Lardizábal y Arza (*diputado general de Guipuzcoa*), José María de Lardizábal (ex-*diputado general*), and his sons José Javier (of the Guardias Reales Españoles) and Joaquin.[23]

On the accession of Fernando VII, Manuel de Lardizábal returned to the Consejo de Castilla, while brother Miguel joined Fernando, en route to Bayonne, who presumably appointed him to the Consejo de Indias, an appointment formalized at Madrid in late June 1808 under the French occupation.[24] When political developments led Lardizábal to leave Madrid for Aranjuez in the fall of 1808, however, the Consejo de Indias was reluctant to recognize his appointment, ostensibly because its membership exceeded its allocated number but in fact because the appointment was made by the French-sponsored government at Madrid.[25]

The circumstances of Lardizábal's "election" as representative of New Spain on the Junta Central almost one year later and subsequent selection as a regent in early 1810 are not clear. It seems to have been the result of a complex jockeying of interests in successive military, political, and economic crises of the Junta Central.

We have seen that when Pedro José Fernández de Córdoba proposed to then prime minister Floridablanca in September of 1808 that the colonies be represented in the Junta Central, he had in mind purely a token representation by individuals of proven loyalty then residing in Spain. When in late October the Junta sanctioned a "representación nacional e inmediata" of the colonies in the "legal government" of the *monarquía,* Lardizábal may have realized his own opportunity. However, selecting American representatives in the colonies themselves appeared to reduce the role of *criollos* long resident in the metropole. At the end of 1808, Miguel de Lardizábal continued

to seek confirmation as member of the Consejo de Indias or alternatively a place in the Estado ministry.[26]

The Consejo's formula involved a three-stage selection process in which colonial *audiencias* would choose, from among candidates proposed by the *ayuntamientos/cabildos* in every major colonial administrative center, three individuals, one to be determined by lot to represent the viceroyalty or captaincy general. This tightly controlled procedure was not implemented, however, until two months later when the Junta Central at Sevilla responded to a new challenge to its authority by declaring the colonies integral parts of the *monarquía*, therefore directly subject to its decisions—conceivably a measure to forestall independent action by the Junta de Cádiz. In an order of 29 January 1809, Saavedra supported the Consejo's proposal for the controlled election authorized earlier.[27] The outcome was predictable. In the important colony of New Spain, Miguel and Manuel de Lardizábal emerged as two of the local candidates chosen by the Audiencia de México, *mirabile dictu*, to enter the final drawing from which Miguel emerged the representative.

The initiative behind the nomination and selection of Miguel de Lardizábal to represent a colony he had not seen in almost fifty years, where he was virtually unknown,[28] probably originated in the scheming and correspondence of colonial crisis managers on both shores of the Atlantic who had sanctioned the removal of Viceroy Iturrigaray a year earlier. The presence at Sevilla and Cadiz of *golpistas* Roblejo y Lozano, Jaúregui, and Jabat has been noted; also involved were members of the Lardizábal network in Spain and New Spain. For instance, in September 1808 French intelligence officers reported that José María de Lardizábal was en route to Madrid and then Cadiz on "colonial matters." His son, Joaquín, in contact with Miguel and Manuel in November, arrived at Mexico City in mid-February 1809, where he was "a la sombra del tío Domingo" reported in a letter to Miguel de Lardizábal from his nephew Rafael.[29] "Tio" Domingo and Rafael de Lardizábal later actively promoted the nominations of Manuel de Lardizábal at Tlaxcala and of Miguel at Mexico City.

"Tio" Domingo Ignacio de Lardizábal y Arza, the more influential of the two, had disembarked Veracruz in 1760 as a *cargador* in the *flota* of Idiáquez to "make America" and achieve respectable status under the wing of his uncle, Francisco Ignacio de Lardizábal y Elorza, Miguel's father. Five years later he married the daughter of *oidor* José Rodríguez del Toro y Uribe, a cousin of Miguel. Entry into the Orden de Carlos III came in 1766; a year later he was a representative of the Consulado de Cadiz defending its *flota*

interests. Seven years later he was *tesorero* of the Aduana de Mexico and subsequently acquired a hacienda and wealth that allowed him, in the name of his two sons, both clerics, to contribute 4,000 pesos to the government in the financial crisis of 1798. Then, in the early 1800s, he invested 25,000 pesos through the Consulado de Mexico for construction—after two centuries—of a wagon road at long last between Mexico City and Veracruz.

In addition and in the fashion customary throughout the Spanish transatlantic network, Domingo Ignacio cultivated essential links to the metropole, where one brother, Francisco José (member of the Orden de Santiago, 1766), was secretary of Spain's Lisbon embassy, later on the Consejo de Hacienda. Another brother, Juan Antonio, was *diputado general* of Guipuzcoa in 1808,[30] and yet another, José Antonio, was the father of José María de Lardizábal y Olloqui who was at Bayonne in 1808; his son, Joaquín, joined his uncle Domingo Ignacio, in Mexico City in 1809.

Rafael de Lardizábal's position in the Lardizábal genealogical network is murky, beyond his identity as a nephew of Miguel. He may have arrived in New Spain in 1789 as a *provisto* to become *contador de la Real Renta de Correos* there. Less entrepreneurial than Domingo, he emerges as a persistent networker, exchanging services with members of the family web and alliances in Spain and New Spain. Mier fingered him as the conduit through whom a key figure in the coup d'état against Viceroy Iturrigaray, Monteagudo, corresponded with Miguel de Lardizábal in the metropole.[31]

By August 1809 Rafael de Lardizábal—clearly well connected to the *oidores* of the Audiencia—could inform his uncle, "según . . . lo que me dicen los ministros del Acuerdo," that he expected Miguel and Manuel to enter the final electoral *sorteo* in the process for selecting New Spain's *diputado* to the Junta Central. However, he regretted that Archbishop Lizana had been chosen to replace as viceroy their *paisano* General Garibay. "Garibay, cuya separación siento cada día más," he wrote, "lo tenía casi en la bolsa, pero como ha pasado [el virreinato] al Sr. Arzobispo, no puedo tener tanta seguridad." On 19 September, however, in acknowledging news of his uncle's appointment to the new Consejo Reunido de España e Indias, he again expressed optimism about the upcoming *sorteo* and found no incompatibility in the possibility of two positions, *diputado* for the colony of New Spain and *consejero* on the Consejo Reunido.[32]

When the *oidores* of the Audiencia de México finally elected three of the nominees presented by the Ayuntamientos of the subordinate district capital cities on 4 October, they were Manuel de Lardizábal for Tlaxcala, Miguel de Lardizábal for Mexico, and José Mariano de Almanza for Veracruz—by birthplace all *criollos*. Winner by lot was Miguel, to the satisfaction of his

nephew, who dreaded the possibility of an Almanza victory—Almanza had already displayed localist sympathies. Miguel de Lardizábal's position as *diputado* to the Junta Central was reported in Spain on 18 January just days before its dissolution; Miguel never took his oath of office.

The selection of Lardizábal to represent New Spain, and then all the American colonies, in the metropolitan government could be viewed by most colonials as only the result of interest and intrigue. To Spain's privileged elites and their colonial connections, on the other hand, Miguel de Lardizábal seemed a logical point man to maintain traditional relationships between crown and colonies. However, the colony that Miguel had left in the early 1760s was hardly the New Spain of 1810, and the colonial genii liberated by the extraordinary events of 1808 and 1809 were not as amenable as constant reports of colonial support for the *fernandista* cause suggested. Lardizábal as symbol of tokenism, as opponent of liberal reform, and later as protagonist of arch reaction during the restoration after 1814 under Fernando VII, hastened rather than delayed the final rupture between New and Old Spain.

The replacement of Fernández de León by Miguel de Lardizábal not only revealed the Regencia's tenuous authority, its dependence upon Cadiz, and the traditionalism of the conciliar system but also signaled the priority given to placating the peninsula-born elites in the colony of New Spain, who could be expected to continue to provide resources to carry on resistance to French occupation. The ambivalence occasionally expressed by the Regencia toward the Consejo Reunido and the Junta de Cadiz, spokesmen for those conservative elites, suggests reluctant acceptance of this basic fact.

Further personnel change in the improvised regime confirms this conclusion. The marqués de las Hormazas, who, in November 1808, had replaced Saavedra as Hacienda secretary when Saavedra became prime minister, now replaced him in that position when he became a regent. On 7 February Hormazas took on another portfolio when Benito de Hermida—proponent in the Junta Central of a liberal constitution—was shifted to the Consejo de Estado. Secretary of the Regencia as well, Hormazas was a dominant figure in the early months of 1810. He was well fitted for that role.

Nicolás Ambrosio de Garro y Arizcún, marqués de las Hormazas through his deceased wife, was a rich Navarrese *asentista* and a landlord in Navarra and in Madrid real estate. Like other families of the Baztán Valley in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, ancestors had invested in profitable colonial enterprise including smuggling, tax farming (*asientos*), and government provisioning. His maternal grandfather, Francisco de Arizcún y Mendinueta, had spent the early years of the century overseas in

New Spain, where he married the daughter of another Navarrese, Pedro de Irigoyen, with whom he associated as *capitán de mar y guerra* in the galleon trade with Manila. Sometime before 1737 he left his extended family in Puebla to return to Spain as *pagador de juros y mercedes* at Madrid and inherit a *mayorazgo* valued at 200,000 *pesos sencillos* along with his deceased brother's title, marqués de Urbieta. In his own right, his brother Miguel was beneficiary of uncles in metropolitan and colonial commerce, was a successful *asentista*, and *socio* in a commercial house with his cousin, Ambrosio Augustín de Garro y Micheltoreno.[33]

Hormazas, then sixty-three, besides his business activities had been a *director* of the Banco Nacional de San Carlos in 1787 and *tesorero general* in 1796, and in the acute financial crisis of the following year he had served briefly as Hacienda secretary, preceding in that post Francisco de Saavedra. Subsequently *consejero de estado*, in 1808 he was on the *Tribunal de la Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas*. A signer of the Constitution of Bayonne in July 1808, he abandoned Madrid for Sevilla in November, where he was appointed to head Hacienda under Saavedra. His contacts with the Cadiz mercantile and financial community, already well established, were strengthening, he corresponded with the Cadiz Consulado, and he is reported to rely on the advice of *criollo* Miguel Lobo, a Jalapa-born merchant prominent in the Veracruz trade and the affairs of the Cadiz Junta.[34]

Hormazas's empowerment effectively centralized executive and administrative authority in the first months of the Regencia. The *secretaría general*, which in the hands of Quintana and García Malo had played so important a role in the Junta Central under Garay, was now quietly dismantled on the grounds of "extraña al sistema de nuestra legislación que solo autoriza las del Despacho." Control of the press and other security measures tightened. The conde de Tilly, Sevilla's *diputado* to the Junta Central, was held at Gibraltar where, it was rumored, he tried to embark with an army for the colonies in America. Tilly and Calvo de Rozas, imprisoned at Cadiz, were now accused of misusing government funds—the classic formula for removing objectionable civil servants.[35] Orders went out to prevent any member of the Junta Central from escaping to the colonies and to denigrate them if they returned to their home in Spain.

Manifestoes to the Colonies

The potential fallout in the colonies of the demise of the Junta Central (and the earlier coup d'état at Mexico City in September of 1808), immediately preoccupied the Regencia. "Las Américas . . . es lo que más llama la

atención. La unión con España es muy interesante," wrote Benito de Hermida. And he urged the Junta Central, despite its state of "degradación," "sea la que anuncie a las Américas que . . . se ha desprendido del mando y nombrado el Consejo de Regencia." Although this option was rejected, in initial moves the Regencia continued the Junta Central's preoccupation with placating *criollo* sentiment. How else can one account for the fact that on 7 February the Regencia exonerated ex-viceroy Iturrigaray, attributed his behavior in 1808 to ineptitude rather than disloyalty, and postponed the charge of malfeasance in office to the formal judicial review (*residencia*) of his viceregal tenure? By these moves, signed by Hormazas on 18 February, the Regencia hoped "remover en Méjico un fuego," although it conceded that "tal vez no está más que amortiguado."[36]

A similar intention motivated two other measures signed by Hormazas in the following days: a manifesto to *criollos* in America, "Americanos españoles," explaining the change in government and, more significant, a decree authorizing the immediate election of *diputados* to the long-awaited *cortes* to be convened as soon as the military situation permitted.

The manifesto, signed on 14 February by all the regents, bore the clear imprint of Quintana's hand. It reviewed the successive military setbacks in the peninsula, which had combined with the selfish designs of unnamed individuals and corporate bodies "La ambición de los particulares [y] la de los cuerpos se había excitado hasta un punto extraordinario . . . en una contradicción más o menos abierta con la authoridad." As a consequence, the prestige of the Junta Central had fallen to a point such that its sole recourse was to transfer its authority to a regency committed to convoking the long-announced *cortes* in order to preserve and regenerate the *monarquía*, "si todos los Españoles de uno y otro mundo concurren energicamente a la generosa empresa." The manifesto went on to recall that "desde el principio de la revolución, declaró la Patria esos dominios parte integrante y esencial de la Monarquía española" endowed with "los mismos derechos y prerrogativas que a la Metrópoli." Here Quintana's candid pen took off in a confessional tone many in the colonies welcomed: "Desde este momento, Españoles americanos, os veis elevados a la dignidad de hombres libres; no sois ya los mismos que antes, encorvados bajo un yugo mucho más duro mientras más distantes estabais del centro del poder; mirados con indiferencia, vejados por la codicia y destruidos por la ignorancia . . . vuestros destinos ya no dependen, ni de los Ministros, ni de los Virreyes, ni de los Gobernadores; están en nuestras manos." Now colonial *diputados*, joined in the promised *cortes* with representatives of the metropole, would confront Bonaparte's destructive plans and rectify "todos los abusos, todas las extorsiones, todos

los males que han causado en estos países la arbitrariedad y nulidad de los mandatarios del Gobierno antiguo."[37] Strong language, indeed.

The decree accompanying this manifesto stipulated that, although it was necessary to postpone convocation of the *cortes*, election of colonial *diputados* should immediately proceed in "cada Capital cabeza de partido de estas diferentes Provincias." The Ayuntamiento of every colonial capital would elect three candidates of good character, ability, and education, of whom one would be selected by lot to participate in the extraordinary *cortes* envisioned. Questions of electoral procedure would be resolved by viceroy or captain general jointly with the Audiencia. In the meantime *diputados* would gather on the island of Mallorca in the Mediterranean to await the opening of the *cortes*.[38]

After printing the manifesto and attached decree—delayed by shortage of printers—they were put on sale, the Regencia insisting on prompt dispatch to the colonies on a vessel ready and waiting.[39] An American-born naval officer, José de Luyando, who was charged with taking the publications to New Spain, ordered "hacer propaganda contra los enemigos de la Corona." Hormazas prepared special instructions for Luyando to promote harmony in the viceroyalty; record complaints of "its pueblos"; ensure steps to prepare for the forthcoming *cortes*; promise measures to encourage demographic growth, trade, and agriculture in that colony; and offer what was long overdue, a "justa balança para provisión y alternativa de empleos entre europeos y americanos"—in sum, to achieve "la unión más estrecha de ese País con éste" because "de su logro pende en gran parte la felicidad y libertad de nuestra amada patria."[40] It unambiguously acknowledged Spain's dependence upon New Spain.

Yet eight days later after regents Castaños, Saavedra, Escaño, and Lardizábal had signed the manifesto, Luyando's ship had not yet departed. Hormazas forwarded the manifesto and decree to the Consejo Reunido de Espana e Indias, which on 27 February produced a critique of the two extraordinary measures. The Consejo Reunido praised the Regencia's decision to inform the colonies candidly of the metropolitan situation and the reasons for creating the Regencia, agreed with postponing the *cortes*, and reiterated its decision to give priority to national resistance to occupation. However, apropos the decree for immediate election of *diputados* to the *cortes*, it suggested that equality of representation had its limits in a system of empire: if every *cabeza de partido* sent a *diputado*, colonial representatives would form a "small army," and if every provincial capital sent a *diputado*, American representatives would outnumber those of the metropole. There were dangers in too much representation.

The Consejo Reunido proposed a revision: the peninsular representation would be constituted by *diputados* of Spain's traditional cities *de voto en cortes*, while colonial *diputados* would be selected by the Ayuntamientos in the capitals of viceroyalties and captaincies general overseas. The twelve American representatives would suffice until the *cortes* itself determined the number and method of selection of "Españoles americanos" for the *cortes*. The Regencia's manifesto, the Consejo Reunido complained, contained "una ideas nada agradables a aquellos habitantes y que, por otra parte, no son justas ni convenientes." It feared—possibly recalling the effects of revolution in France on Haiti—that Quintana's rhetoric might inspire slave revolts, particularly in Cuba, and denied that the colonial peoples had been kept in ignorance; it could point to colonial universities established in the sixteenth century, or to *americanos* in office or honored. "La conservación de nuestras Indias se ha de deber a las obras y buenas hechuras del supremo gobierno, y no a los discursos exaltados y llenos de *alegorias*," and the Consejo Reunido concluded that "sería de desear que el Real Decreto y Manifiesto no se hubiesen publicado ni vendido."[41]

In its 1 March response, the Regencia went far to defer to the Consejo Reunido. While observing that *diputados* representing the colonies in America in the coming *cortes* should not be too few lest the *americanos* believe that the intention was to deceive them, the Regencia called on the Consejo to offer an appropriate clarification (or interpretation) of a critical issue—the provisions of the 14 February decree, always bearing in mind the relative number of *diputados* to be assigned the metropole and adjacent islands. As for the Consejo Reunido's criticism of Quintana's rhetoric (to others, his frank anticolonialism), the Regencia insisted that the purpose of his manifesto "no es otro que asegurar a los españoles americanos de la vigilancia y protección del gobierno para que los virreyes y demás autoridades no obran despótica u arbitráriamente, sino conforme a las leyes de Indias . . . de cuyas infracciones se han quejado muchas veces, o han callado a su pesar por no tener esperanza de remedio." To Quintana's promise of a more equitable relationship between colonies and metropole, the regents countered with the promise of improved administrative oversight. They added abjectly that were there still time; Quintana's phrases could be suppressed or tempered to avoid even remote risk of misinterpretation. But, the Regencia warned, "los inconvenientes de recoger la impression, aún cuando fuere practicable, serían ciertos y mayores."[42]

In fact, although the Regencia's statements indeed were beyond retraction, they were in large measure superseded by a second manifesto on 28 February issued independently by the domineering Junta de Cadiz, signed

by its *presidente*, Francisco Xavier Venegas, *gobernador* of Cadiz, joined by nineteen *junteros*, mainly merchants. Addressed to "la América Española: Pueblos de América," the new manifesto recapitulated recent events but in a manner emphasizing the special contribution of Cadiz, which, by virtue of its population, wealth, commercial networks, and geographic location, was destined to fulfill the great hopes the nation placed in it, for "en ella iban a constituirse las principales esperanzas del estado." Cadiz's *gobernador*, Venegas, the first to subordinate himself to its new popularly elected local Junta, had been confirmed in his post. The Junta de Cadiz welcomed a Regencia that augured a "gobierno más consiguiente a nuestras leyes y a nuestras costumbres," one that "vió en la elección del Señor Lardizábal para representante de la América (elección en que ella había invocado con sus deseos y preparado tal vez con el alto aprecio que hace de sus prendes eminentes), un nuevo y precioso lazo para estrechar la fraternidad de sus dominios con los de España."[43] This motivated the Junta de Cadiz to welcome the Regencia as depositary of sovereign authority.[44] Self-praise did not end here. As the Junta de Cadiz expressed it, Cadiz, now capital of unoccupied Spain, hoped to be called one day the "restaurador de la patria" and, in this aspiration, called on the American colonies to share "la adhesión y fraternidad que se deben a los vínculos estrechos" linking it to every city, port, and corner, however remote or hidden, where the Cadiz community might count on a correspondent, relative, or friend. There was even more rhetoric: "Igualados a la metrópoli en derechos y prerogativas, llamados en este instante por el Consejo de Regencia a concurrir con nuestros diputados al congreso nacional, ya habeis adquirido sin sangre y sin peligro el carácter más eminente y bello de quantos puede tener el hombre social en el mundo."

To the copy of the manifesto addressed to New Spain, General Venegas as *presidente* of the Cadiz Junta added a note to Archbishop-Viceroy Lizana y Beaumont that called on that colony to put at the disposal of the Regencia "así como nosotros lo hacemos, todos los medios que necesita para cumplir las grandes obligaciones que ha jurado de salvar la patria y echar con la reunión de las próximas Cortes el cimiento seguro de nuestra independencia y felicidad. Los vínculos de sangre, de relaciones y de intereses estrechan más que ninguno otro pueblo los de este y ese Reino, y así esta junta se ve más obligada que ninguna otra a repetir a V. que la unión, fraternidad y obediencia de las dos Españas serán el presagio seguro de la victoria."[45]

The Junta de Cadiz's manifesto was obviously designed to counteract the Regencia's apologetic dispatches of 1 February, but its continued preemption of executive power did not go unnoticed in Spain or America. Six months later, after insurrections at Caracas and Buenos Aires, and just

before violence in New Spain, the Consejo Reunido tried to restate—really, reclaim—its authority. It complained that not only did the Junta Superior de Cadiz maintain "directa correspondencia con los Cuerpos, Gefes y Prelados [de Indias] en materias proprias del Superior Govierno, sino que dirige, o ha dirigido Proclamas; y considerando que este sistema puede producir funestas consequencias en las circunstancias . . . ha acordado . . . que los dos señores fiscales expongan . . . lo que se les pareciere." In their report sixty days later, when the Cortes was already in session and after considerable prodding, the *fiscales* opined that the Junta de Cadiz "remitió en 28 de Febrero una proclama a diferentes parages de la América, *cuya gestión es propio del Superior Gobierno*, *no es dado a ningún cuerpo particular el abrogarse esta facultad inseparable de ls Soberanía*" (emphasis added). Moreover, the *fiscales* added that they doubted "si el Supremo Consejo de Regencia la autorizó para el efecto o si después lo ha tolerado o consentido."[46] This was, at best, restrained criticism.

In view of the Consejo Reunido's reticence or insecurity, one can only surmise from fragmentary evidence the history of the conflictive messages directed to the colonies in America in the volatile spring of 1810. Early in January the Junta de Cadiz on its own authority had closed its port to shipping bound for America presumably to monitor the outflow of news and personnel to the colonies pending resolution of the crisis.[47] The regents' *comisario regio* to New Spain, José Luyando, may have sailed from Cadiz in March (after the critique of the Consejo Reunido?) and debarked at Veracruz in late April. On 1 May, the *Gazeta de Gobierno de México* merely listed the arrival of the *San Fernando* carrying no newspapers, after a voyage of one hundred days; it had left Cadiz on 3 March with official announcement of the formation of the Regencia. On 4 May it announced the arrival of a second vessel that apparently brought the Regencia's dispatches.[48] Probably the first ship carried an unofficial copy of the Cadiz manifesto forwarded by Francisco Escudero de Isasi to the Consulado de Mexico on 1 March[49]—hence the tentative tone of the official gazette's initial announcement on 1 May.

Though no mention was made of his arrival, Luyando probably debarked from the second vessel.[50] Official correspondence and Luyando's debriefing undoubtedly provided crisis managers in the Audiencia de México with welcome news of the current configuration of power in the metropole. The Regencia's formal installation was celebrated on 7 May, and the Audiencia's replacement of Archbishop Lizana as interim source of authority pending the arrival of a new viceroy was announced two days later. On 11 May the *Gazeta* published an account of recent events in the metropole "remitida

por un sujeto de carácter y probidad, que salió de Cádiz para este reino el día 1 de marzo último." Probably this cryptic note referred to the Regencia's *comisario regio*, Luyando. If so, there was a clear intention to downplay or even disguise his mission.

That mission—"hacer propaganda" and assure the "pueblos" of the colony of New Spain of the Regencia's commitment to address their complaints—was difficult under any circumstances, one for which Luyando was less prepared to achieve than perceived by those responsible for his appointment. Son of a former *oidor* who had served in both the Audiencia of Guadalajara and then Mexico, and in the Casa de Contratación at Cadiz in 1786, José Luyando moved from the colony to enroll in the royal navy at Cartagena in 1778 at age fifteen. Unacquainted with the colony he had left years before, he immediately alienated *criollo* opinion by (perhaps inadvertently) associating with *oidor* Guillermo de Aguirre y Viana and the faction in the Audiencia de México involved in the coup d'état removing Iturrigaray.[51] Henceforth his effort to take the high ground of "patriot" in the ongoing friction between *criollos* and *peninsulares* in the colony's capital—a conflict he insisted on ascribing to the machinations of Napoleon—brought the antagonism of both. And the replacement of the cautiously moderate archbishop-viceroy Lizana by the Audiencia *gobernadora* indeed left him hanging in the wind.

Luyando's conciliatory mission was further compromised by the subsequent arrival, perhaps in June, of Juan Antonio de Yandiola, who also claimed the status of *comisario regio* of the Regencia. Earlier, in mid-April, one of the regents, Francisco Javier Castaños, had signed the exit visa of a Juan Antonio de Yandiola, archivist at Hacienda entrusted with official correspondence with New Spain, to proceed to New Spain on official business. It was rumored he came entrusted, at his own request, with a "segundo pliego" alleged to duplicate the Regencia's dispositions of 14 February. Later it emerged, however, that the *pliego* was merely the order of 15 February "en que se pidió informe sobre sugetos que sirven cargos y empleos eclesiásticos, políticos, militares y de Real Hacienda" as well as secret assignments that might require some official assistance.[52]

If Luyando fell short in his mission to reconcile *criollo* opinion, Yandiola went far beyond his presumed intelligence-gathering function. Attaching himself to Luyando, he became an interpreter of the colony's reality and an adviser. The prism through which he scanned the situation in New Spain, while differing in essential points such as the issue of "liberalized" trade, was akin to Luyando's, that of a Spaniard from the peninsula's periphery. If Luyando symbolized the American-born career naval officer of the era of

Charles III, Yandiola could be categorized as a Basque regionalist closely associated with the large cohort of *vizcaíno* emigrants from Vizcaya's Encartaciones who sailed to the colony of New Spain between 1790 and 1810.

Juan Antonio de Yandiola y Garay, Castaños y del Llano, was born at Galdames, which—with neighboring Güeñes, Zalla, and Sodupe—was the center of that stream of emigrants to the American colonies. Among Yandiola's influential relatives in the colony of New Spain was his maternal uncle, Pedro Antonio de Garay y Llano, merchant and *regidor* on the Ayuntamiento of Veracruz in 1807. At Mexico City there was possibly a brother, Manuel Ramón de Yandiola y Garay, who in 1802 remitted funds via the intermediation of Pedro Antonio de Garay y Llano at Veracruz to Manuel de Garay at Madrid. Other members of this transatlantic family network were located in the colony's major productive areas, the mining centers of north New Spain and the cochineal zones of Oaxaca.[53] These connections may have been behind the decision, presumably approved by General Castaños, known for his partiality to *parientes y paisanos* and an *encartado* possibly related to Yandiola. But is it possible that neither Castaños nor Lardizábal was aware of the covert mission of Yandiola in addition to his more limited and ostensible assignment?

Regencia, Consejo Reunido, and Junta de Cadiz

In the evolution of the Regencia's colonial policy and its implementation, one again perceives the regional and sectoral interests in conflict, and the Regencia's inability to transcend them. Its early hope to garner the support of *criollos* and *peninsulares* overseas in the empire's wealthiest colony, New Spain, in the aftermath of the coup d'état of September 1808, evaporated under pressure from the mercantile and bureaucratic elites, who dominated Spain's politics and economy.

The establishment's elite, to be sure, did not always see eye to eye. Members of the Consejo Reunido tended to view with alarm the petulant insularism of Cadiz just as they had the hegemonism of the Junta de Sevilla. For their part, many Cadiz merchants were ready to challenge the entire conciliar system of government, the civil service in particular, that had repeatedly obstructed their direct participation in political decision making. Yet, in the volatile political climate in the spring of 1810, Consejo Reunido and Cadiz contributed to deprive the insecure Regencia of independent initiative in that critical area, colonial affairs. Replacing Fernández de León with Miguel de Lardizábal and, as we will see, Luyando's failed mission to satisfy *criollo* sensibility contributed to this situation. The two episodes

that followed the dispatch of the manifestoes further eroded the Regencia's executive power and moral authority.

First was the campaign sponsored by conservatives in the Consejo against members of the Junta Central; second, the elimination of the nearby autonomous troops under the command of the duque de Alburquerque, who threatened the Junta de Cadiz's control over its own precinct.

The hegemony of the Junta de Cadiz and, within it, of the merchants trading with New Spain was not a foregone conclusion in early February 1810. The presence of the Consejo Reunido at Cadiz, made up of influential figures from the high civil service of Madrid, and the Junta Central, as well as a considerable population of refugees from many regions of occupied Spain, posed a countervailing force to Cadiz's mercantile elite. Nor can one neglect that the presence on the outskirts of Cadiz of a military contingent commanded by the duque de Alburquerque, now captain general of Andalucía and *gobernador* and nominal *presidente* of its Junta, posed a challenge to the Junta de Cadiz and its militia, which had long controlled its territory.[54]

In the third week of February, the Junta de Cadiz initiated two adroit maneuvers in public relations to eliminate these cores of potential support for an independent Regencia. The first bypassed the Consejo Reunido and effectively destroyed what remained of the moral and political authority of the Junta Central. Thereby it undermined the authority of the Regencia overseas and in peninsular Spain.

The Consejo Reunido had used the occasion of recognizing the Regencia in early February to condemn anew the Junta Central and all its works. The diatribe—aimed at the outspoken progressives Calvo de Rozas and Quintana—was signed by the Consejo's *decano*, José Joaquín de Colón y Larreátegui,[55] who again questioned the legitimacy of the Junta Central and called for a return to the "leyes, loables usos y costumbres santas de nuestra monarquía." The Consejo intended to intimidate the Regencia, to have it ward off advocates of innovation, eager in his sights, and to seduce an innocent people; consideration of reform must be postponed until peacetime.[56]

The Consejo Reunido's public relations assault against the Junta Central soon extended to many members about to return to their provinces. Lorenzo Calvo de Rozas had already been imprisoned on the ritual grounds of misuse of government funds; the conde de Tilly, mired with attempting to embark for the colonies with a contingent of troops, suffered a similar fate.[57] Now, on the basis of rumors deliberately spread in Cadiz by one Francisco de Nocedal,[58] who in a campaign of disinformation accused the Junta Central of making off with state property ("large amounts of money

and jewels"), the Junta de Cadiz sought and received from the insecure Regencia authorization to detain and search all the *centrales*—a public indignity. The Regencia, Nocedal claimed, believed these security measures would dispel the rumors. When the Junta de Cadiz delayed executing the search, the Regencia, perhaps responding to the *centrales*' protests, requested substantive data pinpointing the individuals "sobre quienes recayese la sospecha del pueblo," otherwise permitting *centrales* to leave. In an ambiguous response, the Junta de Cadiz urged that the *centrales* be held accountable but held that a current investigation was impolitic. For that reason, and because their presence in the provinces would be dangerous (although detention in Cadiz would create a negative reaction in the provinces), it was advisable to keep them under surveillance. Noteworthy is the fact that what had led to Godoy's overthrow at Aranjuez, fear of the government seeking refuge overseas in the colonies—the Portuguese model—resurfaced. The Junta de Cadiz warned that "si se encamina alguno de dichos señores [*centrales*] a la América, a pesar de las restricciones que prescribe la prudencia, son tanto más de temer resultados funestos: pues que dividida la opinión, deve arruinarse el Edificio Social, sobre que se sostiene." The Junta de Cadiz hoped to reconcile these contradictions but, it had to lament, "careciendo de autoridad legal . . . puesto que los mismos [*centrales*] le despojasen de la que tenía y la transmitieron al Supremo Consejo de Regencia," it left the decision to the Regencia, which it had cornered.[59]

The insecure Regencia now consulted the Consejo Reunido, which again chose to accuse the Junta Central of "violenta y forzada usurpación" of power and—a far more serious charge—"trastornando enteramente el gobierno monárquico." But like the Junta de Cadiz, it considered a judicial hearing inopportune and advised instead that the *centrales* be watched and prevented from fleeing to America.[60] It did not stop here. With the approval of Regencia and Consejo Reunido, the civil servant in charge of public security at Cadiz, the now familiar Juan Miguel Páez de la Cadena, was ordered to search the *centrales* then on board *Cornelia*—predictably, none of the rumored loot was found.[61]

The calculated denigration and humiliation of the Junta Central once again demonstrated the Regencia's frailty, and the determination of the Consejo Reunido to reassert the role of the traditional conciliar system and institutions of the old regime. More important, it displayed the astute one-upmanship of the Junta de Cadiz in assuring control of the port and preservation of its colonial interests. In this instance, interests and mentality of the civil servants on the Consejo along with those of Cadiz's elites coincided in maneuvering the Regencia into a stance that could only further under-

mine its authority. Probably the appointment of Miguel de Lardizábal to the Regencia and his connection with both Manuel de Lardizábal and José Joaquín de Colón y Larreátegui on the Consejo Reunido, not to overlook Juan Miguel Páez de la Cadena, were instrumental in effecting this outcome.[62] The significance and mechanics of the whole public relations campaign surely were not lost on politically savvy contemporaries in Spain and New Spain. It emboldened conservatives and angered would-be reformers, a dynamic of growing polarization.

Publication and distribution of the Regencia's 14 February manifesto and decree without prior consultation with the Consejo Reunido—or, for that matter, the Junta de Cadiz—confirmed the determination of the Junta de Cadiz to reinforce its hegemonic presence in the operations of the Regencia and, above all, control over its precinct, both city and port. That control had been effective when General Castaños was captain general of Andalusía, and General Venegas *gobernador* of Cadiz. However, when Castaños became *presidente* of the Regencia, and Venegas was reassigned, the Regencia proceeded to appoint the acclaimed "savior" of Cadiz, the duque de Alburquerque, both captain general of Andalusía and *gobernador* of Cadiz. As such he also became titular *presidente* of the Junta de Cadiz, and although this responsibility and that of *gobernador* were delegated to Andrés López de Sagastizábal, Alburquerque himself met frequently with the local Junta to press his preoccupation with provisioning his troops and improving Cadiz's defense works.

In Alburquerque's power, the Junta de Cadiz detected a clear and present threat to its sudden preeminence, and potential as a buttress for a Regencia to become more independent of Cadiz and more representative of Spain's other provinces assembling at Cadiz. Immediately it began to undermine Alburquerque's leadership, belittling his military skill in intercepting French forces, asking the Regencia to move his headquarters to the nearby Isla de León, reviving the rumor that he had been involved with the conde de Tilly in planning to embark with troops to "stir up America," and suggesting he was angling to become a regent. The Junta was not above withholding funds and materiel for maintaining and reequipping Alburquerque's tattered troops. Rebuffed in his requests for support, on 11 March he had to turn to the Regencia to order Cadiz to meet the army's needs; meanwhile, he apparently looked for broad support by publicizing his complaints. However, understandably apprehensive of the influence of Cadiz, on 15 March he backed off by denying that his criticism was directed at the Junta. For its part, the Junta riposted on the next day by printing a blistering statement, which has disappeared, in which according to an irritated

gaditano, his complaints had "traspasados los límites de la justicia y . . . del decoro y llena de groserías invectivas."[63] More galling to Alburquerque, the counterattack left the impression that he had withdrawn his complaint after the Junta de Cadiz had attacked him.

As military officer and *grande*, Alburquerque's resignation was predictable. Equally so—in view of its recent performance—was the Regencia's quick acceptance. To finesse the situation, the general was offsided to London as special envoy charged with conveying to London the gratitude of the Spanish government for aid received. Alburquerque, like army officers Solano, Morla, and Villel before him, was the victim of a power play by the Cadiz mercantile elites intent on defending their special colonial interests. And once more the Regencia showed its vulnerability to manipulation by the Junta de Cadiz. As Antonio Alcalá Galiano would comment, although Cadiz had indeed become temporarily "una España abreviada," its Junta "mal podía pretender . . . gobernar la nación entera; pero en punta a Cadiz, no queria que su autoridad fuese ofuscada o contradicha por otra superior."[64]

Yet this triumph of the Junta de Cadiz would have portentous and contradictory consequences. In London, Alburquerque enlisted the counsel and editorial skills of self-exiled publicist José Blanco White to publish a manifesto accusing the Junta de Cadiz of simulated moderation while conspiring to assert its domination. He attributed refusal to supply his troops to its desire to take over the government's finances for the benefit of its commercial interests. In publicizing his complaint, he denied he had intended to spread civil discord or abort the Junta de Cadiz's careful planning. "Quales son los sigilosos pasos de la Junta de Cadiz que yo he hecho abortar con mis reclamaciones públicas?" he demanded. "América?" Cadiz's actions, he retorted, had scandalized not only everyone in general but "en especial a nuestros hermanos de América a quienes perpetuamente han llegado en seguida de las ponderaciones de nuestras fuerzas, las noticias de nuestras derrotas." It was the Junta de Cadiz that had put the national cause at risk by withholding recognition of the Regencia until at last—"as few are unaware"—England's ambassador had to pressure it to do so.

On the contrary, he had not hesitated to recognize the interim government, the Regencia, "que solo se formaba para convocar las Cortes, y que era el único que podrían reconocer las demás Provincias y *América*." This was the root, he charged, of the Junta's ill-disguised animus against the Regencia, which it had lost no opportunity to dominate, and of its effort to "ponerme en el resbaladero en que hubiese de perder el crédito . . . o, como sucedió, me viese obligado a dexar el mando." This acerbic exchange

between the Junta de Cadiz and Alburquerque lasted until he died in early 1811, still troubled by his disgrace.[65]

The Regencia and Finance

The regents recognized immediately the importance of their, rather than Cadiz's, control of government finance, and on 6 February 1810 "resolvió se previniese al terorero de Real Hacienda de Cadiz, que los caudales que vinieran de Indias los tuviese *únicamente a disposición de la* Regencia, dando un estado semanal de los que entren y salgan" (emphasis added).[66] A statement of intention was hardly adequate to address the financial crisis of the government. Even including funds expected to arrive from the colonies, the government's deficit was calculated to reach 500 million reales annually. Printing paper money was out of the question in view of "el uso y abuso que se hizo de él en el último reinado."

This financial crisis was Cadiz's opportunity. Although prior borrowing by the Junta Central had seemed the only alternative and had already been explored in England and its colonies, it was time-consuming and offered little hope "para un Estado que en el concepto general de Europa se halla en vísperas de su ruina." At this point "los recursos se veían remotos, las necesidades eran parentorios" and "ocho ejércitos [que] clamaban por su sustento en la circunferencia de la Peninsula" threatened to disperse, turning Spanish resistance into "una espantosa anarquía." The Junta de Cadiz seized the opening. It had already played a prominent role in financing the *fernandista* movement, momentarily it contained "gran parte de los mayores capitalistas del reino"—a remarkable admission—and now "propuso al Gobierno hacerse cargo provisionalmente en su distrito de todas las rentas de la Corona, con inclusión de los caudales procedentes de América, y asegurar por medio de una distribución económica y oportuna, el mantenimiento de las cargas políticas y judiciales del Gobierno, y la subsistencia y aumento de los ejércitos nacionales."[67] The Cadiz merchant community would, in effect, function as the sole viable government of resistance.

In fact, the Junta de Cadiz had taken virtual control of the government's fiscal operations within its precincts from the time of its creation at the end of January. The situation was formalized in February when the Junta offered to assume responsibility for all aspects of the government's fiscal administration. Discussion of the plan's nineteen articles brought together members of the Regencia individually and as a body, government finance experts, and representatives of the Cadiz mercantile community. There were problems, not the least of which was having to bypass "todo el sistema ad-

ministrativo de las rentas de la Corona establecido por las leyes." Moreover, the Regencia cautioned the Junta that, under the best of calculations, in undertaking defense and provisioning of Cadiz and *fernandista* resistance throughout the peninsula, it also would have to accept the obligation of covering an existing deficit of 30 million *pesos fuertes*. In response, the Junta de Cadiz assured the Regencia it could count on its credit standing in western Europe and that it was prepared to accept additional financial responsibilities. Confident of the good faith of the Junta de Cadiz and eager to avoid future accusations of financial maladministration, the Regencia accepted the terms of the Junta de Cadiz on 31 March, when Cadiz's formal responsibilities took effect.[68]

19. The Pivotal *Orden* of 17 May 1810

Una providencia que iba a cambiar en un momento favorablemente el aspecto de nuestra causa en todos los sentidos que son imaginables. Manuel de Albuerne, *Origen*

Una Real Orden de 17 de Mayo . . . sobre el comercio libre en las Americas . . . es apócrifa, nula y de ningun valor y efecto. AGN, Reales Cédulas (July 1810)

La Regencia . . . niega que haya mandado expedir la tal orden . . . Un proceder tan vergonzoso que tan altamente desacreditaba el Gobierno, era un obstáculo más para la reconciliación de los Americanos. Flores Estrada, *Exámen imparcial*

The fate of the Regency's decree of May 17, 1810, proved to be indicative of the sentiment of the elements in ultimate control of the situation in Spain. J. Hann, "Measures of Reform"

Entre los puntos de mayor importancia . . . ninguno presenta maiores males que la solicitud del Comercio Libre de los Extrangeros con la Nueva España.
López Cancelada, *Ruina de la Nueva España*

Magnifying the demands of Havana's planters in 1809–1810 was the added insistence of other export interests—producer and merchant—at Caracas, Cartagena, and Buenos Aires on modifying Spain's transatlantic commercial system. In part this was the result of the late developing bipolar colonial economy, the established mining complexes in Peru and New Spain, and the more recent export growth of cattle products and the staples sugar and coffee. The new economic zones had to export even in wartime products that deteriorated when warehoused, while precious metals could be stored; Cuba had to ship out sugar and molasses and import foodstuffs—flours, salt fish, and beef—for an increasing slave labor force. In the confrontation of interests pitting Havana, Caracas, and Buenos Aires against Mexico City, Veracruz, and Lima, most Cadiz merchants supported Mexico City's and

Veracruz's continuation as entrepôt agencies, surviving by curbing direct commercial exchanges between Spain's colonial ports and U.S. and English merchants and shippers.

Generalized crises of imperialism usually conjoin external and domestic factors, and the Spanish imperial crisis of 1808 to 1810 was no exception. Whether Junta Central or Regencia, the government had to contain expansionist groups in the United States by offering channels of trade, legal or illegal, with Cuba—what Spain's minister Luís de Onís urged at Philadelphia in late 1809. Concurrently, English insistence on direct trade with the Spanish colonies could hardly be denied when Spanish resistance to French occupation forces desperately sought financing by Treasury or private lenders assured by the security of the English government and, ultimately, by the customs receipts of Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City. In the last case, how could the government in refuge at Sevilla, namely the Junta Central, and later the Regencia at Cadiz, disregard the interests of potential donors and lenders among prominent merchants at New Spain's capital, its principal port, and the commercial emporium of Cadiz?

Second, appeals for changing the commercial system were an ineluctable consequence of the Junta Central's proclamation promising the Spanish colonial world equality of status with the metropolitan provinces in the governance of the empire—a deliberately vague form of federation. To such stimuli the colonial world responded too rapidly. And dread of mounting colonial demands lurked behind postponement of a general *cortes* by both the Junta Central and Regencia.

These were the countervailing currents pressing upon and dividing first the Junta Central and then the Consejo de Regencia, their ministries and ministers and, in particular, the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias, when obliged to decide policy for resolving the conflict between the restless interests of Havana, on the one hand, and Mexico City and Veracruz, on the other. The decision became the notorious order of 17 May 1810. Well known are the essential elements, including the role of the Cadiz commercial community. Nonetheless, detailed analysis of the episode with a wealth of detail is enlightening on many counts. For the details bare the workings of the Spanish imperial civil service, the pattern of delay, reports, more reports, and the pattern of defense of the bureaucracy—the protection of its loyal members. Second, they reveal the ties of the civil service to civil society and to its most influential members, in particular, the mercantile interests of Cadiz and of Mexico City and Veracruz. Third, they reveal how Cadiz, in the critical hours of the empire in 1810 just before the government was forced by colonial uprisings to call definitely for a *cortes*, managed to control

policy and contribute decisively to the collapse of the empire Cadiz sought to sustain.

In the initial weeks of its existence, Spain's first government of resistance, the Junta Central, had to juggle economic interests, many contradictory, that never could be reconciled. The government was torn between maintaining the loyalty of traditionalists in commercial policy—Cadiz and associated interest groups at Veracruz and Mexico City—and tolerating colonial governments bending to local pressure for wartime expedients that would legalize contact with nearby friendly or neutral colonial ports, while conciliating English commercial groups demanding legitimation of large-scale, largely illegal operations with Spain's colonial ports. Always in the background was the Junta Central's awareness that one major financial resource was London—the Exchequer, Bank of England, and their private lenders—as well as the core of wealthy Spanish merchants at Veracruz and Mexico City: Basoco, Heras Soto, Ágreda, and their support network of religious corporations. Resolution of these conflicting interests would tax the skill of any government under normal conditions; in wartime, as resistance on the government's perimeter in the peninsula was contracting before advancing forces of occupation, there could realistically be no solution, only short-lived and contradictory stopgaps.

Between September 1808 and the following March, colonial governments and London interests apparently bent the Junta Central to loosen commercial policy on the scale of expedients adopted in 1804, 1806, and 1807. Responding to local interests at Caracas and Panama, colonial officials there opened trade with Curaçao and English island possessions in the Caribbean (Panama's officials included *all* friendly or neutral colonies).[1] This was the moment when Arango y Parreño's comprehensive critique of the shortcomings of Spanish trade policy for the Cuban economy in wartime (1793) became particularly relevant.[2] The loyalty of colonial interests to the resistance government in the metropole obviously had a price. Repudiation of colonial officials' expedients was made difficult since English exporters expected the Junta Central to lower duties on English woolens and remove other products from the Spanish prohibited list. In fact, England's foreign minister tried to persuade the Spanish government that "intercourse with South America was indispensably necessary for the obtaining, by this country, the means of continuing its aid to the Spanish cause"—a point driven home when Cadiz merchants Pedro Antonio de Aguirre and Miguel Lobo sought London financial support to keep afloat the Junta Central.[3] English and colonial pressures probably motivated the Junta Central's October (1808) manifesto promising to restructure Spain's civil, criminal, and

commercial codes—"Libre navegación y comercio y de la comunicación abierta con nustras colonias," as well as "las relaciones con nuestras colonias estrechadas más fraternamente."[4] The Junta Central, in December 1808 fleeing enemy troops approaching Trujillo, may have desperately offered English representatives the prospect of a commercial treaty; however, the Anglo-Spanish defense treaty (14 January 1809) omitted any reference to trade.[5]

Fears of colonial dissatisfaction, no doubt joined to intelligence concerning the Spanish merchants' role in the Mexico City coup d'état that removed Viceroy Iturrigaray, help explain the radical tone of the Junta Central's January (1809) proclamation that the colonies formed "parte esencial e integrante de la Monarquía espanõla, y sus habitantes con iguales derechos" and a vaguely worded "derecho positivo al libre comercio."[6] That "libre comercio" might mean direct commercial contact seemed a real possibility at Havana: an English vessel direct from Liverpool arrived in February (1809) and was permitted to sell its cargo, the U.S. Non-Intercourse Act authorized trade with Spain and its colonies, and on 25 March Havana's authorities published regulations covering trade with U.S. Atlantic and other neutral or friendly ports, *before* seeking the approval of the Junta Central.[7]

This unplanned drift toward trade liberalization by wartime expedients was slowed by countervailing pressures always obvious to the Junta Central. Shortly after the formation of the Junta, Cadiz's Consulado—aware of London's insistence on direct access to Spain's colonial ports in exchange for financial assistance—pressed the Junta Central for a policy statement rejecting English insistence on revision of Spain's tariffs.[8] Probably these views induced the ever-ambiguous finance minister, Saavedra, to order in January 1809 colonial officials to suspend entry of foreign shipping at their ports; perhaps Saavedra hoped to mollify Spanish merchants resident at Veracruz and Mexico City opposed to Havana's export drive. In an order of 17 March, the Junta Central rebuked Caracas's and other colonial officers—it did not pinpoint specifically Cuba's—for the presence of non-Spanish shipping without specific Junta Central authorization and for local changes in the level of customs duties.[9]

By mandating in effect a return to a strict traditionalist imperial trade policy, the buffeted Junta Central responded to the most apparent pressures, those of Cadiz and London. Both could furnish financial infusions. An English agent, Andrew Johnson Cochrane, received a 3 million peso sight draft on the treasury of New Spain, while the Junta Central commissioned Aguirre and Lobo of the Cadiz merchant community to explore the possibility of a 15 million peso loan at London.[10] The peso draft entrusted to

Johnson inspired English agent Frere to advise London that soon it might be possible for English merchants to "export any quantity of specie obtainable at Veracruz, without paying normal export duties."[11] (Meanwhile, the Junta Central approached the Cadiz community for a short-term, 1 million peso loan to be managed by its Consulado officers—it was immediately granted, interest-free.)[12] Concessions to the English supplemented by licenses (*gracias*) awarded to the Compañía de Filipinas to ship 500,000 pesos of European and Asian goods directly from London to Veracruz convinced some English exporters that the Junta Central had opened ports in Spain and its colonies to English cargo, imitating "lo que había echo el Príncipe Regente de Portugal."[13] The English were soon disabused.

Havana's Initiative

The drastic language of the 17 March order was both time bomb and provocation to those in the American colonies who had interpreted literally the Junta Central's manifesto of late 1808 as well as its proclamation of early 1809 that promised a new trade policy requested by colonial interests.[14] Encouraged by the Junta Central's declarations and the U.S. Non-Intercourse Act, Havana's exporters pushed ahead to open their port formally to ships from the United States and other nations. After conferences organized by officers of Havana's Consulado in tandem with the local Ayuntamiento, they agreed on an "arreglo provisional . . . con respecto al comercio ultramarino de introducción," U.S. flours and other staples—a prime consideration to Cuban slave-owners—would be admitted as were imports on the prohibited list, along with new items absent from Spanish tariff schedules. Mindful of the predictable reaction of Veracruz and Mexico City interests, the agreement's innovations assigned to the Consulado supervision of cargo handling and—to calm merchants anxious about foreign competitors in internal distribution—stipulated that no foreign merchant could operate "una casa abierta de comercio"; foreigners would have to consign goods only to "casas españolas." Clearly further imports of New Spain's more costly flours could not compete in the Havana market; more damaging to New Spain's Spanish merchant community was the legalization of Havana's reexports of foreign goods to "cualquiera destino ultramarino." To soften the impact upon Veracruz importers, Havana rationalized that total duties of 46.5 percent on Havana's reexports were 12 percent above those on goods moving directly from Cadiz to Veracruz. The agreement of Havana's Consulado and Ayuntamiento received the support of Captain

General Someruelos and Intendant General Aguilar; it was duly published in the official gazette, *El Aviso de la Habana*; and Someruelos urged the Junta Central to approve the "acuerdo . . . sobre admitir las expediciones neutrales y aliadas por las contínuas instancias de aquel ayuntamiento."[15]

Veracruz's *almaceneros* quickly learned of Havana's initiative and within a fortnight petitioned Viceroy Iturrigaray's replacement, General Garibay, to disallow the unloading of Havana reexports regardless of the legislation of 1806 and 1807. The bulk of those reexports, the Veracruz Consulado insisted, were not legally introduced items in surplus, as alleged, but really the product of smuggling; reexports must carry as proof of their legal status the "polizas originales de los registros de salida de España." Veracruz Consulado officers Castillo, Del Valle, and Miquilena asserted that Havana's initiative revealed a "espíritu de libertinage y el prurito de querer que sea la Isla de Cuba el emporio del comercio y el almacen general de la América"—overtones of Arango y Parreño's boast in 1797. Veracruz's petition supported by Mexico City's Consulado was sent to the Junta Central. Perhaps Mexico City's merchants were encouraged by the Junta Central's approval of their Consulado's recent elections, which brought to office the main figure in the coup d'état against Iturrigaray, Gabriel de Yermo. To guarantee the Junta Central's rejection of Havana's initiative, Veracruz asked colleagues at Cadiz to lobby the government at Sevilla.[16]

Havana's action was not unique. Over the next five months of 1809, May to September, the Junta Central received similar petitions from colonial officials at Panama and Caracas, all counterbalanced by petitions from Consulados at Veracruz, Mexico City, and Cadiz. Yet despite the repeated insistence of the Cadiz group for a clear-cut decision on colonial trade policy, the Junta Central delayed its response. At the end of August, the Cadiz Consulado wrote that it expected the Junta Central to maintain Cadiz's "antigua posesión exclusiva removidos los permisos que nuestro anterior ministerio prodigó a vanderas extrangeras" and in September reiterated its support of the anti-Havana position of Veracruz and Mexico City.[17] At the same time the agent of Havana's interested parties, Bernabé Martínez de Pinillos, who had been sent to lobby at Cadiz for Havana's April resolutions, went from Cadiz to Sevilla to pressure the Junta Central "aprobar sus [Havana's] acuerdos y pretensiones, intervenidas y autorizadas por los respectivos Gefes gobernador e intendente."[18] In the labyrinth of influence peddling at Sevilla, on 25 September he sought out the Hacienda secretary's *oficial mayor*, Manuel de Albuerne, to convince Hacienda secretary Hormazas and through him the Junta Central of the "necesidad absoluta" of

Havana's provisional measures. A veteran civil servant, Albuerne cautioned Pinillos about the "trastorno que ocasionarían estas providencias."[19] Albuerne was to prove only too correct.

Pinillos's lobbying via Albuerne was effective. A month later (2 October) Hormazas, responding to a letter from Pinillos, sent the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias a packet of documents whose centerpiece was a letter from Cuba's captain general, Someruelos, justifying opening Havana to foreign shipping;[20] in the packet Hormazas included the opposing views of New Spain's viceroy, Garibay, and of the Consulados of Veracruz and Cadiz.[21] Someruelos's letter reminded the Junta Central of its publicly expressed intention to air colonials' grievances and their reform recommendations and to promulgate a commercial code, noting that eight years earlier the Hacienda minister (Soler was not mentioned) had authorized colonial officers at Havana to welcome neutral vessels in order to satisfy import needs and to export warehoused goods.[22] On 31 October the Consejo Reunido transmitted Someruelos's letter to its own *fiscal* and a petition from Caracas's colonial authorities to the Contaduría General de Indias, for their respective *informes*. But without fanfare, the Consejo—through Hacienda Minister Hormazas—issued a general order closing Havana and other Cuban ports to all foreign shipping. This was further evidence of the Junta Central yielding to the dominant interest of Cadiz and associated ports.[23]

Here demonstrated was a classic phenomenon of bureaucratic tactics, one hand suspending action pending informed staff opinion while with the other secretly sustaining traditionalist policy. In late 1809 when the government in the metropole sought legitimacy, double-edged tactics were unacceptable to aggrieved, aggressive, and moneyed colonial interest groups. In fact, the Junta Central's life chances were tenuous in November and December 1809 as French and Spanish troops pressed against Sevilla, temporary capital of the government of resistance, while within Sevilla the politically wise detected the rightward drift of the Junta under the leadership of a military commander, the marqués de la Romana, who had earlier dismissed the reformist Junta de Oviedo in Asturias. A new government, the Regencia, would soon replace the ever-vacillating Junta Central. Its rightward drift probably led Hormazas to tolerate the unilateral action of the Cadiz authorities, who suspended exports to the colonies and even ordered the offloading of vessels in the harbor about to sail overseas despite English blockaders.[24]

The Junta Central had delayed for months, until the end of October 1809, to begin a formal assessment of the action of Havana's authorities—

Consulado, Ayuntamiento, intendant, and captain general—in opening their port on 17 March. The Junta allowed two more months to pass without receipt of what were critical pieces, the *informes* of its fiscal and, in particular, of the veteran colonial civil servant who had returned after decades of service at Caracas, Estéban Fernández de León. As in October, so in January of 1810 agent Pinillos pressed the Junta Central for a decision favoring Havana's initiative. His ostensible purpose was twofold: first, to provide a rationale for suspending the furtive order of the Junta Central closing Cuba's port to foreign (really, North American) shipping, by presenting a detailed survey of Cuba's export economy in wartime.

At stake, ran his argument, was the fate of Cuban agriculture and trade currently undermined by the Cadiz Consulado when it insisted on maintaining "leyes establecidas" despite conditions of "los tiempos presentes." Average annual sugar output had tripled since the decade of the 1790s, when a medium-sized *ingenio* (sugar plantation) engaged about three hundred slaves and a capital investment of between 300,000 and 400,000 pesos. By maintaining Spain's traditional exclusionist Atlantic trade policy even in wartime, sugar stocks grew, deteriorated in humid conditions, or were sold at uneconomic prices to the few Spanish ships that managed to arrive to profit from an asymmetrical buyer's market. "Anglo-American" (North American) shippers were dissuaded by an average import duty level greater than 43 percent.[25] Via this line of argument Pinillos achieved his second purpose: to let it be known that he knew that the Cadiz Consulado had pressured the Junta Central to cut off Havana from contact with the United States. In pursuit of its "interés individual, momentaneo," Cadiz sacrificed the "interés perpetuo y general."[26] Pinillos's letter was dated 13 January: Did he act because he had learned that Hormazas had ordered on 10 January New Spain's three Consulados to arrange a loan—extraordinary for its time—of 20 million pesos, giving them full discretion to select their own organizing group and assign as the basis of amortization and interest any "derecho sobre los géneros y frutos de importación y exportación por las Aduanas?"[27] This extraordinary discretion manifested the incapacity of the Junta Central (and, later, the Regencia) to resist the coalition of mercantile interests of Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz. On 13 January the Cadiz Consulado reminded the Junta of its extensive role in Spanish government finance, managing six borrowings—"su administración, pago de intereses y . . . la prolija y mui extensa correspondencia con los encargados de recaudar los derechos de subvención en España y en las Americas." At the end of the month, management of the finances of the successor government to

the Junta Central, the Consejo de Regencia, was entrusted to the Junta de Cadiz—indicating that structural change of the Spanish transatlantic trade system would have tough sledding.[28]

Estéban Fernández de León: From Caracas to Cadiz

Saavedra's selection of Estéban Fernández de León as *contador general* of the finance section of the Consejo de Indias in September 1809—like most such key appointments—was not the result of a bureaucratic lottery. Not only did both men share the experience of colonial civil service, but both had been *intendentes* at Caracas, and both had experienced the trauma of assuaging aggrieved interests and the inevitable residue of their bitter suspicion. No radical in formulating or executing policy, Saavedra displayed the flexibility of an enlightened conservative, a quality he probably recognized in Fernández de León. In 1797, to be specific, Saavedra at Madrid and León at Caracas had supported an unavoidable policy expediente, *comercio neutro*, to meet the immediate needs of colonial producers as well as the long-range survival of entrepôt merchants at Cadiz and the colonies. These were the interests that, then, recently appointed Contador General León was asked to conciliate in an *informe* he was assigned to draft on 25 October 1797. As the Junta Central was collapsing at the end of 1809 and the influence—especially economic—of the Junta de Cadiz rose, Saavedra had no reason to press the contador general for an opinion that might antagonize traditionalists among the merchants of Cadiz and their colleagues in the colonies; their financial support could spell survival for the Junta Central now in its Andalusian retreat.

León in 1809 typified the *criollized* Spanish civil servant often encountered in the colonies, more rarely in the metropole. The type was produced by extended colonial residence, civil service, or activity in the private sector there, and by a certain empathy for the local elite's chafing at the outgrown constraints of colonialism. Native of a pueblo near Badajoz (Extremadura), his first post was at Caracas (about 1760), where he remained for the next four decades before returning to the metropole. In Venezuela he found a number of relatives, although the precise relationships are yet to be clarified.[29]

A prominent relative was Antonio Fernández de León, proprietor of holdings near Caracas, and a slave owner. Notoriety or prestige came in 1808 when Antonio was implicated in an aborted Caracas junta when disturbing reports arrived of the abdication of the Bourbons at Bayonne; he criticized Joaquín de Mosquera, dispatched from Mexico City to prosecute

those behind the movement, briefly jailed without justification along with prominent *criollos*, and then shipped for trial to Cadiz. Antonio was back at Caracas in 1810 and was titled marqués de Casa León. In 1815 one Sebastián Fernández de León was *prior* of the Consulado of Caracas.[30]

Estéban Fernández de León enjoyed the support network of an extended family in a thirty-nine-year career in the colony of Venezuela, where he encouraged the growth of the local economy. He backed the formation of the Caracas Consulado that was promoted by intendant Francisco Saavedra and was acquainted with the Consulado's first *sindico*, Martín de Herrera; the enlightened secretary of the Veracruz Consulado, Donato de Austria, deposed in his behalf when Estéban petitioned for entry into the Orden de Carlos III. As intendant of Caracas (1791–1803) León favored opening the trading operations of local merchants, *peninsular* and *criollo*. For instance, in 1793 he recommend that Madrid permit merchants at Caracas to charter shipping on their own account—no small innovation—to sail to metropolitan ports, and he used local agents of such Cadiz merchants as Pedro de Iriarte, Francisco Bustamante y Guerra, Antonio Lasqueti, and conde de Reparaz to transfer colonial treasury funds to Madrid, bypassing the services of local agents of the Compañía de Filipinas.[31] The hope of Venezuela's estate owners for commercial exchanges with nearby non-Spanish colonial ports, especially when English blockaders began to patrol the Caribbean in 1796, sparked long-standing friction with the hard core of influential Basque immigrants who dominated Venezuela since the days of the Compañía Guipuzcoana, as correspondents of merchant firms at Bilbao and San Sebastián. This Basque group lost no time in taking issue with intendant León when in 1797 he initiated the sale of government-owned tobacco to merchants of nearby neutral ports at Saint Thomas and Curaçao. The flare-up between Venezuela's *hacendados* producing export crops of tobacco as well as cocoa, sugar, indigo, and coffee, and Caracas merchants in overseas trade foreshadowed the conflict of interest groups he confronted in drafting his *informe* thirteen years later in January 1810.

Years of residence at Caracas, ties to export-minded *hacendados*, and his responsibilities as intendant sensitized León to the colonial repercussions of Spain's involvement in the superpower conflict in the Atlantic, which was revived in late 1796. In the next year he sent Madrid an assessment (*informe*) of the undercurrent of colonial opposition to Madrid's tax and trade policies, which had led to rioting in Peru, Ecuador, New Granada, and Venezuela and fear of the same in New Spain. León was convinced, he told Madrid, of serious shortcomings in colonial policy "y principalment en el errado y perjudicial sistema de comercio" and the dissatisfaction of

colonial residents.[32] Following the decision of Havana's authorities, he recommended issuing licenses to U.S. ships to enter Venezuelan ports and in April supported trade with the nearby "colonias amigas y neutrales."[33] The contraction of imports would lower government revenues, and foreseeing outlays on Venezuelan defense and the support of the Spanish naval forces at Santo Domingo, he approached prominent merchants in the Caracas Consulado for a loan of 400,000 pesos. They turned him down, suggesting he draw instead upon the funds of Spaniards dying intestate (*bienes de difuntos*) held by the colonial treasury department. This León rejected, along with a belated offer from the local agent of the Compañía de Filipinas, Mayora, and obtained the necessary funds by selling stocks of government tobacco to firms at Saint Thomas (Lalanda and Ekard and Co.) and Curaçao (Robinson, Philips and Corser).[34]

Reports of León's tobacco sales generated criticism from the influential Basque trading group—merchants Larrain, Baraciarte, Echezuria, and Las Llamosas—in the Caracas Consulado. He had given them an excuse to attack him as well as Havana's authorities for bowing to local *hacendados* by consenting to open colonial harbors in wartime to foreign ships without authorization from Madrid. To counter the *hacendados*' complaint that the monopsonic strategy of the Basque merchant firms consistently underpriced Venezuelan exportables, a junta (largely Basque) of the Caracas Consulado countered that the entry of foreign merchants had neither modified price levels nor made available any goods of "mayor consumo de la provincia en la esclavitud y peonage del campo." To the contrary, imports now consisted of high-priced English goods reexported from the United States (*paños, casemires, eternas, bayetones, lienzos de Irlanda . . . loza, bacalao, pañuelos*). And if colonial officials at Caracas, like those of Havana, maintained such commercial contacts in wartime for an extended period, the Consulado predicted "no se verían todos ellos [ports] un barco de la Peninsula y el Comercio Nacional quedará enteramente cortado." More to the point, the Junta recalled, had not Madrid, responding to representations lodged with the Junta Central by the Cadiz Consulado, ordered Havana's authorities back in 1797 to halt trading with friendly nations and to treat "con reglas de equidad los intereses del Comercio Español procurando combinarlos con los de los hacendados y comerciantes de sus respectivos territorios?"[35]

The Basque group sent its comment to Fernández de León in his capacity as tobacco superintendent but—significantly—omitted a copy to the Venezuelan *hacendados*, despite the fact their situation had motivated the response of León and other colonial officers. However, the local producers learned of the Basque merchants' attitude and distanced themselves. Their

bitter, almost ad hominem critique, addressed to the Junta, revealed the widening chasm between producers and intermediaries at Caracas—as at Havana—where the basis of the economy was commodity exports rather than precious metals.

At the outset, the four-man Junta General de Agricultores, including León's friend Martín de Herrera, declared it did not share the merchants' interest in terminating the "giro actual con los Extrangeros."[36] Rarely had it found merchants interested in agricultural issues, and it charged the Basque group with deliberate distortion of facts by presenting its position "bajo de unos supuestos conocidamente falsos, bajo de unos cálculos equivocados, bajo de unas noticias apócrifas, bajo de unas soberanas disposiciones incoherentes." In Fernández de León, on the contrary, the Junta found an understanding supporter. He had foreseen government deficits in wartime, twice asked for financial assistance from "comerciantes españoles," and twice been rebuffed: once to offer tobacco, later to ask for the 400,000 peso loan. There remained one possibility: accepting neutral vessels as his "único y . . . solo arbitrio." More to the point, León understood the needs of Venezuelan planters in wartime when commercial intermediaries drove up the price of imports 50 to 100 percent while depressing the price of exportables. Merchants, it seemed, always banked on the prospect that "la hambre y la desnudez" would make consumers accept "el yugo de sus duras leyes."

At bottom, the thrust of the argument was the incompatibility of landowners and wholesale merchants. Merchants incorrectly cited the royal order of 5 June 1797 closing the port of Havana to vessels from friendly or neutral ports: first, the order from Madrid was directed to specific colonial ports and did not apply elsewhere and, second, even that order had the proviso permitting trade contacts with foreigners in case of extreme necessity. The merchants at Caracas either rejected reality or were simply incompetent: they mislabeled Chinese nankeens as English products or exaggerated the volume of their cocoa sales to foreign buyers, claiming their—rather than foreign—purchases stabilized cocoa prices. These practices contradicted the purpose of Spanish commercial regulations, designed to protect the interests of "todos las partes del Estado" rather than solely those of merchants at Caracas or in the metropole who, "tímidos o impotentes" in commercial enterprises, preferred to "aniquilar la substancia" of Venezuelans. This was preliminary to an uncommonly unrestrained critique of the Basque members of Caracas's merchant community. Now, the Junta General de Agricultores felt, was the time to "romper el velo de silencio," confront "opresores," publicize their intrigues, and go to the main issue—that "espíritu de monopolio de que están animados" past and present. "Impo-

tencia, encogimiento, impericia o pobreza"—these were the dominant traits of Caracas's merchants, nurtured under the privileged Compañía Guipuzcoana, which for decades had held a *señoríó* over the colonial economy. Even termination of its charter (1781) and later the inclusion of Venezuela in *comercio libre* (1789) failed to erode the Basque merchants' local hegemony. For one matter, under *comercio libre* (1789), Caracas exporters at first could not a send *their* vessels to peninsular ports; for another, local entrepreneurs lacked adequate commercial information and trade networks; third, Cadiz merchants lacked data about Venezuela's exports and consumption patterns since they considered the colony "patrimonio natural . . . da la nación vizcaina." Blocked for almost a half century from competing in the Compañía Guipuzcoana's zone of privilege, "Caracas" (Venezuela), most Cadiz merchants and those of other peninsular ports simply lacked the tools to develop direct commercial contacts there—"cuales eran los artículos del general consumo, cuales los del gusto particular de los vecinos, cuales las producciones, cuales los precios a que podia comprarse y venderse, cuales las partes en donde debían fijar los establecimientos, cuales los habitantes en quienes podían librar sus confianzas."

Minus effective competition, the successor to the Compañía Guipuzcoana, the Compañía de Filipinas, had perpetuated control through "agentes, dependientes y agregados," among whom the *hacendados junteros* singled out the elected officers of the Caracas Consulado—all Basque: *prior* Echenique, *consul* Anza, and *consejero* Míntegui, who wanted León to suspend contact with foreign merchants. As the Junta General de Agricultores etched the business style of the *vizcaínos*, the resident Basques barely merited the title of merchants since they were not risk takers; most were "meros consignatarios" of merchant houses in Spain, satisfied with "los lucros de un salario fixo o de un quanto respectivo a la comisión" and with following instructions from Spain—hence their "impotencia para desempleo distante a los intereses ajenos, su escasez de facultades propias unida . . . a su falta de nociones y experiencia en negociaciones con los extrangeros, los intimida y retrae para emprender esta." Nourished on the "emponzonada leche" of the Compañía Guipuzcoana and "adictos" to its business practices, they guarded the company's territory. If Cadiz exporters ventured a shipment, it would be consigned to them; if an infrequent vessel from Barcelona arrived, the company's agents set the prices of the imports and procured the exportables "a fin de que no se entendiesen con los cosecheros ni levantasen por necesidad los precios." To be sure, some Basques had split from the pack—those of "espíritu más despegado," who with their own funds and technical know-how moved to foreign Caribbean ports, where they

exported Venezuelan products, sent back manufactured goods, and earned profits up to 40 percent. The majority, however, those who were among the loudest to denounce contact with neutrals, engrossed whole shipments forwarded by neutral merchants, offering in exchange cocoa, indigo, cotton, and coffee bought from Venezuelan proprietors at artificially depressed prices. Such ventures were their preference since they skirted risking the funds of metropolitan firms and were "negociación segura y lucrosa, sin riesgos, y sin peligros de mar." Unflattering criticism of the merchant guild signaled that Caracas landowners despaired that the local *vizcaíno* merchant group might support the pragmatism of León and other colonial officials in wartime. Such traders, they were convinced, "nunca consultan más que su propia utilidad ni propenden a otro objeto que el de vender caro y comprar barato."

Favorable consideration of the colony's agricultural interests, they had to conclude, depended on the public rather than private sector at both Caracas and Madrid. And there were recent precedents for confidence in bureaucratic realism. Years earlier Madrid authorities had investigated the monopolistic pricing tactics suffered by Venezuelan exports by the *peninsular* networks linking Caracas, Cadiz, and Madrid. During recent warfare with France, from 1793 to 1795, when local merchants rigged prices, intendant Fernández de León had overcome the opposition of the agent of the Compañía de Filipinas, Mayora, by authorizing commercial exchanges with Caribbean ports of friendly nations. In 1797 once again León's tolerance of such commercial exchanges in wartime could balance agricultural and commercial interests; in fact, the Junta General de Agricultores confessed its indebtedness to León for his timely intervention. More significant, León's initiative was shortly confirmed in November 1797 when Prime Minister Saavedra—ex-intendant of Caracas—countersigned *comercio neutro*. The immediate effects of neutral trade were palpable as imports at La Guayra climbed fourfold between 1797 and 1799, leading a Madrid civil servant to lament, "Una prosperidad constante es imposible con las vicisitudes humanas, y el orden de la naturaleza."[37]

León returned to the metropole in 1803 after twelve years handling Hacienda and commercial affairs and tagged by *peninsular* merchants at Caracas and Cadiz as unreliable in defending what they considered the metropole's economic interests. The Cadiz merchant guild, León learned, held him responsible for "el libre comercio de las colonias amigas y neutrales . . . sin restricción alguna" (an exaggeration); Cadiz's agent at Caracas reported that León suspended collection of 1.5 percent on La Guayra's imports due Cadiz's Consulado; worse, he intervened in market operations by setting

up "almacenes públicos nominados del Rey en donde manda por una parte suspender unas veces las ventas, y por otra obliga a qualquiera embarcación extrangera, a que lo venda a los precios que le pone al cargamento que trae, o que dexe el Puerto."[38] Another revealing facet of his evolving commercial perspective surfaced in 1805 when he asked for an evaluation of Viceroy Iturrigaray's approach to trade at Veracruz in wartime. The time for tinkering with Spain's transatlantic system of trade was past, he wrote in an iconoclastic vein; now it was necessary to formulate "un plan general de Rentas y de Comercio para Nuestras Américas," a conviction the next five years of maritime conflict and interrupted traffic in the Atlantic reinforced.[39]

In May 1808, years after returning from Venezuela, León abandoned Madrid, heading for home in Extremadura after the 2 May rioting and Murat's ruthless retaliation. Passing through Móstoles on the outskirts of Madrid, León discussed with Pérez Villamil the "traición de los franceses." Then he, Pérez Villamil, and Andrés Torrejón drafted a manifesto urging Spaniards to reject the authorities designated by the Bourbons on their departure from Bayonne and meeting with Bonaparte, and to resist the French forces. A courier carried their manifesto to Andalusia for distribution in the south.[40]

Months later, in the fall of 1809, when Cadiz merchants pressured the fragile Junta Central to reject the petitions of Cuban and Venezuelan planters for pragmatic adjustments in trade policy in wartime, there was much to recommend León, an experienced, enlightened, but hardly radical former colonial civil servant sensitive to the politics of imperial trade.[41] At a moment when Havana's agent Pinillos pursued government approval of Someruelos's decision on trade with neutrals in the Caribbean, León understood the political and financial influence of the Cadiz commercial establishment, even the possibility that the ultimate refuge of the Spanish government of resistance might be within the walls of Spain's major port, Cadiz.

León's "Nuevo Sistema"

León's belated *informe* addressed to the Consejo Reunido days before the collapse of the Junta Central—Pinillos's insistence on 13 January probably forced León's hand—confirmed Saavedra's selection of León as *contador-general de Indias*, a former colonial civil servant known in the Spanish Caribbean and at Cadiz for a flexible approach to Spain's transatlantic trade system.[42] Service in a late-developing peripheral area of the Spanish Empire in America had provided an understanding of how to integrate mercantile

and landholding sectors in the colonies—in his phrasing, the "comercio español" or "comerciantes de la metrópoli" with the "ideas, designios y pretensiones de los habitantes de nuestras Américas."[43] He pinpointed the core of the controversy in the conflict between the "leyes de gobierno de nuestras Indias" proscribing direct commercial exchanges with foreigners, and pragmatic accommodation to the effects of blockade: the orders of 1806 and 1807 authorizing Spanish shipping en route to the colonies to enter certain foreign ports and the re-export of European goods from one colonial port to another, for example, from Havana or New Orleans to Veracruz.

As León fashioned a factual basis for recommendations, he located statistical data confirming the position of Havana's "negociantes y labradores" in the fashion of Arango y Parreño in 1798: Spanish shipping to America was down 66 percent from normal levels, peninsular manufactures absent, and reexports from colonial ports blocked. Moreover, high customs duties designed only for revenue stimulated massive smuggling in colonial waters. Far more worrisome was widespread "disgusto general de nuestros Americanos" that raised the possibility that foreigners "entren, residen y trafiquen" in the colonies; foreigners, he reminded the members of the Consejo Reunido, had been involved in seditious movements overseas in the previous three decades. Yet despite changing conditions in the colonial world when Madrid had to authorize reexports to Veracruz and when Havana's officials between May and July 1809 had allowed foreign shipping to enter, the backward-looking Consulados of Veracruz and Cadiz had insisted that the Junta Central "se restablezca en su primitivo vigor, la observancia de nuestras leyes de Indias." León marveled that Spanish-born merchants in the colonies insisted upon their unique proprietorship of the colonies, their right to control European imports and colonial exports, while the "Americanos" (he did not use "Españoles Americanos") insisted on trading with foreigners because *they* in fact introduced European goods and remitted local staples bought at equitable prices. He put it pungently: the positions of the *habitantes* of America and the *comerciantes* of the metropole were "diametralmente opuestos." In view of the desperation of the "hermanos Americanos" and the subversion by foreign contacts, the government would have to "variar el sistema comercial de las Américas" by fashioning "un nuevo sistema" if only to satisfy wartime imperatives temporarily. He now turned to squaring the circle, to accommodate commercial interests in Spain, the colonies in America, and—here indeed was his innovation—England.

León turned prudently, first, to the situation of merchants at Cadiz, the Balearics, and Canaries. He would grant them the right to ship to the

colonies in Spanish vessels any foreign-produced good (except, of course, French-made) and, en route, to call at English ports in Europe or America to load manufactures for sale in colonial ports. To placate English interests, English products obtained in English ports would be dutied at 2 percent below similar goods loaded elsewhere. Next, León tried to mollify merchants in colonial ports; after all, colonial officials at Havana, La Guayra, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo had disregarded commercial regulations to meet local needs. Under his plan, both *peninsular* and *criollo* merchants would employ *their* ships to traffic with metropolitan ports and those in the Balearics and Canaries. To minimize this innovation, he reminded the Consejo Reunido that shippers in colonial ports in wartime were already permitted to send colonial products to friendly or neutral ports in America, returning with a limited range of goods; this would permit them to bring a full range of products from English ports dutied slightly below rates imposed on imports from non-English ports. This was no minor change: if merchants in colonial ports used their shipping and even hired black or mulatto crewmen, they could load any colonial product—the prohibited list of such exports would be suspended. Finally, to firm up the finances and loyalty of Consulados at Cadiz and Mexico City (whose financial commitment to the government at Sevilla and then Cadiz was already considerable), León stipulated that the 0.5 percent charge on all colonial external trade (*avería*) be deposited with those merchant guilds.

Overall, León's recommendations might preserve Spain's transatlantic trade structures, provisionally adjusted to wartime pressures. Preservation of the system's fundamental feature León underscored in capital letters to reassure anxious merchants: "A NUESTRAS INDIAS NO PUEDEN IR BUQUES EXTRANGEROS." Instead, peninsular merchants, their vessels and crews, as well as—here appeared León's first innovation—merchants in the colonial ports would be able to maintain contact with foreign ports; their trade would be "activo" rather than "pasivo." A second system adjustment would suspend the list of prohibited items in exchanges among colonies, the metropole, and by implication foreign colonial ports such as Kingston, Providence, and Port-of-Spain in the Caribbean and Rio de Janeiro in the South Atlantic. The myth of protecting Spain's would-be manufactures faded before the extraordinary expansion of England's industrial and mercantile capacity.

León's most controversial modification appeared obliquely. In the introduction of his *informe*, he highlighted the source of the problem addressed: the provisional adjustments by Havana and Caracas authorities accepting the entry of foreigners at their ports and—more specifically—

Havana merchants' reexport to New Spain of imports from the United States, vehemently protested by the Veracruz and Cadiz Consulados. The friction between Havana and Caracas on one hand and Veracruz, Mexico City, and Cadiz on the other would have to be resolved by the Junta Central. For León the essential solution might be a broad "nuevo sistema" embracing *all* Spain's American colonies. In treating intercolonial exchanges between "nuestro continente americano" and "islas españolas" (he did not specify Veracruz, Havana, or Puerto Rico), León listed guardedly "frutos y producciones del país o europeos tanto españoles como extrangeros"—ostensibly a systemic approach but implicitly reexports from Havana to Veracruz and Campeche. Equally restrained was León's handling of the Veracruz Consulado's insistence on no Havana reexports, a delicate theme he relegated to his *informe*'s end almost as an aside. He felt the Consejo Reunido at Sevilla should find out how Mexico City's viceregal authority handled what León called Veracruz's "pretensión . . . para que no se admitan . . . géneros procedentes de la Havana o Puerto Rico, no obstante el concedido de 16 de junio de 1806 y de mayo de 1807."

Conceivably León's minimal adjustments[44] to what was the Reglameno del Comercio Libre of 1778 might have convinced the moribund Junta Central and reduced *disgustos* at Havana, La Guayra, and the River Plate. Such modifications, however, did not satisfy most *almaceneros* at Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz keyed to the core, silver-producing colonies, or, for that matter, the successor to the Junta Central, the Consejo de Regencia installed shortly after León finished and presented his *informe*. Saavedra reappeared as regent, and days later came Fernández de León's appointment to the Regencia as the colonial world's representative.[45]

Within the politically influential Cadiz mercantile community many distrusted him because of his Caracas performance, nor was there reason to warm to his *informe*. The Consejo de Regencia quickly replaced him (29 January 1810) as representative of the American colonies with the traditionalist Miguel de Lardizábal.[46] The transparent motive was Lardizábal's birth in New Spain; the real one was not León's birth in the metropole (Extremadura) but his *informe*'s leitmotif: flexibility in the imperial Atlantic commercial system was inescapable, a position that Cadiz and associated overseas trading interests inflexibly opposed. León's removal as a regent signaled to metropole-watchers overseas that Cadiz's oligopolists would exploit the crisis in Spain to recover their former hegemony in the imperial system of transatlantic trade. It was clarified candidly a year later: "En Sevilla hubiera sido fácil y precisa la medida propuesta por el Contador General [León] respetada y cumplida en todas partes las órdenes consiguientes;

pero en Cadiz? Y Cuando? Cuando a la disolución de la Central se había substituido un Consejo de Regencia tan débil, tan irreflexivo y tan subordinado a la Junta de Cadiz formada pocos dias antes para considerarse más legítima y autorizada que la Regencia."[47] Power and finance were now effectively concentrated within the fortifications of Cadiz.

The Regencia and the Caribbean

The Regencia, overshadowed by the Junta de Cadiz and its Consulado, delayed action on the issues broached in León's comprehensive *informe*. In reality, Lardizábal's appointment demonstrated the current of traditionalism in the Regencia since his selection brought front and center the conservative elements in the Basque provinces and, for that matter, the colonial world. Mexico City's Ayuntamiento had voted Lardizábal in 1809, after the coup removing Viceroy Iturrigaray, as its representative to the now defunct Junta Central; Lardizábal's brother, Manuel, a member of the Consejo Reunido, heard the appeals and counterappeals presented to the Junta Central and then the Regencia by commercial and landholding groups at Veracruz, Havana, La Guayra, and Rio de la Plata. There was also a technical factor behind pigeonholing León's position paper: in the previous October (1809) the Consejo had asked León to review the case of Caracas, and on his own initiative he had combined Caracas's problem with other comparable cases and produced a general plan of reform—this was, after all, his long-term preoccupation. Havana's dossier had previously been assigned to a *fiscal* of the Consejo Reunido, Antonio Cano Manuel, who—witnessing León's fate—withheld his *informe* until mid-March when he was removed by the intervention of Havana's agent, Martínez de Pinillos.[48]

Cano Manuel's brief review carefully sidestepped León's analysis and recommendations to focus narrowly on what the Consejo had requested, Havana's situation. Reviewing León's recommendations for modifying the "sistema legal de comercio," he claimed he needed data not readily available and time for reflection since tinkering affected the sources of Spain's "riqueza nacional." Nor did he consider political factors, which he did not elaborate. Havana's situation, on the contrary, demanded an immediate policy decision. He echoed León's conclusion that the colonial commercial system was currently inoperative: there was hardly a Spanish merchant marine, and only foreigners could supply the colonies' basic import needs. He came quickly to recommendations: an explicit order for ships of friendly nations temporarily to enter Havana "libertar a aquellos habitantes de los males que les amenazan."[49] This left intact structures while accepting lim-

ited compromise confined to isolated zones of Spain's colonial world in America—a strategy of delayed minimal adaptation that had for centuries maintained the Spanish colonial system. In 1810 few in the high Spanish civil service understood—or wanted to understand—that the Atlantic commercial system was changing irreversibly.

Certainly this is the impression given by the long delayed final *consulta* of the Consejo Reunido on 6 April, six months after the Junta Central had initially sought advice on handling complaints from Cuba and Caracas. It had to reconcile the recommendations of Fernández de León and Cano Manuel, one suggesting a systemic (albeit provisional) modification of the structures of the colonial trading system, the other approving only adjustments requested by Havana's authorities pressured by its Ayuntamiento and Consulado. In addition, in drafting policy recommendations, the Consejo Reunido had to balance other factors: division between the commercial interests of the Mexico City–Veracruz axis and those of Havana, securing the financial support of Mexico City and Cadiz for the Regencia's survival, and bartering with London for a loan or subsidy in return for privileged access to trade in the empire. New Spain was the Regencia's main preoccupation: in just the month of February, it had dispatched agents Yandiola and Luyando to size up the situation at Mexico City, removed Viceroy Archbishop Lizana and replaced him with the more conservative Audiencia, and approved the results of electoral conflict in the influential Consulado there—all while mindful that the merchants of Cadiz ultimately would manage the Regencia's finances.

Since the Consejo had advocated removing Fernández de León from the Regencia, the Consejo rejected as well his broad restructuring of Spain's Atlantic trade system. Instead, it purported, as Cano Manuel proposed, to address only the Havana situation. It shared the pessimistic assessment of the *contador general* and the *fiscal* concerning trade flows between Cadiz and Cuba: under current imperial legislation Cuba's sugar and coffee landholders could neither export their production nor obtain basic imports, and other colonies faced the same predicament. Years of warfare with England coupled to the successive national crises after 1803 made trade between metropole and colonies virtually impossible. Fernández de León's calculations proved, the Consejo Reunido pointed out, that Spain lacked sufficient cargoes, shippers, and shipping to continue its "comercio exclusivo." Unless "providencias extraordinarias" were made, the "manantial de la riqueza de nuestras colonias" would evaporate along with the possibility that Spain, once free of occupation, would be able to draw again upon its colonial resources for national recovery—confirmation of the metropole's dependence

upon its colonial world. Since "comercio exclusivo" had been formulated in "distintos tiempos y circunstancias," and there existed no general legislation of exception covering wartime conditions, the regents should consider, after "mayor instrucción y profundo examen," proposals for revised commercial legislation. In the meantime since Cuba's needs "no sufren espera," the Consejo Reunido opined that the regents approve Havana's provisional arrangements for contact with neutral and friendly ports and for the entry of U.S. and English shipping at Havana—trade both "activo" and "pasivo."

To this point the Consejo Reunido appeared to accept the approach of its *fiscal*, Cano Manuel. However, examination of four conditions appended to the Consejo's *consulta* clarified that colonial authorities at Havana could review their measures every six months if conditions warranted; more important, similar authorization was extended to other colonial ports in comparable difficulties. How else explain the phrases that Manuel Albuerne's edition of the *consulta* put in capital letters, that "el permiso sea general, y por el tiempo preciso de seis meses, aunque podrán repetirlo por igual plazo o menor, según el estado de las cosas, y *de la verdadera necesidad del pais*."[50] Over six weeks, between the end of January and early April 1810, the harried, insecure, and undoubtedly divided regents had received two sets of propositions for revising imperial trade policy under wartime conditions. León's offered all the American colonies opportunity to have direct trade contacts ("comercio activo") with ports of the neutral United States, those of England's colonies in the Caribbean, and, last, of Portugal's Brazilian colony. For his part, Cano Manuel restricted his recommendations to Spain's Cuban colony (as did the Consejo Reunido with some ambiguity), both accepting—León to the contrary—only the *entry* of U.S. and English vessels ("comercio pasivo") at Havana. Yet neither set of recommendations, operative only in wartime, tampered with basic structures of Spain's colonial commercial policy; with the restoration of peace, peninsular ports would resume their secular oligopoly ("comercio exclusivo") with the colonies.

Difference over the entry of shipping from non-Spanish ports may be explained by the timing of the recommendations. León's systemic approach for all the American colonies coincided with the Junta Central's earlier well-publicized promise of the equality of colonies and metropole in a new imperial order, a "Liberal" one; Caro Manuel and the Consejo Reunido, focusing solely on Havana interests, hoped to satisfy the new governing body, the Regencia, more conservative than the Junta Central, more financially influenced by the merchant community at Cadiz, its Junta Superior, and Consulado, and by its fellow interests overseas at Veracruz and Mexico City.

In April and May 1810, the political dominance of Cadiz and Mexico

City—now the poles of the empire's economic system—over the Regencia grew. In April Hacienda minister Hormazas sought out the opinion of a traditional-minded, respected Cadiz merchant Miguel Lobo, on concessions acceptable to English interests in exchange for London's financial aid. Predictably, Lobo opposed allowing English shippers to bypass major peninsula ports like Cadiz for direct contact with the colonies; he and the Cadiz Consulado rejected what many colonial authorities had been forced to concede, virtual if not de jure "libertad de comercio en todas las provincias de nuestras Americas permitido a los Ynglesees."[51] In early May there disembarked at Cadiz Ciriaco González Carbajal, ex-*oidor* of the Audiencia de Mexico, now promoted to a position on the Consejo de Indias and delivering millions of pesos donated by New Spain's elites in trade, mining, agriculture, ranching, and the church, and the promise of further financial support. Carbajal had been directed to counsel Hormazas on matters concerning New Spain; he could hardly have neglected to pass along the reactions of *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz to Havana's expanding commercial operations and, what they feared more, aspirations.[52]

By the end of April, the regents could hardly postpone further an official position on the provisional measures taken by Havana, Caracas, and other colonial centers to cope with shortages of goods normally unloaded by vessels from Spain. Not only was London still insisting upon direct commercial contact with the Spanish colonies, but Spain's minister at Philadelphia, Luís de Onís, reported the impatience of local exporters to ship flours to Havana and other Caribbean ports and—if Spanish authorities adhered to traditional policy—that the U.S. government might tolerate French corsairs in its Atlantic ports. Onís, in fact, urged reliance upon U.S. shipping were Spanish-registry vessels unavailable, and—to improve the quality of flours from New Spain—to have coopers from the United States instruct New Spain's barrel makers, a kind of technical assistance program *avant la lettre*.[53]

Further procrastination was impossible, although the Regencia had taken no action on León's recommendations of late January, he remained respected for his "ilustración, consumada inteligencia y zelo patriótico," and at the end of April Hormazas asked for his view on deflecting pressures from both English and U.S. commercial interests.[54] León's advice in an informal paper dated 10 May was consistent with his prior positions. Rebuffing such demands would antagonize them; Spanish authorities had to make limited trade concessions, above all to English merchants, possibly an indication how much he appreciated their role in Caribbean ports during his service in Venezuela. The solution reiterated his January advice: Span-

ish shipping from Spain or its Caribbean islands en route to the colonies should be authorized to procure cargo at English or Portuguese ports in Europe or their colonies; similarly, ships from Spain's colonial ports could trade with English or Portuguese colonial ports returning with almost any category of imports. León would also permit shipments of Cuban cattle to the Bahamas, in English vessels if necessary. His core position remained intact: he would confine the colonial trade to Spanish-registry shipping whether metropolitan or colonial, freighted by merchants of Spain or the colonies. This was the essence of a "comercio activo."[55] His response probably matched the views of at least two regents with colonial experience—Saavedra and Castaños—and convinced Hormazas that an artfully ambiguous order granting limited concessions might dampen conflicting demands from Havana, Caracas, and Veracruz, as well as those from the United States and England. There seemed, moreover, a liberalizing current among some regents that surfaced in a decree of 29 April opening Santo Domingo's ports to direct contacts with foreign ports for fifteen years as well as the entry of foreign shipping.[56]

A Real Orden "Apócrifa"?

On 11 May Hormazas put together a dossier of representations from colonial officials along with the position papers of León, Cano Manuel, and the Consejo Reunido and went before four of the five regents—the bishop of Orense had yet to arrive at Cadiz—for a decision.[57] Spain's transatlantic system, he argued, based upon "buenos principios" had worked under peacetime conditions but failed during prolonged maritime conflict. Three unexpected factors, he noted, had produced "una tendencia general de toda la America a recibir directamente géneros extrangeros." Colonial officials were issuing "permisos parciales o disimulados" when dealing with the "impatience" of Spanish merchants overseas and the "irresistible Ley de la necesidad." He warned that it was dangerous explicitly to block colonial trade with foreign colonies; besides, competent civil servants could formulate an interim "sistema general para toda la América." As discussion with the regents was concluding, Hormazas summarized their *resolución* in "una esqueleta según su regular costumbre": a directive on the contents of an *orden*, that Hormazas proceeded to read aloud. It referred to the reluctance of the U.S. government to recognize the Regencia as Spain's governing body and to readiness to harbor French agents and shipping in U.S. ports, and then proposed flour imports in Spanish ships at colonial ports under restrictions formulated by "el Gobernador y el intendente" (no specific col-

ony mentioned) and conforming to the positions of the consejo Reunido and Contador-General Fernández de León.[58]

The regents' *resolución* (or Hormazas's?), a classic case of bureaucratic ambiguity, incorporated different approaches. Where the Consejo Reunido's *consulta* (6 April) legitimized only the action of Havana's authorities tolerating the entry of foreign shipping (*comercio pasivo y activo*), León proposed employing only Spanish-registry vessels in trade with foreign ports (*comercio activo*), which he would extend to all major colonial ports in the empire in America. No wonder the civil servant covering the Cuban desk in the Consejo Reunido declined to draft the *orden* specified in the regents' *resolución*. Instead, Hormazas conferred with his *oficial mayor*, Manuel Albuerne, who handed over to León a large dossier of documents labeled "El comercio de las Américas." Included were representations of Havana, Caracas, and Buenos Aires petitioning for commercial exchanges with friendly and neutral ports, the counterrepresentations of Lima, Veracruz, and Cadiz, plus the regents' *resolución* summarized by Hormazas. Albuerne attached a personal note to explain that Hormazas wanted León to review the whole dossier before drafting the *orden*, bearing in mind the "concepto de que el comercio era para toda América."[59] León, however, found the regents' *resolución* "confuso, vacilante y nada exacto," and he sought clarification from Albuerne and two regents, Saavedra and Lardizábal. Privately he told the president of the Regency, Castaños, that the regents "habían seguido su informe con preferencia al del Consejo; lo que comprueba la misma resolución de 11 de mayo." Or so it would seem.[60]

In drafting what later became the notorious 17 May order, León retained the guidelines, since reviewed with Albuerne, which had shaped León's recommendations of late January: the external trade of the American colonies was dangerously reduced; the colonies were starved for basic imports; their exports backed up—all because the metropole had failed to provide shipping and goods. What most vexed León were endemic smuggling operations whose unprecedented proportions he tried to quantify. Estimating an aggregate colonial population of 13,978,556 (to Mexico he assigned 5,760,000, to Cuba 300,000, and to Caracas 800,000), León derived a total annual colonial import level of 143.8 million *pesos fuertes*; of this, a startling 86 percent (123.8 million) represented smuggling in wartime.[61] Colonial exports were in an equally critical condition: if one assumes total annual exports of roughly 100 million pesos, current purchases by Spain absorbed at best 20 percent. In this wartime situation, maintaining the traditional transatlantic managed trade policy was responsible for "la ruina de aquellos avitantes con un disgusto general de ellos, y con una injusticia y violencia

notoria contra el derecho natural de nuestros hermanos de América." León's and Albuerne's well-founded understanding of the economic impasse of the colonial elites was transparent. Moreover, León predicted that current imperial trade policy, if unchanged, contradicted the Junta Central's proclamation that the colonies in America were now provinces, integral parts of the Spanish *monarquía*. To improve the colonies' external trade required a rise in imports and exports freighted in Spanish ships, all managed by Spanish entrepreneurs who were indispensable. In León's ingrained colonialist reasoning, since it was a "supuesto incontestable" that "nuestros hermanos criollos" showed a preference for agriculture, ranching, and mining, Spaniards from the peninsula "han de hacer todo el comercio con nuestras América." As for cargoes, goods currently unavailable in peninsula ports could be purchased at English and Portuguese ports.

By insisting upon Spanish merchants employing Spanish-registry shipping to enter English and Portuguese harbors seeking cargo for colonial consumers, León proved he had not swerved from the view that colonial trade had to remain "activo." Yet, as a civil servant with colonial experience in Venezuela, León also understood that inflexible nationalist measures might be unworkable if Spaniards "no alcanzasen a llenar las introducciones y extraccions necesarias"; in this case, he introduced a fallback option, permitting English and Portuguese shipping in Spain's colonial ports to supply import shortfalls. This, however, could take the form of a local option, one made by the power elite in colonial capitals—by juntas of colonial civil servants in audiencias and treasury offices, customs officers, and representatives of consulados and ayuntamientos.[62]

These guidelines León incorporated in his draft (*minuta*) of the 17 May order, submitted to *oficial mayor* Albuerne on that date with the notation, "ya la había visto y aprobado el Sr. Marqués [de Hormazas] con elogios."[63] It covered all the colonies, not just Cuba, and throughout emphasized "por ahora el comercio franco puramente activo," excluding—except for overwhelming conditions—the participation of non-Spanish merchants and their ships in Spain's transatlantic system. In addition, his *minuta* contained items specifically satisfying the petitions of Havana interests: sales of Cuban cattle on the hoof to the Bahama islands, improvements in New Spain's cooperage to insure delivery of well-conditioned flours from Veracruz to Havana, and, most controversial, authorized trade between Spain's colonies in America—in reality, covert approval of Havana's reexports to Veracruz.[64]

Perhaps León trusted that concessions to Havana and Caracas interests might be offset at least in the critical eyes of merchants at Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz by emphasizing the continued dominant role of Spain's

merchants, shippers, and shipping in the peninsula's colonial trade. If not acceptable, León wanted no misunderstanding about his execution of the regents' *resolución*. Hence, contrary to Hormazas's instructions transmitted by *oficial mayor* Albuerne, León prepared not an *orden* but a *decreto*, thereby requiring that the regents—the ruling body of the government of resistance—initial his *minuta*. Albuerne, however, adhering to bureaucratic protocol, insisted on an *orden*, and in this form it went to the Hacienda minister for signature. The fate of the *minuta* now passed out of the hands of the marqués de las Hormazas and his *oficial mayor* Albuerne.[65]

Oficial Mayor, Manuel de Albuerne

In mid-1810 Albuerne could look back upon thirty-four years of government service in which he had performed with distinction and, after 1794, risen in the Hacienda division of the Consejo de Indias. His responsibilities and expertise were in economic matters, first in Spain's mercury-producing area of Almadén (Andalusia), later in the Finance Ministry at Madrid. In both regions he came into contact with interest group pressures operating on and through Colonial Secretary José de Gálvez and later treasury secretaries between 1794 and 1810. The career experience sharpened his perception of the necessary separation between public and private interests, and the venality of civil servants and the covert power of merchants. In May 1810 high visibility as *oficial mayor* of influential Finance Minister Hormazas as well as awareness of the influence of the commercial community of Spain's major port city, Cadiz, made him doubly wary in executing his function as civil servant. Foresight, however, does not avoid disaster.

Manuel María de Albuerne Fernández Calienes y Fernández Vivigo was born at Pravia (Asturias) into a gentry family distantly related to the marqueses de Altamira.[66] In government service he repeated the careers of other Asturian gentry who, like Campomanes and Jovellanos, distinguished themselves in the long reign of Carlos III. As a young civil servant he was posted to Almadén and by 1786 had risen to district chief responsible for tax collection, antismuggling operations, mercury production, and distribution to mining colonies in America (most to the silver mines of New Spain and Peru). Mercury allocations ("tan interesante a Cadiz") put him in contact with merchants and exporters at Cadiz, where he learned "quales eran los medios de enriquecer a los pueblos."[67] For his performance at Almadén and on a royal commission to investigate conditions in Aragon and Valencia, he was honored with a leave of absence for reasons of health. Five years later Albuerne entered the Indias section of the Hacienda ministry, rising under

eleven successive treasury ministers through eleven stages to that of *oficial mayor* in October 1809 when Fernández de León became *contador general de Indias*. Albuerne served under Hormazas in the 1790s when he observed how adulation of Manuel Godoy brought Hormazas appointments as *tesorero general*, then—briefly—*secretario de Hacienda* and *consejero de Estado*. Hormazas, he once remarked, had used his position as finance minister to distribute "empleos eclesiásticos" to "parientes, criados y comensales."[68]

Albuerne's exposure to colonial issues, sensitivity to "Americanos" dissatisfaction with administrative infighting and delayed decision making, and his critique of civil servants siding with "peculiares intereses" rather than with the public weal were apparent in a paper requested by Saavedra on the advantages of creating a "ministerio universal de Indias." The prevailing system of scattering colonial administration among five ministries permitted "interés personal" to take precedence over "interés público y del estado," which was probably veiled criticism of political influence in colonial affairs by Cadiz merchants. The system also nourished the "arbitrariedad" of colonial officials, "las órdenes encontradas," and endless delays in processing colonial complaints usually justified with commonplaces such as "no se puede en un dia" and "es necesario enterarse." Precisely because "Americanos" were dissatisfied with ministerial incompetence and neglect, Bonaparte's foreign secretary Champagny, Albuerne reported, had specifically addressed New Spain with the promise that its affairs would be attended by "un ministerio único." If left unattended, colonial dissatisfaction would flare into "una emancipación" and then "una revolución sangrienta, interminable y destrucctora." Albuerne's position paper requested by Saavedra, was dated Sevilla, 27 November 1809; Saavedra lost interest in the subject, which may explain why the Junta Central did not review it. In mid-February, Albuerne presented it to the Regencia, where it encountered the opposition of Benito Ramón de Hermida, secretary of Gracia y Justicia under the now defunct Junta Central, and of Hormazas (in February he held down two ministries, Gracia y Justicia, and Hacienda).[69]

Albuerne's grasp of national and colonial issues was also evident in his vision of one of the most significant pieces of legislation under Carlos III. Raised in the protonationalism widespread under that reign, Albuerne admired what he considered *comercio libre*'s lasting stimulus to facets of Spain's colonial world: demographic growth, agricultural expansion, and "ilustración." Furthermore, *comercio libre* was designed to benefit the "nación entera." It minimized the "intereses de pocos" typified by the Cadiz "monopolio gremial mercantil" and colonial associates who jointly had kept "atados los derechos más sagrados de toda la nación en ambos mundos con

los candados de la ominosa esclavitud, encubiertos con aparentes velos." In the commercial legislation of 1778 Albuerne located the basic elements of León's *minuta* of the 17 May order, and he shared León's confidence in a systemic approach to colonial trade issues in wartime, an approach that accorded priority to "el bien general" over "intereses particulares." His sole apparent difference with León concerned framing the draft as an *orden* rather than *decreto*, but this was settled since Albuerne insisted on an *orden*.[70]

Protocol-wise, then, Hormazas as finance minister did not need to show the *minuta* to the regents or have them initial it, since Albuerne would be executing the regents' *resolución* of 11 May. In fact, as Albuerne later claimed, he could have ordered publication of León's draft "sin necesidad de consulta del Consejo, sin preceder informe de nadie, y sin rúbrica del ministro [Hormazas]."[71] The regents' approval might be appropriate but was in this instance, dispensable. On the other hand, ultimate responsibility for executing the regents' *resolución* was in the hands of Hormazas, who, to be sure, had many responsibilities. He had to read and sign documents constantly crossing his desk, and he relied upon the counsel of *oficial mayor* Albuerne. In this case, responsibility for publishing León's order might then fall to Hormazas's right-hand man. As we have seen, Albuerne had reservations about Hormazas's sense of rectitude, to put it mildly, once he felt the survival of his career was imperiled.

Moreover, there were considerations other than the purely procedural that cautioned Albuerne about operating on his own authority. Most important, Albuerne recognized that León's systemic recommendations might affect negatively—at least in the short run—financially influential groups in the Mexico City–Veracruz–Cadiz axis. This transatlantic interest group invariably opposed formal direct commercial links to English Caribbean and North American ports, their merchants and shipping, and especially those large flour reexports from Havana—now open to U.S. ships by local authorities—to Veracruz and Campeche. León's draft accepted direct trade—that is, *comercio activo y pasivo*—with non-Spaniards, admittedly only *in extremis*. And last, Albuerne could not minimize the family links of Regent Lardizábal to the *peninsulares* at Mexico City, or the counsel that capital's merchants had presumably given Ciriaco González Carbajal before he left, or Cadiz's considerable financial and now political leverage. In brief, Albuerne pursued a course of wary action because, in his own words, he knew the "personas, la diferencia del lugar entre Sevilla y Cadiz, las intrigas, el tiempo, y las ideas de los que deberían hacer solo el bien, y han causado y hecho el mal de la nación."[72] He meant, of course, the politically aggressive Cadiz merchants.

These factors conditioned Albuerne's handling of the 17 May order. On 18 May he delivered León's draft to Hormazas along with two major items from the voluminous dossier—León's position papers of 22 January and 10 May—while cautioning Hormazas that the order's "importancia, nuestra situación y la autoridad de la Junta de Cadiz" made imperative that the regents examine it closely.[73] He recognized that the major obstacle to the order was that the self-styled Junta Superior de Cadiz was opposed to a trade modification "enteramente opuesto al que tenía el giro mercantil de la plaza de Cadiz." Cadiz wanted to exercise "un espíritu de tutela" over the Regencia to advance "un interés privado"; treated the Regencia as a client body; humiliated it in the eyes of colonials by blocking the departure of shipping from the port, then dispatching its proclamations overseas while holding up those of the Regencia. The Regencia, for its part, displayed "el poco caracter de firmeza"; like the exiled Fernando VII in France, it could be considered in a status of "opresión y falta de libertad."[74] Two days later (20 May) Hormazas told Albuerne that the regents would delay printing the order; their excuse was the need to counter Ambassador Henry Wellesley's insistence that ships sail from England directly to Spanish colonial ports in exchange for financial assistance—a loan or subsidy. He asked Albuerne to remind him of the *orden* within ten days or so. (Hormazas calmed an anxious León with word that the 17 May draft fitted the regents' *resolución* and would soon be printed.)[75] In fact, ten days of confusion ensued as the regents abandoned the Isla de León to retreat within the walls of Cadiz in the face of oncoming French troops. Hurriedly gathering his papers, León discarded (so he later claimed) Hormazas's confidential note ("encargo confidencial") to so frame his 17 May order as to cover the contingencies of *all* the colonies in America.[76]

Around 1 June, Albuerne, as instructed earlier, reminded Hormazas of the suspended 17 May order whose existence was rumored at Cadiz, possibly because the Junta de Cadiz had just demanded that the regents justify why they had decided in late April to open Santo Domingo to direct trade with non-Spanish ports for fifteen years.[77] Perhaps to generate support in the Cadiz community, Albuerne proposed seeking a favorable opinion from an experienced and internationally connected merchant. Significantly Hormazas did not turn to his friend Lobo, who "siempre había acostumbrado a consultar en cosas de comercio"; instead he accepted Albuerne's choice of Juan Francisco Vea Murguía y Lizaur who fitted Albuerne's prescription for a "comerciante de conocimientos teóricos y . . . que tubiere comercio en America y estubiese instruido en el que hacían allí los exrangeros."[78]

True, he represented that segment of the Cadiz merchant community with international and colonial linkages; he corresponded with merchant houses at Valparaíso, Buenos Aires, and Veracruz; in 1797 under *comercio neutro* he had wrangled *permisos* to utilize neutral shipping between Hamburg and Buenos Aires; through a brother-in-law he had contacts with the London firm of Garay & Company; and in 1798 he had been elected an officer of the Cadiz Consulado.[79] On the very day (14 June) that Vea Murguía predictably approved the 17 May order as "el único medio que se presentaba por ahora . . . atendidas las circunstancias y el fin de precaver los males que nos anunciaban por toda esta parte," Hormazas authorized its printing and distribution.[80]

Almost one month had passed since Hormazas had shown León's draft, revised by Albuerne from *decreto* to *orden*, to the regents and received their endorsement. Even discounting days lost in moving from the Isla de León to Cadiz, still it is odd that a decision on so fundamental an issue as colonial trade policy was delayed—proof, it would seem, of the Regencia's internal divisions and its reluctance to confront the interests dominant at Cadiz. According to Henry Wellesley, perhaps the delay was intentional, to permit the order to be "concluded before it became publicly known . . . and then it would have been too late to have recalled it."[81] More incomprehensible was Hormazas's—and presumably the regents'—decision to proceed with the order when they must have known of the regents' commitment in the previous March when they dispatched Yandiola as their agent to New Spain to support the objectives of the *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz: their resistance to Havana's reexports; their approval of Yermo, Aguirre, and others responsible for the coup d'état removing Viceroy Iturrigaray; and their distrust of those critical of that move, among them Archbishop Lizana and the Audiencia de Mexico's *regente* Catani.

There are questions: Was Hormazas encouraged to adopt the position of León and Albuerne after receiving a divided opinion at Cadiz, personified by Lobo and Vea Murguía?[82] Was there a comparable division within the Regencia, the key decision-making body: Saavedra versus Lardizábal? Did Hormazas, Cadiz, and the Regencia simply feign acceptance of the 17 May order to secure financing at London—a plausible conspiracy since the regents usually sought the opinion of the Junta de Cadiz on all issues concerning "comercio, especialmente de Indias"?[83] At this time regents Saavedra and Castaños also conferred with members of Cadiz's junta, with merchants Francisco Bustamante y Guerra, Luis Gargollo, and Tomás de Istúriz, about an English loan of 1.5 million pesos, assigning to their Junta

access to, and control of, government funds (deposited with Hacienda and the Mint) along with "todos los frutos venidos de Indias por donativo o con cualquier otro título."[84]

In the early hours of 22 June, Albuerne was at his office when printed copies of the 17 May order arrived. They were expected, as word of publication was making the rounds of Cadiz since the day before. Following bureaucratic protocol, at noon Albuerne collected the printed copies and relevant background manuscripts—León's *informe* (10 May) to Hormazas, Hormazas's handwritten *resolución* (11 May) summarizing the regents' approval, the draft (17 May) initialed by Hormazas—and entered Hormazas's office. Protocol prescribed that Hormazas obtain the signature of the Regencia's *presidente*, General Castaños, "al pie de la resolución que tenía extendida el Marqués de las Hormazas de su puño al margen de ella."[85] Then Hormazas as issuing secretary would sign one hundred copies and initial another four hundred for distribution to the Consejo Reunido, naval commandant of Cadiz, and chief customs officer, and to all consulados in the peninsula and colonies. Albuerne returned to his office where he worked until late that afternoon when a messenger told him to report immediately to Hormazas. (About the same time, Fernández de León heard that legislation concerning the colonies would soon appear; when he asked Regent Lardizábal about it, Lardizábal said he knew nothing.)[86]

Albuerne encountered Hormazas outside the Regencia's conference room. Hormazas showed him a copy of the printed 17 May order. "Have you seen this?" Albuerne replied testily, "That's what I delivered to you at noon along with other papers." Snapped back Hormazas: "It's not the same, this is what the Junta gave me." A bewildered Albuerne asked, "Which Junta?" "The Junta de Cadiz," rejoined Hormazas, adding that "they want the whole dossier and I want you to get it." "But I gave you those papers," Albuerne reminded him. Since Hormazas had misplaced the key to his writing desk, Albuerne was about to break it open when the regents emerged suddenly from the conference room. Hormazas held them back, exclaiming "Please wait one moment," then returned to his office where Albuerne had gathered up the dossier, which he discovered on a table.[87] Had Hormazas been simply confused, or had he intended to get Albuerne out of the way so that he could talk freely with the regents?[88]

"Un fenómeno el más extraordinario en la política"

Both men went to the conference room where they found the regents—Castaños, Escaño, Saavedra, Lardizábal, and the bishop of Orense, along

with ten or twelve members, all merchants, of the Junta Superior de Cadiz. It seems that members had protested earlier to Castaños that they had not been consulted on this important economic issue, the 17 May order.[89] When Hormazas and Albuerne appeared, Castaños asked Albuerne to enter and provide relevant details about the order. When Albuerne began to quote from documents in the dossier, Castaños interrupted to assert that on 11 May the regents had discussed only flour shipments and decided that "no se podían permitir su comercio." Then he asked to see the 11 May *resolución* authorizing the drafting of León's order. Scanning it, Castaños looked up to remark: "This doesn't authorize the contents of the 17 May order," to which Hormazas added, "And I don't know anything about it." Albuerne was dumbstruck: Hormazas "negaba los hechos . . . los pasos . . . detallados, lo que contiene su esquela, lo que había acordado con Fernández de León y después conmigo, su misma letra de la resolución." This was the hour of truth, and there were more surprises in store for Albuerne.[90]

An unidentified member of the Junta de Cadiz then proposed that the regents agree that "Aqui la resolución es, que la Regencia no ha acordado semejante resolución," adding what was surely to condemn it, "la qual no estaría peor si la pusiera Napoleon." Another Junta member interjected, "Es verdad, es orden Napoleónica," and as if by prearrangement the rest of the Junta de Cadiz agreed.[91] When other Cadiz *junteros* urged the Regency to issue a statement categorically denying it had approved the 17 May order and ordering all copies be burned, Castaños concurred: "We did not order this, nada hai en el caso." Hormazas repeated that the order was "Napoleonic" and had appeared "justamente cuando estamos tratando qué hemos de dar a los ingleses por los beneficios que nos hacen y necesitamos." According to Albuerne's account, although Lardizábal, Saavedra, and Castaños had known of the order when the government was still at the Isla de León, none spoke up except the last regent to arrive, the bishop of Orense.

Turning to members of the Junta de Cadiz, he commented drily, "You gentlemen only have the right to express an opinion, not to make resolutions for us. Let's hear from Fernández de León, then decide our resolution." At this point Castaños interrupted to call the bishop out of order—in effect eliminating León's testimony—and proposed as a resolution the statement that the 17 May order was false, that all copies be burned, and that a notice to this effect appear in the official gazette. At Castaños's order, Albuerne drafted a short *aviso* for the *Gazeta de la Regencia* stating that the Regencia had issued no *resolución* for the royal order printed at Cadiz about "el comercio de America que prohiben las leyes de aquellos dominios" and ordering all printed copies be burned.[92]

This muted disavowal of the 17 May order outraged the Junta de Cadiz, which dismissed it as a "discreto calmante." By now a faction of Cadiz's merchant community felt no restraints on its political activism and no need to defer to a Regencia whose legitimacy was still questionable, whose dependence could be measured by its financial resources controlled by the Junta, and which lacked "valor . . . firmeza para sostener la verdad y certeza de la orden a vista de la esforzada oposición de la Junta de Cadiz."[93] The Junta went further; on 23 June it stated unequivocally its opinion to the regents. Perhaps the Cadiz merchants were emboldened by material collected and analyzed by a longtime resident of New Spain—possibly at one time a government agent—recently returned to Cadiz, Juan López Cancelada? His data may have reassured them that only a handful of *criollos* in New Spain, the empire's largest importer, "piden el comercio libre." To support this assertion Cancelada presented a seemingly reliable guesstimate of these *criollos*—"solo . . . 66,000 en voz de pedir esta concesión."[94]

First, according to the Junta, the *orden* would create discord among Spaniards, undermine "fraternal ties" with the people of America, and destroy Cadiz, "cuyos nervios fortalecidos únicamente por la nutrición del giro exclusivo mercantil que hace con aquellos dominios." Second, a fuller explanation than the *aviso* published in the *Gazeta* of 22 June was urgently needed, since that notice lacked "el gran sello de las firmas . . . ni de algunos de sus ministros, ni designava . . . que la orden declarada apócrifa fué la misma que tenía la fecha en la Ysla [de León] de 17 de Mayo." Third, in its role of "inspectora, zeladora y protectora de la autoridad . . . del trono y Regencia," the Junta de Cadiz—its anger unrestrained, its deference to authority vanished—insisted that those responsible for the 17 May order merited public punishment since a nation's sovereignty is "nunca más expuesta al descrédito, nunca más censurable, nunca menos respetuosa que quando . . . disimula, tolera, perdona y se prescinde . . . de la gravedad de los delitos."[95] Cadiz's insistence on "venganza" and pressure-group tactics touched off among critics a counterreaction, that the Cadiz *junteros* were at last emerging from their shops "con los pechos purulentos de monopolio, a dictar a la Primera Regencia la orden de que recogiera el decreto de comercio libre."[96]

This was just the initial phase of the Junta de Cadiz's campaign to criminalize those responsible for tinkering with the transatlantic commercial system on which the port city and its trading community depended. On 23 June Albuerne was working in his office all day, exchanging with Hormazas views on the startling about-face of the previous evening. Surely Albuerne, a veteran civil servant, suspected that the tactics of the Cadiz merchant com-

munity and the Spanish ritual of political *escarmiento*—the object lesson—set in motion had to pinpoint scapegoats, not principle. Late that afternoon it became clear that the publication of the 17 May order would have to have public victims once Hormazas sent Albuerne, his *oficial mayor*, a handwritten note: the regents had decided Albuerne needed two months' leave of absence to recuperate from the responsibilities of his position. Hormazas went further: he inserted a personal—indeed, a warning—note (*reservada*): the regents wanted him away from the Hacienda Ministry, and until further notice he had to leave behind the key to his writing desk.[97] Albuerne could only conclude he was the object of the Cadiz community's "venganza," the victim of "exemplar castigo" that the *negociantes* intended to execute upon "la persona o personas que resulten cómplices en tan grave delito, sin consideración a clase, ni gerarquia." And Cadiz went further: the next day (24 June) Nicolás María Sierra, minister of Gracia y Justicia, commissioned the nephew of the Regencia's *presidente* Castaños, Justo María Ybar Navarro, to head an inquiry into the "origen y autores de la supuesta real orden de 17 de mayo sobre el Comercio Libre de América." The lexicon of the commission—"supuesta real orden" and "Comercio Libre"—forecast the outcome.

Albuerne read the message: he was caught in a "trama de la Regencia y del Marqués [Hormazas] para separar de su lado a quien los conocia."[98] Once again the Regencia had bowed to Cadiz pressure by failing to persuade the Junta de Cadiz that in giving exceptional publicity to the 17 May affair, those in America would discern "un empeño decidido de sostener las restricciones del comercio colonial a que son tan opuestos."[99] After taking sworn testimony, within a few days Ybar Navarro with the apparent approval of his uncle Castaños ("el más amedrontado por las gestiones osadas de la Junta de Cadiz") suspended from their bureaucratic posts Albuerne, Fernández de León, and—last—Hormazas and confined them to household arrest. This was done without the approval of all the regents—without the cover of a *real orden*. To cite the Regencia's own notes, the Junta de Cadiz ("cuyos individuos tienen interés personal en este negocio") had forced the regents to uncover culprits "con estrépito y con color."[100]

Weakened by internal divisions and probably troubled by a warning delivered personally by Fernández de León on 25 June that many colonial interests would resent the intervention of the Junta de Cadiz, the Regencia still hoped to minimize notice of retraction or disavowal of the 17 May order; it issued no clarification of its 22 June *aviso*.[101] The aggressive Cadiz merchant community, however, gave the Regencia no respite: it insisted on a governmental response to the demands "de este pueblo intérprete de las leyes ofendidas." On 26 June the Junta de Cadiz informed the regents that a

"junta general o reunión de comercio" hoped that one day the "patria" could affirm that the Regencia was the first Spanish government "de nuestros dias" to listen to Cadiz and try to close the gap that "el despotismo había puesto entre el soberano y el vasallo." The Regencia, insisted the Cadiz merchants, should jail whoever authorized the May order along with those in the Hacienda Ministry involved in any way, publish the charges against those jailed, and promise to observe the "leyes prohibitivas de Indias." The next day (27 June), the Junta—sensitive to anti-Cadiz currents overseas in the colonies—insisted that the Regencia affirm publicly that Cadiz's Consulado had not intervened in any fashion—"no había hecho [representación] alguna sobre el comercio extrangero en las Américas." Cadiz merchants could expect no less from "las ideas liberales y del amor a la justicia e illustración" of the Regencia.[102] Praise for liberalism and enlightenment from an interest group viscerally opposed to trade liberalization approaches the height of cynicism.

This time the Regencia finally, publicly, even abjectly caved in to the merchants of Cadiz. On 27 June the five members of the Regencia issued a decree admitting their *aviso* of 22 June might not dispel the "impresión favorable o siniestra" created by the 17 May order, reaffirming it was "apócrifa, nula y de ningún valor ni afecto" and—another retreat before Cadiz—announcing an official investigation into authorship, publication, and distribution of the "supuesta real orden." To dampen colonial reaction to the rejection of a long overdue and carefully crafted policy innovation by Estéban Fernández de León, the regents, or whoever drafted the decree, balanced their rejection with an affirmation of interest in harmonizing the interests of colonies and metropole. They promised to seek "otros medios" to relieve the colonies of "los males y privaciones que sufren" but confessed that at the moment the Regencia could not review "un punto tan delicado y de tanta trascendencia"—adroit euphemism for "el comercio libre de las Américas"—since any innovation might "derogar las leyes prohibitivas de Indias" with serious effects on the "Estado."[103] Here Cadiz interests were artfully subsumed under the rubric of the state. As a piece of legislation, the Regencia's decree affirmed a position that subsequent Spanish governments—the Cortes—would find difficult to weaken, and did so without alluding to the influential interest group really responsible for so blatant a major policy reversal. A few months later a realistic Henry Wellesley drew the logical conclusion that henceforth no Spanish government would attempt to change the imperial transatlantic trade system "in deference of the opinions at Cadiz, without the support of the Cortes, and I doubt whether we shall find in that assembly" an adequate number to overrule "the powerful opposition which will be made to it."[104]

The *negociantes* of Cadiz and associates at Veracruz, Mexico City, and elsewhere in Spain's American colonial world had succeeded in a tenaciously pursued strategy to preserve the Spanish Empire's transatlantic structure. Cornerstone of that system were Spanish-born *almaceneros* overseas at the commercial synapse of Mexico City and links to the colonial civil service, churchmen, and landed and mining elites. To quote José Blanco White, incisive Spanish liberal self-exiled at London, "El áncora de esperanza del partido español anti-americano está en México. En efecto los Españoles son allí más fuertes, y en mayor número que en otras partes." And not only in the capital of the colony, for Veracruz, he added, contained many "igualmente interesados en el antiguo régimen que los de Cadiz" forming "un apoyo bastante poderoso del partido."[105]

It must be noted that, to confirm that support, weeks later (1 July) the Regencia sent a new viceroy to New Spain, General Francisco Xavier de Venegas y Saavedra (a relative of Regent Saavedra), with titles of nobility for influential *montañeses* in Mexico City's merchant community: for Antonio Basoco,[106] Sebastián de Heras Soto, and Diego de Ágreda and also for Juan Martín de Juanmartiñena, lawyer and ex-confidant of *golpista* Gabriel de Yemo, honorary member of the Audiencia de México. Presumably these awards were recommended to Hormazas by Ciriaco González Carbajal, ex-*oidor* of the Audiencia de México and now *consejero de Indias*. Venegas was also instructed to propose a 20 million peso loan for the government in refuge at Cadiz, to remit "cuantos auxilios pueda para sostener nuestra justa causa" and to retain within the Spanish Empire "aquel vasto imperio, el más opulento de sus dominios." Was it duplicity, coincidence, or simply part of the Regencia's balancing of conflicting colonial interests that on 1 July it authorized Ybar Navarro to put under house arrest Fernández de León, Albuerne, and—"con el decoro correspondiente"—Hormazas, for responsibility in authorizing colonial ports to trade with English and Portuguese colonies (the 17 May order), while also on 1 July the Regencia confessed to Ybar Navarro it had intended on 10 May to authorize Havana's covert commercial contacts with U.S. ports—in fact, *comercio directo*.[107] Crisis managers have a remarkable capacity to reconcile the normally irreconcilable.

The intractability of the Cadiz merchant community that forced the Regencia's retraction of the 17 May order, printed in the *Diario de la Regencia*, 25 June, should not mask a dubious victory. Blanco White quickly reprinted the retraction in London's *El Español* (30 July) and from there it spread like wildfire to Spain's colonial capitals. To reemphasize the persistence of a virtual "port" monopoly while tendering to the colonies in America vague promises of betterment repeated and soon forgotten would, he warned,

make them indignant.[108] To do this "en medio de las luces de nuestros dias y confirmarlo con un decreto me parece un fenómeno el más extraordinaria en política." All the more so when, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, Blanco White proposed that the Regencia reward those responsible for retracting the 17 May order "porque este piadoso engaño sería el más antidoto contra todo espíritu de revolución en las colonias."[109] An equally frank Albuerne was not guilty of hyperbole when he concluded that the Regencia's withdrawal of its order "entregó a la desesperación nuestros hermanos de ultramar, y puso en manos y arbitrio de los extrangeros su comercio." In a bitter allusion to the remarks of those Cadiz merchants present in the Regencia's conference room on 22 June, he added: "Las convulsiones de América, si algún dia se averiguen en su origen, acaso nos darán noticia de las maquinaciones de Napoleon."[110] Fernández de León later clarified this linkage in 1812 when he insisted that a major factor in the "funesta revolución" everywhere in the Spanish colonies in America was the Regencia's declarations of 22 and 27 June 1810 prohibiting colonial trade with foreign ports, the "único remedio de subsistir aquellos habitantes."[111]

By bending the regents to public disavowal of their 17 May order, the merchant community of Cadiz through its Junta and Consulado made clear to the colonies and English and U.S. commercial interests that even moderate adjustments of Spain's colonial trade system were improbable, not even in response to unprecedented conditions of trade in the Atlantic. In pursuing the pliable regents from a mild *aviso* to declaring 17 May apocryphal, Gaditano traders also tied the hands of the subsequent constitutional government, the Cortes. They savored briefly the best of two worlds: they reinforced their alliance with the wealthiest consortium in the colonies—the *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz—and Cuba's sugar planters. Through agents in New Spain, authorities at Sevilla and Cadiz knew that many *criollos* shared Melchor Talamantes's idea of opening commercial exchanges temporarily with the United States and England. Even so loyalist a cleric as Valladolid's bishop-elect Abad y Queipo wrote in May 1810 urging the Regencia to head off an imminent explosion by permitting New Spain to trade directly with other nations "baxo de aquellas modificaciones . . . necesarias." Hence the appointment of Miguel de Lardizábal to the Junta Central and then the Regencia; the posting of Ciriaco González Carbajal as adviser to Hacienda minister Hormazas; and the choice of Venegas y Saavedra as viceroy to New Spain, with *títulos de Castilla* for select Spanish *almaceneros* there. Álvarez Flores Estrada considered the 17 May order a "punto capital, tan justamente suspirado . . . y tan mal manejado no podía dexar

de irritarlos [Americanos]." This was a long perspective while Cadiz and Mexico City traders preferred the short one. They must have perceived that England's manufacturers and exporters could survive losing what Adam Smith labeled the "monopoly of the colony trade" of the North American colonies, but to Cadiz and other major peninsular ports loss of their colonial trade oligopoly spelled poverty. In the mining centers of New Spain and Peru, some were disappointed by the Regencia's handling of the 17 May issue, but they were not yet prepared to abandon the colonial system and risk social upheaval. New Spain and Peru were the last continental colonies to accept *comercio libre* and independence. Fittingly enough, just after the rejection of limited *comercio libre*, well-informed *peninsular* López Cancelada, now back in Spain, published in 1811 a reliable, substantial overview of the economy of New Spain with pessimistic observations about the colonial effects of the 17 May *order* in an appropriately titled *Ruina de la Nueva España si se declara el comercio libre con los extrangeros, exprésanse los motives* (Cadiz, 1811).

A similar calculation balancing potential long-term stability against immediate gains governed the Regencia's (and Cadiz's) approach to the problem of Cuba. A flourishing Cuban economy forced the Regencia to bend policy to the needs of Havana's planters and exporters. Like New Spain's elites, Cuba's feared social upheaval like that of nearby Haiti. So the Regencia quietly tolerated trade arrangements by Havana's colonial authorities—captain general, intendant, Ayuntamiento, Consulado—who proceeded informally to deviate from the colonial trade system by maintaining trade with U.S. ports. Cuba's informal integration with the economy of the United States over the nineteenth century proved the ultimate rationality of the Regencia's statement of 1 July.

Inept handling of London's insistence on direct commercial access to the colonies could have disastrous consequences. London had harbored, even pensioned, the Venezuelan Miranda, who might ignite the colonies. Smuggling by English traders along the coasts of Spain's Caribbean colonies had reached epidemic proportions after 1797, and colonial authorities proved tolerant, incapable, or both, of suppressing it. References abounded that often the merchants most vocal in upholding the Spanish imperial trading system proved the most engaged in illegal trafficking. There remained one alternative: the English merchants trading with "Old Spain" who still operated through Cadiz. In January and later, Fernández de León urged authorizing Spanish-registry vessels en route to the colonies to put in at "qualesquiere posesiones Ingleses de Europa y América" (he later added Portugal), an unnecessary concession Gaditanos might argue.

The Regencia had one further resort. French occupation forces deep in the peninsula provided the Regencia with leverage in resisting London's pressure. Provided Spanish guerrilla operations tied down French and allied troops, London would be compelled to support a Spanish government immobile on trade policy and refrain from overt involvement in colonial restivity. This, after all, was a calculation *fernandistas* had made in blocking the flight of the Bourbons to New Spain *á la portuguesa* in April 1808. By mid-July 1810, perhaps earlier, knowledge of London's refusal to intervene in Venezuela could only confirm such calculation; as a matter of fact, neither London nor, for that matter, Washington would offer official support to New Spain's revolutionaries over more than a decade of anticolonial warfare.

When an English observer concluded in 1813 that neither Junta Central, Regencia, nor Cortes had carried out the "numberless decrees for the advantage of America" nor ever intended "to fulfill . . . promises to America," he described Cadiz's calculated policy of preserving intact the Spanish empire's secular Atlantic trade oligopoly. For this persistence, however, Cadiz merchants—"los más interesados siempre en el monopolio"—incurred an unexpected responsibility: "El tiempo y la dolorosa experiencia recordará [*sic*] los momentos en que se sumergió la nación en su mayor abatimiento." The 17 May episode must be examined in the context that enabled Cadiz to continue to draw upon colonial wealth—principally New Spain's silver—to ship expeditionary forces to join loyalists in the colonies in suppressing insurgency there. Characteristically Blanco White grasped the essence of the situation: "El áncora del Partído Español Antiamericano es México. En efecto los europeos son allí más fuertes y en un número que en otras partes. Los comercintes de Veracruz igualmente interesados en el Antiguo Régimen que los de Cádiz, son un apoyo bastante poderoso del partido. Más lo único que de esto se infiere es lo que todos los que ven algo han previsto: que el reino de México sera ultimo en hacer la revolución."[112]

20. Colonial Insurrection and the Call for the Cortes

Nos preguntó [Londres] si nuestro actual gobierno había echo algo en favor de los Americanos, dandoles representación en las cortes y promoviendo sus intereses comerciales por medio de algunos reglamentos de livertad de poderlo hacer con las potencias amigas como la Inglaterra.
Apodaca to Bardaxi, 4 July 1810

The state of our trade with Spanish America . . . is even upon a less advantageous footing for England than . . . previous to the peace with Spain . . . This trade should be placed immediately upon a proper footing.
Henry Wellesley to Richard Wellesley (Marquess Wellesley), 25 January 1810

La consulta del Consejo sobre las ocurrencias de Caracas . . . reduce a que se envie allí . . . un sugeto condecorado . . . que use . . . primeramente de los medios de la pursuasión . . . que para el caso de no producir su efecto los medios suaves . . . que le vayan imediatamente . . . las tropas necesarias para reducirlos por fuerza.
Diario de la Regencia, 12 July 1810

Parece que ha llegado la época de un grande acontecimiento político . . . el estandarte de la independencia se ha empezado a levantar en América . . . Los americanos no pensarán jamás en separarse de la corona de España, si no los obligan a ello con providencias mal entendidas.
Blanco White, *El Español*, 30 July 1810

Once these rebels have felt a smart blow, they will submit.
George III

In retrospect it is ironic that on the day members of the Consulado de Cadiz condemned the 17 May decree, insisting on its formal repudiation by the Regencia and immediate exemplary punishment of its promoters, in London Spain's two envoys examined a manifesto just incoming from Caracas announcing that a local junta had repudiated the Regencia and invited open trade with England. It might appear that the report vindicated the views of Estéban Fernández de León and Manuel Albuerne, lonely partisans of moderate commercial concessions to the colonies, and even led the Regen-

cia to reconsider its toleration of Cadiz's inflexible position. In London, Blanco White quickly condemned the Regencia's strange disavowal of the 17 May decree, when, as he phrased it, "todas las circunstancias estaban clamando por el contrario." León and Albuerne should be thanked rather than prosecuted since, he believed, "este piadoso engaño sería el más poderoso antidoto contra todo espíritu de revolución en las colonias." To such ill-conceived policies of the government he attributed the long-feared move toward independence now signaled by the formation of an insurrectionary junta at Caracas in April 1810 that immediately opened Venezuela's ports to trade with nations friendly or allied, repeating the Portuguese precedent of 1808 at Baía, in the colony of Brazil. In his optic, Caracas had legitimately followed the example of juntas in Spain by forming an interim government to protect regional interests pending the ultimate return of Spain's rightful monarch, or until another legitimate authority should be established on new bases in the metropole. Were the Regencia to assess the situation correctly, Blanco saw new hope for his vision of the empire, a federative solution to the troublesome colonial question.[1] But such an alternative was not to be. The dice had been loaded and cast. This may explain why the Regencia had quickly removed Fernández de León from its members.

The prescience of Blanco White and Fernández de León would become clear in subsequent months and years through the action and reaction of the many interests involved. Yet such foresight and hindsight, too, fell far short of the complex reality that unfolded with an apparent logic defying individual perceptions and preconceptions of actors and observers alike. Although, as so often at critical junctures, the conflicts and positions of those involved appeared well defined, within each major faction were differences of interest and strategy. These proved major factors in an outcome that betrayed the plans and expectations of the protagonists.

The English government had two prime objectives. The first concentrated on supporting Spain's resistance to the occupying forces of the French Empire. The appointment of General Wellington, formerly part of the East India Company's armed forces, to command English forces, despite London's dissatisfaction with the hapless prosecution of the struggle in the peninsula, indicated England's commitment to Spain's struggle. From the outset the English were convinced the conflict would be long and were prepared to encourage if necessary a "war of partisans."[2] Now, despite French penetration into Andalusia, interception of Miguel de Azanza's correspondence with the government of José I at Madrid convinced Henry Wellesley at Cadiz that he saw what was becoming a Spanish quagmire for the French and the Anglo-Spanish forces. To cite from his correspon-

dence with Arthur Wellesley (Viscount Wellington), "If Bonaparte means to keep Spain, he must relinquish every other object . . . the means . . . for raising money here are already exhausted."[3] There remained the wealth of the Spanish colonies in America, in New Spain, for instance.

By curious coincidence, London had in place at this juncture of Anglo-Hispanic relations three Wellesley brothers just returned from colonial service in India:[4] Arthur, later Duke of Wellington; Richard, ex-governor general of India and, between 1809 and 1812, influential in foreign affairs (Marquess Wellesley); and Henry, England's minister-envoy extraordinario to the Spanish government at Sevilla/Cadiz in 1810. The Wellesleys understood the dynamics of colonialism; no doubt there was the memory of the disastrous assaults on Spain's colony in the Rio de la Plata (1806 and 1807); and they could take comfort from the fact that colonies once liberated like those lost in North America might turn into far better trading partners. "One family controlled the central places in Great Britain's prosecution of the war in Iberia," as a Wellesley descendant would later describe it.[5] In politics and especially in the sensitive area of trade in the Spanish transatlantic system, Henry Wellesley (Richard's private secretary and peripatetic agent in India) was well prepared to push England's export interests, and he was joined by Robert Jenkinson, second Earl of Liverpool, competent and aggressive in England's international trade and mindful of preserving the Spanish Empire at least for the immediate future.

London, Caracas, and "Free Trade"

The second objective of long-term importance to English interests and integral to London's strategy was obtaining direct access to trade in the Spanish Empire in America—overseas trade has always been a major goal of imperialism. Henry Wellesley hoped to forge "cordial cooperation" with Spanish authorities at Cadiz while advancing "our trade with Spanish America" and the protection of "individuals concerned in this trade," which, he recommended, "should be placed immediately upon a proper footing." Cooperation, he predicted, would be difficult "until the impressions of jealousy with respect to the designs of His Majesty . . . shall be entirely removed."[6] Of course, the Spanish government had good reason to suspect London's motives. By March 1810 Henry Wellesley could envision a situation in which "Cadiz might be induced to declare itself a free port under the protection of the English and that its connection with South America might (if Spain were to be conquered) facilitate any arrangements"[7]—precisely why Cadiz had blocked the Regencia's 17 May decree.

Reports of instability from Caracas were by no means unexpected in London and Cadiz. Venezuela had been an imperial trouble spot since the decades there of the privileged Compañía de Filipinas and friction between that chartered enterprise and local producers.[8] Venezuelan landed proprietors, producing staples of cocoa and coffee in response to strong external demand, grew increasingly restive about the economic constraints on their export trade—prohibitions, import-export duties, and, after 1796, repeated English blockade. Many resorted to large-scale smuggling—"el enorme contrabando inglés"—with English traders in newly occupied Trinidad and Curaçao, which further divorced local from imperial interests, the *americanos* from *españoles*.[9] The divisions were widened by the Gual affair in the 1790s, by Miranda's premature politics of revolution, and in April 1810 by the Caracas insurrectionary Junta.

No surprise, one of the first orders of business of the insurgent Junta de Caracas—its port at La Guayra handled 50 percent of Venezuela's external trade[10]—was establishing legal direct trade with non-Spanish Caribbean islands. The Junta sent representatives to nearby Curaçao where they met with the English governor-general Layard, who immediately sent Captain Kelly to London with their proposals for expanded commercial exchanges in return for official recognition. In addition, Layard expected authorization to send his aide-de-camp John Robertson to the Caracas Junta to arrange a commercial agreement—somewhat akin to a real *comercio libre*—opening legal trade with Venezuela. Layard's enthusiasm—he thought a proper response to Curaçao's overtures was "la abierta e inequívoca ayuda y el amparo fatalmente dados a los jefes de la rebelión"—was not contagious at London.[11] Rebellion at Caracas played an overlooked and important role in the convocation of the Cortes de Cadiz in 1810.[12]

Kelly's arrival in England on 21 June with dispatches from General Layard, followed by publication of his reports two days later[13] in the London press, set in motion action previously contemplated at London and Cadiz. The dispatches of Spain's special representatives in London, Juan de Apodaca and the duque de Alburquerque, to Eusebio de Bardaxi, Spain's foreign secretary at Cadiz, reflected the unsettling impact of insurrection in Venezuela ("Caracas") on the complex relationship between wary allies with differing immediate objectives, Spain and England, a peculiar alliance born of the Bayonne settlement.

Immediately after Kelly's arrival, Richard Wellesley reported on the situation at Caracas to Spain's London agents; two days later on 23 June he met with Alburquerque and Apodaca along with fellow cabinet member and

foreign trade specialist Robert Jenkinson, secretary of war and colonies. The colony of Venezuela was fissioning geographically and ideologically: Wellesley displayed the manifestoes issued by the Caracas revolutionary Junta rejecting the Regencia, along with correspondence received by General Layard from the Venezuelan ports of Coro and Maracaibo supporting the Regencia and—unlike Caracas—requesting equipment to suppress the insurgents at Caracas.[14]

Foreign Secretary Richard Wellesley—hoping to shore up all-important Spanish resistance to French occupation—reiterated his government's disapproval of the actions of authorities at Caracas "porque su ánimo había sido siempre de mantener la integridad de la monarquía Española y la unión de sus dominios ultramarinos a la patria como metrópoli [metrópoli crossed out]." This was, at the very least, encouraging—given the record of English assaults on Spanish possessions in the Caribbean and on Buenos Aires in the south Atlantic. He hoped, Alburquerque reported, to avoid "toda novedad que pudiese dirigirse a desmembrar qualquier parte de ella," declaring that "los deseos de SMB, declarados desde el principio de nuestra justa y gloriosa revolución, habían sido y serían siempre los de hacer que la España unida con sus dominios de América fuese una Monarquía grande y poderosa que a la vez impusiese el respeto a las del continente y hiciese la felicidad de las Americas." Wellesley offered to forward to Cadiz the dispatches of Apodaca and Alburquerque that would inform the Regencia of England's inflexible intention to support "la integridad y unión de nuestras Americas, cuya independencia solo debería verificarse en el caso que estaba muy remoto y no se esperaba, de que fuese enteramente subyugada la España"—an adroit link between resistance to French occupation and the territorial integrity of the empire. Alburquerque added that Wellesley—perhaps recalling England's recent failure to pacify the restive North American colonies with the concept of "virtual" representation, or responding to Henry Wellesley's recommendation—wanted to know if the "Consejo de Regencia había convocado a los Americanos para las próximas Cortes dandoles representación en ella."[15] He was assured that the Regencia "así lo había hecho desde luego que fué instalado." Furthermore, Wellesley was shown "para su más completa satisfacción . . . el Manifiesto dirigido a los Americanos por el Consejo de Regencia para el qual había sido nombrado el Exmo. D. Miguel de Lardizábal y Uribe" elected by the "virreinato de México" to the Junta Central—presumably evidence of colonial representation in the metropolitan government. Alburquerque found the foreign secretary satisfied but regretful that under the current difficult circumstances

his government "no podría hacerse más por nuestro Gobierno." Wellesley was preparing the ground for insisting on access to New Spain's silver and direct commercial contact with the colonies.

Then Wellesley turned to one of London's major preoccupations: that Spain loosen its transatlantic trade restrictions. "Lo único que restaba era fomentar el comercio de aquellos dominios concediendoles alguna mayor libertad de hacerlo con las potencias amigas, como la Inglaterra." Following this seemingly disinterested and incidental remark, Wellesley ended the interview, assuring the envoys that he would reveal the orders, shortly to be sent out to General Layard at Curaçao, implementing the "justícissimas intenciones de SMB relativo a la conservación de nuestros dominios Americanos y su unión y dependencia del Gobierno Español." Was this a deliberately opaque way to assure the Spanish agents that London would not support insurrectionary groups in Spain's colonies in America? Or, really, a threat to do so? Two weeks later, however, Alburquerque had to report that "no nos haya avisado hasta ahora de la salida de barco que dixo pensaba despachar," adding that he and Apodaca were relying upon a *paquete ordinario* to carry their reports on the meeting with Wellesley of 23 June.[16]

Apodaca's second dispatch of the same date related the reference to the trade question differently. When Wellesley had asked about steps taken to provide for adequate colonial representation in the promised *cortes*, he wrote, the two Spanish envoys were also asked what had been done in "promoviendo que intereses comerciales, medio de algunos reglamentos de libertad de poderlo hacer con las potencias amigas como la Inglaterra; lo que le parecia conveniente se hiciese para atraherlos a mayor unión con la metrópoli, y que hallaba del caso los hicieramos presente a SM." In short, was this about strengthening the new Hispano-English alliance through trade expansion? To this Apodaca had replied that the envoys would pass along the request, advising "SM de su parecer como nos pedía y como merecía un dictamen de tanto peso y autoridad." These Spanish envoys were far from ingenuous.[17]

Despite Wellesley's presumed promise, he reneged. The envoys were neither helped to communicate with Cadiz via an English vessel nor shown the English government's response to Layard's communiqués. The response was contained in a letter signed on 29 June by War and Trade Secretary Robert Jenkinson (Liverpool) and a copy sent to Spanish authorities at Cadiz.[18]

"Liverpool"'s Letter and Insurrectionary Caracas

Robert Jenkinson was no novice in matters of foreign policy and trade. His father, Charles (first Duke of Liverpool), had been associated with a leading commercial and slave-trading port, Liverpool, and in 1786 was president of the Board of Trade, where he continued to serve for fifteen years; in addition, he managed to edit two useful publications, *Collection of All the Treaties . . . between Great Britain and Other Powers* (1785) and in 1808 another *Collection of . . . Reports and Papers on the Trade and Navigation . . . Britain's Colonies in the West*. His son, Robert, had served on the India board (1798), been a principal negotiator with France at Amiens (1801), and in 1810 was secretary for war and, like the three Wellesleys, eager to support Arthur Wellesley's expeditionary forces in the Iberian Peninsula with troops and money. By 1811 he would manage to put forty-eight thousand troops behind Wellesley, financed in that year by £9 million. We know he collaborated smoothly on foreign policy with both Castlereagh and Canning. It is not surprising that Jenkinson would reproach Layard for his overt support for the Caracas movement. England, he was convinced, had to be the honest broker.[19]

The famous "Liverpool Letter" to Layard elaborated and emphasized points made verbally to Apodaca and Alburquerque on 23 June. "Mientras que la nación española persevere en su resistencia," Liverpool stated, England would "oponerse a todo género de procedimientos que puedan producir la menor separación de las provincias españolas de América de su metrópoli de Europa." He added reassuringly that his government did not doubt that, once the Caracas Junta learned that resistance in the metropole was continuing, that colony would "restablecer sus vínculos con España como parte integrante de la monarquía española." London's hopes in this regard, Liverpool's letter continued, were further justified by evidence that the Regencia had adopted "los mismos principios generosos y sabios que los adoptados anteriormente por la Junta Suprema [the Central], de establecer las relaciones entre todas las partes de la monarquía española sobre el pie más liberal, mirando a las provincias de América como partes integrantes del imperio, y admitiendo a sus naturales a tener parte en las cortes del reyno." And once again the English government emphasized discreetly its commercial objective, its hope that "la misma generosa e ilustrada política . . . moverá al gobierno de España a arreglar la comunicación de las provincias americanas con otras partes del mundo, sobre bases que puedan contribuir al aumento de la prosperidad, y al mismo tiempo acrecentar todas las ventajas que del estado presente pueden justamente esperarse."

Finally, Liverpool stated cryptically that the English government hoped this clarification would help General Layard to adjust ("arreglar") his conduct "en cualqluier clase de comunicación . . . con las provincias contiguas de la parte meridional de América" (New Spain, perhaps?), adding that a copy of his letter would be sent to the Spanish government, which—he was sure—"jamás se podrá oponer ni objetar nada en orden al uso que hicieseis de estos sentimientos, que las circumstancias os parecerán haber exigido."[20]

Why Apodaca and Alburquerque were not shown Liverpool's letter or allowed to forward their dispatches along with those of the English government on the same vessel is not clear. Nor is it why, and at whose suggestion, a copy was nevertheless immediately sent to the Spanish government. Possibly there was a division of opinion on policy between England's foreign secretary (Wellesley) and the secretary of war (Jenkinson) with respect to the Caracas developments and the Spanish government's steadfast refusal to grant English demands for direct commercial access to its colonies. Liverpool was by far the most knowledgeable about trade policy in the English ministry and aware of the intense debate within the Spanish government on colonial commercial policy, especially of the outspoken opposition of the Cadiz merchant community to change in the traditional transatlantic system of trade. Jenkinson's letter of instructions to Layard at Curaçao, transmitted to the Spanish government, was obviously designed to reinforce England's commercial demands at the critical moment when the content, as well as the disavowal, of the 17 May decree was still rumored in London. The letter's language implies that Liverpool believed, or more accurately feigned to believe, that a substantive change in Spanish colonial trade policy would emerge.[21] By forwarding a copy to the Regencia at Cadiz, he wished presumably to strengthen the government's resolve to carry it through.

On the other hand, by giving the governor of Curaçao a free hand to further English commercial interests with local Spanish colonial authorities ostensibly loyal to Fernando VII and committed to resisting France, Liverpool demonstrated England's determination to enter into de facto if not de jure relations with any Spanish colony that refused to abide by the metropole's trade restrictions.[22] Whatever and whenever Liverpool knew about the situation at Cadiz and the handling of the 17 May decree, apparently he did not expect the Regencia to be resolute enough to prevail against Cadiz interests and provide English merchants immediate as well as long-term direct trade outlets in the Spanish colonies. His letter gave no hint that London would accept either the moderate concessions proposed by Fernández de León or Cadiz's trade expansion then under negotiation by England's envoy Henry Wellesley at Cadiz.

For some time Wellesley had been discussing privately with Bardaxi a "commercial arrangement" that, by lowering duties and eliminating prohibitions on selected English cottons, might encourage English merchants to continue to export to Cadiz for reexport to the colonies. This would maintain the flow of English manufactures through Spain's traditional colonial trade system. Wellesley *seemed* sensitive to the interests of Cadiz merchants; for example, in March of 1810 he had hinted that Cadiz might be induced to declare itself a free port under English protection, envisioning that Cadiz's "connection with South America might (if Spain were conquered) facilitate any arrangements we might wish to make in that quarter."[23] Bardaxi, "who is a very clever man and very much the friend of the English," observed Foreign Secretary Wellesley in early April, had persuaded him that the moment was propitious "for concluding a commercial arrangement . . . which should be so formed as to make it easy to prove that while it is advantageous to the interests of Great Britain, it is not injurious to those of Spain." Henry Wellesley's low-keyed approach seemed promising.

The major stumbling block in negotiations was Spain's insistence that English goods destined for its colonies be carried in Spanish bottoms. For his part, Wellesley saw no reason why a commercial agreement facilitating English exports to Cadiz should preclude ongoing English smuggling with the colonies.[24] Like Bardaxi and the Consulado de Cadiz, Wellesley probably found Liverpool's letter to Layard, on careful reading, to be dangerous double-talk disguising—at least to the Spanish government—an unjustified insistence on direct access to Spain's colonial ports. "I have it in my power to conclude a treaty which, without breaking open the Spanish colonial laws, would pour millions into the pockets of our merchants," Wellesley wrote his brother Arthur in a bitter mood two months later, "but this will not do, and we must either have the trade direct with the colonies or nothing. Thus are petty British objects of commerce suffered to interfere with the great and interesting work of releasing this country from the yoke of France."[25] There was no ambiguity in Wellesley's execution of a two-pronged policy toward Spain.

Probably Bardaxi too believed in July that London could be pressured by conservative groups with a large stake in the traditional trade with Cadiz, as well as by Alburquerque, Apodaca, and Cevallos, to reject the goals of Liverpool's policy and reach an accommodation on the prime preoccupations, trade and aid. He may have interpreted the "commercial arrangement" worked out confidentially with Henry Wellesley as an enticement to gain the support of those groups and thereby protect Spain's colonial interests and obtain a guarantee of English military and naval support in case of an ir-

repressible insurgency in America. Perhaps with this in mind, soon after the Regencia approved in principle a commercial treaty, in mid-July he attached a condition requiring the English government "se accediese a otro proyecto de tratado . . . que nos asegurase los auxilios que SMB debe darnos en virtud del artículo 3 del tratado de Alianza y el segundo artículo separado del mismo . . . como igualmente de la necesidad . . . de reunir de una vez gran cantidad de dinero como la de 10 millones de libras esterlinas."[26] This would seem to imply that the Regencia could expect a loan in return for relatively minor trade concessions. Predictably Foreign Secretary Richard Wellesley, replied "definitively" that London "no se hallaba en disposición de poder conceder el empréstito."[27] The response was unambiguous.

For a brief moment in July, however, it appeared that Bardaxi's strategy might bear fruit. Apodaca reported that in a conference (19 July) Wellesley gave Spain's envoys copies of reports on the situation at Caracas. He took pains to point out that more recent reports indicated that the governor of Curaçao "se había separado (no se sabe por qué motivo) del sistema que había adoptado en los principios . . . de no consentir en separación alguna de nuestras colonias," and he read them Liverpool's letter to Layard. He explained that in a meeting arranged by Johnson Cochrane between himself and the Caracas deputies, the latter had made clear that despite the wish of the Caracas Junta to maintain friendship and support with the peninsular government as well as friendship and trade with England, it would not recognize the legitimacy of the Regencia. Wellesley proceeded to say that, despite his warning of the consequences of their action and his assertion that the English government opposed their attitude, they remained unmoved. The meeting ended in an agreement to meet again. Subsequently Wellesley, after consulting the cabinet, informed the Caraqueños that London would try to persuade the Spanish government to "atendiese en las quejas de que hacían mérito," trusting to find ground for reconciliation. There remained the obvious problem, Wellesley added, about English policy if efforts at reconciliation failed.

Responding to Foreign Secretary Wellesley's presentation, Apodaca reported that he and Alburquerque had agreed to the "medios suaves e insinuativos" suggested by Richard Wellesley "para atraher estas gentes descarriadas a la verdadera obediencia," always assuming that if reconciliation failed, Caracas would be considered in a state of rebellion. Unintimidated by Wellesley's open question (or threat) about England's policy if the Spanish government withheld commercial concessions, Apodaca pointed out that the Regencia had generally received recognition in the colonies, and well-founded complaints should be sent to the Regencia and later to the

Cortes soon to meet on the Isla de León. He stressed that unity between England and Spain was essential in the struggle against France, but if England withheld assistance, public opinion in Spain might cease supporting their common struggle against France. First, control and then subjugation of the Iberian Peninsula by French forces, he warned, would be a prelude to the loss of Europe and the threat of an invasion of England. Then he went to the heart of Anglo-Hispanic cooperation: Where would England find monetary resources for further operations on the European continent, since America's silver mines would close for lack of mercury supplied by Almadén and Istria? Peace with France would permit Bonaparte to rebuild a navy for which Spain had the necessary resources. To counter this dismal scenario, Apodaca could only offer "el continuar en la unión más estrecha de los aliados y de las Américas con España para resistir el Tirano, y promover el espíritu público auxilando prontamente a los Españoles del modo más eficaz y extensivo." In concluding his report to Cadiz, Apodaca expressed the belief he had convinced Wellesley, who promised to present the Spanish envoys' conclusions to the cabinet.[28] Events would soon disabuse him.

Once again the Spanish colonies in America forced the issue. The unexpected arrival on 18 July of deputies sent by the insurgent Junta de Caracas, Simón Bolívar and Luis López Mendez, followed on 6 August by "un tal Ramón de Irigoyen" from the revolutionary Junta at Buenos Aires, fed in England euphoria and the desire to back Spanish American uprisings. Bolívar and López Mendez surely reminded Richard Wellesley that the Caracas Junta had decreed the hoped-for "libertad comercial" for Venezuela and lowered by 25 percent tariffs on imports of English goods. Further, their *Nota sobre Caracas* circulating by July expressly underscored "los grandes beneficios comerciales que se sienten ya con el aumento del mercado de contrabando y que serían incalculables si el tráfico fué libre."[29] Wellesley welcomed this. As a result, the opposition of English conservatives soon petered out in a pro forma inquiry into Layard's strong support for the Caracas Junta, while English policy formed behind the artfully articulated policy initiated by Robert Jenkinson.[30]

More meetings with Richard Wellesley on 30–31 August quickly destroyed Apodaca's optimism. After providing the Spaniards a written account of discussions with Venezuelan representatives Bolívar and López Mendes, their proposals, and the English government's response—all, Apodaca noted, without signatures or other official formalities—Wellesley laid out his government's policy of neutral intermediation, "limitando este gobierno a recomendar a la provincia de Venezuela que procura reconciliarse inmediatamente con el Consejo de Regencia, a cuyo efecto ofrece su más

eficaz y amistosa mediación, establece su comunicación con aquella provincia, y declara a los comisionados que las instrucciones solicitadas por ellos han sido ya enviadas a los Gefes Británicos, en la plena confianza de que Venezuela continuará guardando fidelidad a Fernando VII y cooperación con la España y con SMB contra el enemigo común." In the perspective of Apodaca, envoy of an imperial power, the English government seemed to give official status to an insurgency threatening imperial integrity.

After a long night preparing s reasoned response, Apodaca took the offensive. Once again he insisted that the English government suspend all dealings with insurgent Caracas, reproaching Wellesley for the shifting position of his government in violation of its alliance with Spain. He warned that England's failure to "oponer con eficacia a unas revoluciones tan conformes a los deseos e intenciones manifestadas por el enemigo común, y operadas en gran parte for su influxo" would anger and discourage Spanish resistance, undermining the common cause. Asserting at the end the need for further consultation with his government, Apodaca requested a ship to carry his courier to Cadiz.

In summing up the obvious standoff, Apodaca had to conclude that the arrival of an agent from the independent-minded Junta de Buenos Aires, along with disquieting news of uprisings in Chile and Peru and prognostications of trouble in New Spain, clearly contributed to the shift in London's position. Above all, he attributed it to the long-standing, underlying sentiment of the English for the emancipation of Spain's colonies and direct trade with them, a sentiment fostered by large-scale retention of goods awaiting export or reexport to Spain's American colonies. This had been the major factor behind the uneasy alliance of the Spanish and French Bourbon monarchies throughout the eighteenth century; for Spanish interests, the "Family Pact" had preserved the integrity of the empire in the western Atlantic against English aggression and direct trade there. In view of what appeared in 1810 as universal public support in England for the government's policy, Apodaca found it impolitic to express overt frustration at his inability to change it.

Instability and outright rebellion in the American colonies, Apodaca reflected, complicated pending negotiations, forcing him to adopt "un prudente disímulo para sacar algun partido." To his insistence on immediate export of muskets to the peninsula, Wellesley claimed a quantity had been shipped to General Arthur Wellesley for distribution in pueblos on the frontier with Portugal, and a further ten thousand would shortly be shipped to Galicia; pointedly he refused to specify the number on route to Cadiz. Meanwhile, Apodaca tried to obtain munitions from Prussia

through an English broker he had met in Vienna.[31] England, he inferred astutely, feared that arms to resist the French in Spain would, instead, be diverted to suppress colonial insurrection. The fear was justified.

Clearly an irresistible force had met an immovable object. The consequences of English insistence on direct access to the colonial markets and Spain's resistance to any accord with restive colonial interest groups would have lasting, far-reaching repercussions in the Iberian world.

In the immediate future, however, the contest was transferred to a new arena, the Cortes, at last hastily scheduled to meet in August—the Regencia's response to insurrection in America. By now the English had few illusions of achieving their objectives in the Spanish metropole. As decision on the method of selecting *diputados* from Spain and its colonies for the still uncertain opening of the Cortes was under discussion, canny Henry Wellesley at Cadiz wrote his brother at London on prospects for liberalizing Spain's transatlantic trading system; he doubted "any Spanish government could venture to make such a concession and that if it is an arrangement likely to be advantageous to the colonies it will probably be discussed in the Cortes." With keen grasp of interest groups—early evident in his recent years in India—he questioned whether such a measure would "be carried in the Cortes . . . as these are likely to be constituted," even doubting that "[the question] will now be brought forward."[32]

It would appear that, whereas liberalism in England was closely associated with the concept of free trade, in Spain liberalism emerged in symbiosis with interest groups determined to preserve the secular Spanish transatlantic system. This anomaly became apparent when news from insurrectionary Caracas arrived at Cadiz, and its impact immediately assessed.

Regencia, Cadiz, and Counterrevolution

At Cadiz, too, news of the Caracas insurgency required a clear-cut decision on colonial trade while indecision led to dissimulation. Anxiety in Spain about reaction in the colonies to the unstable peninsular situation had been spreading ever since the dissolution of the Junta Central early in 1810, and a similar uneasiness overseas among restive colonial elites was ominous. For that reason, perhaps, the Regencia failed signally to advise Caracas authorities of the elimination of the Central and its own formation and also postponed so informing Buenos Aires. Its manifestoes and decrees to the colonial world were signed "Yo El Rey" (countersigned by the regents) and written in the first person simulating dictation by Fernando VII himself. When Vicente Basadre, the former first secretary of the Consulado

de Veracruz, arrived at Cadiz on 3 July with his personal account of the Caracas insurrection, the Regencia characteristically downplayed the event. The cooperative Cadiz press immediately reported that London vowed unswerving support for the integrity of the Spanish monarchy, which, of course, included the empire. It followed that the full text of the "Liverpool" letter was not publicized until late August because—as Blanco White noted—a careful reading scarcely supported such optimism.

Basadre, much exposed to conflicting interests in the Veracruz Consulado, had been posted as intendant by the Junta Central to Venezuela but fled from La Guayra after the uprising at Caracas. At Cadiz he handed a *pliego* declaring the formation of the Caracas Junta along with edicts and proclamations of the new Ayuntamiento; under detailed debriefing he sketched the background of the uprising. True to form, the Regencia referred the Caracas crisis to the interior secretary (Gracia y Justicia) and the Consejo Reunido, requesting they propose appropriate measures as quickly as possible "in view of the gravity of the situation." Cadiz's mercantile groups, however, did not wait for the Regencia's advisory bodies to offer their position before further intervention.

On the day of Basadre's debriefing, the Junta de Cadiz—whose members "se metieron a políticos," encouraged by their successful quashing of the 17 May decree—sent a delegation to the Regencia to insist on ruthless repression of Caracas's *insurrectos*. It demanded—what London had anticipated—dispatch of "algunos buques de guerra, y como mil a dos mil hombres de tropa bajo el mando de un general activo y prudente" and the following day insisted that the Cortes be convoked the next month, August. The Regencia assured the Junta de Cadiz it had already taken appropriate measures and that the projected military expedition—and others—would be readied as soon as the Cadiz merchant community could provide funds and equipment.[33] In a response patterned on that of the English government confronting rebellious colonials in North America in 1775–1776, Spanish counterparts opted for quick suppression of dissidence. Perhaps they were encouraged by the apparent calm in New Spain after the removal of Iturrigaray and, decades earlier, by the stability after local troops crushed the great rebellion of native Americans in the central Andes under Tupac Amarú in the 1780s. From such experience they may have concluded that the proper response to colonial insubordination—in 1810 a movement toward political autonomy and effective *comercio libre*—was repression, which, in the case of Caracas, involved blockade of Venezuelan ports and a quick-response expeditionary force.

Measures were now accelerated to mobilize shipping, troops, and pro-

visions for an expeditionary force from Alicante and Murcia to suppress rebellious Caracas. Orders went out for lumber (ostensibly for the English but more probably for the Spanish navy), and in a move oddly symbolic of the Regencia's disdain for *criollo* elites, the warship *Conde de Regla* built in Havana shipyards and financed by the mining magnate of Guanajuato, Pedro Romero de Terreros, was dismantled presumably to provide materials for the rehabilitation of other shipping. Elements of the army of Murcia were ordered to the port of Alicante for transport to an unspecified destination, and special ovens (*hornos de reverbero*) were prepared at Mallorca for making twelve thousand to fourteen thousand quintals of sea biscuit. Along with these measures came key personnel changes in metropole and colonies. General Xavier Elío, just returned from Montevideo, was raised in rank and sent to Alicante to take command there, and Antonio Ignacio de Cortabarría of the Consejo de Castilla was appointed high commissioner in charge of the Caracas expeditionary force assisted by Juan Collado, ex-*alcalde del crímen* of the Audiencia de Mexico. Collado, it will be recalled, had headed the inquiry into the Valladolid conspiracy (1809) in New Spain, and now he became *regente* of the Audiencia de Caracas whose *oidores* had fled to Puerto Rico, the planned assembly point for the operation against insurgent Caracas. Venegas, currently *gobernador* of Cadiz and scheduled to replace the aging, *criollo*-prone viceroy of New Granada, was instead shifted to the critical viceroyalty of New Spain where the long vacant post of *corregidor de Mexico* would be filled by Ramón Gutiérrez del Mazo.

Cortes and Colonies: Real or Virtual Representation

The Regencia readied its stick for opportune use. The carrot, convocation of the Cortes—often promised and now urgently demanded by the Junta de Cadiz—was a more complex matter. Preparations for the Cortes, originally scheduled by the Junta Central to meet on 1 March, had not been completed when the Central was dissolved. Although orders for the election of *diputados* representing the *brazo popular* had gone out as scheduled on 1 January to towns and cities, and some seventeen peninsular *diputados* were already at Cadiz by early June, orders for the nobility and clergy had not. The Regencia had ordered on 14 February the election of *diputados* from the colonies but then appeared to abandon the whole project until late May and early June. The opposition of the Consejo Reunido de España e Indias, forcefully expressed in a *consulta* of 26 February, had been convincing and now must be effectively countered.

The two major issues sharply dividing the Junta Central and the Consejo

Reunido had to be resolved. Were nobility and clergy to be convoked separately and meet in separate chambers, as Jovellanos had finally persuaded the Central? Or were *diputados* to the Cortes to be chosen irrespective of social distinctions and deliberate in a single chamber? A second thorny issue involved the legitimacy, number, and method of selecting temporary substitute *diputados* for the colonies and the occupied provinces of the metropole. Consensus on these questions had evaded the Junta Central partly because liberals and the Cadiz commercial elites hoped to avoid domination by the *grandeza* and clergy in a bicameral *cortes*, partly because equality of colonies and metropole predicated in the decree of 22 January 1809 appeared incompatible with the traditional parliament of estates.

The Junta Central's final decree of 29 January drafted hastily by the Central's centrist intellectuals Jovellanos and Garay, sought but failed to resolve these fundamental issues: it satisfied neither conservatives nor liberals.[34] Although the Central ordered that "se expedirán inmediatamente convocatorias individuales a todos los Reverendos arzobispos, y a todos los grandes de España en propiedad" who were to deliberate in a separate "cámara de dignidades" (Article 15), it specifically excluded those not "cabezas de familia," those with criminal records, those who had collaborated with France at Bayonne or Madrid (Art. 5, para. 3). Aside from the fact that some grandees would be excluded on such grounds, no mention was made of the larger body of lesser nobility of relatively recent vintage.[35]

Unalterably opposed to a bicameral *cortes* were radical liberals interested in root-and-branch reform of the *monarquía*'s institutions and the centrist-oriented metropolitan commercial bourgeoisie dissatisfied with lack of direct participation in government. Radicals and centrists were, moreover, acutely aware of the need to attach colonial elites to the metropole by granting them at least a limited political voice. Aside from the problems of a bicameral parliament containing *españoles europeos y americanos*, Cadiz—priding itself on ignoring differences of social status in its affairs—preferred a unicameral *cortes* where the aristocracy would have no independent voice to oppose reforms to which Cadiz was deeply committed: oversight of uncontrolled royal household expenditures to aristocrats, and removal of legal obstacles to debt collection imposed by entails. On the other hand, Cadiz would resist trade liberalization and tariff reform. Partly for these reasons, the Consulado de Cadiz expressed satisfaction with the decree of 22 May 1809 calling for the revival of a *cortes*. More important, however, it recognized that in the crisis of the empire, a *cortes* might strengthen a weakening colonial compact between colonies and metropole. For more pragmatic and less idealistic reasons than those of the liberals who hoped the Cortes

might rectify deeply rooted malfunctions in both colonies and metropole, merchants in Cadiz's colonial trades saw in a *cortes* of limited colonial representation *the* instrument of lasting imperial unity and renewed peninsular hegemony.

On the other hand, Rodrigo Riquelme and Pedro de Rivero, early political power brokers between Junta Central and Cadiz, had become in the last months of the Junta Central prominent supporters of a unicameral parliament with minimal requirements for both electors and elected. The sharp, internal divisions may explain the Regencia's reluctance to publish the Junta Central's 29 January decree, a failing it later tried to justify on dubious grounds that it was unaware of its existence.[36] Conservatives later blamed liberals for the apparent disappearance of the decree, while liberals accused both the conservative Regencia and the Consejo Reunido of hiding it.[37]

Whatever the explanation, absence of the decree left the question of convoking the high estates and specifying their role in the Cortes up for debate at the moment when reports of colonial unrest made convocation urgent in early July 1810. In a series of maneuvers, liberals and the Junta de Cadiz pressured the Regencia and Consejo Reunido to ensure that the Cortes would have the form and composition both desired.[38] As usual the Regencia yielded to the force of circumstance—colonial flare-ups, guarded English support, its own lack of expertise, pressure from Cadiz's commercial bourgeoisie, and public opinion. As for the Consejo Reunido, divided between Consejeros of Castilla and of Indias, between conservative legalists and colonial pragmatists, it was ultimately dominated—yet not really persuaded—by its pragmatic members.

Contrary to Toreno's assertion, the Regencia had not ignored the high priority assigned to the *cortes* project by the outgoing Junta Central. As we have seen, on 14 February the Regencia issued a manifesto and decree drafted by Quintana, the manifesto reaffirming equality between American-born and peninsular Spaniards, the decree mandating the immediate election of *diputados* to the Cortes to meet as soon as the military situation permitted. Immediately after the 14 February decree—and probably earlier—Hormazas in his twin capacity as minister of Hacienda and of Gracia y Justicia contacted Manuel de Abella and Pedro Polo y Alcocer of the Commission on the Cortes to collect all the papers of the commission left by the Junta Central. Abella, however, had returned to London as embassy secretary taking along his meticulous records of the commission's meetings, despite the efforts of Polo y Alcocer, Hormazas, and Lardizábal to retrieve them. Despite insistent orders to return them, they did not materialize until early August, when convocation of the Cortes was reasonably certain.[39]

Early in March the Regencia reiterated its cautious concern with the *cortes* issue by asking the Consejo Reunido to opine on the number of *diputados* to be assigned to the colonies in America, and it turned to Polo y Alcocer for information on "ciertas gestiones que deban proceder a la apertura de las cortes," presumably concerning the form and composition of the *diputados*. Polo was asked to collect and organize all relevant materials according to the Regencia's order of 14 February. However, members of the Regencia still hoped to delay the formation of a representative body. In Lower Andalusia, refuge of the government of resistance, Spanish and American-born government employees understood that colonial interests would demand more than virtual representation in the forthcoming Cortes. No doubt some had read about England's bitter experience with the former North American colonies between 1765 and 1776 over representation. Nonetheless, on 6 March Tadeo Francisco de Calomarde, *oficial mayor* of Gracia y Justicia (Hormazas's ministry) and a protégé of conservative regent Miguel de Lardizábal, emphasized the traditional role of his ministry in issues related to calling a *cortes*; he requested and received custody of the records of the Comisión de Cortes. He then dismissed Polo y Alcocer and ordered that no one should be employed "en un encargo en el qual no debe estar empleado ni un solo hombre."[40] Hormazas at Gracia y Justicia was braking the momentum for a broadly representative parliament.

Consequently, over the subsequent three months there were few signs at Sevilla and Cadiz of movement on the *cortes* issue. By contrast, from London Abella reported widespread interest in the promised *cortes*—understandable given English parliamentary history—and requested specific instructions on what to say publicly, beyond that the Cortes would meet when the military situation improved and steps taken for the election of *diputados* from the colonies. Somewhat later he confessed authoring an article enlightening the London press on the "antigua costumbre de convocar las Cortes de Castilla . . . negocios graves con el objeto de hacer manifestar las verdaderas y sabias intenciones del Supremo Consejo de Regencia de juntar las Cortes."[41] But Abella delayed forwarding what Gracia y Justicica (or Calomarde) wanted, the records of the Cortes commission in his possession, fearing perhaps for their safekeeping in the hands of Calomarde, point man for putting a quietus on the critical project. And even when Blanco White at London, who had refused in the first place to participate in the Comisión de Cortes, published and then sent to Cadiz a copy of the Junta Central's "lost" final decree instructing the Regencia on holding the Cortes, nothing happened.

Blanco's decision to move to England, he had to explain in 1811, had

been provoked by backroom deals—"intriguas con que estaban queriendo impedir las cortes"—intrigues that "tal habían de dexar a la España que las cortes mismas apenas gozarían del poder que necesitan para labrarla" and that he kept to himself for sound political reasons, "por no escandalizar a las Americas, y por no destruir los medios de conciliación que presentaban respeto de la Metrópoli."[42] One may hypothesize Blanco was referring to trade policies debated within the Spanish government in Andalusia, and between Spain and England, in the spring of 1810. In his view, the recently aired *fracaso* of the 17 May decree cut short hope of adjustment of commercial policy favoring the colonies. However, apprehension regarding the predictable colonial reaction to the formation of a regency and its policies gave renewed urgency to calling a *cortes* so long compromised by the intrigues of confirmed conservatives. Although it is difficult to reconstruct the interplay of factors—information, expectation, strategy—now stirring the government at Cadiz, apparently by the end of May it was assumed that no news was bad news, and the Cortes had to be activated.

The *cortes* issue sprang suddenly to life again when the Regencia, fearing perhaps a negative colonial reaction to the recall of the 17 May decree, ordered in late May that "sin pérdida de tiempo se comunicase un decreto para que las provincias y ciudades del Reino nombrasen desde luego los referidos diputados, los cuales viniesen a la Isla de León, para donde se expidió la primera convocatoria de Cortes, a fin de estar prontos a dar principio a su celebración cuando pareciera conveniente." The colonial situation was becoming ominous: two weeks later on 19 June, Nicolás María Sierra, secretary to the minister of Gracia y Justicia, Hormazas, requested the immediate return of the records of the Comisión de Cortes in Abella's possession. Momentum was overwhelming to assemble the Cortes at the earliest possible hour.

On 14 June the Regency, to expedite election of metropolitan *diputados* announced in 1809, had to settle, first and foremost, the "delicate and highly debated" issue of assembling in one or two chambers, with or without representatives of aristocracy and church. Either through bona fide uncertainty or conforming to established procedure, the Regencia turned this issue over to the Consejo Reunido. However, before the Consejo presented its finding, pressure from *diputados* already in Cadiz and from the Junta de Cadiz resolved the issue. Both groups insisted in mid-June that the Cortes assemble according to the convocation announced in January: a single chamber.[43] That day, too, the Regencia decreed the immediate election of remaining *diputados*, as well as the opening of the Cortes as soon as a majority of *diputados* had assembled at the Isla de León.[44] The abrupt change

in pace demanded public explanation particularly regarding the nature of the colonial *diputación*. The Regencia followed on 26 June with a cedula signed "Yo, El Rey" that informed colonial authorities in New Spain that "las actuales críticas circunstancias y las delicadas ocurrencias que frecuentemente se suceden" had obliged the Regencia to accelerate the meeting of the Cortes. Selection of colonial representatives following instructions of 14 February should be completed immediately; on the other hand, should the colonial *diputados* debark at Cadiz late, local substitutes would serve in the interim. "Está muy persuadido SM," the cedula concluded, that henceforth American and European Spaniards, a single people bonded for over three centuries, would form "an insuperable barrier" against the nation's enemies.[45] Belatedly on 13 July the Consejo Reunido came out in support of a single-chambered *cortes*, without social distinctions, and accepting interim substitutes (*suplentes*).[46]

The issue of substitute *diputados* (*suplentes*) representing occupied Spain as well as the colonies was the last resolved. In fact, appointment of the colonial *suplentes* was postponed until the eve of the Cortes in mid-September. Resolution was perhaps as much the result of the pressure of time and the Junta de Cadiz as of planning. Although the principle of *suplencia* had been approved by the Junta Central months earlier, Regencia and Consejo Reunido doubted its legitimacy and, for that reason, feared future rejection of whatever benefits the Cortes might bring. Conservative Miguel de Lardizábal, who opposed both *cortes* and *suplentes*, after debate among members of the Regencia, had at last accepted both, but with misgivings that predictably soon gave way to outright condemnation of the whole liberal *cortes* project.[47]

Cadiz was among the first to back the *suplente* solution for interim colonial representation. At the end of 1809 and in the early months of 1810, Cadiz's *gobernador* Francisco Venegas—soon to depart for New Spain as viceroy—had ordered full registration of colonials resident in the port in order to form a pool for the selection of *suplentes*.[48] But beginning in March, as French troops occupied Andalusia, registration of *americanos* had lapsed. In August, when Pablo de Valiente, ex-intendant of Cuba and currently a member of the Consejo Reunido, took charge of organizing the election of *suplentes*, he recommended in conciliatory fashion that representatives from insurrectionary Caracas be included as a way to persuade that troublesome Junta of its errors. After more than twenty years in colonial service, Valiente understood the mentality and reality of colonial Spanish America and was convinced his proposed system would inspire gratitude and ultimately "nuestra fraternidad y nuestra unión."

Yet as late as the end of August no date for the Cortes had been set nor had the method of electing or selecting *suplentes* been resolved. Nonetheless, optimism spread at Cadiz fed by news of England's cautious stand vis-à-vis instability at Caracas (since April) and Buenos Aires (since May), and by reports in Blanco White's *El Español* of *diputados* arriving at London from the American colonies. Finally, on 8 September Valiente drafted for the Regencia instructions, quickly turned into a decree, for electing *suplentes*. Aimed "principalmente a salvar la unión general de las Indias con su Metrópoli, y la de ésta en sus provincias libres y ocupadas"—the primacy of the colonies is noteworthy—Valiente bypassed the thorny issues of legitimacy and representation to resolve the *suplente* crisis on the basis of necessity, pragmatism, and convenience.

The decree indicated that the colonial delegation would have thirty *diputados*, seven from New Spain, five from Peru, and three from Buenos Aires and Santa Fe respectively; Caracas, Cuba, Chile, and the Philippines, two each; one each for Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo. It was sufficient that *electores* were natives of the provinces they represented, while residence at Cadiz or the Isla de León was required for *diputados*. In view of the small number of *criollos* at Cadiz and Isla de León, *vocales* to choose seven *electores* who would then choose individual *diputados* were joined in two groups: one of natives of South America, the other uniting natives of Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean islands, and the Philippines. Obviously there would be good reason to question the legitimacy of *suplentes* from America as well as the size of the whole colonial *diputación*.

Pressure inside Cadiz to speed the opening of the Cortes could no longer be contained. A rush of activity followed: on two days, 8 and 9 September, a delegation demanded the Regencia inaugurate the Cortes within one week, on 15 September; given the proximity of French troops, the inaugural would occur at Cadiz rather than the Isla. On 15 September the Regencia also had the Consejo Reunido announce that the Cortes would begin on 24 September, without status distinctions and in one chamber.[49]

"La Verdadera Revolución Española"?

On 17 September amid the supercharged confusion of "juntas, reuniones, corrillos, conferencias con la regencia, demandas, aclaraciones," elections of the metropolitan *suplentes* began, followed on 19 and 20 September by those representing the colonies.[50] It had become evident that the insecure Regencia and weak Consejo Reunido, undermined by division and inflexibility, had lost control of the situation. The electoral results made this clear.

Not only were the *diputados* generally of a younger generation than the incumbent authority figures, but on the whole their political philosophy was far removed from that of the metropolitan elites who had initiated the resistance in 1808. One *diputado*, who later chronicled the complex course of that struggle, believed that the Cortes about to begin was the "verdadera revolución española."[51] The context of resistance—first metropolitan, then colonial—had changed radically between May 1808 and September 1810.

Young Toreno's optimism, mirroring that of the *diputados* committed to reforming the "rusty fortress" of the Spanish imperial state, was understandable and—like Miguel Artola's twentieth-century interpretation of the Junta Central in 1808 and 1809—valid in the long run. That Spain's old regime had indeed lost its capacity to function was plain to a majority—if not all—of the assembly at Cadiz in September 1810. To those like Toreno, who would chronicle events of that time in the mid-1830s when the bitterness of two decades of Restoration had been sweetened somewhat by the resurgence of a third parliamentary regime, it indeed seemed possible to say that Spain's liberal "revolution" had begun with the opening of the Cortes of 1810.

In that September, however, celebrating the demise of the centuries-old "gothic edifice" of the Spanish state and the economic, social, and political institutions at its base was premature. As the traditional *consejos* lost ground in the contentious elections of *suplentes*, they tried to restrain the new parliament. On 16 September, for instance, the Regencia decreed the restoration of the old regime's Consejo de Castilla and Consejo de Indias just as they had existed before 1808 and proposed the Regencia preside over the Cortes while Consejeros of Castilla and Indias would participate in its sessions. Both initiatives failed to capture public support and, instead, encountered the opposition of the Junta de Cadiz, which had its own rationale for opposing the intervention of the old Madrid authorities.[52]

The Promise of a Divided Cortes

Thus the struggle between the old order and the promise of the Cortes that set itself the project of creating a new regime, a monarchy under a liberal constitution curtailing privilege, began before the *diputados* gathered at last on 24 September. On that day conservatives would have liked to cut short the project—they later confessed as much—if only they had had the force to do so, and if many had not properly feared the disastrous consequences of a preemptive restoration.[53] In the near term they had to conduct a rearguard opposition to the Cortes's liberal initiatives until the

end of French occupation, the anticipated return of Fernando VII, and a restorationist regime.

The young liberal leaders now replacing those who had tried to guide the Junta Central's vacillating steps toward the Cortes were strikingly ingenuous and sanguine that the constitution they promised to create at Cadiz would be acceptable not only to the monarch-to-be-restored but to the nation as a whole once liberated from French occupation. But if the ideators of the Bayonne strategy had erred in their plan to invest a regency quickly with power to fill the vacuum created by the absence of the hereditary monarch, the liberals were also unable or unwilling to foresee the contradictory contingencies created by *their* solution. The disasters of war and the failures of successive *fernandista* governments, from 1808 to 1814, hardly prepared most Spaniards to embrace the paper achievements of the liberals; meanwhile, unreconstructed conservative elites waited in the wings gathering around throne and altar to restore the old regime.

Nor was a majority of the Spanish people—peasants, laborers, artisans, servants, soldiers, priests—ready to embrace a new order designed to remove those economic and social institutions of the old regime that had protected them in some measure. Spaniards who had opted to remain behind at Madrid to support the constitution crafted at Bayonne as well as Joseph Bonaparte (both a promise of change in a different fashion) were justifiably quick to question the viability of the constitution enacted by the Cortes at Cadiz in 1812. "Quien será bastante . . . poner en planta esta constitución? Donde lo ha de ser? Qué brazos la apoyarán y sostendrán? Quien la obedecerá," queried the anonymous liberal who authored a pamphlet circulated in Cadiz.[54]

The driving force behind the Cortes at Cadiz in 1810, one must conclude, responded more to the imperative to preserve the unity of the empire (or suppress colonial insurrection) than to replace the old regime in the metropole, although clearly both phenomena were inseparable. In Spain disunity and successive military defeat had reduced *fernandista* options: surrender to the government under José I at Madrid, seek refuge in a colony, or convoke a *cortes* in the semi-insular precinct of Cadiz. Only the Cortes promised to reinvigorate resistance in the metropole and confront the threat of colonial independence.

In choosing this last option, the old mercantile elites of Cadiz proposed to apply economic and political power to preserve their economic operations. Limited participation in the Cortes, it was calculated, might restore secular collaboration between *criollos* and *peninsulares*, between *europeos americanos* and *europeos peninsulares*, bonding colonial elites to the metro-

pole at least for the immediate future. Limited concessions responding to the most egregious injustices endured by native Americans also promised to remove a possible source of widespread popular disaffection.

"Spaniards from America" (*españoles americanos*) gathered at Cadiz to elect substitute representatives to the Cortes were not, however, as amenable as Cadiz crisis managers hoped. Before the election of *suplentes* began, they made clear that the number of *diputados* assigned to the colonies in America could not, and would not, be accepted as permanent. Citing the manifesto's declaration of the equality of America with European Spain, they demanded that the same criteria—proportional representation and requirements for participation in the electoral process—had to apply to America.

Nor were all Spanish America nor all Spanish Americans willing to await, much less trust, a metropolitan solution of colonial grievances and aspirations. In mid-September 1810, two years after New Spain was shocked (and some outraged) by the preemptive coup against its viceroy, and only weeks before the opening of the Cortes at Cadiz, a provincial cleric inspired an insurgent mass of mine workers, peasants, day laborers, mestizos, and native Americans to attack the mining center at Guanajuato, then the colonial regime, and march on Mexico City, the most populous and wealthiest capital in the Western Hemisphere. Only months later, Miguel Hidalgo and his ragtag followers were defeated by regular army and militia units under the command of Francisco Venegas, ex-*gobernador* of Cadiz and newly installed viceroy of the colony of New Spain, while most members of the *criollo* elite preferred continued Spanish hegemony and the existing social order to civil war. The movement for autonomy and then independence would burn like a prairie fire for more than a decade and a half, suppressed in one area of the colony only to break out in another. In the struggle in New Spain and Spain, many pillars of the old order weakened and many crumbled, but not all.

21. An Eroding Colonial System: New Spain, 1808–1810

En todo el Reino hay un fuego sordo que ellos mismos [los españoles]encienden, sin prever los bárbaros que la explosión debe caer contra ellos y sus temeridades.

Fray Vicente Santamaría, letter, ca. 15 December 1809

[L]a clase miserable y . . . la clase media . . . estas dos clases las últimas en la consideración del gobierno y las primeras en importancia social, se lanzaron solas en la carrera de la revolución, en la que dejaron profundas huellas de su carácter. Mariano Otero, *Ensayo* (1842)

La obra de nuestra libertad lo es de la medianía, en cuya clase solamaente encuentra valor y sentimiento para insular a la muerte misma y salvar la patria.

Carlos María de Bustamante, Oaxaca, May

La revolución de las colonias españoles no tuvo su origen en una mera cuestión de derecho abstracto, sino en padecimientos reales y en una opresión ominosa . . . causas que hubieren indudablemente producido la revolución sin la crisis violenta a que estaba expuesta la madre patria, y que no hizo más que acelerar aquel suceso.

Lorenzo de Zavala, *Manifiesto de los principios políticos del . . . sr. Poinssett* (1828)

Explaining why colonial systems collapse is as complicated as explaining why colonialism may endure for centuries. The complexity reflects the beguiling strength of colonial structures until the final moments of their existence. It is left to later analysis to reveal how consensus and the monopoly of force which maintained it were already profoundly weakened, undermined by events in metropole and colony.

Long before the events of 1808 at Mexico City there had surfaced outcrops of dissidence with Spanish colonialism in which New Spain had so prominent a supporting role, but they were isolated incidents by isolated social groups. For example, the urban riots in the mining center of Guanajuato in the course of the Jesuits' expulsion in 1767, an urban movement

repressed with cold fury by Visitador General José de Gálvez, or native American protest movements later in the century also suppressed by colonial troops.[1] The capacity to snuff out such dissidence no doubt inspired one viceroy to publicize his opinion nailed to the main entry of the Jesuit school of Valladolid in 1767: "Pués de una vez para lo venidero deben saber los súbditos del gran monarca que ocupa el trono de España, que nacieron para callar y obedecer y no para discurrir en los ditos asuntos del gobierno."[2] Four decades of apparent colonial (and, to colonial authorities, reassuring) passivity followed.[3] This changed radically after the summer of 1808, which ended in Mexico City with the preemptive coup engineered by the European commercial community legitimated by the Audiencia. The shock of that coup d'état reverberated for months, moderated only by the Junta Central's hesitant handling of deposed Viceroy Iturrigaray on his arrival at Cadiz and by the promise of reform the Central held out to restive colonials over the following seventeen months.

While most of New Spain's *criollo* elites trusted in a rapprochement between major factions increasingly defined as *europeo*, or *nativo* and *americano*, more profound reverberations of the conservative preemptive coup of September did not subside. The phenomenon was a measure of how much the colony of New Spain had changed since the era of Gálvez and Viceroy Croix. For Iturrigaray's overthrow had an unexpected catalytic effect, clarifying a dominant characteristic of colonialism, subordination of all classes and status groups born in the colonial world whether *criollo* elites, *clase media*, *castas*, or *indios*, to the immigrants from Spain, the *europeos*, *peninsulares*, or *gachupines*. The September 1808 coup smoothly executed by *europeos* in commerce and civil service—"las Golillas de México . . . y toda la comparsa del Parián"—fused hitherto isolated anti-European currents in the colony. For removing a viceroy who seemed overly empathetic to *criollo* grievances, *europeos* (many married to *criollo* women) were now branded responsible as a group for the colony's shocking immiseration and poverty amid plenty, and they were pilloried in handbills and family discussions as prosperous, smug, self-serving entrepreneurial exploiters of *americanos*. Europeans were now held responsible for colony-wide "descontento y . . . desesperación general."[4]

Other aftershocks of the September coup were visible. Operating within the institutional framework of the Mexico City Ayuntamiento, the colony's most prestigious and largely *criollo* political entity, New Spain's *criollo* elites in the two months from mid-July to mid-September 1808 had attempted to nudge the colony toward adjustments by utilizing legislation that they viewed as basically just but flawed and correctable. The preemptive coup

and ensuing repression of thought and speech, of dissidence and dissidents, without visible backlash from *criollo* leaders (the often outspoken mining magnate Rayas was an isolated phenomenon), left leadership to another native group, which developed different objectives.

Over the next two years, September to September 1808–1810, leadership quietly shifted from *criollo* elites of the capital to the elite and *clase media* of provincial centers like Valladolid and Querétaro in the Bajío. Disillusioned, embittered, and finally outraged by unfulfilled promises dangled by successive metropolitan governments at Sevilla and later Cadiz, first by the ambivalent Junta Central and then the reactionary Regencia, New Spain's provincial elites and *clase media* reassessed the colonial system and found it fundamentally both unjust and unreformable, and they prepared to jettison the system. The colony's self-styled *clase media*—medium and small landowners (*labradores*), mine and estate managers, lawyers, clerics, and artisans along with small-scale merchants (*pulperos*)—shifted their goals from autonomy or self-management within Spain's colonial system to outright rejection of the system via independence, shifting from the "organismos constituidos" within the colonial order to the radical sovereignty of the "pueblo originario."[5] Now we know that because the preemptive coup of 1808 cut short a moment of freedom to organize a representative "congreso nacional" prior to initiating armed rebellion (as had evolved in Britain's North American colonies, 1775–1776), New Spain's insurrection began and then long labored in anarchy.

The transition in leaders and objectives occurred during a critical conjuncture beginning with the September coup in New Spain and the reoccupation of Madrid that fall. It continued over the seventeen-month life of the ever-vacillating Junta Central, a period when the metropolitan government could have implemented promises to revamp the colonial system to accommodate colonial interests and the requirements of a new international order in the Atlantic. Promises directed to the colonies in January 1809 and later in February 1810 by the Junta Central's progressive publicist, Quintana, remained unfulfilled. In New Spain the policy of accommodating *criollo* grievances and sensibilities pursued by Viceroy Archbishop Lizana—whom the Junta Central chose to replace the paper viceroy, General Garibay, installed jointly by Mexico City's *oidores* and *almaceneros*—promised to stabilize the situation in the Spanish Empire's wealthiest overseas colony.

It proved a fragile stability, fractured by a second conjunctural crisis in less than two years. The French rethrust into Lower Andalusia in late 1809, the collapse of the Junta Central by conservative interests there at the end of the following January, and then the increasingly hard-line policies of the

Regencia, destroyed Lizana's fragile handiwork. The Regencia proceeded to replace Lizana with the Audiencia pending selection of a new viceroy; dispatched poorly disguised agents to ascertain the mentality of the colony's political class; welcomed the hardly impartial advice of an ex-*oidor*, González Carbajal, a collaborator in 1808 of *golpistas* Aguirre and Bataller; reopened the dormant case of ex–viceroy general Iturrigaray and then accepted the humiliation of disavowing publicly its 17 May order on transatlantic trade—this last, its long postponed decision to satisfy a major colonial complaint. Failure to maximize the two years of grace after September 1808 must be blamed upon peninsular merchants and civil servants at Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City, then the most influential pressure groups in the Spanish colonial order. Their resistance left to the Regencia and then to the belatedly held Cortes in September 1810 the bitter legacy of two years of lost opportunity, the bloody burden of pacifying rebellion in New Spain and other colonies in America.[6]

The Security Apparatus

Unsettling symptoms of the changing political climate of New Spain after September 1808 were uncensored handbills or pasquinades and the private correspondence and privately voiced critiques of news and policies in western Europe, Spain, and New Spain. Disturbing to colonial authorities were the divisions between colonialists and colonials, between *peninsulares* and *criollos*, along with the realization that disaffection was widespread within the colony's capital. Through the postal service whose hub was Mexico City, gossip, rumor, and general dissatisfaction were spreading to provincial centers and then seeping into the countryside fed by news reports in the official *Gazeta de México*; its editor López Cancelada—savvy ultraconservative Galician publicist of more than fifteen years' residence in the colony and devotee of *oidores* of the Audiencia and *almaceneros* in the Consulado—collaborated closely with the newspaper's official censor, *oidor* Aguirre, to manage the *Gazeta*'s reporting. Perceptive *criollos* and other natives, whose correspondence and social contacts provided alternate news sources, chafed at the *Gazeta*'s censored and slanted news; politicized *criollos* understood, for example, that invariably Spain's military reverses were minimized.[7] "La Gazeta de esta Ciudad," complained the marqués de Rayas from Guanajuato in a letter signed with a pseudonym, "cada día me enfada más, por su mala elección de noticias y poca crítica de ellas. Sería tolerable en otra clase de Ympresos, pero no en los que destinados a informar al Público de los Sucesos de que para su provecho debe ser informado, o se le viertan con

falcedad, o se le dan alterados para que nunca pueda formar una crítica de su cituación política."[8] In 1808 New Spain had a tiny but well-informed public opinion that colonial authorities could neglect at their peril.

The authorities employed security measures, long in place and applied vigorously in the heightened climate of insecurity following the September coup d'état, in order to repress an underground "espíritu de independencia."[9] The flow of letters at the Mexico City post office was easily surveilled; incoming letters were numbered and listed by addressee who claimed them.[10] Correspondents critical of metropolitan and colonial affairs avoided putting disaffection in their letters. "*Cuando veo los motivos que han dado causa a la prisión de algunos pobres*," commented one correspondent to his brother in February 1809, "*me parece que la correspondencia epístolar más inocente se calificaría por criminoso*, o a lo menos para un idioso apresivimiento, sólo porque se discurre sobre los asuntos del día."[11] It was a cat-and-mouse game between correspondents and government investigators who had to discount written protestations of loyalty to "Corona y Estado" as pure "efecto de estudio, de artificio y de temor."[12] Government security officers employed other surveillance techniques, such as enlisting the collaboration of reliable European merchants and petty tradesmen in provincial capitals and small towns, including lawyers and clergymen, to denounce suspected subversives, or planting informers "mañosamente . . . en . . . tertulias . . . mesas, y en medio de . . . inocentes placeres." As one informer confessed, "Yo estaba destinado por el gobierno para entrar en las conversaciones . . . y fingirme de su partido."[13]

Colonial authorities complemented covert thought-control with explicit measures of intimidation—demonstration of state-sanctioned terrorism. In the immediate post-coup weeks of September 1808, street patrols were maintained by European-born clerks (*cajeros*) enrolled in military units formed by Iturrigaray and instrumental in his removal, the Voluntarios de Fernando VII derisively labeled by the capital's residents as *chaquetas*. Their arrogance and tactics widened the rift between *europeos* and *americanos*.[14] For months after the coup, correspondents in the capital noted the colonial government's security apparatus and marveled that "jamás se ha visto esta capital con tanta tropa ni tan bien custodeada." The display of the colonial state's power was both unprecedented and omnipresent: "Las Patruyas dobles de Caballería y Ynfantería no dexan un momento los barrios, sin descuidarse del centro de la Ciudad," a Mexico City resident wrote his brother, a provincial parish priest. "Las muchísimas espías secretas . . . nos ponen a cubierto de una insurrección," convincing him to abandon the capital.[15] Particularly worrisome to colonial authorities, since they revealed the ineffi-

cacy of repression, were handbills or pasquinades,[16] some pillorying the *españoles* or *gachupines*, others cleverly urging joint action by the colonial government, the capital's Ayuntamiento, and by clergy and others to convoke in Mexico City a national junta in the name of Fernando VII in order to reject the authority of a French-dominated government in Spain. "Corren sin cesar Pasquines y papeles que se circulan por todo el reyno," Gabriel de Yermo complained to the Junta Central in November 1808, "conspirando a la independencia y al odio contra los Europeos. Este ha sido el efecto que estamos viendo."[17] In the early weeks of 1809, after news arrived of Madrid's reoccupation by combined French and Polish troops and rumors that Fernando had married a niece of Napoleon, New Spain's mail was filled with correspondence and pamphlets suggesting ways to respond to the imminent collapse of resistance forces in the peninsula and of the fragile Junta Central itself.[18] In an oddly contradictory fashion, the metropolitan policy of collaboration with the French countered by fear that France might occupy the whole peninsula, allowed early revolutionaries in New Spain to justify their movement as a defense against French invaders.

The Radicalization of "Paiserón"

One anonymous handbill, a *proclama*, forwarded by Puebla's astute Intendant Flon was read by Viceroy Field Marshal Garibay on 15 February. Predictably it was not the elaborate state security apparatus that had found the proclamation but an unexpected (and nervous) informant. A *criollo* lawyer of Puebla, Licenciado Tomás Mariano Bustamante, receiving a letter from Mexico City signed "Paiserón" enclosing five copies of the unsigned *proclama* (to be sent to *oidores* of the Audiencia and persons outside the capital) had immediately turned over the materials to the intendant's (Flon's) office. "Paiserón" advised Bustamante that friends had recommended contacting him as a person of "bien conocidas . . . luces y eficacia," an "Americano ilustrado" interested in furthering "la libertad de su Patria." "Paiserón" swore he would never reveal Bustamante's collaboration.[19] Just a few months earlier, Flon had warned Garibay that he had answered "Paiserón," informing him he had followed instructions to forward the letters—but no *proclamas*—to designated *oidores* of the Audiencia (Aguirre, Bataller, Foncerrada, Árias Villafañe, and Collado), and he recommended that Garibay have "Paiserón" arrested when he claimed his correspondence at Mexico City's post office.

The suggestion brought quick results. Garibay advised Flon to keep writing to Paiserón and to monitor "las acciones y movimientos de los sugetos que le parezcan sospechosos," and he ordered the administrator of mails,

Andrés de Mendívil, to arrest "Paiserón."[20] He was seized on 18 February near an entry of the viceregal palace while reading his mail, which included a letter from the wealthy mine owner, the marqués de Rayas, that he tried to swallow when the arresters approached.[21] Pamphlet, author, his network of correspondents and friends, and the disposition of the criminal case against him reveal how events of July to September ending in the coup d'état ousting Iturrigaray had radicalized the native-born *clase media* of the colony.

"Paiserón" turned out to be Licenciado Juan de Castillejos, native of Tehuantepec, alumnus of Mexico City's Colegio de San Juan de Letrán, licensed to practice law before the Audiencia. A sister was in a convent of the capital; brother Mariano was a respected *promotor* in the southern intendancy of Oaxaca.[22] His acquaintances included the mining magnate and proxy of ex-viceroy Iturrigaray, Rayas, with whom Castillejos maintained frequent contact along with members of the *criollo* landed nobility—the condes de Santiago and Jala.[23] Presumably Castillejos's legal expertise made him useful to New Spain's *criollo* elites.

Castillejos was known to the political literati of the capital since he had drafted two *discursos* intended for publication in the capital's other periodical recently established (1805), the *Diario de México*, edited by the well-connected *criollo* Jacobo de Villaurrutia, *alcalde* on the Audiencia who had supported Iturrigaray's plan for a national congress.[24] His first *discurso* appeared on 7 August 1808; the second was slated for publication in the 12 August issue but never got beyond galley proof because censors prohibited publication.[25] Castillejos's *discoursos*, drafted after the *Gazeta de México* published without comment the official version of the stunning news of the Bourbons' abdication to the emperor of the French at Bayonne, voiced a patriotic appeal for loyalty to the Bourbons and Fernando VII in captivity and an end to "pueril rivalidad . . . entre europeos y americanos."[26] Europeans and Americans united, urged the discourse, should offer "la ciega obediencia a las autoridades constituidas," rejecting "insidiosos discursos de algunos espíritus emprendedores y turbulentos" along with "todo espíritu de innovación y de reforma."[27] The discourse closed by citing approvingly France's "gran político Carnot" who claimed he had always rejected "novedad." This and other evidence indicated that Castillejos read the *Moniteur* and other French periodicals.[28]

While Castillejos emphasized unquestioning loyalty to the Bourbons, he knew that some in New Spain believed that Fernando along with close officials had elected to enter France to meet Bonaparte at Bayonne despite efforts to retain them at Victoria.[29] Castillejos later testified that some in the colony had concluded that "por su misma voluntad se había atrahido

esta desgracia . . . Señor Don Fernando Séptimo, y la había atrahido sobre la demás familia real."[30] No censor could object to appeals for unity and loyalty, for by August 1808 these had become ritualized expressions of conformity to the colonial regime and a litmus of patriotism. *Oidor* Guillermo de Aguirre, for example, had read and approved the contents of Castillejos's discourses.[31] On the other hand, it was already risky to support a notion of *independencia*, a barrier Castillejos crossed in his first discourse where he advanced a carefully defined concept of independence: rejection of domination except that of "nuestros legítimos reyes."[32] The *Diario*'s readers could infer that the basis of such independence was loyalty and the alliance of colonials and colonialists. Censors apparently reviewed Castillejos's second discourse more critically; although this omitted mention of independence—the concept that colonial authorities later found incriminating when scrutinizing Talamantes's private papers—it was not published.[33]

Six months later, five months after the September coup and tightened thought-control by the administration of Viceroy Garibay, Castillejos had become radicalized, and he understood his views could circulate only underground. This was the significance of the anonymous *proclama* examined by Garibay on 15 February. It responded to the *Gazeta*'s unsettling news of the crumbling of Spanish troops protecting Madrid from French and allied troops now under Bonaparte's direct command. "La España toda por fatal desgracia va a gemir baxo su yugo," predicted Castillejos's proclamation. Again, there was an appeal for loyalty, unity, and "índependencia de Nueva España para conservarla a . . . Fernando Séptimo."[34] What made Licenciado Bustamante at Puebla nervous and galvanized Intendant Flon and Viceroy Garibay to arrest the *proclama*'s author along with members of his network, gather incriminating evidence, and draw up on indictment was the second half of the *proclama*. More than the vague appeal to loyalty and unity in Castillejos's August discourses, independence now required the colonial authorities—viceroy, Audiencia, Ayuntamiento—to convoke a junta representing the "nación." Here was the very proposal that had sparked Iturrigaray's downfall. Its principle was not support of the old regime's constituted authorities but the acceptance of the concept derived from the "infinitos impresos que nos bienen de la Península . . . una verdad confesada y reconocida"—namely, that "en las actuales circunstancias reside la soberanía en los Pueblos."[35] National junta, sovereignty of the people, liberty for America, an appeal to the "Habitantes de América" with no explicit reference to Europeans or Spaniards—these threatened the colonial regime in New Spain.

Flon had no trouble communicating his sense of urgency on digesting

the anonymous *proclama* addressed by "Paiserón" to Puebla, to Mexico City's authorities, and to Garibay and his advisers on the Audiencia, *peninsulares* Aguirre and Bataller. On 16 February Mendívil received orders at the post office to apprehend "Paiserón," and Castillejos was jailed on 17 February when he collected a numbered letter addressed to "Justo Patricio Payserón."[36] His residence was carefully searched on 18 February, and his interrogation begun the following day.

At the outset were strong presumptions of his guilt: his attempt to swallow a letter just received from the marqués de Rayas, five pseudonyms ("letter-drops"?) that he confessed using, and the confirmation by handwriting "expert" Marcos Antonio Berazaluze that Castillejos had indeed written both the letter to Bustamante and the enclosed handwritten *proclama* copies.[37] And if López Cancelada can be trusted, there was an additional fact: he wrote the Junta Central on 19 February, that "al llevarlo a la Cárcel, suplicó a un sacerdote que le avisase a Villaurrutia (Diarista), por consequencia a Bustamante, Don José María Fagoaga y demás complota . . . Este tiene mucho dinero y . . . Tambien el Marqués de Rayas es dueño de minas."[38] For viceroy, Audiencia, and Consulado troubled for months by handbills attacking "gachupines," by "más de cien alarmas que emos tenido desde la prisión de Iturrigaray," and by "los Europeos pasando malas noches," trapping Castillejos (alias Paiserón) was a Godsend. He was an "Americano," a member of the capital's lawyers' guild who frequented the viceregal palace daily to chat with official personnel; was critical of recent colonial policy; and maintained enough contact with *criollo* noblemen to justify colonial authorities in menacing them with guilt by association without the dangerous consequences of their imprisonment. Castillejos, in brief, was now a prime suspect for a classic political object lesson or *escarmiento*. Intentionally, his arrest was given wide publicity.

After days interrogating Castillejos and his contacts at many levels, a picture emerged of the effort of a radicalized, prerevolutionary intellectual to galvanize his colonialized countrymen. Here was the recruiting ground of those clergymen and lawyers, the professionals of the *clase media* who later provided leadership for anticolonial revolution in the colony of New Spain. Castillejos, like his contemporaries Antonio Calleja and Padre Zugástegui, should be rescued from the obscurity of premature patriotic sacrifice.

Castillejo moved easily in the capital's legal and bureaucratic world. Mornings he passed by the dressmaker's shop owned by a childhood friend on his way to the post office, then on to a watchmaker's shop on the fashionable Calle de los Plateros, and finally into the labyrinth of offices in the nearby viceregal palace. Afternoons he lunched, napped, then wrote until

early evening prayers. Sometimes he socialized with Jacobo de Villaurrutia, an *alcalde* of the Audiencia, or would enter the townhouse of the marqués de Rayas; after September 1808 he joined Rayas and others of the *criollo* elite—the cleric José Beye Cisneros, the lawyer Ignacio Pérez Gallardo—to review legal tactics in order to defend ex-Viceroy Iturrigaray.[39] Among his closest friends (and perhaps confidants) were Rayas and a former schoolmate at the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán, Manuel Mallol, parish priest of Tixtla. Mallol was also a *compadre* of Castillejos, had baptized two of his children, and dined frequently with him; when Mallol resided at Puebla, they corresponded weekly. Mallol had read Castillejos's two *discursos* before publication but under questioning could not remember why the second did not appear.[40]

Other acquaintances were the conde de Jala, Licenciado Juan Bautista Raz y Raz Guzmán, Licenciado Benito Guerra, and a cleric, Dr. José Nicolás Larragoiti of the Sagrario of Mexico City's cathedral. Another good friend was Presbyter José Hermenegildo Ruíz Palmero, vice-rector of the Colegio de San Juan de Letrán; since Ruíz Palmero happened to pass Castillejos on his way to jail, Castillejos asked him to tell his wife that he would not be home for lunch since he was under arrest.[41] This pattern of associates reveals two *criollo* figures among mine owners and *hacendados*, four lawyers, and four clergymen who knew each other since school days—all *criollos*. Other contacts were the conde de Santiago and the Mexico City lawyer Luis Lozano. Lawyers and clerics often exchanged visits, were politicized, chatted about legal matters, and "hablaron muchas veses refiriendo noticias de Gazeta . . . que han corrido, aplaudiendo . . . las favorables . . . lamentando la desgracia de la Peninsula."[42]

No doubt in conversation and correspondence they exchanged news and gossip that neither official journals, *Gazeta* nor *Diario*, could or would publish—items from private correspondence from Europe, gleanings from English and French newspapers, or the pasquinades.[43] Castillejos, for example, mailed to Rayas at Guanajuato résumés of the *proclama* he had mailed to Tomás Mariano Bustamante, his *paizano* at Puebla.[44] On 13 February Rayas replied that he had received Castillejos's summary of an *anónimo* and that at Querétaro he had seen another *anónimo* forwarded to its Ayuntamiento along with the viceroy's order to arrest its author. Rayas, naïve, foolhardy, or just self-confident, judged the anonymous author's zeal and *loyalty* praiseworthy, adding "si todos fueren como él que me detalle Usted, aparecida en ese [Mexico City] el día cinco, en las Esquinas, serian laudables."[45]

For his part, Rayas must have known the anonymous author who posted *proclamas* to Querétaro and at least four other provincial capitals between 3

and 17 February—to Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Puebla, and Oaxaca.[46] Other copies Castillejos mailed directly to people like Bustamante at Puebla, or he distributed in a studiedly casual fashion in Mexico City. As a lawyer accredited to the Audiencia de México, Castillejos frequented offices in the viceregal palace and also drafted lengthy briefs for a secretary, Fernando Tamayo. On the morning of 10 or 11 February 1809, Castillejos entered the office of an employee of the Tribunal de Minería, Pedro Martínez de Lizárraga; customarily they "mutuamente se preguntaban de las noticias nuevas y se daban razón de los que cada uno sabía."[47] This was obviously an informal news network. After asking if Lizárraga had seen a *papellón* circulating, Castillejos produced his *proclama*. Glancing it over, Lizárraga found its main ideas acceptable "porque aunque trata de independencia," as he reported to this interrogators, "la entendió respecto de otra nación extrangera que quiciera invadirnos"—presumably France. Quickly Lizárraga made a copy, which he showed to his *oficial mayor*, José Nicolás de Irigoyen, and then to a lawyer friend, Luís Lozano, who also made a copy and enclosed it in a letter to his cleric brother, Mariano, parish priest at Mezquitía near the provincial capital of San Luís Potosí.[48] Mariano pestered Luis for news of "las ocurrencias de esta capital." Then Mariano Lozano met a fellow clergyman in a barbershop, Presbyter José María Pérez Calderón, and passed along the report that a viceregal proclamation warned the public to prepare to defend the colony if the metropole collapsed. Pérez Calderón repeated this to a high official in San Luís Potosí, who, learning by mail of the arrest of "espíritus revoltosos" posing a threat to public order (probably the investigation of Castillejos and Padre Zugástegui), called upon Mariano Lozano to ask for his brother's letter sent from Mexico City. Lozano complied, and the official then reported the incident to the viceroy as directed by the statutes of the security tribunal set up by Viceroy Garibay.[49]

Two months after his arrest, on 29 April the evidence against Castillejos assembled by the Audiencia's *alcalde del crímen*, Juan Collado, was turned over for evaluation (*pedimento*) to the Audiencia's three *fiscales*—Sagarzurieta, Borbón, and Robledo—who had resided in the colony long enough to recall how much the political climate had changed since news of the Bourbons' abdication and its aftershock, the ouster of Viceroy Iturrigaray, and his replacement by Field Marshal Garibay. Even some *españoles peninsulares* in the colony were known to consider Fernando VII "el primer traidor a la Nación . . . un testaferro de que se usan para llevar adelante sus ideas de dominación."[50] The flood of visible pasquinades barely masked those invisible persons who scribbled, copied, distributed, commented on, or—worse—shared their often violent expression of dislike of European

Spaniards, whose dominance in the colonial state was so palpable. The calm and passivity of Mexico City's residents that López Cancelada had reported so reassuringly to Sevillan authorities on the morrow of Iturrigaray's overthrow with the backing of the capital's Spanish merchant community had been illusory, more so in the early weeks of 1809 when colonial security forces tracked down critics like the irrepressible Franciscan Fray Miguel Zugástegui or the respectable Licenciado Juan de Castillejos, or gathered testimony about the subversive conversation of the influential *criollo* mine owner Rayas.[51] Zugástegui was probably turned in by an undercover agent, Michel y Laredo, who frequented the capital's cafés and bars to eavesdrop.

The *fiscales*, all veteran jurists, now had to weigh evidence involving possible capital punishment for a new breed of accused, political rather than common criminal offenders. In the novel situation of metropole and colony, punishment might have to fit the new political climate rather than the presumed crime of sedition or rebellion charged against the native-born of a vital colonial possession. The metropolitan government of resistance—still tilting for undisputed authority with Sevilla's Junta—was unstable, its authority contested. "Alli era menester consolidar el poder vacilante de España," as Blanco White later put it accurately.[52] Above all else, the Junta Central was anxious to preserve the colonial system by promising to shape an old system to new demands from the colonies. Fearful of the fissures dividing colonials and colonialists in the wealthy colony of New Spain, the Junta Central vacillated in handling the indictment of Viceroy Iturrigaray, hastily patched together by the Audiencia after hurriedly deporting him to stand trial at Cadiz on charge of treason. His path-breaking dossier was fittingly assigned to the eminent jurist and intellectual Jovellanos, who typically delayed his *sumaria* until August 1809.[53] One suspects the Central knew it had to mollify somehow Iturrigaray's influential supporters in New Spain.

The *fiscales* reviewing seven large folders of evidence against Castillejos—*proclamas*, correspondence, oral testimony—were wary of the attitude of one of his acquaintances with whom he shared "interés e amistad," mining magnate Rayas. One must recall that Iturrigaray had given Rayas power of attorney before his deportation; the decision epitomized his recognition of the influence of the colony's *criollo* mining group, its family and business networks, the counterpart of Havana's planter-exporters.

Rayas's attitude appeared in the evidence by indirection, at first in an anonymous letter received by *oidor* Aguirre on 13 February, then later in the direct testimony of a Spanish military officer. Rayas was uncomplimentary to the Audiencia, to *its* viceroy Garibay, and to his decisions dictated by

the *oidores*; the *fiscales* could only infer that Rayas mirrored the opinion of a spectrum of the colony's politically engaged groups. The letter to Aguirre from "un incógnito" accused the anti-*europeo* Rayas of planning to assassinate Aguirre for installing Garibay as viceroy—"un viejo chocho, caduco y que en todo subscreve al parecer" of Aguirre; the Spanish faction supporting Garibay's administration was all "voluptuosos, pícaros y déspotas"—the "inmundicia de España."[54]

On 17 February authorities had seized Castillejos, and on 20 February a Spanish army officer, José María Falces, testified that on his frequent visits to Rayas's townhouse in Mexico City he customarily found an animated group of clerics, Colonel Ignacio Obregón, and a "Licenciado Castillejos." The tone of their discourse, Falces found, was far different from that of late 1807; now there were expressions of "odio y desprecio contra nuestra gobierno," against the "Canalla de hombres" who had ousted Iturrigaray, against *oidor* Aguirre ("Autor de tanta maldad y de las desgracias que experimentaban esta América y la España") who had installed Garibay ("hombre inepto, viejo, tonto, que entodo subscreve a su parecer, un testaferro para mandar maldades") and was responsible for "las providencias para la prisión de tanto inocente, bajo el pretexto de traidores."[55]

Inevitably the political climate in the capital of the colony, rather than the evidence, had to shape the way the *fiscales* wrapped up their investigation of the marqués de Rayas, Fray Zugástegui, and Castillejos in mid-February 1809. Rayas was too prominent for jail and interrogation; *oidores* could not rely on the Junta Central's support in prosecuting him; the marqués was a member of a privileged category of *criollos* whose rights could entangle prosecutors in legal complexities; and fellow *criollos*, including those who did not share his politics, might close ranks in solidarity. Most important, news of Rayas's case could electrify the politically sensitive throughout the colony. Falces's charges against Rayas were perfunctorily pursued, Rayas was not interrogated, and the case against him and the others mentioned was shelved on 5 April on the ground, among others, that some of those involved were outside the capital. Just a week earlier the three *fiscales* had terminated Zugástegui's inquiry, charging him with conspiring for independence, an offense punishable with death. Furthermore, it was impolitic, judicial relevance aside, in the volatile ambient of New Spain in late March 1809 for the colonial state to prosecute "personas Eclesiásticas," thereby stirring up "un escándalo y unos males de las mayores y más graves trascendencias." The *fiscales* chose a "medio prudente, pronto, eficaz y suave," packing Zugástegui off to the Junta Central for judgment. On 28 April he arrived under armed escort at San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz's harbor; five days

later, like Padre Talamantes months earlier, he died of yellow fever in his "Calabozo o piesa de seguridad."[56]

Castillejos, on the other hand, had to suffer lengthy investigation as authorities tracked down and interrogated one lead after another to gather incriminating testimony. Not until 29 April was his dossier turned over to the *fiscales* for evaluation, weeks after the cases of Zugástegui and Rayas had been completed or suspended. His case lent itself to a low-level *escarmiento*. Neither clergyman nor nobleman, he lacked the protection of privileged status. Castillejos was a mere lawyer of obscure antecedents in a distant colonial province (Tehuántepec) but nonetheless had legal contacts and a degree of social entrée in the capital. An intellectual and political pamphleteer known for his patriotic *proclama* of August 1808, he had employed pseudonyms to ship anonymous handbills through the mails; similar handbills had kept the Spanish commercial community of Mexico City in an uproar for months. Yet, despite incriminating evidence, the *fiscales* delayed their *pedimento* for six weeks, until mid-June.

The *Fiscales*' Judgment

They constructed a tight case against him. His was the handwriting of the letter to Licenciado Bustamante of Puebla, and of its enclosed anonymous *proclama* proving, the *fiscales* insisted, his "falcedad y falta de confianza a la seguridad pública de la Estafeta." Under questioning, they found his answers a "texido de subterfugios, inverasimilitudes, contradicciones."[57] "Subterfugios" is perhaps key to an argument prominent in the case against him. Since July and August 1808, the Spanish community in the colonial capital had been suspicious of *criollo* demonstrations of loyalty to the Bourbons, despite their abdication at Bayonne, their plea for collaboration between "Europeos" and "Americanos," and their support for "independencia." Still, independence of any but Spanish rule was acceptable in August 1808; after the September coup, *criollo* declarations of loyalty and unity when linked to independence however defined, and to a colonial junta based on the sovereignty of the people, became unacceptable because subversive.

To illustrate Castillejos's use of subterfuges, the *fiscales* claimed that the underlying thrust of the signed *proclamas* of August was as subversive as his unsigned *proclamas*, mailed to Puebla and Ayuntamientos throughout the colony. They reviewed the two *proclamas* of August since "miradas . . . con más cuidad que el que se puso a los principios, quando preocupados los ánimos en favor de su aparente bondad se leían rapidamente, no dexando de traslucirse algunas especies menos adequadas." Castillejos's innocuous

appeal for unity was an ingenious hoax, designed to fan what in fact did not exist between Europeans and Americans, division and discord. The *fiscales*, of course, found no such disunity, only "embidia" beween *nativos* and *europoeos* over employment or "una especie de pasión por sus respectivas Patrias," just like that among Spaniards "por sus Provincias y lugares."[58] And Castillejos's unity, scented the *fiscales*, was not to bring about loyalty but "independencia, voz menos oportuna, equívoca, y solo acomodada a sus perversas ideas" when he should instead have called for "oposición, resistencia, defensa y guerra."[59] The accusation that Castillejos sought independence was substantiated by his anonymous pamphlet of 5 February, which urged both Spaniards and Americans—"Garibay . . . Oidores, Alcaldes . . . Regidores"—to convoke a junta representing "la Nación" since sovereignty resided in "los Pueblos."[60]

By establishing to their satisfaction the consistency of Castillejos's radical thought, the *fiscales* aimed to undermine a key element of his defense, that colonial authorities had allowed publication of one (and almost another) pamphlet. The *fiscales* intended to explain to a critical public why Castillejos signed his *proclama* of August, yet hid behind anonymity in that of February. By insisting upon Castillejos's consistency, the *fiscales* hoped to refute the conviction spreading throughout the colony—a development they feared—that September's preemptive *golpe* had transformed the political climate, sowing disunity and discord between "Europeos" and "nativos" and radicalizing those critical of unreformed colonial structures and policies. In reality, the *fiscales* were anticipating the polemic that would later fissure New Spain's public for more than a decade over the effects of the conservative coup of 1808. The *fiscales* hoped to minimize this issue by establishing the subversive intentions of colonial intellectuals like Castillejos *before* as well as *after* 16 September 1808. The violence and destruction of New Spain's ensuing civil war between 1810 and 1820—to some, avoidable—fueled the polemic and later inspired Gabriel de Yermo's confidant and lawyer, Juanmartiñena, to issue in 1820 his *Verdadero orígen, carácter, causas, resortes, fines y progresos de la revolución de Nueva España*, whose documentary appendix conservative historian Lucas Alamán would cite extensively.

The *fiscales*' final judgment was not surprising. They charged Castillejos with "cedición y discordia" aiming to achieve "independencia y rebelión," and they therefore found him liable to the death penalty. However, as in Zugástegui's case, because they found impolitic "en las apuradas circunstancias del día usuar del ruidoso castigo del último suplicio," they recommended sending Castillejos and his dossier to Spain for the Junta Central's judgment. Equally impolitic, they realized, would be exposing Castillejos

to yellow fever at Veracruz ("Veracruz está infestado de vómito") where others such as clerics Talamantes and Zugástegui, also accused of treason, had died in a San Juan de Ulúa cell block awaiting a departing ship; they recommended Garibay hold him at Perote until the epidemic passed.[61] For more than a year Castillejos was jailed at Cadiz without a hearing until amnestied when the Cortes issued a general pardon in late 1810; en route back to Mexico City two years later—unrepentant—he was overheard at Perote (where his group of returnees had to halt because insurgents were blocking the highway to the colonial capital) swearing to hang the viceroy from "uno de los balcones de Palacio" and was jailed again on arriving at Mexico City.[62]

As for the marqués de Rayas, against whom were strong presumptions of complicity with Castillejos, the *fiscales* feared to do more than ask for his testimony "atendiendo . . . a las circunstancias del . . . Marqués," his appointment as legal representative of ex-viceroy Iturrigaray, and his prominent position on the Tribunal de Minería. Rayas boasted in writing that he would defend his "fueros, distinciones y representación actual," and it was public knowledge he often threatened to call upon his haciendas' *cuadrillas* if the authorities prosecuted him—a threat not to be taken lightly in the aftermath of Iturrigaray's ouster.[63] Castillejos, of course, could muster no such force of opposition or privileged status; he had only a law degree and a pen—one that threatened the colonial order.

Castillejos—like Iturrigaray, Talamantes, Verdad, and Zugástegui—was victimized by overblown fear within the colonial capital's small Spanish establishment of civil servants, merchants, clergy, and military along with their native supporters. Suddenly, their assured colonial world seemed collapsing with reports of the Bayonne abdications, disintegration of metropolitan authority, and proliferation of irrepressible and competing regional centers in the metropole. One product of the psychosis of fear and alienation was the September coup that made political criticism ground for imprisonment. Castillejos's *proclamas* were hardly inflammatory, but his use of what anxious colonial authorities considered revolutionary—national junta, popular sovereignty, independence—*appeared* inflammatory. A committed revolutionary intellectual would not forward the *proclamas* to Mexico City's Audiencia. Castillejos did, because, like Bishop Abad y Queipo in March 1809, he wanted the real governing group in the colony, rather than its figurehead viceroy, to know the thinking of colonial professional groups. There remains an intriguing question: Did he fail to forward a copy to Mexico City's Ayuntamiento because he considered its elitist-minded *regi-*

dores already "burned," hence politically inert after their participation in the trauma of July to September 1808?

Uncovering Castillejos and his network of like-minded, native-born individuals suggests the alienation of New Spain's "clase media" of professionals—lawyers, clerics, civil servants—beginning to spread into provincial centers and perhaps into the general countryside. Moreover, there were other aftershocks of the *europeos*' preemptive coup within the capital of the colony: the sharpening of divisions within a pillar of the colonial establishment, the influential Consulado de México.

22. Fissures in the Colonial Elite: Merchants

En los disturbios y disenciones que si en todo tiempo deben evitarse, mucho más en las circunstancias presentes. "Expediente . . . sobre elecciones"

Quanto más era de temer que formasen partidos en un asunto importante como la soberanía de sus respectivas patrias sobre América? Mier, *Historia*

No colonial elite forms a seamless web of undivided hegemony. Intra-elite conflicts invariably flourish especially in a colonial system of high-value exports, a relatively large and coercible labor reserve, and growing demand for imported finished goods. For decades prior to 1808 there were rifts dividing entrepreneurial constellations in New Spain's commercial and mining sectors that were containable in the absence of profound political crisis in the imperial order—not to overlook secular divisions among civil servants and clergy. The conflict of interests in the colony's principal economic sectors became unavoidable, however, when political crisis across the Atlantic in the metropole erupted.[1]

A constant inflow of European immigrants meant that *peninsulares* accumulating capital (or access to local investment pools) crowded or threatened to displace those at the top. Well-established *peninsulares* tended to forge supporting links to native-born landowning and mining elite families. In "making America," immigrants from Spain maintained family responsibilities, regional identification, and nostalgia along with business ties with the metropole; it took time and usually visible success for some to shift from a peninsular to an "American" matrix. Many became "criollized," which is not to argue that they turned against Spain's colonial hegemony; rather, they developed different perspectives and responses in resolving

contradictions in the imperial order in which they figured prominently. Criollized *peninsulares* came to understand, tolerate, and seek to accommodate *criollo* complaint and disaffection, where other immigrants (both established and recent arrivals) saw disloyalty and rejection of Spain's hegemony, responding with force. None denied that native American jacqueries that threatened the colonial order deserved and invariably received exemplary suppression—state counterterrorism. After the coup of September 1808 at Mexico City, however, *peninsulares* discovered it was one matter to employ force against lower-class disaffection but quite another to direct it against the *criollo* elite and the *clase media*.

Factions

Among *peninsulares*, differences in perspective owed much to Spanish provenience, stages in migration, and the nature of the networks formed in New Spain. From Cantabrian Spain via the port of Santander (opened to direct exchanges with Veracruz and other major Spanish colonial ports after 1778) came *montañeses* and *vizcaínos* as well as those from areas between the Basque provinces and the mountains of Burgos, the *encartados*—in New Spain they considered themselves *vizcaínos*. Those departing from Santander seem to have tenuous business lines to the peninsula while those migrating from Cantabria through Castilla down to the port of Cadiz—where after clerking in commercial firms they often left for Veracruz—seem to have cultivated firmer ties to the Cadiz merchant community. *Vizcaínos* tended to display an international outlook, a product of their province's location sandwiched between France and Castilla, and attachment to their local rights (*fueros*) that protected their smuggling operations. The most successful of the largely ill-fated Spanish privileged companies of the eighteenth century was the Basque or Guipuzcoan Company, later incorporated into the Compañía de Filipinas.[2]

Another factor differentiating peninsular career and network patterns in the colony was the relationship with New Spain's silver mining industry. Some immigrants eased into mine operations through trade, then finance and marriage like the Castañizas and Antonio Basoco; others, like Apecechea, Iriarte, and Pemartín at Zacatecas and Guanajusto, were economic rivals of *criollo* and criollized groups. Rivalry surfaced in the competition between the *casas conductores de plata* formed in 1804 following the bankruptcy of the long-lived firm of Oteyza y Vértiz. One was *vizcaíno* and criollized, organized by Miguel Ángel Michaus and Antonio Uzcola, and included as guarantors (*fiadores*) members of *criollo* mining families (Obregón, Fa-

goaga), the other headed by two *montañeses*, Diego Fernández Peredo and his cousin Juan Manuel Fernández Peredo, and using among *fiadores* Francisco Alonso de Terán—but none from among New Spain's *criollo* mine owners. While *criollos* dominated mining, immigrants had no *criollo* competition in overseas trade, in wholesaling and retailing, and recruited clerks (*cajeros*, *dependientes*) exclusively from Cantabrian towns and hamlets—their *patrias*. The rising volume of trade at the end of the eighteenth century provided employment for many peninsular clerks in the commercial firms of Mexico City, provincial capitals, and towns. The capital cities held a significant concentration.

Friction between *vizcaínos* and *montañeses*, and between the criollized and non-criollized, turned into explicit political positions in the climate of crisis caused by developments of 1808 in Spain at Aranjuez in March and in France at Bayonne in May. They induced in the colony a crisis over recognition—the Junta of Sevilla or Oviedo or none—and then the shocking overthrow of Viceroy Iturrigaray. Debate over recognition of the Junta de Sevilla, as Iturrigaray had informed Sevilla, sharpened friction within the colony's immigrant community; by a statute of 1742, there were two voting blocs in the Consulado de Mexico, *vizcayíno* and *montañés*, alternating different offices annually. Among those voting for nonrecognition of the Junta de Sevilla at the Junta General in Mexico City were leading figures of the Consulado establishment: Antonio Basoco (criollized *encartado*) and Francisco de la Cotera (third-generation *criollo* of *montañés* extraction); Basoco, former *decano* of the *parcialidad de vizcaínos*; and Cotera, leader of the *montañeses*. And joining in that vote was the mining notable, *criollo* Rayas, who did not hide his backing of Viceroy Iturrigaray's position. As a contemporary mused about the conflict over recognition dividing *vizcaínos* and *montañeses*, "Quanto más era de temer que formasen partidos en un asunto tan importante como la soberanía de sus respectivas patrias sobre América."[3]

The stance of Basoco and Cotera must have fired passions within the capital's European merchant community, leading some merchants to authorize the participation of several hundred Spanish-born *dependientes* in the overthrow of Iturrigaray. López Cancelada, editor of the official *Gazeta de México* and associate of *oidores* and *almaceneros*, publicized the participation of the "juventud española" (the *dependientes*), which Abad y Queipo months later clarified as the "juventud europea del comercio de la capital." López Cancelada's provocation was gratuitous and inflammatory, and the Audiencia foreseeing the backlash obliged him to issue a retraction on the ground he had not submitted copy for prior censorship.[4]

This retraction could not mask the prominent role of a small group within the Consulado's membership supporting Yermo's preemptive coup, which probably included Francisco Alonso Terán, José Martínez Barenque, Diego Fernández Peredo, Juan Marcos de Rada, Lorenzo García Noriega, Roque Pérez Gómez, Santiago García, and the tantalizingly vague membership of the "comercio de ropas." Perhaps at the urging of this group, Viceroy Garibay's administration tried to suppress outspoken criticism in the military units of the Regimento Urbano del Comercio. Colonel Joaquin Colla, *almacenero* and a former officer of the Consulado whom Iturrigaray had considered a friend, was overheard muttering in the morning after the September *golpe* as he observed artillery and infantry units guarding the viceregal palace, "Déseme orden y a pesar de sus cañones yo disiparé esta chusma en un momento con solos mis granaderos"; his sergeant-major and fellow *almacenero*, Miguel Ángel Michaus, insisted publicly that "era preciso formar causa al Capitán de la Guardia Dn Santiago García por haber entregado a su General [Iturrigaray]."[5] As a consequence, Colla and Michaus were suspended from their military posts.

The anti-Iturrigaray faction became anxious when units of native troops were called to the capital to maintain public security, and with their arrival signs multiplied of unfavorable reaction to the coup. Businessmen heard a fictive, uncensored story about the jailing of *criollo* lawyer Primo y Verdad entitled "El Duende de la Alma del Licenciado Verdad en la Cárcel del Arzobispado" along with anonymous pasquinades lampooning "gathupines," demanding "las cabezas de varios españoles y en general de todos" and protesting outflows of capital to finance the Junta Central. Everywhere the *golpistas* of September spotted a generally unfavorable public reaction to the ouster of Iturrigaray and overheard the "públicas charlas de independencia y subversion de los nativos."[6]

The immigrant minority in the colony of New Spain felt isolated, desperate for at least the appearance of consensus when confronting a threat to its world, real or imagined. To create a sense of unity, Yermo's backers invented a counterrumor, that Iturrigaray's removal had the approval of *all* the Europeans in the colony and was rejected only by natives, and so informed the Junta Central. A long-term *peninsular* resident of the colony later reported otherwise to the government in Spain. Francisco Noriega asserted that to claim a division of opinion over Iturrigaray's case was a gross simplification designed "únicamente a sembrar la desconfianza." To the contrary, he found a majority of *europeos* in Mexico City, among whom he put the wealthiest and most thoughtful, "detestan a la facción que depuso a Iturrigaray" whom they considered loyal. In this group he found "la mayor

parte de los ex-priores y ex-cónsules ('principalmente Basoco')" along with *almaceneros* Diego de Ágreda, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, Miguel Martín de Michaus, Tomás Murphy, and Ángel Puyade, as well as Archbishop Lizana and José María Fagoaga.[7] The *almaceneros* mentioned had refused to assign "ni un dependiente para el servicio de armas"—the post-coup military patrols in the center city as well as the suburbs.[8]

The aggressive group of merchants behind Iturrigaray's removal felt pressured to prove their coup had strong local support. Their opportunity came in the election of Consulado officers in 1809—a *prior*, a *consul* "moderno," plus five *diputados*—by statute held annually in the first week of January. Consulado elections were indirect: all duly qualified merchants (those *matriculado* in the Consulado) voted for an intermediate body of thirty *electores* (fifteen from each *parcialidad* or *partido*, *vizcaíno*, or *montañés*), who in turn balloted for candidates proposed by each *partidos*'s *junta preparatoria* consisting of its *decano* assisted by former *priores* and *consules*. This electoral system combined the principle of representation filtered through a smaller body of former officeholders with *matriculados* furnishing apparent support for the self-selecting mercantile elite of the colonial capital.[9] It was hierarchical and hidebound, no model of disputatious governance, nor so intended.

Consulado Electoral Politics

Elections began when *prior* and *consules* posted a proclamation inviting merchants resident in the capital (*vecinos*) to register as voters providing they were older than twenty-five years of age, married or widowed, self-employed, not foreigners, and maintaining for a minimum of two years in Mexico City an "almacén . . . y casa de por si."[10] Notices were ceremonially affixed in the center city—at the corner of Santo Domingo (or Cordobanes), the two entries of the Portal de Mercaderes, and at other main intersections—by the town crier accompanied by a picket of grenadiers from the merchants' Regimento urbano.[11] The Consulado of the capital of Spain's principal overseas possession was a pillar of the colonial order; this electoral ritual, like the Consulado's ceremonial welcome to incoming viceroys outside the capital at Ecatepec, was a measure of its power and prestige. Symbolic of the intertwining of commerce and the colonial state was the presence of a representative of the state at the time of elections, a *juez de alzadas* drawn from among the Audiencia's *oidores*. This apparatus of ritual was designed to "conservar el buen orden, y acierto en las elecciones."[12]

Consulado officials accepted one innovation in the customary ritual.

Since the number of *matriculados* had "crecido extraordinariamente de algunos años a esta parte"—testimony to the commercial prosperity after the "reform" legislation of 1789—officers arranged for separate meetings of each *partido* in the main salon of the Consulado (rather than in the residences of the respective *decanos* Basoco and Cotera), in order to approve lists of *electores* agreed upon by separate *juntas preparatorias*.[13] In effect, the Consulado establishment consisting of the most influential merchants, all former Consulado officers, was self-perpetuating: it was a kind of senate providing continuity not only of policy and control of potential dissidence among *matriculados*, *juntas preparatorias* but also of the *decanos*' ultimate authority—these constituted the *costumbre* that insured orderly and proper elections.

On 5 January 1809, when each *partido* assembled by turn in the Consulado, the *matriculados* expected to approve the slate of *electores*, *diputados*, *consules*, and *prior* presented according to custom by respective *decanos*—in all, 190 *vizcaínos* and *montañeses*.[14] *Vizcaínos* (who included *encartados*) presided by *decano* Antonio Basoco convened first in the morning, followed in the afternoon by *montañeses* under their *decano*, Francisco de la Cotera. Basoco called to order his *matriculados*, presented a list of fifteen *electores* nominated by his *junta preparatoria*, and then, as ritual required, asked those present "si tenían algo que decir contra ellos." Were there no objections, he could rule that the *electores* constituted "legítimos vocales de su parcialidad." The ritual review of *electores* handpicked by *juntas preparatorias* and presented to the *matriculados* had been repeated for decades without marked reaction; the Consulado establishment had played successfully upon harmony to avoid "las desórdenes que necesariamente deberían suscitarse si alguno de los concurrentes tachara en público a los nombrados por el Decano." This time harmony among *matriculados* was not apparent, for "algunos . . . en el acto . . . reclamaron" the habitual deference to the *decanos*' authority. However, those objecting *vizcaínos* soon yielded to the majority because it was "antiguos y condecorados, o por más adictos al Decano, y siempre por fines de alguna conveniencia y propio interés personal," and consequently Basoco's fifteen *electores* were "elected."[15]

If Basoco and other members of the Consulado establishment felt relieved after the *vizcaínos*' morning junta, it was premature. Disaffection ran deep among Consulado members angered by the domination of those "wealthiest and most thoughtful" *almaceneros* and quietly critical of the recent September coup, and it exploded during the afternoon meeting of the *parcialidad de montañeses* chaired by the *criollo* of *montañés* extraction, Cotera. When he called for approval of his prepared list, the opposition

immediately insisted that *matriculados* could elect whomever they wished in secret balloting if they were to enjoy their "liberty" as *matriculados*. More specifically, the angry *montañeses* argued that "no havía ley, cédula o Real orden que se las [elecciones] limitase ni que le diese derecho al Decano para proponer cierto número y mucho menos para nombrar a los 15 sugetos que traía en su lista," nor did they wish to participate in a public "crítica odiosa de las calidades de cada uno de los nombrados."

Regardless of the *decano*'s preferred list, the *montañés parcialidad* claimed that all *matriculados* had the right of freedom of choice exercised by secret rather than open ballot. When Cotera insisted that the *montañeses* were bound to follow *costumbre*—"la práctica de muchos años en que se havían verificado así las elecciones"—opponents countered that he and "algunos de sus amigos que se le han asociado" were motivated not by precedent but by "un espíritu de partido y no por el mejor servicio de Diós, del Rey y del Comercio."[16] A case of the pot calling the kettle black? The *montañés* junta broke up after hours of debate and bitter exchanges—"En una palabra," as Cotera later described what he called a *motín*, "todo fué desorden, casi todos gritaban a un tiempo" and insults were shouted at Cotera, his supporters, and his *junta preparatoria*. No vote had been taken, and Cotera announced he would appeal for the intervention of a colonial authority, a decision by Viceroy Garibay.[17] Consulado de Mexico elections were a serious matter.

Garibay, and the *oidores* of the Audiencia who really made his decisions, now had to resolve the open rift within the corporate body whose financial support was already critical to the survival of the Junta Central in the metropole and might soon become even more so. Within weeks the Junta Central requested a 20 million peso loan from investors in the colony. Basoco, Cotera, and their supporters were prominent members of the capital's commercial oligarchy, wealthy, prestigious, influential, and responsible; but they had tolerated Iturrigaray's policies in mid-1808 and helped to foment the crisis that the Audiencia's *oidores*, Yermo, and his supporters in the Consulado had resolved by violence. It was ironic that Cotera and Basoco hoped for a favorable decision from those colonial authorities who only a few months earlier had legitimated the violence of those now confronting the plaintiff *decanos*. Garibay temporized; he rescheduled a convocation of the embattled *partido montañés* for 9 January, ordered the *juez de partido (*Francisco Mendieta) to preside, and—Solomon-like—directed the *matrículados montañeses* either to accept their *junta preparatoria*'s list of *electores* or to choose another slate by secret ballot.[18] The *montañeses* proceeded to reject Cotera's list and elected a different slate including among the fif-

teen new *electores* eight clearly identified backers of the coup of the previous September.[19]

The final act of the Consulado's electoral process came on 10 January when the thirty *electores* joined by twenty "comerciantes y almaceneros" assembled and chose as *prior* and *consules* merchants other than those whom *decanos* Basoco and Cotera had proposed to all 190 *matriculados* of the Consulado on 5 January. The *decanos* had originally advanced the candidacy of Sebastián de Heras Soto (*montañés*) as *prior*; instead, the new *electores* gave Francisco Alonso Terán twenty of a total of twenty-nine votes cast. The *decanos* had supported as *consul moderno* Diego de Ágreda (*vizcaíno*); instead, opponents of Ágreda—who had disapproved of the September coup—elected the leader of the coup, Gabriel Joaquin de Yermo (*encartado/vizcaíno*), with eighteen votes.[20] This was outright repudiation of Consulado leadership, baring fission within an important segment of the colonial order.

With some exaggeration, a distraught *decano* Cotera labeled the *montañés* assembly that had rejected his prearranged *electores* an uprising. It is no exaggeration to conclude that the electoral outcomes on 10 January were a public rebuke to criollized *vizcaínos* and *montañeses* who had kept a low profile in the political crisis of the summer of 1808 and then distanced themselves from the *golpistas*. Since the conflict surfaced at the *montañés* junta, there was some truth to the view that it confronted "los Decanos y los individuos que representan la parcialidad montañesa";[21] evidently, as vote counts showed, a few *vizcaíno* electors had defected to the *montañeses* to elect Terán and Yermo. Criollized *almaceneros vizcaínos* like Basoco, Iturbe e Iraeta, and Olloqui, troubled by uncommon dissention in the Spanish commercial community of the colonial capital, insisted that *vizcaínos* and *montañeses* "no tienen disenciones entre si por otras causas . . . se trata solo . . . con el objeto de conservar el buen orden, y acierto en las elecciones," and their lawyer—José Andrés de Alcántara—reiterated the theme, claiming "ningún interés individual mueve a mis poderdantes sino la buena fe con que han creído de su obligación defender una costumbre . . . anciano."[22]

Such disclaimers notwithstanding, political issues—the contested recognition of the Junta de Sevilla and the September *golpe*—are detectable when *montañeses* questioned the "lealtad, honor y patriotismo" of Basoco, Cotera and others and traced Basoco's motivation to "la venganza, la sobrada elación de ánimo, y el empeño de salir más que sea momentaneamente con los propios caprichos, y especialmente con el de desairar a los electores aprovados."[23] The political element was more explicit in Basoco's denunciation of his *montañés* and other critics as "sediciosos, rebolucionarios, or-

gullosos, feroces, y sin educación."[24] The election of Terán and Yermo did not end the internal divisions among Mexico City's *almaceneros*; it simply underscored the fact that certain merchants, *oidores*, and the viceroy they had installed would insist on preserving the colonial order unreformed.

Outcomes: Terán and Yermo

Francisco Alonso Terán's election as chief officer (*prior*) of the Consulado de Mexico by an insurgent group of *montañés* immigrants epitomized the upward mobility in New Spain's merchant community of Spaniards (*peninsulares*) committed to maximizing the colonial status quo. Peninsular provenience, family, and business networks made him typical of many *liebaneses* of the Cantabrian *montaña* (in his case, Puente Pomar in the Valle de Polaciones) who left small peasant holdings equipped with a minimum of reading, writing, and counting skills to migrate via Cadiz to Veracruz and Mexico City or the interior cities and towns of New Spain. "La familia de Terán," ran a biographical sketch, "hace más de 120 años que es muy conocida en México."[25] Like other *montañés* emigrants to New Spain, Terán maintained business contacts with Cadiz and Manila. Alonso Teranes were interlocked with another *liebanés* family in New Spain, the Gutiérrez (one of their women, Rafaela, married the son of an ex-viceroy, the conde de Flores). In New Spain, Francisco had a brother, Antonio Alonso Terán, also a Mexico City *almacenero*; a blood relative, *asesor* in the intendancy of Valladolid (Michoacán), José Alonso Terán; and a relative by marriage, his *concuñado*, an *almacenero* at Veracruz, José Ignacio de la Torre (they married sisters). Terán had a joint business venture with Torre, and supplied Francisco Antonio de la Torre, agent of the Cadiz Consulado at Veracruz, with shipping information.[26] His brother, Antonio, was an agent for Manila interests and, along with Juan Marcos de Rada and other businessmen of Mexico City, participated in a consortium selling Asian luxury goods shipped to Acapulco in the Philippine galleon.[27] Francisco's career paralleled his brother's, of whom it was noted, "Desde muy jóven, poseía y manejava caudales de mucha importancia. La que junta a su creditada buena fe, le producía obtener toda confianza y de consiguiente todas las relaciones a que le hera posible corresponder, siendo la casa a que dirigían negocios la mayor parte de los comerciantes de Manila." Terán's name is listed as an investor in the *casa conductora de plata* formed by the *montañés* family of Peredo.[28]

By 1809 Francisco Alonso Terán had been in New Spain about thirty years, in which time he claimed to have imported goods averaging 600,000

pesos annually.[29] A stand-patter in colonial commercial policy, he had opposed *comercio libre* extended to New Spain in 1789, and in 1809 backed Veracruz merchants in urging the Junta Central to stop Havana's reexports of European goods to Veracruz. It will come as no surprise that his political views mirrored his economic preferences. He distrusted Iturrigaray, disliked his politics, and testified under oath that he had overheard that Iturrigaray's wife had warmed to the possibility she might one day be addressed as "Your Majesty," and he suggested ambiguously that Iturrigaray may have even pondered "si a coronarse en el Reyno o constituirlo colonia Francesa."[30]

Behind Terán's assessment of Iturrigaray one detects the fear that the former viceroy's policies threatened the Spanish colonial order and its economic underpinning, exclusion of foreign and even other colonial competitors. His was the perspective of an immigrant from Spain who had prospered by virtue of diligence and skill in the commercial milieu of a colony benefiting from transplanted and adapted legislation, institutions, culture, and administrators from the Spanish metropole. The Spanish colonialists' admiration of their classical counterparts in antiquity surfaced in Terán's likening New Spain and other Spanish colonies to "Provincias Proconsulares de la antigua Roma," for they formed part of the Crown of Castilla, governed by legislation the crown had bestowed upon them—to quote Terán, "se han uniformado con las costumbres de la Peninsula, tienen adoptadas sus máximas, han vivido hasta ahora de su comercio, y han estado subordinadas a los gobernadores que les ha mandado."[31] To a confirmed colonialist like Francisco Alonso Terán as to many twentieth-century applied anthropologists, colonies had no past; the imprint of European colonialists alone gave form and substance to colonialized peoples.

It follows that Terán found much to recommend in an integral element of Spanish colonialism in America, the transatlantic commercial system as it functioned *before* 1778, those "dichosos tiempos" when New Spain's external trade was limited to Cadiz and Manila via *flotas* and *galeones*. He dismissed charges that the system fostered "el ponderado monopolio y la mohatra exagerada" as the product of envy; in fact, he felt it minimized "los riesgos de quiebras asombrosas." The current system would remain, Terán predicted confidently, just as long as "haya Españoles amantes de la dominación católica."[32] This *montañés* immigrant had no faith in the loyalty of New Spain's colonialized peoples.

As for *golpista* Yermo, his surprising electoral upset also revealed unsuspected dimensions of the opposition to Iturrigaray's general policy of accommodating *criollo* interests. An *encartado*, Yermo was registered with the

parcialidad de vizcaínos, yet was elected with *montañés* votes; a member of the Consulado de Mexico like uncles before him, Yermo's economic interests were principally those of the sugar *hacendados* of the Cuernavaca Valley. Unlike the unidimensional Terán—successful immigrant merchant with a starkly unreconstructed perspective on colonial issues—Yermo understood the need to improve the living conditions of the colony's underprivileged native peoples, mestizos, and parish clergy, by eliminating consumption taxes and ineffective restraints on economic enterprise, for example, on olive oil and wine production, and textile manufactures.[33] Where Terán had the typical European wholesale importer's conception of the colonial economy, Yermo, a planter, had a physiocratic approach, which is not to say he was antagonistic to the concerns of *almaceneros* at Mexico City and Veracruz. The interests of Cuernavaca Valley sugar planters dovetailed with those of the capital's *almaceneros* as well as those in Veracruz on the Caribbean coast; neither tolerated competition in European goods reexported from Havana or introduced by English and other foreign shipping under special wartime licensing agreements or in competitively priced Cuban sugar and brandy exports to Veracruz. Yermo represented a bridge between European *almaceneros* and *criollo* estate owners seeking to expand output to meet domestic and, hopefully, external demand.

Second, by forcing their candidate for *consul moderno* (Yermo) upon the more cautious members of the capital's European commercial establishment, insurgent *vizcaínos* and *montañeses* intended to prove that, if their mutual interests were threatened, they could forge an effective political alliance overcoming their peninsular regional rivalries and would not be restrained about violence and repression in defending those interests. Iturrigaray's removal (for this they substituted the neutral "separacion") was "necesario e indispensable," Yermo remained convinced, lest the colony of New Spain "estubiere . . . separado de la Metrópolí."[34] At the same time, in electing a forceful estate owner and enterprising cattle buyer, the Consulado's *vizcaínos* and *montañeses* inspired confidence among *criollo hacendados* anxious about controlling their dependent, resentful work force.

Yermo was aware how widespread was disapproval of his coup in September, installing a viceroy manipulable by the Audiencia, which then set up an abrasive public security system to root out dissidents. He had become a lightning rod of resentment, and he confessed to the Junta Central in November 1808 that he was quite aware of "la insolencia con que se habla y aún se escribe contra mí, llegando a pedirse muchas veces mi cabeza en los papeles sediciosos."[35] There is, therefore, no reason to question his confession of surprise blended with pleasure in a letter of acceptance sent from his

"San Gabriel" plantation on learning of his election as *consul*—"un suceso tan inesperado para mí." To accept the position made him uncomfortable. Now he would have to go up to Mexico City for meetings; his reluctance he attributed to "insuficiencia para su desempeño" since his principal interests were agricultural, not commercial. In brief, he would have to sacrifice his "propia inclinación, ideas e intereses." On the other hand, he appreciated the "honor y distinción que debo a ese Tribunal, y al comercio" as well as the "concepto y estimación que oficiosamente ha reunido en mí la mayoría de votos de los Electores." So he accepted the position, confident he could fulfill his responsibilities with the support of the "luces" of his "compañeros de tanta integridad e ilustración."[36] To put this in perspective: the election of Terán and Yermo together, *prior* and *consul*, signified that those who had backed Iturrigaray's violent removal would spare no effort to maintain their influence in the colony, to pursue their accusations against Iturrigaray before the Junta Central, and to use "política y justicia para impedir la propagación de las ideas sediciosas, persiguiendo y castigando a los malvados sin indulgencia."[37] This was an unequivocally public demonstration by the Mexico City commercial establishment of support for the *golpe*.

The fissure between "decanos, ex-priores y ex-consules"—prominent figures of the colonial trading establishment—and its *montañés* membership did not narrow in the months following the January 1809 elections. Neither supporters of Basoco and Cotera nor their opposition led by recently elected Consulado officers Alonso Terán and Yermo showed any inclination to seek an accommodation as both parties petitioned viceroy and Audiencia to reject or accept the procedures and results of the previous January's election. General Garibay, viceroy by choice of Audiencia and a segment of the Consulado's *matriculados*, ruled that the new electoral procedures were legal, refusing to authorize an appeal to the Audiencia on the grounds it was simply a matter of administration rather than justice; a ruling on Garibay's approval would, Garibay and his staff argued, have to be made by the Junta Central.[38] In response to repeated petitions from outvoted and disaffected *decanos* Basoco and Cotera, Garibay turned to *fiscal* Sagarzurieta for advice. On 30 April and again on 3 June, Sagarzurieta and Mendieta, whom Garibay had selected as presiding officer representing the colonial state in the January Consulado elections, upheld Garibay's ruling that the Junta Central finally decide the issues "por las consideraciones políticas y prudentes que exigía la materia," adding pointedly "y el empeño y ardor con que se había seguido."[39]

With this backing, on 5 and 12 June, Garibay reiterated his position, which Sagarzurieta again supported. On 3 July Garibay learned from Fran-

cisco Saavedra that the Junta Central at Sevilla had approved the report on the Consulado elections forwarded by Terán and Yermo; three days later Garibay reconfirmed his position, that the Junta Central resolve the Consulado's recent procedural innovations and election results in view of "las empeñosas gestiones de ambas partes, cuya acaloramiento se aumentaba en cada trámite."[40] Two weeks later came official word that the Junta Central had appointed Archbishop Lizana y Beaumont as Garibay's replacement—presumably a gesture to mollify the opposition to the September 1808 coup and to Garibay's administration under Audiencia tutelage. The Junta Central's approval of the elections enraged both *decanos* who learned that Consulado officers Terán and Yermo (without the approval of Ruíz de la Bárcena, *consul antiguo* elected in January of 1808) had omitted from their report to the Junta how the elections of 1809 had been held.[41]

The volume of petitions, counterpetitions, opinions, and the rulings by General Garibay, in theory all subject to Junta Central review, could not be withheld from eavesdropping by the politicized public or political class of the colonial capital. For intellectual clerics like the *europeo* bishop-elect Abad y Queipo, it was ominous in March 1809 to observe the disunity splitting apart the colony's elites, *criollo* and *europeo*, and he urged the Audiencia (whom he addressed unambiguously as Garibay's "director") to modernize the organization and equipment of the colony's armed forces. Abad y Queipo could publicly allude only to "turbaciones intestinas, capaces de comprometer la tranquilidad pública y la unión de sus habitantes." He was confident, he later explained, that the *oidores* would grasp his real target, the "alto grado de efervescencia, las rivalidades y discordias que excitaron entre la clase española esos hombres turbulentos," who were motivated by "sus pasiones, la envidia, la ambición y la avaricia."[42] Clearly he and others in and outside Mexico City sensed the rancor in a sector of the capital's elite—the *europeos* of the "clase española"—in the Consulado, which had led *decanos* Basoco, Cotera, and their followers to boycott juntas called by the new officers, who, in turn, now complained that the "falta de asistencia de algunos vocales" was spreading "desprecio de la autoridad de este Consulado" instead of inspiring "subordinación y obediencia" to the merchants' corporate body. Hardly blameless were Consulado officers Terán and Yermo, since they showed no compunction to call for the opinions of *ex-priores* and *ex-consuls* "conforme a la costumbre."[43] Restoration of the political unity of New Spain's *clase española* seemed unobtainable.

The Consulado's factions continued to pressure Garibay's successor, Archbishop Lizana, to review its electoral innovations as late as December 1809. Reviving the issue at this date were various factors. First, private corre-

spondence from Cadiz implied the imminent collapse of the Junta Central; Romana's diatribe against the Central convinced many in the colony that its members were "ineptos . . . interesados, dilapidadores, egoistas" and "más delincuentes" than Manuel Godoy.[44] The reasoning of the Basoco-Cotera faction was logical: on appeal, a successor government in the metropole might reverse Garibay's ruling. More pressing—the second factor—were the forthcoming Consulado elections of January 1810 and the procedures to be followed. When on 20 December the Audiencia once again affirmed the appropriateness of the electoral procedures of 1809 and the right of Consulado *matriculados* to "absoluta y plena libertad" to choose electors, the dissident *decanos* insisted Archbishop Lizana suspend the forthcoming elections, pending the long delayed resolution from the Junta Central. In turn, Terán and Yermo countered with a request for viceregal clarification "en el concepto de que sería muy peligroso proceder a elecciones sin una expresa declaración que aquietará los ánimos y cortará [de raíz] los disturbios y disensiones."[45] Viceroy Archbishop Lizana turned for legal advice to the Audiencia's three *fiscales*—Sagarzurieta (*civil*), Borbón (*hacienda*), and Robledo (*criminal*), two of whom (Sagarzurieta and Borbón) had questioned Iturrigaray's intention to convoke a colonial junta in New Spain.[46]

Harmony and Friendship

Predictably the *fiscales* of the Audiencia that had legitimized the coup of September 1808 and the installation of Iturrigaray's successor (whom the *oidores* had handpicked) and then authored his decisions could do no less than confirm that successor's decision, that the Consulado's electoral changes were legal.[47] In addition, they reaffirmed that a viceregal judgment (*sentencia*) of purely administrative matters could be appealed only to the metropolitan government. There had always been, argued the *fiscales*, separate jurisdictions, administrative and judicial, allocated to viceroys and *audiencias* respectively. Since the electoral procedures of the merchants' guild were administrative matters ("causas y motivos políticos"), the dissident *decanos* could not appeal the viceroy's decision to the Audiencia at Mexico City. The *decanos*' persistent attempts to reverse Garibay's judgment by insisting on an Audiencia review visibly annoyed the *fiscales*; they found that the *decanos*' "impertenencia" served only to "encender los ánimos y dividirlos más de lo que están." *Fiscales*, *oidores*, and *montañés* merchants aimed to cut off what had become a "ruidoso asunto" and its consequent "división de ánimos"; now it was essential to preserve "unión y conformidad" between viceroy and Audiencia, all the more "importantísima al presente

por las desgraciadas circunstancias de la Monarquía." This was an oblique warning to the archbishop—a temperate cleric with reservations about the events of 1808 and their aftermath—to continue the policies of the Audiencia that had exploited Garibay's "edad octogenaria y decrépita . . . y su absoluta indisposición para los negocios," as the Audiencia's *regente* Catani once bluntly put it. Sensitive to the colonial repercussions of disunity then rife among competitive governing bodies overseas in Lower Andalusia—Junta Central, Consejo de Castilla, Junta de Sevilla, and Junta de Cadiz—the colonial administrators hungered for the superficial harmony of the old regime, which had minimized overt manifestation of conflicts of interest.

On this issue the *fiscales* were explicit. The colonial code, they pointed out, prescribed that between viceroys and *oidores* "[no] haya alguna diferencia sino toda conformidad, y que las contextaciones que haya de una a otra parte sean sin demostración ni publicidad, ni de forma que se puede entender de fuera." Reversing Garibay's (really the Audiencia's) handling of the Consulado elections would inevitably cause "escándalo y publicidad." In reaffirming *fiscal* Sagarzurieta's view of the previous 20 April, the three *fiscales* were advising Lizana, the viceroy recently appointed by the Junta Central aiming to reduce conflict among the colony's "clase española," to accept the Audiencia's legitimization of the *golpistas*, among whom was Yermo, now an elected officer of the Consulado de Mexico.

This was more readily recommended than done, given the prominence and influence of the disaffected *decanos* and like-minded supporters. In a kind of extended postscript apropos the elections soon to be held according to the changes of January 1809, the *fiscales* proposed that Lizana, a clergyman, soften the *decanos*' defeat by applying his "zelo pastoral" to "los medios más eficaces de concordar los ánimos de las personas que litigan." Hopefully the Consulado's factions might agree "con armonía y amistad" on procedures for the upcoming elections, at least until a resolution came from metropolitan authorities. *Oidor* Bataller, the archbishop's *asesor general*, specified that Lizana choose two representatives from each Consulado faction to meet in the viceregal palace in his presence.

The effort to settle this "grave asunto" proved a total failure, sadly Lizana reported.[48] As for action by the metropolitan government now in its refuge at Cadiz, as late as February 1811 the Consejo de Indias found no reason to withdraw approval of Garibay's judgment.[49]

23. Fire under the Embers: Between Preemptive Coup and Insurrection

De las manos en que haya de ponerse este encargo [el virrey de México] depende en gran manera el logro de los fines a que debe aspirar la Suprema Junta.

Borrador to Francisco Saavedra, 3 February 1809

Ya se ve que Garibay, lo hacía todo de acuerdo con Aguirre y el Secretario que la [*sic*] puso.

Mora, *Historia*

En todo el Reino hay un fuego sordo que ellos mismos [los Españoles] encienden, sin prever los bárbaros que la explosión debe caer contra ellos y sus temeridades.

Fray Vicente Santa María

El fuego elétrico de la Revolución Francesa puso en movimento y reunion en estos paises los primeros elementos de la division y deseo ardiente de la independencia.

Abad y Queipo [1813]

Archbishop Lizana's inability to bring the Consulado's factions to reason together, or to modify the Audiencia's unconditional backing of *golpistas* within the Consulado, points up the arrogance among the European colonialists in high colonial administration and the merchant community in Mexico City. To government officials after September 1808, the merchant communities of Mexico City and Veracruz, of New Spain's capital and its principal Caribbean port, formed the pillars of the colonial system there and the major financial resource of the government of resistance now in Lower Andalusia. As Spain's hegemony in the colony was crumbling following the events of mid-1808, the domination of Spanish or, as it was said, "European" interests survived and seemed even to accentuate.

The unopposed coup of 1808 with the advertised participation of armed elements recruited among the capital's commercial firms fueled the natural

arrogance of European colonialists. Not only did natives have to tolerate "el inveterado desprecio en que siempre se había mirado a los Americanos"; now they had to tolerate among *europeos* "un nuevo aire de orgullosa superioridad" as well as "dicterios, sarcasmos y expresiones injustas y dolorosas."[1] At the same time the absence of overt reaction to Iturrigaray's overthrow rendered merchants from Spain callous to what their action had generated, "descontento y . . . desaprobación general" among all layers of native society. As an anonymous observer would later conclude, "Llenos de un entusiasmo por su buen suceso, vinieron a ser aún menos populares y desplegaron bien pronto una audacia y un despotismo sin límites, sabiendo que la Junta Central había aprobado grandemente su conducta."[2] Nothing like success to breed arrogance, which here took the form of a mass celebrating the uneventful deportation of ex-viceroy Iturrigaray, held at the church frequented by *europeos*, their Virgen de los Remedios; the mass was paid by twenty-five of the disliked and arrogant *chaquetas* who had been the escort guard of Iturrigaray between Mexico City and Veracruz. Inevitably the *chaquetas*' bravado produced an altercation with a native, leading the *criollo* abbot, Cisneros, to complain to Viceroy Garibay, who ordered the Consulado to "reprendiese y apercibiese" the organizers of the ritual.[3] Suspecting Guadalajara's intendant, Roque Abarca, of pro-Iturrigaray sentiments, elements in Guadalajara's merchant community declared "una guerra encarnizada" against him; as Abarca added in a letter, "Lo peor de todo era estar satisfecho de que dominando el mismo partido en México, nada tenia que esperar sino desaires."[4]

Europeos and *Criollos*

The self-assurance of many of the capital's merchants rested on the pattern of *criollo* assimilation of European immigrants into colonial society. As *criollos* of Querétaro (including Intendant Miguel Domínguez) defended their relationship with such immigrants, "Los europeos eran nuestros parientes, estaban casados con nuestras hijas o hermanas, eran nuestros buenos amigos, y teníamos con ellos nuestras relaciones de comercio, y nuestros intereses y caudales estaban mezclados con los suyos y aún dependían de ellas absolutamente."[5] The portrait was not overdrawn. Prosperous Europeans recognized that while many *criollos* along with middle- and lower-class native-born residents resented the "codicia de los gachupines," others more generously attributed their success to "el deseo innato en el corazón del hombre de mejorar su condición, que es el primer móvil de las operaciones humanas, y el estímulo de las virtudes sociales, de los talentos,

aplicación, economía, frugalidad, valor y consistencioa en las empresas, y en las adversidades."[6] In provincial capitals like Zacatecas, Spaniards and *criollos* had always lived side by side; it was the *golpe* of 1808 that shattered social harmony generating an "íntempestiba mudanza"; now the "pueblo entero" there viewed Europeans in a different light and "les espanta su vecindad y su fortuna."[7] Now pasquinades mushroomed overnight with threats to expel "gathupines"—"esta canalla de forasteros ladrones que han venido a cojerse lo que es nuestro." As a consequence, when a group of clerks employed in Zacatecas's commercial firms walked the streets, they were now jeered, and on one occasion "dentro de un momento se juntó una multitud inmensa de léperos y varretteros, armadas de garrotes, cuchillos y piedras."[8] In other provinces the local theater provided an opportunity to pique the dominating Spaniards. They reported incidents such as happened at Tepeyahuales in April 1809 during the performance of a comedy, when the leading actor suddenly improvised for his audience. "Dicen que viene Virrey nuebo de España para gobernarnos? Y debemos permitir que nos gobiernan gachupines?" Most unsettling to this letter writer was the reaction of the audience—passivity: "Todos se quedaron callados hasta el mismo teniente de justicia."[9]

The attitudinal turnabout from superficial toleration of "ultramarinos" to overt dislike naturally led the minority of Spaniards to suspect the natives of scheming to "sorprehender a los Europeos en sus casas, en los templos de Dios, o en los sepulcros," of the "saqueo y destrucción de sus casas y haciendas" and of transforming "paisanos y parientes españoles" into people "tan infelices como a los judíos."[10] Wrapped in the arrogance of domination and fear of the native masses, European *golpistas* among Mexico City's *almaceneros* managed to keep viceroy and Audiencia inflexible in suppressing overt dissidence between September 1808 and the arrival from Cadiz of recently appointed viceroy general Venegas in late August two years later.

Unprecedented as was Viceroy Iturrigaray's ouster by several hundred Spanish (*europeo*, *gachupín*, or *ultramarino*) merchants and their clerks, even more unprecedented were the viceregal replacements beginning with a military officer (General Garibay), continuing with a cleric (Archbishop Lizana), and ending with the Audiencia itself over a twenty-four-month period, September 1808 to September 1810. Their performance along with the colonials' growing perception of the incapacity of metropolitan governments to resist French occupation contributed to the general process of alienation that distanced the governed in the colony of New Spain from the colonial government representing the Spanish imperial system. The insurgents of 1810 would have at minimum two years of attitudinal separa-

tion—mental decolonization—from a colonial system three centuries old and seemingly indestructible.

Opponents and supporters of the coup of 1808 sensed the shifting ground. The politics of the colony could not be divorced from the hesitant, often contradictory transition in the Spanish metropole, from the preconstitutional ("absolutist") monarchy of the old regime to Spain's first constitutional monarchy, a transition proceeding under the Junta Central, Regencia, and finally the Cortes that would assemble at Cadiz in September of 1810 and, even then, not by unanimous demand.

Over its sixteen-month existence, the Junta Central struggled to confirm its authority against the Madrid government nominally under Joseph Bonaparte (supported by many Spaniards), against the Consejo de Castilla, the Junta de Sevilla (unrelenting in demanding authority over Spain's colonial world), and against the Junta de Cadiz, until the Junta de Sevilla drove the Central from Sevilla to Cadiz where it disintegrated into the Consejo de Regencia. Divided by conflicting interests, the Junta Central tried to respond to unexpected colonial pressures for equality of rights with metropolitan provinces, for colonial representation first on the Central itself, and then in the ever-promised and ever-postponed Cortes, and—as we have seen—for imperial trade reform. In trade as in other policy areas, the Junta Central could not sustain a consistent position. It alternated promises of colonial representation and political rights, beginning with Quintana's unexpected and stirring denunciation of colonial exploitation and promise of equality, with urgent, even immoderate requests for the colonies' financial support to which New Spain's religious and secular corporate bodies as well as wealthy Europeans and *criollos* alike responded far more generously than comparable groups in other American colonies or the metropole itself.[11] All the while, interest groups at Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz pressured the Junta Central; unreconstructed colonialists in the nearby Junta de Cadiz schemed to achieve the objectives of equally unreconstructed colleagues in New Spain manipulating a pliant Viceroy Garibay. Among other issues, the Central's toleration of the policies of General Garibay, installed by a few *oidores* of the Audiencia de Mexico and its "facciosos" supporters in New Spain's merchant groups, induced the articulate *criollo* loyalist, José Beye de Cisneros, to conclude that the undeclared policy of metropolitan resistance governments from the Junta Central onward was "prometerles siempre mucho, pero jamás cumplir nada, sino de palabra."[12] His statement reflected how much the deference of New Spain's colonials to both colonial and metropolitan governments had eroded after 1808.

Garibay: Protest and Repression

The *oidores*—with the approval, one must recall, of the Junta de Sevilla's recently arrived agent to New Spain, Juan José Jabat—had put in place an aging career military officer who had served in the colony for years, married into a *criollo* family, visited daily a daughter in the Convento de la Encarnación, and compulsively borrowed from friends for small personal expenditures. Garibay was honest, unaspiring, uninspiring, and—worse—manipulable. As a veteran European resident of New Spain reported to the metropolitan government, Garibay had acquired "ninguna versación en los negocios de tan difícil gobierno" and therefore performed as an "automata que por su incapacidad y por su gratitud les [his advisers] estubiese enteramente adicto y dependiente."[13] For advice on trivial as well as significant issues, he depended visibly upon *oidores* Aguirre, Bachiller, and González Carbajal, as well as upon his secretary selected by Aguirre.[14] Garibay did not follow the pattern of independent viceroys—Revillagigedo the younger, for instance—who might reject the opinion of the Audiencia; his public pronouncements invariably noted that the Audiencia had approved them. (Some claimed his *criolla* wife and her family members shaped his decisions.)[15] Catani, the Audiencia's regent, usually tolerant, had to inform the metropolitan government of Garibay's "edad octogenaria y decrépita" along with his "absoluta indisposión para los negocios." *Criollo* lawyer and historian Carlos María de Bustamante intolerantly pulled no punches when describing him as "inepto, viejo, tonto, que subscribia en todo lo que le decía."[16]

The Audiencia de Mexico, in effect, was a shadow government that repeatedly permitted representatives of the *golpista* bloc to participate in Audiencia sessions.[17] Garibay had to maintain a hard line against alleged supporters of deposed Iturrigaray; as a result, the deaths of imprisoned *criollos* like Primo y Verdad and Melchor Talamantes from natural causes were charged to Garibay's insensitive policies. Because he gave wide latitude to the Audiencia's *fiscales* to track down those suspected of sedition, they made a point of investigating high-level supporters of the ousted viceroy and a potential role model like the "anti-*europeo*" marqués de Rayas. (*Oidor* Aguirre received an anonymous note accusing Rayas of libeling Yermo's colleagues as "la inmundicia de España" and Garibay as a "viejo chocho caduco.") At the same time Mexico City *almacenero* Miguel Ángel Michaus, openly critical of the *golpista* faction, was denounced to the authorities by 180 merchants.[18] Such harassment further embittered those disapproving the coup of 1808, while the *golpistas* found themselves isolated "irrevocable-

mente hasta llegar a verse convertidos en obgetos de pública execración y menosprecio."[19]

The result was an uncontainable surge of underground protest, the shower of "anónimos, pasquines o libelos famosos" that Garibay credited to "algunos espíritus inquietos, genios indignos y revoltosos," which brought on the colonial government's countermeasures.[20] The security apparatus of the colonial state installed an informer network that "mañosamente introducía el gobierno en . . . tertulias . . . mesas, y en medio de . . . más inocentes placeres"; it alerted post offices to inspect the mails, which—along with reports of the jailing of suspected subversives—led one correspondent to warn that "la corrrespondencia epistolar más inocente se calificaría de por criminosa . . . solo porque se discurria sobre los asuntos del dia"—in other words, politics.[21]

Still, countermeasures could not stem the erosion of the prestige of both metropolitan and colonial authorities. By March 1809 the weakness of the Junta Central and the colonial establishment was evident to New Spain's political class fed by private correspondents overseas, by critical reading of censored reporting in the Mexico City press, and by divisions within the Consulado. The alternative—an autonomous colonial government—remained unthinkable, at least until ultimate defeat of the French. This moment of "alto grado de efervescencia" colonial authorities tried to dispel with appeals for unity and for an end to "esos apodos de criollos y europeos" and to pigeon-holing people by birthplace, "aqui o del lado de allí del mar." They dwelled upon how much the Junta Central now drew upon what only months before had been labeled subversive—"todo el fondo de ideas liberales"—suspension of property sales forced by Consolidación fashioned under Godoy's administration or of holding controlled indirect elections for a colonial representative on the Junta Central. The tactics were ineffective by May 1809 to judge by the volume of subversive pamphlets "píntando con la figura más despreciable la autoridad soberana de la Suprema Junta Central" that were composed and distributed clandestinely in the capital's much frequented public spaces such as the cathedral and numerous parish churches. In June a special antisubversion commission staffed with three *oidores* was formed to proceed vigorously against elusive pamphleteers and alleged subversives.[22]

Along with financial support from New Spain (Garibay's administration managed to scrape together at least 2.65 million pesos of Consolidación receipts in New Spain, Guatemala, and the Philippines exclusive of surplus in the Mexico City treasury and outright gifts),[23] the Junta Central now in refuge at Sevilla received complaints about Garibay's inept administration,

his inability to moderate elite factionalism, and the threat of widespread disaffection in the colony's armed forces. The loyalty of the armed forces was, for those who had supported the removal of Iturrigaray, questionable in light of his publicized attention to officer training, extended field maneuvers, and the consequent opportunities for *criollo* officers of dispersed regional units to train together and inevitably discuss political issues—"ideas, quejas, anhelos"—that is, protonationalism.[24] Moreover, judging by bureaucratic delays in processing the Audiencia's accusations of sedition leveled at Iturrigaray, evidently colonial onlookers could conclude that the Audiencia had failed to collect evidence convincing the Junta Central's prominent, centrist *fiscal* assigned to the case, Gaspar de Jovellanos, of the reasons justifying the viceroy's removal.[25]

The Junta Central, while tolerating the appointment of Garibay, had wisely never confirmed him formally as viceroy.[26] As early as the first week of February 1809, perhaps earlier, Francisco de Saavedra, in his dual and often confusing capacity as Hacienda secretary of the Central and president of the competing Junta de Sevilla, received an assessment alerting him about the political fallout in the administration of post-Iturrigaray New Spain. The critical nature of relations with the colonies in America—"su importancia y delicadeza, y el riesgo a que están expuestas" along with their hoped-for "tranquilidad y prosperidad"—must focus, ran the assessment, on the main issue, selection of a viceroy for that colony. "De las manos en que haya de ponerse este encargo depende en gran manera el logro de los fines a que debe aspirar la Suprema Junta."[27] Unrest in the colony stemming from dissatisfaction with policies formulated by the Audiencia joined to complaints from both pro- and anti-Iturrigaray factions finally convinced the Central on 13 February 1809 to remove Garibay; it took five months to execute the decision.[28] On 19 July General Garibay returned to obscurity (Yermo and friends would assist him later with monthly contributions), replaced by Mexico City's Archbishop Lizana, presumably a naïve, reluctant participant in the September coup. Just five days earlier, *oidor* Guillerme de Aguirre had petitioned for retirement, foreseeing a conflict over the governing of the colony, between anti- and pro-Iturrigaray factions.

Lizana y Beaumont: The Politics of Moderation

Appointments to a prominent post in any administrative structure, and especially the selection of a chief colonial administrator during a generalized imperial crisis, invariably signal to colonized and colonialists the metropolitan government's direction of intention. By picking a Spanish cleric of five

years' exposure in Mexico City to replace an aged military officer installed in mid-September 1808 by force of arms at the direction of the Junta de Sevilla, the Junta Central showed its awareness of how far the political situation in its major overseas possession had deteriorated and its intention to curb the influence of those responsible for colonial divisions there. Ex-bishop of Teruel (Aragon), Lizana like many European colonial officials and clerics had only a primitive notion of what Mexico City was like on embarking at Cadiz for Veracruz in late 1805, about one year after the arrival of Viceroy Iturrigaray and his family at the port. He is supposed to have brought along "cajones de catones, cartillas, catecismos y zapatos como si viniera a un pais de hotentotes."[29] Five years later he was probably less ingenuous and more politicized; certainly his fiscal policy where church property was involved was hardly naïve.[30] Convinced that church funds had been mismanaged, he was persuaded that "la imposición más segura era la real hacienda, y asi protejió con el mayor empeño el plan de la consolidación." Although he voted against Iturrigaray's proposal for a colonial congress at the fateful Junta General of 9 September 1808, he was a last-minute supporter of the coup. Soon, however, he developed doubts about the evidence presented by the Audiencia justifying the coup, and he unabashedly advised the Junta Central of his change of mind.

His admission of error was examined at Sevilla by *fiscal* Sierra to evaluate evidence in the indictment of Iturrigaray forwarded by the Audiencia de México to the Central. How to proceed with Iturrigaray's politically sensitive case after he had debarked at Cadiz in January 1809 remained a major issue for the Central. Sierra's preliminary assessment of the evidence, as well as Lizana's disavowal of support for Iturrigaray's ouster, no doubt influenced the Central to replace Garibay with Lizana. For his honest judgment Sierra would pay months later when the Junta de Cadiz forced the Regencia to remove him as Gracia y Justicia minister.

Like his aged predecessor, Lizana was no energetic colonial civil servant. When ill, which was frequent, he would work in bed on official papers, counseled by his cousin Inquisidor General Alfaro and *oidor* Bodega (a *criollo* and no supporter of fellow *oidor* Aguirre).[31] His lack of administrative experience inspired Aguirre to call him the *colegial* (inexperienced graduate student); others, because of his clerical instinct for moral uplift and his distress with an inveterate popular attraction of Mexico City, gambling, nicknamed his administration the "pontificado."[32] All of which suggests that Lizana was appointed not so much to right wrongs but to reduce mutual distrust among those who had differed bitterly over Iturrigaray's role, and

to dispel the overhang of treason from those convinced that the September coup was unnecessary, certainly ill-advised.

On balance Lizarza continued the policy orientation of his predecessor, maintaining the security apparatus to control dissidents, ensuring the election of a properly conservative *diputado* to the Junta Central, dutifully collecting funds at the orders of the peso-devouring metropolitan government. In September 1808 he broadened the powers of Garibay's security apparatus to net those threatening public order or favoring French policy with anonymous pasquinades and through rumormongering. Possibly the appointment of the Audiencia's regent, Catani, to the three-man security agency provided more balance? Over the next month, the colonial government implemented orders from the Junta Central to hold carefully staged elections, first in provincial *ayuntamientos*, then in the colonial capital at Mexico City, for one *diputado* to represent the 6 million inhabitants of the colony of New Spain in the Junta Central.

The election proclamation of the Central—probably a Quintana creation—opened with a rhetorical, uplifting flourish—"Desde este momento, españoles americanos, os veis elevados a ls dignidad de hombres libres"—and closed with the attractive prospect of elections that would prove that "vuestros destinos ya no dependen ni de los ministros, ni de los virreyes, ni de los gobernadores; están en vuestras manos." An auspicious invitation, but as *criollo* Carlos María de Bustamante later footnoted the proclamation, "Ya veremos que las obras no correspondieron a las palabras."[33] In the second phase of indirect elections, Lizana and the Audiencia (ten voters) balloted for one of three finalists from the list selected by provincial capitals' town councils. In the first round, all ten votes went to Manuel de Lardizábal (native of Tlaxcala, but absent from the colony for forty years); in the second, Lardizábal's brother, Miguel, led with nine votes over the *oidor* Aguirre (one vote); in the third balloting, a native of Veracruz and prominent *almacenero* José Mariano de Almanza, won with six votes over Aguirre's three. In the final balloting, a candidate virtually unknown in the colony he was presumed to represent, Manuel de Lardizábal, won. The contrast between Junta Central's rhetoric and colonial reality was artfully encapsulated by Bustamante who commented with his usual caustic wit that the metropolitan government's policies after 1808 reminded him of "el viejo con la muerte cuando la invocaba; esto es . . . que le ayudase a llevar la leña, y no más." To members of the Consulado de Mexico, such controlled elections were still *costumbre*.[34]

In other ways, too, Lizana's administration aided the Junta Central. An-

drew Johnson Cochrane, English agent contracted by the London government to buy silver in the world's silver capital of Mexico City, was warmly welcomed by Lizana, who informed him that silver outflows had drained the colonial treasury, then borrowed 2.7 million pesos from wealthy private lenders in the capital by guaranteeing 6 percent interest and immediate amortization from colonial revenue receipts. It was testimony of Lizana's evenhandedness that he attracted large sums from major lenders in both political camps, from Yermo and his backers (50,000 pesos), the Terán brothers (200,000), and Eusebio García (60,000), as from those opposed to the September coup, Basoco (200,000), Iturbe e Iraeta (100,000), and Heras Soto (100,000). When the Junta Central unrealistically pressured Lizana to float a loan of 20 million pesos among the colony's Spanish and *criollo* capitalists despite the preceding years of massive silver exports to the metropole, Lizana had to remind the Central of years of decapitalization of the colony.[35] The reaction of New Spain's *criollos* was pithily phrased: "La América era la vaca chichigua que se procuraba ordeñar hasta exprimir la ubre."[36] Lizana did agree to announce the offering, although aware of widespread dissatisfaction over the colony's shortage of capital, but refrained from pressuring potential lenders.[37]

Interpreting the exasperation of wealthy residents as well as lack of confidence in the security of such loans, the finance expert Bishop Abad y Queipo provided Lizana (and the Junta Central) with an unsolicited analysis. Local capitalists would not respond to appeals to their "celo y patriotismo" but made business decisions on the basis of "egoismo y . . . avaricia." And even assuming that "el comercio prestará sus capitales," there would be little left to finance trading operations since "ya se resiente su falta [de numerario] en la circulación y cada dia se resiente más." His business "quick fix" was indirect taxation: raising the sales tax by 23 percent and tobacco prices (a government monopoly) by 40 percent.[38]

Abad y Queipo's asides about the hardnosed attitude of the colony's "acomodados y ricos" in general and merchants in particular mirrored widespread reservations about New Spain's wealthy and politically powerful *almaceneros.* At this point in his career, Abad y Queipo could still afford to comment on the colonial system without fearing attacks on his loyalty to that system. For example, in a brief elliptical paragraph, he mentioned that a potentially large revenue increment—raising customs returns by stimulating imports—was currently impossible. The reason: oligopolists—"ocho o diez casas de comercio de Mexico y Veracruz"—controlled the flow of imports, rigged prices, and earned "la excesiva ganancia del momento," inflicting "gran perjuicio a los consumidores y mucho escándalo y envidia a

los demás comercianates." Ever the cautious critic, however, he made no explicit link between merchant and European, but it was implicit. A perceptive cleric and intellectual became oddly inarticulate: "Me consta el hecho. Conozco los efectos. Pero"—here he backed off with uncommon modesty—"no tengo las nocioines suficientes para consultar al remedio," which he diplomatically left to "los mismos comerciantaes" and other knowledgeable people in Mexico City.[39] Abad y Queipo's political antennae made him prudent, given the political weight of the colony's European merchants and their supporters in the Audiencia, *oidores* Aguirre, Bataller, and González Carbajal.

In one respect the conservative archbishop Lizana, averse to confrontation, did break with Garibay's administrative pattern of close collusion with *oidor* Aguirre and his supporters in and outside the government. Within weeks of taking office, Lizana approved Aguirre's petition to retire from the Audiencia: Lizana requested that the Junta Central recall to Spain Aguirre *and* González Carbajal.[40] Perhaps *oidor* Bataller, Aguirre's "íntimo consejero," had stiffened Lizana's resistance to the dominating influence of Aguirre and the barely controllable editor of the *Gazeta de México*, López Cancelada. Cancelada—restraint was not one of his virtues—exasperated Lizana by his identification with Mexico City's *partido español*, his siding with Aguirre in questioning Lizana's decisions, and his commitment to metropolitan over colonial interests. Of him it was observed, "Pocas personas han servido a España con tanto zelo como Cancelada." Unconditional supporter of Aguirre, Cancelada's loose tongue led him to declare publicly that viceroys were "déspotas y debían mandar subordinados a la audiencia."[41] With that, Lizana had him jailed on a charge of libel and deported to Cadiz for trial; there his merchant friends managed to free him, whereupon he became an effective (probably well-paid) partisan publicist for the Cadiz, Veracruz, and Mexico City commercial establishments and bête-noir of New Spain's *criollo* elite, whom he relished goring.

Lizana's break with Aguirre was equally visible if not as successful, and it accentuated disunity in the colony's governing class, reinforcing the colonials' perception of governmental incapacity. The reasons for Lizana's attitude are not clear although there are plausible hypotheses. Perhaps it was Lizana's apparent reluctance to doubt the loyalty of those who had supported Iturrigaray's interest in interim autonomy and a congress held in the colony. Or perhaps Lizana did not provide vigorous endorsement to petitions condemning Havana's commercial policy prepared by the Mexico City and Veracruz commercial establishments.

The break became public when Jacobo Villaurrutia's son informed Li-

zana that there were "juntas de conspiración" plotting to remove him, a repeat of the coup against Iturrigaray.[42] Lizana's apprehension was real, so much so that on 3 November 1809 he issued specific orders to the security forces assigned to the viceregal palace. Patrols were increased and maintained from 10 p.m. until dawn, "patrullando únicamente el Portal de las Flores, Diputación y ambos [portales] de los Mercaderes" in the Parián center of the capital's commercial operations "estando casi todas las casas habitadas por europeos."[43] The patrols accosted anyone bearing "rifle, shotgun, or carbine" as well as "personas decentes o de mediano porte" exiting buildings near the portals, and to report if "muchos individuos decentes" entered buildings in the area. Any group of armed men in the zone was to be arrested on the spot.[44] Clearly, this was warning a faction of European (*peninsular*) merchants not to attempt another coup. Shortly thereafter, Lizana ordered Aguirre to leave Mexico City for Puebla, ostensibly on commission but really preparatory to shipping him to Cadiz because of presumed conspiratorial activity. Lizana never clarified his motives for moving against a colonial government official of such prominence; others pointed to Aguirre's possible involvement in planning a coup, his irreverent attitude toward Lizana, or simply to "deposiciones de personas acreditadas."

This confrontation Lizana lost. Aguirre's friends among the *chaquetas* who had arrested Iturrigaray pressured Lizana, and after a few days Aguirre returned, met by them on the road back.[45] *Europeos* in Mexico City now used their Cadiz merchant colleagues to have Lizana replaced; one Spaniard at Mexico City is said to have sent fourteen complaints.[46] Failing to execute successfully an act of reprisal against a prominent figure in the capital's European community, Lizana confirmed a general impression of indecision and weakness. New Spain's chief colonial administrator revealed himself as unsteady, lacking credibility, and, above all, unable to resist pressure from anti-Iturrigaray elements, the disliked *chaquetas* of September 1808.

Nor was this the last occasion when Lizana displayed a critical failure of nerve. Late in 1809 those responsible for Iturrigaray's deportation were worried by the Junta Central's handling of his case. No doubt Aguirre, Yermo, and those of the colonial capital's commercial establishment, whose clerks had seized Iturrigaray, learned of the caustic judgment of the reputable jurisconsult and *fiscal* of the Consejo de Indias then at Sevilla, Gaspar de Jovellanos, to the effect that the *oidores* of Mexico City did not know how to prepare a convincing indictment of the former viceroy.[47] In brief, the raison d'être bearing the signature of the commercial oligarchy in the colonial capital was inadequate. Concurrently, too, merchants in Mexico City and Veracruz expected Estéban Fernández de León at Cadiz to complete his as-

sessment of Havana's merchant planters' insistence on trading with foreign islands in the Caribbean as well as reexports of so-called surplus imported goods to Veracruz; in light of León's policy when intendant at Caracas, his recommendations might favor Havana export interests. These, then, were reasons for financing the trip to Cadiz of an agent representing the interests of an influential segment of Mexico City's Spanish community, commercial and bureaucratic, to shore up its case for Iturrigaray's removal on grounds of disloyalty, to influence the Central's decision on Havana's trade petitions, and—not least—to urge Lizana's replacement. The Consulado de Mexico's slush funds were, to be sure, real and legendary.

Concerned Europeans chose as their agent Marcos Antonio de Berazaluce, a lawyer who had testified as calligraphic expert in April of the year that Castillejos had written the anonymous pasquinades. Links to the capital's merchant community are beyond question: many participating in Iturrigaray's arrest and deportation assigned Berazaluce power of attorney to represent them; in fact, Berazaluce had inventoried Iturrigaray's sequestered goods and property.[48] When Lizana learned of Berazaluce's imminent departure for Cadiz, he had the *alcalde de corte*, the *criollo* Jacobo Villaurrutia, arrange his detention and seizure of his papers. He was subsequently released on a flimsy pretext, which did not strengthen credibility in Lizana's leadership. Berazaluce departed for Veracruz, but died at sea three days after leaving the port; meanwhile, the governor of Veracruz had just received orders to rearrest him.

Provincial Unrest: Valladolid

Lizana's handling of a conspiracy, betrayed in mid-December 1809, in the provincial capital of the province of Michoacan, probably clinched the case for his removal. His administration, we must recall, coincided with signs of deepening crisis in the Junta Central, imminent total occupation of the metropole by Franco-Spanish troops, and the real possibility of a headless imperial system in Spain's colonies in America. At last a colonial assembly, autonomous of a French-dominated metropole, seemed imperative to many *criollos* not only in the capital of the colony dominated by Europeans but also in the provinces, for instance, the prosperous province of Michoacan. Absence of an uncontested center of imperial leadership in Spain brought on by the mass Bourbon family abdication—self-denying Bourbons—loosed criticism of monarchy in general, which the French revolution had fanned. Among colonials in New Spain, not a few granted that revolution had improved government there and that as a general assump-

tion "los reyes eran unos ociosos que en un rato de indigestión decretan la muerte de cien mil hombres."[49] In a wealthy provincial capital like colonial Valladolid, dissatisfied *criollos* circulated manuscript copies of articles culled from the European press, like one from the Naples gazette of 25 April during the French occupation. Under the headline, "República Napolitana, Libertad, Ygualdad," it ripped into the Bourbon monarch who had fled Naples carrying away "tu oro, tu plata . . . todo lo que el pudo robarte."[50] The proclamation by French republicans at Naples appealed to colonials in New Spain, alienated from an imperial system long impermeable to meaningful reform.

A decade after the height of the French Revolution there subsisted a residue of respect for its early phase when, to quote a provincial cleric and intellectual in Michoacan, Frenchmen had reformed "su trono . . . el dispendio de su tesoro real . . . sino a discreción de la nación en su Asamblea . . . las rentas eclesiásticas y moderación de los ministros a una congrua bastante"—information obtained from his correspondents abroad.[51]

The Spanish Bourbons' ineptitude colored colonials' attitudes toward the resistance government in the metropole, the Junta Central, which had fled Aranjuez southward to Sevilla and in late 1809, threatened by opponents in that city and by French occupation, planned to evacuate to far more defensible Cadiz. Alternation of promises of reform to impatient colonials with ever-postponed realization, as well as regional conflicts within the Central along with signs of unrelenting intervention by Cadiz commercial interests on their own account and as surrogate for colleagues overseas at Veracruz and Mexico City, rendered plausible, even welcome, to already disappointed colonials any denunciation of the Junta Central by prominent metropolitan figures. As Abad y Queipo noted, the Junta Central lost credibility "por los revezes de la guerra y por su conducta ajena de la expectación nacional."[52] Slashing criticism of the Central by the ultraconservative marqués de la Romana published at Sevilla in mid-October 1809 was not reprinted in Mexico City's gazette but circulated nonetheless clandestinely among the literate and politically sensitive, for instance, among clergymen. Fray Vicente Santa María, jailed at Valladolid on suspicion of sedition, urged a visiting cleric to look at his copy of Romana's representation obtained from a local merchant who refused to let it circulate because too many others would read it.

The clergyman, Santa María confessed, was shocked by Romana's principal points: questioning the Central's legitimacy, its loss of authority, and the caricaturization of its members as "ineptos, partidarios, aceptadores de personas interesadas, delapidadores, egoistas"—worse than the "criminal"

government of that "traitor," Godoy. Romana's criticism, nervously concluded Santa María's visitor, Fray Manuel Agustín Gutiérrez, would have "perniciosísimas resultas" in the form of "ninguna subordinación" to the colony's governing bodies, "ninguna confianza en ellas," and "ningunos auxilios a la Madre Patria." Santa María hastily wrote Archbishop Lizana to advise that materials touching upon "actuales negocios de la nación" be permitted to circulate only with "la aprobación y licencia expresa e individual del gobierno." As for those held in custody on suspicion of treason, they should not be allowed to read such materials "ni aún oiga o trate de noticias que induzcan a desconfianza de la buena causa de la Monarquía o den esperanzas de su ruina a los descontentos." The advice was accepted: Lizana's security commission promptly ordered Santa María's jailers to confine him to a "pieza reservada sin permitirle que conteste con nadie."[53]

Circulation of proscribed materials—Romana's diatribe was officially disavowed as "ilegítimo, perjudicial, criminoso"[54]—outside the colonial capital, despite the government's reinforced security apparatus, suggests that Lizana's administration offered "los descontentos" merely a change of tone from that of Garibay, hardly of substance. One year after the September coup the colonial government still remained dominated by the established economic and administrative interests that had stymied Iturrigaray's effort to form an interim autonomous colony in the event of total metropolitan collapse—a real possibility, to strengthen local defense forces against potential French aggression from Louisiana and, not least, to satisfy some of the long unmet demands of interest groups in the colony. Moreover, the colonial government's inability to stifle discord within the influential Audiencia and Consulado, along with its obvious collusion with the Junta Central in "fixing" the pseudo-election of an unknown *criollo* like Lardizábal to the discredited Junta Central, did not dispel sentiment among New Spain's *criollo* political class that an autonomous colony remained a viable and even unavoidable alternative.

In an unexpected and ironic intellectual reversal, the unreconstructed colonialist terrorists who had ousted Iturrigaray in 1808 fed the colonials' aspiration for independence one year later. As a provincial landholding *descontento* of Valladolid reflected, those "celosos de la obediencia a España y dependencia de ella" who had rationalized easily the earlier coup, like those "europeos de crédito" Intendants Abarca (Guadalajara), Riaño (Guanajuato), and Flon (Puebla), military commander Colonel [Félix María] Calleja and Bishop Abad y Queipo, believed that Iturrigaray and his fellow travelers intended to make the colony independent and thought they were quite capable of resisting French efforts to conquer it. Iturrigaray's sup-

porters insisted, however, they had no such intention, much less faith in the colony's military defenses. But by September 1809 when the French had thrust into Andalusia and seemed about to occupy Sevilla and Cadiz, New Spain's *criollos* dispersed in provincial capitals and towns adopted the mentality of the *europeos* of 1808. Now they were convinced of the "posibilidad de la independencia y nuestro poder para sostenerla."[55] And since they were convinced independence was a realistic alternative to Spanish colonialism, they hunted down materials on "el modo con que se establecieron las juntas en la peninsula."[56] What is not to be overlooked, though, is that many had drawn lessons from the recent history of the English colonies in North America. One final step remained: Who would have the "valor de ponerle el cascabel al gato," and where?[57]

Valladolid Radicalized

The first attempt in New Spain to form an autonomous junta or congreso had been tried in the colonial capital, Mexico City, largest urban center in the Western Hemisphere, where "Los Golillas . . . excitados por . . . Yermo y todo la comparsa del Parián, se resistieron a la formación de la junta" and removed surgically "los Americanos de algun talento y representación."[58] Shock reinforced by the colonial state's security apparatus—the *peninsular*-dominated colonial government employed "agents asked to report conspiratorial activities, seditious conversations, satirical papers"—paralyzed autonomists in the capital leaving underground pamphleteering and guarded *tertulias* as the sole vents for suppressed resentment of the colonial order.[59] However, in a province of New Spain like Michoacan whose economic and social contacts linked its residents to the export-oriented mining center of Guanajuato, the apparatus of repression was less effective. International news of Europe, the United States, and other areas in the Americas such as Buenos Aires and Caracas surfaced in the censored press, in privately collected and circulated clippings, and correspondence; it was discussed in intimate family gatherings, with trusted friends during the many balls held by provincial notables, and around billiard tables of Valladolid's affluent townspeople. Perhaps Valladolid's security apparatus was less intimidating, certainly the proportion of *europeos* and their social and political visibility were far less prominent than in the colonial capital. Or perhaps, as a historian has recently suggested, there was the relative security of a social class of *burgueses latifundistas* outwardly "pasivo y conformista," some of whose *criollo* component (mainly second-generation sons of immigrant European fathers like colonial army officers Allende, Aldama, and Abasolo) "bajo la

máscara de una plena identidad con el sistema, vivía . . . inconforme con él y . . . ansioso por cambiarlo."[60] In short, a pool of potential radicals had formed in Valladolid and surrounding towns; uncertain of *criollo* support for colonial autonomy, they accepted appealing to the lower orders, *indios*, to join their movement.[61]

In 1809 the provincial capital of the intendancy, Valladolid, was no colonial backwater. It was a busy entrepôt for local agricultural and ranching staples, European imports, and some local manufactures and was an administrative and archdiocesan center. It was also an educational center distinguished by the former Jesuit Colegio de la Compañía and a seminary inaugurated in 1770. The center of the city held the cathedral, government offices, and the townhouses of upper-class Europeans and *criollos*, perhaps one hundred families of estate owners, wholesale merchants, high bureaucrats, and clergymen. Around it was the "other" city of *indios*, some long resident and others relatively recent incomers fleeing famine in the countryside in 1785, and "los Negros del barrio de la Columna."[62] Poverty set them off from the wealthy in the city's core; obligatory payment of *tributo* (the head tax) branded them—*indios*, *mestizos*, *mulatos*, *castas*—as separate and inferior. Between the two socioeconomic strata, one white or near white, the other *indio*, *mestizo*, and *negro*, were about fourteen thousand of what contemporaries termed a "clase media" of officeholders, lawyers, doctors, artisans, and secular and regular clergy "educados y formados en ciudades como Valladolid."[63] Its political class consisted of lawyers, clerics, and colonial militia officers who were merchants and landowners, many sons of immigrant Spaniards married to local women. The clerics—many pseudo-clergy who were really intellectuals with no visible support other than the church in the form of a *congrua*—formed a lively element of the community, well-read, knowledgeable of their region, disputatious, a few critical and even fewer outspoken. Valladolid was the educational core of New Spain's revolutionary curates, Hidalgo, Morelos, and the less-known Vicente Santa María.

Santa María, then fifty-five years old, born in Valladolid and educated there, entered the Franciscan order. In education, extraclerical interests, and in perception of where the burden of colonialism fell, one traces the making of a native-born, free-thinking anticolonialist. He attended primary school in Valladolid, studied liberal arts (*filosofía*) at Celaya, and then theology at Valladolid's seminary, where he obtained a lectureship in theology. The Escandón *criollo* family (the condes de Sierra Gorda) hired him to survey and map landholdings in the province of Nuevo Santander bordering on the Gulf of Mexico and to write its history based on the family archives

and subsidized its publication, dedicating it to the outstanding Viceroy Revillagigedo of the early 1790s.[64] In his eighteen months' research, Santa María encountered firsthand the miserable condition of native peoples, and he came to identify with and defend them and the colonial countryside against the European literary current comforting to colonialists and popularized by De Pauw—the natural inferiority of man and nature in the New World. Santa María's skill as human geographer and mapmaker brought him a second commission about 1800 to survey the Huasteca region and, later, a third commission covering the Chapala area of Guadalajara. It was no doubt intellectual compatibility based on shared reservations about unreformed colonialism that brought Santa María (a *criollo*) and Abad y Queipo (*europeo*) to travel together in 1809 to nearby Zinapécuaro and Salvatierra in the Bajío.[65]

Like many colonial clergymen, Santa María found the church a university whose educational institutions, financial resources, and intellectual contacts gave him a window on the world and an opportunity for critical reflection on the church in the world. An intellectual, he was "aficionado a los talentos Franceses," to Racine (his *Histoire ecclésiastique*), to Diderot (*Fils de famille*), to Montesquieu and De Pauw, and he did not neglect publications listed in the Index. The reformist phase of the early revolution in France he welcomed; what he thought of Napoleonic France—Bonaparte, the aggressive self-made leader understandably fascinated many in the colony[66]—made him within the church a freethinker, an attitude he wrapped in protective irony. Bantering with straitlaced colonialist clergy, he would joke about Saint Augustine and the doctrine of infant sin, criticize Saint Dominic for the Inquisition and the Vatican's broad definition of heresy, refer familiarly to his small image of the Virgen de Guadalupe as his "virgen chichimeca," and attribute ironically the miraculous appearance of Guadalupe to "el arte de pintar."[67] The sometimes ambiguous irony of his wit led one of his defenders (José Nicolás de Michelena) to try to protect him from criminal charges by putting him down as "un hombre que siempre ha servido de diversión en su casa, y que si se huviese de hacer caso de sus producciones, sería necesario tenerle por loco . . . todo quanto producía era según se le pintaba en su imaginación."[68] In other matters he was also mundane; like many clergy, he had an illegitimate child. His bishop, San Miguel, labeled him "muy ligero, mal intencionado, y revoltoso . . . notado de incontinencia con las mugeres."[69]

Beneath his worldliness flowed a current of empathy for the human resource base of colonialism, the native people whether "Gentes, castas . . . bajo Pueblo."[70] On 14 December 1809 Santa María's young Indian servant

was picked up in Valladolid for nonpayment of *tributo*; Santa María hurried to the jail located on the main plaza where—he commented later—he "tuvo impulsos de gritar a la plebe . . . Sígame, que ya no hay ni tributo ni rey a quien pagarlo!"[71] He contained himself, fearing an "alboroto," as he put it, but observed in the same letter, "En todo el Reino hay un fuego surdo que ellos mismos [los ultramontinos] encienden, sin prever los bárbaros que la explosión debe caer contra ellos y sus temeridades." Judging by Santa María's correspondence, fifteen months after the coup of September 1808, tension in Valladolid between *criollos* and Europeans was reaching the flashpoint; *criollos*—soldiers, young men "y hasta las mujeres"—were arming (they bought up almost all the lead shot available) as rumor spread that "los chaquetas" had met secretly to plan to "asesinar a los criollos de algun caudal . . . para por este medio hacerse del Reino, ganando al vil pueblo con la plata."[72] Another source put the threat to Valladolid's native elite in more specific terms: the Europeans, claimed a clergyman, planned to kill "toda Gente blanca criolla, y hacer alianza con la plebe para sostener el reyno por su parte." For their part, members of Valladolid's European community, terrified by exaggerated rumors that "los criollos trataban de despachar todos los europeos para España, exceptuando los clérigos, y si hicieren resistencia, acabar con todos," gathered in the home of a well-known European merchant, Francisco Palacios. There they had their worst fears confirmed when one of them reported that the city's "Léperos de los puestos" had asked an army officer on whose side were his soldiers. When told, On the side of "Justicia," the townspeople commented with relief, "pués entonces tenemos los Soldados de nuestra parte." Valladolid's elites, both *criollo* and *europeo*, were divided by profound mutual distrust, by "ún odio general."[73]

In fact, Valladolid's Europeans had grounds for suspecting a *criollo* plot. Since early August a small group of native-born merchant-landowners (José García Obeso), lawyers (José Nicolás de Michelena, José Antonio Soto Saldaña, and Manuel Ruiz de Chávez), clergymen (Vicente Santa María and Mariano Quevedo), officeholders (José María Abarca), subdelegado of Pátzcuaro, and postal manager at Tuxpán (Luís Gonzaga Correa), some of whom were also militia officers (Captain García Obeso, Alférez Mariano Michelena) had been meeting in the homes of Nicolás Michelena and García Obeso to consider a new effort to form a colonial government. Over many lunches in García Obeso's home, he "hablaba y desía su modo de pensar sobre las noticias que venían de España, ya prósperas o adversas, y lo mismo hacían otros que allí concurrían."[74] The moment was as auspicious as in mid-1808, when the metropolitan government of resistance seemed about to collapse, undermined by local interests particularly at Sevilla and

Cadiz, then threatened by an effective French offensive thrust into Andalusia. As political verses in the possession of García Obeso read, the metropole was sunk in a "sueño aletargado" waiting to be galvanized by some "golpe."[75] About the same time, too, officers and men of Valladolid's two locally recruited regiments, infantry and cavalry, returned to the provincial capital from assembly points and joint maneuvers organized under former Viceroy Iturrigaray. Perhaps Valladolid's plotters were encouraged by reports of a coup by Quito's *criollo* elites in August removing both viceroy and Audiencia and installing a junta supporting exiled Fernando VII. The fall of 1809 was a moment for Valladolid's *criollos* when "Hablan unos, otros callan, y se quedan pensativos, algunos discursibos."[76]

Planning the coup proceeded in stages, the plotters adapting tactics to changing conditions and newly perceived needs. The objective, as formulated initially in August, was a colonial government to resist a French attempt to occupy New Spain, perhaps from Louisiana; successful execution of the coup required mobilizing regional military units along with "los Principales de la Provincia"—"hombres de bien y [que] tuviesen obligaciones," thereby avoiding a "cosa popular."[77] It is not clear if the original design aimed at one national junta or regional ones; in any event, the new colonial government would provide the basis for colonial autonomy until a legitimate government reappeared in the metropole.[78] Then on 9 December "empezó a ser mayor la fermentación" fed by rumor that "los Europeos del Reyno, dependientes de los Consulados, querían degollar a los principales Criollos y Americanos dando por razón la liga o enlace de intereses que tienen estos con los de España." By mid-December the plan was reformulated and—more interesting—radicalized: to a junta was added a *cortes* (each *pueblo cabeza* to send a deputy), while "la cosa popular"—*indios*—would complement the regular military units.[79]

Three features reflecting the experience of 1808 and changing colonial and metropolitan realities differentiated the revised plan of 20 December from efforts of Mexico City's Ayuntamiento and its supporters in 1808: the intention to draw upon military units in provincial centers at Pátzcuaro, Zitácuaro, Zinapécuaro, and even Querétaro and San Miguel el Grande (*criollo* military officers Allende and Abasolo apparently agreed to cooperate at San Miguel); the dispatch of units of Valladolid's regiments to occupy the mining center of Guanajuato, enlisting en route support from Indian pueblos; and the radical decision to seek the collaboration of the colony's native peoples at Valladolid, in surrounding towns and in the sierra by proclaiming the elimination of the offensive, racist, social category of *casta*, the head tax (*tributo*), and the community funds (*cajas de comunidad*) of Indian

pueblos. These had been drawn down ruthlessly in recent decades to meet metropolitan financial needs—steps Mexico City's *criollos* had avoided in 1808, but which struck Valladolid's plotters' assurance that "nadie habría que no siguiese el Partido."[80] They seem to have aimed for a joint movement of elites and masses—a remarkable preview of the insurgency to be led by Padre Miguel Hidalgo from Dolores to Guadajuato.

Probably the most "discursibo" and radical plotter, Fray Vicente Santa María, who may have been the conspiracy's "director psicológico intelectual," suggested approaching the Amerindian communities, a strategy other conspirators shared. The interest of Valladolid's *criollos*—whites or near whites (*euro-mestizos*)—in forming a united front with native peoples emerges in the testimony of seventy-two-year-old Pedro Rosales, "Yndio Cacique" of Valladolid's Amerindian "barrio de San Pedro," and "alguacil mayor de Cruzada" as well as plain "panadero." García Obeso, a member of the colony's emergent bourgeoisie, admitted to "manejando . . . copiosos intereses . . . dos casas de comercio, una hacienda, tres diezmatorios, dos obrajes, la administración de rentas del convento de monjas . . . y del Colegio de Niños y la Colectoría General de Vacantes de todo el Obispado." García Obeso summoned Rosales to his Valladolid home on 20 December, telling him to bring along his "Yndios" the next morning because "*estos Gachupines nos quieren aqui, nostros somos Yndianos Yndios, todos somos unos. Yo tambien soy Indiano*."[81]

Absence of a *criollo* and Indian counterforce to block European armed units had accounted for Yermo's smooth operation in the 1808 coup. Unlike the English colonies in North America, where the colonial system had fostered local government of limited representation before 1776 (in historian Carlos María Bustamante's view, London had conceded "ciertas sombras de libertad a semejanza de la que disfrutan los moradores de las márgenes del Támesis"),[82] in the colony of New Spain as in other Spanish colonies in America, only by initially overwhelming imperial authorities and their armed forces could new representative bodies form. This was the lesson New Spain's *criollos* drew from the Europeans' preemptive coup against a European viceroy in 1808.

The Valladolid plot ended in near disaster, since months of conspiracy produced doubt, anxiety, fear, ultimately some defections, and, worse, informers and mindless leaks. Local colonial authorities (interim intendant José Alonso Terán and the garrison commander Lieutenant-Colonel Juan José Martínez de Lejarza) learned of the conspiracy through various channels. Intendant Terán may have had wind of the movement around 14 December from an "eclesiástico de carácter y respeto," perhaps a Michelena

relative, Prebendado Juan José de Michelena, or another local clergyman, Francisco de la Concha Castañeda.[83] Concha probably reported that *criollos* would defend the colony in the name of the Bourbon dynasty against the French or English, convinced that the Junta Central "capitularía, entregando este Reyno a una de las naciones insinuadas, para cuyo caso tenían por sospechosos a todos los Gachupines." This, he believed, would provide the pretext; Concha understood that in Mexico City, Guanajuato, Querétaro, and Celaya "había la misma disposición que aqui."[84] Lieutenant-Colonel Lejarza, however, received an anonymous note incriminating García Obeso, the Michelenas, and Abarca.

On 20 December, the day preceding the planned uprising, Mariano Michelena and García Obeso suspected a leak to authorities. Michelena, who may have already decided to abandon the enterprise, burned his version of the plan on that evening, while García Obeso tried to cancel arrangements for calling *indios* into the city. Also on 20 December postmaster Luís Gonzaga Correa, a minor conspirator, blurted to a Celaya priest, Juan Antonio Lecuona, that he had met the day before with the Michelenas, García Obeso, and Abarca, "y se trataba de un lebantamiento sin que corriera sangre," noting that "había plan, es cierto, por que el mismo Michelena lo quemó anoche a mi vista."[85] Meanwhile, uninhibited Santa María himself may have boasted to a fellow priest that thousands of Indians awaited "el grito o rompimiento de revolución." A member of his convent scribbled immediately to Viceroy Lizana, who ordered Terán to arrest Santa María; Terán, however, delayed jailing the other plotters, García Obeso, the Michelenas, and Abarca.[86] He may have been wary of precipitate action in a provincial center rife with mutual suspicion between *criollos*, or he may have wanted to let the other conspirators step back from the precipice.

If Santa María was the most radical conspirator, García Obeso—merchant, *hacendado*, manufacturer, military officer, and a *criollo* notable—was the acknowledged leader.[87] In the evening of 20 December the plotters assigned him military and political authority for the intended coup; by early next morning he had two moments of awesome decision making, forced to choose between "la fuerza o . . . la fuga."[88] The first came when he learned that Santa María had been arrested, signaling that Terán and Lejarza had been alerted by an informer or informants; yet there still remained time for a hurried meeting in his townhouse to decide on the next step. Or, perhaps García Obeso had already ruled out force the day before, when he had countermanded his arrangement with local *cacique* Rosales to gather an Indian contingent? When Rosales returned to García Obeso's residence, the latter surprised him with "Hombre, ya no se necesita para nada." Once Ro-

sales reminded him that many *indios* alerted to come into town would lose a day's wages, García Obeso ordered twenty pesos taken from his tienda's cashbox and wrapped—Rosales recalled graphically—in a "paño blanco de Cambray" to be paid to the *jornaleros*.[89] According to José Nicolás de Michelena's account, the conspirators hastily met again in García Obeso's home, agreed to protect Santa María or, if necessary, to liberate him by force, and to alert collaborators elsewhere "para que estuviesen prontos" at Maravatío, Zinapécuaro, and Pátzcuaro.[90] This was hardly a group decision to take up arms against colonial authorities; the plotters were not pushing events but waiting for them. They did not have long to wait. At seven that evening, the Michelenas's other brother, Dr. Juan José Michelena, spilled the plot and plotters to Intendant Terán.[91] Later that evening the second moment of truth followed, when garrison commander Lejarza cited the plotters to appear at his quarters, rather than marching them under arrest in public view through the center of Valladolid. They agreed to go to Lejarza and begin the revolution if Lejarza tried to arrest them.[92]

García Obeso bore heavy responsibility because he had to speak for all. He was the thirty-three-year-old son of a prosperous Spanish merchant, owner of a fine residence located among Valladolid's other fine homes; a neighbor was another prosperous European *negociante*, José Joaquín de Iturbide, father of army officer Agustin de Iturbide. García Obeso's multiple role as merchant, landowner, and manufacturer created uncommon status. These roles put him in frequent contact and competition with members of local resident European merchants; unlike the Mexico City situation, Valladolid's *criollo* businessmen were probably not dominated by Spanish *almaceneros*. Competition and the Europeans' links to colleagues at Mexico City and overseas at Cadiz may well have been the source of the mutual dislike and suspicion heating up in Valladolid in December 1809.

García Obeso was well aware that no incriminating papers were evident at the moment; Michelena had wisely destroyed the plan the night before. He also understood that colonial authorities were reluctant to make martyrs of dissident prominent *criollos* in provincial centers as well as in the capital. Memory of the deaths of *criollos* Primo y Verdad and Talamantes at Veracruz after imprisonment remained vivid; and we must recall the colonial authorities' wary handling of the outspoken *criollo* mining magnate, the marqués de Rayas.

Furthermore, it is plausible that the conspirators had decided there was no point in resisting arrest when they arrived at the office of the garrison commander on 21 December and that the best course was to deny plotting, on the ground that their economic concerns hardly warranted involvement

in revolutionary activity. Months later to justify contacts with "la Indiada de aquellos barrios" as a tactic to curb potential Indian violence, García Obeso offered a plausible property holders' and businessmen's rationale. Considering the extent of his business activity, he pointed out during interrogation that "no es creíble que estando en mi juicio, quisiese comprometerme en una acción que no me producía otro fruto que el notable atrazo o total pérdida de mis intereses, pués en una sublevación se precipita la plebe sin discernimiento alguno sobre los que tienen bienes, para saciar su desenfrenada codicia y atroz pillaje." This was straightforward class interest shared by property owners colonial or colonialist; long before industrial capitalism, the lower orders were dangerous. García Obeso here was presenting a convenient cover story revealing much of the psychology of the *criollo* businessman. Of course, he coolly granted that a "revolución" might tempt a man of business on the edge of bankruptcy, but his financial situation placed him above "los que aspiran mejorar de suerte en las desaveniencias públicas." His defense suggests the countryside of the colony held many to whom anticolonialism might offer a special form of liberation.[93]

In this light one may appreciate García Obeso's decision once inside the quarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Lejarza. Mariano Michelena, who was there too, put it succinctly. "García calló y nada se hizo de lo acordado, pués según después nos dijo, le pareció que en tal situación no quedabamos tan mal, y que sin duda el negocio terminaría pronto; que el peligro no era grande, y que nuestros recursos quedaban intactos" and other collaborators undetected. In these circumstances, all could count upon "confianza en nuestra posición, relaciones y aura popular." Indeed, "posición" in Valladolid society and its wide networks served them well. In Valladolid the Michelenas's cousin, Antonio Labarrieta (a friend of the curate of Dolores, Miguel Hidalgo) joined others in defending the accused, using as their motive the desire to defend the colony against invasion if—as many in the colony feared—the metropole's resistance collapsed. Transferred for trial to Mexico City, the conspirators hired as their legal counsel the *criollo* son of a Spanish merchant in Oaxaca, Carlos María de Bustamante.[94]

The deeper that *asesor* and interim intendant Terán pursued his investigation into the Valladolid affair, the more he found it a political minefield. Involvement of the "indiada de los barrios" of the provincial capital by members of the *criollo* elite was an ominous finding, leading to intensive interrogation of at least five Indian community leaders, the *caciques*.[95] More worrisome, their testimony revealed that in the evening of 21 December, Soto Saldaña—a conspirator not jailed that day—had met with *indios* to plan to liberate the jailed conspirators.[96] Next, investigators in checking

one lead after another interrogated clergymen who had been Terán's informants, while others were used to check on the presumed subversive activities of friends and acquaintances.[97] The use of clergy as informants was not publicized lest the clergy be compromised as part of the state security apparatus. Even the respected bishop-elect of Michoacan, Abad y Queipo, participated in questioning a priest (Manuel Lloredo) confined to the Carmen convento along with Fray Santa María.[98] Most troublesome, those arrested—all *criollos*—were respected members of Valladolid's provincial elite, and their motives for conspiracy against colonial authorities were likely shared by other colonials alienated by the hegemony of the European community. Such considerations inspired Intendant Terán in mid-January 1810 to recommend suspending the local investigation and its transferal to Mexico City.[99]

One can imagine the accumulated pressures on Viceroy Archbishop Lizana in January when Terán provided details on the progress of his investigation and those investigated. Lizana understood why the Junta Central had sidelined Garibay, and its colonial policy seemed only superficially designed to appease colonial dissatisfaction. He was also aware that the Junta Central was postponing decision on the charges of disloyalty against ex-viceroy Iturrigaray lodged by the hardly impartial Audiencia de Mexico, because the Junta Central knew of the continued sensitivity in the colony to the *europeos*' role in the overthrow of the viceroy and its consequences. Aside from Lizana's view of the justice of the colonials' complaints, he understood the importance of maintaining colonials' faith in the promises of the Junta Central and in the evenhandedness of the viceregal administration, all the more since wealthy colonials and New Spain's religious organizations (to which *criollos* were large benefactors) were major funding sources for donations and loans to the fragile Junta Central. "Si ese Reyno no nos ayude como hemos menester," a clear-eyed Cadiz merchant commented in correspondence with Mexico City's Consulado, "será el, y Cadiz, el restaurador de la Monarquía."[100] Moreover, Lizana's publicized failure to deport *oidor* Aguirre or to prevent the *golpistas*' agents from leaving for Cadiz spotlighted his inability to control European members of the colonial civil service and the commercial community that insisted on a hardline policy for colonial dissidents. Perhaps to check into Terán's recommendation to suspend the inquiry and transfer the case and defendants to Mexico City, Lizana turned to a fellow Spanish cleric, the knowledgeable bishop-elect of Michoacan who shared Lizana's empathy for New Spain's *criollo* elite—"la clase media alta, los ilustrados, los militares de Carrera."[101] Abad y Queipo confirmed Terán's position, pointing out that further grilling of members of

Valladolid's "familias ilustres y beneméritos"—even were they later cleared of charges—would generate "muchos, graves e irreparables perjuicios."[102] The bishop-elect was a sensitive colonialist, and far-sighted.

Consistent, therefore, with his role as mediator among the colony's factionalized and fractioned elites, Lizana had the Valladolid inquiry transferred to the capital in March, freed García Obeso and the Michelenas ("con el obgeto de atender a la subsistencia de sus familias y conservación de sus negociaciones") but confined to the city limits of Valladolid, and at the end of April dispersed García Obeso (to army units at San Luís Potosí commanded by Colonel Emparán, Gabriel de Yermo's collaborator), Mariano Michelena (to a unit at Jalapa), while Nicolás Michelena and Fray Santa María were placed in confinement in Mexico City.[103] As news of the Valladolid investigation ("una muy secreta y reservada conversación") spread and Lizana's discreet handling infuriated ultrarightists in the European community, Lizana felt compelled to make his "sistema" explicit and to emphasize his evenhandedness as New Spain's chief colonial officer and archbishop—as he phrased it, "con el bastón de virey en una mano, y el báculo pastoral en la otra."[104] In a late January proclamation in which he tried to lower the anxiety level of the Spanish community, Lizana discounted rumors of "leves acaecimietos y . . . desavenencias privadas" at Valladolid, Querétaro, and Mexico City, which he trivialized by ascribing them to "la mala inteligencia" about developments in the metropole or to "falsas imposturas en que se ha desahogado el resentimiento personal." This was a pallid reference to the imminent collapse of the Junta Central and of resistance in the metropole and to persistent intra-elite factionalism between *criollos* and *europeos*. He intended to pursue his policy of supporting the innocent and—an obvious allusion to the Valladolid affair—"corregir las equivocaciones y ligereza" of others, treating everyone with "igual amor y consideración."[105] Lizana glimpsed the fire under the embers.

With this public statement, Lizana and his supporters sought to shore up the crumbling authority of the colonial state. It was a skillful way to individualize, personalize, and hopefully minimize what was a spreading mass phenomenon, alienation from the Spanish colonial system. On balance, Lizana offered a plea for moderation and mutual understanding by a colonial officer after six months of turbulent events. It came, however, when the new government now in refuge at Cadiz, the Regencia, was already moving away from the Junta Central's wavering moderation and shifting markedly rightward. Evidently, according to the private correspondence of Europeans in the colonial government service, the merchant groups of Mexico City and Veracruz along with colleagues overseas at Cadiz scorned Lizana's policy for

social peace in the colony as "una deferencia y un disímulo verdaderamente criminales" toward "los americaanos sediciosos," and his approach toward their "crímenes" as "una impunidad escandalosa."[106] Pressure-group tactics of colonial interests at Cadiz and overseas in the American colonies reinforced the rightward drift of the newly formed and reformed Regencia: its removal of a regent (Fernández de León), whose presumed empathy for the colonials' predicament was well known at Cadiz, replacing him quickly with a proven conservative, Lardizábal; the Regencia's refusal to suspend Iturrigaray's pending case; and, on 22 February, its decision to replace Viceroy Lizana with the interim appointment of the Audiencia de Mexico known for its commitment to justify the coup against Iturrigaray. Lizana's removal publicized in mid-May was widely—and accurately—attributed in the colony to the "grande influjo que tenía en aquel gobierno el comercio de Cadiz, de quien fué obra, y estaba conexionada con el de Mexico por sus intereses."[107]

24. The Regencia's *Comisionados* and Bishop-Elect Abad y Queipo

Al disolverse la Junta [Centeral] y empezar la Regencia, todo el mundo vió que la España estaba en inminente riesgo de perder las Américas.
Blanco White, *El Español*, 30 January 1811

El fin de las provincias ultramarinas es el beneficio de la metrópoli a quien debe el ser.
Yandiola, "Informe de . . . Yandiola, Noriega y Luyando acerca del estado de Nueva España"

[Los *criollos*] quisieran mandar solos y ser propietarios exclusivos.
Abad y Queipo, "Representación a la primera Regencia"

Prometerles siempre mucho, pero jamás cumplir nada, sino de palabra.
Beye de Cisneros, *Comercio libre*

When politically astute Blanco White, editor of the voice of Spanish reformers, *El Español*, commented from the safety of London about events in Andalusia in January and February of 1810 that "no hubo hombre de medianas luces que no la [independencia] tubiera por segura en la dispersion de la Junta Central, y entrada de los franceses en Andalucía," he revealed the depth of the radical transformation of the political situation in Spain and America since September 1808.[1] Then the Junta Central had been welcomed by those of the resistance in Spain and supporters in the colonies, by segments of the *criollo* and *europeo* elites as symbol of unity that a Regencia should have provided. Eighteen months later, dissolution of the Junta Central sapped by its struggle to reconcile irreconcilable pressures at home and abroad made colonials question the legitimacy of the recently installed Regencia. Again, to cite Blanco White, "Al disolverse la Junta, y empezar la Regencia . . . todo el mundo vió que la España estaba en inminente riesgo

de perder las Américas."[2] What had been the most auspicious phenomenon in 1808, the unity of *criollo* and *europeo* elites, had become gravely compromised two years later. In New Spain as elsewhere in the Spanish colonial world, there was now a sharply segmented audience to which the Regencia had to direct its attention.

Addressing demands of different constituencies at Cadiz and in the colonies guided the ambiguities of the Regencia's colonial policy from the outset. In the colonies were two elite social groups, one *criollo* or *americano,* the other *peninsular* or *europeo*; at Cadiz there was a comparable segmentation between reformist elements in the high civil service and the Consejo Reunido de España e Indies backed by a majority of the merchant community dominating the nineteen-member Junta de Cadiz and Cadiz's compliant military governor, General Francisco Xavier Venegas. The tactics of ambiguity in the form of delay practiced by the Junta Central over eighteen months reappeared in the regents' actions in February 1810. Not until 3 March were its first decisions officially mailed to Mexico City, where the official press fed only selected items to the colony's political elite, which remained news-starved, expectant, and skeptical of the managed press. This is not to claim that unofficial reports of the Regencia's activities did not enter private correspondence from Cadiz, Malaga, or Havana. What we do know is that Cadiz's Junta tried to withhold official mail to the American colonies by suspending ships' departures in January and February of 1810.

The regents along with the Junta at Cadiz had good reason to delay outgoing official news in February, the Regencia's first month in office. The collapse of the Junta Central from internal dissent and military disasters, the rancor of Sevilla's Junta, and the disapproval of the Junta de Cadiz might, if reported abroad immediately, regenerate aspirations for autonomous movements in the colonies. A satisfactory explanation was needed to cover the suspiciously abrupt removal of a regent, Fernández de León, who understood (and might even sympathize with) the factors behind colonial discontent, and his replacement by Miguel de Lardizábal, a civil servant absent from the colony of New Spain for decades, who was thus peninsular- rather than colony-oriented. More important, since among the commercial groups at Caracas, Havana, Veracruz, and Mexico City many hoped the Regencia would value León's views on imperial trade issues, news of his removal might heighten colonials' suspicions. Finally, no sooner had the Regencia first accepted and then discharged León, it seemed indecisive in handling Viceroy Iturrigaray's case, an explosive issue to partisans at Cadiz and in New Spain.

Encouraged by hope that the recently installed Regencia might view

his case favorably (on 7 February the regents had dismissed the charge of disloyalty),[3] Iturrigaray quickly petitioned minister Hormazas rather than the conservative Consejo Reunido on or before 8 February to dismiss his case or permit him and his family to move to Havana while his case was pending. He also requested that his salary be paid or that his capital invested in New Spain's mines be released. On the surface, these were hardly uncommon requests, and within two days the Regencia released his salary with permission to reside in either the peninsula or the Balearics. Heartened, Iturrigaray went one step further, petitioning for the release of his embargoed funds. To watchful Cadiz *negociantes*, these were signs in the wind that the Regencia might even exonerate the controversial former viceroy, precisely what *europeos* at Veracruz, Mexico City, and Zacatecas feared when they commissioned as their agents to Cadiz Berazaluce and Mier in late 1809. Sensitive to the Cadiz business community and its friends overseas at Veracruz and Mexico City—the Regencia's survival depended on their financial support—Minister Hormazas solicited advice on the Regencia's decision from the governmental body sure to uphold the views of Cadiz, the Consejo Reunido. One of its members, Manuel de Lardizábal, was the brother of the regent who had replaced the open-minded Fernández de León. There was, moreover, a communications link from the Europeans of Mexico City to Miguel de Lardizábal: Gabriel de Yermo's confessor, Monteagudo, shared confidences with Rafael de Lardizábal, the Lardizábals' nephew and a *contador* in the colonial postal service, who passed them along to his uncle.[4] Within days Hormazas had the opinion he wanted: the Consejo Reunido accepted in toto the recommendation of one of its two *fiscales*, either José Colón de Larreátegui or Nicolás María Sierra.

The Consejo Reunido made no pretense of neutrality in Iturrigaray's case. It found that he had been properly "procesado y obligado a responder de su *conducta* a *la nación*"; his was "la causa mas ruidosa de cuantos se haya formado en el tiempo de nuestra gloriosa revolución," one attentively followed by the "público de ambos mundos" since Iturrigaray's conduct "es de la peor opinada por voz general." It was, the Consejo judged, the justifiably suspicious "pueblo" (López Cancelada's term) which "por una marcada desconfianza de su conducta, no solo le quita el mando, se apodera y prende su persona, y embarga sus bienes, sino que lo conduce preso con otros varios reos a la peninsula." The legal logic of the biased *fiscal* of the Consejo Reunido was inexorable: since Mexico City's European community ("el pueblo") had doubted the viceroy's loyalty and therefore deported him to the peninsula for trial, how the Regencia handled his case would

reflect upon the peninsular resistance movement ("nuestra gloriosa revolución") as well as "opinión pública" in the capital. The loyalty of Europeans overseas in New Spain was uppermost: What, the Consejo's *fiscal* asked rhetorically, would "América Septentrional" think of the Regencia's benign treatment of a viceroy who "ha prostituido su alta dignidad con excesos"? By releasing Iturrigaray from confinement and granting him salary and access to his funds, the Regencia would clear him of disloyalty by indirection—"doloroso para el pueblo de Mexico," which had reason to doubt "sus sentimientos . . . patrióticos" and stripped him of his command. The sentiments of the Consejo Reunido were as hard-nosed as those of Mexico City's *golpistas* of 1808.

It was transparent that the Consejo Reunido wanted the Regencia's approval of the coup d'état by the *europeos*. Otherwise, it warned, there would occur an "escándalo grande" with serious consequences once Mexico City learned that the regents had disavowed the *golpistas*' conduct without proper judicial review while at the same time honoring a viceroy "que se adquiría por su conducta la execreción pública."[5] However, despite what was more reprimand than recommendation by the Consejo Reunido, the Regencia let stand orders freeing Iturrigaray along with his financial resources, because it feared alienating what it knew were Iturrigaray's largely *criollo* supporters in the colony. In the same conciliatory vein to *criollo* elites in New Spain and other colonies in America, only one week earlier (14 February) the Regencia had approved printing and distribution of Manuel José Quintana's electrifying manifesto to *criollos*, his *españoles americanos*, remarkable for its condemnation of the "indiferencia . . . codicia y . . . ignorancia" of former colonial administrators whether ministers at cabinet level, viceroys, or governors.[6]

Still the regents proved unwilling or incapable of committing themselves to unambiguous support of colonials' grievances. They tried to maintain the middle ground: they refrained from reprimanding the Junta de Cadiz and the city's military governor for issuing on 28 February what was in effect an unauthorized countermanifesto to Quintana's, one directed to *europeos* overseas in the colonies. The Junta de Cadiz took credit justifiably for the appointment of the avowedly conservative Miguel de Lardizábal to the Regencia, extolled Cadiz's financial and commercial resources, and appealed for the support of Cadiz's friends overseas in the "pueblos de América." The two contrasting manifestoes were clearly targeted at different constituencies in the colonies: Quintana's (and perhaps Cadiz's) was among official papers entrusted to the Regencia's *comisario* José Luyando when he sailed to Ve-

racruz on or about 3 March 1810. Luyando also carried another example of the Regencia's ambiguous tactics: its order of 22 February removing unceremoniously New Spain's mediating-minded viceroy, Archbishop Lizana.[7]

Luyando's official announcements along with recommendations on how to publicize peninsular developments, which he delivered at Mexico City at the end of April, were the first official news from Cadiz since mid-January 1810. Colonial authorities had to confess what many had surmised; that three months (to be precise, one hundred days) had passed without receiving "ni un solo periódico de la Peninsula."[8] This was the situation that the colony's politically aware had deduced from the often confusing and usually jejeune items printed in the colonial government's managed press, the *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, which had been markedly vacuous in the first months of 1810.

To be sure, for more than a year New Spain's political class had recognized news manipulation, certainly after reading López Cancelada's misleading reports on the September 1808 coup. Readers interpreted editorial policy as "no debía publicarse cosa que desanimará la Nación," although authorities knew that their screening of peninsular news stimulated "espíritus impacientes y desconfiados" to predict "algunas consequencias funestas en la Peninsula." Others less generous to, and far more critical of, government disinformation policy considered official reports simply "alterado" or "con falcedad."[9]

News Management: The *Gazeta del gobierno de México*

Content analysis of the *Gazeta* in the critical months of February, March, and April of 1810, when colonial readers anticipated the Junta Central's collapse and the end of resistance in the peninsula, reveals how the colonial government sought desperately to preserve the loyalty of New Spain's influential elites. It alternated reports about New Spain's generous financial support of the metropolitan government with confusing announcements of the ever-postponed Cortes. To cajole donations and loans from New Spain's "particulares, cuerpos y comunidades," the *Gazeta* mixed French threats to Spain's colonial commercial policy with lists of prominent donors and lenders. In February 1810 it noted pointedly—and accurately, in this instance—that in the spring of 1808 as French forces were entering Spain, Bonaparte en route to Bayonne had promised Bordeaux's merchants and manufacturers to "abrir los puertos en la América del Sur, donde despacharían con ventajas sus manufacturas," to which it added one week later a list of those whose properties had been confiscated by José Bonaparte's

regime at Madrid.[10] This was followed by an article to the effect that the Junta Central had published a list of New Spain's prominent subscribers to its first loans, and in a subsequent issue informed readers that the Junta Central intended to float a fresh loan of 46 million pesos, 40 million assigned to "América" (readers knew this was shorthand for the colony of New Spain). Then appeared the names of selected lenders to the Junta Central: the European mine owners at Zacatecas who had supported the coup against Iturrigaray—Rétegui, Apecechea, Iriarte, and Pemartin.[11] To spur gifts for arms purchases, the *Gazeta* publicized prominent private and institutional donors, mainly Mexico City's religious corporations, European *almaceneros*, and, to be sure, the Consulado de Mexico.[12] To loosen the purse strings of the many immigrants from the Liévana (Asturias) in Mexico City's European community, the *Gazeta* planted an item on the participation of the Liévana's inhabitants in the resistance to the French.[13] And it also listed literally hundreds of donors among the colony's low-level civil servants (many in the state-owned tobacco monopoly) and the clergy—their contributions totaling almost 2 million pesos by June.[14] Colonial administrators rewarded the generosity of the colony's wealthy donors and lenders by referring to the "muestra de los inmensos recursos" offered to Spaniards by their "hermanos de América," labeling New Spain as the "glorioso monumento del imperio español . . . el apoyo y fundamento de [las] mas dulces esperanzas" and the Spanish Empire's "último recurso . . . como un gran roca en el océano"—even implying that the Junta Central, if obliged to abandon the peninsula, might proceed to "la capital de la Nueva España, centro de tanta lealtad y patriotismo."[15] This was precisely what Godoy had contemplated at Aranjuez in March 1808.

While appeals to finance the Junta Central were doubtless aimed at wealthy religious corporations and the core of European merchants, precisely those with major stakes in the colonial order and enjoying liquidity, the editor of the *Gazeta* did not overlook dissidents in the colonial political class chaffing at their inferior status yet not fully alienated from the colonial order. These the *Gazeta* tempted with frequent promise of a Cortes, which would be a forum for public airing of colonial complaints. The *Gazeta*'s campaign began in mid-January 1810 with the announcement that the Junta Central on 28 October 1809 had fixed the Cortes's convocation for January "del año próximo," presumably aiming for early 1810. Obviously that date had already passed. In mid-March the *Gazeta* published a fourteen-month-old notice of the Junta Central (January 1809) promising that were a Cortes to be held in March 1810, metropolitan authorities would themselves have to choose colonial representatives from among "Americanos" resident in

Spain. Did this imply that the metropolitan government in refuge at Sevilla or Cadiz distrusted the kind of *diputados* the colonial elites might choose to represent them? However, for most Spain-watchers in the colony, the immediate preoccupation was the fate of the Junta Central rather than the ever-postponed Cortes. At the end of March the *Gazeta* reported that on 16 January the Junta Central intended to abandon Sevilla for the Isla de León near Cadiz and "reunite" there on 1 February.[16] It is intriguing to speculate on the apparent delay in publishing this item since it may have arrived one, even two weeks earlier; equally intriguing was the insertion in the *Gazeta*'s 17 April issue of an advertisement for a memoir on "la libertad política de la imprenta" that the Junta Central's commission on the Cortes had sponsored.[17] Was it an example of the Junta's schizophrenia, simply Quintana's initiative, or sly reference to press developments in England and the United States? In any event, the *Gazeta*'s readers must have absorbed this advertisement with disbelief.

News from the metropole was turning disheartening, and the *Gazeta*'s editor and the colonial administration intended to blunt its impact. At the end of April, colonial authorities began to ready the *Gazeta*'s readers for "varias notícias melancólicas" and then, in the 28 April issue, published that French troops had indeed occupied Sevilla. Only after Commissioner Luyando had debarked at Veracruz on 28 April did the *Gazeta* print the first official news of the fate of the Junta Central. At stake was the possible reprise of the colonial elite's move in 1808 toward autonomy at that moment of crisis in the metropole. A one-page extra edition on 1 May reported that the Junta Central had formed a Consejo de Regencia, listing its initial membership. But three days went by while colonial authorities digested Luyando's materials and scheduled the order of publication.

Possibly the *Gazeta*'s editor and official censors wanted time to sift the political "line" of the materials they saw in the *Gazeta del comercio de Cádiz* covering the rocky weeks from 25 January to 1 March, which Luyando must have delivered as instructed. Then, on 4 May, the *Gazeta* referred ambiguously to the collapse of the Junta Central ("una autoridad que por la fuerza de las cosas ya no tenía ni vigor para obrar, ni impulso para moverse"), reported receipt of Quintana's rousing manifesto, announced the Regencia's intention to call a Cortes once the military situation improved, and confessed without guile that the "grandes notícias" just printed left the authorities "en la mayor obscuridad acerca de los hechos intermediarios. No sabemos . . . ni las fechas en que han acaecido sucesos tan varios." Other disturbing news was withheld until 8 and 11 May when items appeared, which New Spain's political class recognized instantly as the result of Junta

de Cadiz pressure, that Lardizábal had replaced Fernández de León as a regent and that the Regencia had ousted Viceroy Archbishop Lizana without naming a permanent successor. An embarrassed and mortified Lizana was ordered to turn over the government "sin dilación" to an interim replacement, the Audiencia de Mexico, "de quien menos confiaba el público."[18]

Another week had to pass before there appeared the Regencia's sanitized version of events leading to its formation—"una revolución," it asserted, "hecho sin sangre, sin violencia, sin conspiración, sin intriga; producida por la fuerza de las cosas mismas." Somehow the Junta Central had metamorphized into the Regency without hallmarks of the French Revolution or Napoleon's coup d'état of 1799.[19] The purported absence of conspiracy or violence, not to overlook the deliberately obfuscating "force of circumstance," perhaps raised the eyebrows of New Spain's skeptical. The *Gazeta* of 18 May also carried the full text of Quintana's manifesto, which colonial authorities had deliberately withheld for three weeks; May closed with two days of state-sponsored ritual designed to impress upon elite and masses the fiction, if not the reality, of continuity: Fernando VII's birthday was celebrated with prolonged bell-ringing, evening illumination of public and private edifices in the center city, artillery salvos, military bands, a high mass, and a street ceremony in honor of the Virgin of the *europeos*, Nuestra Señora de los Remedios.[20] Similar indoctrination through religious and secular ritual was repeated in provincial capitals and in rural areas.

Yet no amount of state ritual sanctified by church bells could conceal that the Junta Central had collapsed, paralyzed by irreconcilable interest-group conflict. How else interpret the *Gazeta*'s baroque reference to the Central's lack of "vigor" and "impulso"? For critical residents in the colony, the Junta Central had nourished hope for a revival of imperial reform; now its disappearance under suspect circumstance had produced a Regencia of reactionary drift. Its initial decisions could not seem otherwise to those suspicious of Cadiz. It replaced Fernández de León, permitted printing and distribution of the Junta de Cadiz's countermanifesto to Quintana's (of course, the *Gazeta* did not reprint his), ousted unceremoniously a viceroy-archbishop acceptable to alienated *criollos* only to install his uncompromising Audiencia opponents, and—last but hardly least—assigned to the mouthpiece of Cadiz's merchant community, its Junta, management of "todas las rentas de la corona y su dirección" (noted at the bottom of the last page of the edition of 26 June).

The political and financial ascendance of the Cadiz commercial community and its overseas supporters was now beyond question. Particularly damaging to those in New Spain seeking to restore an elite consensus, the

Regencia continued the Junta Central's policy of ambiguity. On the one hand, it put in control of the colony the Audiencia that had supported (if it had not initiated) the *golpe* against Viceroy Iturrigaray; selected and legitimized his replacement, General Garibay; then hamstrung Garibay's successor, Lizana; and remained dominated by Aguirre, Bataller, and Sagarzurieta, who had pressed for Lizana's removal jointly with Mexico City's *europeo* businessmen. On the other, by distributing Quintana's critique of colonial oppression and exploitation, the Regencia condemned the colonial system justifying "con expresiones indiscretas todas las quejas de los americanos" and offering "una confesión de parte que no admite réplica."[21] This confession was long overdue but, coming from the Regencia, surprising and confusing—in a word, ambiguous.

The Regencia's Agents: Luyando and Yandiola

In the four months, May to September 1810, following news of recent metropolitan developments, alienation of segments of colonial society from metropole and the colonial state continued, a process initiated two years earlier by the formation of the Junta de Sevilla in Spain and the overthrow in New Spain of a popular viceroy. This was a process visible to onlookers, whether to special metropolitan intelligence agents like Luyando and Yandiola ("encargado de una misión misteriosa al principio y denigrante del honor de aquellos leales vasallos") dispatched by the Regencia or to a high clergyman like Valladolid's peninsular bishop-elect, Abad y Queipo, with decades of residence in a major region of New Spain.[22]

The agents, first Luyando and weeks later Yandiola, found Spain's most populous and wealthy colony dangerously fractioned after three hundred years of colonialism by shocking income and cultural gaps between wealthy elites and impoverished masses, between *europeos* and *criollos*, and between *castas* and *indios*.[23] Both agents quickly established contacts: Luyando (born at Guadalajara in New Spain and perhaps the son of a former *oidor* who had served at Guadalajara and Mexico City) had relatives in the colony, including the *criollo* landowning family, the Cervantes y Padilla; he may also have been related to a *regidor* of Mexico City, Manuel Luyando y Guerrero.[24] Yandiola, a *vizcaíno,* also had relatives in Mexico City, notably *almacenero* Pedro de Garay y Llano.[25] Luyando had hoped to be an impartial agent, but he antagonized at the outset one section of the capital's political class: he associated with Audiencia ministers recognized as supporters of *golpista* Gabriel de Yermo, those whom Viceroy Iturrigaray's backers labeled "facciosos"—Aguirre (and his house guest Colonel Emparán), Bataller, and

Sagarzurieta. To Luyando's kin and acquaintances who differed with him, he seemed "hombre adherido al partido gachupín."[26] This was hardly the person to strengthen "la unión más estrecha" of colony with metropole, as his official instructions spelled out.

Yandiola and Luyando arrived as representatives of the metropolitan government but were not insensitive to colonial reality. Understanding the colonial situation, Yandiola conceded, required keeping in mind "la razón, la equidad y el mismo conocimiento del carácter, costumbres e ilustración de los que habitan esta no pequeña parte del mundo."[27] Although both were colonialists, they were not clones: Luyando, commissioned by the Regencia in its early February, short-lived liberal phase, held views of colonial trade policy not shared by Yandiola, a *comisionado* of the Regencia's subsequent conservative phase.

Both recognized the interrelation between colonial conditions and metropolitan policy, "la concurrencia . . . que hay entre las causas maléficas de Nueba España con las de la Peninsula."[28] Both would not gild the lily of colonialism; they were too realist. Overall, they concurred on the metropole's long-term mismanagement of the colony, the structural factor behind New Spain's instability. This they found rooted in the Europeans' view of New Spain as "Objeto alhagueño a su ambición y a su tiranía" rather than a "free province."[29] There was also their colonialist attitude toward those born in the colony, which fueled the colonials' bitterness and rivalry and led many to view "los gachupines como unos verdaderos enemigos."[30] More recently, decentralization of the colonial administration among many metropolitan ministries had proved counterproductive since the ministries' directives were often contradictory, giving colonial authorities "puertas . . . abiertas para hacer su negocio particular."[31] In fact, they found that colonial civil servants showed disquieting indications of arbitrary, even despotic authority: "En una palabra, en toda la América no se ha hecho lo que el gobierno ha hecho sino lo que más en voluntad a los que alli mandan."[32]

Neither Luyando nor Yandiola had kind words for Charles IV's administration dominated by his adviser and virtual prime minister Manuel Godoy, or for what they considered his creature, Viceroy Iturrigaray. Both of the Regencia's *comisionados* predicted the scenario after the occupation of Andalusia by French troops and the possible collapse of a Regencia of doubtful legitimacy: an uncontested metropolitan government controlled by French interests would ask the Spanish colonies in America to renew their loyalty to the government at Madrid, the very issue Iturrigaray and his supporters had to contemplate in 1808. This, in the view of the *comisionados*, colonial elites would reject, opting for temporary autonomy easily shifted toward real in-

dependence. It was plausible that the *comisionados* prognosticated that the colonials would choose autonomy if a metropolitan government of resistance collapsed before superior forces; entirely implausible was Luyando's fabrication of a French conspiracy ("agencia napoleónica") in the colony as the source of the desire for autonomy and his prediction that the French-controlled government at Madrid would offer the controversial, long withheld "el comercio abierto a los extrangeros" to maintain the loyalty of New Spain.[33] (This might be construed as a backhanded expression of the hopes of some colonial elites for more unrestricted trade exchanges with the non-Spanish world.)

Given the purpose of their appointment by the Regencia, their metropolitan orientation and familial and social contacts at Mexico City and Veracruz, neither Luyando nor Yandiola took issue with a major factor alienating *criollos* from the metropole—the overthrow of Viceroy Iturrigaray. It was clearly too explosive. Luyando failed to mention it while Yandiola referred to Iturrigaray's "gobierno sórdido . . . su conducta ambígua en los asuntos sagrados de la Patria" and to the *golpistas* of 1808 as "los amigos de la Patria" or as "los europeos sí, los buenos patriotas."[34] Not what was done or how in September 1808, but rather its unforeseen divisive effects troubled the agents. Garibay, they judged, had proved totally inadequate; Lizana, who "produxo males considerables en su tiempo," was hardly an improvement; and the Audiencia "dividida entre sí, fué inerte y nula en las cosas más esenciales."[35] And by failing to adopt an explicitly critical view of the still pending case against ex-viceroy Iturrigaray, neither Junta Central nor Regencia satisfied pro- or contra-Iturrigaray factions. In fact, Iturrigaray's presence at Cadiz, Yandiola believed, "llevó a España sus agravios y resentimientos, e hizo que la Junta Central, y aún el Consejo de Regencia decayesen de las ideas sublimes que . . . concibieron de su gobierno estos habitantes."[36] The *comisionados* recognized the dangerous fault line that now separated the colony's *europeos* and *criollos*.

Yandiola, a Basque in Mexico City consorting with equally hard-line Basques Aguirre and Yermo, who had engineered Iturrigaray's removal, was impatient with those seeking accommodation rather than confrontation between colonial and metropolitan interests groups. It was precisely the ambiguous (to him) policy of successive metropolitan governments toward Iturrigaray's ouster and, equally important, toward other issues that accounted for the pervasive sense of alienation in the colony, what later became "una explosión revolucionaria." He proceeded to provide details: the Junta Central "con su vario y desigual carácter empeoró" conditions in the colony, while for its part the Regencia "proclamando la libertad civil,

prodigando gracias, desmintiendo a sus providencias los sentimientos liberales que anunciaba en sus proclamas, repitiendo igualdad en la América y en la Espana, felicitandose de haber derrocado la tiranía" only worsened the crisis and accelerated the alienation of the colonials.[37] Disaffected *criollos*, moreover, now seemed overly confident in their ability to maintain their hegemony over the colony's Native American masses. They flirted with the notion that political change—autonomy to be followed by the transition to independence—could be managed "sin . . . que se alterase el orden social."[38] Did Luyando overlook the possibility that New Spain's elites may have been encouraged by the purely political change that the British colonies in North America had recently engineered?

Major fissures in the colonial order, highly visible to the recently arrived *comisionados*, they interpreted as dividing New Spain's elites or threatening them with upheaval from below. Both—from their perspective of recent upheaval in Europe—were convinced that some form of land reform ("repartimiento de la tierra") could no longer be postponed; what is striking is that this loomed so large to the Regencia's agents. Was this because, to cite Yandiola, the colony had been isolated from "ideas liberales" and that Spaniards had taught *criollos* so to isolate native Americans that their *pueblos* knew neither God nor King, but only the authority of the district officer and parish priest? These figures were "Hombres poderosos . . . [que] prevalecieron hasta el mayor grado sobre la última clase desidiosa, naturalmente comprimida y exterminada por la esclavitud"—just like the situation in Russia.[39] Both agreed on factors alienating *criollos* from *europeos*: inequality of wealth and the consequent lower status ("consideración pública") accorded *criollos*; their resentment of Europeans' jibes at their expense ("resabios de mala educación . . . que en la Peninsula son más abundantes y pesadas entre los naturales de algunas de las provincias"); and uninterrupted decapitalization of the colony in response to metropolitan financial demands—all producing the pervasive *criollo* judgment that Europeans were "verdaderos enemigos del pais."[40]

Differences between the *comisionados* surfaced in their solutions to fundamental issues that both held largely responsible for dissatisfaction with the colonial order, specifically the latitude of economic liberty necessary to solidify colonials' support, and the direction of change in imperial commercial policy. Of the two, Luyando displayed a consistently more liberal attitude. He would remove imperial restraints on colonial land use, manufacture, and transatlantic trade while preserving those state monopolies that the metropolitan government "estime conveniente." Yandiola, however, would confine manufacture in the colony solely to coarse woolen textiles—he had

to recognize the large output of New Spain's *obrajes*—to privilege high-quality imports of woolens, silks, and linens.

The Regencia had instructed their *comisionados* to report on the "males cardinales de que adolece la Nueva España," the major factors of widespread colonial *atraso*.[41] Colonials, the regents understood, resented the underlying premise of imperial economic policy: "El fin de las provincias ultramarinas es el beneficio de la metrópoli a quien debe el ser."[42] On the sensitive issue of colonial trade—Cadiz's *negociantes*' overriding concern—Luyando came remarkably close to the position of the recently replaced regent Fernández de León: he would tolerate limited *comercio libre*, direct trade of the ports of Cuba, Venezuela, and Puerto Rico with foreign ports on the principle of equality in the imperial transatlantic system, since "Si el Peninsular puede dirigirse a los puertos extrangeros, puede tambien dirigirse a ellos el ultramarino." Such freedom of trade, on the other hand, had to be qualified to satisfy the European *almaceneros* in the colony's major commercial centers, Veracruz and Mexico City, who insisted on trade relations only with metropolitan ports and in Spanish-registry vessels. Hence Luyando's recommendation: "Debe prohibirse absolutamente la entrada en los puertos de ella [New Spain] todo buque extrangero."[43] Luyando's stand justified the opinion of his circle of contacts that he was not "adherido al partido gachupín." To the contrary, Yandiola, consistently more traditional in his approach and reflecting contacts with the Basque business community of Mexico City, confined his policy recommendations to reduction of duties and expansion of trade flows within Spain's established transatlantic commercial system.

A View from the Colony: Abad y Queipo

While both Luyando and Yandiola discerned the lines of interest cleavage in New Spain, they represented the metropolitan government's desperate effort to preserve colonial trade of Spain's wealthiest colony and were receptive to limited adjustments in colonial trade policy but resistant to radical change. These considerations may explain the *comisionados*' otherwise strange neglect of phenomenal changes in the attitude of segments of New Spain's *criollos* in the first decade of the nineteenth century. They perceived alienation, yet neither showed a sense of urgency in addressing the effects of the evolving European and colonial scene. However, to a thirty-year Asturian resident in the colony like Bishop-Elect Abad y Queipo of Michoacan, New Spain's condition in May 1810 was explosive—the colony, he wrote, was poised for "úna insurrección general."[44]

Abad was a cosmopolitan cleric well read in the literature of the Enlightenment—Montesquieu, Rousseau, Smith—cognizant of underlying shifts in the Bajío's economic and social environment since the 1780s, and on good terms with Valladolid's intellectuals including fellow cleric Miguel Hidalgo. In 1805 he protested to Viceroy Iturrigaray in behalf of Michoacan's landholders against enforcement of Consolidación. Since his illegitimate birth blocked advancement in the clerical establishment, he had to return to Spain to remove the impediment: between 1806 and 1808 he was at Madrid, then on to Paris, and in August 1808 embarked at Cadiz for New Spain. He accepted some of the changes in the course of the French Revolution but feared one of its unintended consequences, Napoleon Bonaparte, highlighting his "insaciable codicia [que] contempla a la Nueva España como un manantial inagotable de los tesoros que necesita." Needless to say, he returned to New Spain impressed by the organization, efficiency, and leadership of the French armed forces. The Regencia chose him in May 1810 as bishop-elect of Michoacan, and he would remain a confirmed royalist to the end.[45]

Abad described what he had been monitoring for years, the deterioration—to his mind—of central New Spain's small but influential bourgeoisie of landlords and smallholders, merchants, and artisans. In 1805, drawing upon financial data analyzed over two decades in serving in Michoacan's *juzgado de testamentos*, and in reviewing the finances of a large cross section of borrowers, wills, chaplaincies, and other religious foundations,[46] he had warned viceregal authorities, one must recall, about the alienating impact of metropolitan policy makers who disregarded colonial reality. In recommending suspension of Consolidación when at Madrid, he had insisted that the capital resources of the colony "no sólo no son inagotables como se cree, sino que están agotados efectivaamente." Referring to Michoacan's twenty thousand to thirty thousand borrowers among "labradores, mineros, comerciantes y artesans"—what a later age would call entrepreneurial groups that he termed *empresistas*, and subsequent analysts a budding bourgeoisie—he pinpointed the constraints on their growth: the high level of long-term decapitalization (consequently capital shortage) and the high incidence of colonial taxation, land concentration, and profit taking by wholesale importers (*almaceneros*). His criticism then was, however, muted.[47] Now in May 1810 alienation of the colony's bourgeoisie (perhaps 135,000 or about 2 percent of the population) was widespread and ominous. Somehow over the previous five years the attitude and mentality of his *criollo* and other social contacts had been transformed, and he could warn the Regencia that Nueva España was ready for "una insurrección general."

Like metropolitan agents Luyando and Yandiola, Abad in 1810 fixed on the interconnection between metropolitan and colonial developments. As a well-positioned and confirmed colonialist, he found no fundamental problem with colonialism in New Spain but rather shortcomings in the metropole. Beginning in the era of Charles IV, there had been a progressive loss of confidence in the metropolitan government's "sabiduría . . . justificación y . . . energía" accentuated by military defeat and the Junta Central's incapacity to match "la expectación general."[48] This had touched off Valladolid's recent "movimientos sediciosos" in December 1809 (Abad had been a member of an investigative commission). Defeat of Spanish forces at Ocaña and retreat southward had led to French occupation of Andalusia and total discredit of the Junta Central, triggering the colonial "explosión" at Caracas in April. Abad's conspectus of Spain's transatlantic empire was sound.

Instability in western Europe coupled to the events of 1808 in Spain loomed large in his perspective. First the "fuego eléctrico" of the French Revolution and then the triumphs of the "tirano emprendedor" forced "nuestros americanos" in 1808 to contemplate severing relations with occupied Spain and to move toward "independencia"—in this context he meant autonomy. Abad had no problem with justifying the preemptive *golpe* of September 1808, which he had to oversimplify.

Iturrigaray's "conducta ambígua" encouraged "americanos" (he avoided the word *criollo* here) to believe he shared their aspirations, thereby provoking Mexico City's "juventud europea del comercio" to remove him. (Noteworthy is Abad's omission of the role of the employers of the "juventud"—the politically powerful *almaceneros.*) The result: rivalry between "gachupines" and "criollos" worsened, and neither Garibay nor Lizana could close the gap. Still the Regencia's "liberalidad" and general confidence in "nuestro idolatrado" Fernando VII offered the chance to lower tension among the colony's main elite groups. Backing Fernando would, he argued, justify severing subordination to a French-dominated metropole and, once French occupying forces withdrew, guarantee "gobierno más justo y liberal."[49]

Especially worrisome to Abad, acute observer of New Spain's social order, was the alienation of "criollos" along with the mass of "indios" and "castas" from the Spanish colonial order. The elites, European and *criollo*, were now clearly antagonistic: *criollos* were no longer satisfied to share the colony's resources with Europeans. Now they "quisieran mandar solos y ser propietarios exclusivos." As for the remaining 80 percent of the colony's population of underclass "indios y castas": while separated from *criollos* by a gulf of "riqueza y dominio" and surviving "en un estado abyecto y miser-

able," they shared nonetheless with "españoles americanos" a clear "prevención general contra los españoles europeos" who symbolized to them "la nación dominante."[50]

The sources of Indian and *casta* alienation, to judge by Abad's analysis, were long-standing. First in importance was the social obloquy that the colony's lower classes endured in paying the head tax (*tributo*). They found it intolerable because the colonial order required *tributarios* to carry proof of payment (*carta de pago*) and because the rigorously enforced recounts and reregistration listed on tribute rolls those really exempt but whose poverty and ignorance prevented proving otherwise. Most galling, those listed as subject to *tributo* but not phenotypically Indian were automatically considered mulatto, that is, "descendiente de esclavo africano," an inferior status excluding them from civil employment and membership in *cofradías*.[51]

Restraints on enterprising, small-scale merchants and tradesmen (many Indo- or Afro-American) constituted other alienating factors. Their economic situation preoccupied Abad, committed to helping "familias pobres que viven honestamente" from retail earnings.[52] Countless low-income proprietors of *pulperias* and *tiendas mestizas*, employing small capitals ranging upward from 25 to 200 pesos, selling food and drink, had to pay exorbitant annual license fees, obliging many to abandon their businesses. This left to a few, more-capitalized merchants a virtual sales monopoly in most towns where they served low-income consumers.[53] Moreover, recently petty and medium-sized merchants also found themselves pressured by wealthy merchants, most of them *europeos* selected by the viceregal administration at Mexico City to serve on a "junta de comercio" to corral investors to participate in the Junta Central's large loans allocated to New Spain. That Junta's arm-twisting tactics had turned what was nominally a voluntary into virtually a forced loan.

Most inhibiting to colonial businessmen in Abad's view were the enduring structures of the Spanish transatlantic commercial system founded on outmoded "máximas de Felipe II," what he excoriated as "el sistema de estanco, de monopolio y de inhibición general," which left the imperial system "sin agricultura, sin artes, sin industria, sin comercio, sin marina . . . sin luces." A new system was needed, Abad suggested, a new commercial policy to implement the Junta Central's repeated promises to colonials of equality, of rights shared with counterparts in the metropole. Here Abad targeted for criticism those whom New Spain's businessmen knew would resist any structural change in economic policy—Catalan manufacturers and Andalusian producers and exporters of wines and olive oils, along with the "monopolistas de México, Veracruz, Cadiz, Barcelona."[54] It was

a strange coincidence that Abad urged the Regencia to permit the colonies to expand intercolonial exchanges and to "navegar y comerciar con las demás partes del mundo" at virtually the same moment when the regents at Cadiz rescinded Fernández de León's order of 17 May. Mirroring an attitude widespread among the colony's small bourgeoisie and its *criollo* elite, Abad had no praise for the community of *europeos* or, for that matter, for the metropole's elites. He castigated the "calculaciones y especulaciones de la codicia mercantil," just as he insisted that the burden of the Junta Central's borrowing should fall solely upon "las clases pudientes de la Peninsula."[55]

Partly explicit, partly between the lines, there was embedded in Abad y Queipo's warning to the Regencia in May 1810 a pervasive current critical of the metropole's colonial economic policy and especially of those men of business symbolizing colonialism in colony and metropole, in Spain and New Spain—Spanish merchant oligopolists at Mexico City, Veracruz, Cadiz, and Barcelona, not to overlook Catalan manufacturers and Andalusian wine and olive oil exporters. In this sense, Abad voiced the resentment welling up to become explicit and public, directed against the colony's European community dominated by wealthy *almaceneros*.

25. *Oprimidos y Opresores*

Parece, pués, que ha llegado el dia de vindicar la memoria de los que sin esperanza de obtener empleos ni condecoraciones, sino de morir en los campos de batalla, en las cárceles, o patíbulos, todo lo aventuraron por salvar a su patria. Carlos María de Bustamante, *Martirología*

Un gobierno que por una serie delatadísima de años ha tenido por carácter distintivo la arvitrariedad y el despotismo, qué vejaciones no habrán sufrido aquellos naturales? Ello es, que no puede dudarse que han existido oprimidos y opresores, y es muy fácil conocer en qual de estos dos extremos se han hallado situados los Novo hispanos. Francisco Noriega, "Informe"

Doubtless Abad y Queipo's defense of the interests of small-scale *labradores* and tradespeople, his fears of the social implications of *tributo* collection, and his criticism of Spanish merchant monopolists drew upon both his substantial fund of economic data and decades-long experience in probably the most dynamic region of late colonial New Spain. The Bajío—that long series of linked basins bounded by Querétaro to the east and Lake Chapala to the west, by Aguascalientes to the north and San Luís Potosí, and to the south the Valley of Mexico—constituted the north sector, so to speak, of Central Mexico. Soil and water, location and mineral resources account for its economic importance, the size and composition of its population, and the degree of class and ethnic tension in the two decades after 1790.[1] Around 1810, however, this economic heartland of the colony was a cauldron of dissatisfaction caused by the contradictions of economic growth, social friction, and a temporary recession.[2]

The Bajío: Economy and Society

Forming a series of high basins between New Spain's main mountain ranges on the west and east, the Bajío offered fairly level plains of high fertility due to volcanic ash deposits. In addition, one principal river system, the Lerma and its affluents (the Silao, Turbio, and Laja Rivers) made possible irrigation works over long stretches of alluvial plains from Celaya to Salamanca, and Irapuato to León. Small dams (*bordos*, *cajas de agua*) controlled water flows; the dams, however, irrigated hacienda wheat and corn fields rather than the resource-poor communal properties of Amerindian pueblos. Soils, topography, and water favored cultivation of flatlands; uplands were left to a shrinking number of native American pueblos and to a growing number of small and medium-sized ranchos. Ranchero families concentrated on cattle and sheep ranching and on transport. From the ranchero group came recruits for mule drivers (*arrieros*)—the "truckers" of their time—who moved goods within the Bajío, and in and out of the area, as freight carriers, postmen, and purveyors of merchandise and news and as general intermediaries of great confidence.[3]

Soil and water were not the sole factors behind the dynamism of the Bajío of north Central Mexico at the end of the eighteenth century. A frontier of the colony in the sixteenth century, over the following two centuries the Bajío served as zone intermediate between the Valley of Mexico and its administrative core at Mexico City and the mines of Zacatecas and San Luís Potosí in the dry lands to the north. The main highway (*camino de Tierra Adentro*) was used by thousands of mules that weekly left Mexico City for the town of San Juan del Rio (a *feria* site) and Querétaro, then divided; Querétaro was a hub for mail distribution and road networks leading to the north.[4] One road led northward via San Miguel el Grande to San Luís Potosí, the other proceeded westward through Celaya, Salamanca, and Irapuato, then northward via Silao and León to Zacatecas—precisely the area tapping the Lerma and its affluents. High-yielding corn and wheat haciendas of the Bajío and the cattle and sheep grazing lands of the mountain slopes were complemented by local production of woolen textiles in urban mills (*obrajes*, *trapiches*) concentrated in Querétaro and San Miguel el Grande and to a lesser extent at Acámbaro, Celaya, Iriapuato, and León—not to overlook those in the capital of Michoacan, Valladolid. Drawing upon haciendas, ranchos, tanneries (Querétaro alone had ten large ones), and textile manufactories, the Bajío exported to the northern mine centers flours, leather, and woolens, the same to Mexico City along with cattle and sheep on the hoof.[5] In addition, last, the Bajío had an extraordinary internal

pole of economic growth in the colony's most important silver mines and ore-processing mills in and around the world's silver mining capital at the center of the Bajío, Guanajuato, the smallest intendancy of New Spain. Guanajuato's mining industry and its work force (the city alone contained fifty thousand in 1793, or roughly 10 percent of the intendancy's population) absorbed significant percentages of the Bajío's food, cattle, leather, and textiles, not to mention maintaining about fourteen thousand mules.[6]

Expansion of the Bajío's economy was supported by an equally expanding demographic base. To judge by obviously disparate (and sometimes unreliable) data, over the fifty years between 1743 and 1793 the native American population of the Bajío's main provinces, Guanajuato and Valladolid, rose 2.1 times, with the town of Guanajuato more than tripling. In the colony's seven other provinces the increase was 1.4 times. In the Bajío's principal urban *alcaldías mayores* (districts), the Indian population of Guanajuato rose fivefold, outstripping Valladolid's (1.3 times) and Querétaro's (2 times).[7] Moreover, not only was the Amerindian population of the city and intendancy of Guanajuato expanding, but Amerindians leaving their pueblos and registered on tribute rolls as *laborío*s and *vagos* represented two-thirds of all such Indians in the colony's eight provinces.[8] Their numbers made the intendancy of Guanajuato the colony's most densely populated in 1810. The mines, haciendas and ranchos, tanneries, and woolen manufactories of the late eighteenth-century Bajío drew upon native American and other ethnic elements of an expanding and mobile wage labor reserve.

Equally revealing is the similarly disparate data on the ethnic composition of the Bajío's two main intendancies and their capital districts. In the last quarter of the century, 46 percent of the population of the district of Guanajuato was of mixed ethnic origin (*mestizo*, *mulatto*, *castas*); mulattoes represented 33 percent of the total, but among mineworkers, 40 percent.[9] By contrast, Querétaro's mixed ethnic population totaled only 28 percent. In 1810 the proportion of Amerindians and the ethnically mixed in the population of the intendancies of Guanajuato and Valladolid was roughly equal; combined, the two categories of Amerindian and mixed were 75 percent of the total. Looked at another way, between 1793 and 1810, one-third of the population of the intendancy of Guanajuato consisted of *castas*; in 1810 this percentage was double that of other intendancies such as Mexico, Puebla, and Veracruz.[10] Small wonder that Abad y Queipo worried about *castas*'s resentment at having to carry proof of tribute payment.

These indexes of overall economic and demographic change in the Bajío at the century's end nurtured a pervasive regional pride among both *criollo* and European elites.[11] Growth and attendant elite satisfaction, however,

barely masked their consequence, tensions within and between social strata—lower classes, *criollos*, "clase media"—making the Bajío a political and social tinderbox awaiting a spark.

In Amerindian communities a conjunction of natural population increase and hacienda expansion for land, water, and labor induced outmigration to the Bajío's cities, to Celaya and Valladolid, Querétaro and Guanajuato, producing an urban explosion. In the intendancy of Valladolid (and probably elsewhere in the Bajío), Amerindian communities were stripped of their lands, *hacendados* rejecting even short-term leases of five to seven years, while the few who could lease "dependen del capricho de los señores o de los administradores que ya los sufren, ya los lanzan, persiguen sus ganados e incendian sus chozas."[12] Migrating Indians sought employment, hence the extraordinarily high proportion of Indians in the category of *laborío*s (day laborers) and *vagos* (migrants) in the intendancy of Guanajuato (168,875 *vagos*, 76,582 *indios de pueblo*).[13]

Many of the unskilled found only occasional or no employment, forming a kind of lumpen. Not surprising, urban criminality was on the rise, as reported in the manufacturing city of Querétaro. Guanajuato displayed characteristics typical of mining towns, its people given to drink, gaming, and violence.[14] Perhaps those forced into towns acted on the conviction that "las tierras y todo es suyo en America usurpada por los Europeos."

There were other major sources of tension among the Bajío's lower classes. First, the mine and *obraje* owners employed forced labor. The proprietors of woolen manufacturies recruited petty criminals, Amerindians, and *castas* and forced them to work in notorious subhuman conditions; in 1801 Querétaro's textile shops were described as "unas oficinas que se miran con horror, que solo su nombre infunde miedo, que se han convertido en prisiones."[15] Equally notorious, mine owners utilized press gangs to supplement voluntary wage laborers, drawing upon the unemployed (*vagos*) rounded up in and around Guanajuato. Those dragooned in "ese acto de despotismo colosísimo y usado comunmente en Guanajuato," it has been suggested, may have been responsible for retaliation later committed in the occupation of Guanajuato in October 1810 following months of food shortages, price gouging, and rising unemployment.[16]

A more widespread source of social bitterness, one singled out for criticism by Querétaro's *criollo* corregidor, Dominguez, and by Valladolid's *peninsular* bishop, Abad y Queipo, was the annual payment of tribute by native people as well as the ethnically mixed. Not only was tribute revenue raised by 200 percent in the eighteenth century; it was levied for the first time on mulattoes and at a higher rate.[17] *Tributo* symbolized social inferior-

ity: to Indians it was a reminder of special status as state wards under elite tutelage; to *mulatos* and *castizos*, it was "una marca indelible de esclavitud que no pueden borrar con el tiempo."[18] To both groups, *tributo* was a brand of inferiority and division in colonial civil society. When people claimed exemption, tax collectors demanded proof, which could be time-consuming and expensive, so many paid out of resignation. Or, if some insisted that neither they nor their family members had ever paid tribute, this was "suficiente exigirlo de 3, 4, o 5 años."[19] In other times the offer to pay tribute had been a useful technique to force Amerindians to leave their communities for temporary as well as permanent employment on haciendas or in mining and other enterprises; at the end of the eighteenth century, tribute payments could also drain entrepreneurs' working capital since they would advance the tax for their workers—all the more galling when they could now draw upon a growing reserve army of labor.[20] Worse, the metropolitan government's preoccupation with improving colonial revenue collection pushed colonial tax officials to more rigorous techniques; around 1800, *tributo* constituted at least 10 percent of the area's total tax receipts.[21] Colonial civil servants would check the separate parish registers for whites (listed as *españoles*), *indios*, and *castas* as they sought to register all *vagos*, *laboríos*, and *indios de pueblo*; one must recall that in 1793 fully 14 percent or roughly one in every seven of the colony's "clase tributaria" was located in the two adjacent intendancies of Guanajuato and Valladolid.[22]

In the district of Querétaro, for example, where textile shops and tanneries employed at least nine thousand workers, tribute collection became rigorous indeed. Collection occurred in the city between July and October when employment and high water levels in the nearby river peaked; after October, collectors combed the countryside where workers had returned for the agricultural cycle. The collectors' technique, as Querétaro's corregidor Domínguez reported in 1807, was the only way to catch up with "una gente que . . . no tiene establecimiento ni residencia fija."[23] Domínguez was justifying the techniques employed; later, shortly after the September 1808 coup at Mexico City, Guanajuato's intendant Riaño confessed that he found tribute payment "absurdo, porque deprime las clases productivas, y es contra la esencia de toda contribución que deve ser general, y"—he had to add pointedly—"sin odiosas distinciones."[24] By mid-1810 after two successive years of harvest failure, food shortages, and high food prices, the Bajío's Indians and *castas*, many unemployed as mine owners and *hacendados* temporarily cut back their operations, were at the limits of endurance of victimization under the colonial system.[25] Abad y Queipo, clear-eyed sociological observer, forewarned that this class of people, although "aba-

tida de ánimo," might be moved to react by "las pasiones bastante fuertes en su temperamento fogoso y robusto."[26] More than temperament, however, leadership was required since the class "excluida de todo los beneficios sociales" seemed incapable "moverse por sí sola."[27] That is not to say it was incapable of responding shortly to the slogans of revolutionary leaders like *cura* Hidalgo, who had "la facultad con que seduce el pueblo."[28]

A *Clase Media*?

Potential leadership lay elsewhere, in the stratum of Bajío society that contemporaries labeled "clase media" or "medianía," and recent analysts "a narrow promontory of agrarian society" or social "entresuelo." This implies an incipient middle class whose elements also existed in other Iberian colonial societies at the time.[29] Its composition ranged from the lower levels of the *criollo* elite (what anthropologist Aguirre Beltrán once labeled *euromestizos*) down to the upper levels of the colony's *castas*. It included medium and small landowners (*rancheros*), tenant farmers and sharecroppers, muleteers moonlighting as smugglers, packpeddlars (*viandantes*), and small shopkeepers (*pulperos* and *tenderos*), as well as craftsmen in the Bajío's cities and towns, where they mingled with clergymen, civil servants, and lawyers. Some moved up the socioeconomic scale as managers of landed estates and mines. All were the product of a changing regional economy and society, more differentiated, more mobile socially and geographically, a society inching from status to class. Among its upper elements, this "clase media"—a *burquesía*—had a well-informed intelligentsia of clergymen, lawyers, and colonial officials dispersed in the Bajío's major cities of Querétaro, San Miguel el Grande, and Valladolid and in its towns.

The roots of the region's "clase media" in 1810 lay in the agrarian structures and vicissitudes of its *rancheros-labradores* over the eighteenth century. At the beginning of that century, a core of small landholders had existed, an incipient yeomanry of Amerindian, mestizo, and mulatto phenotypes—a typically New World mixture. The tenures of this heterogeneous group changed between 1740 and 1760 as silver mining expanded in the Bajío. Whites, including immigrants from Spain's Cantabrian *montañas*, bought up and extended existing haciendas. Surviving *rancheros* often had to subdivide their children's inheritance creating undersized holdings (*minifundios*); smallholders survived with difficulty. Their sons and grandsons became tenant farmers and sharecroppers, or shifted to the Bajío's marginal uplands, which they converted to pasture for sheep and goats; others sim-

ply abandoned the land to become muleteers and mineworkers; a few managed to enter the clergy.[30]

Demographic growth that provided a reserve army of tenants, sharecroppers, and day laborers undermined their bargaining power vis-à-vis large estate owners. The insecurity of such "independent" renters and their families deepened during a decade of economic fluctuations, 1800–1810.[31] As tenant farmers and sharecroppers they became, like the fast-disappearing *pueblos de indios*, clients of large estate owners and "dependent upon the whim or will of the landlord."[32] In the century's last two decades, rancher displacement accelerated under renewed investment by *peninsular* merchants (still mainly *montañeses*), and *criollo* mining magnates like Obregón and Alcocer, who raised output by infrastructural improvements in reservoirs and dams, fencing and storage facilities. They were the "ricos y acomodados" *hacendados* of the early nineteenth century.[33] One begins to understand why Querétaro's *diputado* in the Cortes proposed to redistribute land left idle for two consecutive years to those ready to cultivate it.[34]

By 1810 the Bajío's major intendancies of Valladolid and Guanajuato held Amerindian pueblos (371), haciendas (756), independent homesteads (*ranchos*) (1,124), and cattle ranches (144). In Guanajuato, the number of haciendas remained stable from 1793 to 1814, while independent ranches rose from 360 to 416; in 1793 there were 1,046 *ranchos dependientes*, closely tied or dependent upon haciendas.[35] Along with this regional pattern of large landed estates and smallholdings went demographic growth providing demand for corn, wheat, and cattle and pushing subsistence prices upward. With Mexico City's prices serving as surrogate, the average annual price of corn rose from 19.07 reales per fanega in the decade 1794–1804 to 24.75 by 1805–1810, even surging to 34.50 reales in the poor harvest years of 1809–1810. This price trend also reflected production fluctuations as a result of changes in "él clima, el régimen de lluvias y la sucesión de buenas y malas cosechas."[36] Inordinate price gouging by corn speculators led Querétaro's *criollo* corregidor Domínguez to sequester corn hoarded by Spanish merchants, to the satisfaction of poor consumers.[37] Large as well as small producers borrowed heavily—one observer claimed that 90 percent of properties were so mortgaged—but the burden of repayment was felt most by the small and medium producers indebted to religious foundations (chaplaincies, convents, monasteries, and *cofradías*) to purchase seed and draft animals, to cover farmhands' wages and *tributo*, and to buy additional land.[38]

To be sure, contemporaries were obsessed with the deteriorating condi-

tion of *pueblos de indios*, their "indigencia y . . . miseria," and lack of land and water to the point that, as Guanajuato's Intendant Riaño remarked sympathetically, "los Pueblos no pueden extender sus huertas y labranza peculiares."[39] Desperate to avoid the insecurity of tenancy when rents were rising, Amerindians in the districts of San Miguel el Grande and Dolores in the first decade of the nineteenth century sought communal rights to their rented lands by having themselves officially designated *pueblos de indios*; the efforts usually failed.[40] Similarly, *rancheros dependientes*, along with the mass of tenant farmers and sharecroppers "entirely dependent on the whim or will of the landlord for the maintenance of . . . livelihood," had to confront large estate owners.[41] Actually, concentration upon the condition of Amerindian pueblos (Guanajuato's 62 and Valladolid's 309 in 1810) minimizes the equally precarious situation of independent *rancheros* and *labradores* who had borrowed from religious sources but, unlike the "ricos y acomodados," barely met interest and amortization schedules. As reports of the Bajío's agrarian situation confirmed in 1805, the backbone of the area's agricultural system was "los medianos, los pobres labradores" farming under difficult circumstances and "siempre pobre, miserable, lleno de angustias y sobresaltos." Pressed by agents of Consolidación to repay overdue loans, they sold off crops and cattle for cash, often at loss.[42] For decades, moreover, many had been shifting to other occupations, becoming tenant farmers and sharecroppers, *arrieros* and *mineros*, petty tradesmen and shopkeepers.[43] The depressed condition of *rancheros* and *labradores* would later be seen as the "principal causa" of the great rebellion of 1810.

There was another segment of the Bajío's *clase media*, the "mercaderes de tierra adentro," no doubt fewer than *labradores*, tenant farmers, and sharecroppers, yet nonetheless politically significant.[44] As medium-sized merchants (*comerciantes*) as well as smaller *tienda* and *pulpería* proprietors (*tenderos*, *pulperos*), they could be found in the region's towns and villages: as traveling packpeddlars (*agentes*, *canastilleros*), they shuttled between urban centers and the countryside, buying small lots from town *comerciantes* and *tenderos* who traded in local and regional goods and, in some cases, in imports from Asia and Europe—Chinese silks, English cotton prints, Silesian linens.[45] The number of medium-sized and petty shopkeepers in Querétaro, Guanajuato, and Valladolid suggests their role as regional distributors of goods funneled by large-scale Spanish merchants (*almaceneros*) of the colonial capital at Mexico City. Some entrepreneurs from the Bajío's towns were among those *viandantes* who, profiting from internal demand after 1789 and *comercio libre*, began to bypass Mexico City's wholesale and retail importers for those at the port of Veracruz, thereby saving repeated commission fees

and sales taxes, to the frustration of the Mexico City commercial establishment. Put another way, the Bajío's commercial networks, including those mini-tradesmen listed as *traperos*, *roperos*, *varatilleros*, *cigarreros*, and *veleros* seeking a niche in an expanding market to avoid unemployment, reflected regional development, filling the demand of a growing number of consumers entering a monetizing economy.[46] "Aumentanse cada día más las tiendas en esta Capital y en las de las Provincias, aumentóse el número de la clase de comerciantes," an observant Viceroy Revillagigedo recorded in 1793.[47]

Census data for two cities of the Bajío, Guanajuato and Querétaro, indicate the numerical importance of colonials—white, *mestizo*, *castizo*, and *mulato*—in regional distribution networks around 1792. In Guanajuato the number of whites (Europeans and colonials) among merchants and clerks (*comerciantes* and *cajeros*) was virtually the same (149 to 146). Among 331 lower-status dealers (*tratantes*), however, colonials constituted the overwhelming majority (317 or 96 percent) including 58 *mestizos* (17 percent) and 39 *mulatos* (11 percent). In the aggregate, fully 75 percent of Guanajuato's commercial sector (681 so listed) consisted of colonials rather than Europeans.[48] Querétaro's data on the same occupational group are not comparable but remain suggestive nonetheless: for example, whites were not discriminated into Spanish- and colonial-born. Yet in the category of *tratantes*, Querétaro had a significant number of *mestizos* (913, or 24 percent).[49]

Numerous retailers in the Bajío's commercial sector after 1792 could justify the conclusion they constituted the "espina dorsal de una creciente clase media urbana."[50] Regional development may have enabled the Bajío's commercial entrepreneurs to forge both a sphere of colonials' autonomy vis-à-vis Spaniards' economic hegemony in the colony's capital at Mexico City and, to judge by impressive religious and private construction, even a kind of "creole consciousness."[51] On the other hand, the path of growth was not smooth for the Bajío's colonial businessmen. It was not easy for small-scale merchants to penetrate the enclaves that *alcaldes mayores* and *subdelegados* had staked out for themselves and their commercial backers, as Abad y Queipo reported, "para comerciar exclusivamente . . . y sacar de ella en un quinquenio desde 30 hasta 200,000 pesos."[52] They also competed with Spanish businessmen who were linked to the colonial bureaucracy, for instance, Querétaro's Fernando Romero Martínez, "uno de los principales europeos del comercio de Querétaro," who apparently dealt with the Mexico City *oidor*, Guillermo de Aguirre.[53]

The Europeans were more capitalized, enjoyed larger credit lines, handled a larger sales volume, and had greater prestige than their colonial

competitors—those "comerciantes medianos y pobres que hacen la mayor parte del consumo al comercio de España." Colonial tradesmen were inveterate borrowers of church capital: merchants initiating business enterprises, those holding unsold goods, those ready to enter a profitable partnership, others to meet legal expenses or purchase supplies at bargain prices. They were unexpectedly compromised, therefore, by Consolidación, 1805–1808, and many suffered "la dura necesidad de vender a los pocos compradores ricos, que necesariamente le impondrán la ley."[54] The "compradores ricos"—Domínguez's decorous and oblique jab at Spaniards—were resented because Spanish merchants "en diez años con su sistema exclusivo, hacen grandes caudales, tienen apoplético al Estado para hacer oportunamente ostentación triste de su liberalidad en los donativos con que sorprenden" and because the Bajío's tradespeople and consumers knew that Europeans' profits "jamás ha[n] tenido regreso desde aquellos Paízes al nuestro"—a process that a later generation would term decapitalization.[55]

Last, at the upper level of the *clase media* were the minor officials of the colonial civil service, followed by teachers, priests, and lawyers generally of modest social origins, inadequate income, and a high level of critical dissatisfaction. They, like tradesmen, *rancheros*, and *labradores*, were social products of the Bajío's transformation during the eighteenth century mainly responding to the silver-mining boom. No doubt before 1810 many seemed, as Morelos has been portrayed, "buen burgués, pasivo y conformista." On the surface Morelos and, for that matter, Hidalgo as late as July 1809 were publicly listed as donors to financing the metropole's Junta Central, Morelos to the tune of 20 pesos and Hidalgo 50.[56] Others, restless, pushed by parents toward higher-status careers in church or law, entered seminaries intending to become clergymen; many, it appears, abandoned the church for the law and "ún estado miserable" of client hunting and uncertain income.[57] In a real sense, the restrictive nature of a colonial economy failed to provide such professionals adequate employment opportunities or challenge, leading one critic closely associated with the colonial business establishment to carp that "todos los jóvenes de mediana esfera, yacen en una dolorosa inacción, cuando hubieran labrado su felicidad y la de la patria, por medio de la industria y de las artes."[58] Lawyers, many recognizing the "justicia y . . . necesidad" of changes in the colonial order, constituted one sector of the colonial intelligentsia; the other sector was provided by elements of the clergy at Valladolid and Guanajuato (507 priests and 322 friars), which works out to the ratio of one priest per 1,915 persons.[59]

Most parish priests (*curas*) were drawn from the *medianía* and often racially mixed; in the Bajío they usually passed through Valladolid's seminary,

San Nicolás, which graduated Hidalgo, Morelos, and other clergymen like Labarrieta, who welcomed Hidalgo when he marched to Guanajuato with thousands of supporters in September 1810.[60] Aware of their parishioners' daily victimization under the colonial order, meeting them almost weekly since Sunday masses and market days coincided, often sharing parishioners' phenotype, empathizing with their poverty and preoccupations, *curas* like Hidalgo supported local residents seeking community landownership via certification as *pueblo de indios* in the jurisdiction of Dolores between 1804 and 1807. *Curas* had an "ascendiente y aprecio" that made them spokesmen for their parishioners as those who "dirigen la opinión en los pueblos";[61] Spaniards supporting the colonial order saw in them "la multiplicada y escandalosa apostasia de tantos eclesiásticos seculares y regulares." In the vortex of the revolution that flared up in September 1810, *curas* and lawyers who formed the core of the colonial "clase media ilustrada" became the intellectual fighters or, as they self-deprecatingly labeled themselves, "cañones de Guajalotes."[62]

Roots of Alienation: *Europeos*, *Criollos*, and Promises

The common object of disaffection among the middle class, Amerindians and *castas* alike (and even among some of the *criollo* elite) was, of course, the "Europeans"—*europeos*, *peninsulares*, *gachupines*—who incarnated the "nación dominante." Their highly visible "riqueza y dominio" were both coveted and disliked by disaffected colonials. And once colonial authorities suspended farming of *alcabalas* to merchants, the government's tax collectors seemed ubiquitous, prying periodically into the accounts of merchants, shopkeepers, estate owners, and artisans alike. What was most irritating, almost invariably the new tax officials were *gachupines*.[63] Probably *gachupines* pressed municipal authorities to squeeze Amerindian petty tradesmen by excessive taxation, even insulting them with pejorative, racialist observations such as farming, not trade was "lo propio de los indios."[64] And while regionalist and nativist sentiment directed against Europeans in the colony ("las eternas quejas de los americanos contra nuestro govierno") was hardly new, there were countervailing sentiments, too.[65] Certainly among *criollos* intermarried with Europeans there flowed a current of respect, warmth, and dependence. "Los europeos eran nuestros parientes," Guanajuato's Ayuntamiento dramatically reminded the colonial public in 1811 in the first phase of anticolonialist civil war; they married "nuestras hijas o hermanas" and "nuestros intereses y caudales estaban mezclados con los suyos y aún dependían de ellos absolutamente."[66] Ambivalence was rooted as well in the

willingness of some Europeans, most of whom had migrated when young, to lose all but the most formal contact with their peninsular proveniences, becoming "criollized."

To be sure, most upwardly mobile Spanish tradesmen, often "groseros y mal educados," displayed a stubborn addiction to parsimony and capital accumulation—what critical colonials termed "feroz e insasiable [*sic*] codicia . . . invensible apego a Vuesstros tesoros."[67] Still, there were those, like long-term resident of the Bajío Abad y Queipo, who justified Spaniards' skill at wealth accumulation as a "deseo innato" for self-improvement, that mainspring of human activity and stimulant behind "talentos, aplicación, economía, frugalidad . . . y constancia" in all enterprise.[68] Such were the traits that *montañeses* tried to inculcate in their relatives, generally nephews, arriving in the colonies: "La sobriedad y regorosidad de esos emigrantes fue una actitud exclusive del grupo establecido en las colonias americanas."[69] The bishop-elect of Michoacan did not have to read Adam Smith. To attack Europeans, Querétaro's Spanish and *criollo* elites predicted in 1810, would undermine the decades-long labors of many Europeans to provide "su familia criolla una vida cómoda."[70]

Anti-European feeling in late colonial New Spain must be viewed as an indicator of a swelling sense of inequity under the colonial order. In the Spanish colonial economy of late developing commercial capitalism, highly visible Spanish merchants (*peninsulares*) touched colonials of all status and class levels simply "por el monopolio del comercio que ellos sólos exercen."[71] New Spain's lower classes made the Spanish trader the butt of jokes: they interchanged Basque with burro—"sabido es que los Naturales llaman así [los vizcainitos] . . . a aquellos animalitos"—to cite a tongue-in-cheek broadsheet.[72] Colonials found symbols of Europeans' hegemony everywhere, in their apparent monopoly of high colonial office and among the military and, in particular, the highly visible churchmen—this, a reference to the "chocante e injusta adhesión de los obispos a las tropas de parientes y familiares que han traído."[73] Colonialist hegemony was nothing new, but after decades of growth and change in Spain's richest overseas possession, such hegemony appeared unfair, hence intolerable. Now it was dangerously impolitic for a viceroy to proclaim that colonials "nacieron para callar y obedecer." Deference to Spaniards was now perceived as undermining the rights of the "nación mexicana" and "humillante y vergonzosa."[74]

The fragile unity of Spaniards and colonials was first sharply cracked by the preemptive coup against Viceroy Iturrigaray in 1808, then profoundly fissured by suspicion and distrust within the capital's European establishment directed toward colonials in general over the next two years. At the

same time, a syndrome of alienation affected some *criollos* and more of the *clase media*. Appeals of successive metropolitan governments, first under Charles IV, then the Junta Central, and finally under the Regencia at Cadiz, for financial support—Consolidación, gifts, patriotic loans—generated a sense of the colony's importance within the imperial system as well as the realization that the colony's wealth was draining away to sustain an essentially inequitable colonial order. To this sentiment Abad y Queipo was probably responding when in May 1810 he proposed that the Regencia direct financial exhortations instead to the metropole's own *clases pudientes*.[75] A report by a Spanish investigator posted to Querétaro in September 1810 summarized the colonials' malaise and antipathy in the Bajío: "La general miseria que se entra por los ojos," wrote *europeo* Juan Collado to just-arrived Viceroy Venegas, is blamed upon the Spaniards who, instead of responding to the "pueblos" pleas, have become "altivos y soberbios" and simply disregard them.[76] Collado's reaction was echoed by a respectable member of the *criollo* elite who expressed the colonials' view of the Spaniards as those "que no adoran otro Dios que el oro y la plata . . . cada uno se imagina ser un Hernán Cortés, y que por baxo que haya sido su nacimiento y obscura educación, es superior a todos los americanos sin excepción de alguno."[77] Such negative reaction to the Spanish presence in the colony of New Spain in 1810, a perception reinforced by the Spaniards' "surgical" removal of Viceroy Iturrigaray two years earlier, could not reduce the colonials' alienation.

Nor did the measures of the Regencia installed at Cadiz at the end of January 1810 stem the colonials' loss of faith in the metropolitan government, now confined to the peninsula's principal port, and in its colonial representatives. The Junta Central had encouraged New Spain's colonials to trust that, sooner or later, the Junta would convene a representative Cortes, although its structure and the nature of its colonial representation remained suspiciously moot. In mid-January came word that there would be a convocation in January 1811; in mid-March, that if a Cortes met sooner than announced, peninsular authorities would themselves have to choose colonial representatives among those resident in Spain; and on May 4, according to the *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, that the Regencia would call a Cortes when the military situation in the peninsula improved. To those in the colony searching for traces of a commitment to change, the record of metropolitan governments was equivocal.

There were, however, some encouraging signs. In mid-April readers of the carefully censored *Gazeta* learned that a subcommission of the forthcoming Cortes had prepared a memoir on freedom of the press ("libertad política de la imprenta") on sale in Mexico City; if they read the article,

they found a connection between the free press of England and that of the recently liberated United States, and their "santo respeto" for the "derechos del ciudadano."[78] How exhilarating it must have been to open the *Gazeta* of 18 May to read Manuel Quintana's rousing "Manifesto a toda la nación española" proclaiming in the metropole that henceforth "españoles americanos, os veis elevados a la dignidad de hombres libres," no longer to be treated with indifference, no longer "vejados por la codicia y destruídos por la ignorancia." The manifesto confirmed the colonials' view of the colonial order's inequities. As a conservative *criollo* of Guanajuato later would confess ruefully, colonials seized the opportunity to circulate and discuss it widely. The "declaraciones vagas de derechos abstractos," conservative Lucas Alamán pointed out, turned out to be only "magníficas promesas."[79]

Such grounds for optimism were offset by the Regencia's actions and the colonies' responses. In early May it was finally learned that the first choice to represent the colonies on the Regencia, Fernández de León,[80] had been abruptly replaced by Miguel de Lardizábal, who had no colonial exposure. (That he had relatives in New Spain was no substitute for lack of sustained direct contact with the colony of his birth.) The impression of rightward drift was reinforced by the Regencia's unceremonious removal of Viceroy Archbishop Lizana, whom *criollo* elite and *clase media* had come to esteem as at least empathetic to conditions in the colony, only to have him replaced temporarily by a viceregal body, the Audiencia de Mexico, controlled by *oidor* Aguirre and others responsible for the 1808 coup d'état. More disquieting were reports via private correspondence from Venezuela (Caracas) and Spain (Cadiz). News of the Caracas uprising of April 1810 removing colonial authorities came to Veracruz with Caracas's agents seeking New Spain's assistance—and like Havana insisting on "Libertad de comercio con España y las naciones aamigas, aliadas o neutrals";[81] at Veracruz, authorities arrested them. New Spain's official press kept silent, fearing the effect of Caracas's events on disaffected colonials.

Yet reports of violent disaffection in Spain's American colonies could not be suppressed, not at least among New Spain's political class. In late May, Abad y Queipo at Valladolid noted *en passant* that the uprising at Quito one year earlier as well as "movimientos sediciosos" in his provincial city only the previous December marked loss of confidence in the Junta Central's performance or, as he articulated it in the typically oblique style of loyalist criticism, its "conducta ajena de la expectación nacional." The "descrédito total" of the Central was also accountable for the "explosión que acaba de suceder" at Caracas; the well-informed bishop discerned in the Caracas development the handwriting on the wall, which explains his

electrifying opening lines to the Regencia at Cadiz: "Nuestras posesiones de América y especialmente esta Nueva España, están muy dispuestas a una insurrección general."[82] He was no royalist crank nor alarmist, isolated in some remote corner of Spain's empire in America; his was the voice of a cosmopolitan, well-read, and informed member of the colonial clerical establishment and intelligentsia with decades of hands-on experience, first in Guatemala and then in New Spain, and only recently returned from the metropole, where he had had the opportunity to warn Sixto Espinosa about the Consolidación's adverse impact, and from France (where he was nervously questioned about New Spain's loyalty). Perhaps most important, he was in frequent contact with some of the radical clerical intelligentsia of the colony's most dynamic region, among them the loquacious Fray Santa María and the engaging and sophisticated *cura* in the district of Dolores, Miguel Hidalgo—"teólogo . . . afrancesado . . . párroco . . . administrador y tradu tor de las lenguas latina y francesa."[83]

After May the "magníficas promesas" evaporated rapidly as the Regencia, dependent upon the financial support of New Spain, tolerated—even welcomed—the political ascendancy of the transatlantic commercial network of *monopolistas* at Mexico City, Veracruz, and Cadiz. Since 1808 it had been common knowledge that the Consulados of Mexico City and Veracruz had made their "asunto más principal" the policy of blocking Havana exporters' attempts to reexport to Veracruz in order to preserve their position in colonial trade.[84] There still subsisted in New Spain, however, hope that the political clout of the imperial commercial networks might be offset by broader constellations of a more national, rational, and realistic vision.

Optimism began to wane at the end of April, first with the arrival of the Regencia's agents, Luyando followed by Yandiola. Instead of remaining neutral in the highly politicized environment of Mexico City, Luyando—perhaps despite his original intention—associated with those responsible for the tense ambient of the colonial capital, with Yermo, Aguirre, and their collaborators in the colonial civil service and trade. This was hardly a tactic to reduce tension. In the second place, the vigilant political class of the colony saw a member of the troublemakers (*facciosos*), the Audiencia's former *decano* Ciriaco González Carbajal, recalled to Cadiz through the influence of a regent, Saavedra, to serve on the Consejo de Indias. And there he became adviser to Minister Hormazas on policy for the colony of New Spain. Within weeks, Hormazas crafted for the Regencia two lists, one of "proscripciones y jubilaciones de los ministros más íntegros y benemeritos de México," and another of "gracias, ascensos, distinciones y premios de los Europeos facciosos." Not only did the regents accept his recommendations

as coming from an "oráculo," boastfully Carbajal alerted friends at Mexico City of his activities, "con el fin," one of his opponents wrote venomously, "de mortificar a los Americanos, cuya indisposición efectivamente llegó al extremo."[85] The metropolitan government, now confined to Cadiz, appeared to confirm the current of colonial opinion that concluded it had "se entregó ciegamente a la dirección de los consulados."[86]

"Indisposition" was a pale description of the depth of alienation spreading among *criollo* elites and middle classes, essentially the colony's political class in mid-1810. To many colonials, it was now hopeless to expect serious change from peninsular authorities confined to Cadiz, given the Regencia's "plan de gobierno . . . con respecto a la América."[87] Along with fading hope for reform, there ebbed upper- and middle-class consensus behind the colonial order; no longer would many colonials tolerate the metropole's tactic of announcing reform while issuing "órdenes secretas a los gobernadores . . . para entretener a los Americanos con palabras."[88] As an anonymous complaint from Mexico City to the Regencia detailed in mid-August 1810, now the Regencia's inept decisions could set off "de repente volcanes inextinguibles" ending "la tranquilidad pública" in mass rebellion.[89]

Rampant dissatisfaction in the colony, according to this letter, centered on three issues. For months the regents had shown no sensitivity to the volatile colonial situation. Well-informed residents in New Spain had examined the "manifiestos, avisos y contextaciones" directed by Caracas's insurgents to the Regencia as well as to the influential Junta de Cadiz, and their message had left a "mui grande impresión." Yet the regents continued to ignore the underlying causes of the Caracas movement, nor did they reexamine their political and economic measures that might drive "otros reynos y provincias de la América" also to withdraw support from the Regencia.[90] In the second place, the Regencia seemed oblivious of the "disgusto y fermento" in New Spain provoked by removing Viceroy Archbishop Lizana and by the impolitic behavior of their agent, Luyando, who openly associated with the European *golpistas* of 1808—civil servants Aguirre, Bataller, and Sagarzurieta, army officer Emparán, and *hacendado-negociante* Yermo. It was already common knowledge in the capital that the next viceroy dispatched from Cadiz would bring appointments that "anti-Americano" González Carbajal had recommended to the Regencia. Only the *golpista* faction of 1808 would be rewarded; probably Aguirre would become the Audiencia's regent and Sagarzurieta its *fiscal de Real Hacienda*, Emparán promoted to brigadier general, and a *título de Castilla* awarded to Yermo. The Regencia would offer nothing to loyal "Americanos"; in fact, *criollo* bureaucrats would be posted to the peninsula while key appointments in the colony would be

filled by Europeans.[91] González Carbajal's confidential letters from Cadiz had more than done their work.

Third, the Regencia seemed intent on provoking the *criollo*-dominated Ayuntamiento of the capital. For decades the city council had rejected the appointment of a corregidor, viewing it as an unwarranted symbol of subordination; decades earlier the exemption had been purchased for 120,000 pesos annually. Now, at a critical juncture, the Regencia—with the assent of Miguel de Lardizábal, the regent presumably representing the American colonies—chose to appoint a corregidor-intendant of Mexico, Ramón Gutiérrez del Mazo.[92] What most galled the Mexico City *criollo* elite was the role of Lardizábal. The Ayuntamiento had elected him earlier its representative on the now defunct Junta Central and had raised no objection when he replaced Fernández de León on the Regencia as implicit spokesman for the colonies. Now Lardizábal had betrayed the *criollos*' confidence by backing his kinsman, Mazo, who was "generalmente odiado." Lardizábal not only neglected the "intereses de los Americanos," but he seemed positively bent on "deshonrarlos y abatirlos."[93] Like Lardizábal, the Regencia too appeared bent upon self-destruction, through the loss of New Spain and other American colonies. More in bitterness than despair, the anonymous Mexico City letter writer warned the Regencia apocalyptically: "Desatiéndanse los Americanos; premiese únicamente a los Europeos . . . óbrese . . . como se crea más del caso para acabar de imprimir el sello de la degradación y esclavitud a seis millones de habitantes; pero quando estos hubieren despedazado las cadenas que los oprimen, no se impute este procedimiento a intrigas de Napoleón, ni a una trayción infame, sino a la detestable politica del gobierno."[94]

The Regencia's Man: Viceroy General Venegas

The anonymous letter-writer of August 1810 had his facts straight but failed to note that the viceroy slated to replace the Audiencia de Mexico as the colony's chief administrator was a military figure of recent career distinction and a native of Andalusia. Francisco Xavier Venegas y Saavedra was now a "political" general on whom the Regencia and the Cadiz commercial establishment were relying to preserve the subordination of New Spain's elites despite their disenchantment with the policies of the metropole. Born in 1754 at Zafra (Andalusia), Venegas had had an unspectacular army career, retired as colonel to Écija only to be recalled to active duty at the time of the French invasion, participating in the unexpected defeat of French forces at Bailén. In 1809 he commanded an army group in La Mancha, then—per-

haps owing to his influential relative, Francisco Saavedra—was appointed governor of Cadiz. He figured among those who sponsored the formation of the Junta de Cadiz when the Junta Central collapsed and was among the many "golosos de ese virreynato." By early May 1810 rumor circulated that he was the Regencia's choice for New Spain, so the Consulado de Mexico was advised.[95] Mexico City's politically sensitive predicted—wishfully, to be sure—that as Saavedra's relative Venegas would share his views "por que se lo dictará su inclinación, su reconocimiento y sus intereses particulares."[96] Other critics in the colony were less generous or more realistic, arguing that given Venegas's connections, career, and regional identification, he would inevitably perform as a "virrey mercantil, servilmente sujeto a la desenfrenada codicia de los Comerciantes de Cadiz, Veracruz y Mexico."[97]

Debarking at Veracruz on 25 August, Venegas advised the Consulado de Mexico, customarily in charge of the welcoming committee for an approaching viceroy, that he had arrived.[98] Following either instructions or his own inclination, he proceeded by deliberate stages to the capital inland, stopping at Jalapa, Perote, and Puebla for briefing about local conditions; almost three weeks had passed before he finally entered the capital. At Cadiz he had impressed many as "afable, cortés conciliador . . . y de bastante instrucción"; Blanco White valued his "calidades personales y luces"—characteristics he displayed en route from Veracruz.[99] At Jalapa he halted probably to weigh the intelligence gathered by postal employees who usually opened the mails; at Perote he met with the Regencia's agents Luyando and Yandiola, who aired their evaluation of local conditions amassed over several months. They conceded that colonials had grounds for resenting "despotic" governors heedless of their "agravios y quejas." Venegas, they recommended, should issue immediately a proclamation urging colonials to air their grievances, even to offer them the possibility of direct trade with non-Spanish ports—this last recommendation suggests how widespread was local interest in trade exchanges with the non-Spanish Caribbean. Predictably he rejected these proposals as "impolítico" and undermining viceregal authority.[100] Driving the recommendations of the *comisarios* of the Regencia were reports arriving at the capital of conspiracies in the Bajío, centered at Querétaro.[101] Still, Venegas proceeded methodically to Puebla, where he talked to the local bishop as well as the veteran and knowledgeable Intendant Flon, who made a point of accompanying the new viceroy to Mexico City, where Venegas and entourage entered on 14 September.[102]

No sooner had he taken office from the Audiencia, Venegas continued to receive solicited as well as unsolicited advice. Ex-viceroy Lizana begged him to withhold announcement of the Regencia's honors (*gracias*) to be

granted and administrative changes—this was unsolicited and rejected.[103] On the other hand, Venegas now was aware of the tense situation in the interior provinces; en route to the capital and once there he continued to examine reports—some dated as early as 10 September—about *criollo* conspiratorial activity at Querétaro.[104] He solicited advice from the influential and conservative *oidor*, Guillermo de Aguirre, on handling the conspirators in the Bajío, presumably following instructions from the Regencia and counsel from ex-*oidor* González Carbajal. For his part, Aguirre had known for weeks of the Querétaro conspiracy that vigilant postal employees there and in Mexico City had been reporting regularly; perhaps because he distrusted the Audiencia's Catalan *regente*, Catani, Aguirre had withheld from the Audiencia these intelligence reports. Instead he ordered the prominent European merchant at Querétaro, Francisco Romero Martínez, to keep the suspects under close surveillance.[105] On 17 or 18 September word came to Venegas that Querétaro's *criollo* corregidor Miguel Domínguez, his wife, and Epigmenio González (a *pulpero*) along with other *criollos* had been jailed on suspicion of conspiracy against the colonial state. Domínguez had been cornered by "una facción de europeos" joined by soldiers of the local garrison who were members of the Celaya regiment.[106]

At this juncture, to avoid a possible misstep that might embitter already alienated people in the colony, Venegas relied upon the experienced *europeo* Aguirre. They agreed to authorize local Bajío authorities to continue the roundup of suspects and to dispatch Juan Collado (the Audiencia's *alcalde del crímen*) to take charge of the Querétaro investigation and locate the "autores y cómplices de la insurrección que se tramaba."[107] Collado, it will be recalled, had handled the investigation of the Valladolid conspiracy in the previous January. But Aguirre's collaborator, Colonel Emparán (his brother, an army officer, had been seized at Caracas by the insurgents of April),[108] recommended otherwise: that he be sent immediately to Querétaro with a regiment of dragoons. This, *oidor* Aguirre and Viceroy Venegas rejected, possibly fearing such a display of force was unwarranted, even provocative.

Meanwhile, faithful to the Regencia's directives and priorities, Venegas proceeded to guarantee further financing of the Regencia by the colony's wealthy individuals and corporate bodies lay and clerical, by civil servants and professional groups, and by distributing the Regencia's honors to loyalists and even to the mildly dissident among the capital's *peninsular* and *criollo* elites. His first official act was to convoke the capital's notables to a Junta General on 18 September—former viceroys, high civil servants and clergy, army officers, prominent merchants, and mine owners—"las corpo-

raciones de vecinos más ricos y de nombradía de México."[109] Among them were eighteen merchants, all prominent *almaceneros* whether *montañés* or *vizcaíno*, and including those who had supported the coup overthrowing Iturrigaray: Francisco Alonso Terán, Gabriel de Yermo, along with those quietly opposed to that action, Antonio Basoco, Gabriel Iturbe e Iraeta, Joaquín Colla. In executing the Regencia's instructions, Venegas's presentation was straightforward. First he emphasized the Regencia's financial straits, presented a plea for contributions to finance resistance in the metropole, then proposed a plan to canvass the capital's population, barrio by barrio and block by block for more funds, tapping all "clases" and "profesiones." It was further manifestation of the European metropole's pathetic dependence on its major colony in America.

He followed with the Regencia's carrot, presenting a civil list of honors and, in some cases, dubious promotions that many in the audience suspected ex-*oidor* González Carbajal had proposed. Honors went to those recognized as the core of *europeos* responsible for the forcible ouster of Iturrigaray: Aguirre (promoted to *regente* of the Audiencia), Yermo (given the title of *marqués*), his lawyer and confidant Juan Martín de Juanmartiñena (appointed *teniente letrado* of the intendancy of Mexico), and Yermo's clerical friend Monteagudo (created an *inquisitor* along with Manuel de Lardizábal). The regents had balanced these with the retirement of the Audiencia's regent, Catani, at full pay along with transferring the well-connected *criollo* Jacobo Villaurrutia to Sevilla's Audiencia, a kind of promotion to exile. These were doubtful honors for those critical of the coup d'état of 1808.[110]

In handling Mexico City's wealthy merchants, the Regencia was inspired more by their past and potential financial contributions to peninsular governments than by their stance vis-à-vis Iturrigaray. Titles went to Antonio Basoco and Diego de Ágreda, military promotions in the merchants' regiment to Iturbe e Iraeta and Cortina (they had not supported Aguirre and Yermo), other honors to Marcelo de Anza and Francisco Alonso Terán (who had). To onlookers in the colonial capital, according to a critical Spanish observer, the Regencia had resolved to "proteger abiertamente un partido que ni es poderoso, ni puede dejar de ser eternamente detestado."[111] That ever-observant *criollo* Carlos María de Bustamante wryly concluded that those rewarded such as Aguirre, Yermo, and Juanmartiñena "no habían contraído más mérito que el de revolvernos."[112] Behind Venegas's civil list was seen the influence of Cadiz merchants whose allocation of honors were sardonically said to have arrived "como de factura, a estilo de comercio."[113]

Was the Regencia's handling of the elites of New Spain's capital ill-conceived and one-sided, as critics complained? One detects an underly-

ing assumption: despite conflicting views of the preemptive coup of 1808, the interests of Spanish and *criollo* elites in the capital and elsewhere in the colony of New Spain might be harmonized. Like the members of the European community, *criollos* too wanted no social disorder. True, in supporting Iturrigaray's call for a local congress in late August and early September of 1808, the *criollos* in the Mexico City Ayuntamiento had tried to engineer a salon coup. They had convoked no assembly of the capital's notables, a *cabildo abierto*, much less had appealed to the city's *pueblo*.[114] Indeed, *criollo* backers of Iturrigaray's congress had explicitly rejected the French model of change by revolution from below: "Cómo hemos de ser nostros los primeros que . . . abramos la puerta a la inmoralidad, al deísmo y a otras mil pestilentes sectas que devora . . . la Francia?"[115] No doubt handbills—those "anónimos infames"—had circulated attacking Spaniards' hegemony in the colony, like one in the mining town of Zacatecas—"Mueren todos los Gachupines, salga esta canalla de forasteros ladrones que han venido a cogerse lo que es nuestros"—and a few outraged, influential *criollos* like the mining magnate of Guanajuato, the marqués de Rayas, had been outspokenly critical (within the rooms of private homes, to be sure) of the overthrow of Iturrigaray and the colonial government's subsequent tight security apparatus.[116]

But no overt opposition materialized, and underground organized activity like the Valladolid conspiracy had been liquidated without public repercussions. Wealthy *criollos* along with colonial religious bodies had continued to contribute impressively to support first the Junta Central and then the Regencia; meanwhile the colonial elections of August produced seventeen deputies for the forthcoming Cortes, all *criollo*, and a majority (thirteen) of them clerics—and clerics, it was known, were often the most radical of the colonial intelligentsia critical of the imperial system.[117] Fusing *criollo* and European elites in the colony was, after all, a shared class interest: both had reason to fear that a civil war in the colony against European imperialists would loose the envious lower classes—mestizos and mulattoes, Amerindians and blacks—against *criollo* and European landlords and mine owners, as well as the highly visible peninsular merchant groups.[118] Astute policy makers in metropole and colony did not overlook the factor of vanity, either; they banked on *criollo* fixation on the "rancia nobleza de sus abuelos, y de los leones y cuarteles, que orlan las blazones de sus armas nobiliarias y caprichosas," and on a self-protective propensity to "ver los toros desde la lumbrera sin exponer el pellejo."[119] *Criollos* formed (or liked to believe they formed) a colonial aristocracy, as the incisive social critic Lorenzo de Zavala put it baldly, "una clase que aborrece . . . la igualdad de

derechos . . . que se vería más bien privada de estos que el de mirar a todos participando de ellos, y . . . prefiere estar oprimida por sus superiores que ver el poder ejercido por . . . sus inferiores."[120]

Insofar as metropolitan policy makers and colonial civil servants analyzed New Spain through the prism of the colonial primate city, Mexico, the Regencia's measures were adroit. The capital was dominated by the power and symbols of the European metropole, its civil and religious bureaucracy, its armed forces, and its shockingly wealthy European commercial community (there were more than one thousand Spanish merchants and clerks there).[121] Economic growth over the eighteenth century stimulated by the extraordinary output of its mining centers had enhanced the capital's "Spanish" ambiance.[122] The provinces were another matter, particularly the large Bajío region whose economic development had expanded its *criollo* elites, its "clase media" of clerics and professionals, and its petty bourgeoisie of ranchers, *labradores*, tradespeople, and artisans. As a result the Bajío's residents enjoyed a sense of regionalism, of the Bajío's role as intermediary between north and central Mexico, somehow distinct from the peninsular-dominated colonial capital. And *criollo* regional pride may also have translated into acute sensitivity to Spanish immigrants dispersed throughout the area, and their high visibility as successful entrepreneurs in trade, mining, and manufacture.

Is it strange, then, that the conspiracy uncovered in late 1809 appeared in one sector of the Bajío, Valladolid, and why another began to crystallize only a few weeks later in February, this one confined not just to the communications center, Querétaro, but spreading to San Miguel el Grande, Dolores, San Luís Potosí, Guanajuato, and Celaya? This was a conspiracy that, estimated conservatively, would involve collaborators spread over a wide zone well before its leaders began their revolution for independence about the time Viceroy General Venegas took over formal responsibility for ensuring the loyalty and subordination of the centuries-old colony of New Spain.[123]

26. "No Hay Más Recurso Que Ir a Coger Gachupines"

La tiranía tiene sus períodos fijos, y el amor a la libertad es inherente al hombre, y obra como el rayo cuando se pone en movimiento. *La Opinión* (Querétaro), 11 September 1845

Pero quando estos [habitantes] hubieren despedazado las cadenas que los oprimen, no se impute este procedimiento a intrigas de Napoleón ni a una trayción infame, sino a la detestable política del gobierno. "Carta anónima"

En todos los pueblos hallaba el cura Hidalgo una predisposición tan favorable, que no necesitaba más que presentarse para arrastrar tras de si todas las masas. Abad y Queipo

The insurgency of September 1810 signified first and foremost an assault upon the merchant-investor and the shopkeeper at the popular level. Hammett, *Roots*

Writing to the Regencia at Cadiz at the end of May 1810, Abad y Queipo extrapolated from his grasp of the reality of Valladolid and the Bajío when he foretold a colonial insurrection. His and the Regencia's optic differed; Abad y Queipo interpreted provincial conditions in an area he knew well and firsthand, while metropolitan officials viewed the colony of New Spain filtered through reports from the colonial capital at Mexico City, the counsel of colonialists like ex-*oidor* González Carbajal now at Cadiz, where he defended the mutual interests of New Spain's wealthy *almaceneros*, mostly European, and of Cadiz's *negociantes* in the colonial trades. This transatlantic bourgeoisie had no intention to restructure Spain's system of colonial trade—clearly evident in *almacenero* public collaboration in Iturrigaray's removal at Mexico City, and the disavowal of the 17 May decree by the metropolitan government at Cadiz two years later, cowed by local merchants.

This is why the Regencia on advice of Carbajal (and no doubt others) distributed honors and appointments to confirmed—along with somewhat

dubious—loyalists, many in the European commercial community, but none to notables in any faction outside the colonial capital. The regents were convinced that Mexico City controlled the countryside, and they believed that the capital encapsulated the power of the colonial state and Spain's imperial system in the Western Hemisphere. We should not overlook Christon Archer's provocative proposition: "Without the widening of the gachupín-criollo division and deep concerns about the Indian and *casta* masses, in 1810 New Spain might have won a form of bloodless autonomy"; or, for that matter, Hugh Hamill's equally provocative comment: "The grave irony of the Hidalgo Revolt among its creole supporters was their justifiable fear that many of their class—especially in the core provinces—might not unite behind the rebellion."[1] The regents were oblivious apparently, or preferred not to know of the pervasive confusion and consequent anxiety about the precarious present and future of the metropole that affected the colony's provincial elites. In the short run, it did not matter.

Provincials in the Bajío's cities like Querétaro, Valladolid, and Guanajuato, or in towns like San Miguel, Dolores, and Celaya, were as conscious as those politicized in the colonial capital of the deterioration of both the metropolitan government and the colonial state beginning with the political crises of 1808 in Spain and New Spain, at Aranjuez and Bayonne and then Mexico City. Government in the metropole was visibly fissioned: between a constitutional monarchy at Madrid allied with France and at Cadiz—dominated by *negociantes* in the colonial trades—the Regencia as center of resistance supported by England. This precarious and startling situation was known by New Spain's discerning provincials whether clergymen, civil servants, army officers, medium and small estate owners and mine owners, and most tradesmen—the natural leaders of potential revolutionary activity.[2] It was *the* moment for an insurgent movement. These provincials understood that an insurrectionary movement against the colonial status quo needed a broad multiclass and multiethnic base. This may clarify why early in the insurrection, Hidalgo would attack structures of the established order, tribute payments, multiple imposts on regional trade, and slavery. In October 1810 he would decree the abolition of slavery without compensation, citing the "derechos inalienables y imprescritibles del hombre."[3] Success, they could reason, depended upon the managed participation of petty bourgeoisie, urban proletariat, and—a key decision—Amerindian *pueblos* of the Bajío, a delicate and ultimately unstable unity; appealing for *pueblo* support had been planned by the ill-fated Valladolid conspirators. And—an essential consideration—they understood they could not afford to confine

their movement to one city; this had been a major flaw in the *criollo*-sponsored movement by the Mexico City Ayuntamiento in 1808 and its sequel, the Valladolid conspiracy of late 1809.

Those in the Bajío plotting what became the great colonial rebellion of 1810 had reason for confidence when they renewed conspiratorial activity only weeks after New Spain's colonial authorities had snuffed out the Valladolid movement of 1809.[4] They knew colonial authorities in the capital wanted to avoid rekindling reaction to the excessive repression that had antagonized so many in colonial society in the aftermath of the 1808 coup. After all, the colonial order had survived in New Spain by an unwritten consensus among *criollo* and Spanish elites, and between elites—who manipulated power—and masses in cities and countryside. Would-be insurgents in the provinces could reason that Mexico City's authorities would have to react circumspectly even were their plotting revealed. They could capitalize on tensions generated by recent decades of social and economic change and by the explosive potential of colonial exploitation experienced over three centuries; like the Valladolid plotters, Hidalgo's group accepted the real possibility—a fateful commitment—that "the masses were fundamental to the cause."[5] In the provinces as in the capital, they could pinpoint an omnipresent, closely knit minority they held responsible for colonial rule: Spanish-born merchants, storekeepers, peddlers, and civil servants in the Bajío's cities, towns, and pueblos. These *Europeos* impinged upon colonials of all classes and groups. At the lower levels of the colonial system, the activity of Spanish fiscal agents was reinvigorated under Charles III and sustained under Charles IV, to collect effectively customary as well as new taxes. In this process Europeans irritated Amerindians (it was a kind of ethnic profiling) by demanding proof of tribute payment, and now they exacted *tributo* from other groups, too; they upset shopkeepers by checking their tax payments, which coincided with an influx of hard-driving immigrants from the Basque country and the *montaña* of Cantabrian Spain who competed with native-born petty business men customarily trading with Amerindians and the ethnically mixed population. And at the top of the colonial pyramid were Spaniards, the Europeans in the commanding positions of church, military, civil service, and, perhaps most irritating, business. The *gachupin* incarnated domination, the legacy of three hundred years of Spanish colonialism in New Spain. Hidalgo in late 1810 would justify the summary execution of Europeans resisting the insurgency by pointing out that by conquest and its sequelae they had steadily stripped "nativos" of their lands and kept them "siempre avasallados bajo de sus piés."[6]

There was another lesson drawn from the experience of the Mexico City Ayuntamiento inching toward a form of autonomy in 1808. Minus organized military force, no anticolonial movement could survive. The Bajío however, had garrisons of locally recruited and officered troops, mobilized and trained under Viceroy Iturrigaray in 1807 and 1808 to prevent an anticipated English landing along the Veracruz coast from penetrating into the central plateau via Jalapa and Perote. Iturrigaray's military maneuvers had assembled near Jalapa more than twelve thousand officers and men, providing *criollo* officers opportunities to meet, share mutual "ideas, quejas y anhelos," and form networks.[7] Colonial conspirators could with some confidence expect *criollo* regiments to join their movement and confront effectively troops of the colonial state;[8] they counted on winning over provincial garrison units. With justification, on the other hand, *europeos* Yermo (at Mexico City) along with Abad y Queipo (Valladolid) questioned the loyalty of *criollo* officers of colonial units.

But how might the people of the Bajío, who recently had participated in the state-sponsored public ritual of swearing to support Fernando VII exiled to Valençay (France), be induced to abjure that oath? It was the brother of petty merchant Epigmenio González who wondered whether *campesinos* might reject insurgency as irreligious—"contrario al juramento prestado al Rey"—as an attack on the twin pillars of government, crown and church, too. Would the people respond to slogans promising independence and liberty,[9] or would shattering the colonial order have to take the form of a chiliastic attack upon the symbols of colonial rule, European merchants, and their visible wealth?[10] So he proposed a cleric "de probidad y educación" be chosen to make the initial pronouncement of insurrection.[11]

Last, the plotters (or should we say schemers and utopians?) of Querétaro, San Miguel, and Dolores had another source of confidence. Frequent socializing with the colony's high state officials like Intendants Riaño (Guanajuato)[12] and Flon (Puebla), with the enlightened bishop-elect of Valladolid, Abad y Queipo, and with the *criollo* corregidor of Querétaro, Miguel Domínguez, and his *criollo* wife, led Hidalgo and his collaborators to believe royalist resistance might be merely formal since many in the colonial elite, *criollo* and *europeo*, seemed empathetic to the colonials' grievances. This was not far-fetched, for Hidalgo corresponded with Abad y Queipo, Riaño, and Domínguez, and to quote *peninsular* army officer Miguel Costanzó, "Los conocimientos y comunicaciones que algunos de estos vecinos [de Guanajuato] tenían con los mismos insurgentes, pues varias veces vimos a el principal de ellos, a el cura Hidalgo, recebido y obsequiado por el jefe

de la provincia el Sr. Intendente . . . Riaño."[13] Moreover, Carlos María de Bustamante was convinced, prior to the surprising defeat of French troops at Bailén in 1810, that Abad y Queipo, Riaño, and other prominent *europeos* might have accepted an autonomous Mexico.[14]

Confidence founded on such considerations shaped the revolutionaries' tactics. Not independence but reform would be the transparent initial objectives; there would be no embarrassing public break with loyalty to Spain's *monarquía,* no denunciation of Fernando VII and his *camarilla*. Instead, why not spread the "ínfundada y alarmadora voz, de que el gobierno actual aspiraba a entregar estos países a las naciones francesa o inglesa,"[15] the Spanish Empire's traditional aggressors? Next, there would have to be careful organization using conspiratorial cells in the Bajío's principal urban centers; the plotters made no effort to organize in the capital, or in Puebla or Veracruz—these were too carefully watched and, besides, of questionable revolutionary potential. Third, army units could be won over and, with *campesino* support, occupy the Bajío's cities and towns and, gathering followers among natives and day laborers anxious "on account of the scarcity of maize of late years," march on Mexico City: the countryside would overwhelm the capital.[16] Put another way, unlike the cautious *criollos* of Mexico City in 1808, the Querétaro plotters of 1810 were confident they could appeal to the Bajío's population and control it.

This was the basis of the strategy first elaborated by a clerical conspirator in the aborted Valladolid movement of December 1809, Dr. Manuel Iturrigaray, in which Hidalgo and Allende concurred.[17] Their original plan called for initiating the movement in the town of San Juan de los Lagos on the occasion of its annual fiesta of La Concepción (18 December), which customarily drew thousands of pilgrims from Querétaro, San Luís Potosí, San Juan del Rio, Celaya, and Valladolid—thirty-three thousand in 1793. Among them would be *tenderos*, *pulperos*, and *viandantes* operating out of the Bajío's main cities, selling domestic goods and Asian and European imports introduced through Acapulco and Jalapa; in the 1793 *feria* the sales' turnover may have surpassed 1 million pesos.[18] The first order of business would be neutralization of the predictable opposition of the Europeans, and for this the revolutionaries were prepared to distribute a printed proclamation: "Americanos, está alerto . . . y no os dejeis engañar. Hoy, hoy se coge a todos los gachupines."[19] From this rural base the march to Mexico City would start, passing through the mining capital of the Bajío, Guanajuato, to gather up disaffected mineworkers and elements of the urban proletariat. And after occupying Mexico City, they would form a governing

junta with provincial representatives. Then would follow the expulsion of Europeans as efficiently as colonial authorities under José de Gálvez had rounded up and deported the Jesuits in 1767.

This plan of operations and the perception of a crumbling colonial state apparatus motivated the Querétaro conspirators to correspond through the mail service and to risk detection by defectors. Such was the careful planning, the revolutionary leadership moved up the expected date for their movement from early December to early October. In this sense, Hidalgo, Allende, and Abasolo were hardly unprepared when they learned that authorities at Querétaro had jailed corregidor Domínguez, *pulpero* González, and his brother and would arrest the other ringleaders.

Choice of a well-known, much-frequented market town in the western Bajío as the initiating locus of the revolution is a measure of the revolutionaries and their hoped-for constituents. The fête would bring all classes, statuses, and ethnic composites, among whom would be *clase media* and *campesinos*, whites, *mestizos*, *mulatos*, *castas*, and many *indios—labradores*, *rancheros*, *arrieros*, *tenderos*, *pulperos*, *buhoneros*, and *artsanos*—precisely those hankering for entrepreneurial niches in a colonial economic order hitherto dominated by European merchants in the domestic and import trades. The revolutionary leadership itself was middle class, consisting of medium-sized landowners, small-scale traders, army officers drawn from these groups, and, of course, clerics.[20] Revolutions are not usually initiated by political and social elites; rather, their leaders tend to come from the lower elite in frequent contact with the lower classes and aware of the sources of their dissatisfaction. Such a leader was the clergyman Miguel Hidalgo, "criollo de la clase media," curate of a large parish of fifteen thousand and assisted by subordinate clerics.[21]

Hidalgo came from the lower bourgeoisie in rural New Spain, entered the church, proved an outstanding student at Valladolid's Seminario de San Nicolás, then a professor there, and finally became a curate at Dolores and a lively intellectual and conversationalist. "El cura Hidalgo es tenido y estimado por el mejor teólogo de esta diócesis" with a penchant for theological sparring, a witness subsequently testified.[22] Allende considered Hidalgo the most appropriate cleric to make the initial revolutionary pronouncements because "su carácter de sacerdote reunía el de Cura Párroco, el concepto de sabio, el contar con buenas relaciones en Guanajuato y Valladolid."[23] In the course of overseeing several rural parishes, he could not overlook the inequities of a secular system that exploited all colonials, high and low, rich and poor, elite and masses, whites, near-whites, *mestizos*, *mulatos*, blacks and Amerindians. That system privileged land grabbing that was expro-

priating Dolores's *pueblos de indios* and those of the Bajío: "Por un abuso insoportable de las haciendas, no tenían aquellos miserables un palmo de tierra . . . pues las pertenencias de la hacienda la Erre llegan hasta las goteras del lugar."[24] Nonviolence, gradualism—these would not work against Europeans (*españoles europeos*), as merchants, their employees and colonial civil servants at Mexico City had made evident in 1808. Now, almost precisely two years later, to submit any longer to the unreformed—and evidently unreformable—colonial order was intolerable. For the revolutionaries after months of planning, it was the moment of truth. Hidalgo, cleric of heightened social conscience, a covert radical, abruptly had to choose: retreat behind denial and obfuscation, or proceed impetuously. Hidalgo recognized no retreat was possible, much less compromise.

The revolutionaries had perhaps twenty-four hours to weigh alternatives. It was almost two years to the day since the Consulado de Mexico's coup against Viceroy Iturrigaray. When informed that arrest was imminent in the early hours of 16 September, a Sunday when hundreds of parishioners were expected at Dolores for masses and the weekly *feria*, the acknowledged leader of the movement, Hidalgo, is reported to have finally stood up to announce his decision: "Caballeros, somos perdidos; aqui no hay más recurso que ir a coger gachupines."[25] Rounding up Europeans at Dolores and ransacking their residences that morning was the forerunner of subsequent insurgent tactics: "Whatever place they take, they seize the treasures of the Europeans."[26] Hidalgo and the *insurrectos* behind him were attacking some of the wealthiest businessmen in the world, millionaire merchant bankers and mine owners.

The strategy of the countryside overwhelming the capital almost succeeded. The revolution began in the countryside, a precedent for Mexico's subsequent great social movements, the Reforma and the Revolution of 1910. Hidalgo's genius grasped the essence of an anticolonial revolution, the overriding necessity of seeking "la fuente imaginaria de toda orden social: el pueblo" and stirring "las masas y hacer una revolución popular."[27] And like the Spanish conquest, independence by revolution had to have its bloodbath; revolutions have unintended consequences. As insurgent Carlos María de Bustamante phrased it, "Querer revolución sin sangre, y revolución en que se disputaba sobre la libertad de un pueblo esclavizado por tres siglos, he aqui el delirio y quimera mayor que pudiera ocurrir a unos cérebros trastornados."[28]

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Conclusion

There may be no truth but there will always be the story. *The Nation*, 4 July 2005

Like other west European outreaches into the western Atlantic, Spain's was structured on control of territory to exploit natural resources, wherever possible native peoples, and trade. An ideology, Catholicism, justified overseas occupation along with administrative officers, courts of law, and small armed units locally recruited. Control and communications, security and efficiency, were essential, as shipping across the Atlantic became the highway for moving personnel, finished goods, and especially mercury from Europe, and from America exports of silver supplemented in the eighteenth century by dyestuffs and sugar. To get to the point: merchants—initially from the mountains north of Burgos as well as the Basque country joined early by more experienced traders from north Italy, France, and the Low Countries—were and remained key instruments of colonialism and they were accorded consequently what they considered indispensable for their operations, protected shipping and monopoly (really oligopoly) of trade. After two hundred years, however, by mid-eighteenth century the Atlantic was radically different, with Spanish hegemony contested by merchants and seamen operating from Atlantic ports of early nation-states, England and France.

Although keeping to the background—Spain was a land of ruling territorial magnates—merchants were and remained a privileged group with direct and indirect access to power because an embryonic state apparatus needed their capital and skills. The early state could not provide start-up capital for enterprise but could allocate monopoly rights to a handful of major distribution ports and their merchant cadres: in the eighteenth cen-

tury it was Cadiz in the metropole linked to ports in the busy Caribbean zone, namely, Veracruz, Cartagena, and Havana, and in the south Atlantic, Buenos Aires. The efficiency of this primitive colonialism can be measured by its endurance, the wealth of merchants in the principal distribution networks, and their role in major merchandizing enterprises and as investors in colonial textile workshops, dyestuff procurement and export, and—what was essential—silver mining companies. In this stage of commercial or merchant capitalism, merchants, not manufacturers, were kingpins. The extent of which can be seen in their eighteenth-century townhouses, still notable architectural features of twenty-first century Mexico City. For the metropole, however, there was a downside: silver inflows across the Atlantic did not yet seep into the seedbed of the next phase of capitalism, large-scale textile manufacture. Instead, Cadiz exporters handled French and Dutch linens and woolens, Italian silks, and, in the late eighteenth century, English cotton goods. In the decade after 1800 English and French exporters probed paths to penetrate Spain's transatlantic system through Cadiz to Veracruz, for example, or in the case of the English, through contraband vessels in Veracruz coastal waters. This accounts for rejection by *almaceneros* of Mexico City and Veracruz, joined by their Cadiz correspondents, of policy shifts opening the way to *comercio libre*. To the contrary, this is what producers of primary products like dried beef and hides, coffee and cocoa, demanded at Buenos Aires and Caracas.

A drastic change in commercial policy threatened to materialize as Murat's troops converged on Madrid in the spring of 1808, raising the possibility of what had occurred only a few months earlier when French troops under Junot raced to seize the Braganzas at Lisbon. At Madrid, Francophiles and reformers suspected that Godoy would take the Bourbons south to Cadiz and across the Atlantic to the colony of New Spain. Madrid's political elite knew that the Braganzas had sailed aboard English naval vessels to the colony of Brazil where one of their first decrees opened Brazilian ports to ships of allied and neutral nations—to *comercio libre*. Madrid's political elite, *afrancesados* and *liberales* alike, chose to remove Godoy in the course of the *motín de Aranjuez*, the Spanish Bourbons were retained in Europe, and no Spanish government—neither the government of resistance nor the one collaborating with France—would legislate *comercio libre* over the opposition of merchants long established in the Atlantic trades. Spain's unique form of merchant capitalism rooted in a monopoly that colonialism provided proved too profitable to modify. On the other hand, Aranjuez had a far more unexpected outcome, accelerating the disintegration of the first Spanish Empire.

Absent French intervention in 1808, the Spanish Atlantic Empire's most profitable colony, New Spain, might have remained within the system, whatever the internal tension and friction. But Bonapartist intervention put the colony's political and economic elites in a quandary: which government in the metropole, the constitutional successor to the self-destructing Borbones, José Bonaparte I, or one of the many regional juntas—Oviedo or Sevilla or at last the Junta Central—should be recognized as sovereign? Viceroy Iturrigaray and advisers chose to wait and see, and in the interim he preferred to assemble a colonial junta or congress of representatives of the principal regional cities as well as the capital.

This was unacceptable to the most powerful, wealthy corporate body in the colony, the millionaire, predominantly *peninsular* merchants and merchant bankers in the Consulado de Mexico. They had good grounds for insecurity: a local assembly or congress might for the short term modify external trade policy in order to provide effective *comercio libre* with all neutral or allied powers. The *peninsular* merchants with the Audiencia's full approval chose to recognize the Junta de Sevilla, which, closely tied to Cadiz commercial groups, would reject changes in the empire's transatlantic trade structures under any circumstance. The Regency responded to the financial and informal support of the Mexico City merchant oligarchs by disowning its 17 May order about *comercio libre*. The *peninsulares* participated in the ousting of Iturrigaray, welcomed his successor viceroys, and steadfastly backed the viceregal government, the Junta Central, then the Regency, Cortes (with reservations), and—after 1814—the restored, absolutist old regime of the Bourbons.

At the onset of insurgency, Hidalgo and later Morelos could mount a kind of "nationalist" uprising, an enterprise that seemed to fade with their capture and summary execution. The Dolores/Guanajuato districts could be mobilized quickly, as Hidalgo and fellow insurgent leaders tapped into widespread discontent and where some local elites grasped the significance of some changes in the metropole, in France after 1789, and in the new republic of the United States. However, Hidalgo could not control mushrooming masses of mineworkers, small property owners, members of indigenous communities, and the unemployed, who proceeded to attack indiscriminately people of property and wealth, *peninsulares* as well as *criollos* alike, in the initial stage of insurgency. *Criollos* backed away from insurgency, guerrilla warfare raged on for years, and peace came only by mutual exhaustion. After 1815 regional leaders could draw upon local networks to sustain guerrilla operations against the colonial regime, whose operational center remained in Mexico City, that dominant complex of ad-

ministration, church, and, above all, trade and finance. The concentration of power, money, and trade there countered for years of restlessness in the provinces, especially in the Bajío and surrounding areas.

Overall, the colony's merchant oligarchy accepted responsibility for what followed in the decade after 1810: anticolonial insurrection, bitter guerrilla war—what Christon Archer has aptly seen as "one of the greatest guerrilla insurgencies in modern history"—to block what became the decolonization of New Spain. Mexico City merchants financed generously the metropole's counterinsurgency under Viceroys Venegas, Calleja, and Ruiz de Apodaca, whose forces, reinforced after 1815 by expeditionary regiments, killed thousands of insurgents. This was a legacy of three hundred years of colonialism by an early commercial capitalist metropole of Europe that had exploited silver mines and trade monopoly in the western Atlantic.

Because of the structures of colonial administration, of centralized government, its control of revenue flows and expenditure and the dominance of the center city over provincial peripheries—Mexico City versus the provinces that became states—it would require more than a half century for a decolonized nation finally to emerge as liberal, reformist, confederated rather than federated: the nation of Comonfort, Juárez, and Diaz. They would inherit a republic dismembered by the United States, then devastated by resisting a French-sponsored monarchical intervention backed by Marshal Bazaine's *zouaves* and locally recruited auxiliaries. Decolonization would be a dispiriting crucible, which is why politician-historian Lucas Alamán would invoke nostalgically the halcyon time of the viceroyalty of New Spain and the communion of colony and *peninsular* merchants.

Notes

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAEPar	Quai d'Orsay (Paris)
AC	Archivo de las Cortes (Madrid)
AEA	*Anuario de estudios americanos*
AGI	Archivo General de Indias (Seville)
AGN	Archivo General de la Nacion (Mexico City)
AGSim	Archivo General (Simancas)
AHH	Archivo Historico de Hacienda (Mexico City)
ANPar	Archives Nationales (Paris)
ARP	Archivo del Real Palacio (Madrid)
BAE	*Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*
BAGN	*Boletin del Archivo General de la Nación* (Mexico City)
BMus	British Museum (London)
BNMad	Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid)
BRAHM	Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia
BRPal	Biblioteca del Real Palcio (Madrid)
CP	Correspondence Politique
DHM	*Documentos históricos mexicanos*
MINAH	Museo del Instituto Nacional de Antropologia y Historia (Mexico City)
MN	Museo Nacional (Madrid)
NYP	New York Public Library
PRO	Public Record Office (London)
PUL	Princeton University Library
SHM	Servico Historico Militar (Simancas)

1. A National Drama, Act II

1. Basic printed sources on the Causa de El Escorial include Escoiquiz, *Memorias*, *BAE*, v. 97; Godoy, *Memorias*, I; Fugier, *Napoléon*; Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*; Martí Gilabert, *El proceso de El Escorial*; Rispoli, *Godoy*; La Parra Lopez, *Memorias*, 2.

2. Escoiquiz claimed that the major consideration in the 11 October letter was preventing French occupation by winning over Bonaparte. In his convoluted justification, the alliance between a Bourbon and a Bonaparte offered "el único medio de librar la España de una guerra tan desigual con la Francia y de salvar el Trono de las asechanzas del Principe de la Paz, cuya ruina era una consecuencia indispensable de semejante casamiento . . . lo communiqué al Principe [Fernando]." *BAE*, 97:24–32.

3. Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 235. Here Godoy accurately pinpointed *fernandistas* (traditionalists) and *ilustrados* the opposition.

4. Letter, Sevilla. ANPar, AF IV, 1605[a], plaq. 11, 7.

5. Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 234–238. See also Martí Gilabert, *El motín de Aranjuez*, 72–78.

6. Charles IV to Napoleon, 18 Nov. 1807. Fugier cites the letter in AHN, Estado, c. 5217. *Napoléon*, II. It is paraphrased in Lafuente, *Historia de España*, XVI, 205.

7. Beauharnais to Talleyrand, Madrid, 6 Apr. 1807. AAEPar, CP, 671, f. 241; Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 400.

8. Beauharnais to Champagny, Madrid, 30 Nov. 1807. AAEPar, CP, 672, ff. 292–293.

9. Phélipe de Tournon à l'Empereur, "Rapport," 20 Dec. 1807, in Grandmaison, *L'Espagne et Napoléon*, 463–471.

10. Chabannes to Champagny and Talleyrand, Madrid, 20 Dec. 1807. AAEPar, CP, Espagne, 672, ff. 322–324; "Aperçu des moyens faciles par lesquels le gouvernement français peut se rendre maître du cabinet de Madrid." AAEPar, CP, Espagne, 672, ff. 379–382.

11. Fugier was bewildered by Beauharnais's optimism: "Comment pouvait-on croire avec ce même Beauharnais qu'il avait suffi de l'affairs de l'Escorial pour . . . opérer cette 'metamorphose' complète que dècrivaient tout à coup ses dépêches?" *Napoléon*, II, 400.

12. Beauharnais to Napoleon, Madrid, 25 Feb. 1808. ANPar, AF 1680, dossier 9, doc. 15, ff. 413–414.

13. Beauharnais's contacts appear limited to some Francophone grandees in Fernando's immediate entourage. It is unclear if he and most other intelligence agents used by Bonaparte were familiar with Spanish. Nowhere did Beauharnais mention direct contact with Fernando, whose French was at best rudimentary according to records of the Escorial trial.

14. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 2 Mar. 1808.

15. Napoleon's preoccupation testifies to his grasp of the importance of the Escorial trial.

16. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 346. Fugier provides a well-documented account of the antecedents and progress of the intervention in Portugal, especially in II, 216–239, 346–354. See also: Grasset, *Guerre d'Espagne*, I, 93, 107. Major documentary sources

for the following brief coverage of the invasion of Portugal are Napoleon's correspondence and Junot's dispatches in ANPar.

17. Napoleon to Junot, Fontainebleau, 17 Oct. 1807. *Correspondance*, 13267.

18. Russia—bound by a defensive alliance with Portugal—hoped to avoid conflict between France and Portugal.

19. At Vitoria, Junot complained he had not yet made contact with Spanish units with which he was to act in concert. Junot to Napoleon, Vitoria, 3 Nov. 1807 and Napoleon to Junot, Fontainebleau, 31 Oct. 1807. *Correspondance*, 13314. See also Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 326–327.

20. Junot to Napoleon, Vitoria, 3 Nov. 1807. ANPar, AF IV, 1604, plaq. 1, doc. 47, and Napoleon to Junot, Paris, 31 Oct. 1807. *Correspondance*, 13314; Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 327–328. While Spain's shortcomings were obvious, French demands were unrealistic. The division of responsibility for provisioning French troops between Spain's war and finance ministries and other authorities only complicated long-standing Spanish provisioning practice. For this Godoy could hardly be accountable; as Godoy pointed out, Spain's rate for the conversion of the French franc was not attributable to maladministration. There was simply a serious shortage of specie, an aspect of Spain's economic crisis.

21. Junot to Napoleon, 3 Nov. 1807. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 327–328.

22. Junot to Napoleon, Vitoria, 3 Nov. 1807.

23. Napoleon to Junot, Fontainebleau, 12 Nov. 1807. *Correspondance*, 13351.

24. Napoleon to Junot, Fontainebleau, 31 Oct. 1807. *Correspondance*, 13314; Junot to Napoleon, Pancorbo, 6 Nov. 1807. ANPar, AF IV, 1604, plaq. 1, doc. 9.

25. Junot to Napoleon, Abrantes, 25 Nov. 1807. ANPar, AF IV, 1604, plaq. 1.

26. Junot to Napoleon, Lisbon, 30 Nov. 1807. ANPar, AF IV, 1604, plaq. 1.

27. This fits Champagny's intention to transfer to French manufacturers raw cotton and other colonial staples warehoused in Portugal.

28. Toreno, *Levantamiento* I, 46–61; Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 402–407.

29. The occupation of Portugal and soon-to-be of Spain curiously evoked no memory of the recent French disaster in Egypt, all the more curious since many army officers of the Egyptian expedition would serve in the peninsula.

30. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 400.

31. Napoleon to Charles IV, Paris, 10 Jan. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13443; Fugier, *Napoléon*, II.

32. Napoleon to Champagny, Paris, 12 Jan. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13446.

33. Champagny to Beauharnais, Paris, 20 Jan. 1808.

34. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 421–424. Esménard valued highly his own services. "Les circonstances singulières où se trouve en Espagne," he wrote in his application, "et dans celles que des évènements, plus ou moins prochans, peuvent amener, il serait difficile . . . de remplacer les connaissances que j'ai acquis." AAEPar, CP, 673, f. 53.

35. ANPar, AF IV, dossier 9, doc. 12. See also Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*, 366.

36. Hauterive wrote the document, and, indeed, many of its concepts reflect those of Hauterive. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 422, n. 1.

37. AAEPar, CP, 673, ff. 176–193. Cf. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 421–424.

38. Champagny noted the discredit of the Bourbon monarchy, cast by the Escorial affair.

39. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 390–391.

40. Napoleon to Louis Bonaparte, Saint-Cloud, 27 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance* [unnumbered], XVI, 589; Fugier, *Napoléon,* II, 402.

41. Napoleon, *Correspondance*, 13617ff.

42. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 413.

43. Napoleon to Champagny, 9 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13629. On the reasons for Napoleon's delaying tactics, see Fugier, *Napoléon* II, 371, 419–421.

44. Napoleon to Champagny, *Correspondance*, 13629.

45. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 422–424.

46. Apparently Napoleon felt confident the dénouement would take place in Madrid; Beauharnais believed the royal family might flee to the south.

47. Armagnac to Berg, Pamplona, 27 Feb. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 2/111, doc. 142. Armagnac added that "les personnages qui jouent un rôle et à qui je dois peut-être la tranquillité du peuple" had reported that the major fact in the region's "incertitude accablante" was rejection of Godoy, now blamed for handing Pamplona to French forces.

48. Murat to Napoleon, Bayonne, 7 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13663; ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 2/111, doc. 95.

49. Murat to Napoleon, Bayonne, 7 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 3059, 3066. French commanders argued with Mahon that the Franco-Spanish alliance justified their entry into Pamplona to rest exhausted troops.

50. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 299–300.

51. Beauharnais to Champagny, Madrid, 15 Feb. 1808. AAEPar, CP, Espagne, 673, f. 213.

52. Beauharnais to Champagny, Madrid, 20 Feb. 1808. Ibid.

53. Vandeuil to Talleyrand, Madrid, Feb. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1609, plaq. 3.

54. The court—omitting the usual winter sojourn at Madrid—moved from the Escorial to Aranjuez at the end of December 1807. Tournon to Napoleon, 20 Dec. 1807. ANPar, AF Iv, 1605[a,] plaq. 20, doc. 178.

55. Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, 140. "Par une contradiction singulière," wrote Fugier of the situation in Madrid by early March and of open dislike of Godoy, "à mesure que les troupes impériales approchaient, on s'alarmait, on s'irritait, mais en même temps on se rejouissait des angoiss que devait éprouver le prince de la Paix. Les bruits les plus bizarres circulaint sur le trouble du favori: . . . Les pamphlets, chansons, pleuvait sur lui." *Napoléon*, II, 440–441.

56. Beauharnais to Champagny, Madrid, 9 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605[a], plaq. i, doc. 26.

57. Fugier underscored the logistical problems of the French occupying forces in early 1808. *Napoléon*, II, 430. Godoy, titular head of Spanish armed forces, did not intervene in settling these issues.

58. General Dupont, reporting from Valladolid, stressed his troops lacked capotes, doctors, and hospitals. "Les armées françaises ont toujours éprouvé des pertes para la maladie en Espagne." There are also details on poor cooperation with civil authorities over army provisioning. Dupont to Murat, Valladolid, 1 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605[a], plaq. 2i, docs. 124–125.

59. Tournon to Napoleon, Madrid, 9 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1680. dossier 9, f. 395.

60. Tournon to Napoleon, Burgos, 16 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1680, dossier 9, doc. 2, ff. 398–399; Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*, 298–299, 369.

61. Napoleon reassured Murat that fresh troops were crossing at both ends of the Pyrenees; he also cautioned him that between 20 and 30 March, before lines of communication between Spain and France were secure, he should move cautiously, checking on the military forces at the disposition of the Madrid government while reducing the exposure of his troops. Hospitals for his troops were to be well protected. Failure to observe these measures "metrait toute la population en mouvement." Napoleon to Murat, Paris, 14 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13652.

62. Napoleon to Murat, Paris, 16 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13656.

63. Napoleon to Murat, Paris, 19 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13664.

64. Napoleon to Murat, Saint-Cloud, 23 Mar. 1808. *Correspondance*, 13675.

65. Izquierdo did not conceal his fears for Spain's immediate future. "On le voyait dans toutes les ambassades répandant partout des récriminations contre la France et des prédictions sinistres sur le sort réservé à l'Espagne." Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 413–414, citing Russian ambassador Tolstoy.

66. Grasset, *La Guerre d'Espagne*, I, 349.

67. Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 271–277.

68. Ibid., 280–300; Izquierdo Hernandez, *Antecedentes*, 303–4; Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, I, 105–106.

69. The most painstaking reconstruction of the Aranjuez episode, as of the Escorial affair, is Martí Gilabert, *El motín de Aranjuez*. Essential to its analysis, despite discrepancies and posterior judgments, are the accounts of participants and contemporaries—particularly Godoy's *Memorias*, II, 301–337; Pedro Cevallos's *Exposición* (1808), *Observaciones* (1810), and his *Observaciones sobre la obra de . . . Escoiquiz* (1814); and Caballeros, "Relación sucinta de los acaecimientos del Real Sitio de Aranjuez." ANPar, AF IV, 1606a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 14. Recent accounts of particular insight include Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo,* I, 129–147, Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*, 304–319 and Carlos Corona, *Revolución y reacción*, 312–379. French reaction to the Aranjuez coup is documented in ANPar, AF IV, 1606a, and in the published correspondence of Murat and Napoleon.

70. The text announcing Charles's abdication did not refer to the conditions or mental reservations that Godoy later attributed to Charles, namely guarantees of Spain's territorial integrity, Catholicism as the state religion, and security for himself and the royal entourage. Significantly, the Consejo de Castilla—at the direction of Cevallos and Caballero, who argued that the situation did not permit further formalities—published the simple statement of abdication. Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 334–339. However, Charles's alleged conditions for abdication—oddly absent from other Spanish accounts of the events at Aranjuez—did appear in Murat's report to Bonaparte on Charles's repudiation of the abdication. Presumably Bonaparte and advisers now deduced that essential to a smooth dynastic substitution in Spain had to be the guarantee of the integrity of the monarchy and the Spanish Empire.

71. Martí Gilabert, *El motín de Aranjuez*, 37.

72. Escoiquiz, *Memorias*, 28 [*BAE*, v. 97].

73. Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*, 309.

74. Among them had been a captain general of Andalusia, a *patriarca de las Indias*, Pedro de Portocarrero y Guzmán (author of *Theatro monárquico de España*

[1700]), a viceroy of Peru (Melchor de Portocarrero Lasso de la Vega and conde de Monclova).

75. On the paternal side, the conde de Montijo was a member of the Aragonese house of Palafox, which held a cluster of titles with ramifications in Aragon, Navarre, the Basque provinces, and Andalusia.

76. The Palafoxes were, incidentally, tied to other aristocratic houses: Ariz, Granada y Ega, Hijar, Palafox y Mendoza, and Idiáquez.

77. See "Discurso sobre el uso de las señoras y proyecto de un trage nacional," cited in Anes, *Antiguo régimen*, 332–333.

78. Pérez Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, I, 157–158; the pamphlet bore the clarifying title, *Ideas de un militar joven para formarse un partido militar*. Ibid.

79. One sister married the marqués de Villafranca, whose *tertullia* Viegas frequented; Goya painted the marquesa holding a painter's palette.

80. The husband of María Ignacia Idiáquez y Carvajal, conde de Tepa, was under surveillance by religious authorities for alleged masonic ties. A sister married the marquéz de Villafranca del Vierzo, another married a cousin (the marqués de Lazán), a third married the conde de Villamonte, and the oldest, the conde de Contamina y de Parcent. Other aristocratic anti-Godoyistas included the duque del Infantado, de San Carlos, and de Frías, among many others. Teba—not known for his self-effacement—presumed to act as leader of the *grandeza*.

81. Allegedly Jaúregui spread the false report that Fernando had told him that the night of 17–18 March was set for the withdrawal of the royal family southward to Sevilla but that he did not want to join them. Also Jaúregui was credited with signaling for the attack on Godoy's residence. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, I, 77–78; Martí Gilabert, *El motín de Aranjuez*, 138, n. 199.

82. Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 308; Caballero, "Relación sucsinta de los acontecimientos del Real Sitio de Aranjuez." ANPar, AF IV, 1606a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 14.

83. *Manifiesto de los procedimientos del Consejo Real*, 4–8.

84. The *Manifiesto* justified the assault on Godoy as an exercise of the natural right of peoples to prevent the flight of the monarch—also the justification offered by Pedro de Cevallos.

85. Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*.

86. Cevallos, *Observaciones* (1814), 30–34.

87. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 440–443.

88. On 10 March Bonaparte advised Beauharnais: "Mes troupes sont à 30 lieues de Madrid là des évènments importants." Sometime later he informed Murat he would arrive at Burgos on 22 March. *Correspondance*, 16637 and 16652, cited in Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 419–421.

89. Beauharnais, Mar. 1808. AAEPar, CP, Espagne, 673, plaq. 1 doc. 26.

90. Murat to Napoleon, 24 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 1, doc. 64.

91. Murat to Sire, Castillejo, 19 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 54, reproduced in part in Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, I, 133–134, n. 1. Although the note, informally scrawled on common paper, may be apocryphal, its tone and text are consistent with Murat's more formal dispatches. It is conceivable, however, that—as in Viegas's dilemma in the Escorial affair—Murat did not share his anxiety with Bonaparte. Bonaparte may have later written but not sent a letter expressing his own fears about the situation in Spain.

92. Murat to Sire, Buitrago, 20 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 54.

93. Murat to Sire, El Molar, 21 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV 1605a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 56.

94. Murat to Sire, Madrid, 24 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AAF IV, 1605a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 64. French historians, agonizing as much as Spaniards over 1808, have censured Murat for adhering blindly to Bonaparte's instructions covering his entry into Madrid after Fernando's unexpected enthronement. They argue, better to have waited to observe developments. To judge from Murat's quotation cited earlier, he was hardly acting blindly; his and Bonaparte's analyses simply coincided.

95. Murat to Sire, Madrid, 24 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 1/1, doc. 61.

96. Murat to Sire, Madrid, 24 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. 1/1, docs. 61, 64. Obviously Murat and Beauharnais provided Bonaparte with contradictory—and often rival—assessments; both, however, were equally arrogant toward Spaniards.

97. To quote Murat's dispatch to Bonaparte: "J'ai déterminé ce Ministre à faire lui-même cette démarche auprès du Prince, en feignant d'applaudir sa Conduite. Je lui ai dit: Tout ce que vous avez fait jusquà ce moment paraît à merveille, puisque par le fait l'Espagne est sans Roi aux yeux de l'Empereur . . . Mais vous risquez de gâter tout si vous faites ou si vous faites faire au Prince des Asturies un pas de plus. Car qui peut vous assurer, si vous n'aviez pas reçu l'ordre d'empêcher le départ du Roi ainsi que vous me l'assurez, que vous ayez agi dans le sens politique de l'Empereur? Qui peut enfin vous faire présumer que l'Empereur reconnaîtra le Prince des Asturies? Et qu'il consentira surtout à ce mariage qui seul a produit tout l'interêt que l'Espagne porte à ce Prince; car vous savez qu'il ne date que de l'instant où l'on a conçu l'espoir que l'Empereur pourrait consentir à lui donner une de ses nièces." Murat to Sire, Madrid, 24 Mar. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605a, plaq. l/1, doc. 64.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 512–514.

2. Bayonne

1. Aguirre Elorriaga, *El abate de Pradt*, [115, 159, 181]. On the *afrancesados*, who tried to combine enlightened despotism with liberalism, see the clear exposition of Artola, *Los afrancesados* (2d ed., 2008), 47–48 and especially 52–56. Also, Breña, *En el umbral de las revoluciones hispánicas*, 67–94; Mendez Bejarano, *Historia política de los afrancesados*, 177–181. For recent French analyses of intervention in Spain under Napoleon, there are essays edited by Gerard Dufour and Elisa del Larriba. *L'Espagne en 1808* and the semipopular Jean-Joël Brégeon, *Napoléon et la guerre d'Espagne, 1808–1814*.

2. Cevallos, *Exposición de los hechos y maquinaciones que han preparado la usurpación de la corona de España y los medios que el emperador de los Franceses ha puesto en obra para realizarla* (Madrid, 1808), reproduced in *BAE*, 97:153–185.

3. Escoiquiz, *Idea sencilla*, reproduced in *BAE*, 97:188–226. His *Memorias*, where he confessed that Bayonne was the culmination of his plan to entrap Bonaparte, remained in manuscript until published in 1915. By then the original Spanish version of Bayonne was so widely accepted that the revelation of his plan, a kind of confes-

sion, was attributed to a desire to justify his seemingly naive, unpatriotic, indeed contradictory role in the momentous events of late 1807 and early 1808.

4. Bonaparte's ruminations were recorded by the comte de las Cases, *Le mémoire de Sainte Hélène*; Champagny claimed he had little to do with Bonaparte's decision at Bayonne, in his *Souvenirs*.

5. As French historian Fugier remarked, "On sait . . . avec quelle minutie Talleyrand a expurgé les archives." *Napoléon*, II, 315. José García de León y Pizarro, Fernando VII's prime minister after the restoration, cooperated with French ambassador Beauharnais in gathering sensitive documents, which were delivered to Fernando, who "gradually burned them"; Cevallos later explained why some documents had to be burned. *Exposición*, 3. Pizarro also gained possession of the sealed papers of José de Amézaga, who, with Escoiquiz's nephew José de Peral, joined Fernando's entourage at Vitoria on the road to Bayonne and was reputed to hold a detailed diary of what happened at Bayonne. Amézaga accompanied Fernando to exile at Valençay; as Fernando's secretary and later equerry, he became involved in intrigue and financial deals for which he was later condemned to death. Pizarro, *Memorias*, I, 204–206. On these points, see also Godoy, *Memorias*, II, 301–302.

6. In his correspondence and at Saint Helena, Napoleon mentioned mediation.

7. Cevallos, *Exposición*, 3–4.

8. "Replies received by E. Viale to queries he was directed to propose." Gibraltar, 26 Apr. 1808. PRO, CO 91/48.

9. Charles Stuart to George Canning, 17 Sept. 1808. PRO, FO 72/58, f. 222r.

10. Cevallos to Benito Pardo de Figueroa (St. Petersburg), 19 Sept. 1805, ANPar., AF IV, 1611, plaq. 3'I.

11. This was perhaps the first time that a specific colony of refuge was mentioned.

12. This libel has been seriously questioned by recent historiography, and on substantial grounds.

13. The primacy of raison d'état over ties of royal blood was at the core of the conde de Aranda's opposition, as a member of the Consejo de Estado, to Spain joining the English in the counterrevolutionary First Coalition.

14. With the phrase "sin estar violentado," Cevallos hoped obviously to render Charles's renunciation illegal because involuntary.

15. Carta del Rey, nuestro señor, a su padre, el señor D. Carlos IV, Bayona, 1 May 1808. *BAE*, 93:178–179.

16. Carta del Sr. D. Carlos IV a su hijo, el señor D. Fernando VII, Bayona, 2 May 1808. *BAE*, 93:113.

17. Carlos to Fernando, Bayona, 2 May 1808. Cevallos, *Exposición*, 74–79, *BAE*, 98:113, and Llorente, *Memorias*, II, 143–49. This letter's authorship remains uncertain: Godoy attributed it to Napoleon, although internal evidence suggests a Spanish pen. There are two possible interpretations for the inclusion. Perhaps Cevallos published Charles's letter (really, Cevallos himself?) to Fernando in order to criticize Charles's defense of the French alliance and the possible flight south to Andalusia and Mexico. Or, Cevallos—Charles's foreign secretary since 1800—agreed with Charles's foreign policy *until* London rejected the rights of neutral vessels at sea in wartime. This forced the break with France, if only to maintain transatlantic contact with the colonies. Including Charles's long letter appears to reflect the contradictions tearing Spain asunder.

18. Cevallos reported that this courier was intercepted, obliging Cevallos to send a duplicate of the order—a copy of which he claimed he was unable to keep.

19. The decrees imply that Cevallos and his associates either planned to have Napoleon displace the Spanish Bourbons and intern them in France, or they divined—not difficult to do—Napoleon's intention.

20. "Exposición," *BAE*, v. 98. These members of Cevallos's secretariat appear as influential officials of the *fernandista* government taking shape in the fall of 1808.

21. Perhaps the opaque reference to "apariencias de la justicia" permitted Cevallos in 1814—at the onset of one of Spain's most reactionary governments, Fernando VII's restoration—guardedly to grant some justice to French interest in modifying Spain's agrarian structures, class privileges, and cumbersome overlay of state bureaucracy.

22. Cevallos, *Observaciones* (1814), 1–2. A high civil servant of Spain's old regime, Cevallos knew how to play on the profound influence of Spanish Catholicism in galvanizing popular resistance to the French occupation. See what amounts to Cevallos's second anti-French manifesto: *Política pecuilar de Bonaparte*.

23. The proximity of Murat and his troops at nearby Madrid was undoubtedly an important factor.

24. Savary halted at the Escorial to hand a letter to Charles, the official pretext for his mission to Spain as informal agent. No record of his interview with Charles has survived.

25. Escoiquiz, *Idea sencilla*, *BAE*, 97:196–199; *Nuevas observaciones*, 33.

26. Escoiquiz, *Idea sencilla*, 164–166.

27. Ibid.; *Memorias*, 401–455 (also in *BAE*, 97:119–37). The fact that in both Escoiquiz's accounts the interview with Bonaparte is an appendix suggests it was based upon discussion with De Pradt and, in fact, was an expansion of his original account of his first interview with Bonaparte (ibid., 135–136).

28. Godoy, *Memorias*, in *BAE*, 89:371–373, 383–384, 392.

29. Cevallos, *Exposición*, in *BAE*, 98:113–115; Godoy, *Memorias*, II.

30. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, I, app. 26, 82–85.

31. For the texts, see ibid., 82–97, app. 82–27.

32. Escoiquiz, *Memorias*, 398–401.

33. Escoiquiz, *Idea sencilla*, 58–60 (also *BAE*, 97:204). Escoiquiz claimed he had drafted the proclamation, whose meaning, he believed, was not grasped by Bonaparte or Duroc. He had to resort to the "lenguage del Gabinete de Napoleón."

34. Ibid. (also in *BAE*, 97:264).

35. Escoiquiz, *Idea sencilla*, in *BAE*, 97:196–199; Cevallos, *Nuevas observaciones*, 23.

36. *Observaciones*, 74–78.

37. *Nuevas observaciones*, 66, 79.

38. Ibid., 97.

39. How else interpret his oblique rhetoric: "Pero las conferencias entre los Reyes han sido medios oportunos para discutir los intereses de sus estados respectivos? No ha probado la experiencia que son más bien surgentes de la frialdad y de la discordia, que vehículos de conciliación y de amistad? No se ha visto comunmente que las contestaciones sobre el ritual han usurpado el lugar y la atención debida a los esenciales intereses de los Gabinetes?" And finally: "No estaba más a la vista la

impudencia con que trató Buonaparte a los primeros Soberanos de la Europa?" Ibid., 37–41.

40. Ibid., 41.

41. Escoiquiz, *Memorias*, in *BAE*, 97:121.

42. Gil y Lemos to Pedro de Cevallos, Madrid, 15 May 1808. ARP. The announcement was carried aboard the *Atrevida*, which left Cadiz one week later, arriving at Veracruz on 8 June. To that moment, only unofficial reports of events in the peninsula had reached New Spain.

43. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 15 Apr. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605/A, plaq. 1/iii, docs. 150–52.

44. Ibid., 27 Apr. 1808.

45. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 8 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. 1/1, docs. 30–34. The vessels at Cadiz were to carry 20,000 rifles.

46. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 19–28 May, 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. 1/11, docs. 63–66.

47. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 20 May 1808. Ibid., doc. 64.

48. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 29 May 1808. Ibid. Murat explained that Castaños had been considered, too. Murat to Napoleon, 13 May 1808. Ibid., doc. 63. Both Cuesta and Castaños declined their nominations by a government of suspected illegitimacy.

49. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 31 May and 1 June. Ibid., docs. 63–66.

50. Escoiquiz, *Memorias*, *BAE*, 97:132.

51. Ibid., 131–133.

3. Dos de Mayo

1. Basic sources include: Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de mayo*, I, 372–379; Toreno, *Levantamiento,* in *BAE*, 164:42–44. On tension at Madrid between Spanish and French troops, Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*, 417–419.

2. On the incidents of tension, see Izquierdo Hernández, *Fernando VII*, 416, 418–419. On 23 April, an "hombre de buen porte" hurriedly posted in the Plaza del Sol a Francophobic *décima* (418). A covert move to mobilize a crowd quickly?

3. Lecestre, ed., "La guerre de la Péninsule," *Revue des questions historiques*, 117 (1896), 461.

4. Ibid., 460. After examining Napoleon's unedited correspondence, Lecestre concluded that he intended to "réprimer toute tentative d'insurrection" (474).

5. Ibid., 475.

6. Murat's decision to dispatch members of the royal family was opposed by the Junta de Gobierno chosen by Fernando VII before leaving for Bayonne. Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo,* 350–351.

7. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, I, 82.

8. Rojas y Abreu was the son-in-law of the *governador* of Santo Domingo, and probably nephew of that colony's archbishop, Pantaleón Abreu.

9. For sources on Velarde, see: AHN, Consejos, 21, 463, f. 2; Fugier, *Napoléon*, 171, n. 4; Palacio Atard, *Estudios sobre la Espana liberal (1808–1848)*; Priestley, *Galvez*, 154–155; Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, 1:326–327, 332–333, 341, 348; *Titulos de Castilla*, 1:328, 3:541–542; González Echegaray, *Los antecesores de los Velarde*; Real Aca-

demic de la Historia, *Boletin*, 14, 270–278; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:27. On Dapoiz: Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, 1:333, 335, 341; Gómez Imaz, *Apuntes biográficos*.

10. Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, I, 326–327.

11. Ibid., I, 341, 342.

12. Ibid., I, 338–339.

13. Ibid., I, 327, 342–345.

14. Ibid., I, 345–348.

15. Daoiz was startled to learn that Velarde had apparently mentioned his plan to Gonzalo O'Farrill of the Junta de Gobierno. Ibid., 348.

16. Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de mayo*, I, 345–348.

17. This may explain Velarde's discussion with O'Farrill about his grand design. It is not mentioned in Azanza and O'Farrill, *Memoria*.

18. Cuesta grew up in a small town in northern Spain, Tudanco, whose young men migrated to Cadiz to enter the colonial trades, or to the military at Madrid. He rose rapidly, serving in the repression of Tupac Amarú in Peru, then in the peninsula. He respected *ilustrado* General O'Farrill, which may explain why Bonaparte asked him to go to New Spain as Iturrigaray's replacement—he refused. Cuesta's anti-populism probably led him to side ultimately with the traditionalists in the resistance to French occupation. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:274; 2:99–100, 193–195, 216–217; 3:72; Izquierdo Hernández, *Antecedentes*, 377; Valdés, *Publica exposicion*, 47–48; Castlereagh, *Letters and Dispatches*, 7:252–253; ANPar, AF IV 1606^{b}, plaq. 3, n. 6; AHN, Estado, 64.

19. Their joint defense in 1814, their *Memoria*, omits reference to ideological differences between them and their accusers.

20. Azanza and O'Farrill, *Memoria*, in *BAE*, 97:295–302.

21. Cevallos, *Exposición*, in *BAE*, 97:181.

22. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, III, 56; AHN, Estado, 878^{2}, letra 1, n. 59.

23. In an effort to win the support of Quintana, Azanza pointed to Napoleon's "forces irresistibles" and compared them to "la nullité de l'Espagne corrompue par ses princes." Quoted in Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1:320. Other military officers shared their misgivings, notably Generals Solano and Morla at Cadiz. See following chapter.

24. Pradt, *Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne*, xiv.

4. Sevilla

1. Azanza to Berg, Madrid, 19 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV 16088, plaq. 21; Berg to Napoleon, Madrid, 7 May 1808, ibid; Jackson, *Diary*, 2:384.

2. Sanchez Blanco Parody, *Ilustración goyesca*.

3. *Manifiesto de lo que no ha hecho el Conde del Montijo*.

4. Adame to LeRoy, 8 Apr. 1808. AAEPar CC 98.

5. Consul LeRoy, Cadiz, 25 Mar. 1808, and Ayuntamiento de Cadiz to LeRoy, 25 Apr. 1808. AAEPar, CC, 98, ff. 22iv, 242r–242v; LeRoy to French Ambassador, Madrid, 22 Apr. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1605 A, plaq. III, doc. 178; "Extraiat . . . lettre du Consul Général de Cadiz, 29 Apr. 1808." ANPar, AF IV, 1606 A, plaq. II.

6. ANPar, AF IV, 1605, plaq. LIII, doc. 182; also, LeRoy, Cadiz, AAEPar, CC 98, ff. 221r, 250r.

7. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 26 Mar., 8 Apr. 1808. PRO, CO 91/48.

8. Hunter to Gil y Lemos (Pedro Cevallos, foreign minister, was at Bayonne), Madrid, 13, 15, 12, 29 Apr. and 6 May 1808. AHN, Estado, 5617.

9. On Hispano-English exchanges there, see Gómez de Arteche y Moro, *Nieblas de la historia patria*; Girón, *Recuerdos*, 1:162–163.

10. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, 8 Apr. 1808. PRO, CO 91/48.

11. "Replies received by E. Viale to queries he was directed to propose." Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 26 Apr. 1808. PRO, CO 91/48.

12. Consul LeRoy, 28 Apr. 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. li.

13. Translation of a letter from Algeciras, 5 May 1808. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 7 May 1808. PRO, CO 91/48.

14. Pérez Villanueva, *Planteamiento*, 80–81.

15. Dalrymple to Viale, Gibraltar, 6 May 1808. PRO, CO 91/48.

16. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, 7 May 1808. PRO, CO, 91/48.

17. José Fernández de Cosío to Juan Escolano, Cadiz, 6 May 1808. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencio, libro 238.

18. Emanuel Viale to Sir Hew Dalrymple, Irish Town, Gibraltar, 8 May 1808. PRO, CO 92/48.

19. Navarro was possibly a brother of Navarro y Sangrán, then director of the artillery corps.

20. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 8 May 1808. PRO, CO, 92/48.

21. [Castlereagh ?] to Sir Hew Dalrymple, [London], 25 May 1808 (draft). PRO, CO, 92/48.

22. Constantin to Murat, 22 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. III, doc. 74.

23. Rogniat to Murat, 22 May 1808, in ibid.

24. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 13 May 1808. ANPar, 1606A.

25. Castaños to Berg, Gibraltar, 17, 19, 22, 23 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1608A, plaq. LIV, and 1607, plaq. LII.

26. Letter, Castlereagh to Dalrymple, PRO, CO 91/48.

27. LeRoy, Cadiz, 6 May 1808. AAE, Consul., 98 f. 250.

28. Solano to Berg, 26 May 1808; LeRoy to Cadiz, 23 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1607, plaq. LII.

29. Murat to Sire, 23 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. LII, docs. 63–66.

30. Canclaux, "Précis des évenements insurrectionnels qui ont éclatés en Andalousie, mêlé de remarques faites sur cette partie de la peninsule par Canclaux, sous-commissaire consul chancelier de Sa Majesté l'Empereur à Cadiz." ANPar, AE, BIII, 345.

31. Lafuente, *Historia*, 16:292.

32. Gómez Imaz, *Sevilla en 1808*, 23, 93–94; Tap y Núñez, *Apuntes para la historia de España*, 4ff.

33. Pérez de Guzmán, *Dos de Mayo*, 1:157–158; Vigón, *Historia de la artillería Etspañola*; Maturana, *Discurso para la apertura de las Juntas de Instrucción*.

34. Gómez Imaz, *Sevilla en 1808*, 104; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:221.

35. Tap y Núñez, *Apuntes*, 99–110.

36. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:22.

37. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, 1:61–62.

38. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 18 June 1808. PRO, CO, 92/48.

39. Jackson, *Diary*, 2:428–429; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:223; Girón, *Recuerdos*, 1:245–246; Blanco White, *El Español*, Apr. 1810.

40. Defourneaux, *Olavide*, 283.

41. Jiménez, *Causa*, 179.

42. Ibid., 75; Gil, *Oración fúnebre del excelentísimo Señor D. Alexandro de O'Reilly*, xlvi–xlvii.

43. Quesada Montero, *La actuación de la Suprema Junta de Sevilla*.

44. "Bando," *Erección de la Junta Suprema de Sevilla, 29 de mayo de 1808*, in *Colección de proclamas*, 3–5.

45. "Proclama de Sevilla a los Españoles," Sevilla, 29 May 1808, in ibid., 17–21.

46. "Prevenciones," Sevilla, 28 May 1808, in ibid., 6–9.

47. *Manifiesto o declaración de los principales hechos*, in *Colección del Fraile*, 788:107–110.

48. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, (between 18 and 25 May 1808). PRO, CO 92/48.

49. Tap y Núñez, *Apuntes*, 19–20.

50. Real Sociedad Económica de Madrid, "Informe echo a S.M. sobre la libertad de comercio." BRAHM, Mutis 5, no. 641.

51. Stein and Stein, *Apogee of Empire*, 287–288.

52. Gómez Imaz, *Sevilla en 1808*, 139.

53. Solano's biography is based on Castro, *Historia de Cadiz*, 551–603; Grandmaison, *L'Ambassade*, 308–309; Fugier, *Napoléon*, 2:146; Bourgoing, *Tableau*, 3:164; Lohmann Villena, *Los americanos*, 2:451–452; García, ed., *DHM*, 7:13; AAEPar, Consulat, t. 97; ANPar, AF III, 62, plaq. 1, doc. 7; AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, libro 238, f. 112v; Castlereagh, *Dispatches*, 7:426–428.

54. There is a brief biography in *Revista General de Marina*, 165 (July 1963), 101–103.

55. "Mémoire . . . sur les projets d'hégémonie européenne de l'Angleterre," 24 Feb. 1796. ANPar, AF III, 57, dossier 224, plaq. 1, doc. 14.

56. LeRoy, Cadiz, 4 Oct. 1806. AAEPar, CP 97, ff. 296r, 425r–426v.

57. LeRoy, Cadiz, 3 May 1808. AAEPar, CP. 97, ff. 425r–426v.

58. ANPar, AF IV, 1605A, plaq. LIII, doc. 144.

59. Constantin to Murat, "Compte rendu . . . mission . . . a Socorro,[y] Castaños, 6–22 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. LIII, doc. 74.

60. "Réponses des gouverneurs de province, capitaines généraux et fonctionnaires publics à la notification de la nomination du Grand Duc à la lieutenance général du Royaume et sur les évènements de Madrid du 2 mai." Solano to Murat, Badajos, 11 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV 1608A, plaq. l.

61. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:226–227.

62. ANPar, AF IV, 1607, plaq. LII.

63. Lohmann Villena, *Los americanos*, 2:188, 304.

64. "Instrucción que la Junta Suprema de gobierno manda a todas las ciudades y villas de este reinado y quiere ser executada," Sevilla, 29 May 1808. *Colección de proclamas*, 5–6.

65. Castro, *Cadiz*, 578–580.

66. Ibid., 578–580, 610.

67. Azanza, *Memoria*, 99.

68. AHN, Estado, Orden de Carlos III, exp. 1224.

69. LeRoy, Cadiz, 1803. AAEPar, CP 97.

70. Desdevizes du Dézert, *L'Espagne de L'Ancien Regime. Les institutions*, 278.

71. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 7 and 14 June 1808. PRO, CO 91/49.

72. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, Gibraltar, 18 June and 28 July 1808. PRO, CO 91/49.

73. AGI, Consulado, Correspondencia, 55, 28 June 1808.

74. Quesada Montero, *Actuación*; "Testimonio de Francisco Xavier de Cienfuegos," 24 Mar. 1809. AHN, Estado, 43(1), no. 306.

75. Romana like Apodaca would raise the influence of Andalusia in ensuing Spanish governments.

5. A Contested Authority

1. Mier, *Historia*, I, 234–235.

2. The following paragraphs on the Consulado de Mexico's dissension during the elections of *prior* and *consules* over the eighteenth century are based on manuscript materials in AGI 2513: "Representación" of the Consulado's Junta General (Baza Ibañez, Cortina, Pezquera) to Virrey, 29 Nov. 1788, followed by a "Representación" of their Madrid agent's, 25 Apr. 1807; "Resolución" of the Consejo de Indias, 6 June 1807; "Representación" fiscal of the Consejo, 17 Sept. 1807; and the most comprehensive treatment of the question, "Dictamen del Fiscal en al Expediente sobre lo ocurrido en las ultimas elecciones de Prior y Consules del Consulado de Mexico," 9 Oct. 1807.

3. Fuenclara was instructed to settle the sharpening differences *(inquietudes*) between the Consulado's *vizcaínos* and *montañeses*. The mercantile magnates of Mexico City were the major sources of financing the empire in America—which they often reminded Madrid authorities. Sarrablo Aguareles, *Fuenclara*, 2:313ff.

4. The functioning of the *alternative* was questioned by merchants (*matriculados*) in a Junta General in 1788, and they requested the intervention of the viceroy. Letter to Virrey, Francisco Baza Ibañez (prior), Conde de la Cortina, and Francisco Antonio Pezquera (consules), 25 Nov. 1788. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

5. Ibid.

6. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

7. *Fiscal* Sagarzurieta, 30 Apr. 1806. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

8. Iturrigaray to Consulado de Mexico, 2 Feb. 1807. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, 2a ser., t. 233, n. 1195.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, ff. 39v–40v.

12. Ibid., 14 Feb. 1807, ff. 51.

13. Ibid., sección 10.

14. Consulado de Mexico to Soler, 14 Feb. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

15. Iturrigaray to Consulado de Mexico, Feb. 1807, Mexico, 2513, f. 23, sección 10.

16. Iturrigaray to Consulado de Mexico, Feb. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

17. AGI, Mexico, 2513, f. 21, sección 10.

18. Consulado de Mexico, "Representación," 18 Mar. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

19. Consulado de Mexico (Francisco Cotera, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, Meoqui), 18 Feb. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

20. Audiencia de Mexico to SM, 13 Apr. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

21. Sánchez Tirado, letter, 25 Apr. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

22. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

23. Ramón de Posada, "Respuesta fiscal," to Consejo de Indias. AGI, Mexico, 2513. Posada opined that the documented complaints of Consulado and Audiencia "clearly" showed that Iturrigaray had acted "con abuso y exceso de sus facultades." (Perhaps Posada had served too long in New Spain as colonial civil servant?)

24. AGN, AHH, 550-68 and 550-83. A copy of the Real Orden of 9 July 1807 to Iturrigaray is in BRAHM, Colección Mata Linares, n. 122.

25. Consulado de Mexico (Cotera, Iturbe e Iraeta, Meoqui) to SM, 25 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

26. Consulado de Mexico to Sánchez Tirado, 6 July 1808. AGI, Mexico, 2516.

27. AGN, AHH, 442-16.

28. On this point, see "Escritura de depósito irregular . . . a favor de Don Manuel García Herreros, 1782." AGN, AHH, 1869-18. Also Marichal, *La bancarrota*, 113–118.

29. Soler to Consulado de Mexico, 28 July 1805. AGN, Consulado, t. 62; Pedro de Aparici to Diego de Gardoqui, 25 Apr. 1796. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

30. Ibid.

31. "Escrtura de Depósito irregular." AGN, AHH, 1869-18. In 1777, the three "principales ministros" of Mexico City's Customs also collected for the Consulado its six per one thousand. Consulado de Mexico to Virrey, 24 Nov. 1777. AGN, AHH, 791-8.

32. The Consulado de Guadalajara in 1803 complained to Hacienda minister Soler about the "indeferencia" of the *avería* collector at the port of Acapulco, blaming it on his small "honorario" and recommending it be raised to 20 percent of gross receipts, "especialmente en el despacho de la Nao de China." Consulado de Guadalajara to Soler, 15 Apr. 1803. AGI, Mexico, 2996.

33. AGN, AHH, 677-1; AGI, Mexico, 2833. Zavala y Zengotieta's correspondence (550 folios) with the *tesorero* collecting the Consulado's *avería* is in AGN, AHH, 677-1.

34. "Tarifa de las cantidades que deben pagar las mercaderías ultramarinas que salgan de Veracruz para el reino, excepto la capital y Jalapa." AGN, AHH, 550-45; Iturrigaray to Soler, 26 June 1808. AGI, Mexico, 2834; "Dictamen del fiscal [Sagarzurieta], 30 Sept. 1808. AGN, AHH, 443-7.

35. Ibid.

36. AGI, Mexico, 2833.

37. Aparici, "Informe," to Gardoqui, 25 Apr. 1796. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

38. AGN, AHH, 443-2; ibid., 502–39.

39. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

40. Aznares, "Informe," 26 Jan. 1811. AGN, AHH, 633-23, f. 125. The *Juventud* referred of course to the young immigrant *peninsulares* employed by the capital's *almaceneros*.

41. Consulado de Mexico (Francisco de la Cotera, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, Juan Fernández de Meoqui) to Miguel Cayetano Soler, Mexico, 29 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

42. The following paragraphs are based upon: Consulado de Mexico (Francisco de la Cotera, Gabriel de Iturbe e Iraeta, Juan Fernándo de Meoqui) to Soler, 29 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

43. Ibid.

44. Aparici to Gardoqui, 25 Apr. 1796; Anonymous to Gardoqui, 22 July 1796. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

45. Letter, Mexico, 24 Oct. 1796. AGI, Mexico, 2507. The Consulado was requested to provide a report on the "producto del derecho de avería 1785–1788 . . . para confrontar con otras notizias de la Aduana." Viceroy to Consulado, 7 Oct. 1789. AGN, AHH, 677-1; AGI, Mexico, 2320; Soler to Virrey de Mexico, 17 Feb. 1801. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

46. Soler to Virrey de Mexico, 17 Feb. 1801. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

47. Ibid.

48. AGN, AHH, 442-12 and 442-16.

49. Soler to Aparici, 15 Mar. 1803. AGI, Mexico, 2833.

50. *Informe* of the *contador segundo* to Consulado de Mexico, 21 May 1805. This was the response to a RO (20 Dec. 1804) demanding full accounting of the fourteen per one thousand *avería extraordinario*. AGN, AHH, 442-16.

51. Ibid., 442–12.

52. It is not clear if totals represent gross or net receipts. Contaduría del . . . Consulado de Mexico, 2 June 1806: "Estado primero que manifiesta las cantidades totales . . . en la . . . Aduana de esta capital." AGI, Mexico, 2834.

53. Contador General, Cadiz, 26 Jan. 1811. AGN, AHH, 633-23; AGN, AHH, 443-4 and 442-12; Iturrigaray to Soler, Feb. 1807 AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, 2a. ser., t 233, n. 1195. Salary overpayments in three instances were between 28 and 102 percent. Aparici to Azanza, 26 Apr. 1808. AGI, 2834.

54. Consulado de Mexico to Soler, 29 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

55. Aparici wrote Soler, after analyzing the *avería* accounts for 1795–1799, that his conclusions were now reinforced by "la arbitrariedad con que se conduce este Consulado, haciendo unos gastos que no deve, ni puede soportar sus fondos"—for instance, excessive outlay on former Viceroy Branciforte's excursion to the diggings at Huehuetoca, or on the consulado's militia. Letter, Madrid, 23 Sept. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

56. RO 28 July 1805 countersigned by Soler, to Consulado de Mexico. AGN, Consulado, t. 62.

57. Soler to Azanza, 26 Apr. 1808. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

58. Iturrigaray to Soler, AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, 2a ser., t. 233.

59. Castillo Negrete to Soler, Feb. 1807. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, 2a. ser. t. 232, n. 1195.

60. Sagarzurieta summarized his position in a detailed report to Viceroy Garibay, 30 Sept. 1808. AGN, AHH, 443-2.

61. Iturrigaray's activity was reported by Aparici to Azanza (who replaced Soler at Hacienda) after the coup at Aranjuez. Aparici to Azanza, Madrid, 26 Apr. 1808. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

62. Sagarzurieta to Garibay, 30 Sept. 1808. AGN, AHH, 443-7. Iturrigaray was convinced the political crisis in the metropole obliged him to create a fresh source of authority, a local authority—a *junta general* in the colony of New Spain.

63. Boisselle to Garibay, 12 Jan. 1809. AGN, AHH, 443-2.

64. Consulado de Mexico (Diaz González, Joseph de la Cotera, José Ruiz de la Bárcena) to Garibay. AGN, Consulado, t. 62.

6. New Spain's Cuban Counterpoint

1. Consejo de Indias, 31 May 1811. AGI, Mexico, 2516.

2. Fernandez de Castro, Letter, to Consulado de Veracruz, 1809. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2462.

3. Quirós, "Memoria, 1807." AGI, Mexico, 2997; *Expediente . . . Habana . . . 1808*, 11–12; Antonio del Valle Hernández, Havana, 14 Oct. 1811; AGN, Consulado, t. 2, exp. 16.

4. Capitán General, letter, 12 May 1809, in Albuerne, *Origen y estado de . . . la Real Orden de 17 de mayo de 1810*, app. 2, p. 16; Estebán Fernández de León, "Equivocaciones," Cadiz, 12 May 1812; AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464; Rafael Villavicencio, Sevilla, to Junta Suprema de Sevilla, 1 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 59B, n. 101.

5. This is precisely what Quirós, secretary of the Veracruz Consulado, advocated for his port in 1807. "Memoria, 1809," AGI, Mexico, 2997.

6. Consulado de Cadiz (Ignacio de Salazar, Antonio Faxardo, Tomás de Urrutia), 24 Sept. 1811. AGN, 215-14.

7. Consulado de la Habana (O'Reylly, Iguarán, González Larriñaga) to Godoy, 22 Feb. 1808. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

8. Junta económica del Consulado de la Habana (conde de Santa María de Loreto, Francisco Laiseca, Pedro Juan de Erice) to Capitán General de Cuba, 17 Oct. 1811. AGN, Consulado, t. 2, exp. 16.

9. Antonio del Valle Hernández, Habana, 14 Oct. 1811. AGN, Consulado, t. 2, exp. 16; *Expediente . . . Habana . . . 1808*, 11–12. Galling to Havana merchants was the requirement that merchandise from the United States would be dutied at the rate as if shipped to Spain and then reexported to Havana, raising total effective duties to between 39 and 43 percent of cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) Havana.

10. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 159.

11. AHN, Estado, 6367[2].

12. Ibid. Vázquez Cienfuegos, *Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba*, ch. 5, esp. 231–259.

13. Rafael de Villavicencio, Sevilla, to *presidente*, Suprema Junta de Sevilla, 1 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 59b n. 101.

14. Juan de Villavicencio, Habana, to Suprema Junta de España e Indias, en Sevilla, 9 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 59b, n. 101.

15. Ibid. Vázquez Cienfuegos, *Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba*, ch. 5, esp. 231–259.

16. Rafael de Villavicencio, Sevilla, to *presidente*, Junta de Sevilla, 1 Jan. 1809, and to Juan Villavicencio. AHN, Estado, 59b, n. 101.

17. Francisco Antonio Rucavado, apoderado especial del Ayuntamiento de la Habana, 6 Dec. 1817. AHN, Estado, 6367[2].

18. Conde de Casa Barreto to SM, 11 Oct. 1809. AHN, Estado, 3637[2]; Juan Justo Ximénez, "Artículo comunicado," *La Lancha* (Habana), 5 Oct. 1813. AHN, Consejos, 21,035; Guerra y Sánchez, ed., *Historia de la nación cubana*, III, 18–20.

19. Rucavado, 6 Dec. 1817. AHN, Estado, 6067.[2] At Santiago in eastern Cuba, planters and merchants distrusted both the local *gobernador* (Sebastián Kinder-

lan) and Capitán General Someruelos because "they . . . welcomed refugee planters from Saint-Domingue" who, they complained, had turned that island into a "lupanar francés." "Representación" (with 15 signatures) to Junta de Sevilla, 28 Dec. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,035.

20. "Paulatín," *La Lancha*, 30 Nov. 1813. AHN, Consejos, 21,035.

21. Rafael de Villavicencio, Sevilla, to *presidente*, Suprema Junta de Sevilla. 1 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 59b, n. 101.

22. Arango, *Examen de los derechos*, 10; AHN, Consejos, 21,035. This was also the conclusion of Ponte Domínguez, *Junta de la Habana*, 108–109.

23. Someruelos to Martín de Garay, Habana, 6 July 1809. AHN, Estado, 59a, n. 41; AHN, Estado, 6367[2]; "Paulatín," *La Lancha*, 30 Nov. 1813. AHN, Consejos, 21,035.

24. Ayuntamiento de la Habana, 21 Aug. 1817. AHN, Estado, 6367[2].

25. Ibid.; Ponte Domínguez, *Junta de la Habana*, 109.

26. Junta Económica del Consulado de la Habana to Capitán General de la Ysla de Cuba, 17 Oct. 1811. AGN, Consulado, t. 2, exp. 16.

27. Arango, *Obras*, II, 95.

28. *Expediente . . . Habana . . . 1808*, 5.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., 9–10; Junta Económica del Consulado de la Habana to Capitán General de la Ysla de Cuba, 12 Oct. 1811. AGN, Consulado, t. 2, exp. 16.

31. *Expediente . . . Habana . . . 1808*, 18–19.

32. Arango, *Obras*, II, 94–100. AGI, Mexico, 2508–2509, 2514, 2516; AGN, Civil, 16566, n. 7; Consulado, 2 expediente 16; AHN, Estado, 6366; Moreno Fraginales, *El Ingenio*, 21, 36; Thomas, *Cuba*, 82.

33. Among others were Martín Madán, Antonio Malagamba, Juan José Iguarán, Pedro María Ramírez, Francisco Antonio de Lanz, Felipe Fernández de Silva. *Expediente . . . Habana . . . 1808*, 38.

34. Ibid., 30, 33.

35. For an illuminating, comprehensive analysis of Arango's economic conspectus, see Dale Tomich's "The Wealth of Empire," 4–28.

36. The "Informe del síndico [Arango] . . . sobre los medios . . . para sacar la Agricultura y Comercio de la Ysla del apuro en que se hallan" is in Arango, *Obras*, II, 16–107.

37. Ibid., 62 and note j (which cites a letter by the secretary of Caracas's Consulado, Carlos Soublet, 14 Oct. 1808, and the *Gazeta de Canarias*, 25 Aug. 1808). Havana's Ayuntamiento, Consulado, and Someruelos emphasized the "urgentes males que padece la agricultura y el comercio de esta interesants colonia" as well as Cuba's need to aid "nuestras posesiones de América" for the benefit of "la madre patria." Acuerdo del Ayuntamiento de la Habana, in *El Aviso de la Habana. Papel periódico literario-económico*, 18 May 1809. AGI, Ind. Gen., 262.

38. Arango, *Obras*, II, 79–80.

39. Ibid., II, 68, 70, 72–73.

40. Ibid., II, 68, 74–75, 80, 85. According to Arango, *almacenistas* were merely "consignatarios nacionales" organized into a "gremio," that is, were "factores de los ingleses, franceses, alemanes." Zamora y Coronado, "Axiomas sobre el comercio," *Legislación ultramarina*, II, 262–268. Cf. Arango, *Obras*, II, 80.

41. Ibid., II, 82.
42. Ibid., II, 44, 49, 53.
43. Ibid., II, 94.
44. Ibid., II, 71–72.
45. Ibid., II, 93–97.
46. Ibid., II, 45–46 and note.
47. Consulado de la Habana to Suprema Junta Gubernativa del Reyno, 29 Aug. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con España, t. 56.
48. Arango, *Obras*, II, 41–42, 106–107. Guerra y Sánchez, ed., *Historia*, III, 28. Reexports from Havana to Veracruz were underscored in a petition from Havana's Ayuntamiento: "Será permitido . . . la re-exportación de . . . efectos y géneros extrangeros para los puertos de . . . nuestras posesiones de América con la libertad de derechos a su salida?" *El Aviso de la Habana*, 18 May 1809. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2462.
49. "Testimonio de la sentencia de residencia . . . Someruelos." AHN, Consejos, 21,036; Beauharnais to Champagny, 10 Feb. 1808. AAEPar, CP, Espagne, 673, f. 167.
50. Someruelos to Junta Central, 20 Dec. 1808. Albuerne, *Origen*, app., doc. 2, p. 23.
51. Acuerdo del Ayuntamiento de la Habana, in *El Aviso de la Habana*, 18 May 1809.
52. This possibility emerged in mid-July 1808 during discussions between Iturrigaray and the Audiencia. Barrère, "Deuxième partie du précis historique." Paris, Nov. 1822. AAEPar, CP, Mexique, t. 1, f. 148. In fact, on 24 Dec. 1808 the Junta Central (then at Sevilla) did select Someruelos to replace the deposed Iturrigaray, but "no tubo efectos." AHN, Estado, 4-A, doc. 5. And in 1811 Facundo de Lizarza, defending Iturrigaray, asserted "Se presumía que el primero [nombrado] era el Señor marqués de Someruelos." *Discurso que publica . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 7.
53. On Cadiz's fears, cf. Consulado de Cadiz (Simón de Ágreda, Juan Miguel de Carlos) to Junta Suprema Governativa del Reyno, 25 Aug. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con España, t. 56; Consulado de Veracruz to Pedro Garibay, 26 Apr. 1809. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2462.
54. Anonymous [perhaps Casa Valencia], "Dictámen," Madrid, 22 July 1796. AGI, Mexico, 2512.
55. Quirós, "Memoria, 1807." AGI, Mexico, 2997; AGI, Mexico, 2516. Quirós criticized "grandes propietarios" who undermined what Madrid bureaucrats labeled "saludable disposición de la Real Cédula de 14 de Febrero de 1805 para que dentro de un año las [tierras] pueblen, y de lo contrario no pueden resistir su enagenación y venta." Such orders, if executed, hardly would win friends among the colony's large estate owners. Ramón de Posada, José Pablo Valiente, Francisco Saavedra to Soler, 7 Jan. 1808. BRAHM, Colección Mata Linares, t. 73.
56. "Expediente formado sobre los pliegos que se han recibido de Nuevo Orleans y Reales Ordenes sobre emigración" (1809). AGN, AHH, 633-14.
57. Castillón to SM, Nuevo Orleans, 1 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2513.
58. "Expediente . . . Nuevo Orleans," (1809). AGN, AHH, 633-14; AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con España, t. 56, to Junta Suprema, 19 Sept. 1809.
59. Oliver to Sixto Espinosa, 5 Feb. 1808. Bruchey, *Oliver*, 312.
60. Fiscal de Real Hacienda, Mexico, 10 Aug. 1801. AGN, Historia, t. 251, f. 1. A subsequent "representación" by the Veracruz Consulado (22 Feb. 1806) highlighted the adverse impact upon Barcelona ("las fábricas, industria y comercio de la Metrópoli") of English imported goods. "Yndice de representaciones en . . . Consulado de Veracruz, 1795–." AGN, AHH, 1869, exp. 6. No doubt New Spain's *almaceneros*

were aware of the efforts of Catalan "fabricantes de estampados, hilados, y texidos" to prevent "excesivo contrabando" in Spain's colonies, and of their proposal to send agents (*celaderos*) to colonial ports and the "ciudad de Mexico" to block the "introducción y despacho de los géneros de contrabando." Soler agreed, but to do so at *their* expense. Soler to Juan Cancheta and Juan Bosch, Madrid, 14 July 1804. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

61. Consulado de Veracruz to Iturrigaray, 13 Feb. 1806; Iturrigaray to Consulado de Veracruz, 16 Feb. 1806. AGI, Mexico, 2516.

62. Iturrigaray to Soler, 26 Feb. 1803. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, t. 213.

63. Consulado de Veracruz (Tomás Murphy, Juan Bautista Lobo, Domingo Lagoa de Miranda), 15 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

64. Juan Jabat, "Observaciones," 17 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 58 E, n. 102.

65. AGI, Mexico, 2319.

66. Marquina, "Instrucciones" (borrador). AGN, Historia, t. 282, exp. IX. Marquina initiated the prosecution of Veracruz's *gobernador* and his nephew, a naval officer. Iturrigaray, Castillo de San Sebastián (Cadiz), 9 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, n. 18.

67. Iturrigaray, Cadiz, 9 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, n. 18; Fiscal de Real Hacienda, Mexico, 10 Aug. 1805. AGN, Historia, t. 25, f. 1.

68. Iturrigaray to Soler, 17 Sept. 1806. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, t. 229, n. 108. This replied to a request of 7 June 1806 for an evaluation of his constraints on shipping and trade at Veracruz.

69. Fiscal de Real hacienda, Mexico, 10 Aug. 1805. AGN, Historia, t. 25, f. 1.

70. Juan José Murillo, 26 Sept. 1808 to Consulado de Cadiz. AHN, Estado, 57 E.

71. Lorenzo Yöldi to José Ruiz Conejares, cited in Calderón Quijano, ed., *Virreyes de Nueva España en el reinado de Carlos IV*, II, 142.

72. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 228; Iturrigaray, "Representación," Castillo de San Sebastián (Cadiz), 9 Nov. 1809. AHA, Consejos, 21,081, n. 18.

73. Iturrigaray to Soler, 17 Sept. 1806. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, t. 229, n. 1083; Casa Alta, "Testimonio." AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3 de la sumaria.

74. Azanza, "Instrucción," 95. On English planning for a landing operation at Veracruz in 1790 or 1797, see Harlow, *Founding of the British Empire*, II.

75. AHA, Consejos, 21,081, quaderno II, n. 35.

76. AHN, Mexico, 2997.

77. Casa Alta to Floridablanca, Mexico, 25 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3 de la sumaria; Marqués de Castañiza (father-in-law of *almacenero* Basoco) in AHN, Consejos, 21,082, quaderno II, cargo 35. The Veracruz Consulado later granted that Iturrigaray's obstinacy stemmed from a desire to block smuggling. Consulado de Veracruz to Saavedra, 1 Mar. 1809. AGI, Mexico, 2997.

78. Muro to Iturrigaray, Puebla, 11 June 1805. AGI, Mexico, 3219.

79. RO 18 Mar. 1809. AGN, AHH, 1869-6; Terán in "Pliegos . . . conteniendo los motivos de la prisión de Iturrigaray." BMus, Add, 13,978; Consulado de Veracruz to Saavedra, 1 Mar. 1809. AGI, Mexico, 2997. Terán (probably an unreliable source) testified that Iturrigaray had good relations with one of the few *criollo almaceneros* at Veracruz, José Mariano de Almanza, a relationship broken off when Almanza concurred with Veracruz's complaints about the viceroy. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, no. 3, ff. 103–104; AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, t. 214, n. 310.

80. Iturrigaray to Soler, 17 Sept. 1806. AGI, Mexico, 2997.

81. Consulado de Veracruz to Junta Central, 1 Mar. 1809. AGI, Mexico, 2997; López Cancelada, *Conducta*, 97, and Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. p. 431, n. 94.

82. Letter n. 273, 14 Dec. 1805. "Yndice de las representaciones . . . Consulado de Veracruz, 1795–," AGN, AHH, 1869-6; Ayuntamiento de Veracruz to Viceroy Garibay, 18 Sept. 1808 (this document first appeared in López Cancelada, *Conducta*, 73, and later in Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. p. 42, n. 93, and García, ed., *DHM*, II, 211). Among the signers of this *oficio* were *regidores* Juan José de Yraeta and Miguel Cavaleri. What the Veracruz signers termed "triste experiencia" was Iturrigaray's insistence (*empeño*) that his orders be obeyed. Consulado de Veracruz to SM, 22 Feb. 1806. AGI, Mexico, 2997.

83. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 169–170, n. 2.

84. The "papeleta" had been copied by Baltasar Ruiz, merchant resident at Veracruz, bankrupt in 1794, a self-styled *riojano*, and son of "pobres honrados Padres, Hijosdalgo," who had made possible "primeras letras y . . . la Religión Cristiana, apostólica, romana." AGI, Mexico, 2516.

85. Juan José Murillo, Veracruz, 26 Sept. 1808. AHN, Estdado, 57 E. Accused were Pedro Telmo Landero (*teniente letrado*), Mateo Lorenzo Murphy, Francisco Arrillaga, Juan Bautista Lobo, and Miguel Cavaleri.

86. Nava Otero *Cabildos*, 158–159, 162–163.

87. Ibid., 160, 162.

88. Iturrigaray, Castillo de San Sebastián, Cadiz, 9 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, n. 18; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 268. Iturrigaray recognized the possibility of England's economic hegemony, "sobretodo si se admitía la idea favorable al príncipe Jenaro [at Naples]" who could be chosen to succeed Charles IV as well as Fernando. Here Iturrigaray revealed his nationalism in its Anglophobic facet.

89. Consulado de Veracruz to SM, 1 Mar. 1809. AGI, Mexico, 2997.

90. The accusation was made by Fabián de Miranda, Sevilla, 22 Nov. 1808, to arzobispo co-administrador and to the conde de Tilly, deputados por la Junta de Sevilla. AHN, Estado, 58 E, doc. 36.

91. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 197. *Vaillant* probably came from the island of Guadeloupe. Arrangoiz, *México*, II, 390. For sources of this episode, see Cevallos to Ayuntamiento de Veracruz, 10 Aug. 1808; Ayuntamiento to Cevallos, 16 Aug. 1808, and Ayuntamiento to Suprema Junta de Sevilla, 26 Aug. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3 de la sumaria, ff. 67–74v.

92. Reports of Solano's assassination were received at Veracruz on 26 July 1808. *Gazeta de México*, 30 July 1808.

93. Ayuntamiento de Veracruz a la Suprema Junta de Gobierno de España, 30 July 1808. AHN, Estado 58 E.

94. On 16 August the Ayuntamiento admitted to Cevallos that his posted orders (*bandos)* were understood by every "persona sensata" as motivated by "la más leal y sana intención." On the *Vaillant*'s arrival (12 July), Iturrigaray had ordered Veracruz's *gobernador militar*, Pedro Alonso de Terán, to keep watch on all foreign or neutral shipping in the harbor, in order to isolate the colony from news of "combustión y fermentación" in Spain. Luis González Obregón, *Plan*, 17.

95. Pedro Alonso de Terán forwarded all printed materials presented by the

Vaillant to the post office at night, and Cevallos prohibited any communication with the vessel's crew. Capetillo to Madrid, Jalapa, 18 Aug. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57 A.

96. Cevallos tried to defend his conduct: "Familiarizado con los riesgos de toda especie desde mi tierna infancia, excusaría explicar la razón de mi conducta." Cevallos to Ayuntamiento de Veracruz, 10 Aug. 1808. At Mexico City, *oidor* Aguirre y Viana wrote Sevilla's Junta secretly (17 Aug. 1808) that neither Pedro Alonso de Terán nor Iturrigaray had reported receipt of a letter from the French foreign minister, Champagny [written at Bayonne]. AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

97. Champagny, Bayonne, 12 May 1808. SHM, *Colección Fraile*, t. 61, f. 201v. The messages (*pliegos*) were delivered to the Audiencia de Mexico on 20 Aug. 1808. AGI, Mexico, 1661.

98. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 177. This is confirmed by Capetillo AHN, Estado, 57 A.

99. Mier, *Historia*, I, 223n. In December 1808 the Madrid press reported that the crowd at Veracruz attacked Murphy's residence because supposedly the former viceroy, Azanza, was hidden there. French reports state that Iturrigaray's replacement was Azanza. ANPar, AF IV, plaque 4[ii], n. 172.

100. A summary of the accounts of events at Veracruz is in AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 67–74, and Estado, 58 E, entitled "Extracto de unos pliegos de Veracruz" sent from Veracruz to Miguel Lobo at Cadiz. Lobo was directed to forward them to the Junta de Sevilla, which he did on 20 Nov. 1808. Was the delay intentional?

101. Ayuntamiento to Cevallos, 16 Aug. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 67–69.

102. Garibay to Real Junta Gubernativa de Sevilla. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, 2a ser., t. 52; Mier, *Historia*, I, 190; Talamantes, "Confeción," in García, ed., *DHM*, VI, 236.

103. Iturrigaray, "Representación," Cadiz, 9 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, n. 18.

104. Ibid.

105. Jabat, on 3 September 1808, wrote from Mexico City to a member of the Junta de Sevilla, Eusebio Herrera, of what he faulted as Iturrigaray's "repugnancia de reconocer y obedecer a esa Junta Suprema." AHN, Consejos, 21,082. Jabat's letters were published in the *Gazeta de México* (18 Sept. 1809); Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. p. 42, n. 93; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 211.

106. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 230; Mier, *Historia*, I, 139, 144. Carlos María de Bustamante asserted that "sugetos principales" at Mexico City were "excitados por los de Veracruz." "El Yndio mexicano." MINAH, Colección Bustamante, t. 440, f. 90. "Disimuladamente." was Iturrigaray's adverb. Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 69–69v. On this point, see also Alamán, *Historia*, I, 168.

7. The Powerful and Insecure

1. *Diario de las Cortes,* 18 Sept. 1811; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 125, n. 54.

2. Consulado de Mexico, "Aviso al zelo patriótico." AGN, AHH, 633-14; López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xv.

3. Iturrigaray to Soler, 27 Mar. 1804. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, t. 219, n. 444.

4. On this critical figure in Cuban history of that time: Vázquez Cienfuegos, *Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba*; Guerra y Sanchez, *Historia de la nacion cubana*, 3:14; Mier, *Historia*, 1:163; Arango, *Examen de los derechos*, 17; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:593; AAEPar, CP, Espagne, 672, f 170; AHN, Estado, 4A, doc 6 and 59; AHN, Consejos, 21034, 21035, 21036.

5. "Carta . . . por un vecino de Mexico a un amigo de Cadiz," in Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 80.

6. Anonymous, AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 115.

7. Jabat to Eusebio Herrera, Mexico, 3 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos 21,082.

8. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, V, 258.

9. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3 de la sumaria.

10. Juan Collado to Virrey Venegas, 21 Jan. 1811. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 211, n. 273; Mora, *México*, II, 260.

11. Raúl Dávila, *La verdad amarga, pero es preciso decirla*, n. 6 (Mexico, 12 Nov. 1821), 7.

12. *El Despertador americano*, 29 Dec. 1810.

13. 29 July 1808.

14. *El Español*, n. 10, 30 Jan. 1811, II, 334; Consulado de Mexico cited in Sagarzurieta, "Informe," 30 June 1805. Archivo del Ayuntamiento de Mexico, 1. 2238, f. 80.

15. Abad y Queipo, *Carta pastoral*, 50–52; Juan Collado to Venegas, Mexico, 21 Jan. 1811. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, II, n. 473, p. 911.

16. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3 de la sumaria hecha al Virrey Iturrigaray.

17. Antonio Calleja. AHN, Consejos, 21,08, n. 128; "Manifiesto . . . Guadalajara." AHN, Estado, 57A, n. 56.

18. Mendiola, *Diario de las Cortes*, 10 Sept. 1811; Moral y Sarabia, "Bayonne," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, V, 258.

19. García, ed., *DHM*, VI, 15.

20. Bustamante, *Intereses de la Puebla*, 10.

21. Diaz Calvillo, *Discurso sobre los males*, 9–11; *Sur. Continuación del Despertador de Michoacán*, n. 53 (1813).

22. AHN, Consejos, 21,061, n. 458; Portilla, *Representación . . . 1826*.

23. Mosquera came from Popayán (Nueva Granada). Born in 1748 he made a career in the colonial civil service prosecuting the opposition to the colonial regime there, notably the *comuneros* of 1789 and later Nariño. Viceroy Ezpeleta urged Eugenio Llaguno at Madrid to post him elsewhere because his prosecutorial zeal had caused "lances desagradables"—hence his reassignment to the Audiencia de Mexico as *alcalde del crimen*. Mosquera remained a consistent supporter of colonialism, proven by his subsequent career at Caracas and Cadiz.

24. AHN, Consejos, 21,061, n. 4.

25. AHN, Consejos, 21,061, n. 4, f. 103. The other plays were *El Traidor contra su sangre* and Fernando Gárate's *El Maestre Alexandre*.

26. "Autos formados con motivo de la conjuración atentado." AHN, 21,061, n. 4; Portilla, *Representación . . . 1826*, 28. In 1826 Lozana was the secretary of the governor of the newly formed Districto Federal. Ibid.

27. Portilla, *Representación . . . 1826*, 28.

28. The Consejo's *sala de justicia* was charged with conducting the judicial review. Collar to Gobernador del Consejo, Antonio Porcel. RO 20 Sept. 1800. AHN, Consejos, 21,061, n. 4.

29. AHN, Consejos, 21,061, n. 458. Members of the Consejo's *sala de justicia* (Acedo, Urizar, Soto, Vara) rejected capital punishment in favor of imprisonment.

30. Marquina to Ministro de Gracia y Justicia, 27 Oct. 1800. Ibid.

31. Portilla, *Representación . . . 1826*, 12.

32. San José Muro, Puebla, 1805. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2310; AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 16; Mier, *Historia*, I, 234.

33. Rodriguez de Campomanes, 2 Jan. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57A, n. 46. *Criollos* prided themselves on the colonial militia. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 86–87.

34. López Cancelada noted that "oficicales del correo" were among the most loyal of the *peninsulares*. *Verdad sabida*, xlv, n. 18.

35. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 86–87; Antonio Calleja, AHN, Consejos, 21,212, n. 128.

36. Gabriel de Yermo to Junta de Sevilla, 8 Oct. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 99v–100.

37. Consulado de Mexico. BMus, Mss., Additional, 13,978, ff. 580–582.

38. Iturbe e Iraeta to Revuelta. 9 June 1808. Iturbe Papers, PUL. There is a guarded reference to the Escorial affair in the *Gazeta de México*, 6 July 1808.

39. López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xv. Presumably to alert crisis watchers in the colonies awaiting changes under Fernando VII, the composition of the new cabinet was reported (Pedro Cevallos, Caballero, Olaguer, Feliu, Francisco Gil, Miguel Cayetano Soler).

40. García, *Leona Vicario*, 46–48; AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 47.

41. Mier, *Historia*, I, xv.

42. Nava Otero, *Cabildos*, 89.

43. *Gazeta de México*, 16 July 1808, reprinted in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 1–14.

44. Lizarza, in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 749.

45. Ibid., I, 506.

46. "Manifiesto . . . de Guadalajara de Indias," 30 Oct. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57 A, n. 56; Villaurrutia, *Voto*; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 86–87; López Cancelada reported that postal employees were useful to colonial civil servants, since they often read the mails handled.

47. "Representación del Ayuntamiento de Xalapa al Virrey Iturrigaray," 20 July 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 41.

48. Ibid.

49. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 506; Flon (conde de la Cadena) to Iturrigaray, 6 Aug. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, 249–250.

50. This is the interpretation of Fabián de Miranda at Sevilla on 22 Nov. 1808. AHN, *Estado*, 58 E, n. 33.

51. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 486, and III, 768.

52. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 126; Nava Otero, *Cabildos*, 93.

53. AHN, Estado, 6367[2].

54. AHN, Consejos, 21,212, n. 1280.

55. Lizarza [pseudonym of Beye de Cisneros] claimed a pasquinade was com-

posed by the literary agent of Mexico City's *almaceneros*, López Cancelada. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 740, n. 72.

56. Anonymous, "Juicio del estado político en que se hallaba la Nueva España." Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 633, n. 251.

57. Capetillo to his brother at Madrid, Jalapa, 19 July 1808. AHN, Estado, 57 A, n. 49.

58. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 303.

59. Iturrigaray, 7 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 211,081.

60. On popular participation see "Los grupos populares," in Avila et al., ed., *La Independencia*, 65–84; "Exposición," in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 176.

61. *Gazeta de México*, 7 Aug. 1808.

62. Later, Iturrigaray insisted that he had to order López Cancelada to print a correction, in order to maintain the "liberalidad" of donors for the metropolitan government, and the trustworthiness of censored reports. Mier, *Historia*, I, 135–136. Cancelada, for his part, admitted that Aguirre wanted the false reports published. *Verdad sabida*, xxxi.

63. AHN, Consejos, 21,212 n. 1280.

64. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 126n; García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 417.

65. "Nota sobre los extractos." AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

66. Capetillo, Jalapa, 19 July 1808. AHN, Estado, 57 A, n. 49; Villaurrutia, *Voto*; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 543, n. 226.

67. "Carta . . . por un vecino de México." Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 73–74.

68. The following paragraphs are based on BMus, Mss. Additional, 13,978, ff. 580–582. This document contains replies to the interrogation of Iturrigaray by *oidor* Miguel Bataller on 22 Oct. 1808 and by Consulado officers Juan Díaz González, Joseph de la Cotera, and Juan Ruiz de la Bárcena. The document also appears in López Cancelada, *Conducta*, 51, n. 21.

69. "Anonymos y pasquines amenazantes," worried Viceroy Iturrigaray late in September when he reported receiving them to the Junta de Sevilla. They indicated the deepening factionalism he dreaded. Alamán, *História*, I, 208.

70. The *Gazeta* of 10 August also printed news of Spain arriving with a ship from Havana that had departed that port on 27 July (Vázquez Cienfuegos, *Tan difíciles tiempos para Cuba*, 231–243).

71. Barrère, "Deuxième partie du précis historique de l'Amérique Espagnole. Révolution de la Nouvelle Espagne." Paris, Nov. 1822. AAEPAR, CP, Mexique, vol. 1, f. 158.

72. AHN, Consejos, 21,212, n. 1280.

73. "Pieza formada en el Concejo concerniente la causa formada en Mexico contra D. Antonio Calleja." AHN, Consejos, 21,212.

74. The versions are those of Antonio Calleja. "Pieza formada." AHN, Consejos, 21,212, n. 1280; Alamán, *Historia*, I, 200–220, who relied on Iturrigaray's version in Mier, *Historia*; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, III, 770.

75. "Pieza formada." AHN, Consejos, 21,212, n. 1280.

76. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 257.

77. AHN, Consejos, 21,212, n. 1280, and 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 117–117v. From Jalapa, Capetillo wrote to Madrid in the same vein: "Los Europeos . . . compraron inmedi-

atamente todas las Armas y Municiones que encontraron en aquella capital." Letter, 18 Aug. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57 A, n. 51.

78. So commented Francisco Ochoa, head clerk of merchant José Hurtado, at the Portal de Santo Domingo near the Aduana. Calleja, "Pieza formada." AHN, Consejos, 21,212.

79. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 5 de la sumaria, f. 117v.

80. Bustamante, *Intereses de la Puebla*, 2.

8. The Audiencia de México, Iturrigaray, and Talamantes

1. The classic study of the high civil service in the Spanish colonies in America is Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*.

2. On Aguirre y Viana, see Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:68–72, 521, 6433; 3:763; AHN, Consejos, Resiodencias, 21, 081, and Estado, 56-E 43 (2); Garcia, ed., *DHM*, 1:225, 240–241; 2:78–80; Cavo, *Suplemento*, 260–264, and Bustamante, "El Yndio mexicano," in MINAH, t. 400, 89–98; Mier, *Historia*, 1:145, 215–216, 228; 2:158–159; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:168–178.

3. Cavo, *Suplemento*, 264. Iturrigaray once sought Aguirre's advice about appointing *criollos* to bishoprics in the colony. Aguirre's response was negative. Mier, *Historia*, I, 136, note.

4. On Bataller y Ros, see Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, VI, 94; NYP, Mss., Poole Sale, box 6 ("Baylen"); Archivo de la Diputación de Vizcaya, Colección Villarías, n. 35 ("Minería"); AGI, Mexico, I, 110; Cavo, *Los tres siglos*, 250.

5. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*; *Titulos de Indias*. Catalogo xx.

6. Calderón Quijano, ed., *Virreyes de Nueva España*, II, 171,173.

7. Howe, *Mining Guild*, 327.

8. Bustamante, letter, Mexico, 25 Feb. 1837. NYP, Mss., "Pruevan . . . casa de Sardaneta." Poole Sale, box 6. For the outstanding loans of the Tribunal de Minería, see Howe, *Mining Guild*, 388.

9. Rayas and Obregón to Juez de Alzadas, Tribunal de Minería. Archivo de la Diputación de Vizcaya, Bilbao, Colección Villarías, n. 35. Año 1809; Howe, *Mining Guild*, 391.

10. Mier, *Historia*, I, 28, 110.

11. Bustamante, "El Yndio mexicano." MINAH, Mss., t. 440, f. 90.

12. Talamantes to Manuel González Torres de Navarra, 16 Sept. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, VI, 165.

13. Yermo to Junta de Sevilla, 12 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3.

14. Cavo, *Suplemento*, 263; *Correo americano del sur*, 6 Oct. 1813.

15. *Correo americano del sur*; Bataller to Regencia, Mexico, 1 Jan. 1814.

16. Bustamante, *Tres estudios* ("Elagio histórico del . . . Morelos"); García, ed., *DHM*, VI, 94.

17. On González Carbajal, see AGI, Mexico, 662, 1321, 2248, 2464; AHN, Estado, 50-D, 87; Consejo, Resistencias, 21, 082, no. 43; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 613, 619; Mier, *Historia*, I: 145–146, 176, 229: II: 92; Cavo, *Los tres siglos*, 266.

18. Blair and Robertson, *Philippine Islands*, LI, 56–57; Schurz, *Manila Galleon*; Lietz, *Calendar of Philippine Documents*, 119.

19. Testimonio, Chihuahua de la Virreina. AHN, Consejos, 21,082, n. 43, cargo 16, quaderno 19. Lafuente Ferrari, critical of Iturrigaray, considered these Iturrigaray's explanations, when in fact they were those of the "Chihuahua," Joaquina Aranguren. See Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 336, n. 1.

20. Ibid., 336, n. 3.

21. Iturrigaray to José Antonio Caballero, 14 May 1805. AGI, Mexico 1143; Carbajal to Iturrigaray, Tacubaya, 7 Aug. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 51–52. At the moment Carbajal must have separated himself from Talamantes, who later accused him of former "pruebas de enemistad positiva."

22. AHN, Pruebas . . . Orden de Carlos III. Exp. 950 (Sevilla, 1796); Carbajal to Prior y Consules, Mexico, 29 Sept. 1794. AGN, AHH, 129 exp. 1797.

23. Mier, *Historia*, I, 229.

24. On Sagarzurieta, see AGI Mexico, 1143, 2513, 2514; AGN, Mexico, AHH, 443, esp. 2; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 531; García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 505, 545; NYP, Mss., Mexico, Commercial Papers, box F, 120v; Juanmartiñena, *Verdad sabida*, xxvi.

25. AHN, Pruebas . . . Orden de Carlos III. Exp. 876 (Lagran).

26. Sagarzurieta to José Antonio Caballero, Mexico, 12 May 1804. AGI, Mexico, 1143.

27. Portilla, *Representación*.

28. Archivo del Ayuntamiento de México, t. 2238, Hacienda, exp. 93.

29. Cavo, *Los tres siglos*, 252.

30. Iturrigaray, letter, 27 Feb. 1807. AGN, Correspondencía de virreyes, 2a ser., t. 233, n. 1195; Cavo, *Los tres siglos*, 252.

31. Talamantes, "Representación nacional de las colonias. Discurso filosófico," in García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 374.

32. Ibid., 505.

33. Archivo de las Cortes, Exp. 22, n. 18.

34. Haring, *Spanish Empire in America*, 126.

35. Ibid., 113; Flores Estrada, *Exámen imparcial*.

36. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, 88.

37. "Respuesta fiscal," 17 Sept. 1807. AGI, Mexico, 2513.

38. Talamantes, in García., ed., *DHM*, VII, 435; Flores Estrada, *Exámen imparcial*, 14.

39. Bustamante, *Apuntes*, 100; Mariano Otero later recalled the resentment of *criollo* lawyers at the "tutela de los oidores españoles." *Ensayo*, 39.

40. For biographical details of Beleña, see AGI, Mexico, 1515, n. 123, and Contratación, 5533; Beleña, "Informe" (1788). BRPal, Colección Ayala, XLI, ms. 2589; Howe, *Mining Guild*, 194–195, 209.

41. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*.

42. Anes, *Economía*, 127. The secretary of the Veracruz Consulado noted approvingly Posada's support for local agricultural development, including improved distribution of landholdings. Quirós, "Memoria de instituto . . . 1807." AGI, Mexico, 2997.

43. *AEA*, 19 (1962), 27; Calderón Quijano, ed., *Virreyes de Nueva España*, II, 124, n. 37.

44. Posada, "Resumen general del despacho en los últimos 7 años." AGI, Mexico, 1515, n. 162.

45. Consulado de Cadiz to Rivera (Madrid), 12 June 1795. AGI, Consulado de Cadiz, Correspondencia con España, libros 63–64.

46. Posada—consistently a man of liberal views—was critical of the effort to improve the *Ordenanza*: "El fin es restituir los repartimientos en toda su extensión, salvando la apariencia de libertad de comerciar . . . El repartimiento . . . fué más fácil proscribir que executar . . . la triste historia de tres siglos." Posada, "Dictamen fiscal." AGI, Lima, 1119, paras. 36–37.

47. For Posada's career, see *Titulos de Indias*, 20, 25, 139, 248, 522; Rodríguez García, *El fiscal de Real Hacienda en Nueva España*.

48. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 196–197.

49. Ibid., II, 196.

50. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 160. Possibly two members of the Ayuntamiento may have led the opposition, José Juan Fagoaga and Villaurrutia. Someone leaked to the *oidores* the discussions held by the Ayuntamiento. Cavo, *Suplemento*, 247.

51. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 182–183, who cites Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, doc. 99, p. 34.

52. García, ed., *DHM*,II, 15–28.

53. Ibid.

54. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, III, 768.

55. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 35, 37–41.

56. "Exposición . . . al Virrey Iturrigaray," 3 Aug. 1808. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 383–390.

57. "Exposición . . . al Virrey," 5 Aug. 1808. Ibid., 390–392. "Citizen" here is one of the first indications of the new lexicon shaped by the revolution in France.

58. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 45.

59. Arrangoiz y Berzábal, *México desde 1808*, I, 39.

60. According to the sequence in García, ed., *DHM*, 407–441, Talamantes's "Idea del Congreso Nacional de Nueva España" was dated 23 July, one day before the covering note to *regidor* Cuevas. There is another date, too, 28 July.

61. Martiñena, *Verdadero origen*, doc. 90, p. 34 n. 1. The letter was among Iturrigaray's papers seized on 16 September. Capitán General Someruelos floated the possibility of a Havana junta on 25 July; only weeks later might Iturrigaray have learned of this.

62. Audiencia de México, 29 Apr. 1809. AGI, Mexico, 1662.

63. Iturrigaray, "Oficio al Real Acuerdo." García, ed., *DHM*, II, 48.

64. *Expediente . . . Habana*, 5.

65. González Carbajal to Iturrigaray, 7 Aug. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 50–53.

66. *El Jugetillo*, n. 4, cited in Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 87 para. 4.

67. "Voto consultivo del Real Acuerdo," 8 Aug. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 53–55.

68. *Gazeta de México*, 5 Aug. 1808, in Alamán, *Historia*, I, 167–168.

69. García, ed., *DHM*, VI, 158.

70. Members of the Audiencia denied Iturrigaray had given a "discurso enérgico." "Relación de . . . las Juntas Generales," ibid., II, 140.

71. Ibid., II, 63. The *proclama* reads: "Inauguradas, creadas, o formadas por SM o lugartenientes legítimas autenticamente." Subsequently, the Audiencia denied any oath to obey properly legitimated juntas, only "una conversación o discusión pasagera." "Relación de . . . las Juntas Generales," Ibid., II, 138.

72. Juan Antonio Riaño to Iturrigaray, Guanajuato, 29 Aug. 1809. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 70–71.

73. Ibid., II, 63.

74. The Audiencia was especially troubled because Iturrigaray "procuraba . . . ensalzar al Ayuntamaiento de México y deprimir el Real Acuerdo." "Relación de . . . las Juntas Generales," ibid., II, 139.

75. *Fiscales* (Borbón, Sagarzurieta, Robledo) to Iturrigaray, 13 Aug. 1808. Ibid., II, 64. The deliberate omission may be laid to Iturrigaray, who is said to have participated in drafting the *acta* of the 9 Aug. Junta. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 98, p. 46. It is *not* omitted in the Audiencia's "Relación de . . . Juntas Generales." Ibid., II, 137. Verdad's reference to popular sovereignty is said to have scandalized the "oidores rutineros." Cavo, *Suplemento*, 243.

76. To judge by *fiscal* Robledo's analysis of the position of the Ayuntamiento, the Audiencia was annoyed by the rejection, by *A*yuntamiento and Iturrigaray, of the anti-junta argument of the *oidores*. Ibid., II, 183–185.

77. Ibid., II, 197; Cavo, *Suplemento*, 247.

78. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 191, 195. Sagarzurieta seemed prepared to stress the concept of a "pueblo subordinado," since he probably had read Talamantes's "Congreso nacional" *before* 9 Aug. Ibid., VII, 41.

79. Ibid., II, 190, 194. *Fiscales*, Robleldo and Sagarzurieta displayed a careful parsing of the evolution of church-state relations in France after 1790 leading to the civil constitution of the clergy. Ibid, II, 194.

80. Ibid., II, 185, 193, 195–197.

81. Ibid., II, 194. In calling the colony of New Spain "pueblo subordinado," Sagarzurieta was reacting to Iturrigaray's concept of a "Congreso Nacional" earlier advanced in Talamantes's proposal, which Talamantes had asked Sagarzurieta to examine. Ibid., VII, 39–42.

82. "Minuta de carta . . . a la Junta de Sevilla," 20 Aug. 1808. Ibid., II, 66. Havana's merchants along with Capitán General Someruelos had reservations about arrangements with English representatives concerning trade. Cf. "Nota está sentada de un modo satisfactorio la paz que nos prometemos concluir con la Inglaterra, ni están conocidas las intenciones de nuestra Peninsula, acerca del futuro comercio que se ha de entablar con la propia nación." Junta de Gobierno del Consulado de la Habana, 16 Aug. 1808 in *Expediente . . . Habana*, 9–10.

83. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 63.

84. Report by José Ramón de Acha, one of four escorting Iturrigaray to Veracruz and imprisonment at San Juan de Ulua. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 5, f. 45. Acha's testimony is suspect, since Iturrigaray's opponents seized every opportunity to incriminate him in order to justify the *golpe de estado*. Was this the influence of Talamantes on the viceroy? Talamantes believed "la independencia de la América no las [*sic*] salvaría de otra dependencia muy infeliz." García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 55.

85. For a succinct biography of Talamantes accompanied by a comprehensive bibliography, see: Emilia Romero del Valle, "Fray Melchor de Talamantes," *HMex*, 11, no. 41 (1961), 28–55, and a bibliography of his manuscripts (sermons, frontier studies, political tracts), 443–449; García, *DHM*, VII, 321.

86. Conde de Vista Florida, "Memoria." AGI, Estado, 84.

87. García, *DHM*, I, 224; Romero del Valle, "Talamantes," 31. López Cancelada, no friend of Talamantes, claimed Rayas and "habanero" Felipe Castro Palomino were "amigos del padre Talamantes . . . ellos se entendían." López Cancelada, *Conducta*, 54, n. 12.

88. He probably talked to others who frequented the Portal de los Mercaderes, Juan de Arredondo, Juan Ignacio Bejarano, and Manuel Roca, especially on the Sunday when the *Gazeta de México* published the official reports of the abdication of the Bourbons at Bayonne. García, ed., *DHM,* VII, 33.

89. Talamantes also frequented the tertulia held by the wife of the intendant of San Luis Potosí; in the weeks after the *junta general* of 9 August, he would often continue talking politics well after midnight, for example, with *criollo oidor* Villafañe. García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 157–158.

90. Iturrigaray testified that Talamantes was recommended for research on the Texas-Louisiana border by Ciriaco González Carbajal, Azcárate, Primo de Verdad y Ramos and the marqués de Uluapa. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 47v.

91. Romero del Valle, "Talamantes," 31.

92. Ibid., 35.

93. González Obregón, *Talamantes*, intro.

94. Apropos Iturrigaray's interest in the work of the boundary commission, note that the 9 March issue of the *Gazeta de México* published Aaron Burr's remarks about a possible invasion of north Mexico.

95. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 412. Talamantes maintained a certain distance from Viceroy Iturrigaray. Possibly because of contact with *criollo* hacendados and mine owners, he belabored him "por las graves injusticias . . . para establecer la junta de consolidación, contra las pretensiones y vivos clamores del pueblo." (Note the reference to "pueblo.") Alamán, *Historia*, I, 498–500.

9. Melchor Talamantes

1. García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 7–8, 12–13, 17–18.

2. Ibid., VII, 441.

3. Ibid., VII, 408. I have used the version of "Congreso Nacional" in ibid., VII, 407–440. Dreaming of New Spain's possibilities if a local assembly were convened, Talamantes exulted: "No es posi ble pintar el embeleso" (409).

4. Ibid., VII, 449–450. For the identification of Guillermo de Aguirre, see ibid., VII, 69, also the opinion of *fiscal de lo civil* Sagarzurieta (191). In the "Confeción" Talamantes omitted reference to *ministro*, paraphrasing the Audiencia's position as "no había pueblo capaz de dictar leyes, ni de organizarse, formando una constitución regional." Ibid., VII, 42.

5. "Representación Nacional," ibid., VII, 448–477.

6. García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 41–42.

7. "Confeción libre y espontanea" in Talamantes's script is a revealing document in many, if not all, ways. Ibid., VII, 38–60.

8. The "Plan de la Obra proyectada" (ibid., 43–60) was, Talamantes stated in his "Confeción," sketched out on "muchos papeles," which he did not retain since "casi todos se rompieron o quemaron" because some touched on "puntos delicadísimos [y] no era prudencia concervarlos." Ibid., VII, 42. Perhaps we err to date his "Plan" between 23 July and 9 August. On 23 August Talamantes has a reference to "el Plan presente de la Obra." Ibid., VII, 440.

9. Ibid., VII, 14 and especially, 169–182.

10. Ibid., VII, 445–448.
11. Ibid., VII, 8.
12. Ibid., VII, 175.
13. Ibid., VII, 55.
14. Ibid., VII, 43.
15. Ibid., VII, 409.
16. Ibid., VII, 417.
17. Ibid., VII, 426.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., VII, 427.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., VII, 417, 427–428.
22. Ibid., VII, 454.
23. Ibid., VII, 58–59.
24. Ibid., VII, 59.
25. Ibid., V II, 414–415.
26. Ibid., VII, 413.
27. Ibid., VII, 414.
28. Ibid., VII, 414, 434–435.
29. Ibid., VII, 413, 434.
30. Ibid., VII, 414.
31. Ibid., II, 28.
32. Ibid., VII, 420.
33. Ibid., VII, 439.
34. Ibid., VII, 440.
35. Ibid., VII, 439.
36. Ibid., VII, 468–469.
37. Ibid., VII, 466–467.
38. Ibid., VII, 467.
39. Ibid., VII, 467–468.
40. Ibid., VII, 450.

41. That evening at the residence of the intendant of San Luis Potosí, Talamantes was reported to have commented to *oidor* Villafañe, "La Junta de mañana es dirigida a que Vmds. no son nadie." Ibid., VII, 158.

42. Ibid., VII, 455.
43. Ibid., VII, 455, 457.
44. Ibid., VII, 509.
45. Ibid., VII, 459.
46. Ibid., VII, 421, 459.
47. Ibid., VII, 25.
48. Ibid., VII, 242–243.
49. Ibid., II, 63, 66, 71.
50. Ibid., VII, 478.
51. Ibid., VII, 29, 40, 115, 246, 499.
52. Ibid., VII, 101, 509.
53. Ibid., VII, 103.

54. Ibid. Luyando testified that Talamantes met him standing in the doorway of the residence of the marqués de Uluapa (his brother-in-law) and suggested "procure Vmd. recomendar ese papel en el Ayuntamiento" (ibid., VII, 98). Note that only one of seven *oidores* supported Luyando's petition for a *título de Castilla*. AGI, Mexico, 1143.

55. Ibid., VII, 98–99.

56. Ibid., VII, 115, 141.

57. On leaving Guardiola's residence, Azcárate also pretended he knew nothing about the session of the Ayuntamiento where Luyando tried to read aloud Talamantes's "Congreso Nacional." Azcárate's excuse: "El Secreto que devia guarder en la materia" (ibid., VII, 115).

58. Ibid., VII, 40.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., VII, 40–41.
61. Ibid., VII, 148.

62. Ibid., VII, 69, 238. 63. Ibid., VII, 115.

64. Ibid., VII, 85, 88–89. Jaúregui, who knew that Talamantes's manuscript had been shown to Viceroy Iturrigaray's chaplain Saint, observed that to judge by Talamantes's papers "se infiere con qué cautela procedía para engañar al Virrey." Jaúregui to Saavedra, Mexico, 23 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 14–14v.

65. Audiencia de Mexico to Madrid, 18 Nov. 1813. AGI, Ind. Gen., 110; "Manifiesto que el Gobierno Superior de Nueva España . . . hace a todas las Naciones," Mexico, 15 Jan. 1816, in Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*, 44.

10. Sevilla's *Comisionados* and Mexico City's Juntas

1. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 66.

2. AGSim, Estado, 8172; AGI, Consulado, Correspondencia, t. 55.

3. *Demostración*, 9–10.

4. "Representación . . . México," and "Representación . . . Valladolid" [1805], in Sugawara *La deuda pública de España*.

5. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 258 n. 46. This sum is also asserted by Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 52–53. Perhaps the 8 million pesos were Consolidación receipts.

6. Francisco Saavedra, letter, 7 Feb. 1809. AHA, Estado, 54-D, n. 72; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 40–41; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 284.

7. Letter, 25 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 134–138. See also Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, II, 288 n.

8. Letter, Manuel Francisco de Jaúregui (*presidente*) and Luis Gargollo (*secretario*), Junta de Cadiz, 30 Aug. 1810. AGI, Consulado, Correspondencia, t. 55.

9. Mier, *Historia*, I, 319; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 101, 58.

10. AGN, AHH, 502, exps. 11–12, 24 Dec. 1807; Calderón Quijano, ed., *Virreyes de la Nueva España, 1798–1808*, II, 132–135. Part of the judicial controversy concerned categorizing either ships and cargo as prizes or only one ship and its cargo. Jabat's role is obscure.

11. Cf. "[Jabat] estaba atrincherado en ella [Mexico City] tomando los sueldos." Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 233, n. 1.

12. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 36; Iturbe e Iraeta Papers, PUL, Letter, 31 Aug. 1808.

13. AGN, AHH, 502, exps. 11–12; AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 194, exp. 240, f. 2.

14. Olmet, *Cuerpo diplomático*, V, 36.

15. Ibid.; Ponte Domínguez, *Junta*, 20.

16. Jabat and Jaúregui to Francisco Saavedra, Mexico, 4 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21081, ramo 3, ff. 11–2v.

17. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3.

18. Jabat to Eusebio Antonio Herrera, Mexico, 3 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

19. Ibid.

20. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 14–15.

21. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3.

22. Guillermo Aguirre to Junta de Sevilla, Mexico, 3 Sept. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 82–83.

23. Yandiola, of course, praised Aguirre; Cavo, *Suplemento*, 264.

24. AHN, Estado, 43 (2), f. 37a; AHN, Consejos, 21,082, n. 10.

25. Iturrigaray, Cadiz, 9 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, n. 18.

26. Flores Estrada, *Exámen*, 38.

27. Casa Alta to Floridablanca, Mexico, 26 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3. A slightly different wording is in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 288.

28. Jaúregui to Junta de Sevilla, Mexico, 23 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 14.

29. Cavo, *Suplemento*, 264.

30. López Cancelada to Junta de Sevilla, 10 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 120.

31. Jabat to Eusebio Antonio Herrera, Mexico, 3 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081; Iturrigaray to General Morla, Mexico, 6 Sept. 1808. AHN, Estado, 43(2), f. 37c.

32. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 71; Mier, *Historia*, I, 69.

33. Mier, *Historia*, I, 74.

34. Villaurrutia, "Voto . . . en la Junta General de 31 de Agosto." Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 540 n. 226.

35. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 37.

36. Mier, *Historia*, I, 70; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 87.

37. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 204–205.

38. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 87.

39. Ibid., II, 103.

40. Mier, *Historia*, I, 74.

41. Ladd, *Mexican Nobility*, 108.

42. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 174, 190.

43. Ibid., II, 770.

44. Ladd, *Mexican Nobility*, 108 and n. 20.

45. On this point, cf.: "Convinieron todos . . . en que el . . . Virey, es legal y verdadero lugarteniente de SM." Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 58.

46. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 207.

47. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 66.

48. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 37.

49. One of Oviedo's *comisionados*—conde de Toreno (José María Queipo de Llano)—later published what became the standard Liberal account of Spain's anti-French resistance movement, a blend of fact and rationalization.

50. Ibid.; Alamán, *Historia*, I, 207; Mier, *Historia*, I, 76.

51. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 71; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray,* 403.

52. Mier, *Historia*, I, 70.

53. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 37.

54. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 495.

55. Ibid., II, 134–135.

56. Ibid., II, 77.

57. Ibid., II, 101; Alamán, *Historia*, I, 208; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 37.

58. Juanmartiñena, *Verdad sabida*, app, 38; Jabat and Jaúregui to Junta de Sevilla, 4 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 32r.

59. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 209; Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 36–37. Juanmarti-

ñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 39. Cf. Mier's version of Iturrigaray's comment: "Y si se viera que hago alguna demosgtración con algunos Señores, no será extraño porque habrá fundamento para ella." *Historia*, I, 78.

60. López Cancelada to Junta de Sevilla, Mexico, 10 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 120r.

61. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 74–76.

62. AGN, Historia, 47, exp. 13; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 216. There are contradictory versions of the vote. Juanmartiñena claimed no votes were taken; Alamán refers to the rejection of the Aguirre-Bataller position as "se acordó por casi todos los concurrentes." We know the views expressed on l September were written down at Iturrigaray's request, constituting a kind of tally.

63. Olmet, *Cuerpo diplomático*, III, 42.

64. When Villaurrutia finally published an account of his position in the three juntas held between 31 August and 9 September, his preface cited that "Una multitud de impresos de España an comprobado la justicia y solidez de mi modo de pensar." He cited Jovellanos in the *Censor de Antequera* and the "juicio político." Villaurrutia, *Voto que di en la junta general . . . en Méjico*, 3. His initial attempt at publication was rejected on the ground of being "sediciosa." Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Coleccion*, I, 534ff. and n. 226.

65. Flores Estrada, *Exámen Imparcial*, 10, 14.

66. Ibid., 20.

67. Ibid., 14, 28.

68. Ibid., 71, 93–94.

69. Ibid., 121–122.

70. Mier, *Historia*, I, xxxix, 9.

71. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 76.

72. Ibid., 77–78.

73. Ibid., II, 86–88.

74. López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xl; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 87.

75. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 94–96.

76. Ibid., II, 99.

77. Ibid., II, 92.

78. Ibid., II, 92–93.

79. Ibid., II, 100–101.

80. López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, 62. This is virtually the same distribution pattern recommended by the Audiencia concerning earlier official positions (e.g., 21 July 1808). García, ed., *DHM*, II, 39.

81. Jabat to Eusebio Antonio de Herrera, Mexico, 3 Sept. 1808, post-scriptum. AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

82. Ibid. In a joint letter the *comisionados* referred ambiguously to the "recurso ultimo de la orden reservadisíma que tenemos de VA." Jabat and Jaúregui to Francisco Saavedra, *presidente*, Junta de Sevilla. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 404.

83. Jabat to Herrera, Mexico, 3 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

84. Jabat to Saavedra, 4 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, ff. 32r–32v.

85. Miranda, *decano* of the cathedral of Sevilla, entered the Junta de Sevilla as representative of the "Estado ecclesiástico." Ibid.

86. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 81–83. García suggested the opinion was directed and sent to the Junta de Sevilla; internal evidence seems to suggest it was prepared for the audiencia. The document (here, *pedimento*) is the *fiscales*' response to Iturrigaray's request for their opinion. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 65, 19.

87. Mier, *Historia*, I, 86.

88. There is another date of the letter (6 Sept.). Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 89, n. 1. See also López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xxxviii.

89. Apparently Iturrigaray considered Garibay's appointment only as temporary, until the formal *pliegos* would reveal Cuba's Someruelos or Guatemala's Saravia. Mier, *Historia*, I, 80–81. To the contrary, the Audiencia's account claims Iturrigaray viewed Garibay as his replacement, predictably the opinion of Alamán and Lafuente Ferrari. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 223. Obviously, the difference was important.

90. Iturrigaray to Regente and Oidores del Real Acuerdo, Mexico, 5 Sept. 1808. AHN, Estado 43(2), f. 37c. This copy was addressed to General Morla.

91. Manuel Velázquez de León, Mexico, 10 Nov. 1808. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 98, 46.

92. Iturrigaray to Regente and Oidores del Real Acuerdo, 5 Sept. 1808. AHN, Estado, 43(2), f. 37c.

93. "Relación . . . formada por el Real Acuerdo." Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 89, 32.

94. Mier, *Historia*, I, 80. Iturrigaray's copy of his proposed resignation, which he sent to Morla at Cadiz, mentions Garibay as *interim* replacement, AHN, Estado, 43(2), f. 37c; however, another version of the *parecer* of the three *fiscales* refers only to opening the formal *pliegos*. AHN, Estado, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 38r. Lizarza claims López Cancelada produced an "añadidura iníqua" in stating the *fiscales*' *parecer* named Garibay as *permanent* replacement. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 34–35; López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xxxviii–xxxix. The Audiencia's version, published by Juanmartiñena, that Iturrigaray proposed Garibay with the approval of the *fiscales,* is the basis of Alamán's account. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 89, 32; Mier, *Historia*, I, 213–214.

95. Mier, *Historia*, I, 80–81, 83–84.

96. Jabat to Herrera, Mexico, 24 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,082; Jabat to Saavedra, 24 Sept. 1808. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 405–406. This last letter is virtually Jabat's report to Herrera.

97. López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xxxviii.

98. Roberto Moreno de los Arcos, "Apuntes biográficos de Joaquín Velázquez de León, 1732–1766," *HMex*, 25 (1975), 41–75.

99. Mier, *Historia*, I, 81.

100. Ibid.

101. "Declaración del secretario del vireinato D. Manuel Velázquez de León." Mexico, 10 Nov. 1810; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 98, 46–47.

102. Mier, *Historia*, I, 81; Alamán, *Historia*, I, 214.

103. Iturrigaray to Francisco Beye de Cisneros. 23 June 1808. NYP, Mss. Poole Collection, box 9.

104. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 34–35.

105. "Pedimento de los fiscales con que el Real Acuerdo contestó el precedente

del virey Iturrigaray," 3 Sept. 1808. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 65, 19–20. Also in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 81–83 (incorrectly addressed to Sevilla).

106. "Voto del oidor . . . Aguirre." García, ed., *DHM*, II, 86–90.

107. "Voto del . . . Monteagudo." Ibid, II, 116–117.

108. "Voto del Marqués de San Juan de Rayas." 5 Sept. 1808. Ibid., II, 103–105.

109. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 215; Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 31.

110. Mier, *Historia*, I, 86.

111. The published record of the Juntas is confused and confusing, depending upon the sources consulted. There are the Audiencia's version ("Relación sucincta . . . formada por el Real Acuerdo" or its "Relación de los pasajes más ocurridos en las juntas generales" (Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, apps. 89–90); that of Alamán, which parallels the "Relación sucincta"; Villaurrutia's version ("Exposición . . . 13 de septiembre de 1808"), in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 169–182; and the "Exposición . . . 22 enero de 1810," in ibid., II, 489–493; or those prepared by Iturrigaray's defenders, José Ignacio Beye de Cisneros [Facundo Lizarza] and Servando Teresa de Mier y Noriega [José Guerra].

112. Villaurrutia, "Exposición . . . 22 de enero de 1810." García, ed., *DHM*, II, 491.

113. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 90, 38; Alamán, *Historia*, I, 217.

114. Ibid.

115. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 90, 38–39.

116. A good source for the Villaurrutias: Nieta y Cortadellas, *Los Villaurrutia*.

117. Ibid., 23–24. A short biography is in García, ed., *DHM*, I, 169–170, II 504. See also Nieto y Cortadellas, *Los Villaurrutia*, 22–31; AGI, Mexico, 1482, 1484; AHN, Conséjos, 21,081, ramo 14, F. 7; Mier, *Historia*, I, 74–75.

118. Francisco Sosa, *El episcopado mexicano. Biografía . . . arzobispado de México*. 3rd ed. 2 vols. (Mexico, 1962).

119. *Jornal económico . . . de Veracruz*, June 1806; Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, 109.

120. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 504.

121. Ibid., II, 498–499.

122. Ibid., II, 496, 499. Bustamante was subsequently replaced by Nicolás de Calera y Toreno (Villaurrutia's *tío politico*).

123. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 207, 348.

124. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 504–505.

125. Ibid., II, 168–169.

126. Ibid., 173–174.

127. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 90, 33.

128. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 381, 322–323.

129. Ibid., II, 170.

130. Ibid., II, 172, 174, 179.

131. Ibid., II, 172–173, 175.

132. Ibid., II, 174.

133. Ibid., II, 176.

134. Ibid., II, 174–175.

135. Ibid., II, 181.

136. Hamill, "Verdad," 445; Mier, *Historia*, I, 46, 110.

137. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 493.

138. Los comisionados de la Junta de Sevilla to Saavedra and the Junta de Sevilla. AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

139. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 146; Hamill, "Verdad," 472, n. 30.

140. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, app. 98, a46; Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando*, 30.

11. Viceroy Iturrigaray

1. For recent reexamination of the controversial Viceroy Iturrigaray, his reasoning, supporters, and opponents, as well as the understanding of autonomy in the colony, there is the analysis of Ávila, "Nueva España, 1808–1809," 129–149, who used materials in Guadelupe Nava Otero, *Ca bildos y ayuntamientos en la Nueva España en 1808* (Mexico, 1973). See also Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*; AHN, Conséjos, Residencias, 21,081–21,082; Alamca, *Historia*, II.

2. Arango, *Examen*, 18.

3. Iturrigaray to Contador General de Azogues, 22 Apr. 1807. AGN, AHH, 449-7. This concerned mercury imports aboard Portuguese-registry vessels inbound from Jamaica; Iturrigaray to Contador General de Azogues, 21 Sept. 1807, apropos arrival from Cadiz, with mercury, of U.S.-registry *La Libertad*; Iturrigaray to Contador General de Azogues, 21 Oct. 1807, reporting the arrival at Veracruz of *Sátira* owned by Gordon & Murphy of London. Ibid.

4. Iturrigaray to Contador General de Azogues, 21 Oct. 1807. Ibid.

5. Lizarza, *Comercio libre*, 27.

6. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 191–192.

7. Contador General de Azogues to Iturrigaray, 7 Oct. 1807, and Iturrigaray to Contador, 8 Oct. 1807. AGN, AHH, 449-7.

8. Iturrigaray followed the recommendation of *fiscal de Real Hacienda* Borbón re the petition of Bolaños's *diputación territorial de minería*." Ibid.

9. Iturrigaray to Soler, 13 Feb. 1808. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, 2a ser., t 236, no. 1463.

10. Bustamante, "El Yndio Mexicano." MINAH, Mss. f. 53.

11. Rayas's testimony to *oidor* Bataller, 21 Oct. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 1.

12. AHN, Consejos, 21,082, n. 43, quaderno 19, cargo 16.

13. Aranguren's deposition recalling conversation with Iturrigaray on taking leave of Iturrigaray at Veracruz in late 1808. Ibid., cargo 19.

14. Ibid., cargo 16.

15. Ibid.

16. "Extracto" from "Representación de la Junta de Diputados . . . Guanajuato." 31 Oct. 1808 in Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*, app. 88, p. 23.

17. AHN, Consejos, 21,082, n. 37 ("Sentencia").

18. AGN, Correspondencia de virreyes, [1803], t. 1, f. 213.

19. Marqués de Rayas, AHN, Consejos, 21,082, quad. 15.

20. AGN, Minería, t. 20.

21. García, ed., *DHM*, VII, 161–162.

22. Ibid., II, 104.

23. Ibid., II, 103.

24. Rayas to Iturrigaray, 5 Sept. 1808. Ibid.

25. Ibid., II, 101.

26. Ibid., II, 305.

27. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 7 (Sumario), f. 58; AGN, Minería, t. 20, n. 5, f. 53v; Howe, *Mining Guild*, 392, citing AGI, Mexico, 2248. Iturrigaray's wife claimed that José de Septien and José María Chico confabulated to "formar el borrador, remitirlo a Guanajuato y arrancar por medios reprobados las firmas de aquellos 6 individuos que se arrogaron el nombre de junta de diputados substitutos y electores de la minería." AHN, Consejos, 21,082, quaderno 19.

28. Jovellanos, *BAE*, 97:493.

29. Jovellanos to Saavedra, 3 Feb. 1810. Ibid., 492.

30. AHN, Estado, 2817.

31. AHN, Estado, 581.

32. Abad y Queipo, "Representación a la Regencia," 30 May 1810. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, II, n. 269.

33. Luyando, "Informe," 6 Dec. 1810. Archivo de las Cortes, Expedientes, 22, n. 18.

34. These newspapers circulated in the provinces, too. The secretary of the Cadiz Consulado, for instance, handled the subscription of Antonio Septien of Querétaro (New Spain). Fernández de Cossío, Cadiz, to Josefa Ruana Calvo, 21 Dec. 1802. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con America, libro 237, f. 358v.

35. Mier, *Historia*, I, xl.

36. Ibid., I, 113; Lizarza, *Comercio libre vindicado*, 9.

37. Iturrigaray, "Representación," Cadiz, 9 Nov. 1809. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, n. 18.

38. Consulado de Veracruz to Soler, 15 Nov. 1805. AGI, Mexico, 2512.

39. Abad y Queipo, " Representación a nombre de los labradores y comerciantes de Valladolid y Michoacán," in Mora, *Obras Sueltas*, 214–230.

40. On rural conditions, indigenous people communities, and resistance to estate expansion, see Tutino, *Insurrection*, 66–67.

41. On Beye de Cisneros's background, see López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, IX–X; Mier, *Historia*, I, 176; López Cancelada, *Ruina*, 32; Bustamante, *Cuadro*, I, 5.

42. Lizarza, *Comercio libre*, 6.
43. Ibid., 4, 14.
44. Ibid., 12–13.
45. Ibid., 12.
46. Ibid., 14.
47. Ibid., 16.
48. Ibid., 21–22, 25.
49. Ibid., 26.
50. Ibid., 27.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 28.
53. Ibid., 14.
54. Ibid., 22.
55. Ibid., 26.
56. Ibid., 14, 20.
57. Ibid., 30.

58. Luyando, "Informe" Disc 18; Archivo de la Cortes, Exp., 22, n. 16.

12. Anatomy of a Colonial Coup d'État

1. *New York Times*, 10 June 1983, 3.

2. Beye de Cisneros [Lizarza] decided that planning the removal of the viceroy "ya o estaba formada, o muy avanzada" by 1 September. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando. . . Iturrigaray*, 30. This seems to confirm Talamantes's testimony: "Esto

mismo que ha sucedido, lo dije yo hace más de un mes que sucederá si no andaban listos."

3. "Relación sucincta . . . por el Real Acuerdo," 9 Nov. 1808. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 358.

4. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 158.

5. Rodríguez, *Nosotros somos*, 1:123.

6. Iturrigaray to Beye de Cisneros, Cadiz, 17 June 1809. NYP, Mss, Poole Collection.

7. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 313.

8. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 224.

9. Juanmartiñena may also have written the Consulado de Mexico's racist denigration of *criollos*' incapacity, in order to justify refusing to grant them voting rights, a statement made to the Cortes de Cadiz (1810).

10. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 301, 310, 339.

11. Ibid., II, 303, 305–306.

12. Ibid., II, 308.

13. Jabat to Eusebio de Herrera, 3 Sept. 1808, referred to Archbishop Lizana as reluctant to "entrar en la lucha." Alamán, *Historia*, I, 230, claims Lizana and his *primo*, Inquisitor Alfaro, were aware of the conspiracy.

14. Mier, *Historia*, I, 157; "Deuda de la nación." BMus, Additional Mss, 13,988, f. 177; "Exposición a la Junta de Sevilla," 8 Oct. 1808, AHN, Consejos, 21,031 ramo 5, f. 90. López Cancelada was explicit, referring to the role of "los sacerdotes que dirigían la conciencia de Yermo." *Verdad sabida*, xlv.

15. Possibly through this channel Cadiz merchants knew that Veracruz merchants intended to remove Viceroy Iturrigaray by force, if necessary. Catalan merchant at Veracruz, Rafael Canalías, participated in Yermo's coup; in 1802 Canalías held shares in Veracruz's recently chartered Compañía de Seguros Marítimos, whose director was Vicente Basadre. *Gazeta de México*, 9 July 1802.

16. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 207; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*.

17. García, ed., *DHM*, II, [31 Oct. 1808].

18. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 226; López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xlv n. 18.

19. Alamán asserted many wanted to collaborate with Yermo, "seguros de la opinion que habían de darle los eclesiásticos con quienes presumían había de consultar." *Historia*, I, 225.

20. Bustamante, "El Yndio mexicano," f. 90.

21. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 159.

22. As Iturrigaray reported to his colleague, General Tomás Morla, at Cadiz (11 April 1809), "Los comisionados de esta Junta [Sevilla] llevaron la orden para que se le pusiere preso si no la reconocía y que así lo hizo la audiencia." AHN, Consejos, 21,081, n. 10. For a brief, suggestive overview of the *golpe*, the perceptions of Iturrigaray, and the aftermath, see Archer, *The Birth of Modern Mexico*, 15–26.

23. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 136. Sagarzurieta's opinion: "Aunque a los principios [*juntas* or *congresos*] tengan buenas intenciones, después degeneran."

24. Mier, *Historia*, I, 22, 78; "Voto de Cisneros," BMus, MSS, Additional, 13,978, f. 107.

25. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 224.

26. Novia de Salcedo, *Historia de Vizcaya*.

27. Yermo had a two-year contract with the Ayuntamiento. *Gazeta de México*, 1 April 1803.

28. Barquera, *Discurso patriótico*, 11.

29. Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*, appendix n. 101, p. 54; Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 150.

30. Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*, appendix n. 101, pp. 54–55. Yermo was inordinately proud of one of his sugar estates ("Jalmolonga") purchased and then renovated for 200,000 pesos, producing annually forty thousand *arrobas* of sugar. Ibid., 55, and Alamán, *Historia*, I, 224, n. 1.

31. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 150.

32. Yermo to Junta de Sevilla, 24 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, f. 90.

33. Ibid.

34. López Cancelada, *Verdad sabida*, xliv.

35. Talking to officers guarding the viceregal palace fronting the *zócalo*, Salaberría learned they insisted the Audiencia authorize the coup: "Le tocaba a la Audiencia, y que así le daban una orden por escrito." García, ed., *DHM*, II, 313.

36. Ibid., II, 277–278.

37. Ibid., II, 279.

38. Ibid., II, 309.

39. Ibid., II, 279–280.

40. Ibid., II, 278.

41. Yermo to Junta Suprema de Sevilla, Mexico, 24 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3, f. 97v.

42. García, ed., DHM, II, 278.

43. Ibid., II, 278–279, 416.

44. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 224; BMus, Mss. Additional, 13,988, f. 180.

45. Yermo to Junta de Sevilla, 9 Nov. 1808, in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, n. 254; II, 665, nn. 254, 257.

46. BMus, Mss, Additional, 13,978.

47. Lic. Morales. NYP, Mss, Poole Sale; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 314.

48. Iturrigaray, "Sumaria." AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ff. 69–69v.

49. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 44.

50. *Regente* Catani to VM [Junta Central ?], Mexico, 18 Nov. 1808. AGI, Mexico, 1661; Barrère, "Deuxième partie du précis historique." Paris, Nov. 1822. AAEPar, CP, Mexique, 1, f. 162v. Catani criticized Robledo's "gestiones tan impropias, y apenas del ministro fiscal de lo criminal," who was "protector de las pretensions iníquas" of Yermo. Mier, *Historia*, I, 165–167.

51. Note the *montañeses* who in January 1809, months after the coup, supported the election of Francisco Alonso Terán and Gabriel de Yermo as Consulado officers: Pedro González Noriega, Francisco de Salas Quintero, marqués de Santa Cruz de Inguanzo, Roque Pérez Gómez, and Diego Fernández Peredo, described as "apoderados . . . de los individulos de la parcialidad de montañeses." AGN, Consulado, t. 9.

52. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 209.

53. Alamán, *Historia,* I, 225.

54. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 156.

55. Rayas to Iturrigaray, 12 Nov. 1810. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 723.

56. Supporters of Iturrigaray later "manifestaron su disgusto con un dependiente para el servicio de armas." "Nota que pone el copiante" on a document of the Consulado de Mexico. BMus, Mss, Additional, 13,978, f. 582.

57. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 12.

58. Juan de Noriega, *Vindicación del difunto coronel . . .* (Mexico, 1821), 6.

59. Mier, *Historia*, I, 157.

60. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 233 n. 12.

61. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 158.

62. Iturrigaray, "Testimonio," AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3.

63. Ibid. This informant may have been Martín Ángel Michaus, *almacenero/conductor de platas* and *socio* of Uzcola who participated in the coup. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 231. Alamán also noted that Yermo was about to inform Michaus that the coup would occur on 15 September but failed to do so. Ibid. Another version has it that in the early evening of 15 September, Iturrigaray learned of the impending coup "por confesión de un arrepentido tumultuario que le manifestó todo el plan." Might this have been Michaus's *socio*?, Cambiaso y Verdes, *Memorias de Cadiz*, 250.

64. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3.

65. Cambiaso y Verdes, *Memorias de Cadiz*, 250. Cf. the comments of Salaberría in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 315. Jaúregui apparently remarked to Iturrigaray's wife about "lo mal quisto que se hallaba" the viceroy in the public's estimation. Hernandez y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, 662.

66. Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*, 46.

67. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 415.

68. Ibid., II, 413. According to Alamán, "mejicanos" among the attackers were Agustín Pagasa (son-in-law of the marquesa de Silvanevada) and a nephew of an unmentioned "europeo." *Historia*, I, 233.

69. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 415; *Noticia muy exacta en forma de Diario de lo acaecido en México*, 6.

70. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 232.

71. García, ed., *DHM,* II, 419. Yermo asserted that Granados and his *alférez*, José Roca, "se hallaban penetrados de los mismos sentimientos y deseos que yo." Yermo to Junta de Sevilla, 12 Nov. 1808, in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, n. 257.

72. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 295. Salaberría testified that Roblejo "andubo en esta material comisionado." Ibid., II, 316.

73. Ibid., II, 224–225.

74. Ibid., II, 272–273.

75. Ibid., II, 272.

76. In Ortega's lodgings they found a note, "Cortes, necesidad de ellas, pagina 237." This referred to volume 3 of the Madrid periodical, *Semanario erudito de Valladares*, that Carlos María de Bustamante had loaned Ortega on 14 September. Ortega had explained to Bustamante that he had just read Jacobo de Villaurrutia's "bello papel," the manuscript justifying Iturrigaray's convocation of a "Cortes en Mexico." Bustamante had immediately loaned the volume requested. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, c, ff. 3–34.

77. *New York Times*, 12 Feb. 1984.

78. García, ed., *DHM*, II, 421.

79. Ibid., II, 423.

80. *Noticia . . . de lo acaecido en Mexico*, 6.

81. "Apuntes de las gracias que D. Gabriel de Yermo propuso vervalmente en el Real Acuerdo en la mañana del 16, como útiles y necesarias para la tranqulilidad de todo el Reyno en las actuales circunstancias, y a que accedió el Real Acuerdo haciendo el mismo juicio y calificación." Dated 17 Sept. and signed by Yermo—an addendum to the Junta de Sevilla, Mexico, 9 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57-E. The addendum is in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, I, n. 254. References in following paragraphs are based on the manuscript. Carlos María de Bustamante termed the addendum "exposición reservada," first printed in *Amigo de Puebla*, 2, no. 7. Bustamante, *Calleja*, 199.

82. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 261, n. 1. Lafuente asserts that the Audiencia had opened the *pliego de mortaja*, learned that Abarca was the designate, and accordingly "hizo caso omiso de su designación."

83. The regular *Suplemento* of the *Gazeta de México* circulated earlier that day, minus reference to the *golpe* of the previous night.

84. A facsimile of the *proclama* is in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 204–205.

85. Mier, *Historia*, I, 158–159.

86. *Gazeta de México*, 17 Sept. 1808. There is a facsimile in Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 257. Jabat wrote candidly to Eusebio de Herrera (at Cadiz) that the coup was "la obra del comercio de europeos"—which would not have surprised him. Letter, 24 Sept. 1808, in Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 284.

87. Cf. the reaction of an *agente de número* at Mexico City, *criollo* Antonio Calleja: "En la Gazeta . . . en esos imediatos dias, se ponía donde desía que havía hecho la prisión el Pueblo, se añadía en paréntesis, *esto es, el Comercio*, y en la misma en otra Página, que este triunfo se debía a la Juventud Española." AHN, Consejos, 21,082, n. 128.

88. This is what Yermo reported to the Suprema Junta de España e Indias (at Sevilla), Mexico, 12 Nov. 1808. This was the comment on 16 Sept. 1808 by Sargento Mayor Juan de Noriega. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3 de la sumaria. Noriega was the husband of Luisa Martín de Vicario y Elías, widow of *almacenero* Antonio Vivanco; Iturrigaray had ordered Noriega in the evening of 15 September not to permit soldiers to leave their *quarteles*. Iturrigaray, Cadiz, 9 Nov. 1809. Ibid., n. 18.

89. Salaberría described the incident (it had occurred on 14 September), which involved a *cajero* employed by "uno de la facción." Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, 158, in García, ed., *DHM*, II, 315.

90. Ibid., 159. Cisneros [aka Lizarza] claimed "la idea era que el gobierno recayese en la Audiencia, en donde serían árbitros los togados que entraron y fueron de los principales autores de la rebellion contra el virrey." Ibid.

91. *Ibid.*, 158.

92. Iturrigaray believed the *pliego* would designate either Someruelos or Saraiva (then *presidente* of the Audiencia de Guatemala). Ibid.

93. Ibid., 160.

94. Garcia, ed., *DHM*, II, 207.

95. The record (*acta*) of the meeting refers to an "acuerdo extraordinario" although the Audiencia's *informe* (dated 24 September) addressed to the Junta de Sevilla called the assembly "ordinario." Ibid., II, 206, 273.

96. Ibid., II, 313.

97. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 230; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 207; Jabat to Saavedra, 24 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 3.

98. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, I, 131; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 301 n. 1.

99. "Por ahora" appears in the minutes of the "acuerdo extraordinario" of 20 Sept. 1808. Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, appendix. p. 44, n. 31; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 208.

100. This was entitled "Disposiciones del real acuerdo sobre el nombramiento del supremo gefe de esta Nueva España."

101. "Extraordinaria," *Gazeta de México*, 18 Sept. 1808.

102. For supporting evidence, a gazette of the port of Kingston (Jamaica) (23 Aug. 1808) was cited. Ibid., 19 Sept. 1808.

103. The *acta* of the "Acuerdo extraordinario" of 20 Sept. 1808 is in Lizarza, *Discurso . . . vindicando . . . Iturrigaray*, appendix, p. 44, n. 31.

104. Jabat to Eusebio de Herrera, Mexico, 24 Sept. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,082; García, ed., *DHM*, II, 279.

105. Francisco Noriega, "Representación tocante a asuntos de Nueva España y el virrey . . . Iturrigaray," Isla de León (Cadiz), 22 Nov. 1810. Archivo de las Cortes, Expedientes, Ultramar, Comisión Ultramarina, 22, n. 18.

106. As late as 1840 this remained the position of pro-Spanish loyalists. See "Manifiesto . . . que el Superioir gobierno de Nueva España," Juanmartiñena, ed., *Verdadero origen*, 45, n. 9. Cf. "Son innumerables las representaciones de congratulación que recibió el Gobierno."

107. "Manifesto a la Nación Americana," cited in Mora, *México*, III, 115n.

108. Antonio Calleja, San Juan de Ulua, 12 Dec. 1809. "Pieza formada en el Concejo concerniente a la causa formada en Mexico contra . . ." AHN, Consejos, 21,081, no. 128.

109. Carlos María de Bustamante, "Elogio," Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, VI, 78.

110. Juan Raz y Raz Guzmán, "Testimonio," Mexico, 28 Feb. 1837. NYP, Mss, Poole, box 6. Cf. Mier in 1812: "Por un poco de tiempo la sorpresa, los aparatos bélicos, la deferencia de los tribunales, el respeto sobre todo a la religión . . . el exceso mismo del atentado . . . embargaron los sentidos y potencias de los Mexicanos." Mier, *Historia*, I, 168–169.

111. García, ed., *DHM*, I, 225; Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección,* I, 723, n. 277.

112. Suárez Argüelles and Brígida von Mentz, eds., *Epístolas y cuentas*, 717.

113. "Testimonio de una certificación." AHN, Consejos, 21,081, ramo 5 de la sumaria. Cf. Miguel Beruete y Abarca: "Se aumentaron a un grado prodigioso los Pasquines." Rúbio Mañé, in *Anuario de estudios americanos*, 6 (1948), 82.

114. "Bando sobre Pasquines," *Gazeta de México*, 8 Oct. 1808.

115. "Papelillos esparcidos," March 1809. AGN, Historia, t. 415, exp. 8; "Bando, Anonimos," *Gazeta de México*, 20 May 1809.

116. Abad y Queipo, "Juicio que manifestó," 26 Sept. 1808; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, appendix n. 100, p. 52.

117. Alamán, *Historia*, I, 259–260.

118. Barquera, *Discurso patriótico*, 11.

119. Hauterive, *De l'état de la France*, 295.

13. Junta de Sevilla, Consejo de Castilla, and the Genesis of the Junta Central

1. The title was originally granted to José Vargas, *gobernador* of the Philippines (1778–1782), in recognition of his role in promoting trade with China, establishing the tobacco monopoly in the islands, and stimulating agriculture. A brother, Joaquín, had once served on Audiencias at Bogotá and Guatemala; another, Alonso, was *alcalde* in New Spain's lucrative cochineal district in Oaxaca, Villa Alta.

2. *Manifiesto que hace la Junta Superior de Observación y Defensa del Reyno de Valencia*, Appéndices, 3–9.

3. *Manifestación política sobre las actuales circumstancias*.

4. *Proclama a los Españoles Americanos*.

5. *Manifiesto . . . de la Junta . . . de Valencia* (Valencia, 1808), 104–110, 120–123.

6. Some three hundred French merchants and artisans were murdered by a mob led by a fanatical priest, Báltasar Calbo. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 1:258–265.

7. *Circular expedida por la Junta Suprema de Valencia a todas las de España sobre el establecimiento de la Junta Central* (Valencia, 1808). SHM, Colección Hijar, VII, n. 42; AHN, Consejos, 5519, doc. 2.

8. The conde de la Conquista, president of the Junta de Valencia, proposed Cadiz be the seat of the forthcoming national government; this was immediately questioned by the Junta's *sindico personero*, who requested that Cadiz be specifically excluded. He had good grounds for opposition. *Manifiesto que hace la Junta Superior de Observación y Defensa del Reyno de Valencia*, 136–137.

9. *La Junta Suprema de Valencia a las otras juntas* (Valencia, 16 July 1808), also in SHM, Colección Hijar, II, n. 42.

10. *Gazeta ministerial de Sevilla*, nos. 1–8, 1–26 June 1808.

11. Quesada Montero, *Actuación de la Suprema Junta de Sevilla a través del diario de su presidente*, 47–81.

12. There is a notable absence of correspondence between Napoleon (Bayonne) and Murat (Madrid) at this point.

13. Murat's observations: (Consejo) "Conseil de Castille . . . de méchants gens . . . tous les ordres de VM sont trammés aussitôt que reçus"; (Gil y Lemos) "médiocre . . . malade," should be replaced by Mazarredo or Sixto Espinosa; (Cevallos) "dangereux." Murat to Napoleon, 21–22 May 1808. ANPar, AF IV, 1606A, plaq. 11, III.

14. Murat to Napoleon, Madrid, 4–31 May 1808. Ibid.

15. Murat to Napoleon, 20 May 1808. Ibid.

16. For some time Murat had been wary of the guard units in his forces.

17. See Savary, *Mémoires* (Bonaparte's comments at St. Helena).

18. Barante, *Souvenirs*, 276.

19. Savary, *Mémoires*.

20. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 390, 452.

21. Azanza and O'Farrill, "Memoria justificativa," *BAE*, 97:303–314.

22. Ibid., 97:308–314.

23. Meléndez Valdés, *Obras completas*, vol. 3.

24. Azanza and O'Farrill, "Memoria justificativa," *BAE*, 97:322–324.

25. Junta de Sevilla, *Manifiesto de 3 de agosto de 1808*. AHN, Consejos, 5519, doc. 19; Colección Hijar, II, n. 22.

26. "Conservan . . . las Juntas Supremas como propietarios toda su autoridad y gozan en su plenitud de todas las calidades y prerogativas de esta propiedad." Further, the Junta de Sevilla required its deputies to swear "defender sus derechos, guardarles fidelidad, no excederse de los poderes que les había dado." "Memoria que a la Junta Central Suprema Governativa del Reyno dirige la Junta Suprema de Sevilla, 27 Octubre de 1808." AHN, Estado, 70, doc. 165.

27. "Instrucción de la Junta Suprema de Sevilla a sus diputados a la Junta Central, 24 de agosto de 1808." AHN, Estado, 70, doc. 166.

28. Jovellanos, "Memoria en defense de la Junta Central," *BAE*, 46:58.

29. This distinction, it should be recalled, was important in the great controversy at Mexico City precipitated by Sevilla's *comisionados* in the late summer of 1808.

30. "Informe de los fiscales del Consejo de Castilla sobre las Juntas provinciales," 28 August 1808. AHN Consejos, 5519, doc. 24.

31. AHN, Consejos, 5519, docs. 22, 24. cited by Artola, *Orígenes* [1975], 1:183–186.

32. "Perecer de los fiscales." AHA, Consejos, 5513; Consejo de Castilla, *Manifiesto de los procedimientos del Consejo Real*, 103.

33. According to Jovellanos, the French reoccupation was generally expected.

34. Consejo de Castilla, *Manifiesto de los procedimientos del Consejo Real*, 103–116.

35. Artola, *Orígenes*, 1:181–186.

36. Consejo de Castilla, *Manifiesto de los procedimientos del Consejo Real*, 113.

37. Pérez Villamil, *Carta sobre el modo*. For an analysis of Pérez Villamil's letter, see Martínez de Velasco, *La formación de la Junta Central*, 97, 127–134, 141–142.

38. Jovellanos, "Memoria en defense de la Junta Central," *BAE*, 46:539–540.

39. "Representación del Consejo de Castilla a la Junta Central acerca de su instalación, Madrid, 8 de octubre de 1808," in Blanco White, *El Español*, 1, no. 1 (April 1810), 31ff.; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 2:114–118; Jovellanos, "Memoria en defensa de la Junta Central," *BAE*, 46:516–518; Artola, *Orígenes*, 1:245.

40. Artola, *Orígenes*, 1:235.

41. Ibid., 1:203–209.

42. Ibid., 1:209–213.

43. Calvo de Rozas, 9 Sept. 1808, in Longás Bartibás, *Representación aragonesa en la Junta Central Suprema*. A more radical approach is in an anonymous pamphlet of August 1808: "Avoir proclamé Roi Fernando, qui ne viendrá prendre possession de sa couronne, c'est la même chose que n'en point avoir, et voilá précisément ce qu'il nous faut. Cette belle idée . . . de proclamer un nom, un simulacre, auquel des prophétes imposteurs feron dire tout se qu'ils voudront sans crainte d'être démentis, cette confusion, ces clameurs, préparent la grande régenération que nous meditons . . . Déjà notre constitución s'avance . . . nous surpassons déjà les Anglais, les Américains et les Français," in *Réponse de l'agent de Madrid au Propriétaire de Bilbastre*. AAE, CP, v. 676, ff. 126r–129r.

44. *Semanario Patriótico*, 1, no. 1 (Sept. 1808).

45. Quintana, "Memoria sobre el proceso y prisión de D. Manuel José Quintana en 1814," *Obras inéditas*.

14. Junta Central

1. Artola, *Orígenes*, I, 242. For a list of the diputados, see Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, appéndice al libro VI.

2. The Garays lived in Saragoza (Aragon), but Martín de Garay y Perales, Martínez de Villela was born in Andalusia (Puerto Santa María) in 1760. He entered the military, like his father. Garay may have been influenced by another Aragonese on the Junta Central, Ignacio Martínez de Villela. As the Escorial affair unfolded, Godoy appointed him superintendent of police at Madrid. He accompanied the Consejo de Castilla to Bayonne and returned to Madrid with Bonaparte's choice of king of Spain, José I. But when the French withdrew from Madrid, Martínez de Villela remained, then indicted the Spaniards who withdrew with José. In February of 1809 he joined the Junta Central then at Sevilla. He was later charged with, then exonerated of, collaboration with the French. *Don Ignacio Martínez de Villela a la Nación Española* (Cadiz, 1812).

3. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, 113; Dérozier, *Garay*, 85–86.

4. "Règlement élaboré par Martín de Garay au sujet de la limitation definitive des pouvoirs des Juntes provinciales, 1 janvier 1809." Dérozier, *Garay*, 87–88.

5. Garay, "Apuntes sobre el papel de Casa Flores para pacificación de América." AGI, Estado, 87.

6. It should be recalled that the chance Godoy might move the royal family to America in March 1808 had led to the coup d'état at Aranjuez.

7. Janine Fayard has noted that the Valdés and Queipo de Llano families of Asturias "ne forment pas seulement une très grande famille, mais un véritable gens," including the Cangas, Omanas, Argüelles de Meres, and Campomanes, among other regional stocks. *Les membres du Conseil de Castille*, 248–253. See also Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, II, 310.

8. Valdés, *Exposición*, 18–28.

9. BNMad, MSS, 3535, f. 77.

10. Guiral to Valdés, Cadiz, 23 Jan. 1788. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2313 B. Consulado de Cadiz to Rivera, Cadiz, 1 Jan. 1789. AGI, Consulados, libro 62, f. 111v.

11. Consulado de Cadiz to Rovera, Cadiz, 1 Jan. 1789. AGI, Consulados, libro 62, f. 111v.

12. Eulate, capitán de fragata and an early *fernandista* close to Valdés, was accused by French officials of being "the principal instigator of [Valdés'] defection." ANPar, AF IV, 1611, plaq 3ii. Cayetano Valdés y Flores, a naval officer on Malaspina's expedition, participated in the naval battle at Cape Saint Vincent (1797), then Trafalgar (1805), an experience that made him admire English naval discipline—"un verdadero comandante inglés"—and a participant in the anti-French insurgency. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, II, 36, 324, and Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, 124. Ramirez was a regidor of Palencia.

13. Eulate, writing to the intendant of Soria, Mateo Diez Durán, described the anti-French riot at Burgos in April and informed him of secret measures "para el caso de que vengamos a las manos, no nos sorprehendan y podamos obrar con éxito desde luego, no en Burgos, sino afuera . . . Aqui ha diputados de muchos pueblos, para tomar las instucciones afin de alistar su gente." He recommended Durán to prepare such measures secretly. Valdés added a note, stating he was communicating

with Infantado and the Obispo de Osma, that "todos caminamos a tientas, pero Dios nos sacará a la orilla." Valdés, *Exposición*, 43. The broad-based insurgency in Castilla "en que tanta influencia tuve," Valdés later claimed, forced the French to divert forces from León to Asturias, where Valdés thought Spanish resistance would center. Ibid., 26, 43.

14. Artola, *Orígenes*, I, 194. Did these juntas initiate the idea of a *cortes*?

15. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, 195.

16. Ibid., III, 14. Federico Suárez has doubted the authenticity of Toreno's quotation, citing inconsistency with the cautious, moderate position Valdés articulated elsewhere (*Proceso*, 67, 126–129). Yet Suárez elsewhere cites Quintana to the effect that the decree convoking the *cortes* "en su parte reformadora parecía tomada a la letra del voto que dió . . . Antonio Valdés." Ibid., 126.

17. Ibid., 101, citing Fernández Martín, *Derecho parlamentario*, I, 448–451. Valdés clearly was effective in softening the language and limiting the scope of the original proposal, thereby insuring its approval.

18. See the comprehensive biography by Defourneaux, *Pablo de Olavide*.

19. Coincidentally, at the government's request, Jovellanos had just published in 1795 his long delayed report on agrarian conditions with the recommendation that certain church properties be sold to small holders. The government distributed widely his *Informe . . . en el exediente de ley agraria*.

20. "Memoria," *BAE*, 46:584.

21. On Jovellanos's economic views, see Herr, *The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain*, 337–347; Robert S. Smith, "The Wealth of Nations in Spain and Hispanic America," *Journal of Political Economy*, 16 (1957), 106; and Jesús Prados Arrarte, *Jovellanos, economista*, 9–12.

22. "Carta sexta a Antonio Ponz," *BAE*, 50:290.

23. Ibid.

24. Prados Arrate, *Jovellanos economista*.

25. "Dictámen dado a la Junta de Comercio y Moneda sobre embarque de paños extrangeros para nuestras colonias." *BAE*, 50:71.

26. Ibid, 71–72.

27. Ibid., 72.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 72–73.

32. Ibid., 73.

33. "Discurso leído . . . en su recepción a la Real Academia de Historia," *BAE*, 58.

34. Sources on Calvo de Rozas include Gadea, *El intendente del primer sitio*; Longás Bartibás, *La representación aragonesa*; Lorenzo Calvo y Mateo, *Resumen histórico de la immortal defensa de Zaragoza en . . . 1808* (Madrid, 1839) and *Estudios de la guerra de la independencia*, III, 133–137; Lafarga Lozano, *Índices de las genealogías de las encartaciones*; Suárez, *El proceso*, 43–58.

35. Required to cut the *diputados* per province to two, surprisingly the traditionalist conde de Sástago was eliminated.

36. Possibly Calvo's career was advanced by Manuel de Negrete y de la Torre, the prominent conde de Campo Alange. Negrete is said to have been influential under the Godoy administration. Like Calvo, his family had roots in Ranero; he rose in the military to the rank of lieutenant general, served as secretary of Guerra, and *gentilhombre de cámara* of Charles IV. His entry into the Orden de Carlos III

was supported by civil servants (conde de Floridablanca, conde de Lerena, Juan de Árias y Saavedra), and by aristocrats—the duques de Medinaceli and Osuna. AHN, Orden de Carlos III, exp. 487.

37. "Pruebas de Ramón Calvo y de Rozas, González y de la Sierra, 1819." AHN, Estado, Orden de Carlos III, exp. 1777.

38. Adolfo Lafarga has identified many from the Carranza Valley at Madrid, Cadiz, and especially in the colony of New Spain after 1750. *Índice de las genealogías de las encartaciones*.

39. Gadea, *El ingtendente del primer sitio*, 156.

40. Suárez, *El proceso*, 45. Calvo was probably an intermediary in provisioning flour to the French fleet at Cadiz. AAEPar, CC, Espagne, 33, ff. 368r–370r.

41. Calvo de Rozas, *Representación . . . al Congreso Nacional*.

42. Juan Francisco Antonio and Nicolás de los Heros y Herrán, Fernández de la Sierra y Palomera. AHN, Orden de Carlos III, exps. 301 (1789) and 879 (1795). Nicolás was at that time secretary of the Consejo de la Inquisicion as well as a *regidor* of Madrid.

43. *Semanario erudito de Valadares*, 26 (1790), 149–280, and 27 (1790), 3–222.

44. Eugenio Larruga, *Memorias políticas y economícas*, 16:195; *Semanario erudito de Valadares*, 27 (1790), 23–29. He was in addition a promoter of the Compañía General de los Cinco Gremios in charge of the Gremios's overseas operations. Family members also sold the products of royal manufacturies in the colonies of New Spain and Peru. Matilla Tascón and Capella, *Los Cinco Gremios Mayores* (under Bernardo de los Heros).

45. Larruga, *Historia*, 5:106–108. Indicative of Montarco's prestige was his election as *prefecto* of the Real Congregación de San Ignacio, *the* Basque welfare society that assisted Basques to establish themselves in the peninsula and colonies. *Noticia del orígen*, *fundación*, *objecto y constituciones de la Real Congregación de Naturales y Originarios de las tres provincias vascongadas* (Madrid, 1896), 16, 84. Montarco went on to join José I's government in 1808, and in 1811 he was his *comisario regio* in Andalusia.

46. Suárez, *El Proceso*, 47 n. 20.

47. Longás Bartibás, *La representación aragonesa*, 13.

48. Palafox, imprisoned in France with Fernando VII, reportedly advised Fernando in 1814 to accept the constitutional monarchy framed by the Cortes; this may reflect the earlier influence of Calvo. García Mercadal, *José de Palafox, duque de Zaragosa*.

49. Longás Bartibás, *La representación aragonesa*, xi–xiii. The conde de Sástago, conservative and one of Aragon's prestigious families linked to Andalusia, did not take his elimination kindly. Calvo, he felt, lacked elementary qualifications to represent Aragon, i.e., noble status. He complained to Floridablanca, who did not pursue the matter; perhaps he felt it unwise to reinforce Andalusian hegemony.

50. Ibid., 100–113.

51. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, 15–16; III, 140.

52. Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, I, 406. Francisco Palafox also lamented that Calvo was adopting the French "revolutionary way." Longás Bartibás, *La representación aragonesa*.

53. Longás Bartibás, *La representación aragonesa*, 23.

54. Calvo de Rozas, *Representación . . . al Congreso Nacional*.

55. The major sources on Quintana include Dérozier, *Quintana*; Vila Selma, *Ideario*.

56. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1:70.

57. Ibid., 1:126–128. Suggestive of the spirit of Quintana's *Pelayo* was the exhortation: "Y escrito está en el libro del destino / Que es libre la nación que quiere serlo. / A fundar otra España y otra Patria / Más grande, más Feliz que la primera. / A impulsos, o del hambre o de la espada / Libres nacimos! Libres moriremos!" Ibid., 1:192.

58. Ibid., 1:167.

59. Ibid., 1:331–334.

60. Ibid.

61. *Semanario Patriótico*, 1 Sept. and 6 Oct. 1808.

62. This curious article also claimed to describe the trip of Liniers's brother to Brazil where the Portuguese royal family had found refuge. "Memoria del conde de Liniers al Excmo. Señor Don Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, 20 de marzo de 1808," *Semanario Patriótico*, 13 and 20 Oct. 1808.

63. Vila Selma, *Ideario*.

64. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1:204–211 and 2:477.

65. At Zaragosa he spent these years in the residence of his father-in-law, the marqués de Santa Coloma.

66. Quintana, *Obras inéditas*, see opening pages.

67. On origins of liberalism in Spain, see Corona Baratech, *Revolución y reacción*, 195–266; Elorza, *La ideología liberal en la ilustración española*; and Herr, *The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain*, 337–347.

68. It was acceptable to attack "ministerial despotism" rather than the arbitrary, "absolutist" *monarquía* of the old regime.

69. Corona, *Revolución y reacción*, 206–219.

70. Interest in reviving the Cortes just before 1808 was evident in domestic intelligence reports on conversations overheard in Madrid's cafés and private *tertulias*. Some reports were prepared by Pedro Giraldo and surfaced during the government's inquiry into the Escorial affair of late 1807.

71. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:124–125.

72. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, 119.

73. Jovellanos, "Memoria en defense de la Junta Central," *BAE*, 46:584.

15. Junta Central versus Junta de Sevilla

1. Letter, Francisco de Saavedra to General Castaños, Sevilla, Sept. 1808. AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 2; Saavedra to Arzobispo de Laodicea, Sevilla, 19 Sept. 1808. Ibid, doc. 3. For a concise exposition of the credentials and powers granted by their respective juntas to their *diputadosi*, see Martínez de Velasco, *Formación de la Junta Central*, 178–188.

2. Saavedra to Arzobispo, Sevilla, 19 Sept. 1808. AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 3.

3. Ibid.

4. The Junta Central probably suspected that Sevilla's secret instructions to its

deputies insisted on control over colonial and financial policy. However, to avoid exposing internal divisions or perhaps resigned to Sevilla's primacy in colonial policy making, Saavedra adopted for the time a "manto de disimulación." Toreno would conclude years later that the Junta de Sevilla's "empeño hubiera podido causar desavenencicas que felizmente cortaron la cordura y tino de ilustrados patriotas"—probably meaning Saavedra. *Levantamiento*, 1:223. Artola has pointed out that *empeño* lasted the brief lifetime of the Central and was a major factor in its demise. *Orígenes*, 1:200.

5. Jovellanos, "Memoria en defensa de la Junta Central, 2 de septiembre de 1810," *BAE*, 46:540. Toreno felt that at this point the Junta de Sevilla backed "una verdadera autoridad soberana e independiente y no subalterno y encadenado" and Artola concluded that Sevilla—following other juntas—freed its *diputados* from seeking advice before voting on "asuntos demasiado árduos." Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 2:114; Artola, *Orígenes*, 1:239. By participating in forming the Junta Central in early August and by stating "no afectamos ni deseamos superioridad alguna," Martínez de Velasco sees Sevilla disavowing pretensions to "gobernar España y América." *Formación de la Junta Central*, 119–120.

6. "Dictamen a la Junta Central, 22 Abril de 1809." AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 22.

7. Circular, "16 de octubre de 1808, sobre limitaciones que eran entonces convenientes en las facultades de las Juntas."

8. "Memoria que a la Junta Central Suprema Guvernativa del Reyno presenta la Junta Suprema de Govierno de Sevilla, 22 de octubre de 1808." AHN, Estado, 82-B, doc. 75.

9. "Memoria que a la Junta Central Suprema Guvernativa del Reyno dirige la Junta Suprema de Sevilla, 27 de octubre de 1808." AHN, Estado, 70-H, doc. 165.

10. Pedro José Fernández de Córdoba al conde de Floridablanca, Madrid, 27 Sept. 1808. AHN, Estado, 50-A.

11. BRAHM, Mata Linares, 122.

12. *Gazeta Ministerial de Sevilla*, 8 Nov. 1808.

13. Fabián de Miranda al Obispo de Laodicea y al conde de Tilly, sus diputados en la Junta Central. Sevilla, 5 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 82-B.

14. Of course Miranda omitted reference to Sevilla's secret discretionary powers given its commissioners to New Spain.

15. Miranda al Arzobispo Co-Administrador y al conde de Tilly, diputados a la Junta Central por la Junta Suprema de Sevilla, Sevilla, 22 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 58-B, doc. 33.

16. AHN, Consejos, 21,082.

17. See Fontana and Villares, *Historia*, 6.

18. Quintana had advised his friend Garay at Aranjuez to enliven the official proclamations of the Junta Central with impassionate prose. Garay asked Quintana to review the draft of his proclamation to the nation. Dérozier, *Quintana*.

19. *La Suprema Junta Gubernativa del Reino a la Nación Española* (Aranjuez, 1808). Dérozier offers a detailed textual analysis of the manifesto. *Quintana*, 2:165–174.

20. *Manifesto de la Nación Española a la Europa* (Sevilla, 1809).

21. *Reglamento para el Régimen de las Juntas Provinciales* (Sevilla, 1809). AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 10.

22. "Junta de Sevilla a la Junta Central, Sevilla," 18 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 9.

23. "Junta de Sevilla a la Junta Suprema Guvernativa del Reyno," 31 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 13.

24. "Junta de Sevilla a la Junta Suprema Guvernativa del Reyno," 10 Feb. 1809. AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 15.

25. José Fernández de Cosío, Cadiz, to Juan Fournier, Sevilla, 27 Dec. 1808. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240; Iturrigaray, Castillo de San Juan de Ulloa, Veracruz, to Tomás de Morla, Cadiz, 16 Nov. 1808. AHN, 21,081, doc. 10.

26. "Observaciones que presenta a SM la Junta Central el capitán de navío D. Juan Jabat, Sevilla, 27 de diciembre de 1808." AHN, Estado, 58-E, doc. 98; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 421–424.

27. "Advertencias útiles para la conservación tranquila y permanente del reyno de Nueva España, con la debida sumisión y obediencia a sus legítimos soberanos"; "Observaciones sobre las medidas que convendrían adoptarse en el virreynato de Nueva España y sus provincias internas, en precaución de las Provincias Unidas del Norte de América que propenden a invadirnos por la provincia de Tejas por el Norte de la del Nuevo México, y restricciones a su comercio." Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 424–429; AHN, Estado, 58-E, doc. 101; 48-C, doc. 93; Olmet, *Cuerpo diplomático*, 3:325–327.

28. His request for the post of *juez de la Acordada* in New Spain was rejected; he apparently rejected a lesser post as *coletor de la Lotería* at Puebla but then solicited a captaincy in the Voluntarios de Fernando VII—the Consulado-financed militia unit in Mexico City. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 302–303; AGN, Reales Cédulas, 201, f. 1.

29. José Fernández de Cosío, 27 June 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240.

30. Iturrigaray, writing at Veracruz in November to his friend Morla at Cadiz, accused Roblejo—he called him Sevilla's principal agent—of returning to Cadiz with 40,000 *pesos fuertes* along with jewels stolen from the viceregal palace at Mexico City in the evening of the coup d'état. Iturrigaray, San Juan de Ulloa, Veracruz, to Tomás Morla, Cadiz. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, doc.

31. Iturrigaray, "Representación," Castillo de San Sebastián, Cadiz. Ibid.

32. Cosio to Roblejo de Lozano, Cadiz, in December and January. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240.

33. Cosío (Cadiz) to Roblejo (Sevilla), 10 and 17 Jan. 1809. Cosío warned Roblejo not to trust Sevillanos. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240, ff. 187r, 193r.

34. By the spring of 1809 Roblejo's daughter, and sometimes his wife, were living with Cosío, who now referred to Roblejo as "old, intimate friend." AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240.

35. Ibid.

36. Cosío to Roblejo, 2 and 9 May 1809. Ibid., ff. 233r–233v.

37. Junta Suprema de Sevilla to Martín de Garay, Sevilla, 31 Dec. 1808 and 9 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 45, doc. 2.

38. AHN, Estado, 82-B, docs. 143, 153.

39. Junta de Sevilla to la Junta Central Sevilla, 10 Jan. 1809. AHN, Estado, 82-B, doc. 157.

40. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 2:34–36.

41. José Canga Aragüelles reminded his readers that "el artículo 87 de la titulada Constitución de Bayona declaró solemnemente 'que los reinos y provincias españolas de América y Asia habían de gozar de los mismos derechos que la metrópoli,'" which "puso al gobierno interino español en la forzada decisión de abrazaarla." *Examen sobre el*, 5.

42. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 6:237.

43. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 2:298.

44. *El Español*, 30 June 1810.

45. "Real Cédula de 1 de marzo de 1809 ordenando que no se permita desembarcar en este reino al Sr. Carlos IV . . . sin expreso orden del . . . Fernando VII, cuando ese se encuentre libre de su cautiverio o de la Suprema Junta Central." AGN, Reales Cedulas, 42.

46. AHN, Estado, 28-C, doc. 128.

47. Blanco White, *El Español*, 30 Dec. 1810.

48. "Mémoire de García Malo sur les circonstances critiques dans lesquelles se trouvent la Patrie et le Gouvernement, et mesures de précaution qu'elles dictent elles-mêmes." Seville, 4 Dec. 1809. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:124–135. Dérozier feels García Malo exerted considerable influence on the colonial policy of the Junta Central.

49. *Carta de un buen patriota* (Cadiz, 18 May 1811), in Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:661–666.

50. Llorens, in *Boletín del Seminario de Derecho Españo l* (Madrid), 26 (1962), 7.

51. AHN, Estado, 45, docs. 510, 511; Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 306–307.

52. Marqués del Villel, Cadiz, to Junta Central, Feb. 1809. AHN, 45, doc. 21.

53. Iturrigaray, San Juan, to Tomás de Morla, Cadiz, 11 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, doc. 10.

54. José Fernández de Cosío, Cadiz, to Tomás de Morla, Cadiz, to José Ramón Roblejo, Sevilla, 8 Feb. 1809 AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240.

55. AHN, Consejos, 21,081, doc. 18.

56. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 2. In September, the Junta de Cadiz named Pedro Simón de Mendinueta, customs *administrador*, and Manuel José de Micheo, a merchant member of its Junta, "trasladarse cerca de la Junta Central" while Dámaso Joaquin de San Pelayo went to the Junta de Sevilla. Mendinueta and Micheo were part of an influential Navarrese connection that included prominent civil servants and merchants; San Pelayo was associated with the dominant Basques in Madrid's Cinco Gremios Mayores. *Gazeta ministerial de Sevilla*, 23 Sept. 1808, and Aguirre, *Diario de las Cortes de Cadiz*, Dec. 1812.

57. José Fernández de Cosío to Juan Escolano, Cadiz, 16 Sept. 1808. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240, f. 147r.

58. Ibid.

59. Junta de Sevilla to Francisco Xavier de Cienfuegos, Sevilla, 4 May 1809. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 270.

60. As the exceptionality of Cadiz was justified: "Aunque continuando el artí-

culo [16] reduce el número de individuos en las Juntas de Partido o Subalternas de las Superiores donde las hubiese, en esta clase no debe considerarse la Junta de Cadiz, respecto a la Superior de Sevilla, por que las circunstancias particulares de esta Plaza, su situación local, su numerosa población, y otras ventajas que son bien conocidas, exigen de justicia que a su Junta de Gobierno se la conserve la distinción e independencia de que ha gozado en su último estado, sin sugetar sus determinaciones a otra examen que él de la Suprma Junta. Manuel Alfonso Villagómez and Tomás Moyano to *gobernador* of Cadiz," Cadiz, 27 Mar. 1809. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 284, n. 1.

61. Junta de Gobierno de Cadiz to the Junta Suprema Central, Cadiz, 17 Feb. 1809. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 267.

62. "Defensa del Marqués de Villel. Informe por Villagómez y Moyano, 25 de marzo de 1809." AHN, Estado, 31-C.

63. Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, 1:228; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 2:306–307.

64. Castro y Rossi, *Historia de Cadiz y su provincia*, 665–680. The militia, "Voluntarios distinguidos de Cadiz," had been organized after the formation of the Junta de Cadiz, by prominent *Gaditanos*, many of them merchants; this militia is said to have been filled by their sons and employees (*dependientes*). This organization is strikingly like the militia organized by the merchants of Mexico City.

65. Sevilla managed the Capuchins' monastery beginning in 1807 and was recognized as successor to the popular Capuchin preacher, Diego de Cadiz. Capuchins were influential in Lower Andalusia and also sent missionaries to evangelize native peoples along the Orinoco and Rio Negro Rivers in Venezuela; they were intermediaries between merchants and indigenous nut collectors. Sevilla served as the Capuchins *comisario general de las misiones de las Indias Occidentales*. Solis, *El Cadiz de las Cortes*, 73; Valencia, *Los Capuchinos de Andalucía*, ch. 4.

66. Cabrera, from a poor local family, early revealed capacity for leadership and learning. He was an attractive preacher and was called the "padre de los pobres." He was present when the mob assassinated Captain General Solano and calmed the mob. Solis, *El Cadiz de las Cortes*, 303–307.

67. Rábago père spent years in New Spain as a merchant, returned to Cadiz in 1760, prospered there (probably by maintaining commercial contacts with Mexico City), was elected to office in the Consulado de Cadiz "Relación de los sujetos . . . habilitados . . . para cargadoresl y factores . . . desde 1757 hasta . . . 1767." AGI, Contratación, 5,532; Valgoma, *Real Compañía*, 437–438.

68. Bando, 23 de Febrero de 1809. AHN, Estado, 31-C.

69. Heredia, like Solano, was wounded, prepared for the gallows with a noose, then dragged through the streets where he died. Felix Jones, Cadiz to Garay, 23 Feb. 1809.

70. Castro, *Cadiz y su provincia*, 675.

71. Commissioners Villagómez and Moyano had accompanied the Central to Sevilla.

72. The secretary of the Cadiz Consulado, José Fernández de León, noted in his correspondence that his three sons in the Voluntarios were "pacifying" the Cadiz mob after the murder of the head of the customs. Fernández de Cosío, Cadiz, to Romualdo de Castro, Sevilla, 24 Feb. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 240, f. 214r.

73. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 244.

74. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 18, n. 5.

75. Castro, *Cadiz y su provincia*, 677–678.

76. Felix Jones to Martin de Garay, Cadiz, 5 May 1809. AHN, Estado 62-G, doc. 280.

77. Villagómez and Moyano to Gobernador de Cadiz, 27 Mar. 1809. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 284, n. 1.

78. Junta Central to Junta de Sevilla, 19 Apr. 1809. AHN, Estado.

79. Junta de Sevilla to Junta Central, 4 May 1809. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 270. Sevilla also complained that Cadiz did not report the restoration of its junta; pursued its ends openly and covertly; and should not claim that its special circumstances dictated its stance—its policies would bring ruin. Above all, Cadiz too must learn to sacrifice.

80. Junta Central to Junta de Sevilla, 19 Apr. 1809. Junta de Sevilla to Junta Central, 4 May 1809. Felix Jones to Martín de Garay, Cadiz, 5 May 1809. AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 280. Cadiz insisted that unlike other *juntas de partido* or *subalterna*, it could claim the right to communicate *directly* with the Junta Central, such correspondence requiring the signature of its *presidente*.

81. Apropos the Central's 3 June order, Cadiz claimed "mandó la Junta Central restablecer la de observación y defensa de esta ciudad, disuelta por causa de los movimientos populares de los dias 22 y 23 de Febrero, con las funciones y número de individuos, correspondientes a las Juntas Superiores a que quedaron reducidas las provinciales llamadas anteriormente supremas, conforme al reglamento de 1 de Enero de 1809." *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 18, n. 5. The cited order is not among papers on this subject in the AHN.

82. Junta Central to Junta de Cadiz, Sevilla, 9 July 1809 (borrador). AHN, Estado, 62-G, doc. 280.

83. *La Suprema Junta Gubernativa de la Nación Española*, Aranjuez, 26 Oct. 1808. AHN, Estado, 62-G.

84. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 2.

85. "Real Orden comunicada al . . . Duque del Infantado, Presidente del Consejo, por . . . Martín de Garay, Secretario General de la Junta Suprema del Reyno." Bisto en el Consejo, ha acordado se imprime, publique y circule. Madrid, 18 Oct. 1809.

86. "Carta del diputado por Aragón en la Junta Suprema, D. Lorenzo Calbo de Rozas, a D. Martín de Garay, Secretario de la misma sobre su gestión encaminada a llegar recursos para las necesidades de la guerra." Madrid, 6 Nov. 1808. Calvo's first target was the well-known *fondo pio* established decades earlier by the well-known *bastanés asentista* and Hacienda secretary Juan Bautista de Iturralde. Longás Bartibás, *La representación aragonesa*, 23–27; on Iturralde, see Caro Baroja, *La hora navarra del XVIII*, 227–243.

87. Arthur Wellesley concluded that "en las clases alta y media . . . se puede descubrir una disposición a observar los acontecimientos y a darse a partido con el que venciere últimamente en esta contienda." Wellesley to George Canning, Sevilla, 15 Sept. 1809. *El Español*, 30 June 1810.

88. Vicente Alcalá Galiano to conde de Floridablanca, Madrid, 26 Oct. 1808.

AHN, Estado, 128, doc. 20. Later the Junta Central awarded a colonial trade privilege to the Compañía as further reimbursement, to the consternation of the Consulado de Cadiz.

89. Real Decreto de 16 de noviembre de 1808. A subsequent decree of 27 January 1809, did retract the retroactive provisions. AHN, Hacienda, Libro 8059, f. 77r.

90. Joseph Joaquin de Aguirre a la Junta Central, Cadiz, 11 Oct. 1808. AHN, Estado, 50-A, doc. 3; "Proyecto de un empréstito en Inglaterra por cuenta de España por Pedro Antonio de Aguirre y Miguel Lobo, Cadiz, noviembre de 1808." AGSim, Estado, 8172, ff. 56r–63r.

91. "Oficios a la Suprema Junta de Sevilla, London," 21, 24 Dec. 1808; 6 Jan. 1809. AGS, Estado, Libro 593, docs. 50, 54, 56.

92. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 2:300–302 (re London's response, see Humphreys, *Tradition and Revolt in Latin America*, 107–108).

16. Financing the Resistance in Spain

1. *Manifestación politica sobre los actuales circunstancias* (Valencia, 1808), 4; reprinted at Sevilla, 1808.

2. Canning, October 1808, cited in Humphreys, *Tradition and Revolt*, 107–108.

3. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2472.

4. Consulado de Mexico to Viceroy Venegas, 14 Sept. 1811. AGN, AHH, 125-9.

5. Saavedra to Secretario de Estado . . . despacho universal de Gracia y Justicia, Ceuta, 24 Feb. 1811. AHN, Estado, 84 D, n. 22.

6. Aranjuez, 26 Oct. 1808; Dérozier, *Quintana*, 11, 169–170.

7. Jovellanos, *BAE*, 42, n. 46.

8. Junta Central, *Circular* (Aranjuez), 5 Oct. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 21,721. Understandably, members of the Junta Central "had a very confused idea" of the transfers of Consolidación funds from New Spain to England. Stuart to Canning, Aranjuez, 29 Sept. 1808. PRO, FO, 72/58, ff. 306r–306v.

9. RO 12 Oct. 1808, "comunicado por Martin de Garay. Secretario General de la Junta Suprema del Reyno." Princeton University Library, Hijar Collection, IV, n. 28; Real Decreto, 16 Nov. 1808. AHN, Hacienda, Libro 8059, ff. 77r–77v. Typically, the public debt was blamed upon "gastos enormes del Palacio [Real]."

10. Longás Partibás, *La representación aragonesa en la Junta Central Suprema*. Colección de documcntos para el estudio de la historia de Aragon, VII, 26; Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1,368.

11. Saavedra, Ceuta, 24 Feb. 1811. AHN, Estado, 84 D, 1122.

12. Marichal, "En un primer momento," 168. Marichal has put succinctly the situation: "Puede afirmarse que el virreynato de la Nueva España cumplió un papel tan importante como sostén financiero del gobierno espanol." Ibid., 151–152.

13. [Martin de Garay], "La Junta Central a la Nación Españiola," 26 Oct. 1808.

14. Floridablanca reported on 5 Oct. 1808 that the Junta Central had initiated efforts to transfer 2 million pesos from England "a la major brevedad." Suprema Junta Central Gubernativa del Reyno, 20 Oct. 1808 impresos. AHN, Consejos, 21,721.

15. Letters from Francisco Saavedra, Vicente Florez, and Manuel Gil, "Cartas

recividas de la Junta de Sevilla," 10 Aug. 1808. In 1808 fully one-third (6,299 million reales) of total *vales* issued (1.890 billion) was held at Cadiz. Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda*, II, 552–553.

16. Stuart to Canning, Aranjez, 29 Sept. 1808. PRO, FO, 72/58, ff. 306r–306v.

17. AHN, Estado, 8172.

18. Saavedra to Apodaca, Sevilla, 22 April 1809. AHN, Estado, 8172. In late November 1808, the Junta de Sevilla received a report from London about "los crecidos intereses de SM que ai en esta ciudad en pader de distintos sugetos par negociaciones echas con la Caxa de Consolidación." "Oficios a la Suprema Junta de Sevilla," London, 25 Nov. 1808. AGSim, Estado, Libro 593, f. 138v.

19. "Oficios a la Suprema Junta de Sevilla," 21, 24 Dec. 1808 and 6 Jan. 1809, ibid., ff. 148r–149.

20. "Buques de la Marina Inglesa." Mexico, 20 Feb. 1809, AGI, Ind. Gen., 2472.

21. RO, 2 April 1809 (signed by Saavedra), in *Gazeta de México*, 12 July 1809, AGN, AHH, 633-20. The principal figure in this operation was the agent of the Exchequer, Andrew Johnson Cochrane, who operated with two Veracruz merchants, José Mariano Almanza and Francisco Anillaga. With the placet of Viceroy Archbishop Lizana, a loan of 3 million pesos was arranged with major lenders from among Mexico City *almaceneros*. Alamán, *Historia*, 1, 283–284.

22. Duff to Marquess Wellesley, Cadiz, 21 March 1810. PRO, FO, 72/99.

23. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 11:269.

24. Examples abound in AGI, Consulados, Libra 80, ff. 110v; Libro 83, f. 252r; Libro 84, ff. 4v–7r; Libro 85, ff. 84r–89r; Libro 86, ff. 13Ir–132r, 137r–139r.

25. AGI, Consulados, Libro 85, ff. 55r–59v.

26. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 4,6; Cruz y Bahamonde, *De Cádiz y su comercio*, 13.

27. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 22, n. 15; AHN, Hacienda, Libro 8055, f. 112r; AGI, Consul ados, Libro de Juntas, 67-2, f. 49v.

28. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 4.

29. *Government Deficits Spain, 1793–1798*

Year	Deficit (in million *reales de vellón*)
1793	101.5
1794	387.6
1795	572.4
1796	237.3
1797	820.4
1798	800.0
Total	2,919.2

Source: Canga Argüelles, *Diccionario de hacienda*, 1, 284.

30. Consulado de Cadiz to Gardoqui, 18 Feb. 1793. AGI, Consulado, Correspondencia con España, Libro 91.

31. AGI, Consulado, Libro de Juntas. 60, ff. 78v–79r, 14 Feb. 1793. The Cadiz merchants collecting subscriptions, José Retortillo and Juan Manuel de Sarriá, had opposed *comercio neutro* in 1797. At a junta of potential lenders were "varios de los

vecinos distinguidos y acomodados, de los muchos que tiene esta ciudad." About eighty appeared. RO, 4 Feb. 1793, in SHM, *Colección del Fraile*, 210, ff. 1r–2r.

32. Consulado de Cadiz to Gardoqui, 15 Feb. 1793, and to Joaquin de Fonsdeviela, 1 Mar. 1793. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con España, Libro 91, ff. 51v–52v, 55v–56r.

33. AGI, Consulado, Libro de Juntas, 67-1, ff. 50r–5 l r. For servicing this loan, the Cadiz Consulado insisted on a new 0.5 percent tax, "quedando a la pribativa y absoluta disposición del Consulado y dos diputados para el pago de capitales y sus premios."

34. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 22; Cruz y Bahamonde, *De Cádiz y su comercio*, 13, n. The Cadiz group protested its high quota, alleging that "proprietarios y hacendados" of Spain had profited from rising agricultural prices, earning thereby specie "dejando en Cadiz solamente el papel." Note to Bartolomé Muñóz, 17 June 1800. AGI, Consulado, Correspondencia con España, 52.

35. Godoy to Consulado de Cadiz, 18 Dec. 1801. MN, MSS, 582, doc. 15, f. 97r; Consulado dc Cadiz to Juan de la Piedra, 22 Jan. 1802. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con España, 52, f. 53r.

36. Consulado de Cadiz to conde de Casa Ravago, 27 Sept. 1799. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con España, 52, f. 39r.

37. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 10.

38. Cadiz estimated at 1.9 million *reales de vellón* the volume of outstanding *vales*; it claimed its region held 32 percent (629 million). *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 10–11.

39. Consulado de Cadiz to Godoy, 3 Sept. 1805. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 54, f. 298r.

40. Real Cédula, 28 June 1805, in *Gazeta del Comercio de Cadiz*, 12 Sept. 1809. SHM, *Colección del Fraile*, v. 787, 153; Consulado de Cadiz to Godoy, 3 Sept. 1805. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 54; *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 6.

41. *Subscribers to the Loan (1805) to the Spanish Government*

	Subscribers	Amount (in *reales de vellón*)
Cadiz	2,537	5,074,000
Madrid	1,396	2,792,000
Sevilla area	45	8,000
Toledo	23	46,000
Coruna	18	36,000
Valencia	10	20,000
Barcelona	8	16,000
Cartagena	8	,000
Bilbao	7	14,000
Total	4,052	8,102,000

Source: Consulado de Cadiz, No. 1. Relación de los subscriptores al Real Empréstito de 100 millión *de reales vellón*. AGI, Ind. Gen. 2326.

42. RO, 29 Jan. 1806. Simón de Ágreda to Francisco Saavedra, Cadiz, II Apr. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 56. f. 88r.

43. Referring to its financial responsibilities to state finance, the Consulado de

Cadiz lauded its "administración, pago de intereses . . . y . . . la prolija y mui extensa correspondencia con los encargados de recaudar los derechos de subvención en España y las Americas." AGI, Consulados, Libro de Juntas, 67-2, 13 Jan. 1810, ff. 173v–174r.

44. José Manuel de Aparici to Secretaria de Indias, 20 May 1815. AGI, Ind. Gen. 2320.

45. José Manuel de Aparici, "lnforme acerca de la cuenta del producto e combersión del derecho de subvención de guerra," 20 May 1815. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2320.

46. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 1.

Derecho de Subvención: *Net Revenue, 1805–1814*

Year	Amount (in *reales de vellón*)
1805 (July–Dec)	168,655
1806	270,287
1807	216,89
1808	145,392
1809	58,952
1810	323,727

Source: AGI, Ind. Gen., 2320.

47. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*.

48. "Informe acerca de la cuenta y estados remitidos por el consulado de Cadiz del producto e combersión del derecho de subvención," 20 May 1815. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2320.

49. Subvención *Receipts, Spain and Colonies*

	Amount (in *reales de vellón*)	Percentage
Spain	37,814,527	100.0
Cadiz	14,213,079	37.5
Colonies	13,540,468	100.0
Veracruz	6,535,152	48.2

Source: AGI, Ind. Gen., 2320.

50. *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 3.

51. RO, 27 June 1808. AGI, Consulados, Libra de Juntas, 66, v. 2, f. 32v.

52. Dalrymple to Castlereagh, 13 June 1808. PRO, CO, 91/49.

53. Consulado de Cadiz to Antonio Coca and Victor Soret, 27 June 1808. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 55, f. 295r; Consulado de Cadiz to Junta de Tarragona, 17 Jan. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Libro de Juntas, 67-2, ff. 152r–153r.

54. Consulado de Cadiz (López Martínez, Simón de Ágreda, Miguel de Carlos) to Junta Suprema de Gobierno . . . de Hacienda de Sevilla, 20 June 1808. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 55, f. 30 I r.

55. Coxe to Father Gil, 14 July 1808. PRO, CO.

56. Consulado de Cadiz to Junta de Tarragona, 17 Jan. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Libra de Juntas, 67-2, ff. 152r–1153r.

57. *Cadiz: Financial Support to Junta Suprema [de Sevilla?] May–August, 1808*

	Amount (in *reales de vellón*)	
Date	Gift	Interest-Free
May	8,893,111	
August	2,000,000	8,000,000
Total	10,893,111	8,000,000

Source: *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 71.

58. Pedro Antonio de Aguirre and Miguel Lobo; Cadiz, "Proyecto de un empréstito en Ynglaterra por cuenta de España," Nov. 1808. AGSim, Estado, 8172.

59. *Cadiz: Financial Support to Junta Central, 1808–1809*

Subscription Date	Repaid Interest Free (in *reales de vellón*)
October 1808	4,000,000
February 1809	3,688,000
May 1809	20,000,000
November 1809	20,000,000
Total	47,688,000

Source: *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 7.

60. *Cadiz: Subscribers to 1 Million Loan*

Subscribers	Amount (in *pesos fuertes*)
—	4,150
31	16,200
78	83,000
60	122,500
41	123,000
34	136,000
37	244,000
13	147,000
7	109,000

Source: "Lista de los Individuos . . . Cadiz." SHM, Colección del Fraile, v. 760. ff. 134r–14Iv.

61. AGI, Consulados, Libra de Juntas, 66, ff. 63r–64v; AG1, Consulados, Correspondencia, 97, f. 34r.

62. Consulado de Cadiz to Hormazas, 2 Jan. 1810. AGI, Consulados, Libro de Juntas, 66-2, 1'69.

63. The Cadiz group estimated that government income from the American colonies, 1805–1811, was 1,500 million reales (100.3 million *pesos fuertes*).

64. Consejo de Hacienda, Dec. 1810. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

65. AGI, Consulados, 5 Feb. 1810, Libro de Juntas, 67-2.

66. *Representación* (May, 1810), 262.

67. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, III, 218.

68. *Diario de la Regencia*, 12 May 1810. With expenditures estimated at 50 million *pesos fuertes*, and receipts of only 25 million, the shortfall was dismaying.

69. Ibid., 18 June 1810; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, III, 473.

70. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 7 Apr. 1810. Wellington, *Supplementary Dispatches*, VI, 510, 514; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, III,474. On 26 January 1810 the Regencia was advised to consider seriously offering London—in return for a large loan—direct trade with Spain's American colonies. AGI, Documentos de la secretaria de Hacienda de España, 26 Jan. 1810. Six months later (19 June), however, London was still insisting on "libertad del comercio" as part of a loan agreement. AGI, Estado, 6173.

71. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 7 Apr. 1810. Wellington, *Supplementary Dispatches*, VI, 509.

72. Apropos English insistence on "a direct trade with South Amertica [*sic*]," Spain's foreign minister reiterated to Wellesley (August, 1810) that "no Spanish government could venture to make such a concession." Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 23 Aug. 1810. Ibid., VI, 579.

73. Consulado de Cadiz to Junta Central, 17 Jan. 1810. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 57.

74. *Diario de la Regencia*, 31 Mar. 1810.

75. *Cadiz: Merchants' Wealth by Category, 1810*

Number	Average Income (in *pesos fuertes*)
12–15 ("ricos")	50,000
35–40 ("caudal modesto")	20,000
100–120 ("capital corto")	8,000

Source: AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 55, 30 Nov. 1810.

Note: The average per category may have been deliberately understated.

76. Ibid.

77. Consulado de Cadiz to Regencia, 3 Nov. 1810. Ibid., f. 181v.

78. *Diario de la Regencia*, 23 June 1810. Tomás Murphy reported from Veracruz in 1810 that Cadiz merchants were slow to "transmit their orders to their agents in the Kingdom [New Spain] to purchase bills of exchange on London." This was further indication that Cadiz viewed Mexico City as a temporary safe haven for their funds overseas. Murphy to English Exchequer, Veracruz, 16 June 1810. PRO, T 1/3622, N. 12218.

79. Consulado de Cadiz to Regencia, 30 Nov. 1810. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 55, f. 189r.

80. *Diario de la Regencia*, 2 May and 10 June 1810. The Junta de Cadiz, Toreno noted, made a practice of repaying "en general las anticipaciones del comercio de Cadiz, o de particulares, con los caudales que venian de América y otras entradas." *Levantamiento*, III, 205.

81. Munoz, "Testimony," AGN, AHH, 216-20.

82. Henry Wellesley to Viscount Wellington, 16 Apr. 1810. Wellington, *Supplementary Dispatches*, VI, 512.

83. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, III, 220.

84. *Cadiz: Exports to America and Veracruz, 1802–1810*
(in *pesos sencillos*)

	To America	To Veracruz	(%)
1802–1810	175,690,000	75,080,000	(42.7)
1808–1810	83,895,000	41,110,000	(49.0)

Source: *Demostración de los distinguidos servicios*, 13.

85. *Veracruz: Exports to Spain [Cadiz]*
(in *pesos fuertes*)

	To Spain	Precious Metals	(%)
1802–1810	105,381,122	77,495,976	(73.5)
(1808–1810)	40,538,470	30,147,023	(74.3)
1808	5,917,231	4,420,468	(74.7)
1809	21,825,226	16,388,812	(75.1)
1810	12,796,013	9,337,743	(72.9)

Source: ARPal, Papeles reservados de Fernando VII, caja 298.

86. *Veracruz: Specie Exports to Spain [Cadiz], 1808–1810*
(in *pesos fuertes*)

1808	6,033,201
1809	3,449,579
1810	8,179,194

Source: ARPal Papeles reservados de Fernando VII, VII, caja 298.

87. Francisco Noriega AC, Expedientes, 22, n. 18.

88. Consulado de Cadiz to Junta Central, 11 Oct. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, Libro 56.

89. *Junta de Cadiz: Government Receipts Administered, February–October 1810*
(in million *reales de vellón*)

Rentas del Distrito	84
Donativas, Imposiciones extra-Ordinarias de la ciudad	17
Préstamos (includes £249,000 from London)	54
Colonial funds (includes funds from occupied Spain)	195
Total receipts	350

Source: Junta de Cadiz, "Manifiesto," in Toreno, *Levantamiento*, III, 476–477.

90. J. A. Luyando, "Memoria," 29 Jan. 1815. AGI, Estado, 87.

91. *New Spain: Public and Private Remissions to Spain, 1782–1809*
(in *pesos fuertes*)

	Interest Free	At Interest	Total
Consulado loans (1782, 1783, 1794)	2,400,000		2,400,000
Tribunal de Minería	618,678		618,678
Consulado and Minería		6,831,452	6,831,452
Consolidación	10,496,397		10,496,397
Subsidios	24,324,841		24,324,841
Total			44,671,368

Source: Antonio de Medina, "Estada general . . . la deuda del Real Erario de Nueva España a corporaciones particulares, Mexico, 10 Oct. 1816." BRAHM, M. Linares, t. 68; Antonio de Medina, "Estado aproximado de la deuda nacional . . . fin de Junia de 1813. Mexico, 12 Sept. 1813." AGI, Mexico, 1145.

92. Consulado de Mexico to Hormazas, 24 May 1809. AGI, Mexico, 2834.

93. *Diario de la Regencia*, 2 May 1810. Over the next month, the Junta de Cadiz distributed 4.2 million *pesos fuertes*—perhaps to *vales* holders in interest and principal. Ibid., 10 June 1810.

94. RO e "Instrucciones . . . préstamo patriótico." 10 Jan. 1810. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, J, 43–48, n. 14.

95. Pedro de Aparici, 28 July 1805. AGN, Consul ado, t. 62.

96. *Diario de la Regencia*, 14 July 1810.

97. *Gazeta del Gobierno de Mexico*, 19 June and 7 Dec. 1810.

98. "Estado general . . . cantidades enteradas por el Consulado de Nueva España por préstamo patriótico . . . 24 de Septiembre de 1810 hasta 31 de Diciembre de 1812." Mexico, 31 Mar. 1813. AGI, Mexico, 1145.

99. Wellesley to Henry Wellesley, London, 13 Mar. 1810. PRO, T 1/3622; *Gazeta de Mexico,* 19 June 1810. Palyart and John [Juan] Murphy shuttled between Madrid, Lisbon, London, and Paris (Nov. 1805–June 1806) checking the arrival of silver shipments from New Spain to England and the continent. Fugier, *Napoléon*, II, 183. Tomás Murphy at Veracruz forwarded silver to Jamaica for transshipment to London aboard Royal Navy vessels. Murphy, Veracruz, 10 Oct. 1810. PRO, T 1/3622, n. 13,920. Murphy, it will be recalled, was one of the guarantors (*fiadores*) of a recently established silver transport company at Mexico City.

100. Tomás Murphy to Palyart, Mexico, 25 May 1810. The Regencia's confirmation was delivered to Veracruz by the master of an English warship, Captain Fyffe. Fyffe, Veracruz, 27 June 1810. PRO, T 1/3622, n. 4660.

101. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, Cadiz, 31 March 1810. Ibid., n. 4660.

102. Tomás Murphy to Palyart, Mexico, 4 June 1810. PRO, T 1/3622; Vice-Admiral Rowley to Admiralty, Port Royal. Jamaica. Ibid., n. 12,269.

103. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, Cadiz, 31 Mar. 1810. Ibid., n. 4660; Murphy to Treasury, Veracruz, 1 Oct. 1810. Ibid., n. 13920. Palyart to Harrison, London, 28 Sept. 1810. Ibid.

104. Tomás and Mateo Lorenzo Murphy, Veracruz, 25 Oct. 1810. Ibid., n. 567.

105. Tomás Murphy, Veracruz, 20 Dec. 1810. Ibid., n. 567. Part of the resistance of New Spain's *almaceneros* and mine owners to purchase bills of exchange on London was the strange element of innovation and novelty. As Tomás Murphy analyzed the problem, merchants bought "bills at the Exchanges I advise them at and attested by a notary public. This is the only document of the kind that can be procured here; because as the negotiation of foreign bills was a thing totally unknown in this part of the world till now, there never was such a thing here as established rates of exchange with foreign parts." Murphy earned on his bills 1 percent commission. Tomás Murphy, Veracruz, 27 Oct. 1810. Ibid. n. 12217.

106. Murphy shipped to England aboard four English warships 947,727 "dollars." Tomás Murphy to Treasury, PRO, T 1/3622; Virrey de Nueva España, Mexico, 31 July 1810. AGI, Mexico. 2519.

17. Dissolution of the Junta Central

1. Junta de Sevilla to Junta Central, 1 July 1809. AHN, Estado, 82-A, doc. 32.

2. Suárez, *Proceso*, 281–186. Valencia also suggested that a permanent *diputación* of the Cortes advise the king.

3. Ibid., 335; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:138; Marqués de la Romana, *Representación*, 13.

4. "Representación de la Junta de Valencia a la Junta Central, 15 Sept. 1809," quoted in Artola, *Orígenes*, 1:225.

5. In instructing its *diputados* to the Central, Valencia specifically reserved its right to determine the nature of, and to collect, taxes and to finance its armed services—in short, its autonomy. It assigned to the Central responsibility for foreign and colonial policy and the preparation of a new constitution, along with reforming civil, criminal, and tax codes and the *consejos* and courts to exercise those functions. These reservations, it felt, did not conflict with the powers of the Junta Central and the rights reserved to the provinces. "Instruccciones que la Junta de Valencia dió a sus Diputados en la Central." *El Español*, 1 Apr. 1810. The Junta Central would not permit Valencia to reform its own tax code. For Quintana's reservations about Valencia's position, see Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:249–254, and Alcalá Galiano. *Memorias*.

6. "Representación de D. Francisco de Palafox en la cual propone la disolución de la Junta Suprema Cenetral y el nombramaiento de un Regente de la Corona." Sevilla, 29 Aug. 1809, in Longás Bartibás, *Representación aragonesa*, 92–98.

7. Fernández Martín, *Derecho parlamenario español*, 1:403ff.; Suárez, *Proceso*, 324–332.

8. "Manifeste de Quintana sous forme de circulaire sur Juntes des provinces pour les mettre en garde contre la fole tentative de Valence et leur rappeler l'impérieuse des Cortes, 23 Oct. 1809," Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2: 249–254.

9. "Representación de D. Lorenzo Calbo de Rozas en la Junta Central, Sevilla, 2 Sept. 1809," in Longás Bartibás, *Representación aragonesa*, 100–105.

10. "Representaciones de D. Lorenzo Calbo de Rozas en la Junta Central Suprema, Sevilla, 8, 12 y 14 de septiembre de 1809," in Longás Bartibás, *Representación aragonesa*, 100–113; Fernández Martín, *Derecho parlamentario español*, 1:505–512.

11. *BAE*, 46:551–552, notably paras. 95–96.

12. Ibid., 46:553.

13. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:255–258.

14. Following his military intervention against the Junta de Asturias, Romana was relieved of military command but soon surfaced as *diputado* to the Junta Central from Valencia; there his brother, José Caro, replaced the conde de la Conquista de las Islas Batanes as president of that Junta.

15. "Representación del Ex. Sr. Marqués de la Romana a la Suprema Junta Central, Sevilla, 14 de octubre de 1809." SHM, V. 787:212–217; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:142. A week later Francisco de Palafox echoed Romana's attack. "Representación de . . . Palafox en la Junta Central Suprema: solicita de nuevo conforme al plan proyectado por . . . Romana, la imediata disolución de la Junta y el nombramaiento de una Regencia de la Corona, Sevilla, 20 de octubre de 1809." Longás Bartibás, *Representación aragonesa*, 119–124.

16. "Manifesto de Quintana a la nación española, 28 de octubre de 1809," in

Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:261–267; Fernández Martín, *Derecho parlamentario español*, 1:514ff.

17. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:143.

18. Jovellanos, *BAE*, 46:558–559.

19. García Malo, "Mémoire sur les circonstaances critiques dans lesquelles se trouvent la Parie et le Gouvernement, et mesures de précaution qu'elles dictent elles-mêmes, Seville, 4 de décembre, 1809." Dérozier, *Quintana*, 2:124–135.

20. Ibid., 2:130–131.

21. Ibid., 2:122.

22. Ibid.

23. Ignacio García Malo, *Memoria sobre las críticas circustancias en que se halla la Patrie y el Gobierno y medidas de precaución que ellas mismas dicitan*. Sevilla, 4 Dec. 1809, in Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1:447–452; 2:124–126.

24. Francisco de Saavedra, "Diario de la Suprema Junta de Sevilla, 28 de enero . . . de 1810," in Quesada Montero, *La situación*, 94–95. The Junta de Sevilla itself later fled to Niebla on the road to Portugal.

25. Calvo de Rozas, *Reglamento que dió al Consejo interino de regencia la Suprema Junta Central, motivos que ocasionaron su nombramiento, y la abdicación de la misma Junta* (Cadiz/Valencia, 1811). AHN, Estado, 84-A; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:200–202.

26. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:203–213. This new Cadiz Junta had eighteen members elected under the Ayuntamiento's auspices, divided into three sections (war, political affairs, and finance), presided over by Andrés López, a member of the Consulado de Cadiz. Castro, *Cadiz y su provincia*, 705–712.

27. *Diario de la Regencia*, 30 Jan. 1810.

28. "Último Decreto de la Junta Central sobre la elebración de las Cortes, 29 de enero de 1810; Último Edicto de la Suprema Junta Central, 29 de enero de 1810; Despedida de la Suprema Junta Central, 31 de enero de 1810," *BAE*, 46:605–608; Castro, *Historia de Cadiz y su provincia*, 688, n. 1.

18. Regencia and Junta de Cadiz

1. Calbo de Rozas, *Reglamento*, 6, n. 1.

2. López Aydillo, *El obispo de Orense*, 64. Other contemporary observers shared this view of the Regencia's "apparent" sovereignty. See Albuerne, *Origen*.

3. "Siempre ha mirado la Regencia a la Junta de Cádiz con cierta predilección, disculpable y aún precisa ya porque de su mano pende en el día la subsistencia de toda nuestra máquina civil y militar, ya porque en medio de los defectos que se la quieran imputar, siempre ha trabajado y trabaja con un celo infatigable aunque a veces amargo por el bien público." "Diario de operaciones de la Regencia," in Quadrado y de Roó, *Elogio*, 320.

4. *Semanario patriótico americano*, Jan. 1813.

5. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:212.

6. To quote Toreno: "Estaba bien persuadido de que no podía desempeñar el delicado cargo de regente con la energía e inflexibilidad necesaria; el estado de su salud y su carácter me lo persuadían; más se hallaba al frente del gobierno que produxo el motín de Sevilla, gozaba de reputación en Cádiz y generalmente en la

Andalucía; era conveniente cortar en su orígen la anarquía." Calbo de Rozas, *Reglamento*, 9.

7. Miguel de Lardizábal, Cadiz, to Pedro de Rivero, Isla de León, 30 Jan. 1810. AGI, Consejos, 22190.

8. Estéban Fernández de León, Rota, to Pedro de Rivero, Isla de León, 29 Feb. 1810. AHN, Estado, 84-A, n. 3; *Índice de la Regencia* (1904), 1024.

9. "Informe de los fiscales del Consejo Reunido (Sierra, Caro Manuel)," 2 Feb. 1810; Benito de Hermida al Consejo de Regencia, 3 Feb. 1810. AHN, Consejos, 11,999, n. 33.

10. Marqués de Hormazas to Consejo Reunido, 4 Feb. 1810. AHN, Consejos, 11,999.

11. *Junta de Cadiz a las Américas* (Cadiz, 1810), 28 Feb. 1810.

12. Argüelles, *La reforma constitucional*, 91. Toreno, too, in a bitter personal attack on Lardizábal referred to his baleful influence on the Regencia's *presidente*, General Castaños, "que tenía que mancomunarse con él, cediendo a menudo a la superioridad de su compañero." Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:212. See also Flores Estrada, *Exámen imparcial*, 107–108.

13. García Carraffa, *Enciclopedia*, 1:49, covers the "Casa de Idiazábal" and its branches.

14. Uribe, son of an *oidor* of the Audiencia de Sevilla and graduate of Salamanca (Colegio Mayor del Obispo), created a social and economic network during long tenure in the colony of New Spain, 1702–1738. Burkholder and Chandler, *From Impotence to Authority*, 62.

15. "Padrón de Mexico de 1753," *Boletin del Archivo General de México*, 2d ser., no. 8 (July–Dec. 1967).

16. His *Discurso sobre las penas contraidas a las leyes criminales de España para facilitar su reforma* (1782) stressed the role of climate and race on criminal behavior and the imposition of more severe punishment on "una nación bárbara, feroz e ignorante" than on "una nación culta, ilustrada y de costumbres moderadas." In combining Aristotle and Montesquieu, the colonialist Manuel reserved the principle of natural rights to the metropole, justifying a different criminal code for the colonies. Blasco y Fernández de Moreda, *Lardizábal: el primer penalista de América Española*. See also Manuel de Rivacoba y Rivacoba, *Lardizábal, un penalista ilustrado*, *Instituto de investigaciones históricas de la Universidad del Rosario*, no. 7 (1964).

17. In correspondence with Godoy, Miguel denied an implicit charge of sedition and requested a formal hearing. Godoy replied that Lardizábal resigned because "no qulzo subordinarse al actual oficial mayor, don Juan José de Peñuelas," failed to obtain "un ministerio que solicitaba," and, perhaps most unsettling, tried to "destruir la autoridada real." This suggests Miguel was bad-mouthing Aranda's replacement Lardizábal to Godoy, 1 Mar., 23 Mar., 9 Apr., 16 Apr. 1794, and Godoy to Lardizábal, 27 Mar. 1795. ARPal, Papeles Reservados, 102: ff. 26r–40r.

18. Olmet, *Cuerpo diplomático*, 2:833.

19. Conde de la Cañada to Godoy, Talavera de la Reyna, 28 Feb. 1795. ARPal, Papeles Reservados, 102: ff. 5r–14r.

20. García Vénero, *Historia del nacionalismo vasco*, 37–38.

21. Shafer, *Economic Societies*, 41; Desdevizes du Dézert, *Société*, 25.

22. Lardizábal, *Manifiesto*, 11.

23. The intelligence-gathering and military and political roles of these figures are treated in Berruezo, "Gupúzcoa en la Guerra de la Independencia," in *Estudios de la guerra de la independencia*, 693–712.

24. Miguel de Lardizábal's name does not appear in *Títulos de Indias*.

25. José Pablo de Valiente to Miguel de Lardizábal, Madrid, 22 Nov. 1808. AHN, Consejos, 3129. Causa de Miguel de Lardizábal, 1811. Probably the Consejo was averse to a member appointed in so irregular a fashion, lacking appropriate credentials.

26. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, 1:126.

27. RO, 29 Jan. 1809. *Gazeta de México*, 15 Apr. 1809.

28. Arangoiz, *Mexico desde 1808*.

29. Rafael de Lardizábal, Mexico, to Miguel de Lardizábal, Sevilla, 15 Feb. 1809. Archivo de la Diputación de Vizcaya, Colección Villarias, n. 30. The network may be glimpsed: Rafael's letter was transmitted by "nuestro pariente, el coronel José González," who had been a local reference for Lardizábal when he applied for entry into the Orden de Carlos III in 1793. At that time González was the *colector de diezmos* at Huexocingo and Tezmelucan, in New Spain. AHN, Estado, Orden de Carlos III, exped. n. 739.

30. He may have been Tehuantepec's *alcalde mayor* in 1768.

31. AGI, Contratación, 1789, Licencias de provistos, 5533, n. 8 (27 May 1789). Among "dependientes y familiares" brought out by Viceroy Revillagigedo in 1789, Rafael de Lardizábal is listed as "sugeto distinguido que lleva en su compañia." Rafael had married into the prominent Avalés family, Urbina y Gaitán. For his contacts with *golpista* Monteagudo, see Mier, *Historia*, 1:231–232.

32. Rafael de Lardizábal, Mexico, to Miguel de Lardizábal, 9 Aug. and 16 Sept. 1809. Bilbao, ADV, Colección Villarias, Cartas a Miguel de Lardizábal de su sobmino Rafael de Lardizábal.

33. On the ramifications of the Garro y Arizcún network in the valley of the Baztán, at Madrid and in America, see Caro Baroja, *La hora navarra del siglo XVIII*, 257–288.

34. On 16 January 1810 the Consulado de Cadiz wrote the Consulado de Veracruz that Hormazas had informed it that although he was unable to withdraw the special permits (*privilegios*) given to the Compañía de Filipinas to import 500,000 pesos of goods under cover of the English flag, Hormazas had assured it verbally that "mientras él fuese ministro no se concedería otra alguna." Consulado de Cadiz (Ágreda, Salazar) to Consulado de Veracruz, 16 de enero de 1810. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 5. 65, ff. 117r–118r. On D. F. Lobo, see Albuerne, *Origen*, 98.

35. Quintana, however, did remain in the ministry as translator and also embellished the Regencia's proclamations to the colonies as well as those of the Junta de Cadiz. Quintana, *Memoria*, 11; *Diario de la Regencia*, 7 Feb. 1810.

36. *Diario de la Regencia*, 7 Feb. 1810.

37. "El Consejo de Regencia de España e Indias a los Americanos españoles, 14 de febrero de 1810." *Quintana*, 2:295–299.

38. Ibid., 2:299–300.

39. *Diario de la Regencia*, 13–14 Feb. 1810.

40. AGN, Mexico, Reales Cédulas, 202–66–3, 13 Feb. 1810.

41. Suárez, *Proceso*, 454–456.

42. Ibid., 457–458.

43. This intimates that the Junta de Cadiz had been instrumental in the removal of Fernández de León from the Regencia.

44. Did the Regencia, by installing Lardizábal, signal to Cadiz's interests that the coup d'état against Iturrigaray would not be carefully scrutinized?

45. "La Junta Superior de Cadiz a la America Española," Cadiz, 28 Feb. 1810. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:22–27.

46. "Sobre la conducta de la Junta de Cadiz de dirigir por sí proclamas y acuerdos a las Americas," 3 September, 26 October 1810. AHN, Consejos Reunidos, 11,999.

47. "Cerrado absolutamente el puerto de Cadiz por su orden, por espacio de dos meses . . . la Junta de Cadiz detuvo los [buques] de su bahía hasta que llevasen sus proclamas, intentando por todos los medios que la autoridad soberana fuese dependiente de la suya, después que la había reconocida a su pesar." Albuerne, "Informe," 1811. BNMad, MSS, 20,2173, f. 19r. However, several ship arrivals were recorded in the *Gazeta de Gobierno de México*, in February and March, but without official correspondence on political developments.

48. "Contamos ya cien días sin haber recibido ni un solo periódico de la Peninsula. Hemos visto llegar dos buques que han conducido grandes noticias; pero ellas no nos presentan más que resultados dexandonos en la mayor obscuridad acerca de los hechos intermediarios . . . En la confusión que debe producirnos tanta escasez de noticias, no tenemos otro recurso para formar un cálculo sobre el estado general de nuestra gran lucha." *Gazeta de Gobierno de México*, 4 May 1810.

49. Francisco Escudero de Isasi, "Cadiz, to Consulado de México," 1 Mar. 1810. AGN, AHH, 633, exp. 3.

50. Mier dates his arrival at the end of April. Mier, *Historia*, 1:227.

51. It remains unclear whether he was instructed to contact Aguirre on arriving, or whether the *criollo* faction simply exaggerated the Aguirre association for its own purposes.

52. In a later report on both *comisarios regios*, Viceroy General Venegas commented there was no evidence in the colony that they were in fact *comisarios*. Nor, he wrote, had Yandiola delivered the decree of 15 February to the Audiencia as instructed. AGI, Mexico, 1535.

53. On the Yandiola-Castaños-Llano family ramifications in Spain and New Spain, the following sources have been used: Real Chancillería, Valladolid, Vizcainías; Lafarga Lozano, *Indice*; García Carraffa, "Archivo Histórico Provincial de Vizcaya. Genealogías e Hidalguías," *Guía de fuentes para la historia de Ibero-America*, fascículo IV, 1:421–439; Catastro de Veracruz, 1801. AGI, Licencias de pasajeros a Indias, 1780–1810.

54. The importance of Alburquerque, a military officer, at this moment of crisis foreshadows the subsequent role of army officers in Spain's politics, for example, Castaños (on the Regencia) and Venegas (*gobernador* at Cadiz).

55. Colón was viewed as an associate of Manuel de Lardizábal in presenting the position of the Consejo de Castilla at Bayonne; both formally recommended that Joseph Bonaparte become monarch of Spain. Then and later, Colón de Larreátegui was a spokesman for Spain's privileged elites.

56. Jovellanos, "Defensa," *BAE*, 46:522.

57. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:207–209; *Diario de la Regencia*, 226–227. Tilly died a prisoner; the Cortes eventually exonerated Calvo.

58. Jovellanos intimated that Nocedal came from the Encartaciones. *BAE*, 46:616 and 86:487.

59. "La Junta Superior de Cadiz al Consejo de Regencia, 14 de febrero de 1810." AHN, Consejos Reunidos, 11,999.

60. Jovellanos, "Defensa," *BAE*, 46:576–577.

61. Ibid., 46:568 and 86:487.

62. Somoza, *Las amarguras*, 185–186; Olmet, *Cuerpo diplomatico*.

63. Alcalá Galiano, *Memorias*, 1:262–264.

64. Ibid.

65. Alburquerque's secretary, Manuel Abella, related the circumstances of Alburquerque's death in a dispatch of mid-February 1811. On receiving the response of the Junta de Cadiz to his manifesto of early February, Alburquerque shut himself in a room along with his secretary in order to refute Cadiz's attack; he could not ignore it, he felt, "sin ser tenido por impostor o enemigo del bien de la patria." Refusing to take other than coffee and soup, he finally suffered a violent delirium and died on 15 February. Abella to Bardaxi, London, 19 Feb. 1811. AHN, Estado, 5462, doc. 1. Curiously, orders for the return of both Alburquerque and Abella had been sent on 6 December, and in early January Alburquerque had written Bardaxí of his satisfaction with the recall and his steps to take leave of the Marquis of Wellesley. A dispatch of 28 January included Wellesley's note that no acknowledgment was necessary since he too was returning to Spain. AHN, Estado, 5462.

66. *Diario de la Regencia*, 227.

67. Ibid., 264–265.

68. Ibid, 265–266.

19. The Pivotal *Orden* of 17 May 1810

1. For example: Captain General, Caracas, 7 Sept. 1808. Acortes. Documentos de la Secretaria de Hacienda de España. Leg. 1, no. 62, carpeta 2; Comandante General, Panama, 23 Oct. 1808. Rafael Morant, 30 June 1814. AHN, Estado, 86; Canning to Marquess Wellesley, 17 Aug. 1809, in Humphreys, *Tradition and Revolt*, 107–108.

2. Comandante General, Panama, 28 Oct. 1808. Rafael Morant, 30 June 1814. AHN, Estado, 86; Canning to Marquess Wellesley, 17 Aug. 1809, cited in Humphreys, *Tradition and Revolt*, 107–108; Dale Tomich, "The Wealth of Empire," 7–11.

3. José Joaquin de Aguirre to Junta Central, 11 Oct. 1808. AHN, Estado, 50-A (3); "Proyecto de un empréstito en Ynglaterra por cuenta de España." AGSim, Estado, 8172, ff. 56r–68v. On learning of the arrival in August 1808 at London of Juan Ruiz de Apodaca as agent of the Junta de Sevilla, English commercial groups anticipated a direct trade to Mexico and Peru, that is, to Veracruz and Lima. Crouset, *L'Économie britannique*, I, 361, n. 12.

4. Junta Central a la Nación Española (signed on 26 Oct. 1808, published 10 Nov. 1808); Marqués de Someruelos, letter, 12 May 1809, in Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 16.

5. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, I, 123. Some felt it inopportune to discuss a com-

mercial treaty then "con el cuidado y reflexión que merece." AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 56 (14 June 1809).

6. Dérozier, *Quintana*, I; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, II, apps. 32–34.

7. José Fernando de Castro, letter to Consulado de Veracruz, Havana, 26 Feb. 1809. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2462; Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 14–15.

8. Consulado de Cadiz to Junta Central; M. Lucena Salmoral, "Los prestámos del Consulado de Cadiz a la Junta Central Suprema," in Congreso de la historia de Andalucía *Actas*, I, 147–158.

9. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 2; Quiróz, "Memoria de instituto, 1812"; *El Telégrapho americano* (Cadiz), 6 Feb. 1812.

10. Rafael Morant, 30 June 1814. AGN, Estado, 86; Francisco Saavedra to London *apoderado*, 6 April 1809. AGSim, 8172.

11. Frere to Canning, 15 Apr. 1809. PRO, FO/72, f355r.

12. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con América, 66-2, f. 41v.

13. Consulado de Veracruz to Hacienda, 16 Jan. 1810; AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con America, 65, ff. 117r–118r; Consulado de Cadiz, 5 Jan. 1810. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con America, 67–2, ff. 171r–172r; AGSim, Estado, 8172, n. 208.

14. Albuerne insisted that the Junta Central realized the "impotente estado de nuestras fabricas . . . el atraso y ruina de la marina real y mercantil" and, above all, the "monstruoso contrabando" filtering into the American colonies from ports of the United States, Brazil, and England. Albuerne, *Origen*, 9.

15. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2462; Consulado de la Habana, 31 Oct. 1810. AGI, Mexico, 2514; Albuerne, *Origen*, 9.

16. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con America, 65, ff. 98r–99r.

17. Consulado de Cadiz to Junta Central, 29 Aug. 1809. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con América, 56.

18. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 24.

19. Albuerne, "Informe," Isla de León, 17 Jan. 1811. BNMad, MSS, 20,7173, f. 2r.

20. Fernández de León claimed later that the Junta Central on 25 October assigned the Havana representation to the Consejo de Indias, and Caracas's problem to Fernández de León. This explains why the *fiscal* of the Consejo, Antonio Cano Manuel, on 13 March reviewed only Havana's case. Fernández de León, "Equivocaciones del . . . Fiscal Manuel de Castillo." Cadiz, 16 May 1812. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

21. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2463.

22. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 14–17.

23. Ibid. 17–18; Fernández de León, Jan. 1811, BNMad. MSS, 20,2173, "Equlivocaciones del . . . Fiscal," 16 May 1812. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

24. Albuerne, "Informe," Isla de León, Jan. 1811, MSS. 20,2173, ff. 34r–34v.

25. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 18–20, 23.

26. Ibid., "Apéndice," 23.

27. RO, 10 Jan. 1810 (Sevilla), in *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, 8 June 1810.

28. Consulado de Cadiz, 13 Jan 1810. AGI, Consulados, Libro de Juntas, 67–2, ff. 173v–174r.

29. For material on León's life and times, see García, *La intendencia en Venezuela*. On a key episode in his life: Lucena Salmoral, "La orden apócrifa de 1810 sobre la

'Libertad de Comercio' en América," *Boletín americanista*, no. 29 (1978), 8–10. See also Brito Figueroa, *Historia económica y social de Venezuela*, I, and Briceño-Yragorry, *Casa León y su tiempo (aventura de un anti-heroe)*.

30. AHN, Estado, Ordenes Civiles, Expediente 695; ibid., Estado, 60-E, n. 79; AGN, Caracas, Gobierno y Capitanía General, 1806, CLXXII, f. 231r; ibid., 1810, CCXVII, f. 200r; ibid., 1812, CCXXI, f. 47r; ibid., Comercio, Reales Ordenes, t. VIII, f. 321r. These materials were graciously supplied by Professor Arcila Faría. See also Estéban Fernández de León, "Defensa de don Antonio Fernández de León por su hermano," *Boletín nacional de la história* (Caracas), (Jan.–Mar. 1964).

31. As his recommendation read: "Pidiendo . . . se le conceda a los comerciantes de Caracas libertad para hacer expediciones a España." Letter, Caracas, 20 Apr. 1793. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2318.

32. Fernández de León, 25 June 1810. AGI, Ind. Gen, 2463.

33. Consulado de Cadiz to Godoy, 27 June 1797. AGI, Cosulados, Correspondencia, 61, ff. 51r–52r; AHN, Consejos, 20,729, p. 86. Cf. "Qual sería la suerte . . . se continuan los Intendentes de América con la facultad de abrir los puertos de su jurisdicción a los Extrangeros?" Consulado de Cadiz, "Representación," 3 Dec. 1797. BRAHM, Colección Mata Linares, XII.

34. AGI, Caracas, 50; Robinson, *Memoires of the Mexican Revolution*, 382–383.

35. "Representación de los diputados del comercio nacional contra el comercio con las colonias amigas y neutrales, Octubre de 1797." AGN, Caracas, Colección Capitanía General, Diversos, t. LXXII, 239r–256r. For this material I am indebted to Professor Arcila Farías.

36. This and following paragraphs are based on Conde de San Xavier, Manuel Felipe de Tovar, Martín Xérez, Martín de Herrera, disputados de la Junta General de Agricultores, "Representación de los diputados . . . 7 de Noviembre de 1797." AGN, Caracas, Colección Capitanía General, Diversos, t. XXII, ff. 257r–305v.

37. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2467.

38. Echeverría to Consulado de Cadiz, Caracas, 30 Sept. 1799. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia con America, 97.

39. AGI, Mexico, 2988.

40. Olmet, *Cuerpo diplomático*, II, 189–191; García, *La intendencia en Venezuela*, 73–74.

41. He had arrived at Sevilla in March 1809, and in August the Junta Central appointed him *contador general de las Américas* and a minister of the recently formed Consejo de España e Indias. García, *La intendencia en Venezuela*, 76.

42. Consejo Pleno, 6 Apr. 1810. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2463; García, *La intendencia en Venezuela*, 76.

43. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 3. A summary is in Albuerne, "Informe," Isla de León, Jan. 1811. BNMad, MSS, 20,2173, ff. 4v and following folios.

44. This was Albuerne's belief: "En el reglamento de 1778 están comprendidos los puntos más principales, y la base en que se funda la orden de 17 de mayo." "Informe," ff. 32v–33r, 36r.

45. Saavedra received notice of his appointment at Rota; a boat was dispatched from Cadiz to bring him across the bay. AHN, Estado, 84-A, n. 3.

46. AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 51, f. 4r. Saavedra had witnessed León's swearing-in; but he did not appear when Lardizábal took his oath. See also García, *La intendencia en Venezuela*, 76–77.

47. Albuerne, "Informe, Isla de León, Enero 1811," BNMad, MSS, 20,2173, f. 3r.

48. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 17.

49. Ibid., "Apéndice," 26–27.

50. Ibid., "Apéndice," 29–31.

51. "Apuntes conducentes a formar juicio del procedimiento criminal sobre la extención de la orden de 17 de mayo de 1810 relativa al comercio de América." Cadiz, 16 Dec. 1811. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464; Consulado de Cadiz to Suprema Junta de Cadiz, 26 Apr. 1810. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 97, ff. 67r–68r.

52. Carbajal arrived with 4.5 million pesos from New Spain's treasury. He conferred with the regents about New Spain's social and political conditions, taxation, French influence there, and the commitment of the overseas Spaniards to the "visión y dependencia de España." To Cadiz he brought "frescas las ideas de aquella capital [Mexico City]." *Diario de la Regencia*, 2, 4, 5, 11 May 1810. Later, according to Mier, Carbajal furnished a list of Spaniards resident in New Spain who merited recognition for their vigorous support of the metropole. *Historia*, I, 229.

53. "Apuntes conducentes a formar juicio," Cadiz, 16 Dec. 1811. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464; Fernández de León, "Equivocaciones del Sr. Fiscal D. Manuel de Castillo," Cadiz, 16 May 1812. Ibid., 2464; Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 54–55; Fernández de León to Hormazas, 10 May 1810. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2463.

54. This was a form of Hormazas's praise. Albuerne, "Informe." BNMad, MSS, 20,7173, f. 6r.

55. Fernández de León to Hormazas, 10 May 1810. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2465; Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 55–60.

56. Fernández de León, "Equivocaciones del . . . Castillo," Cadiz, 16 May 1812. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

57. For a succinct, stimulating analysis of the controversial 17 May 1810 order, see Lucena Salmoral, "La orden apócrifa," 10–19; also Arango y Parreño, *Obras*, I, 64.

58. Albuerne, "Informe." BNMad, MSS, 20,217 3, f. 5v; Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 33r. Weeks later the regents would claim their *resolución* was designed solely to satisfy Cuba's (i.e., Havana's) needs. *Diario de la Regencia*, 22 June 1810.

59. Albuerne, "Informe." BNMad, MSS, 20,2173, ff. 5v–6v; "Apuntes conducentes a formar juicio del procedimiento criminal." Cadiz, 16 Dec. 1811. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464. In 1811 Albuerne did not mention the personal note, although he did note that León had asked him about the contradictory viewpoints. León later claimed he left behind the note when fleeing from the Isla de León to Cadiz escaping French troops.

60. "Apuntes conducentes a formar juicio," Cadiz, 16 Dec. 1811. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

61. *Spanish Colonies in America: Estimated Annual Imports, circa 1810*
(in *pesos fuertes*)

Nontextile[a] (42 ps.fts./capita)	60,025,564
Textiles (6 ps.fts./cap)	83,861,336
Total estimated imports (10.2 ps.ftes/cap)	143,896,900
Current imports from Spain	(–) 20,000,000
Smuggled imports	123,896,900

Source: Albuerne, "Informe," BNMad, MSS, 20, 2173, ff. 7r–8r.
[a]Agricultural implements, household goods, jewelry, foodstuffs.

62. "Dictamen privado de Fernández de León al . . . Hormazas." AGI, Ind. Gen., 2465; Albuerne, "Informe." BNMad, MSS, 20,2173, ff. 7r–9r.

63. Albuerne, *Origen*, 13–14. León claimed his *informe* (or *minuta*) of 10 May 1810 was the basis of the Regencia's *resolución* (drafted by Hormazas) on the following day. Fernández de León, Madrid, to Francisco de Luna, 7 June 1815. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2454.

64. For Albuerne's interpretation of this point, see his "Informe," ff. 10v–11r.

65. "Apuntes," paras. 10–11, 16 Dec. 1811. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

66. Garcia Carrafa, *Encyclopedia de heraldica y genealogía*.

67. Albuerne, "Informe." Ff. 34r–34v; Albuerne, *Origen*, 80 note a.

68. Ibid.

69. "Albuerne to Junta Central, Sevilla, 27 Nov. 1809. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 73–80 and 80 n.

70. Albuerne, "Informe," ff. 33r–35r; "Apuntes," paras. 9–11. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

71. Fernández de León, "Equivocaciones del fiscal D. Manuel del Castillo," Cadiz, 16 May 1812. AGI, 2464; Albuerne, *Origen*, 57; Albuerne, "Informe," f. 15r.

72. Albuerne, *Origen*, 57.

73. Albuerne, "Informe," f. 13v.

74. Albuerne mentioned other considerations that, he later noted, "no se pueden publicarse por ahora." *Origen*, 14–16.

75. Ibid., 17, and "Apéndice," 38; "Apuntes," paras. 12–13 and n. 3. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

76. Ibid., Cadiz, 16 Dec. 1811, para. 20.

77. Ibid., para 17, n. 4.

78. Albuerne, *Origen*, 17–18; Albuerne, "Informe," f. 13v. Miguel Lobo maintained communication, 1808–1809, with Veracruz merchants Almanza and Juan Bautista Lobo. AHN, Estado, 58-E.

79. Sergio Villalobos, *Comercio y crisis*, 58, 81, 117, 207, 245; Urquijo, *Refraccíon de ideas en Hispano-américa colonial*; Real Chancillería, Valladolid, Vizcainías, Letra G-15y 16; AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 62, f. 65v (8 May 1807). AGI, Ind. Gen., 2312.

80. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 1 Aug. 1810. BM, MSS, Add., 37,292, f. 74r.

81. Ibid.

82. Mier recognized perhaps sardonically that Cadiz supporters of the 17 May order included "hombres íntegros e inteligentes aún del comercio de Cadiz"—merchants like Vea Murguia. *Semario patriótico americano*, 25 Oct. 1812.

83. *Diario de la Regencia*, 8 June 1810.

84. Ibid., 10 June 1810. The contacts between regents Saavedra and Castaños—both with years of service in the colonial administration—and Cadiz merchants Bustamante y Guerra and Istúriz, prominent in the transatlantic trades, suggest how policy makers and lobbyists could develop consensus.

85. Albuerne, *Origen*, 17; Albuerne, "Informe," ff. 13v–14r.

86. "Apuntes," para. 14. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.

87. Albuerne, "Informe," f. 14r.

88. On that day (22 June) Hormazas must have learned that the merchants

dominating the Junta de Cadiz were preparing a strong denunciation of the 17 May order that, in their phrasing, was equivalent to "la idea de destruir a Cadiz, cuyos nervios fortalecidos *únicamente por la nutrición del giro exclusivo mercantil*" (emphasis in original). Retaliation was in the air: "El crímen se ha hecho público: Cadiz clama con razón por la venganza." Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 44, 46.

89. The Consulado's ignorance seems feigned. Its members were no strangers to most regents; it monitored the ministries; and the official printing press was located on the floor beneath the Consulado's offices. Consulado de Cadiz to Eusebio de Varea y Azara, Cadiz, 7 Jan. 1812. AGI, Consulados, Correspondencia, 58.

90. Albuerne, "Informe," f. 14v; Albuerne, *Origen*, 17–18.

91. "Como económicamente los miembros de la regencia . . . dependían de la generosidad del Puerto [Cadiz], quedaron pronto a merced de los intereses gadianos." Ávila, *En nombre de la nación*, 90. Ávila, of course, understood that most of Cadiz's "wealth" and hence its "generosity" flowed from trade exchanged with, and silver pesos from, the port of Veracruz.

92. Albuerne, "Informe," ff. 14v–15v; Albuerne, *Origen*, 18, and "Apéndice," 38–39; "Apuntes," para 15. The role of the Junta de Cadiz is uncritically sketched in *Diario de la Regencia*, 22 June 1810.

93. Junta Superior de Cadiz to Regencia, 22 Jan. 1810, in Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 44; "Apuntes," para 18, n. 6; AGI, Ind. Gen., 2463.

94. *Ruina de la Nueva España*. *Ruina* is a remarkable example of early political economy, here, of a mature colony in the New World, one of eight or more publications by a *peninsular* who had lived in the interior of New Spain in frequent contact with colonial civil servants and influential *almaceneros*. In eighty-two pages *Ruina* reviews the demography and economy of New Spain, with one notable omission, external trade with the metropole.

95. "Apuntes," para. 17; Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 44–47.

96. Arango, *Examen de los derechos*, 18.

97. Albuerne, "Informe," f. 21r; Albuerne, *Origen*, 24 and "Apéndice," 39–40.

98. Ibid., "Apéndice," 47–48; Albuerne, "Informe," ff. 21v–22r.

99. *Diario de la Regencia,* 24 June 1810.

100. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 40–41; *Diario de la Regencia*,1 July 1810; "Apuntes," 21v.

101. *Diario de la Regencia*, 28 June 1810.

102. Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 48–49, 50, 54.

103. Albuerne, "Informe," ff. 16v–17r.

104. Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, Aug. 1810. BM, MSS, Add 37,292, f. 74r.

105. *El Español* (London), 30 Jan. 1811, II, 334–375.

106. Accurately described recently as "clásico repreentante de la elite de las últimas décadas de le época colonial . . . sus préstamos y donaciones a la corona." Argüello and von Mentz, eds., *Epístolas*, 42.

107. *Diario de la Regencia*, 1 July 1810; Albuerne, *Origen*, "Apéndice," 41.

108. "The fate of the Regerncy's decree of 17 May 1810, authorizing free trade for New Spain as one of its reform measures proved to be indicative of the sentiment of the elements in ultimate control of the situation." J. Hann, "The Role of the Mexican Deputies in the Proposal and Enactment of Measures of Economic Reform Applicable to Mexico," in Benson, ed., *Mexico and the Spanish Cortes*, 163.

109. *El Español*, 30 July 1810.
110. Albuerne, "Informe," ff. 17v–18r.
111. Fernández de León, "Equivocaciones," f. 11v. AGI, Ind. Gen., 2464.
112. *El Español*, n. xi, 28 Feb. 1811, in Goytisolo, *Blanco White*, 155.

20. Colonial Insurrection and the Call for the Cortes

1. *El Español*, 30 July and 30 August 1810.
2. Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, 6; Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 25 Jan. 1810. *Wellesley Papers*, 1:298.
3. Henry Wellesley to Viscount Wellesley, Cadiz, 13, 16 August 1810. *Wellesley Papers*, 6:574, 579.
4. It is intriguing to speculate on the coincidence of siblings in key posts in the English empire: the Howe brothers, William and Richard, military and naval commanders respectively in North America to 1778; and the Wellesleys three decades later. On the Howe brothers, see Sam Roberts, "Headed for Auction: Back-Channel Gloom on Revolutionary War," *New York Times*, 23 March 2010, sec. c4.
5. Wellesley, *Diary and Correspondence*.
6. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, Jan. 25, 1810. *Wellesley Papers*, 1:295–296 and 298. In the same letter Henry reminded his brother, "The representations of individuals concerned in this trade who have been treated with grave injustice and oppression by the agents of the Spanish Government, have been entirely neglected." Henry Wellesley had his ear to the ground.
7. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 12 March 1810. Ibid., 1:316–317.
8. The Compañía was chartered, in part, to reduce smuggling. Hussey, *Caracas Company*. On Venezuela's cocoa trade to New Spain, see Arcila Farías, *Comercio entre Venezuela y México en los siglos XVI y XVII*.
9. Ferrigni Varela, *Crisis*, 2:143–144. Colonel Tucker at Curaçao would prefer that Spanish commercial restraints remained in place since English smugglers enjoyed a "verdadero monopolio" of their illegal activity, by which "ellos y los holandeses habían edificado grandes fortunas." Tucker, Curaçao, 8 Oct. 1811. Parra Pérez and Mendoza, *Historia de la primera república*, 395.
10. Ferrigni Varela, *Crisis*, 113.
11. Colonel Tucker cited in Parra Pérez and Mendoza, *História de la primera república*, 237.
12. The interplay between Caracas, England, and the Regencia is a curious omission in Miguel Artola's notable *Origenes*, 1:427–445.
13. The information appeared in the *London Courier* as letters from "the islands" to London merchants. See also the *Morning Chronicle*.
14. Coro's appeal for assistance first alerted General Layard to the situation at the capital, Caracas. Only after receiving correspondence from Caracas about the insurrection did Layard report to London, via Jamaica and Captain Kelly.
15. Early in January, just before the dissolution of the Junta Central (he judged it very unpopular), Henry Wellesley advised his brother to recommend an immediate assembly at Cadiz. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, 25 Jan. 1810. *Wellesley Papers*, 1:297.
16. Alburquerque to Bardaxi, London, 4 July 1810. AHN, Estado, 5468, n. 7.

17. Apodaca to Bardaxi, London, 4 July 1810. AGSim, Estado, 8173, letter n. 141.

18. Delgado, *Dinámicas imperiales*, 21–22. Precisely when the "Liverpool" letter was received by Wellesley, Bardaxi, or the Regencia is not clear. It is clear that Apodaca included in a letter of 20 July "un extracto traducido de las instrucciones enviadas de orden de SMG al governador de Curazao." AGSim, Estado, 8173, letter n. 163. Liverpool forwarded a copy of his letter to Arthur Wellington for his "private" information. Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, 6:552.

19. Parra Pérez, *Historia*, 252.

20. Ibid.

21. The decree was published on 18 June, withdrawn as apocryphal on 27 June. Liverpool had certainly not learned of the revocation and probably did not even know of its publication since distribution was quickly suspended.

22. The "Liverpool" statement is said to have had repercussions along the Caribbean mainland. José de Zayas to duque de San Carlos, Madrid, 1814. AGI, Estado, 87. An undated, anonymous letter reported that Liverpool intended that English merchants could trade with all Spanish colonial ports that "reconocieren o no a la Regencia de Cadiz, con tal que no negasen la obediencia a Fernando VII." AGSim, Estado, 8286, doc. 8. These reports, confirmed by the immediate upsurge in commercial speculation, suggest the consequences of the "letter" and its publicity. See also Abella Rodríguez, *"Don dinero" en la indépendencia* (Bogotá, 1966).

23. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, Cadiz, 12 March 1810. *Wellesley Papers*, 1:316–317. Henry reiterated his hint more emphatically to Arthur Wellesley on 2 April: "No man can say what the final result of this contest will be, and it is important to look a little beyond the mere defense of the peninsula. The city of Cadiz is more connected with South America than all the rest of Spain put together, and the establishment of our influence here will greatly facilitate any arrangement we may wish to make hereafter with South America . . . you have stated as much in your letter to General Steward of the 27th of February." The brothers Wellesley shared a common view of the trade potentials in Spain's colonial markets. Henry Wellesley to Viscount Wellington, 2 April 1810. Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, 6:502.

24. Henry Wellesley to Viscount Wellington, Ibid. He saw no incompatibility between exporting to Cadiz and smuggling in the Caribbean.

25. Henry Wellesley to Viscount Wellington, Cadiz, 21 August 1810. Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, 6:584.

26. *Diario de operaciones de la Regencia*, 10 July 1810. The demand for two loans (one was the Aguirre-Lobo project providing the security of the revenues of New Spain's tobacco monopoly plus customs revenues of Veracruz and Cadiz) was added at Cadiz's request. Representatives of the Cadiz commercial community had met with the Regencia on 10 July conceivably to block the commercial treaty that threatened to inundate the Cadiz market with hitherto prohibited English manufactures.

27. Unclear are other issues presumably discussed: Did Cadiz really believe London would now grant a loan recently rejected? The unfavorable rate of exchange offered by Spain? Or Cadiz's opposition to reduced duties on English imports?

28. Apodaca to Bardaxi, London, 20 July 1810. AGSim, Estado, 8173, carta n.163.

29. Parra Pérez, *Historia*, 249.

30. Note that Jenkinson reprimanded Layard when he advised him that Eng-

land's agents in the Caribbean should oppose action that might "destruir la integridad" of the Spanish Empire. Jenkinson to Layard, 29 May 1810. Ibid., 239.

31. Apodaca to Bardaxi, London, 1 Aug. 1810. AGSim, Estado, 8173, carta n. 186.

32. Henry Wellesley to Marquess Wellesley, Cadiz, 23 Aug. 1810. Wellesley, *Supplementary Despatches*, 6:579.

33. *Diario de operaciones de la Regencia*, 4, 5 June 1810. On 8 July the Junta de Cadiz, in a manifesto clearly the work of Quintana, called all *gaditanos* to participate in elections shortly to begin; the Consejo Reunido in a less dithyrambic proclamation assured the colonies that their generosity had provided "el mayor escollo que ha hallado la criminal felonía del Emperador de los Franceses, pues . . . trataron, sin parar un momento, de conservarle intactos e ilesos esos Dominios." Now "con su concurrencia, se promete SM se remediarán todos los abusos, todas las extorsiones, todos los males que sufren" in the forthcoming Cortes to assemble on the nearby Isla de León in September. Draft, Real Orden del Supremo Consejo de España e Indias, Cadiz, nd. AGI, Estado, 86.

34. Suárez, *Proceso*, 390; Argüelles, *Exámen histórico*, 1:184–185. The Consejo Reunido opted for a single chamber; similarly Abella, who preferred a separate convocation of nobility and clergy. Suárez, *Proceso*, 388.

35. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3, app. 20. Note that Argüelles pointed out that sharp social divisions in the colonies made a bicameral *cortes* impossible and only grandees from America already resident in the metropole should be eligible.

36. The view that the Regencia failed to publish the Junta Central's decree of 29 January because it did not know of its existence seems improbable. Nor is there satisfactory explanation of the disappearance of the decree and the long silence of those who prepared it. Even after its publication by Blanco White (in England) and a copy sent to Cadiz was there any resonance, and by then it was resolved to hold a unicameral assembly. Blanco White later confessed he had knowingly been part of the conspiracy of silence.

37. "Descuidó pues la Regencia el cumplimiento de su solemne promesa, y no volvió a mentar ni aún la palabra cortes sino en algunos papeles que circuló a America las más veces no difundidos en la peninsula, y cortados a traza de entretenimiento para halagar los ánimos de los habitantes de Ultramar." Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:370. Conservative Miguel de Lardizábal and José Joaquín de Colón y Larreátegui blamed Quintana, who insisted he had duly surrendered all his papers. Lardizábal, *Manifiesto*; Colón de Larreátegui, *España vindicada en sus clases y hierarquías*; Quintana, *Memoria*.

38. Henry Wellesley was disappointed by the Regencia because it repeated "the same want of energy and firmness and the same system of procrastination . . . in the conduct of the Supreme Junta." Henry Wellesley, 12 March 1810. Wellesley, ed., *Diary and Correspondence*, 54.

39. Polo de Alcocer to marqués de Hormazas, Isla de León, 19 Feb. 1810; Alcocer to Hormazas, 27 Feb. 1810. Hormazas on 28 February and then 11 June advised Abella to return the records. They were delivered in August.

40. Calomarde's role is obscure. In the "ominous decade" after Fernando VII's return from France (1814) Calomarde—son of an "humilde labrador"—was a protégé of Miguel de Lardizábal. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, 2:330.

41. Abella to Secretario de Estado, London, 14 March, 11 April, 1810, cartas 1–5.

42. *El Español*, 2 (28 Feb. 1811), 341–350. Blanco White attributed the intrigues to the Regencia "que intrigó con el mayor ardor para que no se reunieran las cortes, o para llenarlas de sus hechuras." He claimed to have foreseen that "tal habían de dexar a la España que las cortes mismas tapenas gozarían del poder que necesitdan para librarla."

43. *Diario de la Regencia*, 17–18 June 1810; Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3; "Exposición de la Junta de Cadiz relativa a la convocatoria de las Cortes," 17 June 1810. AC, legajo 5, n. 36; Suárez, *Proceso*, 379.

44. "Decreto de la Regencia de España," 18 June 1810. *Gazeta de la Regencia*¸ 22 June 1810.

45. AGN, Reales Cedulas, v. 202, exp. 293; Julio V. González, *Filiación del Gobierno representativo*, lámina XIII.

46. More than three weeks earlier, the Consejo Reunido had been urged to opine "luego, luego, sin levantar la mano de este asunto y con preferencia a qualquiera otro por urgente que sea, si han de asistir a estas cortes los estamentos de la nobleza y clero." Referring to its earlier (24 Nov. 1809) view apropos "la parte que debían tener las Américas en la representación nacional," it reaffirmed its opinion that the Cortes meet "sin consideración de estados . . . ya sea activa o pasivamente" since "el ser ciudadano . . . es lo que da derecho para intervenir en estas asambleas que solo se autorizan quando la Patria peligra o quando se trata de reformar los abusos." In December 1809, the Consejo reiterated the need to "formar una representación completa" of 211 *procuradores* of the metropole, plus 28 for the colonies, using the *suplentes* if necessary, and—to preserve the monarchy—without separate representation of nobility and clergy. "Expediente sobre si ha de componerse de una o más cámaras ls representación nacional. Consulta del Consejo Suprema de España e indias si deberían asistir a las cortes los estamentos de nobleza y clero," 13 July 1810. AC, leg. 4, ff. 23ff.

47. Lardizábal, *Manifiesto*, 306–307.

48. In December 1809, Venegas, following instructions from Manuel Abella, began to register *europeos americanos* at Cadiz and elsewhere. By July 1810, however, registry of *americanos* outside the port was incomplete. Moreover, lists of colonials from the American possessions were inaccurate, since many had exited from Cadiz and the Isla de León.

49. Fernández Martín, *Derecho parlamentario*, 1:696–698; Suárez, *Proceso*, 494–495.

50. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:384.

51. Ibid., 3:387.

52. Toreno concluded that, embittered by failure to dominate the choice of *suplentes*, the old bureaucratic elites immediately questioned the legitimacy of the substitute *diputados* and turned against the Cortes. Toreno, *Levantamiento*, 3:384–385.

53. It was the willingness of *criollo* officers in the Buenos Aires militia units that prevented merchant Álzaga from suffocating the insurrection in May of 1810.

54. Liberio Veranio y Español, *De nuestro estado, nuestros males, y su seguro y único remedio* (Cadiz, 1812), 22.

21. An Eroding Colonial System

1. On mine workers' strikes, 1766–1767, at Guanajuato and Pachuca, see Brading, *Miners and Merchants*; Ladd, *Making of a Strike*; Couturier, *Silver King*, 85–93; Castro Gutiérrez, *Nueva ley y nuevo rey*, 83–93.

2. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos y la revolución de 1810* (Michoacan, 1979), 205–206.

3. *Criollo* José Beye de Cisneros [Fernando de Lizarza] concluded that the "passivity" was cultivated by the Junta Central's policy "prometer las colonias siempre mucho, pero jamás cumplir nada, sino de palabra." Lizarza, *Discurso que publia*.

4. *Correo americano del sur*, 5 Aug. 1813.

5. Villoro, *Revolución*, 43, 47.

6. "El gobierno de España, en vez de aprovechar los momentos para asegurar . . . una dominación que se le escapaba, dejó caer durante dos años enteros las riendas del gobierno en manos débiles o incapaces." Alamán, *História*, 1:320.

7. Ibid., 1:237.

8. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:419.

9. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:291.

10. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:105.

11. Ibid, 1:428 (correspondent's emphasis).

12. Ibid., 1:176.

13. *Despertador americano*, no. 4 (3 Jan. 1811); Bustamante, *Martirología*, 5.5.

14. Ibid., 4.

15. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:428.

16. Cf. "[A]nónimos pasquines o libelos famosos." *Gazeta de México*, 8 Oct. 1808.

17. Yermo to Junta Central, 9 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57-E. Daily, soldiers confiscated handbills aimed at the capital's population, affixed at street corners, tossed into the entryways of townhouses, or surreptitiously dropped under doors. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:445–446.

18. Ibid, 1:445.

19. Ibid., 1:101–102.

20. Ibid., 1:103–106.

21. Ibid., 1:109.

22. Ibid., 1:174, 423–424, 450.

23. Ibid, 1:110, 128, 175. Investigators searched his quarters for two hours and found not other *proclamas* but, instead, drafts of many articles, *memoriales ajustados*, and letters. Ibid., 1:108.

24. Ibid., 1:151–155, 157–163.

25. Ibid., 1:169.

26. Ibid., 1:108.

27. Ibid., 1:158–159, 161.

28. Ibid., 1:115.

29. Insurgent leader Morelos made this clear when he remarked years later, "Ya no hay Fernando VII porque el se quiso ir a su Casa de Borbón a Francia." Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 270.

30. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:120.

31. Ibid., 1:150.

32. Ibid., 1:153.

33. Ibid., 1:169. Under questioning, Castillejos claimed his second *discurso* (he refused to label it a *proclama*) was distributed by Juanmartiñena and Marcelo Anza; they and others sent at least one hundred copies to Veracruz and other provincial centers.

34. Ibid., 1:429.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 1:165–166.
37. Ibid., 1:109, 116, 129.
38. AHN, Estado, 57-E.
39. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:149–150, 248.
40. Ibid., 1:127–128, 166–167.
41. Ibid., 1:128, 133–134.
42. Ibid., 1:132.
43. On the capital's newspapers, see ibid., 1:115.
44. Ibid., 1:173.
45. Ibid., 1:152.
46. Ibid., 1:452–457.
47. Ibid., 1:435.
48. Ibid., 1:433–436.
49. Ibid., 1: 430–432.
50. Josef María Cos, "Respuesta . . . al autor del Verdadero Ilustrador de México," *Semanario patriótico americano*, 6 Sept. 1812.
51. Ibid.
52. *El Español*, xvii (20 Aug. 1811).
53. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 253–254.
54. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:229–231.
55. Ibid., 1:225.
56. Ibid, 1:216, 218–219.
57. Ibid, 1:166, 169.
58. Ibid.,1:170.
59. Ibid., 1:171.
60. Ibid., 1:429.
61. Ibid., 1:173–174.
62. Ibid., 1:182; Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 81 note.
63. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:176, 178–179.

22. Fissures in the Colonial Elite

1. Villoro, *Revolución de Independencia*, 43, 47.
2. Mine owner Rayas boasted in the presence of a cleric from Michoacan: "Yo soy descendiente de Vizcaínos, aunque nací en Guanajuato, los he favorecido, conozco su fidelidad, me gloria de contar entre mis dependientes a Don Manuel Ansaca, que es un San Ysidro honrado." García, ed., *DHM*, 1:249.
3. Mier, *Historia*, 1:183.
4. *Gazeta Extraordinaria*, 17 Sept. 1808; Abad y Queipo, "Representación a la primera regencia," in Mora, *Obras*, 1:258.
5. Mora, *Obras*, 1:168.
6. Villoro, *Revolución de Independencía*, 43–47.
7. Francisco de Noriega, "Informe," Isla de León, Nov. 1810. AC, Ultramar.
8. "Nota que pone al copiante." BMus, MSS, Add., 13,978 f. 582.
9. Juan Díaz González, José de la Cotera, and José Ruiz de la Bárcena, prior y consules, "Bando," 22 Dec. 1808. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 2, ff. 1r–3v.
10. Ibid., ff. 2r–2v.
11. Manuel Pinzón, 23 Dec. 1808. Ibid., f. 3v.
12. AGN, Consulado, tomo 9, exp. 15, f. 6r.
13. Consulado de Mexico, "Junta," 2 Jan. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 3, f. 2r.
14. "Lista de los comerciantes," 2 Jan. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 3, ff. 7v–12r.

15. Consulado de Mexico to Junta Central, 1 Feb. 1809. AGN, Cosulado, tomo 76, exp. 3. *Montañeses* critical of Basoco's tactics spelled out their interpretation of his ritual (*costumbre*): "Esto es, a su solo anteojo; sin libertad en los concurrentes; . . . arrogándose unos quantos individuos la autoridad de nombrar a los que les de la gana por ellos, o meterse en el oficio odioso de acusadores; exponiendo causas . . . que el mismo . . . Basoco y los demás proponentes han de calificar por bastantes o por frívolos, sin más apelación ni recurso . . . Esta ha sido y es su pretensión . . . y este es el sentido de lo que . . . Basoco llama costumbre." José Mariano Cobarrubias y Juan Martín de Juanmartiñena, 29 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo 204, exp. 10, f. 56v.

16. Consulado de Mexico to Junta Central, 1 Feb. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 3.

17. Consulado de Mexico, "Acuerdo de la Junta de Gobierno," 2 Jan. 1809. AGN, Cosulado, tomo 76, exp. 2, ff. 25v–26r.

18. Consulado de Mexico to Junta Central, 1 Feb. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 3.

19. Consulado de Mexico, "Junta," 9 Jan. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 2, ff. 33r–33v. For the record, the *electores* listed by votes received were Roque Pérez Gómez, Antonio Alonso Terán, José Martínez Barenque, Juan Marcos Rada, Juan Manuel Peredo, Manuel Salcedo, Manuel Floranes, Francisco Almirante, Manuel Bedoya, Dionísio Martínez Movellan, Lorenzo García Noriega, José Llain, Joaquin Cortina González, Cecilio Martínez Armiño, and Manuel de la Cuesta. Among these were those who approved the coup against Iturrigaray: Pérez Gómez, Alonso Terán, Martínez Barenque, Rada, Peredo, Floranes, García, Noriega, and Llain. This list has been compared with other sources, e.g., "Copia del oficiio . . . del . . . consul actual Francisco Alonso Terán" in AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 2, ff. 40r–45v.

20. Consulado de Mexico, "Acta," 10 Jan. 1810. AGN, Cosulado, tomo 76, exp. 2, ff. 40r–43v.

21. "Pedimento fiscal," 15 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo 204, exp. 10, f. 24v.

22. AGN, Consulado, tomo 9, exp. 5, ff. 6r, 8v.

23. José Mariano Covarrubias and Juan Martín de Juanmartiñena, 25 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo 204, exp. 10; José Andrés de Alcántara and Agustín Pomposo Fernández, 15 Dec. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 9, exp. 3, f. 22r.

24. José Mariano de Covarrubias, May 1810. Ibid., f. 50r.

25. "Exposición de los méritos de la casa comercial Terán," MN, MSS, 1662, ff. 85r–91r.

26. Ibid.; Calderón Quijano, ed., *Virreyes de Nueva España, 1798–1808*, 2:142.

27. AGN, Consulado, tomo 86, exp. 9.

28. Francisco Alonso de Terán to Regencia, 29 Sept. 1810. AGN, AHH, 676-2.

29. Ibid.

30. Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 110, n. 3; "Pliego . . . conteniendo los motibos de la prisión de Iturrigaray, 1814." BM, MSS, Add, 13978, f. 574r.

31. Francisco Alonso Terán, "Exposición de los méritos de la casa comercial Terán." MN, MSS, 1662, f. 150v.

32. Ibid., f. 151r.

33. "Apuntes de las gracias que Gabriel de Yermo propuso, 17 Sept. 1808" and

addendum, 9 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57-E. See also Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:257, 275.

34. Yermo to Cortes, Mexico, 15 Dec. 1810. AC, Comunicaciones, 22, n. 25. Yermo was justifiably unsure how members of the recently convened Cortes at Cadiz would handle his arrest and deportation of a viceroy.

35. Yermo to Junta Central, Mexico, 9 Nov. 1808. AHN, Estado, 57-E.

36. Yermo to Consulado de Mexico, Hacienda de San Gabriel, 13 Jan. 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 2, ff. 48r–48v.

37. Ibid., ff. 48r–48v.

38. Ibid.

39. "Pedimento fiscal," 15 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo. 76, exp. 4.

40. Ibid.

41. José Andrés de Alcántara and Agustín Pomposo Fernández, "Expediente formado por los Decanos," 14 July 1809. AGN, Consulado, tomo 9, exp. 3, ff. 12r–12v.

42. Abad y Queipo, "Representación al Real Acuerdo de México," Valladolid, 16 Mar. 1809. Mora, *Obras*, 1:242–246.

43. AGN, AHH, 633-20.

44. Fray Manuel Agustín Gutiérrez, "Denuncia de . . . Santa María," Valladolid, 10 Feb. 1810, in Lemoine Villicaña, "Santa María," 106.

45. AGN, Consulado, tomo 9, exp. 3 and tomo 46, exp. 3; "Pedimento fiscal," 15 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 4.

46. García, ed., *DHM*, 5:183–198.

47. This and following paragraphs are based on "Pedimento fiscal," 15 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 4.

48. Bataller to Lizana, 17 Jan. 1810. AGN, Consulado, tomo 76, exp. 4.

49. Estéban Varea to Consejo de Indias, 30 May 1811. AGI, Mexico, 2514.

23. Fire under the Embers

1. Lizarza, *Comercio libre vindicado de la nota de ruinoso*, 8.

2. Anon., *Resúmen histórico de la insurrección de Nueva España* (Mexico, 1821), 3.

3. "Carta escrita por un vecino de Mexico," in Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 75.

4. Abarca to Calleja, in Bustamante, *Siglos*, 276.

5. *Pública indicación del . . . Ayuntamiento de . . . Guanajuato* (Mexico, 1811), 21–26.

6. Abad y Queipo, *Carta pastoral* (Mexico, 1813).

7. "Carta del conde del Peñasco al Capitán . . . Oviedo," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:54, no. 1. 19.

8. "Carta del Dr. Cos," in ibid., 1:50, no. 17.

9. AGN, Historia, tomo 415, exp. 8, ff. 3r–3v.

10. Martínez de los Rios, *Apuntes de algunas circunstancias notables*; Lic. Fernando Fernández de San Salvador, *Reflexiones del patriota americano* (Mexico, 1811), 1.

11. Carlos Marichal has explored this phenomenon in characteristic detail in "En un primer momento: La invasion napoleónica y la persistencia de las lealtades coloniales en la Nueva España, 1808–1809," in Breña, *En el umbral de las revoluciones*

hispánicas, 149–170. About 30 million silver pesos were exported to Cadiz between late 1808 and early 1811 (151).

12. Lizarza, *Comercio libre*, 6.

13. Noriega, "Informe," Isla de León, Nov. 1810; AC Ultramar; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:262–263.

14. Cf. "Ya se ve que Garibay, lo hacía todo de acuerdo con Aguirre y el Secretario que la [*sic*] puso." Mier, *Historia*, 1:165.

15. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:262. To critics of the colonial government's performance, its *bandos* and *providencias* provided choice tidbits of dinner conversation where "la conducta de los Supremos Magistrados" was pilloried, their prestige and authority undermined. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:226.

16. Catani, AGI, Mexico, 1661; Bustamante, *Martirología*, 76.

17. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:262–263.

18. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:230; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 257.

19. Noriega, "Informe" AC, Ultramar, Nov. 1810.

20. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:608, no. 243.

21. Luís Lozano to José Ignacio Lozano, Mexico, Feb. 1809, in García, ed., *DHM*, 1:172. On mobilizing the clerical establishment to shape public opinion in support of the colonial regime under stress, see Torres Puga, *Los últimos años de la Inquisicion*, 69–72.

22. *Gazeta de México*, 29 Apr. and 20 May 1809; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:74–275.

23. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 256. Around 75 percent of New Spain's receipts from Consolidación were transferred during Garibay's viceregal tenure.

24. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 150.

25. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 252–254.

26. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:280.

27. Borrador to Francisco Saavedra, 3 Feb. 1809. AHN, Estado, 54-D, doc. 72.

28. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:280; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 260.

29. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 236.

30. As Alamán understood Garibay's Consolidación policy: "Viendo las frecuentes pérdidas que los bienes eclesiásticos sufrían por las quiebras de los mayordomos, y atrasos de los capitalistas que reconocían fondos, se llegó a persuadir que la imposicion más segura era la real hacienda; y asi protegió con el mayor empeño el plan de la Consolidación, creyendo que al mismo tiempo hacía un servicio a la corona y aseguraba aquellos bienes." *Historia*, 1:305, n. 36.

31. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadera origen*, 77, n. 1.

32. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:290, 304.

33. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 263 and n. 1.

34. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:287; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 263 and n. 1.

35. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 262; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:284. The list of lenders is in *Gazeta Extraordinaria de México*, 11, 23 Aug. 1809.

36. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 263.

37. Ibid., 262; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:285.

38. Abad y Queipo to Lizana, Valladolid, 14 Aug. 1809, in Mora, *Obras*, 248–249.

39. Ibid., 248.

40. Lizana to Benito de Hermida, Mexico, 30 Aug. 1809. AGI, Mexico, 1321.

41. Alamán, *Historia*, 2:289–290; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 263.

42. Based upon the testimony of an anonymous *criolla* widow. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 76; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:290–291; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 263.

43. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 78 and n. 1; Juanmartiñena or López Cancelada, (whoever wrote *Carta . . . por un vecino de México a un amigo de Cádiz*) were close to Yermo, and the *partido montanés* in the Consulado de Mexico, and understood why Lizana turned security-conscious.

44. Ibid., 78.

45. Ibid., 77; Alamán, *Historia*, 290–291; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 263; Arrangoiz, *México desde 1808*, 1:69.

46. Ibid; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:291; Noriega, "Informe," AC.

47. Arrangoiz, *México desde 1808*, 1:67; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 252. Jovellanos's "pedimento fiscal" is in Arrangoiz, *México desde 1808*, 1:252–254.

48. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 77; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:287–288.

49. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," *Estudios de historia moderna y contemporanea*, 1 (1965), 74.

50. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:357–358.

51. "Réplica de Santa María," in Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 119.

52. "Representación," 30 May 1810. Mora, *Obras*, 259.

53. Fray Manuel Agustín Gutiérrez to Arzobispo Virrey, Valladolid, 19 Feb. 1810, and Junta de Segulridad, Mexico, 17 Feb. 1810. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 105–107.

54. Ibid., 106.

55. Mariano Michelena, "Verdadero origen de la revolución de 1809 en . . . Michoacán," in Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:9.

56. Santa María et al., "Defensa conjunta," 18 Sept. 1810. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 110.

57. B. Manuel de la Torre Lloroda to José María García Obeso, 18 Dec. 1809, García, ed., *DHM,* 1:261.

58. *Correo americano del sur*, 5 Aug. 1813.

59. Archer, ed., *The Birth of Modern Mexico, 1780–1824*, 21.

60. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 108, 257. Lemoine suggests that pre-revolutionary Morelos seemed "buen burgués, pasivo y conformista."

61. Hamill, "An 'Absurd' Insurrection?," in Archer, ed., *The Birth of Modern Mexico*, 61.

62. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:299.

63. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 107–112, 199–202; García, ed., *DHM*, 1:298.

64. Fray Vicente de Santa María, "Relación histórica de la colonia de Nuevo Santander y costa del seno mexicano." AGN, *Publicaciones*, XV, apéndice.

65. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 63–124. See also Nicolás Rangel, ed., "Fray Vicente Santa María y la conspiración de Valladolid," *BAGN*, 2 (1930), 707–769, which reprints the basic source, "Relación de la causa criminal de fe, y de estado . . . contra . . . Santa María."

66. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 67, 119; Rangel, ed., "Fray Vicente Santa María," *BAGN*, 2 (1931), 715, 757–758.

67. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 3; Rangel, ed., "Fray Vicente Santa María," *BAGN*, 2 (1931), 717.

68. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:339.

69. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 73; Rangel, ed., "Fray Santa María," *BAGN*, 2 (1931), 728.

70. Rangel, ed., "Fray Vicente Santa María," *BAGN*, 2 (1931), 708.

71. Ibid., 762.

72. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 76; García, ed., *DHM*, 1:258.

73. "Declaración del B. José Rafael Anaya," in García, ed., *DHM*, 1:256–258; Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:6.

74. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:292; García, ed., *DHM*, 1:269.

75. Ibid., 1:353.

76. García Obeso, under questioning, asserted the verses were in the handwriting of José Luís de Guici, *apoderado* of the Spanish mining magnate Diego Rul married to the daughter of the *criollo* mine owner Antonio Obregón (conde de la Valenciana). García, ed., *DHM*, 1:350; Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 308–309.

77. "Declaración de Mariano Michelena," García, ed., *DHM*, 1:341.

78. García Obeso claimed the objective was a "junta provincial compuesta de Diputados de todos los Pueblos cabezeros de la Provincia," ibid., 1:349. Mariano Michelena provided another goal: "La formación de las Juntas bajo el mismo pie que las de España, esto es, que hubiera Subalternas y Supremas, según el Reglamento de la Peninsula." Ibid, 1:343.

79. Ibid, 1:322, 343.

80. Ibid., 1:349.

81. Ibid, 1:277–278, 288–289; Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 113; Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 105.

82. *Correo americano del sur*, 5 Aug. 1813.

83. Abraham López Lara, "Los denunciantes," *BAGN*, 6 (1965), 31. There are other versions: García, ed., *DHM*, 1:304–306; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:293.

84. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:305.

85. Ibid., 1:273.

86. López Lara, "Los denunciantes," 15–17 and n. 8; Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:10.

87. The García Obeso family claimed its members were "descendientes y naturales de la ilustra nación Montañesa" in the colony. Other *montañese* included Obispo San Miguel, Intendant Riaño (Guanajuato), merchant Francisco de la Bárcena. José María García Obeso signed the Valladolid protest against Consolidación in 1805. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 105; AGN, BN, 1667.

88. Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:11.

89. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:290.

90. Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:10.

91. Deposition by José Alonso Terán, Valladolid, 21 Dec. 1809; López Lara, "Los denunciantes," *BAGN*, 6:181.

92. Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:11.

93. "Defensa conjunta," in Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 113–114.

94. Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:11–12.

95. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:281–292, 301–302.

96. "Declaración de Romualdo Carnero," in ibid., 1:271; "Declaración de Br. Pablo Vargas," ibid, 1:311.

97. For example, the testimony of Antonio Seguí, Concha y Castañeda, and Pablo Vargas. Ibid, 1:298–300, 303–307, 311–312.

98. "Declaración de Manuel Lloreda," ibid., 1:366.

99. "Defensa conjunta de Santa María," in Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 110.

100. Francisco Escudero de Isasi to Consulado de Mexico, 1 Mar. 1810. AGN, AHH, 633 exp. 3.

101. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 231.

102. "Defensa conjunta," in Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 110; Mier, *Historia*, 1:245, citing Blanco White, *El Español*, 19 Nov. 1810. Lizana shared the view of *oidor* Aguirre that the day colonial authorities hanged the first insurgents, "España debe perder la esperanza de conservar esta América." Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:13.

103. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:393, 397, 399.

104. Lemoine Villicaña, "Fray Vicente de Santa María," 118, n. 12, reprints an anonymous letter from Aguascalientes to Santamaría; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:297.

105. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*,78. Moderation was perhaps a factor leading José Mariano Michelena to contribute 200 pesos for arms in Spain. *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, 6 July 1810.

106. Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 77 n. 1. Lizana was considered "weak." Barrère, "Deuxième parti du précis historique." AAEPar, CP, Mexique 1.

107. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 264.

24. The Regencia's *Comisionados* and Bishop-Elect Abad y Queipo

1. *El Español*, 27 Oct. 1810.

2. *El Español*, 30 Jan. 1811.

3. *Diario de la Regencia*, 7 Feb. 1810.

4. Anonymous to the Regencia, August 1810, quoted in Mier, *Historia*, 1:232.

5. "Documentos . . . relativos a la causa seguida al Sr. Iturrigaray. Consulta del Consejo [Reunido] a la Regencia." Juanmartiñena, *Verdadero origen*, 47–50 (app. 99).

6. *Diarios de México*, 17–18 May 1810; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:313.

7. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 264.

8. *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, 4 May 1810.

9. García, ed., *DHM*, 1:337, 419, 426.

10. "Nota," *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, 13, 23 Feb. 1810.

11. Ibid., 24 Feb. and 3 Apr. 1810.

12. Ibid., 14, 24 Apr. 1810.

13. Ibid., 6 Feb. 1810, reprinting material from the *Correo de Sevilla*, 14 Dec. 1809. This indicates the variety of metropolitan publications that ultimately were sent officially to the colony.

14. Ibid., 23 Mar., 3 Apr., 13 June 1810. By 10 June, the total collected was more than the extraordinary sum of 1.8 million pesos.

15. Ibid., 2 Feb. and 27 Apr. 1810.

16. Ibid., 12 Jan. and 13, 27 Mar. 1810.

17. Ibid., 17 Apr. 1810. In the 20 April issue, a commentator on this memoir pointedly observed that in the United States and England a free press existed because in those countries there was respect for "los derechos del ciudadano."

18. Mier, *Historia*, 1:228.

19. Dérozier emphasizes that Quintana's *Manifesto a Europa* issued shortly before the demise of the Junta Central was "un appel anti-révolutionnaire, anti-démocratique, anti-républicain" to the nations of Europe. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1:343.

20. *Gazeta del gobierno de México*, 29–30 May 1810.

21. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:314, n. 64, 320.

22. Francisco Noriega, "Informe." AC, Expedientes, Ultramar, 27 Nov. 1810; Mier, *Historia*, 1:230–231.

23. "Informes de los señores Yandiola, Noriega y Luyando, a cerca del estado de Nueva España." AC, Expedientes, Ultramar, Comisión ultramarina, 22, n. 18. The *informes* are dated: Yandiola (1 Jan. 1811), Noriega (22 Nov. 1810), Luyando (6 Dec. 1810). At the end of 1809 or early January, it had been suggested that the metropole send agents to the colonies to recommend caution in reacting to reports from the metropole and prepare for counterrevolutionary action. Dérozier, *Quintana*, 1:149.

24. León y Pizarro, *Memorias*, 2:330; Mier, *Historia*, 1:227.

25. Lafarga Lozano, *Indice*, 427.

26. Mier, *Historia*, 1:227, 230; Barrère, "Deuxième partie du précis historique." AAEPar, CP, Mexique, 1; Luyando, "Informe," 6 Dec. 1810. AC, Expedientes, Ultramar, 22, n. 18.

27. Luyando, "Informe," Mexico, 1 Jan. 1811. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 1 Jan. 1811.

29. Yandiola, ibid.

30. Luyando, ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Yandiola, ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Luyando, ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Yandiola, ibid.

40. Luyando, ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Yandiola, ibid.

43. Luyando, ibid.

44. Abad y Queipo, "Representación a la primera Regencia," 30 May 1810, in Mora, *Obras*, 258.

45. Herrejón Peredo, *Hidalgo antes del grito de Dolores*, 58–60, 63, 67. He would immediately denounce Hidalgo's insurrection, at one point comparing its attack upon *gachupines* to the assassination of whites during the uprising on Saint-Domingue. Ibid., 75.

46. Abad y Queipo, "Escrito . . . a D. Manuel Sixto Espinosa," 1808, in Mora, *Obrasi*, 235.

47. Herrejón Peredo, "Representación a nombre de los labradores y comerciantes de Valladolid de Michoacán," in Mora, *Obras*, 214, 222, 227, 229.

48. Ibid., 259.

49. Abad y Queipo, "Representación a la primera Regencia," in Mora, *Obras*, 250–259.

50. Ibid., 259–260.

51. Ibid., 260–261.

52. Abad y Queipo, "Escrito . . . a D. Manuel Sixto Espinosa," in Mora, *Obras*, 239.

53. Ibid., 239; Abad y Queipo, "Representación a la primera Regencia," in Mora, *Obras*, 261. Suggestive of the situation is the *alcaldía mayor* of Zitácuaro in 1792; there, small *tenderos* (medium capitalization of 200 pesos) constituted 35 percent of all *tienda* owners but represented only 15 percent of aggregate capitalization. Morin, *Michoacán*, 162.

54. Mora, *Obras*, 261, 264.

55. Ibid., 261–262.

25. *Oprimidos y Opresores*

1. On the Bajío's topography, hydrology, and soils, see Bataillon, *Régions géographiques au Mexique*, ch. 3; West and Augelli, *Middle America*; Morin, *Michoacán*, ch. 1; Brading, *Haciendas*, 13–14.

2. The situation is well summarized by Tutino, *From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico*, 82–98, and Jaime Rodriguez O, in Alberro, ed., *Revolución francesa*, 138–143.

3. Bataillon, *Régions,* 158–155,161; Morin *Michoacán*, 21–22.

4. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:323–324.

5. Brading, *Haciendas*, 17–18, and *Miners and Merchants*, 232–233. On Querétaro's *obrajes*, see Salvucci, *Textiles and Capitalism in Colonial Mexico*. Dolores supplied wool for the *obrajes* of San Miguel el Grande and Querétaro. Hurtado Lopez, *Dolores Hidalgo*, 24.

6. The classic study of Guanajuato's mining industry is Brading's *Miners and Merchants*; still remarkable for brevity and insight is Wolf's, "Bajío" 182–186. Guanajuato's population density (633 per square league) was five times the average of the other nine intendancies. Navarro y Noriega, "Estado de la población . . . 1810," in *Memoria sobre la población de Nueva España* (1814), 114.

7. López Sarrelangue, "Población," 523–524, 527–528. Estimated population growth in the intendancies of Valladolid, Guanajuato and San Luís Potosí, 1745–1796, was roughly comparable. Morin, *Michoacán*, 59.

Population of Three Alcaldías Mayores*, 1750 and 1800*

Alcaldías	1750	1800
Guanajuato	5,000	26,618
Valladolid	35,545	47,573
Querétaro	21,275	47,410

Source: López Sarrelangue, "Población," 523–524, 527–528.

8. López Sarrelangue, "Población," 520. In 1806 nine provinces of New Spain registered 268,910 "indios laboríos" or "vagos," 61.3 percent in Guanajuato. Wolf, "Bajío," table, p. 191.

9. Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 258, table 35.

10. *Ethnic Composition of Guanajuato, 1810*

"Español"	149,183
Indio	254,014
Casta	172,931
Total	576,128

Source: Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 225, 227, 248–249.

11. Wolf, "Bajío," 191.

12. Abad y Queipo, "Representación a nombre de los labradores de Valladolid," in Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 224. Note that the "absence of a system of contractual leasehold, other than for the largest units or whole estates, meant that the ordinary tenant, and still more the sharecropper, was entirely dependent on the whim or will of the landlord." Brading, *Haciendas*, 151. In the Guanajuato intendancy (ca. 1800), virtually no *pueblo de indios* had managed to retain communal land; now Indians were renters of hacienda farmland. Morin, *Michoacán*, 287.

13. Wolf, "Bajío," 191, table; Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 228.

14. Wolf, "Bajío," 187; Super, *Querétaro*, 34–35; Morin, *Michoacán*, 35. Note the observations of a perceptive Spanish civil servant investigating Querétaro's role in the conspiracy of 1810: Lacking "medios honestos de subsistir," people had turned to "el engaño, la estafa, la prostitución y el juego, únicos recursos para mantener la vida." Juan Collado, "Informe . . . sobre los acontecimientos de Querétaro," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 2:911–912, n. 273.

15. Miguel Dominguez, "Informe," 30 Sept. 1801; Brading, ed., "Descripción de la industria textil en Querétaro," *BAGN*, 2d ser., 11 (1970), 283, and the classic study by Salvucci, *Textiles and Capitalism*.

16. Bustamante, *Quadro histórico*, 1:19; Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 289–290, 342; Morin, *Michoacán*, 290.

17. Morin, *Michoacán*, 137. Earlier, in 1766–1767, San Luís Potosí *tributo* receipts had quintupled, those of León more than doubled. Ibid.

18. Abad y Queipo, "Representación sobre la inmunidad del clero," in Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 205.

19. Fermín de Reygadas, "El Aristarco," Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 2:810.

20. Wolf, "Bajío," 191.

21. Morin, *Michoacán*, 133.

22. Tributo *Payers, New Spain, 1806*

Valladolid	187,544
Guanajuato	285,154
Subtotal	472,698

Source: Wolf, "Bajío," 191.
Note: Includes *Indios de pueblo*, *laboríos*, *vagos*, *negros*, and *mulatos*.

23. Brading, ed., "Noticias sobre la economía de Querétaro," *BAGN*, 2d ser., 11 (1970), 295.

24. Riaño, "Puntos para proponer a . . . Real Acuerdo. Guanajuato," 5 Oct. 1808. Note the observation of *peninsular* Fermín de Reygadas: "Los agentes del fisco o jueces de cuentas . . . para aumentar el número de tributarios en cuyo aumento fincaban el grande mérito de su comisión, no se detenian en introducir en sus listas a mucho pobres que no debian pagar tributo por ser su calidad exenta por las leyes." "El Aristarco," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 2:809–810, n. 17.

25. Florescano, *Precios*, 153.

26. Abad y Queipo, "Representación sobre la inmunidad personal del clero," Valladolid, 11 Dec. 1799, in Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 206; Farriss, *Crown and Clergy*.

27. Mariano Otero, cited by Reyes Heroles, *El liberalismo mexicano*, 2:108.

28. Abad y Queipo, cited in Mier, *Historia*, 1:264. Wolf implied this ("Bajío, 191–192) and Alamán was explicit (*Historia*, 1:352) as was Lorenzo de Zavala: "En todos los pueblos hallaba el cura Hidalgo una predisposicion tan favorabole, que no necesitaba más que presentarse para arrastrar tras de sí todas las masas." *Umbral*, 59.

29. Brading, *Haciendas*, 163; Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 112. For instance, John Lynch finds in the Rio de la Plata an incipient middle sector." *Spanish American Revolutions*, 44–45. Luís Villoro's "clase media" includes an intelligentsia of minor civil servants, lawyers, and clerics. *Revolución de Independencia*, 24–28.

30. Brading, *Haciendas*, 150–151, 157–159, 163, 167, 172–193.

31. Tutino, "Life and Labor on North Mexican Haciendas: the Querétaro-San Luís Potosí Region, 1775–1810," Reunión de historiadores mexicanos y norteamericanos, 1977, 374–375.

32. Brading, *Haciendas*, 151; Morin, *Michoacán*, 212–214; Tutino, "Life and Labor," 374.

33. Brading, *Haciendas*, 89, 134–144; Domínguez, "Representación contra la consolidación," in Brading, ed., "Noticias sobre . . . Domínguez," *BAGN*, 11(1970), 305.

34. Mariano Mendiola, ed., *Diario de las Cortes*, 10 Sept. 1811.

35. Navarro y Noriega, "Estado de la población," in *Memoria sobre la población*; Wolf, "Bajío," 186.

36. Florescano, *Precios*, 118, cuadro 7.

37. "Letter addressed to Sr. Obregón," Mexico, 7 Nov. 1810. Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Vaughan Papers, E. For his efforts in behalf of the public interest, Domínguez was later jailed at the behest of Querétaro's Spanish community.

38. Domínguez, "Representación contra la consolidación," in Brading, ed., "Noticias sobre . . . Domínguez," *BAGN*, 11(1970): 303.

39. Riaño, "Puntos para proponer," Guanajuato, 5 Oct. 1808.

40. Tutino, "Life and Labor," 377.

41. Brading, *Haciendas*, 151. As Abad y Queipo noted in 1805: "Los pocos arrendatarios que se toleran en las haciendas, dependen del capricho de los señores o de administradores, que ya los sufren ya los lanzan, persiguen sus arados e incenden sus chozas." "Representación en nombre de los labradores y comerciantes de Valladolid," in Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 224.

42. Domínguez, "Representación contra la consolidación," in Brading, ed., "Noticias," *BAGN*, 11 (11970), 310; Abad y Queipo, "Representación a nombre de los labradores y comerciantes de Valladolid de Michoacán," 24 Oct. 1805. Mora, *Obras sueltas*.

43. Brading, *Haciendas*, 163; Mendiola in *Diario de las Cortes*, 9 Feb. 1811.

44. Meoqui, AGN, Consulado, t. 138.

45. Morin, *Michoacán*, 166.

46. Ibid., 155–156, 159–160, 164,166; Arrangoiz, *México desde 1808*, 1:32.

47. Revillagigedo, "Informe . . . sole . . . comercio," *BAGN*, 2, no. 1 (1931), 194.

48. Brading, *Miners and Merchants,* 254, table 32.

49. Super, *Querétaro*, 253 cuadro 17.

50. Ibid., 131.

51. Wolf, "Bajío," 185–186.

52. Abad y Queipo, "Estado moral y politico . . . Nueva España en 1799," in Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 206.

53. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:336.

54. Domínguez, "Representación contra la Consolidación," 397, 311–312.

55. Mendiola, ed., *Diario de las Cortes*, 7 Feb. 1811.

56. Herrejón Peredo, *Hidalgo*, 71.

57. Mariano Tercero of Guanajuato failed as a lawyer and turned instead "servir podees, y a la agencia de negocios." Liceaga, *Adiciones y rectificaciones*, 46.

58. José María Quirós, "Memoria de estatuto, 1818," 27.

59. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 288.

60. In January 1810, nine months before the insurrection, Hidalgo went to Guanajuato for post-Christmas celebrations as Labarrieta's guest. At a family celebration at the home of the mining family of Septien, Hidalgo met good friends Abad y Queipo (bishop-elect of Michoacán) and Riaño (intendant of Guanajuato). It was, in effect, a reunion of clerical and colonial civil service intelligentsia of the Bajío. Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:151.

61. Collado, "Informe," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 2:911.

62. AGI, Ind. Gen., 110. Yandiola defined the *clase ilustrado* as "los Americanos curas y abogados." "Informe," AC, Comisión Ultramarina, 22.

63. Morin, *Michoacán*, 137.

64. Ibid., 163.

65. Juan Collado, "Informe," Querétaro, 21 Jan. 1811. Hernández y Dávalos, *Colección*, 2:411 n. 278.

66. *Pública vindicación del ilustre ayuntamiento de Guanaxuato justificando su conducta moral y política* (Mexico, 1811). 25–26.

67. *Ei Despertador Americano* (Guadalajara), 30 Dec. 1810.

68. Abad y Queipo, *Carta pastoral*.

69. María Concepción Gavira Márquez, "El comercio de los montañeses en America: La Casa Gutierrez a fines del siglo XVIII," in Ibarra and del Valle Pavón, eds., *Redes sociales e instituciones comerciales*, 166. For emigration, training, and business practices, see 166–188.

70. Martínez de los Ríos, *Apuntes de algunas circunstancias notables de la revolución actual*. Querétaro's Ayuntamienti subsidized this publication; among those authorizing the subsidy were *criollo* Miguel Domínguez and the Spanish merchant Fernando Romero Martínez.

71. Mier, *Historia*, 1:272.

72. Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 2:724.

73. Collado, "Informe," in Hernández y Dávalos, *Colección*, 2:909.

74. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 206, 233.

75. "Representación a la primera Regencia," in Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 261.

76. "Informe . . . sobre los acontecimientos en Querétaro," in Hernández y Dávalos, *Colección*, 2:911–912, n. 273.

77. Agustín Pomposo Fernández de San Salvador, "Desengaños que a los insurgentes," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 4:591.

78. *Gazeta del gobiero de México*, 20 April 1810.

79. Zavala, *Manifiesto de los principios políticos*, 13, app. 5; Alamán, *Historia*, 1.

80. León had years of colonial exposure in Venezuela and had favored a broadening of *comercio libre*—anathema to Cadiz commercial interests.

81. Ferrigni Varela, *La crisis del regimen economico colonial en Venezuela* (Caracas, 1999), 2:115; Albuerne, "Informe, 1811," f. 22. Between 1808 and 1809 the number of ship arrivals at La Quayra doubled (Ferrigni Varela, *Crisis*, 2:116).

82. "Representación a la primera Regencia." Mora, *Obras sueltas*, 258–259.

83. Juan Hernández Luna in Carlos Herrejón Peredo, *Hidalgo antes del grito de Dolores* (Morelia, 1992), 9.

84. Quirós, "Memoria de instituto, 1817."

85. Mier, *Historia*, 1:229. The Consulado de Mexico's agent at Cadiz, Aznares, thought the "gracias" should be announced by incoming Viceroy Venegas, the Audiencia's replacement. Venegas, letter, 21 July 1810. AGN, AHH, 633-23.

86. Bustamante, *Intereses de la Puebla* (Puebla, 1821), 4.

87. "Carta anónima," in Mier, *Historia*, 1:230.

88. Blanco White, *El Español*, 20 (30 Jan. 1811), 334.

89. "Carta anónima," in Mier, *Historia*, 1:230.

90. Ibid., 1:229–230.

91. "Carta económica," in ibid., 1:230.

92. Blanco White, *El Español*, n. 13, p. 19, cited in ibid., 1:254.

93. Ibid., 1:231.

94. Ibid., 1:232.

95. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 264; AHN, Estado, 42-A; Mier, *Historia*, 1:230, 255; Aznares to Consulado de Mexico, Cadiz, 6 May 1810. AGN, AHH, 633-23.

96. Norriega, "Informe." AC, Expedientes, Ultramar, Comisión Ultramarina, 22, n. 18.

97. "Proyecto para la confiscación de intereses de Europeos y Americanos adictos al gobierno español," Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 6:219, n. 248.

98. AGN, AHH, 1040-27.

99. Mier, *Historia*, 2:188; Blanco White, *El Español*, 210. Venegas claimed the friendship of Gaspar Jovellanos. Somoza, *Documentos*, 440–441.

100. Venegas to Nicolás María de Sierra, 10 Nov. 1810. AGI, Mexico, 1635; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:336; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 270; Mier, *Historia*, 1:246.

101. One of the conspirators, Francisco Araujo, had handed in August a list of the Querétaro plotters to colonial authorities; they assigned agents to follow their activities, filing reports. Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:161–162. One of the agents may have been the prominent Querétaro merchant, Fernando Romero Martinez, a Spaniard. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:336.

102. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:316.

103. Vista Florida, "Memoria," [1814 ?]. AGI, Estado, 87.

104. Some intelligence reports are in "Extracto de los avisos dados desde la ciudad de Querétaro sobre un proyecto de sublevación en Dolores." Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:68–72. Informants included Joaquín Quintana, Mariano Galván, and Juan Ochoa. Note that on 10 September, Ochoa listed—very accurately—the Dolores conspirators Hidalgo, Allende, Aldama, and others. Ibid., 2:64–65, n. 26.

105. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:336; Bustamante, *Siglos*, 273; Mier, *Historia*, 1:246.

106. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 270, and his *Cuadro*, 1:22; Alamán, *Historia*, 1:344.

107. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:345; Juan Collado, in Hernández y Dávalos, *Colección*, 2:908; Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:22.

108. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:345; Bustamante, *Cuadro*, 1:23.

109. The phrase is from INAH, MSS, Colección Antigua, Colección Bustamante, tomo 2, f. 14.

110. *Gazeta del gobierno de Mexico*, 21 Sept. 1810; Noriega, "Informe," AC Expendientes, Comisión ultramarina, 22, n. 18.

111. *Gazeta del gobierno de Mexico*, 21 Sept. 1810; Noriega, "Informe." AC, Expedientes, Comisión Ultramarina, 22, n. 18.

112. Bustamante, *Siglos*, 271

113. Alamán, *Historia*, 1:319.

114. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 191.

115. "Memoria póstuma del . . . Francisco Primo Verdad y Ramos," García, ed., *DHM*, 2:166; "Exposición," Ibid., 2:180.

116. *Gazeta de Mexico*, 20 May 1809; "Carta del Dr. Cos," Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 1:50, n. 17.

117. Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:166. The Bajío's three *diputados* included two clerics, Dr. Mariano Mendiola (Querétaro) and José Caetano de Foncerrada (Valladolid).

118. On this point see: "Diálogo entre un Liberal y un Filósofo," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 4:769, n. 201.

119. Bustamante, "Elogio histórico . . . Morelos," in Hernández y Dávalos, ed., *Colección*, 6:94; *Correo americano del Sur*, 5 Aug. 1813.

120. Zavala, *Manifiesto de los principios políticos*, 11. Zavala was criticizing the post-revolutionary persistence of these *criollo* vanities.

121. Among an estimated 2,500 Spaniards, 1,020 were merchants and clerks. Semo, *Economía y lucha de clases*, 211.

122. Wolf, "Bajío," 186.

123. Castillo Ledón estimated that in the vicinity of San Miguel, Dolores and Querétaro roughly 3,000 were so committed. *Hidalgo*, 1:168.

26. "No Hay Más Recurso Que Ir a Coger Gachupines"

1. Archer, ed., *Birth of Modern Mexico*, 19, 31.

2. For example, Allende, son of a successful immigrant Spanish merchant in the provinces, sought the collaboration of Epigmenio González (*pulpero*), Francisco Loxero (sawmill proprietor), Ignacio Carreño (estate manager), Mariano Lozada (employee in the state-owned tobacco factory at Querétaro), and Ignacio Martínez (an army officer). Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:143.

3. "El cura de Dolores, como muchos de sus más cercanos seguidores, eran burgueses que habrian enfrentado las trabas del antiguo régimen para prosperar." Ávila, *En nombre de la nación*, 147; Silvio Zavala, "Tres acercamientos de la Illustración Francesa en nuestra historia," in Alberro, ed., *Revolución francesa en México*, 16.

4. Liceaga argued that Allende should have pushed for independence in October 1810, when colonial army units would be returning to garrison quarters after maneuvers at Jalapa organized by Viceroy General Iturrigaray, part of a defensive

strategy against English amphibious forces debarking along the Veracruz coast, as they had recently attempted at Buenos Aires. Liceaga, *Adiciones y rectificaciones*, 41.

5. Hamill, in Archer, ed., *Birth of Modern Mexico*, 69.

6. Marco Antonio Landavazo, "Para una historia social de la violencia insurgente: el odio al gachupín," *HMex*, 59, no. 233 (2009), 199. Landavazo finds one of two driving forces behind the 1810 revolution as "La necesidad de expulsar, cuando no aniquilar, a los perversos gachupines para acabar así con una dominación secular que se veía como injusto por tiránica." Ibid., 197.

7. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 150.

8. *La Opinión* (Querétaro), 11 Sept. 1811.

9. There was good reason for doubt: compare one perception ("El común de los Americanos no es capaz de conocer a fondo todas las ventajas que les acarrea la independencia" published in *El Despertador Americano*, 23 Jan. 1811) with that of *criollo* army officer Pedro Septien ("Los indigenas eran indiferentes al ver la libertad," Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:165). This *criollo* attitude matches the peninsular perception of Juan Antonio Yandiola, Cadiz's agent along with Luyando: "Hablar a los indios de la felicidad de darles la libertad, es la misma que a los niños recien nacidos darles alimento que no pueden digerir." "Informe," Mexico, 1 Jan. 1811. AC, Expedientes, Comisión Ultramarina, 22, n. 13.

10. On the millenarian coloration of *campesino* support for Hidalgo's movement, see Villoro, *Revolución*, 70.

11. Liceaga, *Adiciones y rectificaciones*, 20.

12. Riaño was impressed—and properly so—by the intellectual, engaging *cura* of Dolores. Herrejón Peredo, *Hidalgo antes del grito de Dolores*, 28.

13. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos,* 219; Miguel Costanzó, *Pública vindicación del . . . Ayuntamiento de . . . Guanaxuato* (Mexico, 1811), 5–6. For the frequent intellectual exchanges between *cura* Hidalgo and *obispo-electo* Abad y Queipo, see Herrejón Peredo, *Hidalgo*, 50–78.

14. Bustamente, *Martirología*, 29 and *Cuadro histórico*, 2:24.

15. Francisco Venegas, "Manifiesto de su virrey a la Nueva España," Mexico, 27 Oct. 1810. *Colección del Fraile*, t. 605, p. 1.

16. "Extracts from papers . . . lent to me by Señor Obregón," 11 Jan. 1811. Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Vaughan Papers, E.

17. Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:142. A Valladolid conspirator rented one of Hidalgo's small properties. Herrejón Peredo, *Hidalgo*, 35.

18. Morin, *Michoacán*, 155. Liceaga thought San Juan de los Lagos the place to find a "numerosa multitud de Españoles; y estando a mayor abundamiento desprevenidos y dedicados exclusivamente al comerecio." *Adiciones y rectificaciones*, 19.

19. Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*. This *proclama* was found in the papers of *piulpero* Epigmenio González.

20. Among Allende's co-conspirators numbering twenty-two, four were clerics. Liceaga, *Adiciones y rectificaciones*, 18.

21. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 222; Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:140.

22. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 218.

23. Liceaga, *Adicicciones y rectificaciones*, 20.

24. Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 221–222.

25. Such sentiments were publicized in *pasquines* two years earlier: "Mueran los

gachupines y no tendrá sangre en sus venas el criollo que no ayude a ello." Lafuente Ferrari, *Iturrigaray*, 162.

26. Castillo Ledón, *Hidalgo*, 1:183; "Letter addressed to Señor Obregon, Deputy to Cortes from Mexico," Mexico, 7 Nov. 1810. Oxford University, Bodleian Library, Vaughan Papers, E. On the Sunday morning of 16 September 1810, Hidalgo spoke to hundreds of parishioners "por ser día domingo y haber ocurrido a misa de los ranchos inmediatos." Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 226.

27. Anon., *La Opinión* (Querétaro), 11 Sept. 1845; Luís Villoro, cited in Lemoine Villicaña, *Morelos*, 231.

28. Bustamante, *Martirología*, 4.

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Index

Page numbers in *italics* indicate tables.

Abad y Queipo: Castillejos compared to, 570; on colonial insurrection, 653; on Consulado de Cadiz, 445; on elite factions, 584; as finance expert, 596–97; on financial solicitations, 643; Hidalgo and, 656; on Junta Central, 600, 644–45; Lizana and, 611–12; Lloredo and, 611; on López Cancelada, 574; on lower classes, 635–36; on merchants in Bajío, 639; on Napoleon, 314; as political economist, 317–18, 319; Santa María and, 604; in Sevilla, 259; on status of New Spain, 626–30; on trade system, 526; on wealth accumulation, 642

Abarca, José María, 605

Abella, Manuel de, 545, 546

Acha, Tomás Domingo de, 218, 231, 435

Achútegui, León, 204, 257

Ágreda, Diego de, 330, 342, 525, 576, 579, 650

Ágreda, Simón de, 302, 442, 444, 450

Aguayo, marques de, 269, 272, 289

Águila, conde de, 112, 113, 121

Águilar, Juan de, 166

Aguirre, Felix de, 261

Aguirre, Pedro Antonio de, 426, 436, 444

Aguirre, Teodoro Francisco de, 198, 201

Aguirre y Viana, Guillermo Martínez de: Audiencia and, 622; as censor, 558; *comisionados* and, 264; Consulado and, 147; on France, 315; honors for, 650; Jabat and, 265, 335; *juntas generales* and, 266–67, 268, 271, 276, 284, 285; life and career of, 214–15; Luyando and, 482; "Paiserón" and, 562; Rayas and, 308; as regent, 646; retirement of, 593, 597; Sagarzurieta and, 218; Talamantes and, 240, 248; Venegas and, 649; G. Yermo and, 339–40

Alamán, Lucas: on Consolidación receipts, 259; on critical moment, 205; on Iturrigaray coup, 335, 341; on Uzcola incident, 212; on viceroyalty, 664; on Yermo, 334

Alba, Lorenzo Hernandez de, 200

Albuerne, Manuel de: arrest of, 525; Consejo Reunido and, 510; Hormazas and, 495–96, 513; Junta de Cadiz and, 522–23; as *oficial mayor,* 515–20; on Regencia, 526; regents and, 521

Alburquerque, duque de, 466, 467, 484, 486–88, 532–34

Alcalá Galiano, Antonio, 27–28, 394, 487

Alcántara, José Andrés, 579

Alfaro y Beaumont, Sáinz de, 333–34, 343, 594
Alfieri, Vittorio, 395–96
Allende, 658, 756n1
almanceneros. See merchants
Almanza, José Mariano: election of, 474, 595; Iturrigaray and, 684n79; Johnson and, 720n21; Junta de Sevilla and, 189; mercury and, 303, 305
Alonso, Celedonia, 113
Alonso, Pedro, 187, 189
Alsázua, Bartolomé, 302
Álvarez Campana, Manuel, 302
Amarillas, marqués de, 96
americanos. See *criollos/americanos*
Amerindians: alienation of, 641–47; communities of, in Bajío, 633, 634, 635–36, 638, 654
Amézaga, Juan Gualberto, 67
Andalusia: French control of, 466; insurrection in, 105–12; overview of, 95–99. *See also* Cadiz; Sevilla
Antonio *(infante),* 32, 77, 84, 85, 86, 99
Anza, Marcelo José de, 310, 650
Aparici, Pedro de, 142, 147, 148, 151, 156, 157
Aparici y Prado, José Manuel de, 442
Apecechea, Fermín de, 305, 573
Apodaca, Juan Ruiz de: Alburquerque and, 534; Godoy and, 124–25; in London, 427–28, 435, 532; trade issues and, 540–41; H. Wellesley and, 538–39
Aranda, conde de, 8, 297, 298, 471
Arango y Parreño, Francisco: Beye de Cisneros compared to, 320, 321; boasts of, 163; on commercial system, 178; *informe* of, 171–73; opening of port of Havana by, 228; Someruelos and, 167, 168, 174
Aranjuez: Cevallos on, 51–52, 58, 67–68; double coup at, 33–36; as major *golpe,* 132; as model for insurrections, 106; role of French at, 36–39; significance of, 40–42
Archer, Christon, 654, 664
Argüelles, Agustin, 273–74
Árias de Miranda, 384
Árias de Villafañe, 146, 230
Aróstegui, Martín de, 126
Arrillaga, Basilio de, 142, 153
Arrillaga, Francisco, 181, 685n85
Artola, Miguel, 374, 378, 550
Asturian model of change, 273–76
Audiencia de Mexico: Castillejos and, 565–71; *congreso* and, 283–84; Consulado elections and, 585–86; criticism of, 191; *fiscales* of, 218–20; freedom of discussion and, 251–52; Garibay and, 591; intermediaries of, 331–35; Iturrigaray resignation plans and, 279–81; Junta de Sevilla and, 268; jurisdiction of, 223–24; López Cancelada and, 574; members of, 214, 221; novilísima cuidad versus, 225–30; *oidores* of, 214–18, 221–22; preemptive coup and, 330; rejection of colonial junta by, 232–33; role of, 221; Talamantes on, 247–48, 250–51; as viceregal replacement, 589, 613, 622, 624; Villaurrutia on, 291. *See also* Aguirre y Viana, Guillermo Martínez de; Bataller y Ros, Miguel Antonio; González Carbajal, Ciriaco; Mendieta
Austria y Achútegui, José Donato de, 177, 499
avería, 142–43, 148–50, 151–61
ayuntamientos: of Havana, 228; of Mexico City, 214, 225–30, 647; role of, 89–90; of Sevilla, 96, 107–8; of Veracruz, 176–77, 188, 189–90
Ayus, Juan de, 107
Azanza, José Miguel de: alternate junta and, 85–86; on assassination of Solano, 122; Borbón and, 221–22; *comercio neutro* and, 177, 262; on defeat at Bailén, 368; as *ilustrado,* 40, 76; José I and, 87; proposal of, 92; as replacement for Iturrigaray, 686n99; Talamantes and, 235; vacuum of power and, 88; as viceroy, 198, 199, 200, 215, 220
Azcárate, Gabriel de, 169

Azcárate y Lezama, Juan Francisco: on abdications, 247; arrest of, 348; Ayuntamiento and, 225; as *criollo,* 195; *junta de gobierno* and, 226–27; Junta de Sevilla and, 272; mercury and, 305; Talamantes and, 237, 253; Villaurrutia and, 268, 289

Bailén, Spanish victory at, 364–65, 366–67
Bajío: *clase media* in, 636–41; description of, 631; economy and society of, 632–36; plotting of rebellion in, 654–58; regionalism in, 652; roots of alienation in, 641–47. *See also* Valladolid
Baltimore, direct trade with, 180
Bárcena, Cristóval de, 337
Bárcena, Juan Ruiz de la, 161, 215
Bárcena, Patricio, 341
Bardaxi, Eusebio de, 57, 532, 537
Barreto y Cárdenas, José Francisco, 169, 176
Basadre, Vicente, 113, 177, 261, 328, 541–42, 703n15
Basle, Treaty of, 9, 48, 52
Basoco, Antonio: Consulado and, 140, 143, 156, 158, 579; coup and, 330; donation from, 596; González Carbajal and, 218; as investor, 435; Iturrigaray and, 272–73, 342; Junta de Sevilla and, 269, 574; at *junta general,* 231; mercury and, 305; as mine owner, 573; *pasquines* and, 210; Talamantes and, 237, 241; title for, 525, 650; Villaurrutia family and, 287; as *vizcaíno,* 577
Bataller y Ros, Miguel Antonio: age of, 214; Audiencia and, 622; Consulado and, 147; Iturrigaray coup and, 335; *juntas generales* and, 267, 271, 285; life and career of, 215–17; G. Yermo and, 339–41
Bayonne: anatomy of, 57–66; Cevallos's account of events at, 45–57; as public ritual, 64–65; strategists of, 66–69; treaty of, 46, 65, 73–74, 371
Beauharnais, François de: Champagny and, 12, 21; Escoiquiz and, 10–11; Fernando and, 37, 39, 48; Godoy and, 24; marriage proposal and, 26–27; Napoleon and, 15; on Spanish opinion of France, 13–14
Beleña, Eusebio Ventura, 222–23
Béliardí, 92
Berazaluze, Marcos Antonio, 563, 599, 616
Berg, duc de (Grand Duke of). *See* Murat, Joaquin
Beristáin y Souza, 292, 343
Bernal, Waldo Indalecio, 332
Beye de Cisneros, Francisco, 319, 348
Beye de Cisneros, José Ignacio: Castillejos and, 564; *Comercio libre vindicado de la nota de ruinoso,* 320–23; Iturrigaray and, 283, 307, 319–20, 335, 343; on Junta Central, 590; nationalism of, 316; as political economist, 317, 318–23; Villaurrutia and, 289; on war with England, 303
Blanco White, José: Alburquerque and, 487; on commercial system, 525–26, 528; *cortes* and, 549; *El Español* and, 614; in England, 546–47; on government of Spain, 566; on Liverpool Letter, 542; on *Orden* of 17 May, 530; on Regencia, 614–15; on Venegas, 648
Blanco y Crespo, José, 397
Blasio, Ramon, 236
blockades: by England, 178, 259; of Venezuelan ports, 542–43
Bodega, 288, 343, 594
Boggiero, Basilio, 393
Bolívar, Simón, 215, 539
Bonaparte, Joseph: retreat of government of, 364, 367, 371; as Spanish king, 93, 315; Spanish occupation and, 87, 88
Bonaparte, Napoleon: Abad y Queipo on, 627; Aranjuez coups and, 58; Bourbon dynasty and, 22–23; Cevallos on, 49, 52–53, 59–60; Charles IV and, 55, 60–61, 65; Dos

Bonaparte, Napoleon (*cont.*)
de Mayo and, 78; Dupont and, 367; Escoiquiz on, 62–63; Escorial affair and, 9, 10; Fernando and, 10–11, 50; Junta de Valencia and, 362; marriage proposal and, 15, 26, 27, 37; Murat and, 30–31, 76–77; occupation of Madrid and, 23–24; Portugal and, 15–19; Spain and, 11–12, 20–21; Spanish opposition and, 367–68; tactics of, 24–25; treaty proposals and, 41
Borbón, Francisco Xavier: on Audiencia, 224; Azanza and, 221–22; Castillejos and, 565–66; on colonial junta, 232; *congreso* and, 283–84; Iturrigaray and, 279, 281; "machetes" conspiracy and, 200
Borbón, Luís de, 457
Bornos, conde de, 11
Bourbon, 267, 278
Bourbon dynasty: in Bayonne, 57; displacement of, interpretations of, 69–70; fears of flight to America by, 30; as hostages, 74; internment of in France, 65; Napoleon and, 22–23, 61, 63; restoration of, 68; rumors of departure to Bayonne, 77; withdrawal to Andalusia, 32. *See also* Charles IV; Fernando VII
Braganza dynasty, 15, 17, 18, 662
Branciforte, 146, 220
Brazil, 18, 19
bribery: Consulado de Mexico City and, 154–55; mercury allotments and, 304–6
Bustamante, Carlos María de: on American Revolution, 607; on Audiencia, 214, 222; on autonomous Mexico, 657; on Borbón, 232; *Diario de México* and, 237, 288–89; on ethnic hierarchy, 196, 198; on Garibay, 591; on honors and rewards, 650; as insurgent, 659; on Iturrigaray coup, 340–41; on Juanmartiñena, 332; on Junta Central proclamation, 595; on *junta general,* 230; as legal counsel to conspirators, 610; on mine owner factions, 303; on Rayas, 308
Bustamante, Tomás Mariano, 560
Bustamante y Guerra, Francisco, 499, 519
Bustillo, Ramón de, 170

Caballero, José Antonio, 32, 35–36, 147, 218, 365, 386
Cabarrús, Francisco, 385, 386
Cadena, Juan Miguel Páez de la, 153, 485, 486
Cadiz: *cortes* at, 551–52; customs revenues at, 439; elites in, 615; as financial core of Spanish Empire, 443; insurrections in, 106–12; security of port of, 365–66. *See also* Consulado de Cadiz; Junta de Cadiz
Caldalso, José, 395
Calleja (general), 96
Calleja (viceroy), 220–21
Calleja, Antonio, 355–56, 563
Calleja, Felix María, 348, 601
Calomarde, Tadeo Francisco de, 546
Calvo de Rozas, Lorenzo: activism of, 399, 400; fund-raising by, 425; imprisonment of, 476, 484; Junta Central and, 391–95, 464–65; liberalism of, 375; on Regencia, 458–59; on Saavedra, 468; Valdés and, 383; on year 1810, 467
Camargo, Carlos, 309
Campomanes, Tomás Antonio Rodrígues de, 202, 273, 275
Cañada, conde de la (Acedo Rico), 471
Canalías, Rafael, 342, 343, 703n15
Canclaux, 106
Canning, George, 47, 124
Cano Manuel, Antonio, 508–9, 510
Capetillo, Faustino, 202–3, 205, 207, 292
Capmany, Antonio, 416
Caracas: Consulado de, 500; uprising in, 644
Caro, Francisco, 461
Carvajal y Lancaster, José de, 470
Casa Alta, marqués de, 260

Casa Laiglesia, marqués de, 126, 260, 302
Casa Rábago, conde de, 421–22
Casa Rul, conde de, 305
Casa Tremanes, marqueses de, 384
Casa Valencia, marqués de, 86
Castañeda, José González, 153
Castañeda, José Mariano Ruíz de, 309
Castaños, Francisco Javier: behavior of, 104–5; in Cadiz, 465; Consejo de Castilla and, 373; Dalrymple and, 99–100, 101–2; French view of, 103–4; at Junta Central, 404; on Madrid insurgency, 100–101; Motijo and, 97; *Orden* of 17 May and, 521, 523; as regent, 468, 482; Torres and, 99
castas: in Guanajuato, 633, 635–36; roots of alienation of, 641–47
Castilla, 269, 272. *See also* Consejo de Castilla
Castilla y León, Junta de, 382
Castillejos, Juan de: Audiencia de Mexico and, 565–71; radicalization of, 561–65
Castillejos, Julian de, 309
Castillón, Juan Bautista Victor, 179
Castillo Negrete, Manuel del, 142, 143–44, 146, 159, 218, 318
Castlereagh, 99, 103
Catani: Aguirre and, 265, 649; Audiencia and, 351; on Garibay, 586, 591; Iturrigaray coup and, 343; on Juanmartiñena, 331; retirement of, 650; security agency and, 595
Cevallos, Ciriaco, 183, 184, 186–89, 279, 326, 407
Cevallos, Miguel de, 81
Cevallos, Pedro: at Aranjuez, 36; *ayuntamientos* and, 89–90; as Bayonne strategist, 66, 73–74; career of, 67; Dos de Mayo and, 79; Escoiquiz and, 63–64, 67–68; Escorial affair and, 9, 12; *Exposición,* 45–57, 60, 67; Junta Central and, 398, 428, 436; manifesto of, 368; Murat and, 365; on Napoleon, 13; *Observaciones,* 57–60; Sevilla and, 97; Solano and, 116; Talamantes and, 238; as traditionalist, 86; withdrawal of Bourbons and, 32
Chabannes, 14–15
Champagny: Beauharnais and, 10, 11, 12, 21; Cevallos and, 51–52; Chabannes and, 14; communications from, 314; Escorial affair and, 21–22, 24
Charles III, military-as-bureaucrat phenomenon and, 197–98
Charles IV: abdication of, 31, 33–36, 58; Escorial affair and, 8, 9, 22; Fernando and, 53–54, 55; in France and Italy, 65; invasion of Portugal and, 16; Izquierdo and, 24, 31–32; letter of 2 May, 116–17; marriage proposal and, 13; Murat and, 38–39, 85; Napoleon and, 20, 25, 53, 60, 65; renunciation of, 54–55, 73; treaty of Bayonne and, 46
Chavarri, Francisco de, 210
Chávez, Manuel Ruiz de, 605
Chico, José María, 305
Cinco Gremios Mayores, 425, 426, 434, 437, 441
clase media: alienation of, 571; in Bajío, 636–41; definition of, 557; in Valladolid, 603
class collaboration: in Dos de Mayo riot, 83; in insurgency, 654–58
Clere, Felipe, 153
clerical establishment: as informants, 611; of Mexico City, 333–34; as politicized, 564; in Valladolid, 603. *See also specific clerics*
Cobían, 342
Coca, Andrés, 443–44
Cochrane, Andrew Johnson, 493–94, 538, 595–96, 720n21
Colla, Joaquin, 143, 144, 330, 575
Collado, Juan, 543, 565, 643, 649
Colón, José, 616
colonialism, independence as realistic alternative to, 602
colonial system: classes and status groups within, 556; collapse of,

colonial system (*cont.*)
555–56; Consulado de Mexico and, 576; inequality under, 642–47; organization and endurance of, 661–62; pillars of, 587; reassessment of, 557. *See also* transatlantic trade system
colonies: conflictive messages sent to, 477–81; convergence of policies toward, 76; displacement of Bourbons and, 69–74; England and, 103; factions in, 622–26; insurgency in, 663–64; as integral part of *monarquía,* 413–18; power vacuum in, 205–6, 246, 294–95; promise of equality of status of, 491, 643–44, 645; Spanish political class and, 101; unfulfilled promises to, 557. *See also* Havana; New Spain
Colón y Larreátegui, José Joaquín de, 484, 486
comercio directo, Havana and, 170–75
comercio libre: Albuerne and, 516–17; Beye de Cisneros on, 320–23; Consulado de Cadiz and, 112–13; New Spain and, 133; Valdés and, 382
Comercio libre vindicado de la nota de ruinoso (J. Beye de Cisneros), 320–23
comercio neutro: Azanza and, 177, 262; Consulado de Cadiz and, 437; Fernández de León and, 498, 503; Havana and, 163; New Spain and, 133; Saavedra and, 301, 386, 424, 498; smuggling and, 186; Veracruz and, 177–78
comercio recíproco, 171
Comisión Executiva, 459, 461
Compañía de Filipinas, 390–91, 441, 445, 494, 502, 532
Compañía Guipuzcoana, 470, 502
Concha Castañeda, Francisco de la, 608
"Congreso Nacional del Reyno de Nueva España" (Talamantes), 227, 240, 242–44, 246–48, 249–50, 251, 253, 254, 269
conquest in colonial thought, 196–97, 211–12
Consejo de Castilla: at Aranjuez, 35–36; on Dos de Mayo casualties, 77; Fernando and, 33, 56; Junta Central and, 371–74, 454; Junta de Sevilla and, 370–71, 405; Junta de Valencia and, 364; Murat and, 365; provincial juntas and, 457; Regencia and, 550; withdrawal of Bourbons and, 32
Consejo de Indias: J. Bonaparte and, 315; Consulado de Mexico and, 147–48, 159; Lardizábal and, 472–73; "machetes" conspiracy and, 200–201, 202; Regencia and, 550
Consejo de Regencia. *See* Regencia
Consejo Reunido de España e Indias, 457; authority of, 481; Caribbean and, 508–12; *cortes* and, 543–44, 547–48; Havana port and, 496; Iturrigaray case and, 616–17; Junta Central and, 484–86; Lardizábal and, 469; Regencia and, 466–67, 478–79, 483–84
conservatism and Junta Central, 459, 460–61
Consolidación program: colonial tradesmen and, 640; extension of, 439–40; funds of, 427, 428, 434, 435–36, 444; Iturrigaray and, 141; sale of church properties under, 12, 259; Talamantes on, 243, 244
Constantin, 103–4, 116, 117
constitution, proposal for, 92, 93
Consulado de Cadiz: *comercio libre* and, 112–13; *cortes* and, 544–45; Fernández de León and, 503–4; Junta Central and, 418–20, 422–24, 425–29, 444–45; Junta de Sevilla and, 95, 113–14, 123–24, 258–59, 443–44; leverage of, 417–18, 437, 446–47; liquidity of, 438–39; port monopoly of, 94–95, 410–11; preemptive coup and, 330; Regencia and, 445–48; state finances and, 440–45, *441*; trade with colonies and, 301; treasury of, 437–39; *vales reales* and, 96; Villel and, 420–23
Consulado de Caracas, 500
Consulado de Guadalajara, 142, 144
Consulado de Havana, 173

Consulado de Mexico: Audiencia and, 585–86; *avería* and, 142–43, 148–49, 151–61, 155–56; bribery by, 154–55; Consejo de Indias and, 147–48; elections to, 136–42, 143–44, 576–80, 583–84; factions in, 134, 577–80, 584–85; as financial intermediary, 150–51, 158; Iturrigaray and, 144–47, 159–60, 161; junta convened by, 210–11; *montañeses* in, 134, 574, 577–79; preemptive coup and, 575; public finance and, 449–50; requests for accounts of, 155–59; Sagarzurieta critique of, 160–61; transatlantic trade system and, 162; use of funds of, 149–50; voting blocks in, 574; Yermo and, 495
Consulado de Sevilla, 148–49
Consulado de Veracruz: accounts of, 157; *comisionados* and, 176–77; Iturrigaray and, 142, 184; Junta de Sevilla and, 185–86
Córdoba, Pedro José Fernández de, 406, 472
Cornel, Antonio, 398, 411–12
Cortabarría, Antonio Ignacio de, 543
cortes: Calvo and, 394; Castillejos amnesty and, 570; Consejo Reunido and, 543–44; Consulado de Cadiz and, 544–45; divisions in, 550–52; election of colonial *disputados* for, 478, 549–50; elite reaction to calls for, 456–57; Fernando and, 374; idea of resurrecting, 399–400; Jovellanos and, 392; Junta Central and, 376, 459–60; Junta de Sevilla and, 369, 455–56; Junta de Valencia and, 456; number of chambers in, 547–48; opposition to, 543–44; postponement of, 491; Regencia and, 545–46; resolution calling for, 455; subsitute *disputados* for, 548–49; Valdés and, 383
Cortina, conde de la: Consulado and, 143, 146; as investor, 435; Iturrigaray and, 145, 272–73, 313; Junta de Sevilla and, 269; Partearroyo and, 144; promotion for, 650
Cortina González, Francisco, 305
Cosío, José Fernández de, 101, 412
Costanzó, Miguel, 656–57
Cotera, Francisco de la: Iturrigaray and, 141–42, 210, 342; Junta de Sevilla and, 574; at *junta general,* 231; as *montañes,* 577–78, 579
coups: double, at Aranjuez, 33–36, 58; initial session of Junta Central as, 374; mythology of, 331; in New Spain, 131; plan for, in Valladolid, 605–12; "pueblo" as active in, 326; Villel and, 421–22. *See also* preemptive coup against Iturrigaray; preemptive coups
Covarrubias, José María, 332
criollos/americanos: Abad y Queipo on, 628–29; Audiencia views of, 222, 246, 247–48; in Bajío, 633–34; divisions between *peninsulares* and, 558, 588–90, 605, 615; insurgency and, 663; Iturrigaray and, 136, 194–95, 203, 299, 307–8, 556; Lizana and, 557–58; in New Spain, 1–2; racial superiority and, 134; Regencia and, 617; roots of alienation of, 641–47; Uzcola incident and, 212; in Valladolid, 599–600, 605–6, 605–10, 611. *See also* Azcárate y Lezama, Juan Francisco; Beye de Cisneros, José Ignacio; Fernández de León, Estéban; Obregón, Ignacio; Primo Verdad y Ramos, Francisco; Rayas, marqués de; Talamantes y Baeza, Melchor; Villaurrutia y López Osorio, Jacobo de
crisis: in colonies, 205–6, 246, 294–95; constitutional, 400; external and domestic factors in, 491; salient feature of, 376–77; in Spain, 3–4, 7, 88–89, 432–33
crisis managers: Andalusia and, 97; Bayonne and, 73; execution of grand design of, 294; fears of, 127; plan for colonies and, 111–12; regime change and, 60–61
Cristo y Conde, José Antonio de, 345–46, 348

Cruz Muñóz, Tomás de la, 168
Cuadra, Sebastian de la, 287
Cuba: agricultural development of, 164; sugar from, 169, 173, 174, 178, 497. *See also* Havana
Cuesta, Gregorio de la, 72, 84, 373, 382–83

Dalrymple, Hew, 99–100, 101–2, 103, 108–9, 123, 443
Daoiz y Torres, Luis, 77, 79–80, 81–83, 84
decapitalization of New Spain, 242, 640
decolonization, 664
de Pradt, Abbé, 46, 89
derecho de subvención, 441–43
Desdevises du Dézert, 78
Diario de México, 237, 288–89, 561
Diaz de la Vega, Silvestre, 237, 238
Domínguez, Miguel, 635, 637, 640, 656, 658
Dos de Mayo: Castaños on, 100–101; Cuerpo de Artillería and, 79–83; overview of, 76–79
Dupont, 72, 103, 105, 106, 366–67
Durana, Liborio Tomás de, 204, 257
Duroc, 23, 46, 49, 51, 65

Echarri, Juan Bautista, 332
Echeverría, Pedro Miguel de, 170
Echeverría, Santiago José de, 341–42, 345
Elhuyar, Fausto, 215–16, 308, 310
Elío, Xavier, 543
elites: Andalusian, 96; in Aranjuez, 35, 36–39; assassination of, 121, 122; in Cadiz, 615; calls for *cortes* and, 456–57; conflicting views of, 483; Dos de Mayo and, 80; fear and alienation of, 570; invasion of Portugal and, 19; tensions between, 2, 572; in Valladolid, 602–3, 605. See also *criollos/americanos;* merchants; *peninsulares/europeos*
Embargo Act of 1807 (U.S.), 164, 170, 242
Emparán, Miguel de, 215, 339, 344, 646, 649

England: as ally, 431–32; amphibious operations of, 182; Andalusia and, 97–99; J. Beye de Cisneros on, 320; blockades by, 178, 259; *cortes* and, 546; direct trade issue and, 527–28; Gibraltar and, 99–100; Havana and, 163; Junta Central alliance with, 428; Junta de Valencia and, 362–63; naval power of, 312–14; objectives of, 530–31; proposed loan for Junta Central from, 426–27; threat of economic imperialism of, 245; trade system and, 531–41; wars against, 430–31
Erice, Pedro Juan de, 170, 175, 177
Escaño, Antonio, 84–85, 468
Escaño, José, 398
escarmiento: Castillejos and, 563, 568; C. Cevallos and, 186–89; Villel and, 420–23. *See also* coups
Escoiquiz, Juan de: account of Bayonne by, 46, 61–63; as Bayonne strategist, 66–67, 73, 74, 293; Beauharnais and, 11; Cevallos and, 67; Escorial affair and, 8–9, 58; exile of, 97; Gil compared to, 109; marriage proposal and, 10; *Memorias,* 671n3; *Mexico conquistada,* 196; on Napoleon, 68; treaty of Bayonne and, 65
Escorial affair: Champagny and, 21–22; Escoiquiz and, 58; exile of participants in, 97; overview of, 8–15; significance of, 7–8, 20, 22
Esménard, Jean Baptiste, 21–22, 24
Esquilache, 8, 132
Esquivel, Antonio, 107
Estala, Pedro, 395
Esteller, Juan Bautista, 110
ethnic hierarchy in New Spain, 195–97. See also *castas; criollos/americanos; indios; peninsulares/europeos*
europeos. See *peninsulares/europeos*
Exposición (Cevallos), 45–57, 60, 67
Ezpeleta y Veyre, José de, 84

Fagoaga, Francisco, 272
Fagoaga, José Juan de: Aguirre and, 215; Ayuntamiento and, 692n50;

celebration of Fernando VII and, 211; *comisionados* and, 268; *gratificaciónes* and, 304; mercury and, 305; Velázquez and, 283
Fagoaga, José María: *gratificaciónes* and, 304; Iturrigaray and, 272, 576; mercury and, 305; Rayas and, 309; Talamantes and, 238, 242
Falces, José María, 567
Fernández de León, Antonio, 468, 498–99
Fernández de León, Estéban: arrest of, 525; Basque group and, 499–501; on colonies, 526; as *contador general* of finance section, 498; explanation for removal of, 615; family and career of, 498–99; Havana port and, 497; Hormazas and, 511; Junta General de Agricultores and, 501–3; Orden of 17 May and, 513–15; Pinillos and, 174; position paper of, 511–12; prescience of, 530; as regent, 468–69, 507; suspension of, 523; trade issues and, 460, 504–7, 527, 598–99
Fernández Peredo, Diego, 574, 575
Fernández Peredo, Juan Manuel, 574
fernandistas: Andalusia and, 95; Aranjuez and, 33–35, 40; attitudes toward France and, 13; Bayonne and, 73; colonial income and, 428; commissioners of Junta de Sevilla as, 126; Consejo de Castilla and, 371; consequences of strategy of, 121; *cortes* and, 551; Dos de Mayo and, 79; Escoiquiz on, 62; Escorial affair and, 9–10; factions of, 84, 88–89; García Malo on, 462; Godoy on, 64; military reversals of, 408; at Sevilla, 106–7. *See also* crisis managers
Fernando VII: abdication of father of, 33; in Bayonne, 50–51; Beauharnais and, 37; celebration of birthday of, 621; Cevallos on, 48–49; conditional renunciation of, 53–54; *cortes* and, 374; devolution of, 55–56; Dos de Mayo riots and, 78–79; Escoiquiz and, 66–67; Escorial affair and, 7–16, 22; formal renunciation of, 65–66, 73; Garay and, 380; Godoy on, 64; instruction on Junta de Gobierno from, 84; Lardizábal brothers and, 472; letter of, 55; Napoleon and, 42, 50; return to Madrid by, 49, 61; royal decrees of, 56–57; travel to Bayonne of, 59
Filangieri, Caetano, 121
financial situation: Consulado de Mexico and, 150–51, 158, 449–50; of Junta Central, 424–29, 434–35, 436, 596, 618–19, 629, 640; of Junta de Cadiz, 488–89; of Junta de Sevilla, 123–24, 258; of metropolitan governments, 643; of Murat, 91–92; of provincial juntas, 433
fiscales. See Audiencia de Mexico
Flon, 298, 560, 562–63, 601, 648, 656
Flores Estrada, Álvarez, 273–75, 319, 526–27
Floridablanca, conde de, 260, 294, 373, 378, 399, 471
Fonleta, Francisco, 101–2
Fontainebleau, Treaty of: P. Cevallos and, 49, 52; consequences of, 7; Escorial affair and, 10; Godoy and, 9, 13; Napoleon and, 19; Portugal and, 16, 18; provisioning of French units and, 17
forced labor, 634
France: defeat at Bailén, 364–65, 366–67; foreign policy of, 42–43; invasion of Spain by, 19; Iturrigaray views of, 314–15; Louisiana and, 178; military forces of, 28; misjudgment of Spanish situation by, 70–71; Spanish public opinion of, 25–28, 29; Spanish support for in wars against England, 430–31; views of intervention in Spain by, 12–15. *See also* Bonaparte, Napoleon
Franco-Spanish alliance: England and, 540; Escorial affair and, 9; Godoy and, 43–44; Havana and, 165; Napoleon and, 31–32; Spain's reasons for, 20; Veracruz merchants and, 185

Frere, 494
Frias, duque de, 31
Fuenclara (viceroy), 137–39
Fuerte Hijar, marqués de, 427

gachupines. See *peninsulares/europeos*
Galicia, Junta de, 125–26
Gálvez, José de: Beleña and, 222; Consulado de Mexico and, 139, 140, 150; Reglamento of, 322; riots and, 556; Valdés and, 381; Velázquez de León and, 282
Gálvez, Matías de, 223
Garay, Martín de, 379–81, 394, 396, 408–9, 544
Garay y Llano, Pedro Antonio, 483, 622
García, Eusebio, 596
García, Santiago, 210, 257, 575
García Dávila, Ignacio, 416
García Herreros, Manuel, 305
García Malo, Ignacio, 459, 462–64, 716n48
García Obeso, José, 605–6, 607, 608–10, 612
Gardoqui, Diego de, 156, 438
Gargollo, Luis, 519
Garibay, Pedro: Consulado and, 578, 583–84; handbills and, 560; Iturrigaray coup and, 343; Junta Central and, 590; R. Lardizábal on, 474; on mob action against Cevallos, 189; performance of, 589, 591–93, 624; reexports and, 495; replacement for, 584; security tribunal of, 565; suppression of criticism by, 575; as viceroy, 348, 352
Garro y Micheltoreno, Ambrosio Augustín de, 476
Gazeta, official documents published in, 204
Gazeta de México: censorship of, 558, 618, 620; on Consejo de Regencia, 620–22; content analysis of, 618–22; false reports in, 228; on Junta Central, 620–21; names of lenders in, 618–19; official documents published in, 204–5; promises of *cortes* in, 619–20; publication of coup decisions in, 354–55; reports of juntas in, 226, 227. *See also* López Cancelada, Juan
Gazeta ministerial de Sevilla, 364–65, 406
Gibraltar, 98, 99–100
Gil, Manuel, 107, 109, 111, 413
Gil y Lemos, Francisco: Jabat and, 127, 262; Murat and, 365; Talamantes and, 235; Valdés and, 382; Vandeuil on, 72; withdrawal of Bourbons and, 32
Giraldo, Pedro, 35, 81
Godoy, Manuel: Apodaca and, 124–25; on Bayonne, 61, 64; Beauharnais and, 24; blaming of, 27; Consulado de Cadiz and, 438–39; coup d'état against, 33–36, 58; critics of, 399; Escorial affair and, 7–16; French understanding of opposition to, 42–44; Gil and, 109; hatred of, 28; invasion of Portugal and, 17; Jabat and, 262; Jovellanos and, 8, 434; Lardizábal brothers and, 471; memo attacking, 21–22; Napoleon and, 24–25, 32; Sevilla and, 96; Someruelos and, 167–68; Tap and, 106–7; Tournon on, 29; Treaty of Bayonne and, 65; Velarde and, 81; Veracruz and, 178
golilla faction of Floridablanca, 471
golpe de estado, 132. *See also* coups
Gómez de Labrador, Pedro, 53
Gonzaga Correa, Luís, 605, 608
González, Epigmenio, 649, 656, 658, 756n1
González Calderón, Tomás, 209–10
González Carbajal, Ciriaco: Abad y Quiepo report and, 318; age of, 214; arrival at Cadiz, 447, 448–49; in Cadiz, 511; Consulado and, 147; on *gratificaciónes,* 304; Iturrigaray and, 217–18, 229–30, 339; life and career of, 217–18; recall of, 597, 645–46; Regencia and, 558; Talamantes and, 239
González Lopez de Haro, 238
González Vertiz, Juan Ignacio, 210
González y Montoya, José, 236

Gordon, William, 259, 435
Gordon & Murphy, 177, 259, 303, 436
Goyeneta, Joaquín de, 107
Granada, 113
Granados, Luis, 346
Guadalajara, Consulado de, 142, 144
Guanajuato: census data for, 639; criminality in, 634; riots in, 555–56; silver mining in, 633. *See also* Riaño, Juan Antonio
Guardamino, Juan de, 391
Guardamino, Lorenzo Angulo de, 391
Guardiola, marques de (Cervantes y Cevallos), 236, 237, 292
Guerra, Benito, 564
Guerrero y Luyando, Manuel Cuevas Moreno de Monroy, 237
guerrilla warfare, 663–64
Guridi y Alcocer, 318
Gutiérrez, Manuel Agustín, 601

Hamill, Hugh, 654
handbills *(pasquines):* anti-Spanish tone of, 207, 560, 589; Consulado response to, 210–11; on Franco-Spanish alliance, 185; Iturrigaray and, 207, 210–11, 356; by "Paiserón," 560–68; points of view in, 375; threatening, 203; volume of, 592
Hauterive, 21
Havana: *ayuntamiento* of, 228; Cano Manuel on, 508–9; Consejo Reunido and, 508–12; Consulado de, 173; demands of planters in, 490; as distribution point, 162–63; English occupation of, 163; Fernando abdication and elites of, 165–66; opening of port at, 228, 494–98; plan to form junta in, 166–69, 174; reexports and, 164–65, 176, 194; Regencia and, 527; trade policy and, 164–65, 169–75, 175–76. *See also* Someruelos, marqués de
hegemony in Atlantic: Franco-English competition for, 70; Junta de Sevilla and, 111, 295; overview of, 4; struggle for preservation of, 94–95. *See also* transatlantic trade system
Heras Soto, Sebastián de, 210, 435, 450, 525, 579, 596
Hermida, Benito, 398–99, 475, 477, 516
Hernández de Alba, Lorenzo, 261, 262, 332
Heros y Fernández de la Sierra, Juan Antonio de los, 392–93
Heros y Herrán, Juan Francisco Antonio de los, 392
Herrera, Felix, 99, 100
Herrera, Martín de, 499, 501
Herrera y Rivero, Vincente, 81
Herrera y Rojas, Eusebio Antonio de, 118–19, 123–24, 278
Herreros, Manuel García de, 392
Hidalgo, Miguel: Abad y Queipo and, 627, 645; background of, 658–59; beliefs about elites of, 656–57; as curate, 603, 641; as donor to Junta Central, 640; early attacks of, 654, 659; insurgency led by, 607, 663; justification of, 655; on merchants, 192
Hore, Vicente, 108
Hormazas, marqués de las (Garro y Arizcún): Albuerne and, 515, 516; arrest of, 525; *cortes* and, 545, 546; as finance minister, 459; González Carbajal and, 645–46; Iturrigaray and, 616; Lobo and, 511; opening of Havana port and, 495–96; *Orden* of 17 May and, 517, 519–20; provisioning of armed forces and, 434; Regencia and, 512–13; as regent, 475–76, 478; suspension of, 523
Huerta, Joaquin Antonio de la, 422
Hunter, John, 98, 99

Ibargoyen, José, 236
Ibar Navarro, Justo María, 86
ilustrados: after Bayonne, 68–69; alternate junta and, 85–86; Aranjuez and, 40; attitudes toward France and, 12–15; collaboration with Bonapartist regime by, 86–89; description of, 3; Godoy and, 8; Napoleon and, 22, 25; nationalism of, 43

indios: Abad y Queipo on, 628–29; in Bajío, 637–38; in Valladolid, 603, 606–7, 610
Infantado, duque del, 11, 62, 97
insurgency: in Andalusia, 105–12; in colonies, 663–64; in Consulado de Mexico, 576–80, 582; Hidalgo and, 607, 663; in Madrid, 100–101; plotting for, 654–58; in provinces, 89–90; in Venezuela, 529–30, 532–34, 539, 542–43. *See also* Dos de Mayo
investors: for government borrowing, 440–45, 596, 618–19; for Junta Central, 425–26
Iriarte, Bernardo de, 86, 314, 573
Iriarte, Pedro de, 499
Irigoyen, José Nicolás de, 565
Isasi, Francisco Escudero de, 481
Isla de León, 464, 518
Istúriz, Tomás de, 519
Iturbe e Iraeta, Gabriel: Consulado elections and, 141–42, 579; donation from, 596; on English naval power, 313; González Carbajal and, 218; as investor, 435; Iturrigaray coup and, 330, 342, 576; on Jabat, 262; money borrowed from, 159; *pasquines* and, 210; Posada and, 223; promotion for, 650; Regimiento urbano de Milicias and, 161
Iturrigaray y Aróstegui, José de: arrival in Spain of, 413, 416–17; background and networks of, 299–302; J. Beye de Cisneros and, 283, 307, 319–20, 335, 343; Borbón and, 279, 281; career of, 136–37, 296–97; colonial congress and, 218, 283–84, 285–86, 293, 329–30; commissioners and, 127–28, 263–65, 323–24; Consejo de Indias and, 147–48; Consulado de Mexico and, 144–47, 159–60, 161; Consulado de Veracruz and, 142, 184; Consulado elections and, 140–42, 143–45; control of news and, 205; *criollos* and, 136, 194–95, 203, 299, 307–8; delay of resignation of, 282–83, 326; exoneration of, 477; González Carbajal and, 217–18, 229–30, 339; grand design of, 311–17, 323, 325–26; imprisonment of, 417; Jabat and, 262; Jaúregui and, 126, 260; Jovellanos and, 566, 593, 598; Junta Central and, 416–17, 566; Junta de Sevilla and, 233–34, 252, 263–64, 268, 269–70, 277–78, 311; *juntas generales* and, 227, 228–34, 267, 270–72, 284–85; licenses to émigrés and, 179; Lizana and, 272, 333, 349, 576, 594; mass celebrating deportation of, 588; merchants and, 190, 193–94, 213; Michaus and, 330, 342; S. Mier and, 276, 281, 333–34; military-as-bureaucrat phenomenon and, 297–99; militia units and, 208–9; mining industry and, 302–6, 306–7, 310–11; Miranda and, 406–7; on mob action against Cevallos, 189; Morla and, 262, 263–64, 278, 280, 300; Obregón and, 204, 333, 345; *pasquines* and, 207, 210–11; plans for resignation of, 279–81, 286; policies of, 193–94; pressure for ouster of, 328–29; Primo Verdad and, 231, 282, 286; proposed oath to support, 225–26; Rayas and, 308, 310; reaction to rumors of coup against, 345–46; Regencia and, 477, 615–17; Riaño and, 252, 601; Roblejo and, 279, 281, 339, 347; Sagarzurieta and, 219–20, 279, 281, 339; smuggling and, 181–82, 194; Talamantes and, 237–39; F. Terán and, 317, 343, 575, 583; themes in letters of, 277–78; on Uzcola incident, 212–13; Veracruz and, 176–77, 180, 182–84. *See also* preemptive coup against Iturrigaray
Izquierdo, Eugenio, 12, 23–24, 31–32, 41–42, 49

Jabat y Aztal, Juan Gabriel: Aguirre and, 265, 335; career of, 126–27; on Consolidación receipts, 259–60; in Havana, 175–76; Iturrigaray and, 262; *juntas generales* and, 267–68; letters of, 278–79; life and career of, 261–63;

mercury and, 303; in Mexico City, 265–66; objectives and strategy of, 264–65; preemptive coup and, 331, 340, 343; return to Spain of, 411–12; selection of, 327–28, 406; smuggling and, 182; in Veracruz, 176, 256, 257, 263; Villaurrutia and, 292–93
Jácome, Adrián de, 124
Jala, conde de, 561, 564
Jalapa, 194, 313
Jaruco, condes de, 171
Jaúregui, Agustín de, 126, 300
Jaúregui, Francisco de, 97
Jaúregui, Pablo Martín de, 261
Jaúregui, Tomás de, 35, 97
Jaúregui y Arostal, Andrés de, 300–301
Jaúregui y Aróstegui, Manuel Francisco de: at Aranjuez, 35; career of, 126–27; in Havana, 175–76; Iturrigaray and, 126, 260, 347; Jones and, 422; life and career of, 260–61; mercury and, 303; in Mexico City, 265–66; objectives and strategy of, 264–65; selection of, 327; on Talamantes, 696n64; in Veracruz, 176, 256, 257, 263; Villaurrutia and, 292–93
Jaúregui y Mayora, Juan Tomás de, 300
Jenkinson, Charles, 535
Jenkinson, Robert, 531, 533, 534, 535–36
Jones, Felix, 421, 422, 423
Jovellanos, Gaspar de: career of, 378, 384–87, 387–88; Comisión Executiva and, 459; condesa de Montijo and, 34; *cortes* and, 544; on Dos de Mayo, 78; on English naval power, 313; Godoy and, 8, 434; as *ilustrado,* 40; Iturrigaray and, 566, 593, 598; Junta Central and, 400–401; Junta de Sevilla and, 404; liberalism of, 387; Posada and, 223; on progress of Anglo-Americans, 312; reexports and, 388–90; textile imports and, 390–91; writings of, 275
Juanmartiñena, Juan Martín de, 331–32, 341, 344, 525, 569, 650
Junot, 16, 17–18, 18–19, 28, 103, 366
Junta Central de España e Indias: Abad y Queipo on, 600, 644–45; Cadiz and, 418–20, 422–24, 485–86; colonial policy of, 373–74; colonial representation in, 472; commercial policy of, 492–94; Consejo de Castilla and, 371; conservative drift of, 496; Consulado de Cadiz and, 444–45; *cortes* and, 459–60, 543–44; criticism of, 600–601; Cuesta and, 383; decree of 22 January of, 413–18; election proclamation of, 595; escape plan of, 461; finance bureaucracy and, 433–34; financial situation of, 424–29, 449, 596, 618–19; formation and durability of, 400–402; fund-raising by, 434–35, 596, 629, 640; Garibay and, 592–93; Havana port and, 495–97; on Isla de León, 464–65; issues facing, 432–37; Iturrigaray and, 416–17, 566; Junta de Sevilla and, 368–70, 403–10; Junta de Valencia and, 363–64; liberalism and, 374–77; Lizana and, 595–96; manifestos of, 408–9, 460–61; news of, in colonies, 620–21; origins, experience, and views of men in, 378–79; overview of, 590; persecution of members of, 467, 484–86; personnel changes in, 459; Quintana and, 396; Regencia and, 465; *reglamento* of, 409; retreat of, 408, 427, 428, 454, 462–63; weakness of, 454–55
Junta de Beunos Aires, 540
Junta de Cadiz: Alburquerque and, 486–88; Caracas and, 542; *cortes* and, 547, 548; government fiscal operations and, 488–89; Junta Central and, 418–20, 422–24, 485–86; Junta de Sevilla and, 123; manifesto of 28 February, 479–81; official mail to colonies and, 615; *Orden* of 17 May and, 521–25; Regencia and, 483–84, 486; trade modification and, 518
Junta de Caracas, 532, 539, 542
Junta de Castilla y León, 382
Junta de Galicia, 125–26

Junta de Gobierno (Junta Suprema de Gobierno): alternate insurgent, 87–89; composition of, 227; Fernando and, 56; Murat and, 79, 90–93; Napoleon and, 76; plan for alternative, 84–86
Junta de Oviedo, 270, 273, 276
Junta de Sevilla (Junta Suprema de Sevilla): Águilar and, 166; colonial design of, 368–74; commissioners of, 126–28, 260–66; Consulado de Cadiz and, 113–14, 443–44; Consulado de Veracruz and, 185–86; *cortes* and, 455–56; delegation sent to England by, 124–26; denunciation of Junta de Gobierno by, 227; factions in and critics of, 112–13; financial situation of, 123–24, 258; Flórez Estrada on, 275; genesis of, 257–58; Havana recognition of, 175; Iturrigaray and, 233–34, 252, 263–64, 268, 269–70, 277–78, 311; Junta Central and, 368–70, 403–10; Junta de Cadiz and, 123; Miranda and, 110; organization of, 110–11; plan for colonies and, 111–12; recognition for, 257, 264, 266, 267–68, 269–71, 311, 361, 574; Saavedra and, 108–9; secret instructions of, 369–70, 403–4, 405–6, 410; Solano assassination and, 114; support for, 95, 258–59, 272–73; Tap and, 108; trade system and, 258–59, 370. *See also* Jabat y Aztal, Juan Gabriel; Jaúregui y Aróstegui, Manuel Francisco de
Junta de Valencia, 362–64, 456, 457–58
Junta General de Agricultores, 501–3
Junta General del Principado at Oviedo, 90, 125–26

Kelly, 532

Labarrieta, Antonio, 610, 641
Laforest, comte de, 71, 87–88, 92
Landeta, Manuel de, 337
Lardizábal, Joaquin, 472, 473, 474
Lardizábal, José María, 472, 473, 474
Lardizábal, Manuel de: alternate junta and, 84–85; Consejo de Indias and, 473; Consejo Reunido and, 508, 616; election of, 474, 595; family and career of, 470–72, 486
Lardizábal, Miguel de: Calomarde and, 546; *cortes* and, 548; *criollos,* Mazo, and, 647; election to Junta Central, 474–75, 595; family and career of, 470–73; merchants and, 334; as regent, 468–69, 486, 507
Lardizábal, Rafael de, 334, 473, 474, 616
Lardizábal y Arza, Domingo Ignacio de, 473–74
Lardizábal y Arza, Francisco José, 474
Lardizábal y Arza, José Antonio, 474
Lardizábal y Arza, Juan Antonio, 472, 474
Lardizábal y Elorza, Francisco Ignacio, 470, 473
Lardizábal y Elorza, Juan Antonio, 470
Lardizábal y Elorza, Martín, 470
Lardizábal y Olloqui, José María de, 474
Larragoiti, José Nicolás, 564
Lasqueti, Antonio, 499
lawyers, as politicized, 564, 641
Layard, 532, 534, 535
Layseca, Francisco, 170
Lejarza, Juan José Martínez de, 607, 609, 610
León y Pizarro, 108
LeRoy, 97, 103, 105, 115–16, 123
Leyes de Indias, 283
liberalism: Asturian model of, 273–76; of Calvo de Rozas, 391, 458–59; *cortes* and, 551; emergence of, 399; in England, 541; of Jovellanos, 384, 385, 387; Junta Central and, 374–77; of Luyando, 625; of Quintana, 397–98; in Spain, 541; as tempered by colonial issues, 433
liberals, definition of, 85
licencias: of Madrid, 180; in New Spain, 133; rumors about, 186; Veracruz and, 177
Linares, Benito de la Mata, 97
Liniers, Santiago, 72, 398

Liverpool Letter, 535–36, 542
Lizana y Beaumont, Francisco Javier: Abad y Queipo and, 611–12; Aguirre and, 597–98; Audiencia and, 586; Consulado elections and, 584–85; *criollos* and, 557–58; Iturrigaray and, 272, 333, 349, 576, 594; *juntas generales* and, 276, 285, 286; performance of, 589, 598–99, 601, 624; plea for moderation by, 612–13; replacement of, 613; Valladolid conspiracy and, 608, 611–12; as viceroy, 584, 593–96; Villaurrutia and, 288, 289
Lizárraga, Pedro Martínez de, 565
Lizarza, 337. *See also* Beye de Cisneros, José Ignacio
Lláin, José, 343, 345
Lloredo, Manuel, 611
Lobo, Juan Bautista, 170, 181, 189, 685n85
Lobo y Campos, Miguel, 426, 436, 444, 476, 511
Lobo y Campos, Rafael, 125
López Cancelada, Juan: Aguirre and, 215, 558; J. Beye de Cisneros and, 319–20; on Castillejos, 563; on economy of New Spain, 527; editing of news by, 208; Iturrigaray coup and, 344, 352–53; Junta de Cadiz and, 522; Lizana and, 597; manipulation of public opinion by, 209; *proclama* and, 351; provocation by, 574; on Uzcola incident, 212; Valencia proclamation and, 197; Villaurrutia compared to, 289; on Yermo, 334. See also *Gazeta de México*
López Mendez, Luis, 539
Lorenzana (archbishop), 288
Lozano, Luis, 564, 565
Luyando, José de, 478, 481–82, 617–18, 622–26
Luyando, Manuel, 240, 253

"machetes" conspiracy in Mexico City, 198–202
Madrid: Dos de Mayo in, 76–79; Fernando return to, 49, 61; French control over, 23–24, 89, 365; French reoccupation of, 435; insurgency in, 100–101; isolation of, 72; liberation of, 364–68
Mahon, duque de, 26
Malaspina, Alexandro, 109, 186, 382
Mallol, Manuel, 564
Maniau, Francisco, 305
María (daughter of Charles IV), 38, 65
María Luisa (queen), 24, 31, 53, 55, 65
Marquina, 181, 201–2, 220
Martínez Barenque, José, 304, 337, 341, 342, 345, 575
Martínez Gil, Pedro, 337
Martínez Marina, Francisco, 400
Maruri, José María, 345
Maturana, Vicente María, 107
Mayorga, Martín de, 215, 503
Mazo, Ramón Gutiérrez de, 543, 647
Meléndez Valdés, 8, 368, 395
Méndez Prieto, Antonio, 282, 286–87
Mendieta, 147, 583
Mendiola, 192
Mendívil, Andrés de, 561
Meoqui, Juan Fernando de, 141–42, 305
merchants: Abad y Quiepo on, 596–97; arrogance of, 587–88; Audiencia and, 220; in Bajío, 638–40; Berazaluze and, 599; of Cadiz, 95; Fernando and, 203–4; impact of abdications on, 204–11; insecurity of, 197–98, 202–3, 210–13; Iturrigaray and, 190, 193–94, 213; of Mexico City, 191–98; of New Spain, 133–36; as privileged group, 661–62; resentment of, 630; small-scale, license fees on, 629; support for status quo by, 192–93; of Veracruz, 178–86, 189–90; wealth and influence of, 191–92. *See also* Consulado de Cadiz; Consulado de Mexico; Voluntarios
mercury, 243, 302–6, 322
Mesía, 343
Mexico City: attack on Uzcola residence in, 211–13; attempt to form autonomous junta in, 602; *ayuntamiento* of, 214, 225–30, 647; clerical

Mexico City (*cont.*)
establishment of, 333–34; *juntas generales* in, 266–73, 284–87; "machetes" conspiracy in, 198–202; merchants of, 191–98; native troops in, 575; political climate of, 567; regents' view of, 653–54. *See also* Consulado de Mexico
Michaus, Martín Ángel: Colla and, 575; denunciation of, 591; Iturrigaray and, 330, 342; mercury and, 305; mine operations and, 573; Rayas and, 309
Michaus, Miguel Martín de, 576
Michelena, Alférez Mariano, 605, 608, 610, 612
Michelena, José Nicolás de, 604, 605, 609, 612
Michelena, Juan José de, 608
Michel y Laredo, 566
Michoacan, 602. *See also* Valladolid
Mier, Manuel de, 405
Mier, Servando de: on Cantabrians, 134; Iturrigaray and, 276, 281, 333–34; on R. Lardizábal, 474; on mob action against Cevallos, 188–89; on *oidores,* 315; Regencia and, 616; sermon of, 334
military: anticolonial movement and, 656, 657; crisis of legitimacy and, 119–23; native troops in Mexico City, 575; provisioning of, 434. *See also* Voluntarios
military-as-bureaucrats phenomenon, 294–95, 297–99
mine owners, 195, 231, 303–5, 310–11, 573–74, 634. *See also* Obregón, Ignacio; Rayas, marqués de; *specific owners*
mini-*golpe,* 132
mining guild and González Carbajal, 217
mining industry, 573, 633
Miranda, Fabián de (conde de Tilly): accusations made by, 685n90; Gil and, 109–10; imprisonment of, 476, 484; Junta de Sevilla and, 279, 406–7; murder of Águila and, 113; rumored negotiations of, 461; Tap and, 107
Molina y Soriano, José Blas, 77
Monaster y Roxas, Andrés de, 179
montañeses: Bustamante on, 196; Consulado de Mexico and, 134, 574, 577–79; titles of nobility for, 525; traits of, 642; in Valladolid, 748n87. *See also* Basoco, Antonio
Monteagudo, Andrés, 334
Monteagudo, Antonio, 334
Monteagudo, Matías: Audiencia and, 267; honors for, 650; Iturrigaray and, 270, 334; *juntas generales* and, 284; Martínez Barenque and, 341; social network of, 616
Monteleón, duque de, 77
Montijo, conde de: coup at Aranjuez and, 33–34; *fernandista* government and, 106; Godoy and, 97; Junta de Sevilla and, 119; liberation of, 464; mob action and, 120; Regencia and, 461; Solano and, 118
Montijo, condesa de, 34–35
Moral y Sarabia, José Joaquin, 223
Morelos, 216–17, 603, 640, 641, 663, 742n29
Moreno, Juan Joaquin de, 405
Moreno, Mariano, 173
Morla, Tomás de: Consulado de Cadiz and, 419; as *gobernador* of Cadiz, 122–23; Iturrigaray and, 262, 263–64, 278, 280, 300
Mosquera y Figueroa, Joaquín, 199, 200, 498–99
Móstoles, Bando de los alcaldes de, 89–90
Mouton, 26, 27
Movellán, Diego, 305
Muñóz, Juan Manuel, 447
Murat, Joaquin: appointment of, 23; Cadiz and, 366; Castaños and, 103–4; Charles IV and, 85; colonial question and, 71–72; coups at Aranjuez and, 37–39; Dos de Mayo and, 78–79; Fernando and, 49–50; Junta de Gobierno and, 90–93; in Madrid, 365; marriage proposal and, 15; move toward Madrid, 76; Napo-

leon instructions to, 30–31; nervous breakdown of, 72, 92; provisioning of military by, 26, 28; Regencia and, 101; Solano and, 116–17
Murfi brothers, 262. *See also* Murphy, Juan; Murphy, Mateo Lorenzo; Murphy, Tomás
Murphy, Juan, 177, 427, 436, 452
Murphy, Mateo Lorenzo: accusations against, 685n85; Iturrigaray and, 180; as local agent, 450, 452; neutral shipping and, 177; as *regidore,* 181, 189; Talamantes and, 237
Murphy, Tomás: assault on, 188–89; Azanza and, 177; coup and, 330; as international merchant banker, 450–52; Iturrigaray and, 576; neutral shipping and, 177; Talamantes and, 237

Navarro, Joaquín, 102
Navarro Falcón, José de, 79, 82
Navarro Sangrán, José, 82
Negrete y de la Torre, Manuel de, 392
New Orleans, direct trade with, 178–79
New Spain: Abad y Queipo on status of, 626–30; anti-European feeling in, 641–47; coups in, 131; decapitalization of, 242, 640; ethnic hierarchy in, 195–97; financial salience of, 447–50; freedom of discussion in, 251–52; *junta general* in, 230–34; merchants of, 133–36; regionalism in, 293–94; security apparatus in, 558–60, 592, 595, 602; support for Junta Central from, 596, 629; trade and capital flows from, 452–53; viceroy role in, 220–21. *See also specific cities and provinces*
Nocedal, Francisco de, 484–85
Nolte, Vincent, 179
Noriega, Francisco, 575–76
Noriega, Lorenzo de, 125, 304, 343, 575
Novella y Azbal, Francisco, 81, 82, 83

Obregón, Ignacio: Capetillo and, 292; Elhuyar and, 216; Falces on, 567; *gratificaciónes* and, 304; Iturrigaray and, 204, 333, 345; *juntas generales* and, 231, 286; mercury and, 305; Rayas and, 309; Talamantes and, 237
Obregón, Joaquin, 231
Observaciones (Cevallos), 57–60
Ocaña, military defeat at, 461
O'Farrill, Gonzalo: alternate junta and, 85–86; on defeat at Bailén, 368; in exile, 87; as *ilustrado,* 40, 76; as minister of war, 116, 117; Morla and, 123; proposal of, 92; Vandeuil on, 72; Velarde and, 84
oidores, 221–22, 591. *See also* Audiencia de Mexico
Olavide, Pable de, 109, 384–85
Oliver, Robert, 179, 180
Olloqui y Riostrada, Lope de, 108, 579
Ondraeta, 342
Onís, Luís de, 57, 491, 511
Orden of 17 May: Albuerne and, 517–18; drafting of, 513–15; Hormazas and, 517; Junta de Cadiz and, 521–25; overview of, 491–92; printing of, 519; questions about, 519–20; regents and, 520–22
O'Reilly, Alexandro, 109
Orense, 468, 521
O'Reylly, conde de, 167, 168
Oviedo, Junta de, 270, 273, 276

"Paiserón," 560–68
Palacios, Francisco, 605
Palacios, Mateo, 304
Palafox, Francisco de, 391, 457, 461, 464
Palafox y Melci, Juan Rebolledo de, 391, 393
Palyart, Ignacio, 450, 451
Pardo de Figueroa, Benito, 47
Parish, David, 179, 180
parish priests, 640–41
Parque de Monteleón, 77, 83
Partearroyo, José Gil de, 144, 146
Pasquel, Francisco Tomás, 166
pasquines. See handbills
Pemartín, 573
Peña, Manuel de la, 99, 102, 105, 118

peninsulares/europeos: Abad y Queipo on, 630; arrogance of, 587–88; attacks on, 663; in Bajío, 633–34; criollized, 572–73, 641–42; divisions between *criollos* and, 558, 588–90, 605, 615; ethnic hierarchy and, 195–97; factions among, 135–36, 205–7, 573–76; fear and alienation of, 589; as immigrants, 133–34; investment strategies of New Spain and, 452–53; Iturrigaray coup and, 556; merchants as, 191–92; in New Spain, 1–2; racial superiority of, 134; resentment of, 655
"people" and *golpes,* 132
Pérez, Benito, 205
Pérez Calderón, José María, 565
Pérez de Arce, Joaquín, 185, 206, 245, 313, 316
Pérez de Castro, Evaristo, 57
Pérez de Guzmán, Juan, 78, 79, 82
Pérez Gallardo, Ignacio, 564
Pérez Galvez, 269, 272–73
Pérez Gómez, Roque, 343, 575
Pérez Quijano, Agustín, 153
Pérez Villamil, Juan, 84–85, 89–90, 372–73, 397, 400, 504
Pezuela, Ignacio, 97
Pinillos, Bernabé Martínez de, 166, 171, 495–96, 497
Pinillos, Claudio Martínez de, 173–74
Pitt, William, 313
Polo y Alcocer, Pedro, 545, 546
Porlier, Antonio, 385
Porro y Murphy, 170
Portilla, Pedro de la, 198–99
Portocarrero, Cristóbal Gregorio de, 34
ports: of Cadiz, 94–95, 365–66, 410–11; of Havana, 228, 494–98; of Venezuela, 542–43; vulnerability of, 182–83
Portugal: invasion of, 15–18; occupation of, 9, 20; tripartite division of, 18–19. *See also* Braganza dynasty
Posada y Soto, Ramón de, 147, 222, 223
postal employees, as informants, 257, 559, 592, 688n46
Prado y Ovejero, 238, 272, 276–77, 285–86, 348
preemptive coup against Iturrigaray: Abad y Queipo on, 628; arrogance after, 587–88; assault, 346–47; associates included in, 343; Audiencia and, 331–35; conspirators in, 339–40, 341–42, 650; Consulado elections and, 581–83; culmination of, 347–49; disapproval of, 330; Junta de Sevilla and, 407–8; López Cancelada and, 352–53; merchants and, 213; outcomes of, 356–57; planners of, 342–44; *pliego* and, 351, 353–54, 355; *proclama* and, 351–52; reaction to, 355–56, 556–57; Regencia agents and, 624; status quo and, 327; support for, 575. *See also* Yermo y Bárcena, Gabriel Joaquín de
preemptive coups: in Mexico City, 326; overview of, 132
press gangs, 634
Primo Verdad y Ramos, Francisco: *acta* and, 232; arrest of, 348; Ayuntamiento and, 205, 206–7, 225; as *criollo,* 195; death of, 591; Iturrigaray and, 231, 282, 286; *junta de gobierno* and, 226–27; Junta de Sevilla and, 269, 271; *juntas generales* and, 276; on sovereignty, 330; story about jailing of, 575; Talamantes and, 237
provinces: insurgency in, 89–90; press for economic policy changes in, 95. *See also specific provinces*
Puyade, Ángel, 330, 342, 576

Queipo de Llano, José María. *See* Toreno, conde de
Queraltó, Raymundo José de, 170
Querétaro: census data for, 639; criminality in, 634; description of, 632, 633; leadership from, 557; tax collection in, 635
Quevedo, Mariano, 605
Quintana, Manuel José de: activism of, 399, 400, 401–2; career and poetry of, 395–96; on Consolidación program, 435; decrees and, 414–16; Garay and, 380; Junta Central and, 408–9; on Junta de Valencia, 457–58;

manifestos of, 460–61, 477, 617, 644; *Semanario Patriótico,* 376, 397–98; vision of, 396–97
Quintanilla, conde de, 383
Quito, uprising in, 644

racial superiority, presumed, of Cantabrians, 134
Rada, Juan Marcos de, 575, 580
rancheros-labradores in Bajío, 636–38
Ranz Romanillos, Antonio, 459
Rayas, marqués de (Sardaneta y Legazpi): Audiencia and, 566–67, 570; Castillejos and, 564; *congreso* and, 284; Elhuyar and, 216; González y Montoya and, 236; investigation of, 591; Iturrigaray and, 308, 310; on Iturrigaray coup, 356; Junta de Sevilla and, 574; *juntas generales* and, 268, 308; letter of, 558–59; mercury and, 304–5; "Paiserón" and, 561; positions and actions of, 308–10; on Yermo's clientele, 344
Rayón, Ignacio, 414
Raz y Raz Guzmán, Juan, 356, 564
Real Tesoro, marqués de, 416, 417
reexports, 164–65, 176, 194, 337, 388–90, 495
Regencia: agents of, 622–26; attempts at restoration of harmony by, 650–52; authority and power of, 483–88; Ayuntamiento of Mexico City and, 647; Blanco White on, 614–15; Caracas and, 541–43; Caribbean and, 508–12; P. Cevallos and, 86; civil honors from, 650, 653–54; *comisario regio* of, 482–83; composition of, 468–69; Consejo de Castilla and, 373, 550; Consejo de Indias and, 550; Consejo Reunido and, 478–79; conservatives and, 460–61; *cortes* and, 545–46, 547–48; financial situation of, 488–89, 649–50; government finance and, 445–48; Hormazas and, 512–13; initial concerns of, 476–77; Iturrigaray and, 477, 615–17; Junta Central and, 465; Junta de Cadiz and, 479–81, 488–89, 522, 524; manifestos of, 477–79, 617–18; Murphys and, 450–52; news of in colonies, 620–22; *Orden* of 17 May and, 518, 519, 520–22; Pérez Villamil on, 372–73; recognition for, 466–67; rightward shift of, 612–13, 644; tactics of delay and, 615; trade issues and, 527–28; traditionalism and, 508
regionalism, 293–94
Regla, conde de, 289
Reglamento del Comercio Libre, 322, 507
Reparaz, conde de, 499
"Representación Nacional de las Colonias" (Talamantes), 240, 241, 244, 248–49, 250, 254–55
Revillagigedo, conde de, 144, 215, 223, 298, 382, 639
Riaño, Juan Antonio: *acta* and, 231–32; Hidalgo and, 656; Iturrigaray and, 252, 601; as *montañes,* 748n87; on *pueblos de indios,* 638; on tribute payments, 635; Valdés and, 298
Rigal, François, 106
Riofrio, Francisco, 153
Rios, Joaquín Gutiérrez de los, 286, 348
Riquelme, Rodrigo, 461, 545
Rivero, Agustín, 286
Rivero, Pedro de, 286, 413, 459, 469, 545
Robaud, Rafael Gómez, 169
Roblejo y Lozano, Ramón: in Cadiz, 411, 412–13; Castillejos and, 565–66; *congreso* and, 283–84; Iturrigaray and, 279, 281, 339, 347; junta and, 267; *junta general* and, 278
Rojas y Contreras, José de, 470
Rojas y Pizarro, Francisco de, 80–81
Rojas y Rocha, Francisco de, 80
Romana, marqués de la, 460, 461, 464, 496, 600–601
Romero de Terreros, Pedro, 81, 231, 543
Romero Martínez, Fernando, 639, 649, 755n104
Roque Abarca, 253, 351, 352, 588, 601

Rosales, Pedro, 607, 608–9
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *Social Contract,* 251
Ruíz Palermo, José Hermenegildo, 564

Saavedra, Juan Árias de, 384
Saavedra y Sangronís, Francisco de: Albuerne and, 516; Bailén and, 365; Cadiz and, 466; colonial trade and, 96; *comercio neutro* and, 301, 386, 424, 498; conflicting roles of, 416; Consulado elections and, 583–84; Fernández de León and, 498, 504; on *fernandista* government, 428; Garibay and, 593; González Carbajal and, 217, 229; as Hacienda Minister, 436; as *ilustrado,* 40; Jabat and, 411; Junta Central and, 399, 429, 433, 435, 464; Junta de Sevilla and, 108–9, 278, 404; as regent, 468
Sagarzurieta y García, Ambrosio: Aguirre and, 215; Audiencia and, 622; Castillejos and, 565–66; *congreso* and, 283–84; Consulado elections and, 143, 583; critique of Consulado collection procedures by, 160–61; as *fiscal de Real Hacienda,* 646; Iturrigaray and, 219–20, 279, 281, 339; *juntas generales* and, 267, 278; life and career of, 218–19; "machetes" conspiracy and, 200; Talamantes and, 237, 253, 254; Villaurrutia and, 288
Sagastizábal, Andrés López de, 486
Saint, Juan, 237, 255
Sainz de Alfaro y Beaumont, 238
Salaberría, José María, 207, 331
Salaberría, Juan Manuel de, 341; Aguirre and, 340; Iturrigaray coup and, 332–33, 342, 345, 346, 347; on military sanction, 354
Sandoval, Felix, 285
San José Muro, 181, 183, 202, 316
San Martín, José de, 120, 121
San Miguel de Aguayo, marqués de, 219
Santa Clara, conde de, 173
Santa María, Vicente, 600–601, 603–5, 607, 608, 612, 645
Santiago, conde de, 561, 564
Santo Domingo, 167, 174, 512
Sarachaga, Isidoro, 356
Sardaneta, José Mariano de. *See* Rayas, marqués de
Sástago, conde de, 391, 394
Savary, 50, 51, 58–59, 92
security and surveillance in New Spain, 257, 558–60, 592, 595, 602, 688n46
Septién, José de, 305
Sevilla: *ayuntamiento* of, 96, 107–8; Consulado de, 148–49; French troops in, 466; insurrections in, 106–12; overview of, 95–96. *See also* Junta de Sevilla
Sevilla, Mariano de, 421–22, 423
Sierra, Nicolás María, 523, 547, 594, 616
Sierra, Pablo, 170
silver, 178, 303, 306, 436–37, 442. *See also* mercury; mine owners
silver mining industry, 573, 633
Sixto Espinoso, 120, 179, 259
Smith, Adam, 242, 322, 387, 527
smuggling: along Carribean coast, 133; in Cadiz, 421; in Cuba, 172; Fernández de León and, 513; in Gibraltar, 98; Iturrigaray and, 181–82, 194; Jabat and, 262; Jovellanos and, 390; neutral ships and, 186; in Veracruz, 180–83; *vizcaínos* and, 573; G. Yermo and, 337
Solano, Francisco Xavier, 112
Solano Ortiz de Rozas, Francisco María: arrival of in Cadiz, 105; assassination of, 120–21, 326; Bourbon withdrawal and, 32; career and role of, 28–29, 114–18, 119–20; Morla and, 122
Solano y Bote, José de, 115
Soler: Consolidación receipts and, 259; Consulado de Mexico City and, 153–54, 155, 156–57, 158–59; Iturrigaray and, 144; mercury and, 306; Veracruz and, 178
Sollano, José Saturnino Diez de, 345

Someruelos, marqués de: as captain general, 163; commercial policy of, 176; Godoy and, 167–68; interests of, 174–75; plan to form junta and, 166, 167–68; reexports and, 337; as successor to Iturrigaray, 175; trade policy of, 322–23
Soret, Victor, 443–44
Soto Saldaña, José Antonio, 605
Soto y Carrillo, Francisco Ignacio de, 153
Spain: cleavages in governing elite of, 3; consequences of double coup in, 40–42; decolonization of, 664; destabilizing factors for, 430–31; empire of in America, 1–2; invasion of by France, 19; military administration of, 28; power vacuum in, 88–89; public opinion of France in, 25–28, 29; regionalism in, 293–94; resistance of French soldiers in, 76–77. *See also* colonial system; colonies; Franco-Spanish alliance; New Spain; transatlantic trade system; *specific cities*
Stuart, Charles, 47
sugar from Cuba, 164, 169, 173, 174, 178, 497

Taboada, Felipe Gil de, 84–85
Talamantes y Baeza, Melchor: acquaintances of, 236–37; arrest of, 348; Bataller and, 216; career of, 234–36; case for colonial autonomy of, 249–55; death of, 568, 591; distribution of works of, 252–55; "Ideas del Congreso Nacional de Nueva España," 206; on *junta general,* 230; manuscripts of, 240–41, 251, 252; on mob action against Cevallos, 189; official assignments of, 237–39; "Plan de la Obra Proyectada," 241, 244–45; position papers of, 239; "Representación Nacional de las Colonias," 240, 241, 244, 248–49, 250, 254–55; research of, 217; Sagarzurieta and, 220; sources for and contacts of, 241–42; Villaurrutia and, 290. *See also* "Congreso Nacional del Reyno de Nueva España"
Talleyrand, 10, 11, 14, 23, 67, 78
Tamayo, Fernando, 565
Tap y Núñez, Nicolas, 106–7, 108
tax collectors, 635, 641
Telmo Landero, Pedro, 181, 685n85
Terán, Alonso, 161
Terán, Antonio Alonso, 580
Terán, Francisco Alonso: Consulado and, 579, 580–81, 584–85; as *fiadore,* 574; honors for, 650; as investor, 435; Iturrigaray and, 317, 343, 575, 583
Terán, José Alonso, 580, 607, 608, 609, 610–12
Terán, Juan Antonio Gutiérrez de, 140, 310
Terán, Pedro Alonso de, 181, 183, 685n94, 685–86n95, 686n96
textile imports, 390–91, 419
Tilly, conde de. *See* Miranda, Fabián de
tobacco, 96, 126, 149, 168, 500
Toreno, conde de (Queipo de Llano): on Calvo, 394; on casualties from riots, 78; on Garay, 379; on Junta Central, 445; liberalism of, 273–74, 697n49; optimism of, 550; on overseas possessions, 414; on Quintana, 395; on *Regencia,* 446; on Saavedra, 468; on Valdés, 383
Torre, Francisco Antonio de la, 580
Torre, José García de la, 461
Torre, José Ignacio de la, 177, 181, 580
Torre, Manuel Gil de la, 190
Torre del Fresno, conde de la, 116, 121
Torre Hermanos, 219, 261
Torrejón, Andrés, 504
Torres, José de, 98–99
Toscano, Sebastián, 461
Tournon, Claude Phélipe de, 14, 24, 29–30, 31
traditionalista, definition of, 85
transatlantic trade system: Abad y Queipo on, 629–30; J. Beye de Cisneros on, 320–23; Cadiz and, 443; *comisionados* on, 626; competition for control of, 70; Consulado

transatlantic trade system (*cont.*)
de Mexico and, 162; England and, 531–34; export interests and, 490–91; Fernández de León and, 504–7, 511–12; Havana and, 169–75, 175–76; Hormazas and, 512–13; Iturrigaray and, 311–17; Junta de Sevilla and, 258–59, 370; politics of, 433; port monopoly of Cadiz and, 94–95, 410–11; preservation of, 428; Sevilla-Cadiz axis and, 410; Talamantes on, 242, 243–44, 245–46; viceroys and, 228–29; during wars at sea, 431. See also *Orden* of 17 May
Tribunal de Minería, 306–7, 308, 309–10
tributo personal, 318, 603, 629, 634–35, 655

Uluapa, marqués de (Acevedo y Cosío): Ayuntamiento and, 225; Iturrigaray and, 286; Talamantes and, 236, 237, 253; Velázquez and, 282; Villaurrutia and, 268, 289, 292
United States: direct trade with, 180; Embargo Act of 1807, 164, 170, 242; Non-Intercourse Act, 493, 494; trade with Havana, 164–65; trade with New Spain, 312
Uriarte, Joaquín de, 113
Uribe y Castejón, José Joaquín de, 470
Uriortua, Francisco Xavier de, 112
Uriortua, Juan Manuel, 112
Urquiaga, Manuel, 304
Uzcola (merchant), 212
Uzcola, Antonio, 305, 329, 342, 343, 573

Valdés y Fernández Bazán, Antonio, 298, 378, 381–84
Valencia, Junta de, 362–64, 456, 457–58
Valenciana, conde de la, 305
Valiente, José Pablo de, 173
Valiente, Pablo de, 548, 549
Valladolid: description of, 603, 633; leadership from, 557; plans for coup in, 605–12; radicalization in, 602–3; unrest in, 599–602
Vandeuil, Penchon de, 27, 72
Vasco y Pascual, José Rafael de, 362
Vaughan, Charles, 99
Vea Murguía y Lizaur, Juan Francisco, 302, 518–19
Vega, Andrés Ángel de la, 273, 274
Velarde y Cienfuegos, Juan Antonio de, 80
Velarde y Cienfuegos, Romualdo, 384
Velarde y Herrera, Julian de, 81
Velarde y Santillán, Pedro, 77, 79–81, 82–83, 84
Velázquez de León, Joaquín, 281–82, 345
Velázquez de León, Manuel, 281, 282, 293
Venegas y Saavedra, Francisco Xavier, 465, 480, 525, 543, 548, 647–50
Venezuela: Basque group in, 499–501; England and, 532; insurgency in, 529–30, 532–34, 539, 542–43; Junta General de Agricultores in, 501–3; Liverpool Letter and, 535–36; repudiation of Regencia in, 529–30
Ventura Beleña, Eusebio, 140
Veracruz: Ayuntamiento at, 176–77, 188, 189–90; exports from Cadiz and, 448; Iturrigaray and, 176–77, 180, 182–84; merchants of, 178–86, 194; physical condition of, 149, 156, 176; San Juan de Ulúa cell block in, 567–68, 570; silver-purchasing agents from London in, 436–37; smuggling in, 180–83. *See also* Consulado de Veracruz
Viale, Emanuel, 99, 100, 101–2, 123
Viana, Francisco Leandro de (conde de Tepa), 35, 96, 217, 218, 219
viceroy: *audiencia* and, 291; *oidores* and, 221–22; role of, 220–21. *See also* Iturrigaray y Aróstegui, José de; *specific viceroys*
Viegas, Simón, 22
Villagrán, Felix, 237
Villanueva, Augustín de, 268
Villanueva, José Gabriel, 177, 186–87
Villaseñor y Cervantes, Juan Ignacio, 236, 253

Villaurrutia y López Osorio, Jacobo de: Aguirre and, 215; Bataller and, 216; Berazaluze and, 599; Castillejos and, 564; as *criollo,* 195; *Diario de México* and, 288–89, 561; family of, 287–88; Iturrigaray coup and, 343, 348; *juntas generales* and, 287; life and career of, 288–89; Lizana and, 288, 289; open debate and, 207; opposition by, 692n50; retirement of, 650; statement of position by, 267, 268–69; Talamantes and, 236, 237–38, 253, 254; views of, 289–92
Villaurrutia y Ortiz de la Torre, Antonio Bernardino de, 287–88
Villavicencio, Juan de, 166–67, 263
Villavicencio, Rafael de, 262–63
Villel, marqués de, 416, 417, 418, 420–24, 461
Vivanco, marqués de, 305
vizcaínos, 133, 134, 472, 573, 574, 577
Voluntarios: in Cadiz, 421–22, 423; Iturrigaray coup and, 342; in New Spain, 197, 212; tactics of, 559
von Humboldt, Alexander, 238, 306

Wellesley, Arthur, 531, 540
Wellesley, Henry: on colonies, 414; on *Orden* of 17 May, 519; on Spanish situation, 530–31; trade issues and, 446, 524, 536–38, 541
Wellesley, Richard, 531, 532–34, 539–40
Wellington, 530

Yandiola y Garay, Juan Antonio de, 482–83, 622–26
Yandiola y Garay, Manuel Ramón de, 483
Ybar Navarro, Justo María, 523, 525
Yermo, Gabriel Patricio de, 332
Yermo y Bárcena, Gabriel Joaquín de: background of, 336; clerical establishment and, 334; Consulado and, 495, 579, 581–83, 584, 585; donation from, 596; enterprises of, 336–37; on handbills, 560; honors for, 650; as investor, 435; Iturrigaray coup and, 331, 338–43, 344–45, 346–47, 582–83; oral presentation by, 349–51; Salaberría and, 207; smuggling and, 182; social and business network of, 337–38; supporters of, 575; title for, 646; Villaurrutia family and, 287
Yermo y Larrazábal, Juan Antonio, 161, 336, 337, 341
Ylincheta, 167, 168

Zavala, Lorenzo de, 651–52
Zavala y Zengotieta, Pedro Antonio de, 152
Zugástegui, Miguel, 563, 566, 567–68